PA Collapse and its Effect on Education

Dr. Naim Abo Hommos

Commentary**: Dr. Ali Jarbawi & Dr. Marwan Awartani**

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Dr. Abo Hommos served as the Palestinian Cabinet Secretary from 2009 to 2012, and was the Minister of Education & Higher Education from 2002 to 2006. He started his career path as the Instructor & Chairman of the Education & Psychology Department at Al-Najah University, Palestine, from 1982 to 1988. Dr. Abo Hommos has participated in dozens of conferences, workshops and studies locally & internationally in the field of Education, and has published many books and research papers in the same field. He is a member of many committees & councils on Education.

Dr. Abo Hommos holds an Ed. D. in Curriculum and Instruction from the University of San Francisco, 1985. And an MA in Special Education from the University of San Francisco, 1980, and a B.A. in Education from the University of Jordan, 1976. Dr. Naim was awarded the Academic Palm (Palmes Academiques) from the French Government in 1994.

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P. O. Box 76, Ramallah, Palestine
Tel: +970-2-2964933
Fax: +970-2-2964934
pcpsr@pcpsr.org
www.pcpsr.org

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This paper is one amongst ten such papers prepared within the Palestinian center for policy and survey research's initiative titled, "The day after". The initiative aims to study the circumstances that would face Palestinian politics and society in a situation in which the PA becomes unable to carry out its role. These papers examine the consequences of the dissolution or collapse of the PA on a number of central issues that concern the Palestinians, which include: security, economy, education, health, judiciary, telecommunications, basic services such as water and power, local government, political and civil conditions, as well as the future of the two-state solution.

These papers examine the significance and implications of PA's absence as well as possible options that could be adopted to mitigate the negative effects of such an absence and develop specific recommendations for the sector in question. Two experts have commented on each of these prepared papers. Each paper was presented and discussed in a workshop attended by policy makers, parliamentarians, experts, and academics.

This initiative has been organized in cooperation with the U.S./Middle East Project and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.

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Summary:

This study explores the effects and reactions of the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority in the West bank and Gaza especially in the area of education, whether it is an Israeli imposed or a Palestinian self taken decision. The paper accounts for the expected scenarios resulting from such a decision.

Regardless of the motives and reasons that lead the Palestinian authority to take such a decision whether a PLO based or imposed by different circumstances, it will lead to realities which will reflect gravely on the educational process.

The expected Israeli intervention as a consequence of the political vacuum will lead its military forces to takeover in different forms similar to what happened in 1967, the first and second intifadas in 1987 and 2000 which will eventually cause turbulences in all ways of the Palestinian people's walks of life.

Almost one third of the Palestinian people are school students reaching up to 1,145,000 and 62,000 teachers working in 2751 schools. At the universities and colleges, there are 214,000 students enrolled in 49 colleges and universities.

For these institutions to be subjected to closures, and curfews by the Israeli military will definitely lead to a dysfunctional educational process for long periods of time. The Palestinian Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education will be stripped of their roles which will lead to the loss of great portion of the scholastic year, causing students to join demonstrations and protests subjecting them to real danger such as being casualties or arrested.

Among the consequences of the newly emerging situation, it would be hard for most teachers to reach schools, the Ministry to conduct the Tawjihi exam, print 14 million textbooks and insure the completion of the academic year to fulfill the requisites for promotion for the higher grades. Additionally, the educational process will suffer from many irregularities for a long time to come.

The area of Higher Education is expected to be more affected. The universities and colleges will be closed by the Israeli authority for long periods of time and commuting to these institutions will be very difficult as happened previously.

The shape and size of the Israeli military intervention will constitute the major reason impacting the educational process for a long time till new political and strategic positions are taken by the concerned parties.

The budget for education will have an important impact on the educational process in terms of who will pay the salaries. In 2012, the PA budget for education was 2,365,645, NIS of which 80% was allocated for salaries. The effect of not paying salaries to school teachers will reflect on university students' inability to pay university tuitions which means the Palestinian Higher education system will be paralyzed for long time to come which is expected to cause students inabilities to join higher education institutions, and increase dropout rate especially among girls.

In this regard, it is not expected to find such a big a budget from Arab donors or international ones as it will prove impossible to make it available in the due time. In the best imagined scenarios, the financial support will arrive late and prove insufficient.

As it relates to who is expected to take over the educational administration, this paper presents the following four scenarios;

First scenario; the return of the Israeli civil administration

This scenario predicts the return to the situation prior to 1994 which is the return of the conventional Israel military occupation resulting in totally complex situation perceived to be the worst scenario ever but the most probable one. This change will be rejected from the Palestinian society which will refuse to submit to the military occupation once more.

The second scenario: Acceptance of Palestinian institutions to administer education

This predicts that education is left to be run by Palestinian institutions such as Council of Higher Education leaving the Israeli authority to watch the process from a distance. This scenario is not expected to be implemented without the approval of PLO while the Israelis covertly condoning it. But, it will be also challenged with many obstacles and especially as relates to administrative control and making available the right budgets.

The third scenario: delegating international parties such as the UN to run education.

This is a potential scenario in case of international intervention in form of UN resolutions delegating the UNESCO to take over consequently passing it to UNRWA to implement the resolution. This is a possible scenario which might be condoned by the PLO and the Palestinian people especially if Arab countries request that from the United Nations which will convince Israeli allies in the security council of the complexity of the situation.

The fourth scenario: The combined Egyptian and Jordanian supervision

Although it is improbable but if materializes it will be a result of political agreements between PLO and Arab countries and international parties specifying the interim aspect of it.

This part addresses the general and specific recommendations.

1. **General recommendations**
   a. It is recommended that the dissolution of the PNA be studied very well before taken preceded by political preparations especially if taken by PLO. It should specify the time frame to insure the responsibility of the international community.
   b. It is recommended to consider the UN option to take over the responsibilities of the PNA.
   c. Call for an Arab summit in which the PNA explains the rationale behind its decision to insure the rallying of the Arab countries to guarantee the establishment of a fund in the Arab League.
   d. It is recommended that the PLO establish civil councils in the Palestinian communities to oversee the different Palestinian sectors such as the educational, the economic, the Health and the social sectors in case a decision to dissolve the PNA is taken.
   e. Preparing for resolutions in the UN and UNESCO requiring Israel not to intervene and hinder the educational process guaranteeing schools and universities independence and students and teachers' mobility.

2. **Educational recommendations**
   a. The current Palestinian educational apparatus to prepare plans to protect the educational process especially in time of complete or partial closures and how to run education in abnormal circumstances.
   b. The universities and colleges should draft plans especially with electronic options in times of closures by the Israeli authority.
   c. Delegate Palestinian institutions such as The Council of Higher Education to run the Educational sector regardless of the Israeli stands.

d. Commissioning the Palestinian educational apparatus to draft backup plans for the Tawjehi including drafting new criteria for university admission in case of hardships to conduct it.
e. The establishment of community committees in every residential area to back up the schools.
f. When it proves to be difficult to print 14 million textbook copies, the schools could collect the used ones to be used for the next scholastic year.
g. The establishment of a special Arab fund to support the Palestinian education to provide for salaries and to support the Palestinian colleges and universities.

