



The **Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)** is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policy analysis and academic research. PSR was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. The center engages in several activities. It conducts academic and policy analysis studies. It organizes socio-political surveys and public opinion polls on current Palestinian political and social attitudes. It sponsors study groups and task forces on issues of critical importance to the Palestinians. Finally, it organizes conferences, public lectures, and briefings on current public policy issues. PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas.

This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah



For further information, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa at the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Ramallah, Palestine
Telephone 02 296 4933
Fax 02 296 4934

e-mail: pcpsr@pcpsr.org
<http://www.pcpsr.org>

WHILE THREE QUARTERS OF THE PALESTINIANS WELCOME SHARON'S PLAN OF WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA AND WHILE TWO THIRDS SEE IT AS VICTORY FOR ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST OCCUPATION, 58% OF THE PALESTINIANS PREFER TO SEE THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND ISRAEL NEGOTIATE THE WITHDRAWAL PLAN AND 61% BELIEVE SHARON IS NOT SERIOUS AND WILL NOT WITHDRAW

These are the results of poll # 11 conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between March 14 and 17, 2004 (before the Israeli assassination of Ahmad Yasin). The poll deals with the Sharon plan for a unilateral evacuation of settlements, the separation wall and military checkpoints, the peace process and armed attacks, and internal Palestinian matters. Total size of the sample is 1320 adults (825 in the West Bank and 495 in the Gaza Strip) interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa, at Tel 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

MAIN RESULTS:

This PSR poll has focused on the Sharon plan to evacuate 17 settlements in the Gaza Strip and few more in the West Bank. The findings show wide welcome for the step among the Palestinian public. Indeed, two thirds see it as a victory for Palestinian armed struggle against occupation. What Palestinians see as victory, however, is not the unilateral dimension of the plan, but rather the decision to evacuate settlements. In fact, a majority of the Palestinians prefer to see the Palestinian Authority negotiating the plan with the Israeli government. Moreover, more than 40% of the Palestinians would like to see Hamas too taking part in the negotiations with Israel. Yet despite the welcome, only one third believes Sharon is serious and will indeed withdraw from the Gaza Strip. The overwhelming majority sees Sharon intentions aiming at harming Palestinian interests with his first goal being to push the Palestinians toward internal fighting, the second to consolidate control over the West Bank, and the third to frighten the Palestinian leadership of the opposition. For this reason, only one third of the public believes the Sharon plan will increase the chances for an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement.

With regard to the Israeli separation wall, a majority of the Palestinians believe it will lead to more armed attacks against Israelis. The best way to fight it is by continuation of armed attacks and bombings inside Israel according to 40% of the public. The percentage of those who believe that non-violent demonstrations are the best way to fight the wall or the Israeli military checkpoints does not exceed 10%.

Regarding internal Palestinian politics, the public gives the Prime Minister and his government a negative assessment with regard to their performance in confronting anarchy and lawlessness, preparing for elections, carrying out political reforms, and returning to the peace process. Despite the negative assessment, the majority does not demand the resignation of Abu Ala' and his government.

(1) Gaza Withdrawal Plan

- About three quarters of the Palestinians welcome Sharon's plan to evacuate 17 settlements in the Gaza Strip and few more in the West Bank and two thirds believe it represents a victory for the armed struggle against occupation, but only one third believes Sharon is serious and will indeed withdraw and 61% believe he is not serious and will not withdraw.
- A majority of 58% prefers to see the PA negotiate with Israel Sharon's withdrawal plan, and 38% prefer to see the withdrawal being carried out unilaterally.
- 41% support and 54% oppose Israeli-Hamas negotiation of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
- Withdrawal from Gaza will increase the chances for a peace settlement in the view of 32% and will decrease the chances for peace in the view of 24%.
- In the view of the Palestinians, Sharon's intentions are: first, to push the Palestinians toward internal infighting; second, to consolidate control over the West Bank; third, to frighten the Palestinian leadership of its opposition; and fourth, to maintain a Jewish majority in Israel.
- Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip will lead to a decrease in armed attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip in the view of 41% and will lead to an increase in such attacks in the view of 30%. In the Gaza Strip, 49% believe it will lead to a decrease in the attacks.
- After the withdrawal and the evacuation of settlements, 54% propose to give homes in settlements to those whose homes have been demolished by Israel, 22% want to give them to refugees, and 13% would like to demolish them.

The poll findings show that 73% of the Palestinians welcome Sharon's plan to evacuate 17 settlements in the Gaza Strip and few more in the West Bank. Gazans are more welcoming of the plan (82%) than West Bankers (68%). Yet, the percentage of those who believe that the plan will increase the chances for a political settlement with Israel does not exceed 32%, with 24% believing it will decrease such chances and 39% believing it will have no effect on the peace process. The reason for the pessimistic assessment of the potential effect of the Sharon plan is derived from the public's negative estimate of Sharon's intentions. In the view of 37%, Sharon's first goal is to push the Palestinians toward internal infighting; 33% believe his second goal is to consolidate Israeli control over the West Bank, and 28% believe his third goal is to intimidate the Palestinian leadership with loss of power to opposition parties. The percentage of those believing that his first goal is to maintain Israel's Jewish majority does not exceed 22%.

