

# Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS)

## Public Opinion Poll NO (5)

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### **Palestinian Political Attitudes Towards Elections and Other Issues of Concern**

January 16, 1994

This is the fifth public poll conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS). Similar to the previous polls, this poll deals with issues of concern to Palestinians such as elections, voting patterns, political affiliation, the peace process, and other pertinent political and economic issues. These polls are conducted by the Survey Research Unit at CPRS, and are intended to provide scientific data and analysis on Palestinian attitudes to researchers, policy makers, and concerned individuals and parties. Moreover, CPRS believes these polls provide a democratic mechanism that enables Palestinians to voice their opinions about various issues of concern to them.

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#### Introduction

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The present poll was conducted on the 16th of January, two days after the killing of five Palestinians by the Israeli military in Hebron and Gaza. A limited strike and mourning had been declared (January 15-18) in the West Bank and Gaza. A curfew imposed by the Israeli military on Hebron ended the morning of the day that the poll took place. At the same time, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators were still debating the details of a possible agreement with no news significant progress, and somewhat indifferent to, the Palestinians were frustrated with the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles (DOP). Support for the DOP had already fallen to 41% in December 1993 (as compared with 65% in September).

The Surveys and Polls Unit provides an analysis of the results of this most recent public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition to this analysis, the Policy Analysis Unit at CPRS is in the process of preparing a study on Palestinian Opposition and its future options. This study will be released in the coming few days. CPRS plans to continue its study of Palestinian political attitudes. It will conduct a monthly poll on elections, political agreements, political affiliation, and other important topics.

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#### Methodology

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CPRS researchers are constantly trying to refine and improve the validity of the research methodology and the reliability of the collected data. Towards these ends, fifty-four well-trained field workers were instructed to visit areas (interview stations) that attract a wide range of social groups and strata. These stations included, among others: bus/car stations that lead to villages and refugee camps, main markets, city centers, the entrances of mosques, hospitals, universities, .., etc.

So far, the majority of our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on sampling techniques, survey methods, scientific research, and field work. Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and female so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. All interinterviews took place on the same day and were conducted on a face-to-face basis. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 30) to allow for careful and intensive interviewing. Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies.

As to the questionnaire instrument, it was constructed by several Palestinian social scientists and researchers. As an attempt to identify the possible voting patterns of "independents" and "others", the question on political affiliation was revised from previous polls to include the following choices: the "nationalist independents", "Islamic independents", "no one", and "other political organizations (specify)".

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### Limitations

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A poll, such as this one, may have a number of limitations. Errors may have resulted from non-response which is estimated at 10%, and which was not included in the sample size. Heavy rain in the West Bank contributed to higher non-response rate. Women comprised the majority of non-respondents probably due to the public forum for the interviews, particularly if the data collector was male. Some people refused to respond because they believed that their opinions were irrelevant and were not taken into account by the Palestinian leadership when making decisions. A number of non-respondents explained their position as a statement against Palestinian-Israeli agreements.

Also, there were two terms used in the questionnaire, "Collective leadership" and "the Group of 10", that were not equally understood by all individuals in the sample. We anticipated some confusion over these relatively new terms and provided our data collectors with standard definitions to use if the respondents requested clarifications.

### **Electoral Districts in Gaza Strip**

One of the objectives set for this poll is to attempt to predict Palestinian voting patterns in the case of democratic elections. A random sample of 1607 Palestinians, over the age of 18, were interviewed in Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 618 questionnaires were received from the Gaza Strip and 989 questionnaires from the West bank.

For the purposes of this poll, the Gaza Strip was divided into seven "electoral districts" according to population size and distribution. The seven districts are the following:

District	Localities	Population Size *	Sample Size
North (1)	Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia Village & Project, Jabalia RC, Al-nazli	141.915	101

G. City "North" (2)	Al-Shati', Shiek Radwan, Al-Naser	90.000	83
G. City "West" (3)	Al-Rimal, Al-Sabra, Al-Daraj	110.000	80
G. City "East" (4)	Al-Tofah, Al-Zaytoun, Al-Shuga'iyah	100.000	85
Middle (5)	Al-Bureig, Al-Magazi, Nusierat, Zawaydeh, Deir El-Balah	116.600	89
Khan Yunis (6)	Khan Yunis (Camp and City)	105.514	80
South (7)	Rafah, Qararah, bani-Suhaila, khaza', Abasan	137.346	100

\* CPRS estimates are based on the figures provided by "Palestinian Population Handbook" by the "Planning and Research Center 1993"; "Palestinian Society, A Survey of Living Conditions" by "FAFO, 1993"; "Statistical Abstract of Israel by the "Central Bureau of Statistics, 1993".

