



المركز الفلسطيني
للبحوث
السياسية والمسحية
Palestinian Center for
POLICY and
SURVEY RESEARCH



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The Palestine/Israel Pulse: A Joint Poll

---FOR RELEASE---

A joint public opinion survey from July 2024 finds that October 7th and the current war produce massive fears of genocide, overwhelming mutual distrust and dehumanization; the events reduce support for a two-state peace solution among Israeli Jews while increasing it among Palestinians, but still only a minority support it on each side. Over 60 percent on both sides prefer a regional peace based on a two-state solution and normalization if the alternative is a regional, multi-front war. Incentives remain capable of reversing the hardline views producing strong majorities among both sides for a peace package that permanently ends the conflict

Embargoed: For publication on 12 September 2024

These are the results of Palestine-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the [Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research \(PSR\)](#) in Ramallah and [the International Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation at Tel Aviv University](#) with funding from the [Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah](#) and the [Representative Office of Japan to Palestine](#) through [UNDP/PAPP](#). The joint poll was conducted during July 2024.

Mirror image negative perceptions: Israeli Jews and Palestinians hold near-mirror images regarding the current war: a majority on each side views the other as seeking to commit genocide; each side believes it is the worst victim in the world, and on each side, a large majority believes the other lacks humanity.

- Jewish Israelis were asked to select one of four options describing Palestinian intentions on October 7 and the current war: 66% select “to commit genocide against us,” and 27% believe the aim is to conquer land and expel the Jews (the most extreme of four options). 4% believe Palestinians intended to conquer land without expelling people and 3% said Palestinians were defending themselves to regain security.
- When Palestinians were given the same options, 61% select “commit genocide against us,” and 27% select “to conquer our land and expel the people” (the most extreme of four options). 8% believe Israelis wish to conquer land without expulsion, and 2% think Israelis seek to defend themselves and regain security.
- 84% of Israeli Jews, and 83% of Palestinians agree or strongly agree with the statement that “I believe the victimization of (our side – Jews/Palestinians) is the worst compared to other people that suffered from persecution and injustice,” and 62% of Israeli Arabs think the same about themselves.
- When asked about the level of humanity of other side, Palestinians gave Jews an average score of 6 out of 100; Jews gave Palestinians an average score of 14. 51% of Jewish Israelis gave Palestinians a score of zero, and 71% of Palestinians gave the same score to Israelis. One percent of Palestinians

gave Israeli Jews a score of 80 or higher, and 2.7% of Israeli Jews scored Palestinians in this range. This question could reflect respondents' perception of the inherent qualities of the other side, or their assessment of the other side's behavior, or both.

- Only 10% of Israeli Jews and 6% of Palestinians agree that it is possible to trust the other side. Both findings represent the lowest level since the question was first asked in 2017.

The war: Majorities predict escalation, moderate hope for regional peace: Large majorities on both sides expect the war to escalate and spread to the West Bank. However, when faced with the choice of a regional peace including a two-state solution, and Israeli-Saudi normalization, versus a multi-front regional war, a majority on both sides prefer the regional peace.

- Nearly three-quarters of Israeli Jews (72%) and two-thirds 68% of Palestinians, along with 60% of Israeli Arabs expect the war to escalate to the West Bank.
- Nearly six-in-ten Israelis (58%, including 62% of Israeli Jews and 41% of Israeli Arabs) and 53% of the Palestinians believe the Gaza war will expand into a regional war.
- Asked to choose between a regional war, including Israel, the PA, Lebanon, Yemen and possibly Iran, or a regional peace deal that includes Palestinian-Israeli two-state solution and Arab-Israeli normalization, 65% of the Palestinians and 62% of Israelis chose peace; this represents significantly higher support than either side demonstrates for a two-state solution on its own. 29% of Palestinians and 38% of Israelis prefer the regional war.
- There was minimal difference between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; among Israelis, 55% of Jews and 89% of Arabs prefer the regional and Palestinian-Israeli peace.
- 41% of Palestinians believe the current war is so extreme and unprecedented, it might actually create an opportunity for a breakthrough for peace, like after 1973; more people in Gaza agree (54%, vs. 31% in the West Bank). 52% of Arabs in Israel agree, and 23% of Israeli Jews.

