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This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

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### IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SHARON DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, WIDE SUPPORT FOR THE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE AND FOR VARIOUS FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE, BUT ENDING ARMED ATTACKS FROM THE GAZA STRIP IS CONTINGENT ON A FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM IT

These are the results of poll # 12 conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between June 24 and 27, 2004. The poll deals with withdrawal from Gaza, winning the intifada, armed attacks, reconciliation, local and national elections, reform, democracy, corruption, and the popularity of Yasir Arafat, Marwan Barghouti, and the various political factions. Total size of the sample is 1320 adults (835 in the West Bank and 485 in the Gaza Strip) interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

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#### MAIN RESULTS:

This poll focused on issues related to the Israeli unilateral disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip covering issues like the Egyptian initiative, international presence, and continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip. Poll findings show significant public support for the Egyptian initiative. But support is not uniform with regard to all components of the initiative. Support is not very high for sending Egyptian security officials to the Gaza Strip. The reason for this reserved attitude may have to do with public concerns regarding an Egyptian security presence exactly at a time when the Israeli security presence begins to disappear. It is worth remembering that the Gaza Strip was under an Egyptian military administration prior to the 1967 war. Moreover, it is highly likely that many people think that the Egyptian presence might impose constraints impeding the ability of militant factions from continuing to resort to arms against the departing Israeli forces, especially if the Israeli withdrawal is incomplete.

Findings also show that most Palestinians, almost equally in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, would oppose the continuation of armed attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip if the Israeli withdrawal was full. However, if the withdrawal was partial, similar majorities in Gaza and the West Bank would support continuation of armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Strip.

It is interesting to observe two areas of difference in the attitudes of Gazans compared to West Bankers. The first has to do with perception of victory in the current armed confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians. While a majority of Gazans think Palestinians have won, less than one third of West Bankers think so. Gazans, more than West Bankers, seem to view the Israeli unilateral disengagement as victory for Palestinians. The second area of difference has to do with homes in the settlements. While a majority of West Bankers support keeping homes in evacuated settlements intact, Gazans preferred to see them destroyed. One reason for this could be the concern of Gazans about a possible return of settlers and soldiers to the Strip after the withdrawal, particularly since this withdrawal is unilateral. Perhaps it is this concern about a possible return of the Israeli army that leads most Palestinians, as poll findings show, to support various forms of international presence in the Gaza Strip, including the deployment of international armed forces.

**(1) Withdrawal from Gaza**

- Little less than two-thirds of the Palestinians (64%) support the Egyptian initiative and 32% oppose it, but only 53% support the deployment of Egyptian military advisers and security officials in the Gaza Strip
- High levels of support for various forms of international presence in the context of the Sharon disengagement plan with 60% for the deployment of an armed international or multilateral force in the Gaza Strip that would be responsible for security in the Rafah international border crossing and the Egyptian-Palestinian border
- Support for the modified Sharon disengagement plan as approved by the Israeli government does not exceed 34% and only one quarter believes the plan will actually be implemented
- A majority of 59% would oppose armed attacks from the Gaza Strip if the withdrawal from the Strip was complete
- An almost even split on the future of the homes in the settlements with 49% wanting to keep them intact and 48% wanting them destroyed
- An overwhelming majority (90%) supports Hamas' participation in the administration of the Gaza Strip after the Israel withdrawal

Poll findings show that little less than two-thirds of the Palestinians (64%) support the Egyptian initiative and 32% oppose it. But support for its different components varies: 81% for unification of the security services under the control of the cabinet, 87% for the appointment of a strong minister of interior, but only 53% for the deployment of Egyptian military advisers and security officials in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, the poll finds high levels of support for various forms of international presence in the context of the Sharon disengagement plan: 60% for the deployment of an armed international or multilateral force in the Gaza Strip that would be responsible for security in the Rafah international border crossing and the Egyptian-Palestinian border; 61% for the deployment of such forces in the settlements in order to take custody of them and maintain control until an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on their future is reached; 64% for an international presence aimed at rebuilding PA security services; 70% for an international presence aimed at rebuilding PA civil institutions and ministries; and 78% for an international presence aimed at rebuilding the Palestinian economy and infrastructure.

Support for the Egyptian initiative increases among illiterates (69%) compared to those holding a BA degree (54%), among the retired and laborers (76% and 72% respectively) compared to students (56%), and among supporters of Fateh (76%) compared to supporters of Hamas (56%).

Sharon's modified disengagement plan does not receive the same level of support as the original plan. Poll findings indicate that support for the modified Sharon disengagement plan as approved by the Israeli government does not exceed 34% and only one quarter believes the plan will actually be implemented. In March 2004, 73% welcomed the original plan when it was first announced and only 24% believed that Sharon was serious about implementing it.

Findings also show that the key to Israeli security is related to the size of withdrawal from Gaza: full or partial. As long as the withdrawal from Gaza is not complete, a majority of 55% would support continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after the withdrawal, but a majority of 59% would oppose such attacks if the withdrawal from the Strip was complete.

Opposition to armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after a full Israeli withdrawal increases among the oldest (65%) compared to the youngest (51%) among the retired (71%) compared to the students (50%), among the married (61%) compared to the unmarried (52%), and among supporters of Fateh (69%) compared to supporters of Hamas (49%).

