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This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah



For further information, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa at the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Ramallah, Palestine
Telephone 02 296 4933
Fax 02 296 4934

e-mail: pcpsr@pcpsr.org
<http://www.pcpsr.org>

AFTER FOUR YEARS OF INTIFADA, AN OVERWHELMING SENSE OF INSECURITY PREVAILS AMONG PALESTINIANS LEADING TO HIGH LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR BOMBING AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON ONE HAND AND TO HIGH LEVELS OF DEMAND FOR MUTUAL CESSATION OF VIOLENCE AND QUESTIONING OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMED ATTACKS ON THE OTHER

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between September 23 and 26, 2004. The poll deals with the *intifada* after four years, the Egyptian initiative and the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, voter registration and voting intentions, Gaza's chaos and disturbances, reform and the performance of Abu Ala's government and other PA institutions, and finally, the popularity of Yasir Arafat, Marwan Barghouti, and political factions. Total size of the sample is 1319 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (824) and the Gaza Strip (495) in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3% and rejection rate 2%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa, at Tel 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

MAIN RESULTS:

This poll was conducted two months after the eruption of domestic disturbances in the Gaza Strip in July. These disturbances were accompanied by similar but more limited acts of lawlessness in the West Bank. The effects of this turmoil have been reflected in the findings of the poll which reflect a greater public worry and concern about the future. The poll was also conducted in the aftermath of the bombing attack against Israelis in Beer Shiva in early September. This attack came in the context of the continued mutual infliction of pain and suffering between Palestinians and Israelis. It is worth noting however, that the Palestinian share of the mutual violence that preceded the Beer Shiva attack has dropped dramatically while that of the Israelis has witnessed greater escalation particularly in the Gaza Strip.

Findings of the poll show high level of Palestinian frustration with national conditions as well as internal political conditions. There is an overwhelming sense of personal and family insecurity and serious concerns about the future in light of the perceived domestic power struggle and the perceived inability of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to control the internal situation. Doubts exist about the seriousness of the PA in holding elections, implementing reform, or dealing with corruption; the public therefore views PA performance in very negative terms. Facing entrenched occupation and very difficult security conditions, the public finds itself in the middle of a contradiction. On the one hand, it gives big support for the bombing attack in Beer Shiva in early September and for rocket attacks against Israel and its settlements and increasingly views the Israeli disengagement plan as victory for armed resistance. On the other hand, it shows an increased and wide spread support for mutual cessation of violence and for the Egyptian Initiative; it also raises questions about the effectiveness of armed attacks in confronting Israeli settlement expansion. Facing the deteriorating domestic situation, the public seems to be clear on what it wants: fundamental political reform and the resignation of the current government of Ahmad Qurai' (Abu Ala').

(1) After Four Years of Intifada

- **86% of the Palestinians feel they lack personal security and safety, but the largest percentage (41%) views unemployment and the spread of poverty as the most important problem confronting the Palestinians today**
- **77% support the Beer Shiva bombing attack, but 83% want mutual cessation of violence**
- **Only 48% views armed attacks against Israelis as effective in confronting Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank**
- **From among several controversial intifada practices, three receive wide spread support: firing of rockets into Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, firing of rockets from Beit Hanoun into Israel, and the “liquidation” of Palestinians accused of being Israeli spies**

Despite the growing sense of insecurity after four years of intifada, the Palestinians place economic conditions on top of their hierarchy of priorities. The poll shows that 86% of the Palestinians feel a loss of personal security and safety. This percentage stood at 77% only three months ago. Despite this feeling, the largest percentage (41%) views unemployment and the spread of poverty as the most important problem confronting the Palestinians today followed by the continuation of the occupation and its daily practices (35%), the spread of corruption and lack of reform (15%), and finally, internal chaos (8%). Concern over economic conditions increases in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank despite the July turmoil and disturbances in the Strip. The percentage of those placing unemployment and poverty on top of their list in the Gaza Strip reached 44% while those placing internal chaos on top of the list did not exceed 6%.

The growing perception of threat and insecurity is reflected on attitudes towards armed attacks against Israelis. The poll shows a large percentage supporting bombing attacks inside Israel, including the Beer Shiva attack of early September which received the support of 77%. Yet, despite the widespread support for bombing attacks and despite the belief of 64% that armed confrontations have helped the Palestinians achieve their national rights in ways that negotiations could not, the overwhelming majority (83%) wants mutual cessation of violence and a large percentage (59%) says it will support taking measures to prevent attacks on Israel when an agreement is reached on a mutual cessation of violence. Moreover, despite the widespread support for armed attacks against Israelis, only 48% see them effective in confronting Israeli settlement expansion and 49% support nonviolent steps (such as a ceasefire and a return to negotiations) instead. If a peace agreement is signed by the two sides, three quarters would support reconciliation between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples.

Support for the Beer Shiva bombing attack increases in the Gaza Strip (87%) compared to the West Bank (71%), in refugee camps and cities (85% and 82% respectively) compared to towns and villages (70%), among women (81%) compared to men (74%), among refugees (82%) compared to non-refugees (74%), among housewives and students (82% and 78% respectively) compared to merchants (70%), and among supporters of Hamas (95%) compared to supporters of Fateh (68%).