Palestinian Education.. Its importance and characteristics:

The education sector is considered the largest service sector currently overseen by the Palestinian Authority. 1,145,000 students are enrolled in schools, and 214,000 in universities based on 2012 statistics. The number of teachers in this sector reached 62, 000 teachers.

The number of schools reached 2751, divided between the governorates of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (see index 1).

The equivalent of one third of Palestinian society is enrolled in schools. Each Palestinian family has an enrolled student, as education is considered one of the main components of Palestinian society. Any harm inflicted on the education establishment would affect the nature of this social system and would damage society.

Any changes to the role of the Palestinian Authority in providing education services would affect students, teachers, the education system and its roles, performances, budget, and its ability to continue under such circumstances.

Part One: The effects of change in the role of the Palestinian Authority and its reflection on the educational process:

The occupation, within its strategy to control the Palestinian lands it occupied in 1967, has practiced many calculated methods to control Palestinian society. Concerning the education establishment, here are the main forms of this control:

1) Ending the services of teachers who show the faintest hint of participating in the national movement.
2) Reprinting entire textbooks (Egyptian and Jordanian) in its own way, after deleting sections and pages discussing the Palestinian cause or those which could increase nationalistic feelings.
3) Making changes to the nature of these schools based on its intelligence policies. It switched high schools to elementary schools because they were located in the heart of Palestinian cities, or in critical locations. It also changed boys schools to girls schools and even moved entire schools to areas easier to control.
4) Interrogation, arrest, and administrative detention of students and teachers by the military, which hasn't stopped during the continuous occupation years.
5) Closing and besieging universities.
6) Limiting educational activities in different areas such as sporting, cultural, and social festivals, and disallowing citizens and members of local society to enter schools without permission.
7) Negligence towards educational development in school buildings, availability of technical equipment such as laboratories and libraries that were funded by people's donations, as well as the lack of teachers training.
8) Under political events such as the first and second Intifadas, the army closed many schools for long periods of time, and closed off roads between villages and cities disallowing teachers and students to attend schools. Many school days were lost.
   These procedures and others done by the occupying Israeli forces have not changed. These indicators shed light on the mentality, policies, and ways of the occupation that are expected to be used by the Israelis if the Palestinian Authority ends its work in the Palestinian areas. Regardless of the reasons for its collapse, this would lead to Palestinian and Israeli reactions which would reflect on education as follows:

   First: General Education
   1) The continuation of the education process in the case of the Palestinian Authority's end.

The Palestinian education process and its continuation depend on the situations arising from these variables, as well as on the general situation of Palestinian society and its stability. With such an event that would change the process and future of Palestinian education and in the case of a military Israeli interference, it is expected that a curfew would be implemented on most of the areas with a widespread presence of Israeli military forces inside cities and villages, and with sieges and closures and checkpoints on roads connecting Palestinian cities and municipalities, as well as restrictions on people's movements and the transportation of their goods. This, on its own would hamper the education process as teachers and students would not be able to reach their schools or their educational institutions. This would be more evident in cities rather than villages and towns. Education then would depend on checkpoints and traffic on roads, the position of political groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Israeli interference, as well as the positions within Palestinian society and its institutions. This situation could continue for many months before the return to a sporadic educational process. In this regard, there would be educational phases based on time, meaning as long as the educational process is disrupted, there would be Palestinian voices, especially from students' parents demanding solutions for this problem. Many forms of learning would arise:

    i. Irregular school hours in the quieter areas such as faraway villages.

    ii. Part time education for main subjects such as Arabic, English, mathematics, and science.

    iii. An almost complete school term called for by Palestinian Official and popular fronts, whereas the Israeli side is the only obstacle, since the decision wasn't taken by it.

    iv. Popular education that would take different forms from one area to the other. Called for by Palestinian fronts to be used as a temporary educational method for every student, even those out of the educational establishment. This form of education is the least organized.

2) Managing Education:

If Israel's goal is to completely control the Palestinian areas, as well as the return of the civil administration to these areas, many administrative procedures would be taken over by Israeli military forces. There would be statements and official opinions from those in charge of the education process from the Palestinian Authority, Teachers' Union, unions, and official sides such as municipalities which would call for the disobedience and refusal of orders from Israeli military forces. Israeli forces would use the carrot and stick method under such circumstances, such as political imprisonment for those demanding the disobedience; and the control of the teachers' salaries. It would use the matter of salaries to pressure teachers especially if no Arab countries came to save the situation. There would be several scenarios for the governance of the educational establishment, such as:

    i. That Israel would leave the ministries as they are (without ministers) without interference on the basis that a solution would arise with an international agreement. As for the management of education, many officials would refuse to work even for the benefit of their children until a political stance is taken by the PLO.

    ii. That Israel would not allow the main ministries to work. It would shut them down, control them and their equipment, tools, and information.

    iii. Allowing only directorates of education to operate similar to the military rule following 1967. This indicates the beginning of the complete Israeli control on the establishment. Regardless of the position of the Israeli military or that of the Palestinians, the educational establishments would be plagued with chaos and instability for a long time.

3) Education's Budget:

The education budget possesses the highest share of the PA's budget in services. It varies between %17- %19of the PA's budget with an amount of 2,365,645 million shekels. More than 45,000 teachers from the public sector receive their salaries from this budget. The

education budget has increased in the last few years, due to the increase of the number of students enrolling in public schools. It is estimated to be 50,000 students yearly.

The education sector, in addition to its roles in developmental and character building, is one of the sectors that provides job opportunities for university graduates, especially women.

Despite the low salaries in the public sector, it still attracts graduates due to unemployment and lack of employment opportunities.

The limitation of the salaries does not allow teachers to work without being paid for a long period of time. Even if feelings of patriotism are there, a teacher still needs to provide for their family as well as use transportation to reach schools, and if the roads are closed, the costs would increase and the teachers would not be able to pay without support.

The lack of an Arab alternative willing to provide immediate support for the educational system would increase the inability of educational establishments to serve, not to mention Israeli dictations which might expedite the educational establishments' inability to resist.

Israel might use this to control this establishment and limit its role. This does not mean that Israel would play a positive role by paying teachers' salaries instead of the PA, but it means that it would use this factor if it were in its benefit. In the case of control on the educational establishment by military force, after an amount of time, Israel would take many procedures and decisions to get rid of many administrators and teachers.

4) Students:
Palestinian students would be the first victims of these changes. The school schedule would be affected for many months. Students would lose thousands of school hours, and this would lead to:

   i.   An increase in school dropout rates, taking many forms due to the lack of enrollment under such circumstances.
   ii. Chaos in the school's system and discipline, as well as in the relationship between the student and teacher.
   iii. Emergence of unstudied and unspecified forms of resistance by students. Some of them might die, or get injured, imprisoned or tortured and exposed to different forms of oppression which would cause them deep psychological problems at that age.
   iv. Due to all of these elements, this would cause low academic achievement, similar to what we witnessed in the first Intifada of 1987. Some of these students would lose their academic future because of these circumstances.
   v.   The education system might be forced to create special and various developmental programs in psychotherapy or treat students' weak academic performance. If this period lasts for a long time without the continuation of the academic year, the education establishment needs to make decisions about the entire academic year.