The poll finds an almost even split on the future of the homes in the settlements with 49% wanting to keep them intact and 48% wanting them destroyed. Support for the destruction of the settlements' homes increases among Gazans reaching 58%. The desire of Gazans to see settlements' homes destroyed might be due to their fear that the Israeli army and settlers might come back to these settlements, just as the army returned to cities and areas vacated in 1994-96 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the current intifada.

A slight majority of 50% believes the Bush letter to Sharon on borders and refugees is important in shaping a permanent agreement with the Israelis and 45% believe it is not important.

With regard to domestic matters related to the Gaza withdrawal, the poll shows alarming concerns: 59% are worried about possible Palestinian infighting after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, only 30% believe the PA has high capacity to control matters after the withdrawal, and only 31% believe life in Gaza will fully resume in an orderly manner. Nonetheless, 59% believe the PA will be the body that will assume control over the Gaza Strip after the withdrawal and only 26% believe it will fall into the hands of factions and armed groups.

An overwhelming majority (90%) supports Hamas' participation in the administration of the Gaza Strip after the Israel withdrawal. In terms of the preferred percentage for Hamas' role in decision making, the median was 50% (and the mean 51%) for those supporting the participation of Hamas. The median for the whole sample was 50% and the mean 45%.

## **(2) Peace Process: Intifada, Victory, Armed attacks, and Reconciliation**

- only 40% believe the Palestinians came out winners so far in the ongoing armed conflict that has started in September 2000 and 37% believe no one won. Belief in Palestinian victory is much higher in Gaza (54%) than in the West Bank (32%)
- A majority of 59% supports continued suicide bombings inside Israel if an opportunity arises. Despite this, support for mutual cessation of violence remains very high (79%)
- 77% feel that their safety and that of their families are not assured these days
- support for reconciliation between the two peoples remains very high (72%) even though 43% believe such reconciliation is not possible ever

Findings show that despite the fact that 69% believe that armed attacks have helped achieve national rights that negotiations could not achieve, only 40% believe the Palestinians came out winners so far in the ongoing armed conflict that has started in September 2000 and 37% believe no one won while 16% believe Israel is the winner. On the other hand, 48% believe the majority of the Palestinians think that the Palestinians are the winners, and 51% believe the majority of Israelis think Israel is the winners.

Belief that the Palestinians have been the winners in the current armed confrontations increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (32%), in refugee camps (56%) compared to towns and villages (32%), among those who pray five times daily in the mosque (50%) compared to those who never pray in the mosque (24%), and among supporters of Hamas (51%) compared to supporters of Fateh (39%).

A majority of 59% supports continued suicide bombings inside Israel if an opportunity arises. Despite this, support for mutual cessation of violence remains very high (79%) and if such cessation is obtained, a majority of 55% would support, and 41% would oppose, taking measures by the PA to prevent further armed attacks on Israeli targets.

Pessimism prevails: two thirds believe the Roadmap has collapsed; only 20% believe the two sides will soon return to negotiations and violence will stop; and 77% feel that their safety and that of their families are not assured these days. Nonetheless, support for reconciliation between the two peoples remains very high (72%) even though 43% believe such reconciliation is not possible ever.

## **3) Local and National Elections**

- Opposition to holding local elections in stages is greater than support (49% to 45%) as more people want to hold these elections in all cities, towns and villages simultaneously
- In local elections: 28% will vote for Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates, 26% for Fateh's, 17% for independents, and 9% for family candidates
- A solid majority of 70% supports the participation of refugee camp residents in the municipal council elections within which these camps are located
- Almost three quarters support giving women a quota in the general political elections
- A majority of 88% encourages the participation of Hamas in the general legislative and presidential elections if they take place soon

Findings show considerable opposition among the public for the holding of local elections in stages. Opposition to holding local elections in stages is greater than support (49% to 45%) as more people want to hold these elections in all cities, towns and villages simultaneously. If elections do take place now, a majority of 52% believe it will not be fair and only 38% believe it will be fair. In any case, only 44% believe the PA is serious about holding local elections in September 2004.

Findings show that if local elections were held soon and were fair, 34% of the respondents think Fateh candidates would win, 27% think Hamas candidates would win, 18% think independents would win, and only 9% think family candidates would win. As to how the respondents themselves would behave, 28% said they will vote for Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates, 26% for Fateh's, 17% for independents, and 9% for family candidates. In the Gaza Strip, 32% will vote for Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates, 23% for Fateh's, 18% for independents, and 7% for family candidates. These results indicate that the prevailing perception among the public is that Fateh has more popularity than the Islamists. Reality however is different, as the findings show that the Islamists are in fact supported by more people than Fateh.

Support for Islamist candidates in the local elections increases in the Gaza Strip (32%) compared to the West Bank (26%), in the governorates of Deir al Balah, Qalqilia, Rafah, Gaza City, Hebron, and Ramallah (41%, 39%, 33%, 32%, 31%, and 30% respectively) compared to Jericho, Tulkarm, Bethlehem, Nablus, and Jerusalem (9%, 18%, 21%, 25%, and 27% respectively), in refugee camps (33%) compared to towns and villages (26%), among women (34%) compared to men (23%), among the youngest (35%) compared to the oldest (21%), among housewives and students (34% and 33% respectively) compared to farmers (11%), and among those who pray five times daily in the mosque (39%) compared to those who never pray in the mosque (5%).