Naturally, CPRS researchers realize that if elections were to be held, they would not necessarily be based on "electoral districts". We also understand that electoral districts may be divided in various other ways. However, we believe that this poll captures, as accurately as possible, the political map in the Gaza Strip and its districts.

### **The West Bank**

Based on the our experience in Gaza, CPRS researchers intend to divide the West Bank into several "electoral districts" in the near future. As of now, interviews were conducted in West Bank major towns;

<b>Area</b>	<b>Population Size</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>
Jerusalem	165.310	105
Hebron	259.565	167
Bethlehem	138.918	98
Ramallah	229.693	159
Nablus	230.998	156
Jericho	25.957	31
Tulkarm	202.432	137
Jenin	197.211	136

The collected data, as presented in the findings, show a clear picture of Palestinian voting preferences in these areas. In addition, interested individuals may obtain the results of the voting

patterns in each one these areas according to place of residence (city, village, and refugee camp) by contacting CPRS.

### Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

<b>Geographical Distribution</b>		<b>Area of Residence</b>	
61.5% West Bank "including Jerusalem"		45.3% Town	
38.5% Gaza Strip		33.5% Villages	
<b>Age</b>	<b>Gender</b>	21.2% Refugee Camps	
18-24 31.6%	61.0% Males	<b>Occupation</b>	
25-31 30.5%	39.0% Females	09.7% Laborers	28.8% Employees **
32-38 17.6%	<b>Refugee Status</b>	11.6% Craftsmen	05.8% Unemployed
39-45 10.9%	53.8% Refugee	12.5% Housewives	09.3% Specialists *
46-52 04.9%	46.2% Non-Refugee	09.2% Merchants	00.7% Retired
53+ 04.5%		10.8% Students	<b>Education</b>
		01.5% Farmers	21.5% Up to 9 years
	<b>Marital Status</b>		32.6% Up to 12 years
	39.2% Single		19.6% 2-years college
	59.2% Married		23.9% Bachelor
	01.6% Divorced & Widowed		02.4% Masters & PHDs

\* Specialists: (University Teacher, Engineer, Doctor, Lawyer, pharmacist, Executive)

\*\* Employees: (school teacher, govern.employee, Nurse, Lower-Level Company employee, Secretary, etc.)

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## Findings

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The results of this poll must be placed in their proper context. The circumstances surrounding this poll can be summarized as follows:

1. The general political process has been deteriorating for the last three months. The euphoria that followed the signing of the Declaration of Principles has faded away and people are frustrated with the Israeli attempts to hinder implementation of the political agreements. This has influenced popular views of the PLO as people are impatient with its inability to assert its position in the negotiations.
2. The events immediately preceding the poll in the West Bank had a major influence on the results of this poll. The brutal killing of four Palestinians ( Hamas supporters) in Hebron and the inability of the PLO leadership to stop such killings has led Palestinians to wonder about the future.
3. Internal (Palestinian on Palestinian) violence is perceived by most Palestinians as a problem of major magnitude. Palestinians feel that both the increase in violence and efforts to curb such violence are the responsibility of the Israeli authorities and Palestinian political groups. This perceived absence of rule of law has led to a state of frustration with "factionalism" and a trend towards "independence" or ambivalence.

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## Continuation of Negotiations

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Although a majority of Palestinians (50.9%) expressed their support for the continuation of the negotiations between the PLO and Israel, a large minority (39.8%) opposed such continuation, and a smaller group of individuals (9.3%) said that they were "not sure".