From among a list of ten controversial intifada practices, the poll found that four are unacceptable to more than 90% of the public, three are acceptable to more than three quarters, and three are acceptable to a percentage ranging between a quarter to half of the public. In the first group, the unacceptable practices, we find the following: assassinations or attempted assassinations of public figures or journalists, the burning of PA headquarters or the offices of its security services, shootings in demonstrations and funerals, and the kidnapping of foreigners working or residing in Palestinian areas. In the second group, the acceptable practices, we find the following: firing of rockets into Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, firing of rockets from Beit Hanoun into Israel, and the “liquidation” of Palestinians accused of being Israeli spies. Practices that have some support, even if limited are: the kidnapping of officials accused of corruption (50% support), the appearance of masked

men in public streets and squares (34% support), and the organization of armed marches in public streets and squares (28%). Acceptance of the practice of firing rockets from Beit Hanoun into Israel increases in the West Bank (78%) compared to the Gaza Strip (71%), among students (83%) compared to merchants (63%), and among supporters of Hamas (86%) compared to supporters of Fateh (73%). It is interesting to note that while firing rockets from Beit Hanoun receives support from a majority of the Palestinians (75%), 59% of the residents of Beit Hanoun reject this intifada practice.

(2) The Egyptian Initiative and the Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip

- Support for the Egyptian initiative increases from 64% last June to 69% in this survey
- The percentage of those who view Sharon's Plan as victory for armed struggle increased from 66% in March to 74% in this poll
- Concern grows over the consequences of the Sharon disengagement plan for internal Palestinian conditions

Poll findings show that support for the Egyptian initiative has increased from 64% last June to 69% in this survey while opposition decreased from 34% to 27%. Support for sending Egyptian security trainers and personnel to the Gaza Strip has increased from 53% to 57% during the same period. Support for the unification of the Palestinian security services under the control of the cabinet reaches 79% and support for the appointment of an empowered minister of interior reaches 85%. Moreover, 70% of the public support the Egyptian efforts to arrange for a ceasefire through a dialogue with the different factions.

The poll also shows that the percentage of those who view Sharon's Plan as victory for armed struggle has increased from 66% in March to 74% in this poll. But if the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is complete, a majority of 54% would oppose the continuation of violence from the Gaza Strip. The percentage of those opposed to the continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip if withdrawal was complete increases in the Gaza Strip (57%) compared to the West Bank (52%), among merchants and housewives (60% and 56% respectively) compared to students (52%), among those with the highest income (68%) compared to those with the lowest income (53%), and among supporters of Fateh (62%) compared to supporters of Hamas (50%).

Findings indicate a growing concern among the public regarding possible consequences of the planned Israeli pull out of the Gaza Strip. A majority of 64% (compared to 59% last June) is worried about the possibility of an internal Palestinian power struggle in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal and only 25% (compared to 30% last June) believe the PA has a high capacity to control the situation after the Israeli withdrawal.

(3) Voter Registration and Voting Intentions

- By September 23-26, 39% have registered to vote and two thirds of the unregistered intend to register
- Regarding voting intentions in local elections, a drop in the percentage of those intending to vote for the Islamists and for Fateh from 28% and 26% to 22% and 21% respectively
- Islamists are the strongest in the Gaza Strip with 30% intending to vote for Hamas and 18% for Fateh

The poll shows that 39% of the public have already registered to vote and 61% have not. Two thirds of those who have not registered say they intend to register. If this proves correct, a total of 80% would be expected to register if given sufficient time to do so. The current low level of registration may be due to the fact that only 56% believe that the PA is serious about holding national elections in the near future. If national or local elections take place in the near future, 72% say they will participate in them and 25% say they will not.

If local elections were to take place in the near future and if they were fair, 25% (compared to 34% last June) say they believe Fateh candidates would win them and 27% (as in last June) say they believe Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates would win them. 16% say the winners would be independent candidates and 13% say they would be candidates of families. As to how the respondents themselves would behave, 22% (compared to 28% last June) say they will vote for Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates, 21% (compared to 26% last June) for Fateh's, 16% for independents, and

14% for family candidates. In the Gaza Strip, 30% will vote for Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates, 18% for Fateh's, 14% for independents, and 10% for family candidates.

(4) Gaza's Chaos and Disturbances

- Percentage of those blaming the Palestinian leadership and the security services for the internal chaos and anarchy increases from 25% last March to 36% in this poll while the percentage of those blaming Israel drops from 63% to 54% during the same period
- Gaza July disturbances were motivated by internal factors according to 37% and external factors according to 18%
- 62% view Gaza July disturbances as a power struggle and 30% as a call for reform

The poll shows that 54% (compared to 63% last March) hold Israel responsible for the internal chaos and anarchy and 36% (compared to 25% last March) believe it is the responsibility of the PA leadership and security services. It also shows that Gaza's July disturbances can be traced to internal factors in the eyes of 37% of the public and to external factors in the eyes of 18%. In the Gaza Strip, the belief in the internal causes reaches 43% and in the external causes 13%. 41% believe that the disturbances had internal and external causes at the same time. A majority of 62% explains the disturbances as internal power struggle while only 30% view them as a call for reform.

The percentage of those believing that the Gaza July disturbances was a call for reform increases in the Gaza Strip (34%) compared to the West Bank (28%), among the youngest (34%) compared to the oldest (23%), and among the illiterates (32%) compared to those holding a BA degree (23%).