A solid majority of 70% supports the participation of refugee camp residents in the municipal council elections within which these camps are located, 23% support holding separate elections for these camps to elect local committees for the camps, and only 5% oppose the participation of refugee camps in the local elections. On the other hand, two thirds oppose the proposed amendments to local election law calling for the election of the head of the local council by the elected members of the council and not directly by the voters. With regard to the general political elections, almost three quarters support giving women a quota. The median for the preferred percentage of the quota for those supporting such a quota was 30%

and the mean 35%. The median for the whole sample was 20% and the mean 25%. Findings also show that a majority of 88% encourages the participation of Hamas in the general legislative and presidential elections if they take place soon.

#### **(4) Reform, Democracy, and Corruption**

- An overwhelming majority (92%) supports inside and outside calls for fundamental political reforms in the PA
- Positive evaluation of the status of democracy in the Palestinian areas does not exceed 25% and 50% believe that people can criticize the PA without fear
- 87% believe that corruption exists in the institutions of the PA and two thirds believe that officials and others involved in or accused of corruption are often not charged or brought to account

Poll findings show tremendous support for reform measures but also great doubts about their implementation. An overwhelming majority (92%) supports inside and outside calls for fundamental political reforms in the PA. But only 40% of the public believe the PA is actually carrying out such reform. With regard to the status of democracy in the Palestinian areas, the poll finds that positive evaluation does not exceed 25%, while only 20% believe that freedom of the press exist in PA areas (37% believe it exists to some extent). Despite this, 50% believe that people can criticize the PA without fear.

Findings also show that 87% believe that corruption exists in the institutions of the PA, and among those more than two thirds believe that this corruption will remain the same or increase in the future. Moreover, two thirds believe that officials and others involved in or accused of corruption are often not charged or brought to account.

Belief that corrupt officials are never charged or brought to account increases in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (63%), in refugee camps (73%) compared to towns and villages (65%), among men (73%) compared to women (63%), among the refugees (72%) compared to non-refugees (65%), among holders of BA degree (80%) compared to illiterates (44%), among employees and students (78% and 73% respectively) compared to housewives (61%), among those praying five times daily in the mosques (76%) compared to those who never pray in the mosque (57%), and among supporters of Hamas (76%) compared to supporters of Fateh (59%).

#### **(5) Popularity of Yasir Arafat, Marwan Barghouti, and Political Factions**

- In an open question regarding the election of the PA president, a majority of 54% votes for Yasir Arafat. No one else received 2% or more of the vote with the exception of Marwan Barghouti and Mahmud Zahhar. But in a closed question Arafat received 49%
- In another open question, this time regarding the election of a vice president, Ahmad Qurai (Abu Ala') received 9%, followed by Marwan Barghouti (8%), but in a closed question Barghouti came first with 25%
- The popularity of Fateh has remained unchanged from last March (28%) but that of Hamas increased from 20% to 24%.
- Combined Islamist strength (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) increased from 29% last March to 35%

In an open question (without a list of names presented to respondents) regarding the election of the PA president, a majority of 54% votes for Yasir Arafat. No one else received 2% or more of the vote with the exception of Marwan Barghouti and Mahmud Zahhar (2% for each). But in a closed question (with a list of only two names presented to respondents) Arafat received 49% and Haidar Abdul Shafi 10%. Since 1994, the name of former Hamas leader Ahmad Yasin was presented. As of the next poll, Mahmud Zahhar's name (and that of Marwan Barghouti) will also be in the list along with Arafat. Since he received less than 2% in the open question, Abdul Shafi's name will not be in the list of candidates for the office of the president.

In another open question, this time regarding the election of a vice president, Ahmad Qurai (Abu Ala') received 9%, followed by Marwan Barghouti (8%), Saeb Erikat (6%), Mohammad Dahlan, Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin), and Mahmud Zahhar (3% each), and Haidar Abdul Shafi (2%). But in a closed question (with a list not containing Zahhar or any other Hamas leader, as the names of Rantisi and Yasin were dropped) Barghouti came first with 25%, followed by Erikat (9%), Ahmad Qurai' and Haidar Abdul Shafi (6%), Hanan Ashrawi (5%), Mohammad Dahlan and Farouq Qaddoumi (4% each), and Mahmud Abbas (3%). It is worth noting that Barghouti received more votes in the Gaza Strip (27%) than in the West Bank (24%), and that Dahlan managed to strengthen his support in Gaza (to 8%) while receiving only 1% in the West Bank. Last March, Barghouti received the support of 16%. The results show that the trial of Barghouti has positively affected his popularity as 67% of the public said the trial has made him more qualified to be a Palestinian leader.

The popularity of Marwan Barghouti increases in the governorates of Dier al Balah, Rafah, Jenin, Bethlehem, Nablus, and Ramallah (44%, 33%, 33%, 32%, 30%, and 29% respectively) compared to the governorates of Tulkarm, Jerusalem, Jericho, Khanyounis, Hebron, and Qalqilia (15%, 17%, 18%, 19%, 21%, and 21% respectively), among the youngest (37%) compared to the oldest (18%), among students (35%) compared to professionals and farmers (8% and 11% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh (30%) compared to those who do not belong to any of the known factions and parties (19%).

The popularity of Fateh has remained unchanged from last March (28%) but that of Hamas increased from 20% to 24% during the

same period. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas' support reached 29% compared to 27% for Fateh. Combined Islamist strength (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) increased from 29% last March to 35% (38% in the Gaza Strip) in this poll. This is the highest level of support for the Islamists since 1995. Surprisingly, 39% of the respondents said that they thought that the assassination of Hamas leaders (Yasin and Rantisi) has weakened the movement while only 36% said it has strengthened it.