5) Teachers:
Teachers would face complicated situations; from the official side they would adhere to any decisions taken by the PLO or any other associated national group such as the teachers' union, or any group authorized to follow the matter. The most prominent issues they would face, would be:

   i.   Facing, along with their union leaders political imprisonment.
   ii. Difficulties in movement between their place of residence and work locations. Here, it is necessary for new scenarios to arise such as the enrollment of teachers in the nearest school, similar to what happened in the second Intifada of 2000.
   iii. Difficulty in getting paid. This would get more intense if no Palestinian or Arab party commits to paying their salaries, as well as the difficulty in delivering these salaries due to Israeli procedures.
   iv. The psychological struggle between fulfilling their duties if asked to, and being in danger while travelling to schools, including their financial ability to do so.
   v.   An increase in teacher's interaction with civil society, and the interference of many appropriate and inappropriate elements in education.

vi.   The lack of contingency plans and premeditated scenarios that demonstrate how to work under such circumstances, would lead to a confusion in teacher duties, they would also be under pressure from political fractions and pressure groups, even including their students.

vii. In the case where there is a lack academic activity for a prolonged period of time, they would live in a state of confusion, seeking how to join the popular education efforts.

6) **Official and General secondary examinations (Tawjihi):**
It would be difficult to administer the general secondary examination (Tawjihi) under such circumstances. Postponing the examination would not be useful because the students' understanding of the material, the inability to finish the material, and the lack of suitable circumstances to administer the examination with the administrative and technical requirements. This might lead the PA and its representatives to take measures such as:

i.   Arrangements with Palestinian universities to consider grade 12 results as a basis for entering the university.

ii.   Accepting the results of grades ten, eleven, and twelve as a basis for entering the university.

iii. Administrating a special examination that would gauge the students' abilities in certain subjects, accompanied with their academic results. This happened in the first Intifada of 1987 when the general secondary examination suffered from obstacles and problems. At that time, the council of higher education with coordination with the PLO and the education ministry in Jordan decided to cancel the examination, and instead gave students special exams in universities.

7) **Study plans and Curriculum:**
The academic study plan would suffer for that year. Students would be unable to attend 28-30 weekly classes, taking into consideration the days of school closure. In the case of a partial academic year, teachers would not be able to control the study plans. Here, the school situations would differ from one area to the other and from one school to the next. Based on previous experiences, the focus would be on main subjects, the reduction of classes, or reduction of the school day's length. Many educational activities would be stopped, as well as cultural, social and sporting activities and laboratory classes.

As for the curriculum, there would be a decrease in textbook numbers, because it would requires printing more than 14 million books yearly. The main issue in this case is if Israel interferes by disallowing the teaching of textbooks, or parts of them. To protect our right to teach our children what we find suitable, it is important to get the support of many international establishments, especially the UNESCO. Teachers would refuse to adhere to Israeli orders and Israel might resort to stopping the printing of these textbooks and their distribution.

If Israel returns to the military control of civil and Palestinian organizations in the Palestinian territories, similar to how it was before 1994, this would indeed create interferences in the education establishment, including the curriculum.

Second: Higher Education:
The continuation of the education process in universities and colleges:
Universities and colleges would be affected the most by the emerging situation because of their individuality and structure as it includes students and professors from all governorates and areas, whose transportation would be difficult. The occupation would use military procedures against these universities disallowing people to reach them. Universities paid a high price in the first Intifada as the military rule made continuous decrees to close them for many years. Birzeit University stayed closed for more than four continuous years.

More than one academic term would be lost due to these closures, and consequently many reactions would follow, as students would have to withdraw for various reasons, while others would consider enrolling in international universities. This would lead to more student withdrawal, especially for women and those with weaker academic achievement.

As for teachers and their immigration, it is expected that their percentage would be meager in comparison with the students. It would be difficult to implement alternative programs similar to the first Intifada where new methods of teaching were implemented outside of university campuses, this is due to the large increase in student numbers and the difficulty in controlling them. Today, students in universities have increased to reach between 10,000 to 20,000 students. This number won't allow the universities to map out new programs. What is even more dangerous is the financial difficulty these universities would face as they depend on student tuition fees for the majority of their budget. This would reflect on the universities' ability to pay their employees. The financial impact would be in that the universities would not be able to pay their salaries for many months. This scene would be clearer in universities and colleges than any other sector, as many students and workers would face the repercussions of occupation procedures as it is expected that hundreds of active students as well as professors and administrators would be imprisoned.

It is expected that these universities would be the last to resume their work. This would have a large toll on their ability to function.

It is not expected that universities would receive any organized financial support from any party. The European Union might play a humble role in trying to save these universities as it did in 1990 by establishing a program to support higher education, with a budget of 50 million dollars over three years at that time.

Based on previous experiences, Arab support won't take any organized form as is usually the case. There would not be a plan dedicating a budget to protect the education sector, including higher education.

The dangers the universities and colleges would face can be summarized as follows:

i. A severe financial crisis that might lead to financial collapse in the absence of any international intervention.
ii. Closures that might exceed many semesters which would lead to academic confusion.
iii. Student dropout rates could reach up to % 10 of the student body, depending on the period of closure.
iv. Human right violations as students and professors face imprisonment and assault.
v. Delay in tens of thousands of student graduations which might be delayed one or two years.
vi. Distortions in student academic performance as a result of term irregularities and lack of follow ups in libraries, laboratories, and needed equipment for university academic performance.
vii. Weak economic capabilities for students as a result of their families' inability to financially provide because of the low income of families at such a time.

Part Two: Political changes on the Palestinian Authority, reactions, and expected scenarios of intervention:

Changes in the PA that could lead to its collapse and the end of its executive role in the West Bank and Gaza are real complete changes that equal in their effects the occupation of 1967, and the first and second Intifadas in 1987 and 2000 respectively.

The reasons of these changes on their own would be reflected in the internal and international reactions. If these changes come about from the Palestinian side and the PLO because the political process has ended, and the PA is not necessary any more since the hopes and dreams of the Palestinians have not been reached, and the peace process that began in 1993 has failed. Such a stance would initiate different reactions than those reached if Israel directly or indirectly ended the PA.