(5) Reform and the Performance of Abu Ala's Government and other PA Institutions

- 93% support internal and external calls for fundamental reform in the PA and the largest percentage blames the PA and its leadership for impeding reform
- Percentage of those calling on the prime minister to resign increases from 39% last March to 49% in this poll
- Evaluation of PA performance is negative but the performance of the opposition is viewed positively
- Percentage of those believing corruption exists in the PA remains very high at 88%
- Positive evaluation of democracy under the PA reaches 29%

The poll found that an overwhelming majority of 93% supports inside and outside calls for fundamental political reforms in the PA. But only 51% of the public believe the PA is serious about implementing the reforms called for by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). The largest percentage (42%) believes that the PA (with its government, leadership and ministries according to 30% and President Arafat himself according to 12%) is the one that impedes the process of reform while 39% see Israeli occupation as the party responsible for impeding reform.

Percentage calling for the resignation of Abu Ala's government increases from 39% last March to 49% in this poll. 39% do not want him to resign. An overwhelming majority believes that he did not succeed in achieving what he promised when he was first appointed. Furthermore, a majority refuses to give positive rating to the performance of all PA institutions. The least positive rating goes to the PLC (30%), the cabinet (33%), security services (35%), judicial authority and courts (39%), and the PA presidency (42%). But the opposition forces receives the highest level of positive evaluation (53%)

88% believe that corruption exists in the institutions of the PA, and among those two thirds believe that this corruption will remain the same or increase in the future. Corruption can be found in PA ministries and offices according to 84% of the public, in the PLC according to 73%, and in the PA presidency according to 64%. Positive evaluation of the status of democracy in the Palestinian areas does not exceed 29%, but two thirds believe that people today can criticize the PA without fear.

(6) Popularity of Yasir Arafat, Marwan Barghouti, and Political Factions

- In a competition over the presidency, Arafat's popularity stands at 35%, and in a competition over the vice presidency Marwan Barghouti stands at 22%
- Fateh's popularity stands at 29% and Hamas

In a race for the office of the president involving Yasir Arafat, Marwan Barghouti, and Mahmud Zahhar, Arafat receives the vote of 35%, Zahhar 15%, and Barghouti 13%. One quarter will not vote for any of the three. PSR selected the three names after asking the public to provide us with the names of their preferred candidates in an open question in its June poll. The names of the candidates who received 2% or more were used to form a closed list of presidential

at 22%, but in the Gaza Strip Hamas stands at 30% and Fateh at 24%

candidates in this poll. In the race for the office of a vice president, Marwan Barghouti came first with 22%, followed by Mahmud Zahhar and Haidar Abdul Shafi with 12% each, Saeb Erekat with 6%, Mohammad Dahlan with 4%, Ahmad Quari with 3% and Mahmud Abbas with 2%.

The gap in the popularity of Marwan Barghouti compared to that of Arafat decreases in the cities of Nablus (20% compared to 27% respectively), in Ramallah (13% to 30%), in Jabalia (15% to 28%), in Khanyounis (19% to 36%), in Deir al Balah (17% to 30%), in cities in general (15% to 34%), among holders of BA degree (16% to 23%), among women (14% to 33%), among those with the highest income (21% to 29%), and among supporters of Hamas (14% to 15%).

The popularity of Fateh stands at 29% and Hamas at 22%. Fateh popularity stood at 28% and Hamas at 24% three months ago. The poll found major differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hamas' popularity dropped in the West Bank from 21% last June to 17% in this poll while remaining stable at about 30% in the Gaza Strip. Fateh's popularity on the other hand increased in the West Bank from 28% to 31% and dropped in the Gaza Strip from 27% to 24% during the same period. The total support for all Islamists (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) dropped in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 35% to 32%.

Results of Poll # (12)

23-26 september 2004

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
01) The Palestinian singer Ammar Hasan has become famous due to his participation in the TV show "Super Star" which aired weekly on al Mostaqbal satellite channel. Tell us how did you follow up the performance of this singer?			
1) By watching the program	42.3	46.3	35.7
2) By voting for him	2.2	3.0	0.8
3) By watching and voting	8.3	10.4	4.7
4) Did not watch or vote	47.2	40.2	58.8
02) Have you registered to vote in your area of residence?			
1) Yes	39.2	41.4	35.6
2) No	60.8	58.6	64.4
03) Do you plan to register?			
1) Certainly yes	23.4	17.9	31.8
2) Yes	37.1	41.3	30.9
3) No	29.4	32.7	24.4
4) Certainly no	5.4	3.5	8.3
5) DK/NA	4.7	4.7	4.6
04) Do you have confidence in the Palestinian Central Elections Commission?			
1) Certainly yes	18.7	18.3	19.4
2) Yes	40.0	39.1	41.4
3) No	18.3	18.3	18.2
4) Certainly no	8.3	7.3	10.1
5) Did not hear about it	10.4	12.5	6.9
6) DK/NA	4.2	4.4	4.0
05) If national legislative and presidential elections took place in the near future, would you participate in it?			
1) Certainly yes	26.9	22.0	35.2
2) Yes	45.2	46.2	43.4
3) No	20.2	24.2	13.7
4) Certainly no	4.4	4.0	5.1
5) DK/NA	3.3	3.6	2.6
06) Do you believe the Palestinian Authority is serious and truthful about holding national legislative and presidential elections in the near term?			
1) Certainly yes	12.2	12.2	12.3
2) Yes	43.5	45.9	39.4
3) No	28.4	27.9	29.1
4) Certainly no	5.2	3.9	7.3
5) DK/NA	10.8	10.1	11.9
07) Are you going to participate in the elections for the local municipal and village councils?			
1) Certainly yes	25.2	24.1	27.1
2) Yes	47.5	49.4	44.4
3) No	20.7	21.4	19.6
4) Certainly no	4.3	2.9	6.5
5) DK/NA	2.3	2.2	2.4