The results show that the opposition to the continuation of the peace talks is greater in Gaza (45.5%) than it is in the West Bank (36.3%). This is mainly due to a larger presence of opposition group supporters in Gaza. It is not unexpected that Gazans oppose the continuation of the negotiations more than Westbankers. Expectations of the political agreements are higher in Gaza. The implementation of the Declaration of Principles was supposed to start in December 13, 1993. Instead, the Israeli military continued to roam the streets of Gaza, and violent acts against Palestinians were on rise. The economic living conditions have deteriorated even further. All of this may have resulted in "polarization" of attitudes in Gaza, with fewer individuals saying that they are "not sure" about the issues.

We also notice a correlation between "place of residence" and "educational attainment", on the one hand, and attitude towards the continuation of the peace negotiations. The results of the poll indicate that refugee camp residents express the most opposition to this continuation, with 46% of

them saying that the negotiations shouldn't continue and another 46% saying that they should. The least opposition to the continuation of the negotiations can be found among villagers (34.5%). (See [Appendix 2A](#))

In respect to educational attainment, we find that it is inversely correlated with the position of the continuation of the negotiations. It is noticeable that opposition to such continuation is highest among community-college graduates reaching to 47.%, with 44.3% of them supporting the continuation of the negotiations. The least opposition to this is among the least and the most educated. (See Appendix 2B) Here, we need to emphasize that attitudes towards the negotiations are not perfectly correlated with the views of the DOP. Our December (1993) poll showed that support for the DOP was 41%, ten points less than support for the continuation of the negotiations.

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### Need for Coordination with Jordan

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Regarding the need for coordination with Jordan, 64.4% of Palestinians indicated that there is a need for further and close cooperation and between the PLO and Jordan in the political and economic spheres, 22.4% of the respondents said that there is no need for coordination, and another 13.4% said that they were not sure.

The positive attitude towards coordination with Jordan could be an expression of general asserting Palestinian feeling that the Palestinian negotiators are incapable of asserting Palestinian positions in the negotiations by themselves. In addition the televised speech made by King Hussein on January 1, 1994, left Palestinians with a strong feeling that no agreement is complete without Jordan. The results of this question could also be interpreted as a Palestinian consideration of the future, where Palestinians must promote close ties with Arab countries in general.

In contrast, a previous CPRS poll ([Palestinian Elections and the DOP December 12, 1993](#)) showed that support for a confederation with Jordan was not common as 26.7% of Palestinians supported a confederation, and 52.5% supported an independent Palestinian state.

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### Arab Boycott of Israel

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A large percentage of Palestinians are not in favor of lifting the Arab boycott of Israel at this point, with 42.5% of the respondents indicating that they are against lifting the boycott ever and the largest support (44%) being for the lifting of the boycott, but in the future and depending on political circumstances and the progress of the negotiations. A much smaller group (13.5%) said that the boycott should be lifted immediately.

What support there is for the idea of lifting the boycott could be seen as an ideological acceptance of permanent peace with Israel and a pragmatic understanding of the new political and economic realities.

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### Candidate Criteria

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Palestinians made it clear, that professional competence is the most important criterion to be taken into account when selecting important officials for Palestinian institutions, with 58.1% of respondents selecting the option. A small percentage (16.7%) selected "religiosity" and only 15.8% selected "role in national struggle. The poll also shows that Palestinians are not interested in "party affiliation" when selecting Palestinian officials with only 4.7% indicating that "party affiliation" is the most important criterion.

The emphasis on competence was clearer in Gaza than in the West Bank, with 65.7% of Gazans and 53.5% of West Bankers indicating that competence was their first choice. "Party affiliation" was selected by 6.6% of West Bankers and only 1.5% of Gazans. This difference may be a result of the debate talking place in Gaza over the latest appointments by the PLO for the mayor of the city of Gaza and the leader of Fateh. These appointments prompted widespread discontent, especially among Fateh supporters in Gaza, and resulted in a number of resignations.