**Results of Poll # (12)**

24-27 June 2004

	<b>Total%</b>	<b>West Bank%</b>	<b>Gaza Strip%</b>
<b>00) From among the following satellite news channels, which one was the one you watched most during the last two months?</b>			
1) Al Arabiyyah	10.2	10.8	9.1
2) Al Jazeera	58.1	52.9	67.0
3) Al Hurrah	1.1	1.7	0.2
4) Al Manar	12.0	13.8	8.9
5) ANN	0.5	0.8	0.0
6) Do not watch tv	5.3	4.8	6.2
7) Other (specify ----- )	5.1	6.6	2.5
8) Have no dish	7.4	8.4	5.8
9) DK/NA	0.3	0.2	0.4
<b>01) The PA has decided to hold local elections wherever possible while postponing it in areas where it would not be possible. What do you think? Do you?</b>			
1) Support holding local elections in towns and cities where it would be possible	45.1	48.9	38.6
2) Oppose holding local elections in towns and cities where possible and demand	49.4	44.8	57.3
3) DK/NA	5.5	6.3	4.1
<b>02) If local elections are to take place at this time, would they be fair or unfair in your views?</b>			
1) Will probably be fair	38.4	40.7	34.4
2) Will probably be unfair	51.9	49.8	55.5
3) DK/NA	9.7	9.5	10.1
<b>03) If local elections were held and were fair, which candidates in your views are likely to win, those nominated by family regardless of their political affiliation or those nominated by Fateh and Hamas/Islamic Jihad or the independents?</b>			
1) Fateh candidate	33.9	33.9	33.8
2) Hamas/Islamic Jihad candidate	26.6	24.6	30.1
3) Neither, instead family candidate	9.3	10.7	7.0
4) Independent	17.5	18.2	16.3
5) Other (specify ----)	3.0	3.2	2.7
6) DK/NA	9.6	9.4	10.1
<b>04) And what about you? Will you give your vote in the next local elections to candidates from Fateh, Hamas/Islamic Jihad, or independents? Or will you vote for your family candidate regardless of his or her political affiliation?</b>			
1) Fateh	26.4	28.3	23.1
2) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	28.3	26.3	31.8
3) Independent	17.0	16.5	17.7
4) Family	8.5	9.4	7.0
5) Other	7.9	8.3	7.2
6) I will not participate	7.4	7.3	7.6
6) DK/NA	4.5	4.0	5.6

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
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**05) With regard to the next local elections, people talk about the possible participation of refugee camps located within the municipal boundaries of cities and some propose the participation of these camps in the local elections of those cities. But some propose holding independent elections for those camps, while other oppose the participation of refugee camps in the local elections. What do you think? Do you**

1) Support the participation of the residents of refugee camps in the local elections for the cities where they are located	69.6	68.3	71.9
2) Support holding independent elections for refugee camps to elect local councils to administer them	22.8	23.1	22.3
3) Oppose the participation of refugee camps in local elections	4.7	6.0	2.5
4) Other	0.2	0.2	0.2
5) No Opinion /Don't know	2.7	2.4	3.1

**06) The PA has announced its intentions to hold local elections in the coming September. Do you think the PA is serious or not serious about holding these elections?**

1) Serious	43.9	48.0	36.9
2) Not serious	43.8	40.8	48.9
3) DK/NA	12.3	11.1	14.2

**07) The local election law stipulates the direct election of local council heads by the voters. A proposal has been submitted calling for amending the law so that the heads of the local councils can instead be elected by the elected local council members. Do you support or oppose this proposed amendment?**

1) Strongly support	9.4	9.4	9.5
2) Support	21.2	22.3	19.2
3) Oppose	51.4	55.4	44.5
4) Strongly oppose	16.0	11.0	24.5
5) DK/NA	2.0	1.9	2.3

**08) The PLC is currently debating revisions to the general political election law so that a women quota can be introduced. Tell us if you support or oppose this revision and if you support it tell us what percentage would you propose for women quota in the next PLC.**

1) Support	75.3	74.1	77.3
2) Oppose (Move to Q09)	23.2	24.1	21.6
3) DK/NA (Move to Q09)	1.5	1.8	1.0

**08-1) percentage -----**

Median	30	30	30
Mean	25	25	25

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
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**09) Regarding the legislative and presidential elections, do you encourage or discourage Hamas participation in them if they take place in the near future?**

1) Strongly encourage	48.5	42.3	59.1
2) Encourage	39.9	43.6	33.6
3) Discourage	4.9	6.0	3.1
4) Strongly discourage	2.7	2.9	2.3
5) DK/NA	4.0	5.2	1.9

**10) If separate elections were to take place for the office of the president of the PA, you would vote for: (Open question) -----**

1) Yasser Arafat	54.0	54.0	55.0
2) Marwan Bargouthi	2.0	2.0	1.0
3) Mahmoud Zahhar	2.0	2.0	2.0
4) Other names (less than 2%)	15.0	16.0	14.0
5) DK/ NA decide later	27.0	26.0	28.0

**11) If separate elections were to take place for the office of the vice president of the PA, you would vote for: (Open question) -----**