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
08) If local elections were held and were fair, which candidates in your view are likely to win, those nominated by family regardless of their political affiliation or those nominated by Fateh and Hamas/Islamic Jihad or the independents?			
1) Fateh candidate	24.8	26.6	21.7
2) Hamas/Islamic Jihad candidate	26.7	19.1	39.4
3) Neither, instead family candidate	13.4	17.6	6.5
4) Independent	15.7	16.3	14.6
5) Other (specify ----)	4.0	4.3	3.7
6) No opinion /Don't know	15.4	16.1	14.2
09) And what about you? Will you give your vote in the next local elections to candidates from Fateh, Hamas/Islamic Jihad, or independents? Or will you vote for your family candidate regardless of his or her political affiliation?			
1) Fateh	21.0	22.7	18.2
2) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	22.2	17.5	29.9
3) Independent	15.6	16.5	13.9
4) Family	13.9	16.4	9.7
5) Other	8.7	8.2	9.7
6) Will not participate	13.4	14.2	12.1
7) No Opinion /Don't know	5.2	4.4	6.5
10) In the context of the Israeli intentions to evacuate the Gaza settlements, the Egyptian government has proposed an initiative containing several elements such as the unification of the Palestinian security services under the control of the cabinet, the appointment of an effective interior minister, and the deployment of Egyptian security officials in the Gaza Strip to help in training and in assisting in the implementation of a mutual ceasefire plan. Tell us if you support or oppose each of these elements and if you support or oppose the whole plan as a package:			
10-1) Unification of the Palestinian security services under the control of the cabinet			
1) Strongly support	17.6	19.2	14.9
2) Support	61.2	59.2	64.6
3) Oppose	14.8	14.8	14.7
4) Strongly oppose	2.7	2.7	2.8
5) DK/NA	3.6	4.1	2.8
10-2) The appointment of an effective interior minister			
1) Strongly support	19.9	21.4	17.4
2) Support	65.3	62.1	70.5
3) Oppose	9.6	11.2	7.1
4) Strongly oppose	1.7	2.3	0.8
5) DK/NA	3.5	3.0	4.2
10-3) Deployment of Egyptian security officials to train and assist in the implementation of a mutual ceasefire plan			
1) Strongly support	11.1	12.0	9.5
2) Support	45.7	45.8	45.7
3) Oppose	30.7	30.7	30.7
4) Strongly oppose	9.7	8.3	12.1
5) DK/NA	2.8	3.3	2.0

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
10-4) The complete initiative			
1) Strongly support	10.6	12.2	8.1
2) Support	58.5	56.2	62.4
3) Oppose	23.3	23.4	23.2
4) Strongly oppose	3.6	3.6	3.6
5) DK/NA	3.9	4.6	2.6
11) Egypt is currently organizing meetings in Cairo and the Gaza Strip with groups and factions in an effort to set up a ceasefire. Do you support or oppose this Egyptian step?			
1) Strongly support	15.0	12.3	19.6
2) Support	54.5	57.2	50.1
3) Oppose	22.5	22.6	22.4
4) Strongly oppose	6.6	6.2	7.3
5) DK/NA	1.4	1.8	0.6
12) If the Israeli government evacuates the Gaza settlements and withdraws completely from the Gaza Strip, including the border strip with Egypt and the international border crossing in Rafah, and if it lifts the air and sea blockade so that the airport and sea port would function again, would you in this case support or oppose armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip?			
1) Strongly support	10.1	8.7	12.3
2) Support	31.6	33.3	28.9
3) Oppose	46.0	46.2	45.7
4) Strongly oppose	8.2	6.2	11.5
5) DK/NA	4.1	5.6	1.6
13) When Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip, are you worried about internal Palestinian infighting in the Strip?			
1) Very worried	20.5	16.7	26.9
2) Worried	43.4	48.2	35.6
3) Not worried	29.2	29.1	29.3
4) Not worried at all	4.7	4.2	5.5
5) DK/NA	2.1	1.7	2.8
14) How would you evaluate the capacity of the PA to control matters in the Gaza strip after Israeli withdrawal from it?			
1) High capacity	24.5	23.9	25.5
2) Enough capacity	33.8	32.3	36.4
3) Low capacity	20.5	20.8	20.2
4) No capacity at all	16.3	18.1	13.3
5) DK/NA	4.9	5.0	4.6
15) Do you see Sharon's plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed resistance against Israel or don't you see it as a victory?			
1) Definitely this is a victory	45.3	40.8	52.9
2) I think that this is a victory	28.7	30.3	25.9
3) I think this is not a victory	18.8	21.2	14.7
4) Definitely this is not a victory	5.0	5.0	5.1
5) DN/NA	2.2	2.7	1.4
16) And how do you think most Palestinians see Sharon's plan? Do most Palestinians see it or don't see it as a victory for their armed struggle?			
1) Most Palestinians see it as a victory for their armed struggle	71.1	68.5	75.5