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### 'Collective Leadership in the PLO'

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'Collective Leadership' in the PLO was strongly supported, with 66.7% of the respondents (including 62.3% of Fateh supporters) choosing "yes" for this question, and another 21.4% indicating their support for these calls, while thinking that the present political circumstances made them inappropriate. With only 11.9% of the respondents rejecting calls for "collective leadership," Palestinians seem to desire further democratic practices within the P.L.O., and show that they are in general agreement over the idea of "collective leadership." However, further exploration must be made to arrive at a common ground with regards to the needed mechanisms to implement "collective leadership." (See [Appendix 2C](#))

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### Group of Ten

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A large percentage supports coordination efforts among the opposition. The poll shows that 46.7% of Palestinians support the present coordination efforts of the "Group of 10" opposing the Palestinian-Israeli DOP, 39.2% said that they don't support such coordination, and 14% said that they were not sure. Support of coordination among the "Group of 10" could be seen as a combination of political for the opposition groups and a desire by many Palestinians, from all political groups (especially independents and others) to see an efficient Palestinian opposition. It could also be seen a call for the use of non-violent means in resolving the conflicts among those who oppose the DOP and those who agree with it.

While many Palestinians are supportive of coordination efforts among the opposition groups, they don't believe that these efforts will amount to preventing the implementation of the DOP. Only 18.8% of the Palestinians think that the "Group of 10" will be able to prevent the implementation of the agreement. These attitudes can be explained through the following:

- a) The political circumstances surrounding the DOP lead many Palestinians to think that Israel and the PLO, supported by other countries (the U.S. in particular) have more influence on the political scene than does the opposition.
- b) The latest talk about the Syrian role in the current political process may undermine the opposition's ability to prevent the implementation of the agreement.
- c) There are doubts among Palestinians about the nature of the coalition of the "Group of 10." It is perceived as temporary and directed at a single objective with no long-term prospects. One reason for this perception is the deeply rooted ideological differences among the opposition groups.

Opposition supporters themselves are also doubtful about the ability of the "Group of 10" to prevent the implementation of the agreement. Only 47.4% of Hamas supporters, 38.7% of DFLP supporters, 31.7% of Islamic Jihad supporters and 39.8% of PFLP supporters, think that they will be able to cause the agreement to fail. The rest of the supporters of these groups chose either "no" or "not sure" to such a suggestion. (See [Appendix 2D](#))

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## Election Participation

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A Majority (64.9%) of Palestinians expressed their intention to participate in the general elections for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority. According to the DOP, these elections are supposed to take place on the 13th of July, 1994.



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## Political Affiliation

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Trying to reach conclusive statements about political affiliation among Palestinians at this stage represents a great challenge. Palestinian politics is in a state of flux and the results of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are not yet clear. The immediate circumstances surrounding the poll (i.e., the killing of four Palestinians, " Hamas supporters," in Hebron and the violence in Gaza) had a major influence on Palestinian attitudes, especially towards Fateh. Therefore, we must be cautious about jumping to quick conclusions and generalizations about Palestinian political affiliations.

The context of this specific question should be explained thoroughly. The previously discussed revision of the political affiliation question to include a number of choices that imply independence may have presented an attractive option to many who might otherwise continue to identify themselves with a particular party. The debates within Fateh also provide an important context for questions of political identity. Some respondents may identify with one or the other group within Fateh, others may be so frustrated with the debates that they no longer wish to identify themselves with Fateh, regardless of their views on the Declaration of Principles or related issues. Keeping all of this in mind, the following are the poll results on political affiliation:

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## Political Affiliation Overall

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The poll shows that Fateh support among Palestinians has declined. Fateh, the largest Palestinian faction in the PLO led by Yasser Arafat, scored 34.9% of the votes in this poll, compared with 42.2% in our December 1993 poll. No significant differences can be found in this regard when comparing the West Bank with Gaza.

As indicated in the poll results, the decline in the popularity of Fateh does not mean an increase in the popularity of the opposition groups. The decline may be attributed to an increase in people who identified themselves as "nationalist independents" a choice which is believed to be closest to Fateh. This change may in fact reflect a temporary disillusionment with Fateh and not a wide-scale conversion, a phenomena similar to the "Reagan Democrats" in the U.S. of a few years ago.

The poll also shows that Hamas support is 14.7% and PFLP support is 8.4%, both more popular in Gaza than in the West Bank. If we compare the support for Fateh coalition with Feda and Hizb el-Sha'b with that of the opposition groups (Hamas, PFLP, DFLP, and Islamic Jihad), we find that a Fateh coalition would attract 39.2% of the vote, with 28.8% going to the opposition, a difference of more than ten points. This difference is reinforced in the West Bank where a Fateh coalition gets 39.7% and an opposition coalition gets 25.4% of the vote, a difference of 14.3% points. In

Gaza, the opposition, with 34.4% is gaining on a Fateh coalition (38.2%) in degree of support. We notice that Feda and Hizb el-Sha'b are not as popular in Gaza, and therefore are not adding significant support (2.1% only) to the coalition with Fateh.