1) Ahmad Quarai'	9.0	9.0	8.0
2) Marwan Bargouthi	8.0	10.0	3.0
3) Saeb Erikat	6.0	8.0	5.0
4) Mahmoud Abbas	3.0	3.0	3.0
5) Mohammad Dahlan	3.0	1.0	6.0
6) Mahmoud Zahhar	2.0	2.0	3.0
7) Haidar Abdul Shafi	2.0	2.0	1.0
8) Other names (less than 2%)	26.0	24.0	28.0
9) DK/ NA decide later	41.0	41.0	43.0

**12) Recently, the Israeli Government has approved a modified version of Sharon's disengagement plan. According to this plan Israel will evacuate unilaterally and in stages, all settlements in the Gaza strip and a four settlements in the West Bank.**

**In addition Israel will remain in control of a border strip on the Rafah-Egypt border and on the border crossing, and will continue to block sea and air access to the Gaza strip. Do you welcome or do not welcome this decision?**

1) Definitely welcome	5.6	6.2	4.5
2) Welcome	28.5	31.1	24.0
3) Do not welcome	35.7	38.8	30.4
4) Definitely do not welcome	28.9	22.6	39.7
5) DK/NA	1.3	1.2	1.4

**13) Would you support or oppose armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip after the implementation of this disengagement plan which has been approved by the Israeli government?**

1) Strongly support	18.0	12.8	26.8
2) Support	37.2	40.4	31.8
3) Oppose	37.0	39.3	33.0
4) Strongly oppose	3.8	2.9	5.4
5) DK/NA	4.0	4.6	3.1



	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
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**14) And if the Israeli government evacuates the Gaza settlements and withdraws completely from the Gaza Strip, including the border strip with Egypt and the international border crossing in Rafah, and if it lifts the air and sea blockade so that the airport and sea port would function again, would you in this case support or oppose armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip?**

1) Strongly support	10.8	8.7	14.2
2) Support	26.3	28.7	22.1
3) Oppose	50.2	52.0	47.2
4) Strongly oppose	9.1	6.6	13.4
5) DK/NA	3.6	4.0	3.1

**15) According to the modified disengagement plan, the actual evacuation of settlements is pending upon additional government decisions and it is said to be carried out by the end of 2005. In your opinion, will the modified disengagement plan eventually be implemented or not**

1) Definitely yes	3.1	3.4	2.7
2) Yes	21.0	23.7	16.3
3) No	43.2	44.7	40.6
4) Definitely no	25.2	19.5	35.1
5) DK/NA	7.4	8.6	5.4

**16) In recent weeks there is a sharp decrease in the level of violence exerted by both sides. In your opinion should Palestinians continue nevertheless the suicide bombings inside Israel if an opportunity arises?**

1) Definitely yes	21.9	15.3	33.3
2) Yes	36.7	38.1	34.3
3) No	31.6	35.3	25.2
4) Definitely no	5.5	6.4	3.9
5) DK/NA	4.3	4.9	3.3

**17) In the context of his disengagement plan, Sharon received a letter from President Bush declaring the US commitment to Israel's security and its existence as a Jewish state and the need to settle the Palestinian refugees in a future Palestinian state rather than Israel and the need to take demographic realities rather than the line of 1967 when setting the final borders. To what extent is this letter important in shaping a permanent agreement with the Israelis?**

1) Very important	14.9	14.4	15.7
2) Important	35.2	37.8	30.8
3) Not important	31.3	31.1	31.8
4) Not important at all	13.4	11.8	16.1
5) DK/NA	5.2	5.0	5.6

**18) In the context of the Israeli intentions to evacuate the Gaza settlements, the Egyptian government has proposed an initiative containing several elements such the unification of the Palestinian security services under the control of the cabinet, the appointment of an effective interior minister, and the deployment of Egyptian military advisers and security officials in the Gaza Strip to assist in the implementation of a mutual ceasefire plan. Tell us if you support or oppose each of these elements and if you support or oppose the whole plan as a package:**

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
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**18-1) Unification of the Palestinian security services under the control of the cabinet**

1) Strongly support	22.7	22.4	23.1
2) Support	58.5	58.6	58.1
3) Oppose	12.5	12.9	11.8
4) Strongly oppose	3.2	2.9	3.7
5) DK/NA	3.2	3.1	3.3

**18-2) The appointment of an effective interior minister**

1) Strongly support	23.2	21.9	25.4
2) Support	63.8	64.7	62.3
3) Oppose	8.1	8.3	7.8
4) Strongly oppose	2.2	2.3	2.1
5) DK/NA	2.7	2.8	2.5

**18-3) Deployment of Egyptian military advisers and security officials in the Gaza Strip to assist in the implementation of a mutual ceasefire plan**

1) Strongly support	10.3	10.6	9.9
2) Support	42.9	43.9	41.2
3) Oppose	31.7	31.9	31.3
4) Strongly oppose	11.3	9.4	14.6
5) DK/NA	3.8	4.3	2.9

**18-4) The complete initiative**

1) Strongly support	10.5	11.2	9.5
2) Support	53.4	52.4	55.3
3) Oppose	25.3	25.2	25.6
4) Strongly oppose	6.5	6.6	6.4
5) DK/NA	4.2	4.7	3.3

**19) In the context of the Sharon disengagement plan, there is a talk about the possible deployment of an armed international or multilateral force in the Gaza Strip that would be responsible for security in the Rafah international border crossing and the Egyptian-Palestinian border. Would you support or oppose such deployment?**

1) Strongly support	10.2	8.3	13.4
2) Support	49.5	51.1	46.7
3) Oppose	29.5	32.1	25.0
4) Strongly oppose	9.4	7.5	12.8
5) DK/NA	1.4	1.1	2.1