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
2) Most Palestinians don't see it as a victory for their armed struggle	18.5	20.4	15.4
3) DK/NA	10.3	11.1	9.1
17) Will you support or oppose armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip after Israel implements its disengagement plan which was approved by the Israeli government?			
1) Will strongly support them	13.6	12.3	16.0
2) Will support them	34.6	35.0	34.1
3) Will oppose them	42.0	43.8	39.0
4) Will strongly oppose them	4.9	3.0	7.9
5) DK/NA	4.9	5.9	3.0
18) The Israeli government has recently announced its intention to build hundreds of housing units in the West Bank settlements despite its acceptance of the roadmap which stipulates the freezing of settlement activities. If you want to choose the way that is best able to stop this settlement expansion, what would you choose:			
1) Going to the International Court of Justice in the Hague	10.3	10.7	9.5
2) Unarmed demonstrations	11.9	13.8	8.7
3) A ceasefire and a return to negotiations	26.6	30.5	20.2
4) Continuation of armed confrontations and bombing attacks inside Israel	38.8	31.5	50.9
5) Continuation of armed confrontations but without bombing attacks inside Israel	9.0	10.4	6.7
6) Others, specify -----	3.5	3.2	4.0
19) What do you expect to happen now after the Israeli government decision regarding Sharon's plan for disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the acceptance of the Egyptian initiative by the Palestinian leadership?			
1) Negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop	17.1	16.5	18.2
2) Negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue	39.4	37.0	43.4
3) Armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations	36.7	40.0	31.3
4) DK/NA	6.8	6.6	7.1
20) With regard to the latest bombing attack in Beer Shiva in Israel early in this month which lead to the death of 16 Israelis, do you support or oppose this attack?			
1) Strongly support	36.1	25.7	53.3
2) Support	41.3	45.6	34.1
3) Oppose	17.5	22.3	9.5
4) Strongly oppose	2.2	2.8	1.2
5) DK/NA	3.0	3.6	1.8

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
21) Current Prime Minister, Abu Ala', promised that he would work during his tenure on achieving the following four objectives. Tell us, in your opinion, was he able or was not he able to achieve what he promised so far:			
21-1) Eliminate internal anarchy and absence of security			
1) Was able to a large extent	2.0	1.9	2.0
2) Was able somewhat	15.6	15.8	15.2
3) Was not able	46.2	49.1	41.4
4) Was not able at all	31.7	28.3	37.2
5) No opinion /Do not know	4.6	4.7	4.2
21-2) Prepare for elections in mid 2004			
1) Was able to a large extent	5.3	6.2	3.8
2) Was able somewhat	45.6	46.0	44.8
3) Was not able	30.1	31.3	28.3
4) Was not able at all	10.0	9.1	11.5
5) No opinion /Do not know	9.0	7.4	11.5
21-3) Carry out wide ranging political reforms			
1) Was able to a large extent	1.3	1.1	1.6
2) Was able somewhat	19.4	18.1	21.6
3) Was not able	46.5	50.7	39.4
4) Was not able at all	25.5	22.6	30.3
5) No opinion /Do not know	7.3	7.4	7.1
21-4) Return to the peace process with Israel			
1) Was able to a large extent	1.7	1.6	1.8
2) Was able somewhat	13.3	12.5	14.5
3) Was not able	49.3	51.0	46.5
4) Was not able at all	29.3	27.9	31.7
5) No opinion /Do not know	6.4	6.9	5.5
22) Prime Minister Abu Ala submitted his resignation in July and then he withdrew it. In your opinion, should Abu Ala' and his government or should not they resign?			
1) They should resign	49.3	47.0	53.1
2) They should not resign	38.7	40.5	35.8
3) No opinion/do not know	12.0	12.5	11.1
23) Regarding the prevailing internal anarchy, some say the reason for it is a failure on the part of the security services and political leadership to carry out their responsibility to maintain law and order while others say the Israeli occupation is to blame for it. In your opinion, who is more responsible for the internal anarchy?			
1) the failure of the security services and leadership	36.3	35.3	38.0
2) Israeli occupation	53.9	56.0	50.5
3) Others, specify-----	8.2	7.1	10.1
4) No opinion/do not know	1.6	1.7	1.4

