

Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS)

Public Opinion Poll NO (13)

Unemployment, Jordanian-Israeli Treaty, Armed Operations, Elections, and Other Issues November

17-19, 1994

This is the thirteenth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. The following topics are covered in this poll: unemployment, the Jordanian-Israeli treaty, armed operations, Palestinian-Israeli relations, elections of the PNA president, and elections of PISGA.

SRU has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. Poll results provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. In a broader sense, CPRS strives to promote the status of scientific research in Palestine. SRU disseminates the results of the polls through a number of means, including its community outreach program where the results are shared and discussed with a large number of Palestinians.

The majority (74.2%) of the interviews for this poll were conducted Thursday and Friday (November 17-18) and before the violent confrontations in Gaza after Friday prayers between the Palestinian police and demonstrators from Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The remainder of the interviews (25.8%) were conducted after the confrontations, on Saturday, November 19. These confrontations led to the killing of fifteen Palestinians and the wounding of over two hundred more. It was difficult for us to measure possible changes in attitudes as a result of the confrontations in Gaza because the questionnaire was not designed to measure these changes. However, a comparison of the two sets of interviews (conducted before and after the Friday confrontations) revealed that there was no appreciable difference between them.

Enclosed are the results of the most recent public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank (including Arab Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (see [Appendix](#)).

The period preceding the poll was full of political activity, which could be summarized as follows:

1. Izzidin al-Qassam, the military wing of Hamas, declared its responsibility for a number of armed operations against Israeli targets, including the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Naschon Wachsmann where the kidnappers demanded the release of a number of Hamas prisoners and other Palestinians in Israeli jails. One of Hamas' supporters carried out a suicide bombing of an Israeli bus in Tel Aviv, killing 22 Israelis and wounding many more. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for an armed operation in Gaza that led to the death of three Israeli army officers and the wounding of another six soldiers and a few Palestinians. A Palestinian journalist and Islamic Jihad leader was assassinated by a car bomb. Israelis were suspected of carrying out the attack. Ten thousand Palestinians attended his funeral in Gaza.

2. The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was signed, which increased tensions between the Palestinian and Jordanian sides because of fears concerning the subject of sovereignty over the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, where the treaty gives Jordan the right of supervision over these sites. King Hussein and His Highness Hassan assured the Palestinians that the Muslim holy sites would come under their sovereignty as soon as they restored their sovereignty over their land.
3. November 15th marked the sixth anniversary of the Declaration of Palestinian Independence. A number of celebrations were taking place, especially in Gaza. At the same time, the PLO executive committee was supposed to meet in Gaza. The meeting was attended by only eight members out of the eighteen.
4. Negotiations continued between the Palestinians and the Israelis concerning the transfer of power and responsibilities and also concerning elections. At the same time Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin announced that Israel demands amending the Palestinian National Charter as a prerequisite to holding elections. Mr. Saeb Erakat and other Palestinian leaders described the latest position of Rabin as stalling, aimed at obstructing elections and transfer of authority to the Palestinians. Also during this period the Palestinians assumed their responsibilities at the border crossings.
5. During this period, an economics conference was held for the Middle East and North Africa with the participation of a number of states and organizations and companies. Palestinian and Israeli delegations participated in the conference. The conference coincided with a declaration presented by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin lifting the closure of the West Bank and Gaza to allow some Palestinian workers to return to jobs in Israel, while still prohibiting the majority of the Palestinian workers from working in Israel.
6. The delay in delivering the funding on the part of the donor countries to the Palestinian Authority caused concern to the Palestinian leadership and other leaders in Arab countries. For example, the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, said that the West Bank and Gaza Strip will become another Afghanistan if funding did not reach the autonomous areas in time.
7. There were numerous calls for dialogue and national unity presented by the leadership of the Palestinian authority and the opposition, especially Hamas.
8. During this period, the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron was re-opened. The mosque had been closed since the massacre which took place February 25, 1994. The mosque was divided between the Muslims and the Jews, a procedure which Palestinians and other Arabs opposed.
9. This period witnessed the beginning of internal Fatah elections, where elections were actually held to choose the leadership in the Ramallah area. However, after these elections, the elections for the other areas were postponed indefinitely.
10. Cholera was reported in Gaza which affected a number of Palestinians.

Methodology

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Nablus area prior to the poll. The questionnaire instrument

includes a large number of demographic variables as indicated in the section on sample distribution.

Household Sample Selection

SPU researchers adopted a multi-stage sample selection process. For the purpose of this poll, public-forum interviews were eliminated and replaced by household interviews. The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to district, population size and distribution, and type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp). A simple random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Sample Localities Selection

The Following table lists the localities that were included in the sample for this month.