**20) In the context of the Sharon disengagement plan and the evacuation of the Gaza settlements, there is a talk about destroying homes in these settlements while others see the necessity of keeping them intact for the use of the Palestinians. Which one of the two options do you prefer?**

1) I prefer destroying homes in Gaza settlements	47.9	42.3	57.6
2) I prefer keeping them intact	48.7	53.2	40.9
3) Other (specify ----- )	1.1	1.4	0.4
4) DK/NA	2.4	3.1	1.0

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
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**21) If you support keeping the settlements intact, would you in this case support or oppose the deployment of an armed international force in these settlements to take custody of them and maintain control over them until an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on their future is reached?**

1) Strongly support	10.7	9.9	12.4
2) Support	50.3	53.5	42.7
3) Oppose	28.4	28.7	27.6
4) Strongly oppose	7.9	5.1	14.7
5) DK/NA	2.8	2.8	2.7

**22) In the context of the Sharon disengagement plan, there is a talk about an international or multilateral presence in the Gaza Strip for the purpose of rebuilding the PA institutions, ministries, and security services. Do you support or oppose this presence?**

1) I support this presence to rebuild the civil and security institutions	58.5	56.4	62.2
2) I support this presence to rebuild the civil institutions only	11.7	12.1	11.0
3) I support this presence to rebuild the security services only	5.2	6.0	3.9
4) I oppose this presence	21.5	21.8	21.1
5) No Opinion/ Don't Know	3.0	3.7	1.9

**23) In the same context, there is a talk about an international or multilateral presence aiming at rebuilding the Palestinian economy and infrastructure. Do you support or oppose this presence?**

1) Strongly support	24.2	19.0	33.2
2) Support	54.1	57.6	48.0
3) Oppose	13.2	14.9	10.3
4) Strongly oppose	7.0	6.9	7.2
5) DK/NA	1.4	1.6	1.2

**24) After Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and while awaiting general elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, there is a talk about Hamas participation in the administration of the Strip. Do you support or oppose this participation?**

1) Strongly support	39.6	33.7	49.7
2) Support	50.1	54.1	43.3
3) Oppose	5.5	6.1	4.3
4) Strongly oppose	2.1	2.3	1.6
5) DK/NA	2.8	3.8	1.0

**25) If you support Hamas participation in the administration of the Gaza Strip, how much should its share in decision making be? For example, should it 10% or 90% or something between the two? (Give a percentage between 10 and 90)**

The percentage should be -----

Median	50	50	50
Mean	45	45	46%

**26) When Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip, are you worried about internal Palestinian infighting in the Strip?**

1) Very worried	17.7	14.0	23.9
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	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
2) Worried	41.7	45.2	35.7
3) Not worried	30.9	33.7	26.0
4) Not worried at all	8.0	5.3	12.8
5) DK/NA	1.7	1.8	1.6

**27) How would you evaluate the capacity of the PA to control matters in the Gaza strip after Israeli withdrawal from it?**

1) High capacity	29.7	29.0	31.0
2) Medium capacity	41.8	40.4	44.2
3) Low capacity	14.6	15.8	12.4
4) No capacity at all	10.1	10.2	9.9
5) DK/NA	3.9	4.7	2.5

**28) Who in your opinion who will assume control in the Gaza strip after the Israeli withdrawal from it?**

1) The PA	59.2	58.7	60.2
2) Armed groups and political factions	25.5	27.5	22.1
3) Other	4.1	2.6	6.6
4) No one	4.1	4.1	4.1
5) DK/NA	7.0	7.1	7.0

**29) What do you expect to happen in the Gaza strip after the Israeli withdrawal from it?**

1) Life will fully resume in an orderly manner	31.1	32.5	28.9
2) Life will resume but there will be some disorder	55.4	53.8	58.1
3) Anarchy and chaos will prevail	11.2	11.5	10.7
4) DK/NA	2.2	2.2	2.3

**30) Who came out the winner so far in the ongoing armed conflict that has started in September 2000 between Israel and the Palestinians?**

1) Israel	16.0	18.5	11.8
2) the Palestinians	39.6	31.5	53.6
3) Both	4.6	5.3	3.3
4) Neither	37.2	41.6	29.7
5) DK/NA	2.6	3.1	1.6

**31) And what do the majority of Palestinians think on this issue? In their opinion, who came out the winner in the armed conflict so far?**

1) Most Palestinians think Israel is the winner	17.3	20.6	11.5
2) Most Palestinians think the Palestinians are the winner	47.8	40.2	60.8
3) Most Palestinians think Both sides are winners	2.2	2.9	1.0
4) Most Palestinians think Neither side is a winner	25.8	30.0	18.6
5) DK/NA	6.9	6.2	8.0

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
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**32) And what do the majority of Israelis think on this issue? In their opinion, who came out the winner in the armed conflict so far?**

1) Most Israelis think Israel is the winner	51.0	53.8	46.2
2) Most Israelis think the Palestinians are the winner	20.2	14.7	29.7
3) Most Israelis think Both sides are winners	1.7	1.8	1.6
4) Most Israelis think Neither side is a winner	18.7	21.3	14.0
5) DK/NA	8.3	8.3	8.5

**33) With regard to the Roadmap plan initiated by the US European Union Russia and the UN, do you think it has collapsed or do you think there is still room to implement it?**