These changes would put the Palestinians in a new stage, different in form and content than the

previous lived situation since the occupation. After 1967 the occupation authorities implemented strategies to deal with the Palestinians in order to create controlled stability, so it can carry out its goals in controlling Palestinian lands. Such Israeli procedures included:

1) Complete security control of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, carrying out harsh responses to any Palestinian military areas, as well as controlling and observing all Palestinian factions including individuals or organizations, and in different varieties. It would act against any organization supporting the PLO or demanding the end of the occupation.
2) Following an open bridges policy with Jordan and Egypt in order to establish its policy of not withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza.
3) Maintaining a minimum degree of economy and providing its services for the benefit of the Israeli economy. It encouraged working in Israel, especially for laborers, which created an economic growth as well as development of cities, industry, agriculture, and commerce in Israel. However, it did not contribute to creating a good economy for Palestinians as it did not allow the opening of big factories or even opening banks or creating suitable economic situations for the exporting of goods. It all contributed to the creation of a limited and dependent Palestinian economy.
4) Keeping the civil administration, represented by the Israeli defense ministry as the party responsible for governing the West Bank and Gaza since 1967. It would not allow service establishments such as education and health organizations to break free of this military form.
5) Israeli strategies considered, and still do, the West Bank and Gaza as a part of Israel. Its first opportunity to clarify its position on such an issue was in 1979 where it made its stance and strategies clear. It stated that those areas were Israeli areas and that it would give (Palestinian citizens) limited self-determination in Palestinian communities. This basically means offering general municipal services, like in Nazareth.
The modifications on the Israeli stance since 1967 were not strategic modifications, but military, with the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza while keeping it under military control by changing the form of this control. As for the West Bank, the situation remained the same and even deepened as Israel continued its land confiscation and encouragement of Israeli settlers to live in it, especially in Jerusalem in order to create a new reality that would disallow a Palestinian entity.

Israeli reactions:

Any new conditions the Palestinians find themselves under after the ending of the PA wouldn't change the Israeli strategy in its dealings with the West Bank and Gaza under such circumstances. Israel would take immediate security and military steps to completely control the situation. It would be helped by its military and security ability, and previous experience which has deepened throughout 45 years of occupation. Of the most prominent features of these measures, are:

i. Restoration of military rule in the West Bank and Gaza, and the issuing of military decisions, starting with general decisions from the Israeli government, followed by decisions by the defense ministry, and then military parties.
ii. In the first stages, Israel would spread its military might and there might be military skirmishes. Palestinian cities and towns would be put under curfews and intermittent curfews for long periods of time depending on the area. Thousands of Palestinians would be imprisoned.
iii. After the military control of the territories, Israel and its army would open communication channels with Palestinian civil organizations such as municipalities and chambers of commerce. The focus of these channels would be the Palestinian daily life, such as allowing the movement of ambulances, municipality staff, electricity, water, and such.

iv.   Israel would move towards the second administrative level of Palestinian organizations, meaning health, education, and agricultural directorates in Palestinian governorates. Israel would ignore the first level in Palestinian management such as ministries, which Israel considers to be administered by the PA, similar to 1967 and until the second Intifada when the civil administration opened its doors for traders and those wanting work permits.

Arab Reactions:

The current Arab situation causes extra difficulties for the PLO and the Palestinian people. From a strategic point of view, this is the worst time and place for getting Arab support. Any support given would not exceed moral support accompanied by demonstrations. This support would take these shapes:

i.   Conducting meetings on the level of Arab summits, Arab League, or the Arab Foreign Ministers meetings.
ii.   Arab movement would be political and limited, such as demanding an immediate urgent meeting for the Security Council where many disagreements and neutral decisions are expected to erupt.
iii.   Asking for financial support for the Palestinian people. This would be faced with Israeli procedures and difficulty in receiving such support, unless it comes from the UNRWA, UNESCO, or organizations that Israel approves of, in a limited capacity.

International Reactions:

International movement would be focused around the United Nations and would not exceed asking Israel to respect Human Rights, or discussing the methods of interacting with the Palestinian people. No one would be able to change the status quo on the ground. If the situation becomes more difficult, there might be calls for international, Arab, and Israeli talks to
develop new ideas, but the situation would remain the same for a long period of time.

Palestinian Reactions:

There would definitely be Palestinian reactions to such events, especially taking into consideration that throughout the years the Palestinians have not lost their sense of nationalism, rather the demand for an end to the occupation and regaining independence has increased. Most prominently of the reactions Palestinians would have are:

i.   Popular demonstrations in different forms would erupt in cities, villages, and refugee camps, and would take the same form it did in the first Intifada . These demonstrations would recur daily and would utilize hit and run tactics. As the occupation brings one demonstration under control, another one would erupt
ii.   Political stances would be taken by political parties and figures urging the people not to listen or recognize any form of Israeli administrative orders.
iii.   Palestinians would suffer a severe economic crisis. Palestinian families would be reduced to the minimum requirements of life such as eating and drinking. Basic services such as electricity, communications, and water would be cut off.
iv.   Movement between cities and villages would be limited. Creating difficulties in movement for teachers, students and even the transportation of main supplies of food.
v.   Most Palestinian factions would join the PLO. The PLO's position would be that of political guidance for the Palestinian people as there wouldn't be any new group able to replace the PLO. The PLO would depend on the Arab League in transmitting its political stances at that period with occasional Egyptian, Saudi and Jordanian intervention.

Expected Israeli intervention scenarios on Palestinian education:

First Scenario: The return of the Israeli civil administration.
It is unexpected that Israel would leave the situation in the West Bank and Gaza as it is; it would interfere to fill the ensuing vacuum. If Israel decides to retake control in such a manner, the most important results would be:

i.   The closing of the headquarters of the ministry of education and appointing a military officer to administer the education establishment.
ii.   Implementing military decisions which would reinforce Israel's control on the education process.
iii. It is expected that education directorates would be maintained, and considered technical directorates.
iv.   The education system would face closures for long periods of time assuming that the teachers and Palestinian society would refuse to work under the Israeli education officer.

The Palestinian reactions under such a scenario would be the refusal to adhere to the Israeli civil administration and its orders, even in the case of schools working under specialized Palestinian groups. This would create a dangerous reality as it would be the worst possible scenario since it would create a state of uncontrollable chaos.

Second Scenario: The acceptance of Palestinian organizations administering Palestinian education.
The occupation might not directly interfere with the Palestinian education system by leaving it under the leadership of Palestinian organizations. It would observe as it allows Palestinians to create technical Palestinian bodies to administer the education establishments such as the Council of Higher Education which might decrease the severity of confrontations. These organizations would face many challenges in doing their job. They would need:
i.   Strong support from the PLO and from Arab parties such as the Arab League by asking the Council of Higher Education to fulfill undertake this duty.
ii.   Financial support to cover education expenses such as paying salaries for teachers and university professors. This needs preparation and political meetings on the highest Arab political level to ensure support.
iii. Even though this scenario would be the least dangerous, it would require time for schools and universities to return back to a working state. The education system would not be free from strikes, demonstrations, interventions and different interferences from Palestinian, partisan, and Israeli sides.

Third Scenario: delegating international parties such as UNRWA to administer education.
International interventions, whether by the Security Council or American interventions, even the Russian Federation and the European Union with the goal of solving this crisis. Israel would find itself forced to agree to a scenario where it would delegate UNRWA to administer the Palestinian education establishments as UNRWA currently works side by side with the Palestinian ministry of

education.