District (Sample Size/ %)	Localities (Type)	District (Sample Size/%)	Localities (Type)
Nablus (109/10.1%)	Nablus (C), Balata (RC), Awarta (V), Beit Fureik (V), Yasseed (V)	Tulkarm/Qalqilya (89/8.1%)	Tulkarm (C), Tulkarm (RC), Beit Liyed (V), Zeita (V), al-Zaweya (V)
Jenin (79/7.3%)	Jenin (C), Jenin (RC), Siela al-Thahir (V), Ajja (V), Ramana (V), Zababda (V)	Jericho (20/1.9%)	Jericho (C), A'qbar Jabar (RC), al-Duwil (V)
Ramallah (103/9.6%)	Ramallah (C), Ram (C), Amari (RC), Birzeit (V), Qatana (V), Beit Rema (V)	Hebron (120/11.2%)	Hebron (C), Ithna (T), Nalhoul (T), Tafouh (V), Sureif (V), Al-Aroub (RC)
Jerusalem (75/7.0%)	Old City (C), al-Asawiya (V), Shufat (RC), Sur Bahir (V)	Bethlehem (69/6.4%)	Bethlehem (C), Al-Deheishi (RC), Battir (V), Beit Fajjar (V)
Gaza North (97/9.0%)	Jabalia (RC), Nazala (V)	Gaza City (134/12.5%)	Al-Rimal, Al-Shati, Tufaah, Subra
Gaza Middle (91/8.5%)	Nuseirat (RC), Khan Yunis (RC), Khan Yunis (C), Absaan al-Kibira (V)	Gaza South (90/8.4%)	Rafah (C), Rafah (RC)

Fieldworkers and researchers created maps for these localities. These maps indicated the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these localities which were further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks) with each unit comprising an average of two hundred housing units. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly. Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be two hundred and is assigned ten interviews, the fieldworker divided the 200 by 10, obtaining 20. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the 20th house, and the second in the 40th, and so on. Fieldworkers were asked to start their sample selection of housing units from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc. They were asked to report on the direction

of their sampling walks. Fieldworkers played an active role in drawing the maps for the localities in the sample and in estimating the number of houses in each block.

To select the individual within the selected household to be interviewed, fieldworkers had to flip a coin twice. The first flip was to choose gender of the respondent and the second was to choose whether the respondent is to be older or younger than forty years. When in the household, fieldworkers would conduct the interview with the person who has the characteristics that they selected in this manner.

We received 664 questionnaires from the West Bank and 412 from Gaza, for a total of 1076 interviews.

Table 2 provides the reader with data on sample distribution for the present poll where the sample was selected based on household interviews.

Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

Area of Residence					
West Bank "including Jerusalem" Gaza Strip	61.7%	City	31.4%		
		Town	07.3%		
	38.3%	Village	30.0%		
		Refugee Camps	31.2%		
Age		Sex		Education	
18-22	15.9%	Males Females	48.8% 51.2%	Up to 9 years (elem./prep)	47.3%
23-26	13.6%			Up to 12 years (Tawjihi)	31.7%
27-30	15.2%			2 year College	11.6%
31-35	14.1%			University (BA)	07.6%
36-42	13.4%			MA + Phd.	1.5%
43-50	10.3%				
51+	17.4%				
Refugee Status		Occupation			
Ref. Non Ref.	52.1 46.9	Laborers	11.8%		
		Merchants	03.7%		
		Craftsmen	09.6%		
		Students	07.2%		
		Housewives	39.1%		
		Farmers	02.4%		
		Employees*	10.1%		
		Specialists**	02.7%		
		Unemployed	16.8%		
Retired	00.6%				

* Employees: Schoolteacher, Government Employee, Nurse, Lower-level Company Employee, Secretary, etc.

** Specialists: University Teacher, Engineer, Doctor, Lawyer, Pharmacist, Executive, etc.

***A new question for the demographic section as an initial attempt to measure information access and basis for Palestinian opinions.

Data Collection

Our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on household interviewing, confidence building, mapping, sampling techniques, survey methods, and scientific research. Four special training seminars for data collectors were conducted during this month, attended by a total of sixty-four fieldworkers. Training for data collection was conducted in the field where actual illustrations of the sample selection and interviewing techniques were conducted.

Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. More than fifty percent of our data collectors were female, so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 15 per day) to allow for careful interviewing.

Interviews took place primarily over a three day period, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, and were conducted on a face-to-face basis.

Table 3

Sample Size (%) by Date and Time of Interviews

Day of Interview	% of Interviews		
Thursday	34.1	40.1	25.8
Friday			
Saturday			

Household interviews resulted in a lower non-response rate, estimated at 8.6%. Some respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their political views out of fear or disinterest in the present political factions .

Data Analysis

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is less than 3%, and the confidence level is higher than 95%.