It is interesting to know that support for the opposition groups is higher among students between the ages of 18. and 24. Among this group, 38.5% support the opposition, and 37.9% support a Fateh coalition. Support for the opposition within this group reaches to 47.9% in Gaza (see [Appendix 2E](#)).

It is also clear that there is an ample supply of "swing voters" among Palestinians. These voters chose "nationalist independents," "Islamic independents," "no one" and "others" for a total of 32%, indicating a trend towards independence and ambivalence. This trend is more popular in the West Bank (34.8%) than in Gaza (26.3%).

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### Political Affiliation by District

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The poll shows that Fateh is the largest single Palestinian political group in all districts the West Bank and Gaza, followed by Hamas in most districts. However, a comparison between a Fateh coalition and an opposition coalition in each district shows that the Palestinian electoral map is more complex and amorphous than most people think. Still, we believe that the results of the poll reflect a reliable indicator of Palestinian political affiliations. (See [Appendix 1](#))

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### The West Bank

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#### **Nablus area**

Nablus gives Fateh its strongest support in the West Bank and Gaza. Support for Fateh reaches 45.2% with no significant competition from opposition groups. If elections had taken place on the 16th of January, the day of the poll, a Fateh coalition would have won with 50.3% of the vote, as compared with 16.9% for an opposition coalition.

#### **Tulkarm area**

The poll shows that Fateh is the largest group in the Tulkarm area gaining 33.8% of the vote. Observers believe that the latest talk of friction among Fateh supporters in the area may have had a negative influence on its popularity. The opposition groups got 26.4% of the vote, for a difference of 7 points. However, a Fateh coalition got 34.5% which increases the difference slightly.

#### **Jenin area**

Fateh alone in this area got 41.2% of the vote and in coalition got 42.7%. In comparison, the opposition groups got 26.4% of the vote.

### **Jericho area**

Given the current political process where Jericho will be first to gain from the possible fruits of a political solution, it is not surprising to find that Jericho, like Nablus, gives Fateh its highest support of all other areas. Jericho respondents identified themselves with Fateh at 45.2% and with the opposition at 25.7%. A Fateh coalition got a clear majority with 58.2%

### **Ramallah area**

While Fateh gets the largest vote in the Ramallah area (30.4%) for a single group, the opposition groups present a strong showing with 24.7% support, a difference of less than four points. However, this difference increases when the opposition is compared to a Fateh coalition, which drew 34.2% of the votes. This is one of the areas where "swing voters" were the largest percentage of respondents (41.2%). This large percentage indicates that these voters could play a key role in the outcome of any elections, despite their lack of cohesion.

### **Hebron area**

Hebron presented a strong challenge to Fateh, which while remaining the strongest single group received only 24.6% of the vote, its least support in all areas. If elections had taken place on the day of the poll, a coalition between Hamas and the Islamic Jihad (with 28.8% of the vote) would be sufficient to win over Fateh alone. A coalition of the opposition groups would also be able to win over a Fateh coalition with Feda and Hizb el-Sha'b (37.2% to 33.6%). It is highly likely that the immediate circumstances facing the area had an influence on the results. The killing of four Hamas supporters and the resignations of a number of Fateh leaders might have led to lower support for Fateh. In Hebron, we notice that the percentage of "Islamic independents" (10.3%) is close to that of "nationalist independents" (13.7%).

### **Bethlehem area**

It was clear that the dramatic events in Hebron had an influence on the Bethlehem area nearby. Here, Fateh got 28.6% of the vote. The notion of a Fateh coalition versus an opposition coalition yielded results too close to call. A Fateh coalition got 39.8% of the vote, while the opposition got 36.7% of the vote. The role of the "swing vote" is significant in this area.