Despite belief in Sharon's malicious intent, two thirds of the Palestinian public see in his plan a victory for Palestinian armed struggle while only one third believes it is not a victory. Moreover, 68% believe that a majority of Palestinians sees the plan as a victory for armed struggle. Given the actual results, the assessment of the respondents is highly accurate which indicates that this is indeed the normative attitude prevailing among Palestinians. But the percentage of those believing that a majority of Israelis sees the plan as a victory for the Palestinians is 44%, with 48% believing that most Israelis do not see it as a victory for Palestinians. The belief that the plan is a victory for Palestinian armed struggle increases in the Gaza Strip (72%) compared to the West Bank (62%), in refugee camps (72%) compared to cities (61%), among men (70%) compared to women (62%), and among supporters of Hamas and Fateh (70% and 69% respectively) compared to the unaffiliated (59%).

Despite the welcome of the Sharon plan and the belief that it represents a victory for Palestinian armed struggle, only one third believes that Sharon is serious and will indeed withdraw from the Gaza Strip, while 61% believe he will not. This could be the reason why a majority of 58% prefers to see the PA negotiate the Gaza withdrawal with Israel and only 38% prefer to see Israel withdrawing unilaterally. In other words, what the majority of the Palestinians sees as victory is not the unilateral aspect of the Sharon plan but the evacuation of settlements. In this regard, the public prefers the evacuation and withdrawal to be the result of negotiations, but it still sees victory in both cases.

The survey sought to examine public perception of the legitimacy of a Hamas-Israel negotiation. When asked if they think Israel should negotiate its withdrawal from Gaza also with Hamas, 41% responded positively while 54% said it should not. Similarly, when asked if Hamas should accept to negotiate with Israel, 43% said it should and 50% said it should not. Yet only 36% of the respondents believe a majority of the Palestinians approves Hamas-Israel negotiations and 53% believe that most Palestinians do not approve such negotiations on the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. If Hamas accepts to negotiate with Israel, this would mean a change in the principled positions of the movement toward Israel and the recognition of Israel in the view of 55% of the respondents. The finding showing such support for Hamas-Israel negotiations indicates that a large section of the Palestinian public is dissatisfied with PA performance and wishes to introduce another Palestinian actor into the negotiations process.

If Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip, the level of armed attacks against Israelis from the Strip would decline according to 41% of the public, while 30% of the public believe it would increase the number of such attacks, and 24% believe it will have no impact. The percentage of those believing that withdrawal will lead to a decrease

in attacks from Gaza increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (36%). It also increases among men (44%) compared to women (38%), among the oldest (45%) compared to the youngest (36%), among professionals, the retired, and farmers (60%, 56%, and 48% respectively) compared to students (33%), among those working in the public sector (51%) compared to those working in the private sector (44%), among the married (43%) compared to the unmarried (36%), and among Fateh supporters (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas and Islamic Jihad (40% and 38% respectively).

After the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, a majority of 54% thinks that homes in the evacuated settlements should be given to those Palestinians whose homes have been demolished by Israel. But 22% think they should go to refugees and 13% think they should be demolished.

(2) Separation Wall and Checkpoints

- 55% believe the building of the separation wall will lead to an increase in armed attacks against Israel. 40% believe the best means for the Palestinians to fight it is by armed confrontations and bombing attacks inside Israel; 27% believe in a ceasefire agreement and return to the peace process; 10% prefer popular non violent demonstrations; and 11% believe going to the international court of Justice is the best means of fighting the wall.
- A majority of 61% believes that the International Court of Justice will be biased in favor of Israel and only 26% believe it will be neutral.
- 41% believe that the best means of fighting Israeli military checkpoints is through reaching a ceasefire and returning to the peace process and 28% believe armed confrontations and bombing attacks are the best means, while 9% have confidence in popular non-violent demonstration.

A majority of 55% believes that the separation wall will lead to more armed attacks against Israel, 18% believe it will lead to less attacks, and 25% believe it will have no impact on attacks. But more than two thirds (68%) believe that a majority of Israelis does believe that the wall will reduce armed attacks. The best way to fight the wall in the view of 40% of the public is by the continuation of armed confrontations and bombing attacks inside Israel while 27% believe the best way is to reach a ceasefire agreement and return to the peace process. The percentage of those who believe non-violent demonstrations are the best means to fight the wall does not exceed 10%, and a similar percentage (11%) believes in the effectiveness of complaining to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). One reason why the level of confidence in the ICJ is so low is the surprising finding that 61% of the public believe the Court will be biased in favor of Israel, with only 8% believing it will be biased in favor of the Palestinians and only 26% believing it would be neutral.

During the last three months, 48% of the Palestinians traveled through Israeli military checkpoints. The reasons for travel varied with 35% visiting family, 30% going to work, 23% seeking medical treatment, and 9% going to schools and universities. The frequency of travel varied too with 27% traveling once a month, 26% twice or three time monthly, 21% twice or three times weekly, and 17% daily. The extent of hardship encountered while crossing the checkpoints have been described as very large or large by 82% while 14% described it as medium and 3% as little. More than one third of the respondents said that family members had to locate to other areas because of the suffering at the checkpoints or because of their inability to cross them. The best way to fight the checkpoints according to 41% of the respondents is a ceasefire agreement and a return to the peace process, but 28% said it is the continuation of armed confrontations and bombings inside Israel. Only 9% said the best way to fight checkpoint is by non-violent demonstrations and 12% by complaining to international human rights organizations. Belief in the utility of armed confrontations and bombings inside Israel increases in the Gaza Strip (31%) compared to the West Bank (26%), among men (30%) compared to women (25%), among holders of BA degree (33%) compared to illiterates (26%), and among supporters of Hamas (38%) compared to supporters of Fateh (26%).