Results

The Jordanian-Israeli Agreement

The majority of the Palestinians (51.7%) see the Jordanian-Israeli agreement as harming the Palestinian cause. In contrast, 10.9% believe that the agreement will be beneficial to the Palestinian cause. Additionally, 20.4% declared that the agreement will not have any effect on the Palestinian cause. We find here a difference between the West Bank and Gaza where a larger

percentage of the Gaza residents (56.6%) believe that the agreement will harm the Palestinian cause, compared with 48.6% of the West Bank residents. A total of 30% of respondents in Jericho believe that the agreement will have a positive influence on the Palestinian cause, compared with 55% of them who think that it will be harmful. A larger percentage of residents of the north than in the center or south of the West Bank believe that the agreement will benefit the Palestinian cause.

Table 4

Attitude towards the Jordanian-Israeli Treaty by Area of Residence

	Harmful %	Beneficial %	No effect %	Don't Know %
Nablus	45.0	15.6	16.5	22.9
Tulkarm	49.4	13.5	21.3	15.8
Jenin	46.8	16.5	17.7	19.0
Jericho	55.0	30.0	15.0	---
Ramallah	44.7	09.7	26.2	19.4
Hebron	55.0	07.5	20.0	17.5
Bethlehem	44.9	05.8	33.3	15.9
Jerusalem	52.0	12.0	16.0	20.0
Gaza North	69.1	03.1	21.6	06.2
Gaza City	53.7	11.9	15.7	18.7
Gaza Middle	52.7	14.3	26.4	06.6
Gaza South	51.1	05.6	15.6	27.7

A total of 48.9% of the Palestinians declared that the agreement will increase the Jordanian influence in the West Bank. This view may be the chief cause for their belief that the Jordanian-Israeli agreement will harm the Palestinian cause. There is no difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip in regard to this topic.

The poll results show that supporters of the opposition factions in addition to supporters of the Palestinian People's Party (PPP) are more likely to believe that the agreement between Jordan and Israel will harm the Palestinian cause, followed by factions supportive of the peace process where we find that 49.3% of the supporters of Fateh believe so. With regard to the agreement's effect on Jordanian influence in the West Bank, supporters of the opposition factions believe more than supporters of the factions supportive of the peace process that the agreement will lead to an increase in Jordanian influence in the area. This confirms the existing relation between political affiliation and the position concerning all agreements between Arab countries and Israel as the supporters of the Palestinian opposition view these agreements negatively.

There is a relationship between age and view of the influence of the treaty on the Palestinian cause where the younger respondents (18-35) are more likely than the older respondents (36 and older) to believe that the Jordanian-Israeli treaty will harm the Palestinian cause, where 53.6% of the 18-35 age group expressed this belief, compared with 42% of those over 36 years old.

Palestinian-Israeli Relations

Palestinians were asked about three issues related to Israeli-Palestinian relations: the degree of Israel's seriousness in implementing the agreement, armed operations against Israeli targets, and the establishment of dialogue between Hamas and Israel.

A.) Seriousness of Israel

The poll results show that most Palestinians (62.3%) think that Israel is not serious in implementing its agreements signed with the Palestinians, compared with 18% who feel that Israel is serious. As for the correlation between political affiliation and this topic, we find that trust in the seriousness of Israel is very slight among supporters of the opposition, while a larger percentage of Fateh and Feda supporters consider Israel's position to be serious.

Despite the view of Israel's position being predominantly negative in all the areas, more than 20% of the residents of Nablus, Jenin, Bethlehem, and Gaza Middle consider Israel to be serious in seeking peace. Lack of trust in Israel's position increases among those with a B.A. degree, where 85.7% of them declared that Israel is not serious, compared with 65.1% among those with primary education.

B.) Armed Operations

With regard to the attitude towards armed operations against Israeli targets *outside the autonomous areas* (the West Bank and Israel), 34.4% of Palestinians expressed their opposition to these operations. This is compared with 33.3% who expressed support. A total of 5.4% declared their support for these operations in the West Bank only, and 18.8% declared their support for these operations inside Israel only.

Support for the continuation of armed attacks (outside the autonomous areas) is larger in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank where 41.4% of Gazans declared their support for these operations, compared with 28.2% of the West Bank respondents (13.4% less). This difference may be due to the fact that the West Bank residents feel that these attacks could endanger their opportunity to end Israeli occupation and come under Palestinian authority. Also, the tendency towards support for the Islamic position calling for a Palestinian state on all of the land of Palestine is greater in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, which could account for the larger support for these operations in Gaza.

There was a clear correlation between support for armed operations and the nature of political affiliation as Palestinians opposing the agreements with Israel tend to support armed operations more than those supporting the agreements.