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
24) In your view, do the Palestinian security services have the capacity to enforce law and order in the areas of the PA in which you reside?			
1) Certainly yes	12.9	9.9	18.1
2) Yes	44.3	47.9	38.3
3) No	33.9	33.9	33.9
4) Certainly no	6.7	5.8	8.1
5) DK/NA	2.1	2.4	1.6
25) And do these services do that or try to do that?			
1) Certainly yes	7.1	6.6	7.9
2) Yes	59.7	62.0	55.8
3) No	27.6	25.7	30.7
4) Certainly no	3.6	3.3	4.2
5) DK/NA	2.1	2.4	1.4
26) And what about the institution of the justice system and the courts, do they have the capacity to do their work (for example in conflict resolution and in punishing criminals, corrupt individuals, and those who violate the law?)			
1) Certainly yes	8.5	8.3	8.9
2) Yes	42.4	45.4	37.6
3) No	38.0	37.1	39.4
4) Certainly no	8.1	5.8	11.9
5) DK/NA	3.0	3.4	2.2
27) And do these institutions and courts do that or try to do that?			
1) Certainly yes	7.8	6.8	9.3
2) Yes	60.4	63.2	55.8
3) No	23.8	23.0	25.1
4) Certainly no	4.3	2.7	6.9
5) DK/NA	3.8	4.3	3.0
28) With regard to the events and disturbances that took place in the Gaza Strip and some West Bank cities in July (such as the demonstrations of armed men demanding reform, the kidnappings, the occupation of some of the offices of the security services, and others), do you think the causes and motivations were:			
1) Internal	37.1	33.8	42.6
2) External	17.6	20.4	12.9
3) Internal and external	40.7	40.4	41.2
4) DK/NA	4.6	5.5	3.2
29) How do you explain these events, are they in your view:			
1) Power struggle and personal interests	62.0	62.9	60.4
2) A call for reform and a public service	29.8	27.6	33.5
3) Others, specify ---	1.7	1.6	1.8
4) DK/NA	6.5	7.9	4.2
30) What in your view will come out of it?			
1) Internal infighting	48.2	48.6	47.5
2) Internal reform	25.2	23.9	27.5
3) Nothing	21.2	22.0	19.8
4) DK/NA	5.4	5.5	5.3

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
31) Do you believe the leadership of the Palestinian Authority is serious in implementing the reforms demanded by the Palestinian Legislative Council?			
1) Certainly yes	7.7	7.4	8.3
2) Yes	43.4	46.5	38.2
3) No	43.5	34.1	35.2
4) Certainly no	9.6	6.9	13.9
5) DK/NA	4.9	5.1	4.4
32) Who in your view is impeding reform in the Palestinian Authority? (open question)			
1) Arafat, the president, the leader	11.6	11.3	11.9
2) The government, PA, PA employees, Prime Minister	30.4	29.0	32.8
3) Occupation, Israel	38.7	42.0	33.4
4) Others	11.3	11.7	10.7
5) No Opinion/Don't know	7.9	6.0	11.1
33) With regard to the campaign of solidarity with the prisoners in Israeli jails during last month, was your participation through:			
1) Visits to the solidarity tents or taking part in marches	27.1	24.9	30.7
2) Follow up by watching special TV shows on the issue	66.8	68.9	63.2
3) Others, specify	6.2	6.2	6.1
34) The years of the intifada have witnessed the following practices which increased recently. Tell us if these practices are acceptable or unacceptable to you:			
34-1) Shootings in popular demonstrations and funerals			
1) Highly acceptable	1.1	1.6	0.2
2) Acceptable	7.4	9.1	4.5
3) Unacceptable	55.4	59.7	48.2
4) Highly unacceptable	35.5	28.6	47.0
5) DK/NA	0.8	1.1	0.2
34-2) Appearance of masked persons in public streets and popular marches			
1) Highly acceptable	3.9	3.6	4.4
2) Acceptable	30.3	27.7	34.5
3) Unacceptable	47.7	49.5	44.8
4) Highly unacceptable	16.2	16.9	14.9
5) DK/NA	1.9	2.3	1.2
34-3) Armed marches in public streets and squares			
1) Highly acceptable	2.8	3.3	2.0
2) Acceptable	24.9	22.7	28.5
3) Unacceptable	53.6	55.0	51.1
4) Highly unacceptable	17.2	17.1	17.4
5) DK/NA	1.5	1.8	1.0
34-4) Firing rockets from Beit Hanoun area towards Israel			
1) Highly acceptable	22.8	21.3	25.3
2) Acceptable	52.3	56.2	45.9
3) Unacceptable	17.5	14.1	23.2
4) Highly unacceptable	4.1	4.0	4.2
5) DK/NA	3.3	4.4	1.4