(3) Peace Process, Reconciliation, Armed Attacks, Hizballah Prisoners' Deal, and the Arab Summit

- 66% believe the Roadmap has collapsed. Last December, 58% believed it had collapsed; and last October the percentage was 68%.
- Wide support for armed attacks: 87% support attacks against Israeli soldiers, 86% support attacks against settlers, and 53% support attacks against Israeli civilians.
- Despite that, 84% support mutual cessation of violence and 70% support a Hudna.
- 67% believe that armed confrontations have helped the Palestinians achieve national rights in a way that negotiations could not.
- After reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, 74% would support reconciliation between the two peoples, but 42% are convinced that such reconciliation is not possible ever.
- 80% believe that Hizballah came out a winner from the prisoners' exchange with Israel.
- In the occasion of the Arab Summit in Tunis, 86% of the Palestinians believe that they cannot count on Arab States to support them in regaining their rights.

The findings show little optimism about the prospect for a return to negotiations and cessation of violence. Only 15% believe that violence will stop soon and the two sides will return to negotiations and 45% believe some armed confrontations will continue but the parties will be able to return to negotiations. More than one third, compared to less than one quarter last December, believes that violence will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. Two thirds, compared to 58% last December and 68% last October, believe that the Roadmap has collapsed.

Support for armed attacks against Israeli soldiers remains very high at 87% and against settlers at 86%, and against civilians at 53%. These figures are similar to those obtained during the last six months except for the support of violence against civilians which stood at 48% last December and 59% last October. Two thirds (67%) of the public believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Last December, this percentage stood at 64%.

Despite the wide support for armed attacks, a large majority of 84% support mutual cessation of violence and 70% support a hudna in which the Palestinians stop using arms against the Israelis and the Israelis stop using arms against the Palestinians. If such agreement is reached, 57% of the public would support the PA in taking measures to prevent armed attacks against Israeli targets.

The findings show that a majority of the public does not blame Palestinian opposition groups for the failure to reach a ceasefire agreement as only 11% do so, another 17% blame the PA for this failure, and 37% blame both sides. The rest of the public blames others, mostly Israel. The percentage of those blaming the opposition groups more than the PA increases among supporters of Fateh (9% blame the PA and 18% blame the opposition) compared to supporters of Hamas (26% blame the PA and 8% blame the opposition).

After reaching a peace agreement between the two sides and the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel, 74% would support reconciliation between the two peoples. Despite this finding, 42% believe reconciliation is not possible ever, while 18% believe it will be possible only after several generations, 8% believes it to be possible in the next generation, 7% during the next 10 years, and 16% during the next few years. Regarding the modalities of reconciliation after reaching a peace agreement, 86% would support open borders between the two states, 65% would support joint economic institutions and ventures, 29% would support the creation of joint political institutions toward a confederation, 39% would support the enacting of laws that prohibit incitement against Israel, and only 7% would support the adoption of a school curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians.

An overwhelming majority of 80% views the Israel-Hezbollah prisoners exchange as a victory for Hezbollah, 9% view it as a victory for Israel, and 7% believe the two sides came out victorious. On the occasion of the Arab summit, originally scheduled for the end of March in Tunisia, PSR asked respondents whether they can count on support from Arab states in regaining their rights. Only 14% responded in the affirmative and 86% said Palestinians can not count on support of Arab states.

(4) Domestic Issues

- Only 20% to 25% believe that Prime Minister Abu Ala' has been able to achieve his four stated objectives of putting an end to internal anarchy, prepare for elections, carry out political reforms, and return to negotiations. Despite the low evaluation, only 39% believe that he should resign and 47% believe he should not.
- 63% believe Israeli occupation is responsible for the chaos in the Palestinian areas and 25% put the blame on the Palestinian security services and the Palestinian leadership.
- 70% want to have Palestinian legislative and presidential elections after Israel ends its occupation of Palestinian cities and towns, but 27% support holding them now.
- 91% support internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms in the PA.
- Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy does not exceed 23%, with 84% believing that corruption exists in the PA, and 94% believing that one can not find a job without a wasta.
- Arafat's popularity stands at 38% as the case was last December.
- For the office of a vice president, Marwan Barghouti remains at the top with 16%, followed by Abdul Aziz Rantisi with 14%, and Saeb Erikat with 8%.
- Fateh's popularity stands at 27% and Hamas at 20%. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas has the support of 27% compared to 23% for Fateh. The popularity of the Islamists combined (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) stands at 29% and the percentage of the non-affiliated stands at 40%.

The findings show little positive evaluation of the performance of the Abu Ala's government. When asked whether the Prime Minister has been able to deliver on what he promised regarding the elimination of internal anarchy, preparation for elections, political reforms, and return to the peace process with Israel, only 20% to 25% said he was able to deliver for each item while 65% to 75% said he was not. Despite this grim assessment, only 39% said the Prime Minister and his government should resign and 47% said they should not. One reason for this could be the finding that 63% of the public blame the Israeli occupation for the anarchy and lack of security while only 25% blame it on the failure of the Palestinian security services and leadership.

Demand for Abu Ala's resignation increases in the Gaza Strip (43%) compared to the West Bank (37%), in refugee camps (44%) compared to towns and villages (35%), among men (45%) compared to women (33%), among the youngest, between the ages of 18-22 years (45%) compared to the oldest, over 52 years old (33%), among holders of BA degree (41%) compared to illiterates (29%), among professionals, laborers, employees, and students (60%, 51%, 48%, and 46% respectively) compared to housewives and the retired (32% and 22% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (49%) compared to supporters of Fateh (34%).