Table 5

Attitude Towards Armed Operations by Political Affiliation

	Yes %	No %	West Bank Only %	Israel Only %	Don't Know %
PFLP	59.7	09.7	01.6	27.4	01.6
PPP	14.3	71.4	---	14.3	---
Hamas	51.6	17.9	04.3	19.6	06.6
Feda	---	75.0	08.3	16.7	---
Islamic Jihad	56.4	17.9	07.7	10.3	07.7
Fateh	23.7	43.0	05.1	20.4	07.8
DFLP	58.3	08.3	16.7	16.7	---
Islamic Inds.	39.4	27.3	03.0	24.2	06.1
Nationalist Inds.	37.3	31.3	07.5	17.9	06.0
Others	43.2	31.8	04.5	09.1	11.4
No One	19.6	42.0	01.4	16.1	20.9

We find support for these operations to a greater extent among the younger age groups and those with 2-year degrees and to a lesser extent among those who have no more than primary education and among those with an M.A. or PhD. We notice also that the opposition to armed operations increases among retired, specialists, laborers, farmers, and housewives, whereas students and employees are more likely to support these operations.

Women are more likely to oppose these armed operations than men where 38.5% of women declared their opposition compared to 30% of men. A total of 39% of men who support the operations against Israeli targets, compared with 27.4% of women. These findings are consistent with a large number of studies that were conducted in a number of countries including Israel. These studies indicated that women tend to support nonviolent means more than men in resolving conflicts.

C.) Dialogue Between Hamas and Israel

Despite the support for armed operations against Israeli targets, most Palestinians (59.1%) support the establishment of dialogue between Hamas and Israel. This support increases with an increase in age, where we find that 64.4% of those 36 and older support dialogue between Israel and Hamas, compared with 55.7% of those in the 18-35 age group. There is an inverse relationship between support for this dialogue and educational attainment (excluding those with 2-year degrees) where we find that 40% of those with an M.A. or PhD support this dialogue, compared with 60% of those with only primary education.

Table 6

Attitude towards Dialogue between Hamas and Israel by Education

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
9 years or less	59.9	25.7	14.4
Tawjihi	58.6	32.7	08.6
2 year college	62.9	30.6	06.5
B.A.	53.0	38.6	08.4
M.A. or PhD	40.0	40.0	20.0

Support for this dialogue declines among students, farmers, and specialists and increases among craftsmen and the unemployed.

It is interesting to find that 44.6% of Hamas supporters support the notion of establishing dialogue with Israel, compared with 72.5% among Fateh supporters.

Table 7

Attitude Towards Dialogue between Hamas and Israel by Political Affiliation

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
PFLP	35.5	53.2	11.3
PPP	64.3	21.4	14.3
Hamas	44.6	50.0	05.4
Feda	81.8	18.2	---
Islamic Jihad	35.9	61.5	02.6
Fateh	72.5	19.5	08.0
DFLP	41.7	50.0	08.3

Islamic Inds.	48.5	42.4	09.1
Nationalist Inds.	70.1	19.4	10.5
Others	54.5	29.5	16.0
No One	52.8	21.5	25.8

Proposed Solution to the Palestinian Issue

The poll results show that 49.8% of the Palestinians accept the solution that the PLO has proposed to the Palestinian issue, which is the establishment of two states -- one for Palestinians and one for Israelis. We find that acceptance of this solution is spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza, with slightly more support in the West Bank (50.5%, compared with 48.7% in Gaza). As for the Islamic solution, which the Islamic groups propose and which calls for the liberation of all the land of Palestine, it has the support of 38.7% of Palestinians. Support for this solution came to a larger extent from Gaza, where 43.1% of the respondents choose this option, than from the West Bank where 35.9% of the respondents selected such an option, a difference of 7.8%.

We find also that support for the Jordanian solution, re-annexing the West Bank through negotiation with Israel, is almost exclusive to the West Bank, where 8% of the Palestinians declared their support for such an option.

Support for the PLO position comes mainly from supporters of the peace process with Israel (Fateh, Feda, PPP) in addition to supporters of nationalist independents and DFLP. Support for the Islamic solution comes mainly from supporters of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and joining them in their calls to liberate all the Palestinian land are most of the supporters of PFLP and Islamic independents.

Table 8

Attitude Towards Proposed Solutions by Political Affiliation

	PLO	Islamic	Jordanian	Other
Fateh	70.1	19.6	05.2	05.1
Feda	100.0	---	---	---
PPP	78.6	21.4	---	---
Nationalist Inds	68.7	22.4	03.0	05.9
Hamas	14.8	79.8	03.3	02.1
Islamic Jihad	12.8	82.1	05.1	---
PFLP	37.1	50.0	03.2	09.7
DFLP	58.3	41.7	---	---
Islamic Inds	36.4	54.5	03.0	06.1
Others	50.0	36.4	02.3	11.3
No one	33.6	40.0	11.4	15.0

Support for the Jordanian solution is spread throughout the political factions, and increases slightly among those respondents who declared that they would vote for none of the factions listed in the questionnaire, where it reached 11.4%.

