The Palestine/Israel Pulse: A Joint Poll

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Adding poll-tested incentives to the core items of two-state peace package raises support among both Israelis & Palestinians above their initial support for the plan without the new items. Yet, support for the two-state solution falls to the lowest level during the past two years. Pairing zero-sum reciprocal incentives yields mixed results.

13 August 2018 ———— Only a minority of both Israeli Jews and Palestinians (43% each) supports the concept of a two-state solution, following the trend of incremental decline over the course of the decade among both populations. Support among Palestinians and Israeli Jews dropped three points each from December 2017 (in total, an eight point decline among Palestinians and nine points among Israeli Jews since June 2016). Among Israeli Arabs, support remains stable and very high at 82%. Moreover, in its fifth round of polling, our original 9-point final status package for implementing the two-state solution is supported by 37% of Palestinians, 39% of Israeli Jews, and 82% of Israeli Arabs; a three-point drop for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs and four-point increase for Israeli Jews since December. A modified version of the same package tested for the first time, with three additional items, generates greater backing: 42% of Palestinians, 45% of Israeli Jews, and 91% of Israeli Arabs support the modified plan.

In a second experiment, the current survey drew on sixteen previously tested zero-sum incentives intended to raise support among those opposed to the package in previous surveys. In the current study we paired measures that show reciprocal benefits/costs to each side. The impact of the pairs on the Israeli side was promising, as most of the eight pairs generated significantly higher levels of support, and some raised support to a majority among Jews. However, among Palestinians the same pairs had a much weaker effect and most of them failed to increase support for the two packages beyond the original levels in this survey.

A plurality or a majority of Israelis and Palestinians, respectively, believe that settlements have expanded so much that the two-state solution is no longer viable: nearly half of Israeli Jews (47%) and 56% Palestinians. Large majorities on both sides believe the other side is untrustworthy. The perceived lack of feasibility and the lack of trust are closely connected to opposition to the plan. Findings also show a net decline over the last two years in the percentage of Israeli Jews and Palestinians who think the other side wants peace.

These are the findings of the new Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll, published today by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU) and the government of Japan. The poll was conducted in June-July 2018 among representative samples of 2150 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and 1600 Israelis, with oversamples of settlers and Arab citizens. The margin of error is +/-2.5% for the Palestinians and +/-3% for the Israelis. The survey tested the details of a permanent peace agreement, perceptions of the other, and alternate scenarios to the two-state solution, including both equal and unequal versions of one state, and a confederation of two states. The following summary has been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki and Walid Ladadwa from PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.

Detailed Findings: Support for the two-state solution declines from 46% among Palestinians and Israeli Jews six months ago to 43% for both sides today. This is the lowest level of support for this concept among the two publics during the past two years of the Pulse, the lowest in more than a decade, when a steady decline in support began, and the lowest in almost two decades of joint Palestinian-Israeli survey...
research. Among those who do not support a two-state solution, only smaller constituencies on both sides support three possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights, one state without rights, and expulsion or “transfer.” Among Israeli Jews, the portion of the total who do not support two states but instead prefer one equal state or annexation without rights for Palestinians – an apartheid-like situation – rose relative to December 2017: the one-state constituency rose from 14-19% and the apartheid constituency from 11% in December to 15%. Among Palestinians the constituencies did not change significantly.

Half of the Palestinian and Israeli samples were presented with a peace package identical to the one we presented to them four times over the past two years. Only 37% of Palestinians (compared to 40% in December 2017) and 39% of Israeli Jews (compared to 35% six months ago) support this permanent peace agreement package, along with 82% of Israeli Arabs – typical of the high level support from Israeli Arabs in previous surveys. In total, 46% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises: a demilitarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims. Forty-eight percent of Israelis (54% of Israeli Jews) and 61% of Palestinians are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package.