Less than one quarter (23%) gives Palestinian democracy a positive evaluation. But 50% believe people can criticize the PA without fear, and 49% believe that there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Palestinian territories. Belief in the existence of corruption in PA institutions reaches 84%, and from among those 70% believe that this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future. More than three quarters (77%) believe that to a large extent jobs in the PA are obtainable through wasta, with an additional 17% believing that wasta is used sometimes. Only 2% believe employment is done without wasta. The percentage of those who say that conditions in the Palestinians areas forces them to seek permanent emigration reaches 15%.

Support for internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms reaches 91% in this poll. Support for holding general political elections after an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities reaches 70% with an additional 27% supporting the holding of elections today, under the current conditions of occupation.

Arafat's popularity remains unchanged as it was last December (38%). Regarding support for a vice president, Marwan Barghouti's popularity remains highest (16%) followed by that of Abdulaziz al Ranatisi (14%), Sa'eb Erikat (8%), Haidar Abdul Shafi (6%), Ahmad Yasin and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), Farouq Qaddoumi (4%), Ahamd Quari'-Abu Ala' (3%), Mohammad Dahlan (2%), and Mahmoud Abbas-Abu Mazin (1%). In the Gaza Strip, Rantisi's popularity increases to 17% compared to 12% in the West Bank. Similarly, Dahlan's popularity increases in the Gaza Strip to 5% compared to less than 1% in the West Bank. Fateh is the most popular faction with 27% followed by Hamas with 20%. Hamas' popularity is the largest in the Gaza Strip (27%) followed by Fateh (23%). The combined Islamists popularity (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and independent Islamists) reaches 29% and the percentage of the non-affiliated stands at 40%.

Results of Poll # (11)

14-17 March 2004

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
01) Current Prime Minister, Abu Ala', promised that we would work during his tenure on achieving the following four objectives. Tell us, in your opinion, was he able or was not he able to achieve what he promised so far:			
01-1 Eliminate internal anarchy and absence of security			
1) Was able to a large extent	0.9	0.7	1.2
2) Was able somewhat	18.6	19.1	17.8
3) Was not able	44.55	48.3	38.2
4) Was not able at all	30.3	25.1	39.0
5) No opinion/do not know	5.7	6.8	3.8
1-2 Prepare for elections in mid 2004			
1) Was able to a large extent	1.4	1.6	1.2
2) Was able somewhat	19.9	20.3	19.2
3) Was not able	43.1	45.8	38.8
4) Was not able at all	21.4	17.4	28.1
5) No opinion/do not know	14.2	15.0	12.7
01-3 Carry out wide ranging political reforms			
1) Was able to a large extent	1.5	1.2	2.0
2) Was able somewhat	23.0	20.4	27.5
3) Was not able	43.9	49.2	35.2
4) Was not able at all	25.4	22.3	30.5
5) No opinion/do not know	6.1	6.9	4.8
01-4 Return to the peace process with Israel			
1) Was able to a large extent	2.1	1.8	2.6
2) Was able somewhat	22.1	21.1	23.6
3) Was not able	44.7	49.3	37.0
4) Was not able at all	26.3	22.0	33.5
5) No opinion/do not know	4.9	5.8	3.2
02) In your opinion, should Abu Ala' and his government or should not they resign?			
1) They should resign	39.2	37.0	42.8
2) They should not resign	47.0	49.1	43.4
3) No opinion/do not know	13.9	13.9	13.7
03) Regarding the prevailing internal anarchy, some say the reason for it is a failure on the part of the security services and political leadership to carry out their responsibility to maintain law and order while others say the Israeli occupation is to blame for it. In your opinion, who is more responsible for the internal anarchy?			
1) The failure of the security services and leadership	24.5	22.1	28.7
2) Israeli occupation	62.7	65.8	57.6
3) Others, specify-----	11.7	11.0	12.7
4 no opinion/do not know	1.1	1.1	1.0

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
--	--------	------------	-------------

04) The Palestinian Authority had been engaged in a dialogue with Hamas and other factions in an attempt to reach an agreement on a hudna whereby use of arms against Israelis would stop in return for an Israeli commitment to stop using arms against the Palestinians. Do you support or oppose such a hudna?

1) Strongly support	16.2	14.1	19.7
2) Support	54.2	55.9	51.5
3) Oppose	20.5	21.0	19.7
4) Strongly oppose	7.3	6.9	7.9
5) No opinion/ Don't know	1.8	2.2	1.2

05) Internal Palestinian dialogue between the PA and the opposition groups and factions, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others, to reach a ceasefire agreement or a hudna has ended in failure. In your opinion, who is responsible for this failure?

1) The PA	17.3	16.2	19.0
2) Opposition groups and factions	11.3	11.9	10.3
3) Both	36.7	36.8	36.4
4) Neither	28.1	27.9	28.5
5) No opinion/ Don't know	6.7	7.2	5.9

06) Some suggest conducting parliamentary and presidential elections under the present conditions while others see the need to postpone these elections until there is a ceasefire agreement and an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities and towns. What view do you support?