The poll results show that there is a relationship between view of the solutions and area of residence, where support for the PLO's proposed solution surpasses support for the other solutions in the north of the West Bank in particular. In Hebron and Gaza Middle, support for the Islamic solution is higher than support for the PLO solution. The two solutions have about the same support rates in Jerusalem and in Gaza City. Support for the Jordanian solution is particularly evident in the Nablus area, where it reaches 17.9%.

Table 9**Attitude Towards Proposed Solutions by Area of Residence**

	PLO %	Islamic %	Jordanian %	Other %
Nablus	48.1	23.6	17.9	10.4
Tulkarm	54.0	36.8	04.6	04.6
Jenin	56.0	30.7	08.0	05.3
Jericho	65.0	30.0	05.0	---
Ramallah	52.9	24.5	12.7	09.9
Jerusalem	40.0	53.3	05.0	01.7
Hebron	58.0	37.7	02.9	01.4
Bethlehem	46.7	45.3	01.3	06.7
Gaza North	59.4	32.3	---	08.3
Gaza City	46.4	41.0	01.5	11.2
Gaza Middle	38.5	61.5	---	---
Gaza South	51.1	38.9	---	10.0

Support for the PLO solution is more popular among men (54.8%) than among women (45%). We find that support for the Islamic solution is more popular among the young (18-35 years) where it reaches 45% than among the older groups, where it is at 33.4%.

Table 10**Attitude Towards Proposed Solution by Age**

	PLO %	Islamic %	Jordanian %	Other %
18-30 years	48.1	43.1	04.0	04.8
31+ years	51.3	34.9	06.0	07.7

Support for the Islamic solution is at 47.4% among students, compared with 44.7% student support for the PLO solution. Support for the Islamic solution is present at a noteworthy extent among the merchants and retired. Support for the Islamic solution as suggested by the poll questions is not only from supporters of the Islamic groups but also from supporters of the nationalist secular groups such as PFLP and DFLP.

Elections of the Head of the National Authority

The current poll includes an investigation into Palestinian opinion regarding a group of possible nominees for election as head of the Palestinian authority: George Habash, Yassir Arafat, Ahmed Yassin, and Hayder Abdel Shafi. The results show that in the event of separate elections for the head of the Palestinian authority, Yassir Arafat would win with a percentage of 44.2% of the votes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Ahmed Yassin would attain 19.7% of the votes, followed by Hayder Abdel Shafi at 8.9% and George Habash at 6.8%. A total of 20.4% represents undecided individuals or supporters of other Palestinian leaders.

The results show that support for Yassir Arafat, the head of Fateh, comes primarily from the supporters of that group. He also enjoys some support among the supporters of Feda and nationalist independents. Ahmed Yassin's support comes primarily from the supporters of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Islamic independents. Hayder Abdel Shafi attracts support from PPP, nationalist independents, and Islamic independents.

Table 11**Election for Head of Palestinian Authority by Political Affiliation**

	Habash	Arafat	Yassin	Abdel Shafi	Other
Fateh	01.8	87.3	02.0	03.4	05.5
Feda	08.3	33.3	---	08.3	50.1
PPP	---	07.7	07.7	53.8	30.8
Hamas	---	05.5	78.7	04.9	10.9
Islamic Jihad	---	05.3	57.9	07.9	28.9
Islamic Inds.	---	18.2	27.3	15.2	39.3
PFLP	90.3	03.2	---	03.2	03.3
DFLP	---	16.7	08.3	08.3	66.7
National Inds	01.6	24.2	01.6	50.0	22.6
Other	02.3	20.9	04.7	11.6	60.5
No one	02.8	18.4	12.1	08.5	58.2

There is a difference between the West Bank and Gaza, where Yassir Arafat enjoys greater popularity in the Gaza Strip (55.3%) than in the West Bank (37.2%), a difference of 18%. These results are compared with those of Ahmed Yassin, who enjoys greater popularity in the West Bank (23%) than in Gaza (14.6%). The highest percentage for Ahmed Yassin is in Hebron, where he attained 40% of the vote, compared with 28% for Yassir Arafat.

Table 12**Election of Head of Palestinian Authority by Area of Residence**

	Habash	Arafat	Yassin	Abdel Shafi	Other
Nablus	08.7	46.2	12.5	08.7	23.9
Tulkarm	03.5	43.5	29.4	05.9	17.7
Jenin	08.5	40.8	21.1	15.5	14.1
Jericho	10.0	55.0	20.0	05.0	10.0
Ramallah	05.8	30.1	13.6	12.6	37.9
Hebron	04.2	28.0	39.8	11.0	17.0
Bethlehem	10.4	46.3	20.9	09.0	13.4
Jerusalem	08.3	25.0	20.8	08.3	37.6
Gaza North	09.3	46.4	15.5	10.3	18.5
Gaza City	04.5	56.7	15.7	06.0	17.1
Gaza Middle	06.7	59.6	15.7	05.6	12.4
Gaza South	06.7	58.4	11.2	06.7	17.0

Support for Yassir Arafat is approximately the same among men and women, while we find that support for Ahmed Yassin is higher among women (23.2%) than among men (16%). Support for Hayder Abdel Shafi came more from men (11.1%) than women (6.6%), possibly due to a large number of women, particularly uneducated women, not knowing Mr. Abdel Shafi, especially since we find that educated individuals are more likely to vote for Mr. Abdel Shafi. As for George Habash, slightly more men than women support him.