1) Definitely the Roadmap has collapsed	40.5	40.0	41.3
2) Think the roadmap has collapsed	26.3	28.2	22.9
3) Think it has not collapsed and room exist for its implementation	24.6	23.3	26.9
4) Definitely It has not collapsed, room exists for its implementation	3.5	4.3	2.1
5) No opinion/ Do not know	5.2	4.2	6.8

**34) What do you expect to happen now after the Israeli government decision regarding Sharon plan for disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the acceptance of the Egyptian initiative by the Palestinian leadership?**

1) Negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop	20.4	21.3	19.0
2) Negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue	51.7	51.2	52.5
3) Armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations	21.2	20.6	22.3
4) DK/NA	6.7	7.0	6.2

**35) Would you say that these days your security and safety, and that of your family, is assured or not assured?**

1) Completely assured	3.3	3.8	2.3
2) Assured	19.9	18.7	22.1
3) Not assured	48.5	51.0	44.1
4) Not assured at all	28.1	26.1	31.5
5) DK/NA	0.2	0.4	0.0

**36) In your view, are officials and others involved in or accused of corruption often charged or brought to account?**

1) Certainly yes	5.5	6.2	4.3
2) Yes	22.6	26.6	15.7
3) No	42.2	45.4	36.5

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
4) Certainly no	25.9	17.4	40.6
5) DK/NA	3.8	4.3	2.9
<b>37) There are internal and external calls for wide and fundamental domestic reforms and changes in the institutions and authorities of the Palestinian Authority. Do you support or oppose these calls?</b>			
1) Strongly support	36.5	30.0	47.5
2) Support	55.9	61.7	45.9
3) Oppose	4.9	5.5	3.9
4) Strongly oppose	0.8	0.6	1.0
5) No opinion/ do not know	2.0	2.2	1.7
<b>38) In your view, does the PA carry out these days wide and fundamental domestic reforms and changes in its institutions and authorities?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	6.1	5.4	7.2
2) Yes	33.6	38.9	24.4
3) No	39.1	39.7	37.9
4) Certainly no	14.2	8.9	23.4
5) DK/NA	7.1	7.1	7.0
<b>39) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, I....</b>			
1) Strongly support	43.7	33.6	61.2
2) Support	42.3	50.1	28.7
3) Oppose	10.5	11.8	8.3
4) Strongly oppose	1.1	1.1	1.0
5) No opinion/ do not know	2.5	3.5	0.8
<b>40) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli settlers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, I....</b>			
1 Strongly support	42.3	32.9	58.5
2 Support	40.5	46.8	29.5
3 Oppose	13.5	15.3	10.3
4 Strongly oppose	1.1	1.4	0.6
5 No opinion/ do not know	2.6	3.5	1.0
<b>41) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I....</b>			
1) Strongly support	23.1	15.9	35.5
2) Support	27.0	28.5	24.4
3) Oppose	42.0	46.6	34.1
4) Strongly oppose	5.2	5.2	5.2
5) No opinion/ do not know	2.7	3.7	0.8
<b>42) With regard to call for a cessation of violence by both sides, I</b>			
1) Support it	79.0	79.1	78.9
2) Oppose it	17.9	17.1	19.4
3) No Opinion/ Don't know	3.1	3.8	1.7
<b>43) If an agreement is reached to cease violence by both sides, but armed attacks against Israelis continued, do you approve or oppose, in this case, the Palestinian Authority taking measures to prevent them?</b>			
1) Approve	55.0	56.9	51.7
2) Oppose	40.7	38.7	44.2
3) Don't Know /No answer	4.3	4.4	4.1

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
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**44) Do you believe that armed confrontations so far have helped achieve****Palestinian rights in a way that negotiations could not?**

1) Definitely yes	26.0	19.7	36.8
2) Yes	42.9	46.9	36.2
3) No	24.5	28.4	18.0
4) Definitely no	3.9	2.4	6.4
5) Don't Know /No answer	2.7	2.6	2.7

**45) And what do the majority of Palestinians think on this issue? Does the majority think, or does not think, that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve Palestinian rights in a way that negotiations could not?**

1) Most Palestinians think armed confrontations have helped	62.1	57.1	70.7
2) Most Palestinians do not think armed confrontations have helped	29.8	33.9	22.8
3) DK/NA	8.1	9.0	6.4

**46) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian people and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, would you support or oppose the process of reconciliation between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel?**

1) Strongly support	15.8	15.1	17.0
2) Support	56.3	60.1	49.7
3) Oppose	21.1	19.4	24.0
4) Strongly oppose	5.3	3.6	8.3
5) DN/NA	1.4	1.7	1.0

**47) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian people and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, how soon do you think will reconciliation between the two peoples be achieved?**

1) Reconciliation is not possible ever	42.7	36.7	53.1
2) Only in many generations to come	17.2	17.1	17.6
3) Only in the next generation	12.4	16.3	5.6
4) Only in the next decade	5.9	7.7	2.9
5) On the next few years	13.8	14.5	12.4
6) No Opinion /Don't know	8.0	7.7	8.5

**48) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, the following are steps that may be taken in order to enhance relations between the State of Israel and a Palestinian State. For each of the suggested steps please tell me whether you support or oppose it:****48-1 Open borders to free movement of people and goods**

1) Strongly support	25.8	26.2	25.0
2) Support	58.2	58.8	57.2
3) Oppose	12.2	12.1	12.4
4) Strongly oppose	3.0	2.2	4.3
5) DN/NA	0.8	0.7	1.0

