

#### **Palestine Center for POLICY and SURVEY RESEARCH**



**Survey Research Unit** 

Poll Number (16)

9-11 June 2005

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policy analysis and academic research. PSR was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. The center engages in several activities. It conducts academic and policy analysis studies. It organizes socio-political surveys and public opinion polls on current Palestinian political and social attitudes. It sponsors study groups and task forces on issues of critical importance to the Palestinians. Finally, it organizes conferences, public lectures, and briefings on current public policy issues. PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas.

This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah



Konrad -Adenauer-Stiftung

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DESPITE NEGATIVE EVALUATION OF PALESTINIAN CONDITIONS SINCE THE ELECTION OF ABU MAZIN, AND DESPITE THE CONTINUED RISE IN THE POPULARITY OF HAMAS, EXPECTED ELECTIONS' OUTCOME GIVES FATEH 44% AND HAMAS 33% OF THE SEATS OF THE NEXT PLC

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between June 9-11, 2005. The poll deals with public evaluation of Palestinian conditions since the election of Abu Mazin, expected outcome of the next parliamentary elections, the participation of Hamas in the political process, and the disengagement plan. Total size of the sample is 1320 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (825) and the Gaza Strip (495) in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

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#### MAIN RESULTS:

Focus in this poll has been placed on domestic matters, especially the balance of power between factions and the popularity of leaders as well as public evaluation of conditions since the election of Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) as president of the PA. Three findings emerge from the poll:

- (1) The competition between Fateh and Hamas is becoming fierce. The poll was conducted soon after the second round of local elections which were dominated by the two factions. Despite the impressive ability of Hamas to increase its popularity during the past six months, Fateh remains stronger, particularly in the West Bank. But Fateh lacks a majority support and needs to forge a coalition with other forces in order to be able to govern. Hamas' strength lies in the public belief that it is clean and most able to fight corruption. Moreover, many of Hamas' supporters believe that its decision to participate in the parliamentary elections is a sign of moderation. Fateh's strength lies in the public belief that it is most able to bring about a peace agreement, improve the economy, and enforce law and order.
- (2) Poll findings show that in the competition among Palestinian leaders for public support, Marwan Barghouti emerges as the most popular followed by Mahmud Abbas and Ahmad Qurai. In the second line of leadership, six figures are prominent, two of which are Hamas leaders, Mahmud Zahhar and Ismail Haniyyeh, and four are nationalists: Mohammad Dahlan, Saeb Erekat, Farouq Qaddoumi and Mustafa Barghouti. These results demonstrate one of Hamas' weaknesses: the inability, due to Israeli assassination policy, to put forward popular and charismatic leaders.
- (3) Despite the negative public assessment of Palestinian conditions since the election of Abu Mazin, a significant part of the public does not necessarily blame him for that. Most Palestinians probably put the blame on Israel. Nonetheless, it is likely that Fateh and Abu Mazin will suffer the consequences for the deterioration of Palestinian conditions as the public tends to believe that it is Fateh, not Hamas, which is able to change these conditions. With Fateh seen impotent, it loses its advantage over Hamas in delivering better outcomes with regard to the peace process, the economy, and the enforcement of law and order.

## (1) Public Evaluation of Palestinian Conditions since the Election of Abu Mazin

- Majority sees conditions deteriorating or remaining the same since the election of Abu Mazin
- But 60% say they are satisfied with Abu Mazin's performance and 35% say they are unsatisfied
- The public is evenly split over Abu Mazin's decision to postpone the elections and only 39% see the outcome of his visit to the US as beneficial to the national interest

From among eight major areas of public concern, a majority believes that things have either stayed the same or became worse in six areas and improved in one area, while the public is divided in half over one other area. Conditions are the same or worse in the following areas: settlements, economic conditions, democracy and human rights, enforcement of law and order, fight against corruption, and internal relations among Palestinian factions. The only area in which progress is seen is the release of prisoners by Israel. The area in which the public is divided is related to occupation measures such as closures and checkpoints. Overall, only 3% believe that things in general have improved a lot since the election of Abu Mazin while 45% believe that things improved a little, 38% believe things remained the same, and 12% believe that things have worsened. Despite this negative assessment, 60% are satisfied and 35% are unsatisfied with Abu Mazin's performance since his election. Satisfaction increases in cities (65%) compared to refugee camps (56%), among illiterates (67%) compared to holders of BA degree (53%), among housewives (65%) compared to students (53%), among those most willing to buy a lottery ticket (73%) compared to those most unwilling to buy a lottery ticket (46%), and among supporters of Fatch (77%) compared to supporters of Hamas (45%).

39% believe Abu Mazin's latest visit to Washington has been beneficial to Palestinian interests while the rest is divided between those who think it has not been useful (30%), neither useful nor unuseful (17%), and those with no opinion (14%). Moreover, 44% are satisfied and 46% are not satisfied with Abu Mazin's decision to postpone legislative elections.