As for age, support for Yassir Arafat is higher among the younger and older respondents and drops by an average of 10% among the middle-aged (28-35 years) groups. Support for Ahmed Yassin is higher among the younger respondents than the older ones.

Table 13

Election of Head of National Authority by Age

	Habash %	Arafat %	Yassin %	Abdel Shafi %	Other %
18-22	11.3	42.9	23.8	04.2	17.9
23-26	07.0	53.8	19.6	04.9	14.7
27-30	09.4	35.2	24.5	12.6	18.2
31-35	06.1	35.8	25.7	08.8	23.6
36-42	04.3	46.4	20.0	10.0	19.3
43-50	03.8	50.9	16.0	09.4	19.8
51+	03.4	46.9	09.6	11.3	28.8

The poll results show a relationship between place of residence and attitude towards the people listed in the questionnaire, where we find more support for Yassir Arafat from the camps and less from the villages. This is the opposite of Ahmed Yassin, where the villages give him the largest percentage of votes, followed by the cities and towns. His support is the least in the refugee camps. This phenomena is linked to the low support for Ahmed Yassin in the Gaza Strip, where support for Fateh and the authority is common in the refugee camps.

Table 14

Election of Head of National Authority by Place of Residence

	Habash %	Arafat %	Yassin %	Abdel Shafi %	Other %
City	05.8	43.1	19.0	11.3	20.8
Town	03.8	43.6	17.9	09.0	25.6
Village	08.3	39.4	24.4	07.7	20.2
Refugee Camp	06.9	50.0	16.6	07.5	19.0

The poll results show that support for Yassir Arafat is higher among refugees, whereas support for Ahmed Yassin and Hayder Abdel Shafi is higher among nonrefugees, which corresponds with the area and place of residence information presented above.

Support for these individuals is linked to degree of education, where support for Arafat is more common among those with less education, as shown by how 49% of those with primary education or less support Arafat, and 35% of those with a B.A. support him. Ahmed Yassin is more supported among those with Tawjihi, and Abdel Shafi among groups with 2 year college degrees.

Table 15

Election of Head of National Authority by Education

	Habash %	Arafat %	Yassin %	Abdel Shafi %	Other %
9 years or less	06.0	49.0	18.7	06.0	20.4
Tawjihi	07.5	42.9	23.4	09.3	16.8
2 year college	06.6	37.7	15.6	18.0	22.1
B.A.	07.2	34.9	18.1	09.6	30.1
M.A./PhD	06.7	33.3	06.7	13.3	40.0

Elections

The current poll results confirm the results of the twelve previous polls where most Palestinians (81.8%) support the idea of general political elections as the preferred means to select the members of PISGA. Also 76% of the respondents expressed their intent to participate in the elections. It is noticeable that the desire to participate in elections is found among both supporters and opponents of the Declaration of Principles.

Table 16

Intent to Participate in Elections by Political Affiliation

	Yes %	No %	Not Sure %
PFLP	69.4	19.4	11.2
PPP	85.7	14.3	---
Hamas	73.9	19.0	07.1
Feda	100	---	---
Islamic Jihad	79.5	17.9	02.6
Fateh	85.7	09.8	04.5
DFLP	58.3	08.3	33.4
Islamic Inds	75.8	09.1	15.1
Nationalist Inds	92.5	06.0	01.0
Other	65.9	15.9	18.2
No One	47.2	34.7	18.1

A larger percentage of men (81.9%) intend to participate in elections than women (70%). The intent to participate is higher in cities and villages than in refugee camps and towns, as shown in Table 17.