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
34-5) Firing rockets against Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip			
1) Highly acceptable	26.0	24.4	28.7
2) Acceptable	57.5	58.6	55.8
3) Unacceptable	10.8	10.0	12.3
4) Highly unacceptable	3.2	3.5	2.6
5) DK/NA	2.4	3.5	0.6
34-6) Liquidation by armed groups of persons accused of being Israeli spies			
1) Highly acceptable	27.1	25.3	30.1
2) Acceptable	46.6	47.6	44.8
3) Unacceptable	18.7	18.6	18.8
4) Highly unacceptable	4.0	4.4	3.4
5) DK/NA	3.6	4.1	2.8
34-7) Burning by armed groups of headquarters and offices belonging to the PA			
1) Highly acceptable	1.9	2.2	1.4
2) Acceptable	4.8	4.5	5.3
3) Unacceptable	65.2	66.7	62.6
4) Highly unacceptable	26.5	24.8	29.4
5) DK/NA	1.6	1.7	1.4
34-8) Assassinations or attempted assassinations of public figures or journalists			
1) Highly acceptable	1.0	1.0	1.0
2) Acceptable	2.2	2.6	1.6
3) Unacceptable	63.7	64.5	62.4
4) Highly unacceptable	31.1	29.8	33.3
5) DK/NA	2.0	2.2	1.6
34-9) Kidnappings of Palestinian officials accused of corruption			
1) Highly acceptable	11.3	10.1	13.3
2) Acceptable	38.2	36.9	40.2
3) Unacceptable	36.6	37.5	34.9
4) Highly unacceptable	10.8	11.5	9.7
5) DK/NA	3.1	3.9	1.8
34-10) Kidnappings of foreigners residing or working in the Palestinian areas			
1) Highly acceptable	1.4	1.1	1.8
2) Acceptable	6.2	6.3	6.1
3) Unacceptable	59.1	59.8	58.1
4) Highly unacceptable	31.7	30.7	33.2
5) DK/NA	1.6	2.1	0.8
35) The following is a list of problems confronting the Palestinians today. Tell us which one in your opinion is the top priority, then tell us which one is the second in importance.			
35-1) The first priority is -----			
1) Unemployment and spread of poverty	41.3	39.7	43.8
2) Continuation of the Israeli occupation and its daily practices	35.4	38.1	30.9
3) Internal chaos	7.6	8.4	6.3
4) Spread of corruption and lack of internal reform	15.0	12.9	18.6
5) Others, specify -----	0.5	0.5	0.4
6) DN/NA	0.2	0.4	0.0

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
35-2) The second priority -----			
1) Unemployment and spread of poverty	27.6	28.7	25.9
2) Continuation of the Israeli occupation and its daily practices	32.4	33.1	31.3
3) Internal chaos	12.8	12.7	12.9
4) Spread of corruption and lack of internal reform	26.6	25.1	29.1
5) Others, specify -----	0.2	0.2	0.2
6) DN/NA	0.4	0.2	0.6

36) In general, how do you evaluate the performance of:

36-1) Palestinian Legislative Council

1) Very good	3.7	2.6	5.7
2) Good	26.5	26.5	26.5
3) Neither good nor bad	30.3	29.6	31.5
4) Bad	18.7	20.8	15.4
5) Very bad	15.3	14.5	16.6
6) DN/NA	5.5	6.1	4.4

36-2) The Palestinian cabinet

1) Very good	3.8	3.0	5.1
2) Good	28.9	28.1	30.3
3) Neither good nor bad	27.6	27.1	28.5
4) Bad	21.9	24.4	17.6
5) Very bad	13.7	12.2	16.2
6) DN/NA	4.2	5.2	2.4

36-3) The Judicial authorities and the courts

1) Very good	5.0	3.3	7.9
2) Good	34.0	33.7	34.5
3) Neither good nor bad	25.9	27.3	23.6
4) Bad	18.8	19.0	18.6
5) Very bad	10.8	10.4	11.3
6) DN/NA	5.5	6.3	4.0

36-4) Security services and police

1) Very good	3.7	2.9	5.1
2) Good	31.7	28.3	37.4
3) Neither good nor bad	25.0	25.9	23.6
4) Bad	24.0	26.2	20.2
5) Very bad	12.1	12.4	11.7
6) DN/NA	3.4	4.3	2.0

36-5) The institution of the presidency

1) Very good	7.0	6.8	7.3
2) Good	35.0	34.3	36.2
3) Neither good nor bad	23.1	23.8	21.8
4) Bad	14.9	15.8	13.3

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
5) Very bad	11.3	10.9	11.9
6) DN/NA	8.8	8.4	9.5
36-6) Opposition factions and parties			
1) Very good	10.9	8.2	15.4
2) Good	42.0	38.9	47.1
3) Neither good nor bad	24.7	28.5	18.4
4) Bad	11.8	10.7	13.5
5) Very bad	4.0	5.2	2.0
6) DN/NA	6.7	8.5	3.6
37) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian people and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, would you support or oppose the process of reconciliation between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel?			
1) Strongly support	15.3	13.0	19.2
2) Support	60.1	64.6	52.6
3) Oppose	15.9	15.1	17.2
4) Strongly oppose	7.1	5.5	9.7
5) DN/NA	1.6	1.8	1.2
38) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian people and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, how soon do you think will reconciliation between the two peoples be achieved?			
1) Reconciliation is not possible ever	47.3	41.8	56.5
2) Only in many generations to come	14.5	13.9	15.6
3) Only in the next generation	10.4	14.0	4.5
4) Only in the next decade	6.2	7.3	4.3
5) On the next few years	12.6	13.5	11.1
6) No Opinion /Don't know	9.0	9.6	8.1
39) Would you say that these days your security and safety, and that of your family, is assured or not assured?			
1) Completely assured	1.7	1.8	1.6
2) Assured	12.3	13.1	10.9
3) Not assured	55.1	57.6	51.0
4) Not assured at all	30.7	27.3	36.2
5) DK/NA	0.2	0.1	0.2
40) There are internal and external calls for wide and fundamental domestic reforms and changes in the institutions and authorities of the Palestinian Authority. Do you support or oppose these calls?			
1) Strongly support	31.1	25.6	40.1
2) Support	61.9	66.7	53.8
3) Oppose	4.7	4.9	4.5
4) Strongly oppose	1.1	1.3	0.6
5) No opinion/ do not know	1.3	1.5	1.0