This scenario, would technically cause the least damage to the education sector, although not very likely, as Israel refuses international and UN intervention in its politics; and the Palestinians would approve of this scenario if the PLO approved of it. It is expected that the Palestinians would agree to such a scenario as it happens under an international umbrella. As for the technical side, the UNRWA would not be able to lead the education establishment due to its size; it would play a political educational or high administrative role. This would allow the ministry's administration to play its role and maintain all directorates of education. As for the UNRWA, it would interfere only with the United Nations approval as it officially belongs to it. Ideas might develop about UNESCO's role in helping with the implementation. UNRWA would not be able to take such a role without clear financial coverage.

Fourth Scenario: joint Egyptian-Jordanian administration of education.

Although this scenario is difficult to occur, it still remains possible, but it would depend on political positions, such as an appointment by the Arab League with the approval of the PLO. Egypt and Jordan would not take such a role without a detailed political strategy, such as having a condition that there would be a political plan based on a timetable, and that Egypt and Jordan would only form a transitional period towards achieving this goal. This political scenario would only occur with Arab and international agreement. Under such a case, the education system would be kept the same without any modifications as the goal would be to keep and maintain the educational process.

Part Three: Recommendations:

With all the political justifications for this decision -ending of the PA in the West Bank and Gaza- it would have political, economic, cultural, and service consequences that would have an effect on the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza especially.

This paper's recommendations center around general recommendations on implementing such a decision, as well as specific recommendations regarding education, which are connected with the first general recommendations.

First: General Recommendations.
i. The decision to end the work of the PA should not happen suddenly or without planning, with an international political campaign preceding it. This campaign should include the United Nations and its organs, the United States, the Russian Federation and the European Union, as well as Arab and Islamic countries to explain the dimensions of such a decision and set a time for its implementation. The PLO should consider handing the responsibility of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to the United Nations, as Palestine is a member state, as well as handing responsibility to the Arab League.
ii. Working on making the decision political, with the least negative consequences on Palestinian society and its organizations, economics, social, educational and health services.
iii. The guarantee of an Arab support system (politically and financially) and the transformation of a Palestinian confrontation to an Arab confrontation, calling for an Arab summit where Palestine presents its reasons for such a step, as well as setting up a fund for Palestine that is different than before in the sense that each country has to set a portion of its budget to fulfill the needs of the Palestinians, as well as giving political Arab support for this step.
iv. Recommendation to form technical councils in all sectors (educational, health, social, economic) to take responsibility for providing services for the Palestinian people replacing the PLO, these should be announced at a suitable time. These councils would be the alternative

voice for the Palestinians regardless of the scenarios and the intervention of the Israelis and such.

Second: Recommendations concerning the education sector.

As has been discussed in this paper, it is expected that the education sector would be affected the most from these decisions. Some of the most important recommendations include:

1) Forming a civilian council- board of education for example- by a decision from the PLO to be centered around education and to be able to support the education establishment regardless of the expected scenarios that could happen after the ending of the PLO. In the case of spreading of the Israeli military, this council would direct the managers and teachers to not obey the Israeli military or its orders. In the case there is an acceptance of this council, it would mean giving it limited technical responsibility in education services. If the third scenario comes true, i.e. the one where UNRWA is the responsible party, this council would be supportive and important in maintaining the education process. If the fourth scenario comes true, which is giving Jordan and Egypt a shared responsibility, this council would represent all Palestinian hopes and dreams for education.

2) Providing a supportive budget for the education establishments, which won't last for a long time, and it would be difficult to provide Palestinian financial security. The PLO would not be able to provide such support because of the lack of resources. Here it is worth mentioning that Arab support is needed to protect the education process.

3) The PLO, along with teachers and students need to take up their historical responsibility under such an important political era, by making every effort to support and stand with each other to choose the best form of teaching for our children.

4) Asking official parties in general and higher education to implement immediate and alternative plans for basic education in the case of a crisis that would affect the process of education, and to train and clarify its forms to the managers in universities, directorates, and teachers based on educational scenarios. These scenarios are, from the most difficult to the easiest as follows:
   A) Long term closure scenario: Here, new processes of education would emerge relating to chronological reshuffling, such as attending school in the summer break, and changing the academic year to compensate for lost time. Other topics would emerge such as the focus on main subjects and the process of transferring teachers to schools closer to where they live. In the worst case scenario, using popular education and focusing on elementary and high school students. This program would necessitate the participation of Palestinian families and providing them with educational resources.
   B) Intermittent closure scenario: Creating plans relating to changes on the yearly school plan and reorganizing it to allow students to receive at least the minimal amount of knowledge.
   C) Benefiting from the following year: In which the old material would be covered in the beginning of the new year by appointing months to finish the old material and move on to the new one.

5) Having the Palestinian education system implement alternative plans for the general secondary examination (Tawjihi) in the case of it not being administrated, such as:
   Postponing the exams for a period of time.
   Focusing on school grades and appointing a specialized university entrance exam based on the student's major.

6) Asking the universities, colleges and council of higher education to create plans in the case of university closures that might affect the students and their enrollment. These recommendations are:

<ol start="7">
Preparation for drafting resolutions in the UN and UNESCO that restrict Israeli interference and intervention in the educational process and designate areas of protection for that education process and its observation. As well as guaranteeing the free movement of students and teachers, protecting universities, preventing their closure and guarantee the ability to reach them without any difficulty.

<ol start="8">
Directing schools to create plans for the retrieval of textbooks form students, and make arrangements for them to store these textbooks at school. This is in case it is not possible to print new textbooks, which are estimated at around 14 million textbooks, for any political or financial reason.

<ol start="9">
Creating popular support committees in cities and villages to support schools and work on creating supporting committees for each school to support their administration.

*Table (1) Number of schools, teachers, and students in schools and universities in Palestine for 2012.

Schools	West Bank	Gaza	Total
Public	1.639	398	2037
UNRWA	99	245	344
Private	320	50	370
Total	2058	693	2751
Teachers	**West Bank**	**Gaza**	**Total**
Public	31503	11628	43131
UNRWA	2250	8560	10810
Private	6793	1291	8084
Total	40546	21479	62025
Students	**West Bank**	**Gaza**	**Total**
Public	540788	228076	768864
UNRWA	51800	224795	276595
Private	84184	15782	99966
Total	676772	468653	1145425
Universities	**West Bank**	**Gaza**	**Total**
Students	123043	90923	213966
Professors			14667

* Ministry of education and ministry of higher education statistics for the year 2012.

This commentary falls into three sections: the first section includes comments on the TOR, the second comments on the paper itself and the third includes some specific recommendations inspired by the paper itself.