### **Jerusalem area**

The poll shows that Jerusalem is a "swing vote" city with 46.2% of the respondents identifying with "independents," "no one," and "others." Fateh alone got 32.7% of the vote and in coalition got 40.4%, while the opposition groups got 13.4%. Our November 1993 poll showed that support for the opposition was 22.9%, with 12.1% supporting Hamas. Further research is needed to determine the cause for this declining support and whether it represents an increase in ambivalence on the part of the Jerusalem population.

### **First District (North: Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia, Jabalia, al-Nazli)**

The vote in this area is divided almost equally among Fateh with its coalition, the opposition, and the "swing voters." Fateh is still the largest party in the area with 36.4% of the vote (Feda and Hizb el-Sha'b with 1% gave Fateh no significant help in this district). The opposition and the "swing voters" got an equal percentage, each with 31.3%.

### **Second District (Gaza City "North": al Shati, Shiek Radwan, al-Nasr)**

A possible coalition among the opposition groups could win over this area if it is faced by Fateh alone. The opposition got 30.8% and Fateh got 25.9% of the vote. If the opposition ran against a Fateh coalition, there would have been a tie, with 30.8% for each. Again, the "swing vote" might determine the outcome in this district.

### **Third District (Gaza City "west": al-Sabra, al-Daraj)**

The opposition and the Fateh coalition got almost equal votes in this district, with 43% for the opposition and 44.3% for the Fateh coalition. We notice a large presence of Fateh (41.8%) and a significant presence for Hamas (21.5%).

### **Fourth District (Gaza City "east": al-Tofah, al-Zaytoun, al-Shogayia)**

In this area we notice a high percentage of "swing voters," 40.3%. Support for Fateh is 30.7% and support for its coalition is 33.2%, compared with 26% for the opposition groups.

### **Fifth District (Middle: al-Bureig, al-Magazi, Nuseirat, Zawaydeh, Deir el-Balah)**

The results of the poll show a wide gap in support between the opposition and a Fateh coalition. A coalition among the opposition groups would take this area with 43.4% of the vote (23% going to Hamas). In contrast, 32.1% of the respondents identified with a Fateh coalition. Fateh alone got 31%.

### **Sixth District (Khan Yunis: city and refugee camp)**

In this district, 42.5% of the respondents identified themselves as Fateh supporters compared with 36.3% as opposition supporters. This district was different than all other districts since "Islamic independents" got more support than "nationalist independents".

### **Seventh district (South: Rafah, Qararah, Bani-Suhaila, Khaza'a, Abasan)**

Fateh got its highest support in Gaza from this district with 44% of the vote. A Fateh coalition got 46% and an opposition coalition got 30% of the vote.

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## Conclusion

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The present poll shows that if elections took place on January 16, 1994, Fateh would be the largest single Palestinian groups. Compared with a coalition of the opposition groups, Fateh could win the areas and districts of Nablus, Jericho, Jenin, Jerusalem, and Tulkarm. It could also win Ramallah and Bethlehem, but with some difficulty. Hebron, however, is leaning towards the opposition coalition. In the Gaza Strip, the political map is even more complex, where it is difficult to

determine the final outcome of an election based on "electoral districts". When we compare Fateh with the opposition coalition, we find that Fateh shows a decisive win in only two districts (Khan Yunis and the South). It faces great difficulties in the first district (north), the third district (Gaza city "west") and the fourth district (Gaza city "east"). The opposition coalition leads in the second district (Gaza city "north") and the fifth district (middle).

One of the most interesting findings in this poll is that the Palestinian electorate could be described as tri-polar, including: DOP supporters (mainly Fateh), the DOP opposition groups, and the "swing voters." The three categories are almost of equal standing, with a trend towards "independence" or ambivalence.

In general, the poll shows that the Palestinian electorate is a complex one. It is going through a process of change responding to the circumstances of the ongoing current political period. The results of the peace negotiations and the general economic and living conditions will have major impact on Palestinian political affiliations.

Lastly, there is no doubt that this poll conducted by CPRS represents an important indication of the Palestinian political landscape in the Occupied Territories. However, we must emphasize that the most accurate mechanism to determine political affiliations is free general elections.

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## Results

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### 1. Do you support the continuation of the current peace negotiations between the P.L.O and Israel?