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
41) In your opinion, can people in the West Bank and Gaza today criticize the PA without fear?			
1) Yes	67.4	66.0	69.8
2) No	30.1	30.9	28.8
3) DK/NA	2.4	3.0	1.4
42) If you want to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority, you would say it is:			
1) Very good	4.1	4.0	4.3
2) Good	24.8	24.2	25.9
3) Not good and not bad	24.5	24.9	23.9
4) Bad	24.4	24.7	23.9
5) Very bad	19.9	19.7	20.2
6) DK/NA	2.2	2.4	1.8
43) Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions?			
1) Yes	87.9	86.8	89.9
2) No	6.1	6.6	5.3
3) Don't Know /No answer	6.0	6.7	4.9
44) If yes, Will this corruption in PA institutions increase, decrease or remain as it is in the future?			
1) Will increase	51.1	52.8	48.4
2) Will remain as it is	15.0	18.0	10.1
3) Will decrease	26.3	22.6	32.4
4) No opinion /Don't know	7.5	6.6	9.0
45) In your view, in which of the following PA institutions there is corruption? Is there corruption in:			
45-1) Ministries and government offices			
1) Yes	84.2	83.3	85.7
2) No	9.0	9.1	8.8
3) DK/NA	6.8	7.6	5.4
45-2) Security services and police			
1) Yes	84.1	85.5	81.7
2) No	10.7	9.1	13.3
3) DK/NA	5.2	5.4	5.0
45-3) Office of the presidency			
1) Yes	63.6	61.9	66.4
2) No	20.9	21.4	20.1
3) DK/NA	15.5	16.7	13.5
45-4) The Legislative Council			
1) Yes	72.6	74.3	69.9
2) No	16.0	13.1	20.6
3) DK/NA	11.4	12.6	9.5

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
46) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, I....			
1) Strongly support	54.1	44.3	70.4
2) Support	38.1	46.5	23.9
3) Oppose	5.8	6.3	4.9
4) Strongly oppose	0.5	0.6	0.4
5) No opinion/ do not know	1.5	2.2	0.4
47) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli settlers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, I....			
1) Strongly support	50.5	41.7	65.2
2) Support	39.6	46.1	28.7
3) Oppose	7.8	9.6	4.9
4) Strongly oppose	0.5	0.5	0.6
5) No opinion/ do not know	1.5	2.1	0.6
48) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I....			
1) Strongly support	27.4	18.7	41.8
2) Support	26.4	26.5	26.4
3) Oppose	40.7	48.5	27.6
4) Strongly oppose	3.6	3.9	3.2
5) No opinion/ do not know	1.9	2.4	1.0
49) With regard to call for a cessation of violence by both sides, I			
1) Support it	82.5	83.2	81.3
2) Oppose it	15.7	14.3	18.1
3) No Opinion/ Don't know	1.7	2.4	0.6
50) If an agreement is reached to cease violence by both sides, but armed attacks against Israelis continued, do you approve or oppose, in this case, the Palestinian Authority taking measures to prevent them?			
1) Approve	59.3	58.9	60.0
2) Oppose	36.7	35.9	37.9
3) Don't Know /No answer	4.0	5.2	2.0
51) Do you believe that armed confrontations so far have helped achieve Palestinian rights in a way that negotiations could not?			
1) Definitely yes	22.6	16.7	32.5
2) Yes	41.0	43.9	36.1
3) No	29.7	32.8	24.3
4) Definitely no	4.0	3.0	5.5
5) Don't Know /No answer	2.8	3.5	1.6
52) If separate elections for the president of the Palestinian Authority were held today, whom would you choose?			
1) Mahmud Zahhar	15.1	13.9	17.1
2) Yasser Arafat	34.9	34.8	35.2
3) Marwan Barghouti	12.9	12.4	13.8
4) Others (specify ----)	0.8	0.9	0.6
5) None of the above, will decide later	24.6	25.3	23.6
6) I will not participate	10.1	10.9	8.7
7) No Opinion / Don't Know	1.6	1.9	1.0

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
53) If separate elections for a Vice President of the Palestinian Authority were held today, whom would you choose?			
1) Saeb Erikat	5.7	5.3	6.3
2) Haidar Abdul Shafi	12.2	11.1	14.0
3) Marwan Bargouthi	22.2	24.2	18.9
4) Ahmad Quarai'	2.7	2.8	2.6
5) Mahmud Abbas	2.0	1.9	2.0
6) Mohammad Dahlan	3.6	1.2	7.5
7) Mahmud Zahhar	11.5	10.8	12.6
8) No one, will decide later	27.4	27.9	26.4
9) I will not participate	10.0	11.2	7.9
10) Others (-----)	1.0	1.2	0.6
11) No Opinion / Don't Know	1.9	2.3	1.2

54) Which of the following political parties do you support?

1) PPP	0.5	0.4	0.6
2) PFLP	2.1	2.2	2.0
3) Fateh	28.7	31.3	24.3
4) Hamas	22.0	17.4	29.6
5) DFLP	0.9	1.2	0.4
6) Islamic Jihad	3.8	4.9	2.0
7) Independent Islamists	5.5	4.9	6.7
8) Independent Nationalists	7.0	7.8	5.7
9) None of the above	28.7	29.3	27.8
10) Other, specify -----	0.8	0.7	0.8