Section 1: The Terms of Reference:
In the TOR provided by PSR, three scenarios were postulated for the hypothetical collapse or dissolution of the PA, resulting in its dis-functionality. The author was requested to study the impact of each of the scenarios on the public and higher education sectors.
I have a couple of issues with the TOR formulation:
a. The three scenarios postulated in the TOR have some redundancy since the third and the first are essentially isomorphic. Foreign aid constitutes around x% of the PA's budget and during the very turbulent and rugged journey of the PA, the donor community played a very carefully calculated game to weaken and destabilize the PA as needed but not to drive the it to bankruptcy causing its collapse. Hence, reaching ultimate financial bankruptcy [3rd scenario] will almost certainly be associated with or deriving from financial and political sanctions of some sort [1st scenario]. So we end up with two scenarios: the first is a dis-funtionality resulting from an imposed/induced covert or overt financial sanction and the second resulting from a proactive politically and nationally motivated choice by the PLO leadership. Besides, in the hypothetical situation where the PA is not in charge anymore, a logical immediate implication would include a complete or partial military takeover by the Israeli army reminiscent of the past two Intifadas. The Israeli leadership will not tolerate vacuum and will certainly readily move to fill the gap.

b. In all cases, it is quite difficult for the consultants working on various social service sectors to conduct a study of the implications of each of the two or three scenarios on the individual sector. A plausible analysis of such impact will very much depend on the status of other primary sectors such as: security, economics and finance, ICTs as well as the nature of the relations, then, to Israel and to the donor community.

c. The TOR makes no reference to Gaza and leaves the door open for different interpretations implying, for example, that both the choiceful and the induced dissolution of the PA would include Gaza, with the subsequent military reoccupation of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. Such assumption is inconsistent with a publicly declared position of Hamas against the choiceful dissolution of the PA and the official position of the Israeli leadership negating any intention to reoccupy Gaza. Subsequently, the paper's analysis of the impact of the various scenarios makes no special provision for the specific geopolitical context of the Gaza strip except in one instance: Egypt possible taking over the management of the Gaza education system while Jordan takes care of the West bank.

d. It is noteworthy that the scenario of a forced dissolution resulting from an overt military action was not proposed.

Section 2: Comments on the Paper:
The paper provides a thorough narrative of various likely scenarios that may ensue the dissolution of the PA. The basic assumption being made is that Israel will reoccupy the WB and the GS. The comprehensive account of possible subsequent ramifications on the Education sector is reminiscent of the concrete past experiences in 1967 and the two Intifadas, where the Israeli Army swept the territories and imposed a range of sanctions and repressive measures taken by the Israeli army during these episodes.
a. The forecasted description of the response of the international community is quite realistic and is also reminiscent of past experiences. A fine distinction needs to be made, however, between the official

response of governments and that of their societies. Dramatic development in modern media including expansive and vibrant social networks and live mainstreaming have made world events instantaneously visible and transparent world-wide. This will expose Israeli repressive and violent actions and is likely to create cascading popular protests around the world, especially when it comes to violations targeting the education sector. Besides, the new observer statehood of Palestine may be an added complicating factor for the Israeli occupation.

b. Based on a very consistent track record especially in recent years, one should not expect much in terms of Arab financial and political support, especially when the PA dissolution is not a priori orchestrated with or at least acceptable to the US and its allies.

c. As indicated earlier, the paper makes no distinction between Gaza and the West Bank across the various scenarios. The demographic, geopolitical, economic and social context and realities of the Gaza strip warrant a customized analysis. There is also no mention of lateral spin offs that will certainly impact the Education Sector in East Jerusalem.

d. The recommendations cited towards the end of the paper are also inspired by the very rich experiences and insights deriving from the multitude of popular and grass root self organizing resistance modalities responding to the sanctions and restrictions imposed by the occupation forces. These approaches rejuvenated, especially during the first Intifada, a culture of volunteerism, initiative and entrepreneurship , collaboration, endogenous creativity, resilience and enlightened dignity, which strengthened the social fabric and increased people's capacity to face up to the huge challenges imposed by the occupation forces. Things may have changed over the past 25 years: the new generations have been born and lived all their life under the Oslo ecosystem, somewhat different values, different cultures and different social dynamics have emerged. It is somewhat uncertain how today's teenagers and youth will respond to a fully fledged occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. This may warrant a more careful analysis.

e. The analysis does not take into consideration the changing political terrain in the West Bank where Hamas enjoys nontrivial support amongst youth. Hence assuming that the full range of the political spectrum in the West Bank will unite under the PLO banner is somewhat presumptuous. In fact, there is a nontrivial possibility that ideologically and politically divergent approaches to forms of resistance would emerge, unlike the way things were in the 1st Intifada.

f. The analysis does not factor the new reality of settlements and settlers with their rapidly expanding disruptive aggressions.

Section 3: Recommendations
a. Upon deeper scrutiny, it is readily obvious that any effective response to the challenges of "the day after" requires a lot of work right now. This includes for example the development of informed scenario setting and simulation, long term contingency plans and a wide range of purposeful actions on various levels and across various sectors that would equip people with the awareness, competencies, skills and attitudes which enable them to navigate and work effectively and in synch under scarcity, adversity, and uncertainty. A crisis or even disaster management system needs to be articulated. In fact, an inter-ministerial task force led by the Ministry of Interior may be set up for that purpose.

b. A large number of measures proposed in the paper can be actually taken way before the day after. For example, a national education council and possibly local replica can be established and operationalized now, and their formation would be value added with or without "the day after". The same applies to e-learning where we can capitalize on significant developments both in universities and the public education system alike [e-school, school gateway and more]. A lot of communication and information infrastructure needs to be developed especially in marginalized areas, integrated solutions need to be created, e-content needs to be also developed and deployed, and capacity building programs

need to be included in the ambitious teacher training programs launched by the ministry of education. Students need to receive the necessary orientation on how to navigate in a hybrid or e-mode in response to certain contingencies. In fact, this would constitute an integral component of what may be rightfully branded as "a resistance learning ecosystem".

c. Deploying learner centric pedagogical approaches and practices supporting flexible self and peer learning, in contrast to rigid route education need to be mainstreamed, and teacher training programs need to include modules in this area. Schools and universities alike need to strengthen their enrichment programs in the areas of civic engagement, entrepreneurship.

d. The recommendation towards setting up civil national councils for the various service sectors is a good idea. It may be quite useful to also consider an integrated local model, whereby the emphasis goes to municipalities, towns, villages and localities. A recent initiative undertaken by the Ministry of Local Government can help gauge the feasibility of such a model.

Workshop Discussion
Dr. Na'eem Abu Al-Homos:
This study talks about the consequences of changes that is possible to happen if the PNA dissolves itself, how it affects fields of educational process, the expected Israeli and Palestinian reactions of this decision and the expected procedures and scenarios of education in these circumstances. By the way, a third of the Palestinian society are at schools. Therefore, closing educational institutions as a result of any expected Israeli military decisions or procedures leads to closing the educational institutions for a long time.
The way and size of Israeli military intervention represents the most important factor in affecting the educational process and this effect for long time up to developing new positions; the subject is connected with political, national and strategic positions of the PLO, Palestinian factions and the Palestinian people as well.
In fact, education's budget will be another basic element in affecting education's process: teacher's salaries are paid from this budget. In2012, the education's budget of the PNA reached 2,365,645 Israeli shakles . About 80% of it is for the salary item. In addition, the budget of universities and colleges mainly comes from students' fees which are the main tributary of these budgets. Of course, it isn't possible to fill the financial gap from Arab and international entities.
Concerning managing education or the institution that will direct the era after the PNA's collapse , this paper explains four expected scenarios:
1. The return of the Israeli civil administration: This is the worst scenario and the most possible option to take place . It will be refused by the Palestinian society.
2. Accepting Palestinian institutions to direct education: This scenario will collide with many problems and obstacles in the administrative control and difficulties in providing proper budgets.
3. Asking international bodies such as Relief Agency for directing education: This scenario may happen if Israel and the countries supporting it in the security council are convinced that things are more complicated. It may be accepted by both the Palestinian people and the PLO as an international umbrella for directing education and other civil affairs.
4. A joint Egyptian-Jordanian supervision: The possibility of this scenario is often connected with political agreement between the PLO on one hand, the Arab countries and international entities,

on the other hand. This is to assure that the intervention will be for accounted transitional period and a political horizon that leads to a two – state solution.