A modified package, containing all the same items as the original one described above, was presented to the other half of the sample. However, the modified version included three additional components that previous research showed to provide positive incentives to respondents who opposed the original package on both sides: Israel and the future state of Palestine will be democratic; the bilateral agreement will be part of a regional agreement along the lines of the Arab Peace Initiative; and the US and major Arab countries will insure full implementation of the agreement by both sides. In comparison with support for the original package, the modified one received greater support from both sides: 45% of Israeli Jews and 42% of Palestinians, a 6-point and a 5-point increase respectively. Among Israeli Arabs, support rose to 91%, bringing the Israeli weighted total to 53%, a majority.

The current survey also tested the likely impact of previously tested zero-sum incentives on the level of support for the original and the modified packages. Drawing on eight such incentives, we paired measures that show reciprocal benefits/costs to each side. The impact of the pairs on the Palestinian side was weaker than on the Israeli side, as most of them failed to increase support for the two packages. On the Israeli side, six of the eight pairs generated higher levels of support for the original comprehensive package. One item managed to raise support beyond the original levels on both sides. This item was that both sides would end their campaigns blocking the other side’s international relations: Palestinians would end the boycott and Israel would end its opposition to Palestine joining all international organizations. Only among Palestinians who heard the modified version included three additional components that previous research showed to provide positive incentives to respondents who opposed the original package on both sides: Israel and the future state of Palestine will be democratic; the bilateral agreement will be part of a regional agreement along the lines of the Arab Peace Initiative; and the US and major Arab countries will insure full implementation of the agreement by both sides. In comparison with support for the original package, the modified one received greater support from both sides: 45% of Israeli Jews and 42% of Palestinians, a 6-point and a 5-point increase respectively. Among Israeli Arabs, support rose to 91%, bringing the Israeli weighted total to 53%, a majority.

Reasons for doubts. The skepticism about the two packages is closely correlated with serious doubts about feasibility. Palestinians and Israelis are both divided almost equally about whether a two-state solution is still possible, or whether settlements have expanded too much to make it viable. Among all Israelis, nearly half believes the solution is still viable (48%), while 45% think settlements have spread too much for it to be viable. While Israeli Arabs remain highly optimistic, with 64% thinking this solution remains viable, only 44% of Israeli Jews agree with this assessment. Among Palestinians, 56% say the two-state solution is no longer viable (a four-point decrease from December), while 39% think it is. But fully 72% and 81% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, respectively, do not expect a Palestinian state to be established in the next five years.

The second main reason involves lack of trust in the other side and a zero-sum dynamic, or the belief that whatever is good for one side is bad for the other. A quarter of Israeli Jews trust Palestinians and only 11% of Palestinians trust Israeli Jews. Further, only 35% of Israeli Jews and 39% of Palestinians think the majority on the other side wants peace. Almost half of Israeli Jews (47%) and 71% of Palestinians think the conflict is zero-sum.

Where to go from here. When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 41% of the Palestinians (47% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) 45% of Israeli Jews and 84% of Israeli Arabs choose “reach a peace agreement.” This represents a significant increase in support for a peace agreement among Palestinians compared to only 26% who chose this option in the aftermath of the Trump declaration on Jerusalem six months ago, and returns close to levels seen in June 2017. Over one-quarter (27%)
of Palestinians (compared to 38% six months ago) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 20% call for “a definitive war with the Palestinians,” the highest figure of the last three surveys.

**Alternatives.** To understand the preferred scenarios among those who do not support a two-state solution, three alternatives were tested: (1) One equal state, (2) one unequal state (apartheid), and (3) an extreme scenario in which one side expels the other. Once those who support a two-state solution are separated from the analysis, the maximum number who support each of these alternatives ranges between 8% and 19%, from each population. When asked separately about a confederation between two states, Israel and Palestine, 30% of all Palestinians, 31% of all Israeli Jews, and 68% of all Israeli Arabs support it. Palestinian attitudes have shifted up and down over the last two years, while Israeli Jews showed a net rise of 11 points from initial support (20%) when the question was first asked in December 2016.

**Complete poll summary attached. For more information or interviews: contact Roy Yellin, TSC’s spokesperson, at ryellin@gmail.com or 0544654431 (Hebrew and English speakers and reporters in Israel) or Hamada Jaber, PSR Administrator, at hamada.jaber@pcpsr.org or 059-947-4310 (Arabic and English speakers or those located in the Palestinian territories).**

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