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
<b>48-2 Create joint economic institutions and ventures</b>			
1) Strongly support	16.5	16.1	17.1
2) Support	50.0	50.4	49.2
3) Oppose	27.6	28.5	26.0
4) Strongly oppose	4.4	3.6	5.8
5) DN/NA	1.6	1.4	1.9
<b>48-3 Create joint political institutions (such as a parliament. designed eventually to lead to a confederate system</b>			
1) Strongly support	6.0	7.1	4.1
2) Support	25.0	26.9	21.7
3) Oppose	50.6	52.0	48.3
4) Strongly oppose	14.4	10.0	21.9
5) DN/NA	4.0	4.1	3.9
<b>48-4 Take legal measures against incitement against Israel</b>			
1) Strongly support	4.3	4.9	3.3
2) Support	29.0	27.3	32.0
3) Oppose	48.4	51.7	42.6
4) Strongly oppose	15.4	12.7	20.0
5) DN/NA	2.9	3.4	2.1
<b>48-5 Adopt school curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians</b>			
1) Strongly support	1.7	2.6	0.2
2) Support	7.4	9.4	4.1
3) Oppose	49.2	55.5	38.5
4) Strongly oppose	39.5	30.1	55.7
5) DN/NA	2.1	2.4	1.4
<b>49) If separate elections for the president of the Palestinian Authority were held today, whom would you choose?</b>			
1) Haidar Abdul Shafi	9.9	8.5	12.4
2) Yasser Arafat	49.2	46.6	53.7
3) Others (specify ---- )	4.5	4.7	4.1
4) None of the above	25.0	26.2	22.9
5) I will not participate	10.5	13.1	6.0
6) No Opinion / Don't Know	0.9	1.0	0.8
<b>50) If separate elections for a Vice President of the Palestinian Authority were held today, whom would you choose?</b>			
1) Saeb Erikat	9.3	9.1	9.7
2) Hanan Ashrawi	4.7	5.5	3.3
3) Haidar Abdul Shafi	6.4	4.7	9.3
4) Farouq Kaddomi	3.6	3.8	3.3
5) Marwan Bargouthi	25.4	24.4	27.3
6) Ahmad Quarai'	5.7	6.7	3.9
7) Mahmoud Abbas	3.0	3.0	2.9
8) Mohammad Dahlan	3.6	1.0	8.1
9) No one, will decide later	22.9	23.3	22.3
10) I will not participate	10.1	12.7	5.6
11) Others (-----)	3.0	4.1	1.2
12) No Opinion / Don't Know	2.2	1.7	3.1



	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
<b>51) In your opinion, is there a freedom for the press in our country?</b>			
1) Yes	20.2	19.4	21.5
2) To some extent	37.0	38.1	35.1
3) No	40.0	39.9	40.1
4) DK/NA	2.8	2.5	3.3
<b>52) In your opinion, can people in the West Bank and Gaza today criticize the PA without fear?</b>			
1) yes	50.2	47.5	55.0
2) no	45.4	47.4	41.9
3) DK/NA	4.4	5.2	3.1
<b>53) If you want to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority, you would say it is:</b>			
1) very good	3.9	4.9	2.3
2) good	20.8	23.7	15.7
3) not good and not bad	27.0	24.9	30.6
4) bad	26.2	26.4	25.8
5) very bad	19.5	17.5	22.9
6) DK/NA	2.6	2.5	2.7
<b>54) Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions?</b>			
1) Yes	86.7	86.6	87.0
2) No	7.0	7.7	5.8
3) Don't Know /No answer	6.3	5.8	7.2
<b>55) If yes, Will this corruption in PA institutions increase, decrease or remain as it is in the future?</b>			
1) Will increase	51.9	50.1	55.0
2) Will remain as it is	14.4	17.1	9.7
3) Will decrease	25.5	24.7	27.0
4) No opinion /Don't know	8.2	8.1	8.3
<b>56) Which of the following political parties do you support?</b>			
1) PPP	0.8	0.7	0.8
2) PFLP	2.6	2.8	2.3
3) Fateh	27.5	27.9	26.9
4) Hamas	24.0	21.4	28.5
5) DFLP	0.9	1.2	0.4
6) Islamic Jihad	5.7	6.7	3.9
7) Fida	0.1	0.1	0.0
8) Independent Islamists	5.4	5.5	5.2
9) Independent Nationalists	6.1	7.4	3.7
10) None of the above	25.8	25.5	26.4
11) Other, specify -----	1.2	0.8	1.9
<b>57) An Israeli court has completed the trial of Marwan Barghouti (member of the PLC and Fateh's Secretary General) and sentenced him to several life sentences. How in your view did the trial affect the image of Barghouti?</b>			
1) Did not affect it positively or negatively	25.6	31.7	15.1
2) I see him more qualified to be a Palestinian leader	66.6	58.8	80.2

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
3) I see him less qualified to be a Palestinian leader	4.1	5.3	2.1
4) DK/NA	3.7	4.3	2.7

**58) During the last few months, Israel has assassinated tow of Hamas leaders, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi. Now after the passing of several months, would you say these assassinations have weakened or strengthened Hamas so far?**

1) Strengthened Hamas	36.0	34.4	38.6
2) Weakened Hamas	39.1	40.6	36.4
3) Did not affect Hamas	21.9	21.6	22.3
4) DK/NA	3.1	3.4	2.7