Table 17

Intent to Participate by Place of Residence

	Yes %	No %	Not Sure %
Cities	78.9	13.6	07.5
Towns	70.5	17.9	11.6
Villages	77.4	14.8	07.8
Refugee Camps	73.1	18.2	08.7

Political Affiliation

When compared with the results of the previous poll, the results of this poll show some differences. Particularly significant are:

- a. While the overall popularity of Fateh is generally consistent between this poll and the last (42.8% last month compared with 42.3% this month), there are differences between the West Bank and Gaza, where support for Fateh in the West Bank fell 7.6%, from a percentage of 44.6% in the previous poll to 37% in the current poll. The opposite occurred in Gaza where support for Fateh rose from 40% to 50.6%. These results may be due to the existence of most of the national authority in Gaza and the institution building there, while in the West Bank a lack of concrete results from the negotiations leads to lower trust in the decisions of the authority, which effects the popularity of Fateh which most see as the main supporter of the authority. Also, as the poll results show, support for Fateh comes to a large extent from the camps and among refugees who are more numerous in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. These figures are opposite to what we find for

support for Fateh among the residents of villages and nonrefugees, who are more numerous in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, and whose support is less. All of this leads to lower support for Fateh in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip.

Table 18

Support for Fateh and Hamas by Refugee Status

	Fateh %	Hamas %
Refugee	46.0	16.0
Non-Refugee	38.2	19.0

The poll results show that support for Fateh increases among those with less education, where we find that 44.5% of those with primary education or less support Fateh, compared with 31.9% of those with B.A. degrees.

Table 19

Support for Fateh and Hamas by Education

	Fateh %	Hamas %
9 years or less	44.5	15.0
Tawjihi	44.9	19.6
2 year college	35.8	19.5
B.A.	31.3	16.9
M.A. or PhD	40.0	13.3

b. Concerning the popularity of Hamas, support at the end of September was 10.1% and has increased this month to 17.4%. The latest result, in the opinion of most CPRS researchers, is more representative of Hamas support in the West Bank and Gaza. Previous polls conducted by CPRS have indicated that support for Hamas averages around 15% and repetition of these polls would cause any faction to return to its average. This may have been the case in the difference between last month's results for Hamas and this month's. There may have also been political factors that would account for an increase in the popularity of Hamas. The increase may have been due to an increase in the faction's activities, particularly of armed operations against Israeli targets. For many Palestinians, these operations that Hamas carried out are no more than an expression of the large degree of frustration from the lack of felt changes in their situation, represented by the continuation of the occupation and lack of progress in the negotiations. Also there is actual support for the armed operations at this stage among Palestinians as shown in the previous poll.

Support for Hamas was higher than support for Fateh in Hebron, where Hamas got 29.2% and Fateh 25%. This poll confirms what was found in all the previous polls where the Islamic groups in this district are obtaining a majority of support. We also find Hamas support in Tulkarm, Jenin, Gaza City, and Gaza Middle.

c. The percentage of support for independents (and others and no one) has declined from 33.1% in September to 27.2% currently. Since these groups make up a third of Palestinian society, it is worthwhile to understand the nature of the attitudes of their members. If we note the position of these groups regarding the armed operations against Israeli targets and we compare their positions with those of the supporters of Fateh and Hamas, we find that the position of the independent groups is in the middle between the two groups, as shown in Table 20.

Table 20**Armed Operations: Comparison between the Positions of the Independent Groups, Fateh, and Hamas**

	Support %	Oppose %	Support WB only %	Support in Israel only %	Don't Know %
Is. Inds.	39.4	27.3	03.0	23.2	06.1
Nat'l Inds.	37.3	31.3		17.9	06.0
Others	43.2	31.8	04.5	09.1	11.4
No One	19.6	42.0	01.4	16.1	21.0
Fateh	23.7	43.0	05.1	20.4	07.8
Hamas	51.6	17.9	04.3	19.6	06.6

Regarding attitude towards the proposed solutions to the Palestinian cause, the results indicate that most of the Islamic independents (54.5%) and 40% of those declaring that they would vote for no one on the list, support the Islamic solution, a position closer to that of the Islamic movements. At the same time we find that 68.7% of nationalist independents, and 50% of those declaring that they will vote for a group not mentioned on the list, support the PLO solution (Table 19), a position closer to those supporting Fateh.

Table 21**Proposed Solutions: Comparison between the Positions of Independent Groups, Fateh, and Hamas**

	PLO %	Islamic %	Jordanian %	Other %
Islamic Inds.	36.4	54.5	03.0	06.1
National Inds.	68.7	22.4	03.0	06.0
Other	50.0	36.4	02.3	11.4
No One	33.6	40.0	11.4	15.0
Fateh	70.1	19.6	05.2	05.1
Hamas	14.8	79.8	03.3	02.2

Finally, the average support for Yassir Arafat is approximately equal among these groups (20%) and despite the fact that the largest percentage of all these groups (not counting nationalist independents) tend not to specify their candidate, support for Yassir Arafat among those not choosing a faction or choosing a faction not listed is higher than support for any other person. Among Islamic independents, Ahmed Yassin obtained the most votes, and Hayder Abdel Shafi got the most votes among nationalist independents.