1) I support conducting elections now, under the current conditions	26.9	25.8	24.2
2) I support conducting elections after the Israeli withdrawal	69.7	67.4	73.5
3) No opinion/do not know	3.4	4.1	2.2

07) Recently, Sharon has announced a disengagement plan from the Palestinians. According to this plan Israel will evacuate most settlements in the Gaza strip and a small number of settlements in the West Bank. In your opinion will this plan increase the chances for a settlement with Israel, decrease the chances for a settlement or will not have any effect on the chances for a settlement?

1) Increase the chances for a settlement	32.0	30.9	33.9
2) Decrease the chances for a settlement	24.4	24.5	24.0
3) Will not have any effect	38.8	39.5	37.6
4) DK/NA	4.9	5.1	4.4

08) Do you welcome or do not welcome Sharon's disengagement program which proposes to evacuate most settlements from Gaza strip and a small number of settlements in the West Bank?

1 Definitely welcome	29.2	21.5	42.0
2 welcome	43.7	46.0	40.0
3 do not welcome	18.5	22.7	11.6
4 Definitely do not welcome	7.4	8.4	5.7
5 DK/NA	1.2	1.5	0.8

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
09-1) Of the following goals which one in your opinion is Sharon's most important goal in his decision to declare the disengagement plan to evacuate most settlements in Gaza and a few in the West Bank?			
1) To push Palestinians toward internal fighting in Gaza	36.9	33.5	42.4
2) To maintain the Jewish majority in Israel	21.6	23.0	19.4
3) To strengthen Israel's control of the West Bank in return for the concessions in Gaza	29.2	28.7	30.1
4) To intimidate Palestinian leadership with loss of power to opposition parties	9.5	11.2	6.7
5) DK/NA	2.8	3.6	1.4
09-2 And which one is Sharon's second most important goal in declaring his disengagement plan			
1) To push Palestinians toward internal fighting in Gaza	24.5	23.0	27.0
2) To maintain the Jewish majority in Israel	24.1	25.5	21.7
3) To strengthen Israel's control of the West Bank in return for the concessions in Gaza	33.4	31.2	37.0
4) To intimidate Palestinian leadership with loss of power to opposition parties	15.5	17.0	13.1
5) DK/NA	2.5	3.3	1.2
09-3 And Sharon's third most important goal?			
1) To push Palestinians toward internal fighting in Gaza	20.8	21.7	19.2
2) To maintain the Jewish majority in Israel	24.6	20.2	32.1
3) To strengthen Israel's control of the West Bank in return for the concessions in Gaza	21.9	22.6	20.7
4) To intimidate Palestinian leadership with loss of power to opposition parties	28.3	30.4	24.7
5) DK/NA	4.4	5.1	3.2
10) Do you see Sharon's plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed resistance against Israel or don't you see it as a victory?			
1) Definitely this is a victory	37.6	32.2	46.8
2) I think that this is a victory	28.2	30.0	25.3
3) I think this is not a victory	23.7	26.5	19.2
4) Definitely this is not a victory	8.3	8.5	8.1
5) DN/NA	2.0	2.9	0.6

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
11) And how do you think most Palestinians see Sharon's plan? Do most Palestinians see it or don't see it as a victory for their armed struggle?			
1. Most Palestinians see it as a victory for their armed struggle	67.9	64.0	74.4
2. Most Palestinians don't see it as a victory for their armed struggle	26.4	28.9	22.2
3. DK/NA	5.7	7.0	3.5
12) And how do you think most Israelis see Sharon's plan? Do most Israelis see it or don't see it as a victory for the Palestinians?			
1) Most Israelis see it as a victory for the Palestinians	44.2	42.8	46.6
2) Most Israelis don't see it as a victory for the Palestinians	47.9	48.0	47.8
3) DK/NA	7.8	9.1	5.7
13) Do you think that Sharon is serious and will indeed withdraw from the Gaza strip as he says, or he is not serious in his statement and will not withdraw?			
1) Definitely will withdraw	10.0	8.5	12.5
2) Think he will withdraw	23.7	25.6	20.6
3) Think he will not withdraw	35.0	35.6	33.9
4) Definitely he will not withdraw	25.9	25.0	27.5
5) DK/NA	5.4	5.3	5.5
14) Do you prefer to see the Palestinian Authority and Israel negotiating the Israeli withdrawal from the Strip, or do you prefer to see Israel withdrawing unilaterally without negotiations?			
1) I definitely prefer to see the PA and Israel negotiating the withdrawal	35.4	30.9	42.8
2) I think it is preferable to see the PA and Israel negotiating the withdrawal	22.4	23.3	21.0
3) I think it is preferable to see Israel unilaterally withdrawing without negotiations	21.1	22.7	18.4
4) I definitely prefer to see Israel unilaterally withdrawing without negotiations	17.1	18.0	15.8
5) DK/NA	3.9	5.1	2.0
15) Do you think Israel should negotiate its withdrawal from the Gaza strip also with Hamas?			
1) Definitely yes	13.1	11.2	16.2
2) Yes	27.8	31.3	22.0
3) No	38.4	39.6	36.4
4) Definitely no	15.3	11.3	22.0
5) Don't Know /No answer	5.4	6.6	3.4