The two-state solution/terms for peace

- 40% of Palestinians support a two-state solution, a 7-point rise compared to 2022. More Palestinians support this than those who support either a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews (33%), or a single democratic state with equal rights for all (25%).
- Twice as many Jewish Israelis support annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians (42%), as those who support a two-state solution (21% - a 13-point decline from 2022 and the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s). 14% of Israeli Jews support a single democratic state.
- Support for an alternative two-state confederation has declined among Israelis relative to 2022: 20% of all Israelis (compared to 29% in 2022), but increased among Palestinians, from 22% to 35% in 2024. Among Israelis, just 12% of Israeli Jews support a confederation, but 52% of Arabs
- Support for a detailed peace package identical to the one we presented to both sides since 2018 show an 8-point rise among Palestinians support, a 6-point drop in Israeli Jews, and a 7-point rise among Israeli Arabs. Today, 34% of Palestinians, 25% of Israeli Jews, and 69% of Israeli Arabs support the package. The peace package comprises: a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic, the bilateral agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states, the US and major Arab countries will ensure full implementation of the agreement by both sides, and the end of the conflict and claims. Sixty-three

of Palestinians, 65% of Israeli Jews, and 13% of Israeli Arabs are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package.

- However, incentives offered to each side intended to make the above two-state comprehensive peace plan more attractive were effective for a significant portion of Israelis and Palestinians, who said specific incentives made them more likely to support a detailed peace plan.
 - “Unilateral” incentives, in which each side is told about steps the other side will take in support of an agreement, boost support: six such incentives cause Israelis who were originally opposed to a detailed peace plan to change their minds; added to original supporters, a majority support the peace plan following each of the six incentives. Among Palestinians, four incentives by Israel have the same effect, yielding a net majority in support of a detailed peace plan.
 - “Paired” incentives offer each side the same steps tested earlier, with an added incentive their own side will provide to the other. This is intended to reflect reality in the event of an actual negotiation for peace, which will contain terms each side considers favorable to its side, but also terms favoring the other. These pairs are less effective at raising support for a detailed peace agreement; but one pair yielded net majority support from Israeli Jews (after calculating opposition that shifted to support for an agreement and vice versa) – specifically, both sides combatting incitement against the other in textbooks (61% net support), and one pair raised Palestinian support to a majority (allowing Palestinian laborers to work in Israel, while Palestine allows Israeli factories to remain in Palestine).

The flexibility of attitudes towards peace in response to new terms for an agreement, including incentives, is consistent with earlier surveys, despite the significantly lower support as a starting point in previous years. The comprehensive framing of the urgency for peace versus the alternative within a regional context is stronger than the stand-alone concept of a two-state solution, or a detailed version of a two-state peace package. But the barrier of dehumanized, fearful, non-trusting, zero-sum attitudes towards the other is a significant obstacle being fueled by leaders and developments on the ground, both of which will have to change for attitudes to improve.

Methodology

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face, 830 in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and 440 in the Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 17-20 July, 2024. The margin of error is +/-3.5%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis. 500 Israeli Jews were interviewed through an online panel, with an oversample of 200 West Bank settlers, by Project Midgam. 200 Arab respondents were interviewed by iPanel, between 18-29 July. The sample has been weighted to reflect the representation of each group in Israel’s population. The margin of error is +/-3.34%

Complete poll summary attached. For more information or interviews: contact Khalil Shikaki, PSR director, at pcpsr@pcpsr.org or 02 296 4933 or 059-944-4045; Nimrod Rosler, Head of the International Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation at Tel-Aviv University, rosler@tauex.tau.ac.il, or Dahlia Scheindlin, at dahlia60@gmail.com or 0544384605.



With funding from the [Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah](#) and the [Representative Office of Japan to Palestine](#) through [UNDP/PAPP](#).