Table 22**Election of Head of National Authority by Independent Groups**

	Habash %	Arafat %	Yassin %	Abdel Shafi %	Other %
Is. Inds.	---	18.2	27.3	15.2	39.4
Nat'l Inds	01.6	24.2	01.6	50.0	22.6
Other	02.3	20.9	04.7	11.6	60.5
No One	02.8	18.4	12.1	08.5	58.2

Despite the fact that these given figures are not enough to arrive at a final conclusion regarding the subject, it appears that the people who are claiming independence from political factions are in fact independent in more than name. However, we can say that the position of the nationalist

independents tends to support the general line of the PLO. As for the Islamic independents, they lean mostly towards the position of the Islamic groups. Also an examination of the results of this and previous polls leads us to say that Fateh is able to take the votes of most of those who answered the political affiliation question with "other." Hamas might be able to attract the votes of some of those who have declared that they would vote for "no one" if these individuals decide to participate in elections.

Appendix

1. With regard to the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, I...

	Total	West Bank	Gaza
a. believe it will harm the Palestinian cause.	51.7%	48.6%	56.6%
b. believe it will benefit the Palestinian cause.	10.9%	12.0%	09.0%
c. believe it will have no effect, positive or negative on the Palestinian cause.	20.4%	21.1%	19.4%
d. don't know	17.0%	18.3%	15.0%

2. The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty will...

a. increase Jordanian influence in the West Bank.	48.9%	48.3%	50.0%
b. decrease Jordanian influence in the West Bank.	10.6%	08.7%	13.6%
c. not change Jordanian influence in the West Bank.	21.3%	23.2%	18.2%
d. I don't know	19.2%	19.8%	18.2%

3. With regard to the carrying out of armed operations against Israeli targets in the West Bank and Israel (outside the autonomous areas) by Palestinian groups,

a. I support these operations	33.3%	28.2%	41.4%
b. I do not support these operations	34.4%	36.7%	30.7%
c. I support these armed operations in the West Bank only.	04.5%	03.6%	05.8%
d. I support these armed operations in Israel only.	18.8%	19.9%	17.0%
e. I don't know	09.0%	11.6%	05.1%

4. After witnessing the Israeli implementation of the Palestinian-Israeli agreement on the ground up until now, I feel that

a. Israel is serious in seeking to achieve peace with the Palestinians.	18.0%	18.9%	16.5%
b. Israel is not serious in seeking to achieve peace with the Palestinians.	72.3%	70.7%	74.7%
c. I have no opinion	09.7%	10.4%	08.8%

5. The solution that I accept for the Palestinian cause is...

a. the PLO solution (establishment of two states in Palestine: Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza).	49.8%	50.5%	48.7%
b. the Islamic solution (that which is suggested by the Islamic movements and calling for the liberation of Palestine from the sea to the river).	38.7%	35.9%	43.1%
c. the Jordanian solution (Jordan negotiating with Israel to re-annex or unite the West Bank with Jordan)	05.1%	08.0%	00.5%
d. other (specify)	06.4%	05.7%	07.7%

6. Do you support the establishment of dialogue between Hamas and Israel?

a. Yes	59.1%	59.0%	59.1%
b. No	29.8%	28.2%	32.4%
c. No opinion	11.1%	12.8%	08.5%

7. In a staetment released by the "Local Government and Elections Commission" it was reported that the proposed Palestinian electoral law will state that the head of the Palestinian Authority will be elected directly by the people. If a separate election for the head of the National Authority takes place, and the following nominate themselves, I will choose...

a. George Habash	06.8%	06.9%	06.6%
b. Yassir Arafat	44.2%	37.2%	55.3%
c. Ahmed Yassin	19.7%	23.0%	14.7%
d. Hayder Abdel Shafi	08.9%	10.0%	07.1%
e. Other (Specify)	20.4%	22.9%	16.3%

8. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose the members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?

a. Appointment by PLO leadership	10.5%	09.1%	12.7%
b. Appointment by political groups on a quota basis.	04.7%	04.1%	05.6%
c. Political Elections	81.8%	82.9%	80.0%
d. Other	03.0%	03.9%	01.7%

9. Will you participate in the election for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?

a. Yes	76.0%	76.4%	75.4%
b. No	15.7%	16.1%	15.1%
c. Not sure	08.3%	07.5%	09.5%

10. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:

a. PFLP	05.9%	05.7%	06.1%
b. People's Party (Hizb el-Sha'b)	01.3%	01.7%	00.7%
c. Hamas	17.4%	17.6%	17.0%
d. Feda	01.1%	01.9%	00.0%
e. Islamic Jihad	03.7%	04.6%	02.2%
f. Fateh	42.3%	37.0%	50.6%
g. DFLP	01.1%	01.2%	01.0%
h. Islamic independents	03.1%	03.4%	02.7%
i. Nationalist independents	06.3%	07.9%	03.9%
j. Other (specify)	04.2%	02.6%	06.6%
k. None of the above	13.6%	16.4%	09.2%