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
16) And what about Hamas, do you think it should accept or reject to negotiate with Israel regarding Israeli withdrawal?			
1) Hamas should definitely accept	8.2	8.0	8.5
2) Hamas should accept	34.8	34.5	35.4
3) Hamas should reject	37.2	38.0	36.0
4) Hamas should definitely reject	12.5	11.0	14.9
5) Do not know/ no opinion	7.3	8.5	5.3
17) And what about the majority of Palestinians? Do most Palestinians think that Hamas should also negotiate with Israel the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip or most Palestinians don't think so?			
1) Most Palestinians think so	35.8	35.2	36.8
2) Most Palestinians don't think so	52.5	51.8	53.7
3) DK/NA	11.7	13.1	9.5
18) If Hamas accepted to negotiate with Israel, do you think this would mean a change in the principled positions of the movement toward Israel and the recognition of Israel?			
1. Definitely yes	23.8	20.6	29.1
2. Yes	31.6	33.1	29.1
3. No	30.6	31.2	28.5
4. Definitely no	9.2	9.2	9.1
5. Don't Know /No answer	4.9	5.8	3.2
19) Do you think an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip will decrease the armed attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip, increase the armed attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip, or will have no impact on armed attacks against Israel			
1) Increase the armed attacks	30.0	31.7	27.3
2) Decrease the armed attacks	41.2	36.3	49.3
3) Have no impact on armed attacks	24.0	26.3	20.0
4) DK/NA	4.9	5.7	3.4
20) After Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, what do you propose to do with the evacuated settlements?			
1) Demolish them	12.5	14.1	9.9
2) Give homes in settlement to those whose homes have been demolished by Israel	54.3	56.1	51.3
3) Give homes in settlements to refugees	21.5	21.7	21.2
4) Other, specify -----	9.0	5.5	14.9
5) No opinion/ Don't know	2.7	2.7	2.6
21) The Palestinian side has gone to the International Court of Justice to fight the separation wall. Do you think the ICJ will be neutral, biased in favor of the Palestinians or biased in favor of the Israelis?			
1) Neutral	25.5	26.8	23.2
2) Biased in favor of the Palestinian side	7.7	7.0	8.9
3) Biased in favor of the Israeli side	60.8	61.2	60.2
4) DK/NA	6.0	5.0	7.7

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
22) Do you think the separation wall being built by Israel in the West Bank will decrease the number of armed attacks inside Israel, increase the number of armed attacks or will have no impact?			
1) Increase the number of armed attacks	55.4	52.7	59.8
2) Decrease the number of armed attacks	18.4	20.0	15.8
3) Will have no impact	24.8	25.9	22.8
4) Don't Know /No answer	1.4	1.3	1.6
23) And what about the majority of Israelis. Do most Israelis think or don't think that the separation wall will decrease, increase or will have no impact on the number of armed attacks inside Israel?			
1) Most Israelis think it will increase the armed attacks	19.6	19.4	20.0
2) Most Israelis think it will increase the armed attacks	68.0	69.2	66.1
3) Most Israelis think it will not have an impact on the armed attacks	8.7	8.0	9.9
4) Don't Know /No answer	3.6	3.4	4.0
24) There are several ways and means to fight the separation wall. If you want to choose the ways and means that have a chance of succeeding in demolishing it, you would choose:			
1) Going to the ICJ	11.2	10.2	12.9
2) Popular unarmed demonstrations	9.6	11.4	6.5
3) Reaching a ceasefire and returning to the peace process	26.8	27.2	26.3
4) Continuation of armed confrontations and bombings inside Israel	40.0	36.4	45.9
5) Continuation of armed confrontations but without bombings inside Israel	7.6	9.1	5.1
6) Others, specify -----	4.9	5.7	3.4
25) What about the prisoners exchange between Israel and Hizballah? Who came out a winner: Israel or Hizballah? (don't read response options)			
1) Israel	8.6	8.7	8.3
2) Hizballah	80.2	82.7	76.0
3) Both	6.8	4.6	10.3
4) Neither	2.0	2.3	1.4
5) DK/NA	2.5	1.6	4.0
26) During the last three months, did you or do you still travel across Israeli checkpoints established by the Israeli army during the current intifada?			
1) Yes	47.7	54.1	36.9
2) No	52.3	45.9	63.1
27) If yes, for what purpose is most of your travel?			
1) Medical treatment	22.5	25.3	15.8
2) Work	29.5	31.6	24.5
3) School or studies	8.9	9.0	8.7
4) Visiting relatives	34.8	28.5	50.0
5) Others, specify -----	4.3	5.6	1.1

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
28) Is your travel.....			
1) Daily	17.0	17.9	14.7
2) Twice or three times a week	20.8	22.9	15.8
3) Twice or three times a month	25.6	26.9	22.3
4) Once a month	26.8	23.5	34.8
5) Other	9.8	8.7	12.5
29) To what extent do you encounter difficulty or hardship while crossing a checkpoint?			
1) To a very large extent	61.4	59.8	65.2
2) To a large extent	20.3	22.7	14.7
3) To a medium extent	13.5	12.6	15.8
4) Little	3.3	3.6	2.7
5) Very little	1.1	0.9	1.6
6) DK/ NA	0.3	0.4	0.0
31) Does your family had one or more of its members who have moved to live in a new area (for the purpose of work, study, treatment, etc.) because of the difficulties or hardships encountered at checkpoints and because of inability to cross the checkpoint on daily basis?			
1) Yes	33.9	40.6	22.7
2) No	65.4	58.7	76.5
3) DK/NA	0.8	0.7	0.8
33) If you want to choose the ways and means that have a chance of succeeding in fighting and removing Israeli checkpoints, you would choose:			
1) Through appeal to international human rights organizations	11.5	11.5	11.5
2) Reaching a ceasefire and returning to the peace process	40.7	40.3	41.2
3) Continuation of armed confrontations and bombings inside Israel	27.5	25.5	30.9
4) Continuation of armed confrontations but without bombings inside Israel	5.9	7.2	3.8
5) Popular unarmed demonstrations	9.4	10.1	8.3
6) Others, specify -----	4.9	5.3	4.2
34) What do you expect to happen now after Sharon's announcement regarding his intentions to evacuate settlements and withdraw from the Gaza Strip?			
1) Negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop	15.2	14.1	17.0
2) Negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue	44.5	41.6	49.2
3) Armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations	34.1	37.7	27.9
4) DK/NA	6.3	6.6	5.9

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
--	--------	------------	-------------

35) With regard to the Roadmap plan initiated by the US European Union Russia and the UN, do you think it has collapsed or do you think there is still room to implement it?