General recommendations:
a. A recommendation that there will be no sudden decision of putting an end to the PNA, but a planned decision preceded by a political action if it is a PLO one.
b. Studying the possibility of handing over the responsibility in Gaza and West Bank to the United Nations upon the State of Palestine's request, since Palestine is a non- member state in the UN.
c. Calling for an Arab summit by the State of Palestine to clarify the reasons that force Palestine to take this step and also take a decision to establish a Palestine Fund in away different from the former ones.
d. A recommendation to the PLO to establish Palestinian civil councils that direct various sectors.
e. Preparing projects of decisions in the UN and UNESCO urging Israel not to intervene or put obstacles before the educational process.

Educational recommendations:
A. The Palestinian education system must set especial plans to save the educational process to deal with partial or complete closures.
B. Setting plans by universities and intermediate colleges concerning new methods of learning such as learning outside walls universities; electronic learning is a good example.
C. Mandating specialized Palestinian entities like the Palestinian Higher Education Council to take over the PNA's role in directing Palestinian education.
D. Asking the Palestinian education system to set specific and alternative plans for Tawjihi exam.
E. Forming civil and popular committees in each city and village to subsidize schools; it could be for every school in cities to help school administration.
F. A recommendation to every school to collect the outdated copies of school books from students and keep them in each school re-use them if there is lack in books or not available.
G. Working for establishing a especial Arab Fund to support the Palestinian education and provide basic needs of this large sector; particularly, teachers' salaries and budgets of universities and college.

Comments by Dr. Marwan Awartani:
First of all, what is required in the research is dealing with the dissolving or the collapse of the PNA in terms of its effect on education sector since the first and the third assumptions are concerned with the PNA's bankruptcy and its inability of doing its duties either the bankruptcy is as a result of external or internal pressures, whereas the second assumption is built on the fact that the PNA dissolves itself.
Secondly, it is difficult to study the consequences on service sectors on equal foot with security and economy. It was a good idea to study the effects on the security and economic sectors, then study services' sectors relying on what mentioned.
Thirdly, the study ignores Gaza and the consequences of this collapse on the education sector in Gaza.
Fourthly, public institutions should set different scenarios, especially instability under which the

region has been living.

Fifthly, there has been changes during the past years which have affected the situation; some are internal concerning ' Hamas' movement, others are external concerning the increase of power of Jewish settlers.

Dr. Ali Al-Jarbawi :

In General, we should look at three things; the place (West Bank, Gaza strip and Jerusalem), the time and non-separations of service sectors. With regard to place, under the partition among the three areas; do we want the same action to take place in all of them or not? If we can't practice education in West Bank, for example, then not doing it Jerusalem or Gaza, either.

In fact, we can't compare the collapse with the dissolve of the PNA; collapse is an out come in which the Palestinian is passive (receives the action), whereas the dissolve is an action in which the Palestinian is active.

In addition, no one (individuals groups or countries) has an interest in the PNA's collapse on the local or international level.

However, it is possible to dissolve the PNA by a Palestinian decision and this decision is orientated to the whole world, but the question is: what is the benefit of dissolving the PNA if things remain organized; therefore, chaos is the slogan of the phase.

Finally, we must continue working on the basis of centralization system because transferring responsibilities to the local community in each area will create a proper environment for Israel to divide the Palestinians.

Other Comments:

First of all, all the scenarios assume the existence of Palestinian National Organization although it is possible that its role declines for the benefit of Islamic movements or alternative local leaders.

All the scenarios suppose a return of the Israeli army although most discussions talk about an Israeli remote control through an alternative leaders or something like that.

Anyhow, there are questions like: Why aren't there scenarios to consolidate the PNA and improve its performance in different fields? Concerning education, if the dissolve or collapse happen the Palestinian people will refuse not sending children to school and look for alternatives. There is also another scenario; that is, the collapse of the security situation, while the PNA remains. This is due to Intifada against Israeli Occupation is more violent than the previous two ones which leave negative effects on education sector. Finally, the idea of decentralization under a strong leadership is an excellent one, but the idea of decentralization under a week leadership is a bad one.

Day After - Workshops' Participants

#		Name	Organization
1	Mr.	Abd Alnaser Masoud	National Sec. Forces - NSF
2	Dr.	Abd Alrahman Altamimi	Head of Palestinian Hydrology Group
3	Dr.	Abdelnaser Makky	JICA/Birzeit University
4	Ms.	Abeer Albatma	PENGON
5	Mr.	Abulmajeed Melhem	PALTEL
6	Mr.	Ahmad Hindi	PWA
7	Mr.	Ahmad Qurei "Abu Alaa"	Adisory Board/Fatah
8	Mr.	Ahmad Surghally	PALTEL
9	Mr.	Alaa Lahlouh	PSR
10	Mr.	Alaa Yaghi	PLC
11	Mr.	Ali Hamoudeh	JDECO
12	Dr.	Ali Jarbawi	Minister of Higher Education
13	Mr.	Ali Nazzal	President office
14	Mr.	Ali Omar	National Sec. Forces - NSF
15	Mr.	Amin Maqboul	Sec. General, Fateh Revol. Council
16	Mr.	Ammar Dwaik	Birzeit University
17	Mr.	Anwar Abu Ammash	Welfare Association
18	Dr.	Ayman Daraghmeh	PLC
19	Mr.	Aziz Kayed	PSR
20	Dr.	Azmi Shuaibi	AMAN
21	Mr.	Basem Tamimi	Popular Committes
22	Mr.	Basri Saleh	Ministry of Education
23	Mr.	Bassam Alaqtash	National Sec. Forces - NSF
24	Ms.	Buthaina Hamdan	Ministry of TLC
25	Ms.	Covadonga Bertrand	UNDP
26	Mr.	Daoud Darawi	Adala law
27	Mr.	Eyad Zeitawi	PMA
28	Mr.	Fadel Hamdan	PLC Member
29	Mr.	Fadi Qura'an	Alhaq
30	Ms.	Fadwa Barghouthi	Revolutaionary Council/Fatah
31	Dr.	Faisal Awartani	Researcher
32	Mr.	Fajr Harb	Carter Center
33	Mr.	Faris Sabaneh	Supreme Judicial Council
34	Dr.	Fathi Abumoghli	former minister of Health
35	Ms.	Florence Mandelik	NOREF
36	Mr.	Florid Zurba	Ministry of TLC
37	Dr.	Ghassan Khatib	Birzeit University
38	Dr.	Hanan Ashrawi	PLO
39	Dr.	Hanna Abdalnour	Alquds University
40	Mr.	Hasan Abushalbak	Ramallah Municipality
41	Mr.	Hazem Gheith	Egyptian Embassy