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) Yes	50.9%	51.6%	49.7%
b) No	39.8%	36.3%	45.5%
c) Not sure	09.3%	12.1%	04.8%

### 2. At this stage, do you think that there is a need for further & close cooperation and coordination between the P.L.O and Jordan in the political and economic spheres?

a) Yes	64.4%	68.5%	58.0%
b) No	22.4%	17.1%	30.8%
c) Not sure	13.2%	14.4%	11.2%

### 3. As to the Arab economic boycott of Israel:

a) I don't support its lifting at all	42.5%	38.2%	49.4%
b) I support its termination immediately	13.5%	13.3%	13.9%
c) I support its termination, in the future and depending on political and depending on political	44.0%	48.5%	36.7%

### 4. In your opinion, what is most important criterion to be taken into account in selection important officials for Palestinian institutions?

a) Religiosity	16.7%	17.6%	15.2%
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b) Professional competence/ specialization	58.1%	53.5%	65.7%
c) Role in the national struggle.	15.8%	17.7%	12.9%
d) Party affiliation	04.7%	06.6%	01.5%

**5. Recently, there have calls for "collective leadership" in the P.L.O. What is your opinion?**

a) I support these calls	66.7%	67.5%	56.6%
b) I don't support these calls, but this is not the appropriate time to make them.	11.9%	10.9%	13.4%
c) I don't support these calls	11.9%	10.9%	13.4%

**6. Do you support the present coordination efforts of the "Group of 10" opposing the Palestinian-Israeli Agreement?**

a) Yes	46.7%	41.3%	55.6%
b) No	39.2%	41.3%	35.8%
c) Not sure	14.1%	17.4%	08.6%

**7. Do you think that the opposition "Group of 10" will be able to prevent the implementation of the Palestinian-Israeli Agreement?**

a) Yes	18.8%	19.5%	17.8%
b) No	48.9%	46.0%	53.4%
c) Not sure	32.3%	34.5%	28.8%

**8. Will you participate in the general elections for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority?**

a) Yes	64.9%	65.5%	64.1%
b) No	23.2%	20.8%	26.8%
c) Not sure	11.9%	13.7%	09.1%

**9. If these elections were held today, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:**

a) Hamas	14.7%	13.1%	17.3%
b) DFLP	01.9%	02.2%	01.5%
c) Islamic Jihad	03.8%	03.8%	03.8%
D) Feda	01.8%	02.5%	00.5%
e) Hizb El-Sha'b	02.5%	03.0%	01.6%
f) Fateh	34.9%	34.2%	36.1%
g) PFLP	08.4%	06.3%	11.8%
h) Islamic Independents	04.8%	05.7%	03.3%
I) Nationalist Independents	11.8%	13.7%	08.8%
j) Other organization (Specify)	04.3%	03.5%	05.6%
K) No one	11.1%	12.0%	09.7%

## Appendix 1

### Political Affiliation by Area of Residence-West Bank

	Nablus	Tulkarm	Jenin	Jericho	Ramallah	Hebron	Bethlehem	Jerusalem
Hamas	12.3%	14.0%	19.1%	16.1%	07.6%	18.0%	14.3%	03.8%
DFLP	0.6%	01.5%	02.9%	03.2%	02.5%	01.8%	04.1%	02.9%
I. Jihad	0.6%	02.2%	-----	03.2%	03.8%	10.8%	06.1%	01.9%
Feda	0.6%	0.7%	01.5%	06.5%	0.6%	06.0%	05.1%	02.9%
H.Sha'b	04.5%	-----	-----	06.5%	03.2%	03.0%	06.1%	04.8%
Fateh	45.2%	33.8%	41.2%	45.2%	30.4%	24.6%	28.6%	32.7%
PFLP	03.2%	03.7%	04.4%	03.2%	10.8%	06.6%	12.2%	04.8%
Islamic Ind.	01.9%	05.9%	02.9%	03.2%	04.4%	10.2%	09.2%	06.7%
other org.	02.0%	05.9%	07.4%	06.4%	06.3%	-----	-----	00.1%
No one	17.5%	16.1%	09.6%	-----	13.3%	05.3%	04.1%	20.2%
Nationalist Ind.	11.6%	16.2%	11.0%	06.5%	17.1%	13.7%	10.2%	18.3%