1) Definitely the Roadmap has collapsed	37.9	35.2	42.2
2) Think the roadmap has collapsed	27.8	30.1	23.8
3) Think it has not collapsed and room exist for its implementation	24.9	24.4	25.7
4) Definitely It has not collapsed, room exists for its implementation	4.0	4.3	3.6
5) No opinion/ Do not know	5.5	6.0	4.6

36) Soon, there will be an Arab Summit meeting. Do you feel that the Palestinians can count on Arab States to support them in regaining their rights?

1) Definitely yes	2.5	2.3	2.8
2) Yes	11.2	9.9	1.5
3) No	30.1	34.7	22.4
4) Definitely no	55.4	52.3	60.6
5) Don't Know /No answer	0.8	0.9	0.6

37) Do conditions in the Palestinian areas in the West Bank and Gaza force you to seek permanent immigration?

1) Yes	15.0	16.8	12.1
2) No	84.1	82.0	87.7
3) DK/NA	0.8	1.2	0.2

38) There are internal and external calls for wide and fundamental domestic reforms and changes in the institutions and authorities of the Palestinian Authority. Do you support or oppose these calls?

1) Strongly support	40.7	38.3	44.8
2) Support	50.4	54.1	44.2
3) Oppose	6.2	5.2	7.9
4) Strongly oppose	1.1	0.9	1.6
5) No opinion/ do not know	1.5	1.6	1.4

39) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, I....

1) Strongly support	53.2	43.2	69.9
2) Support	34.2	41.0	22.8
3) Oppose	9.7	12.0	5.9
4) Strongly oppose	1.3	1.5	1.0
5) No opinion/ do not know	1.6	2.3	0.4

40) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli settlers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, I....

1) Strongly support	50.8	40.1	68.7
2) Support	35.0	42.2	23.0
3) Oppose	11.1	13.5	7.1
4) Strongly oppose	1.4	1.8	0.6
5) No opinion/ do not know	1.7	2.4	0.6

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
41) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I....			
1) Strongly support	26.9	19.9	38.4
2) Support	26.2	28.1	23.0
3) Oppose	39.9	42.9	34.9
4) Strongly oppose	5.5	7.2	2.6
5) No opinion/ do not know	1.6	1.9	1.0
42) With regard to call for a cessation of violence by both sides, I			
1) Support it	83.6	84.2	82.6
2) Oppose it	14.9	14.4	15.8
3) No Opinion/ Don't know	1.5	1.5	1.6
43) If an agreement is reached to cease violence by both sides, but armed attacks against Israelis continued, do you approve or oppose, in this case, the Palestinian Authority taking measures to prevent them?			
1) Approve	57.4	57.6	57.0
2) Oppose	37.9	36.0	41.2
3) Don't Know / No Opinion	4.7	6.4	1.8
44) After reaching an agreement to cease violence by both sides, but the Palestinian Authority did not take measures to prevent these armed attacks against Israelis, do you think that the continuation of such attacks may impede the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis?			
1) Yes	72.1	73.0	70.5
2) No	24.4	21.9	28.5
3) Don't Know / No Opinion	3.6	5.1	1.0
45) After reaching an agreement to cease violence by both sides and the Palestinian Authority takes security measures to prevent such armed attacks against Israelis, are you concerned that these measures may lead to internal Palestinian conflict?			
1) Yes, very worried	38.8	34.3	46.3
2) Somewhat worried	39.6	44.1	32.1
3) No, not worried	19.3	18.7	20.4
4) Don't Know / No Opinion	2.3	2.9	1.2
46) Do you believe that armed confrontations so far have helped achieve Palestinian rights in a way that negotiations could not?			
1) Definitely yes	24.7	19.5	33.3
2) Yes	41.9	43.3	39.6
3) No	24.0	25.9	20.8
4) Definitely no	5.0	5.5	4.2
5) Don't Know / No Opinion	4.4	5.8	2.0
47) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian people and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, would you support or oppose the process of reconciliation between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel?			
1) Strongly support	16.9	15.5	19.4
2) Support	57.4	60.3	52.5
3) Oppose	17.1	16.5	18.0
4) Strongly oppose	6.6	5.4	8.7
5) D.K./N.O.	2.0	2.3	1.4

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
--	--------	------------	-------------

48) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian people and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, how soon do you think will reconciliation between the two peoples be achieved?