42	Mr.	Henry Siegman	US/ MIDLLE EAST PROJECT
43	Mr.	Ibrahim Barghouthi	head of MUSAWA
44	Mr.	Ihab Shihadeh	Ministry of Justice
45	Mr.	Jacob Hoigilt	NOREF
46	Mr.	Jamal Zakout	FIDA
47	Mr.	Jamil Rabah	Negotiations Support Unit - NSU
48	Dr.	Jehad Albadawi	MOH
49	Mr.	Jehad Alwazer	PMA Governor
50	Mr.	Jehad Harb	PSR
51	Dr.	Jehad Mashal	Expert
52	Mr.	Jihad Shomali	UNDP
53	Mr.	Khaled Alosaily	Business man
54	Mr.	Khaled Shtayeh	UNDP
55	Mr.	Khalil Rifai	Deputy Ministry of Justice
56	Dr.	Khalil Shikaki	PSR
57	Mr.	Mahmoud Haroun	Military Intelligence
58	Mr.	Mariano Aguirre	NOREF
59	Dr.	Mashhour Abu Daka	Former Minister of Communication
60	Mr.	Mazen Sinokrot	Private Sector
61	Mr.	Mohammad Alfaqih	PNC
62	Mr.	Mohammad Aref	PMA
63	Mr.	Mohammad Attoun	Wassel co.
64	Mr.	Mohammad Daraghmeh	Journalist
65	Mr.	Mohammad Hadieh	Ministry of Justice
66	Dr.	Mohammad Odeh	MOH
67	Dr.	Muatasem Alhmod	MOH
68	Mr.	Munib Masri	Private Sector
69	Mr.	Munir Barghouthi	Ministry of Education
70	Dr.	Munther Alsharif	NAS
71	Mr.	Musa Haj Hasan	QIF
72	Mr.	Mutaz Abadi	PWA
73	Mr.	Nabil Amr	Fatah
74	Mr.	Nabil Masri	Private Sector
75	Dr.	Naim Sabra	MOH
76	Dr.	Naim Abuhommos	Birzeit University
77	Dr.	Naser Abdelkarim	UNDP/Birzeit University
78	Mr.	Naser Yosef	Adisory Board/Fatah
79	Mr.	Natasha Carmi	Negotiation Aff. Dep.
80	Mr.	Nayef Swetat	Revolutaionary Council/Fatah
81	Mr.	Omar Assaf	Return right committee
82	Mr.	Peter Krause	Boston University
83	Mr.	Qaddora Fares	Prisoner's Affairs
84	Mr.	Qais Abdelkarim	PLC

85	Mr.	**Radi Jarai**	Alquds University
86	Mr.	**Reda Awadallah**	PPP
87	Mr.	**Roland Friedrich**	DCAF
88	Dr.	**Sabri Saidam**	President consultant
89	Mr.	**Sadam Omar**	National Security Forces
90	Dr.	**Safa Nseraldin**	Minister of TLC
91	Mr.	**Said Alhmouz**	PMC
92	Mr.	**Said Zaid**	PLC
93	Mr.	**Salam Zagha**	NEDCO
94	Mr.	**Saleh Ra'afat**	Former Head of FIDA
95	Mr.	**Samer Farah**	Welfare Association
96	Mr.	**Sami Alsaedi**	AI Bank
97	Mr.	**Samir Abdallah**	MAS
98	Mr.	**Sergio Garcia**	NOREF
99	Dr.	**Shaddad Attili**	PWA president
100	Mr.	**Shaker Sarsour**	PMA
101	Ms.	**Shereen Zedan**	PWTI-PHG
102	Mr.	**Shihadeh Hussein**	PMA
103	Ms.	**Stephanie Heitmann**	KAS
104	Dr.	**Sufian Abuzayedeh**	Birzeit University
105	Mr.	**Tareq Tayel**	Egypt Embassy
106	Dr.	**Tarif Ashour**	MOH
107	Mr.	**Tayseer Zabre**	HURRAT Center
108	Dr.	**Ummaya Khammash**	UNRWA
109	Dr.	**Wael Qa'adan**	PRCS
110	Mr.	**Waleedd Ladadweh**	PSR
111	Dr.	**Walid Aburas**	HWC
112	Mr.	**Walid Hodali**	JWU
113	Mr.	**Wisam Atwan**	National Security Forces
114	Mr.	**Yousef Adwan**	UNDP
115	Mr.	**Zafer Milhem**	PERC

The Day After:
How Palestinians Can Cope if the PA Ceases to Function
January-October 2013

PSR, in cooperation with the USMEP and NOREF, has initiated in January 2013 a policy research project that aims at exploring Palestinian conditions and options in the day after the PA ceases to function. The initiative seeks to produce a series of expert papers focusing on 10 main challenging areas of "the day after" in Palestinian political, social, financial, economic, and security life.

The initiative's point of departure is that the PA may collapse or may decide to dissolve itself in the near future under the heavy weight of various financial and political pressures. Three scenarios are conceivable: (1) Israel and the US may impose on the PA severe or crippling financial and political sanctions; (2) the PLO leadership may conclude that the two-state solution is no longer practical and may begin to search for other means to gain Palestinian rights leading it to dissolve the PA; and (3) a series of economic, financial and political crises may lead to popular demands for change expressed in mass demonstrations against the PA and a widespread demand for regime change leading to chaos and eventual collapse.

The initiative goals are three: (1) explore the implications of such a development on various critical dimensions of Palestinian life and government, elaborating on the magnitude of the problems and challenges that might arise as a result of PA demise; (2) debate various policy options to respond to such a development, to contain the damage, and to capitalize on potential benefits, if any; and, (3) recommend a course of action for Palestinians to pursue in response to the expected complications.

PSR has gathered a team of 30 experts in the areas of finance and economics, internal security and law enforcement, health, education, communication, justice system, local government, water and electricity, civil and domestic political affairs, and the future of the two-state solution. Experts have been asked to write 10 papers in their various areas of expertise examining the implications, policy options, and recommendations. Each paper has been reviewed and critiqued by two experts. Drafts of the expert papers have been discussed in small specialized workshops attended by policy makers, parliamentarians, experts, and academics.

A final report will be prepared based on the expert papers, workshops/focus groups, interviews, and background research. The report will summarize the main findings, examine the overall policy implications for the PA and the international community, and provide policy recommendations for the various relevant parties.

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)

P. O. Box 76, Ramallah, Palestine
Tel: +970-2-2964933
Fax:+970-2-2964934
pcpsr@pcpsr.org
www.pcpsr.org