### Political Affiliation by "Electoral District"-Gaza Strip

	North (1)	Gaza (2)	Gaza (3)	Gaza (4)	Middle (5)	KhanYunis (6)	South (7)
Hamas	12.1%	11.1%	21.5%	18.0%	22.7%	18.9%	17.0%
DFLP	02.0%	02.5%	02.5%	-----	01.1%	-----	02.0%
I. Jihad	05.1%	01.2%	03.8%	03.6%	01.1%	07.5%	04.0%
Feda	-----	03.7%	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
H. Sha'b	01.0%	01.2%	02.5%	02.5%	01.1%	01.3%	02.0%
Fateh	36.4%	25.9%	41.8%	30.7%	30.7%	42.5%	44.0%
PFLP	12.1%	16.0%	15.2%	04.8%	18.2%	10.0%	07.0%
Islamic Independents	03.0%	07.4%	01.3%	02.5%	01.1%	05.0%	03.0%
Nationalist Independents	05.1%	13.6%	05.1%	18.9%	10.3%	03.8%	06.0%
Other Organizations	05.1%	12.4%	01.3%	08.3%	04.6%	03.7%	04.0%
No one	18.1%	05.0%	05.0%	10.7%	08.1%	07.4%	11.0%

## Appendix 2

### A- Place of Residence by Attitude Towards the peace Negotiations

	Yes	No	Not Sure
Town	50.9%	40.1%	09.0%
Village	55.0%	34.5%	10.5%
Refugee Camp	46.0%	46.0%	08.0%

### B- Education By Attitude Towards the Peace Negotiations

	Yes	No	Not Sure
Up to 9-years	58.6%	29.9%	11.5%
Up to 12-years	54.4%	38.2%	07.4%
2 years collage	44.3%	47.3%	08.4%
University degree	47.7%	44.6%	07.7%
Masters& PHDs	47.2	30.6%	22.2%

### C- Political Affiliation By Attitude Towarde Towards "Collective Leadership"

	I Support	I Don't Support	I Support, But not Now
Hamas	64.9%	22.2%	12.9%
DFLP	80.6%	6.5%	12.9%
I. Jihad	72.9%	16.9%	10.2%
Feda	82.1%	7.1%	10.8%
H. sha'b	79.5%	7.7%	12.8%
Fateh	62.3%	10.8%	26.9%
PFLP	74.6%	11.9%	13.5%
Islamic Independents	67.1	8.2%	24.7%
Nationalist Independents	70.4%	5.4%	24.2%
Other Organizations	55.9%	14.7%	29.4%
No one	65.9%	9.6%	29.4%

### D- political Affiliation By The Perceived Ability of the Opposition to Prevent Agreement Implementation

	Yes	No	Not Sure
Hamas	47.45	21.8%	30.8%
DFLP	38.7%	25.8%	35.5%
I. Jihad	31.7%	26.7%	41.6%
Feda	07.1%	57.1%	35.8%
H. Sha'b	12.5%	57.5%	30.3%
Fateh	05.1%	37.9%	21.0%
PFLP	39.8%	21.1%	39.1%
Islamic Independents	19.2%	30.1%	50.7%
Other Organizations	08.8%	63.2%	28.0%
No one	16.4%	36.3%	47.3%
Nationalist Independents	10.2%	50.3%	39.5%

### E. Political affiliation (University Students Between the Ages of 18 to 28) DOP Supporters

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
Fateh	33.8%	38.7%	31.5%
Feda	01.4%	02.7%	-----
Hizb El-sha'b	02.7%	02.7%	02.7%
<b>Total</b>	37.9%	44.1%	31.5%



## The Opposition

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
Hamas	19.6%	12.0%	27.4%
Islamic Jihad	07.4%	08.0%	06.8%
PFLP	10.8%	09.3%	12.3%
DFLP	00.7%	-----	01.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>38.5%</b>	<b>29.3%</b>	<b>47.9%</b>

## Independents & others

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
Nationalist Ind.	07.4%	09.3%	05.5%
Islamic Ind.	02.0%	02.7%	01.4%
Others	02.0%	-----	04.1%
No One	12.2%	14.6%	09.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>13.6%</b>	<b>26.6%</b>	<b>20.6%</b>