1) Reconciliation is not possible ever	41.5	38.8	45.9
2) Only in many generations to come	18.1	18.7	17.2
3) Only in the next generation	8.4	9.6	6.5
4) Only in the next decade	6.9	7.3	6.3
5) On the next few years	16.2	16.9	14.9
6) No Opinion /Don't know	8.9	8.6	9.3

49) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, the following are steps may be taken in order to enhance relations between the State of Israel and a Palestinian State. For each of the suggested steps please tell me whether you support or oppose it:

49-1 Open borders to free movement of people and goods

1) Strongly support	23.6	22.3	25.9
2) Support	62.3	63.6	60.0
3) Oppose	10.2	9.9	10.7
4) Strongly oppose	3.1	3.2	3.0
5) DN/NA	0.8	1.1	0.4

49-2 Create joint economic institutions and ventures

1) Strongly support	12.2	11.8	12.9
2) Support	52.4	51.6	53.5
3) Oppose	26.8	27.4	25.9
4) Strongly oppose	6.4	6.8	5.7
5) DN/NA	2.2	2.3	2.0

49-3 Create joint political institutions (such as a parliament. designed eventually to lead to a confederate system

1) Strongly support	3.2	2.7	4.0
2) Support	26.1	24.7	28.3
3) Oppose	47.6	49.9	43.6
4) Strongly oppose	18.2	17.3	19.8
5) DN/NA	4.9	5.4	4.2

49-4 Take legal measures against incitement against Israel

1) Strongly support	3.3	2.9	4.0
2) Support	35.4	32.2	40.6
3) Oppose	42.7	45.7	37.6
4) Strongly oppose	14.4	14.0	15.2
5) DN/NA	4.2	5.1	2.6

49-5 Adopt school curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians

1) Strongly support	0.5	0.2	1.0
2) Support	6.1	5.8	6.5
3) Oppose	46.9	50.9	40.4
4) Strongly oppose	44.3	40.0	51.5
5) DN/NA	2.1	3.0	0.6

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
50) In your opinion, is there a freedom for the press in our country?			
1) Yes	14.7	12.9	17.8
2) to some extent	34.1	33.4	35.4
3) no	48.0	50.8	43.4
4) DK/NA	3.1	2.9	3.4
51) In your opinion, can people in the West Bank and Gaza today criticize the PA without fear?			
1) Yes	49.8	51.0	47.9
2) No	46.9	45.6	49.1
3) DK/NA	3.3	3.4	3.0
52) If you want to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority, you would say it is:			
1) Very good	1.5	1.6	1.4
2) Good	21.8	22.7	20.2
3) Not good and not bad	25.6	26.5	24.0
4) Bad	25.3	24.8	26.1
5) Very bad	22.4	20.6	25.5
6) DK/NA	3.4	3.8	2.8
53) Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions?			
1) Yes	84.3	84.5	83.8
2) No	7.4	5.8	9.9
3) Don't Know /No Opinion	8.4	9.6	6.3
54) Will this corruption in PA institutions increase, decrease or remain as it is in the future?			
1) Will increase	57.1	57.2	56.8
2) Will remain as it is	13.0	14.7	10.1
3) will decrease	22.6	20.4	26.4
4) No opinion /Don't know	7.3	7.6	6.7
55) Some people say that one can not these days find a job or work without wasta. Others say that jobs are given to those who deserve them only. From your personal experience, you would say:			
1) to a large extent, jobs are obtained through wasta	77.1	74.9	80.6
2) jobs are sometimes obtained through wasta	16.5	18.6	12.9
3) jobs are obtained without wasta	2.1	1.6	3.0
4) Do not know of a personal experience	3.3	3.4	3.2
5) DK/NA	1.0	1.5	0.2
56) If separate elections for the president of the Palestinian Authority were held today, whom would you choose?			
1. Haidar Abdul Shafi	8.0	7.7	8.7
2. Yasser Arafat	38.2	39.5	36.0
3. Ahmad Yasin	14.0	12.0	17.2
4. Others (specify ----)	1.3	1.2	1.4
5. None of the above	25.2	24.7	26.1
6. I will not participate	12.5	14.2	9.7
7. No Opinion / Don't Know	0.8	0.6	1.0

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
--	--------	------------	-------------

57) If separate elections for a Vice President of the Palestinian Authority were held today, whom would you choose?

1. Saeb Erikat	8.2	7.9	8.7
2. Hanan Ashrawi	4.6	4.0	5.5
3. Haidar Abdul Shafi	6.1	5.0	7.9
4. Ahmad Yassin	5.2	6.0	3.8
5. Farouq Kaddomi	4.1	5.6	1.6
6. Marwan Bargouthi	16.0	18.5	11.7
7. Ahmad Quarai'	2.5	2.4	2.6
8. Mahmoud Abbas	0.9	0.9	1.0
9. Abdul Aziz Al-Rantissi	13.8	11.6	17.4
10. Mohammad Dahlan	2.1	0.5	4.7
11. No one, will decide later	23.3	22.4	24.7
12. I will not participate	12.2	14.0	9.1
13. Others	0.5	0.6	0.2
14. No Opinion / Don't Know	0.8	0.7	1.0

58) Which of the following political parties do you support?

01. PPP	0.6	0.5	0.8
02. PFLP	2.6	3.4	1.2
03. Fateh	26.6	28.7	23.0
04. Hamas	20.3	16.4	26.7
05. DFLP	0.8	1.0	0.6
06. Islamic Jihad	4.2	4.4	3.8
07. Fida	0.0	0.0	0.0
08. Independent Islamists	4.9	5.4	4.0
09. Independent Nationalists	5.3	5.7	4.6
10. None of the above	33.8	33.7	33.9
11. Others	1.0	0.9	1.2