### (2) Popularity of Factions and Expected Outcome of Next Parliamentary Elections

- Support for Fateh and Hamas increases
- In the next parliamentary elections, 44% will vote for Fatch and 33% for Hamas
- Perception of corruption plays a significant role in electoral behavior
- Fatch is most able to deliver on most requirements of voters
- Marwan Barghouti is the most popular Palestinian leader

Findings show continued increase in the popularity of Hamas standing today at 30%, compared to 25% last March and 18% last December. Fateh's popularity stands at 41% compared to 36% last March and 40% last December. Fateh's popularity is the same in the Gaza Strip (41%) as in the West Bank (42%). But Hamas' popularity is greater in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (27%), among women (34%) compared to men (26%), among students (36%) compared to merchants (19%), among the most religious (34%) compared to the least religious (13%), among the most willing to buy a lottery ticket (46%) compared to the most unwilling to buy a lottery ticket (22%), and among those employed in the private sector (29%) compared to those employed in the public sector (22%).

Findings show that the level of participation in the next legislative elections will be 77% and the outcome of those elections will be as follows: 44% for Fateh, 33% for Hamas and Islamic Jihad, 3% for the left, and 8% for independent lists. 12% are undecided. If the contest is between two lists only, one for Fateh and headed by Marwan Barghouti and one for Hamas and headed by Mahmud Zahhar, 47% would vote for Fateh and 38% for Hamas. 15% would vote for neither list or do not know to whom they would give their vote. Fateh's list wins over Hamas' in nine electoral districts: Toubas, Salfit, Jericho, Jenin, Bethlehem, Hebron, Khanyounis, Dier al Balah, and Rafah. Hamas wins in three districts: Tulkarm, Jabalia, and Gaza City. In the remaining four districts, Fateh wins with a slight advantage over Hamas.

The most important consideration in voting for individual candidates in the next legislative elections is going to be the integrity and lack of corruption of the candidate. From among eight considerations in voting for election lists, number (1) is the ability to fight corruption, (2) ability to reach a peace agreement with Israel, (3) ability to improve economic conditions, (4) ability to maintain national unity, (5) ability to protect refugee rights in negotiations, (6) the name or affiliation of the list, (7) ability to enforce law and order, and finally- (8) ability to insure the continuation of the intifada.

Fateh receives greater appreciation (compared to Hamas, left, or independent and new parties) for its ability to deliver on five of seven considerations while Hamas receives greater appreciation for its ability to deliver on two. Fateh is more able to improve the economy (46% for Fateh and 34% for Hamas), to reach a peace agreement with Israel (65% for Fateh and 22% for Hamas), to protect national unity (43% for Fateh and 37% for Hamas), to protect refugee rights (44% for Fateh and 36% for Hamas), and to enforce law and order (52% for Fateh and 32% for Hamas). Hamas is more able to fight corruption (47% for Hamas and 37% for Fateh) and to insure the continuation of the intifada (64% for Hamas and 23% for Fateh).

Major public concerns are organized in the following order of importance: (1) poverty and unemployment (34%), (2) occupation measures (33%), (3) corruption (24%), (4) internal anarchy and chaos (8%). After legislative elections, the public would like to see the following order of priorities: (1) improve the economy, (2) fight corruption, (3) reach a peace agreement with Israel, (4) enforce law and order, and finally, (5) maintain national unity.

In an open question, Marwan Barghouti receives the greatest level of support to lead Fateh's election list in the next legislative elections receiving the support of 14% of respondents followed by Mohammad Dahlan (5%), Ahmad Quarai and Farouq Qaddoumi (4% each), while 57% have not decided yet or do not know.

If presidential elections were held today, Abu Mazin, in an open question, receives the largest percentage of support (24%) followed by Marwan Barghouti (12%), and Mahmud Zahhar (8%). 36% have not decided or do not know. In an open question regarding nomination for vice president, Marwan Barghouti receives the largest percentage of support (11%), followed by Ahmad Quarai (5%), Mustafa Barghouti and Mohammad Dahlan (4% each), Mahmud Zahhar and Saeb Erikat (3% each), and Ismail Haniyyeh and Farouq Qaddoumi (2% each). 52% have not decided or do not know. For the position of prime minister after the next legislative elections, Ahamd Qurai, in an open question, receives the largest percentage of support (9%) followed by Marwan Barghouti (7%), Mahmud Zahhar (5%), Mohammad Dahlan and Mustafa Barghouti (3% each). 56% have not decided or do not know.

### (3) Hamas' Participation in the Political Process

• 40% believe that the willingness of Hamas to participate in the next parliamentary elections means that the movement is more willing today to embrace the peace process but 20% believe it

Findings show that a large percentage (40%) sees in Hamas' willingness to participate in the next parliamentary elections a sign of moderation on the part of the Islamist movement, including a more willingness to accept the peace process. Only 20% believe that Hamas' decision means the movement is adopting a more hard line position on the peace process. One third believes it reflects no change at all. Despite these findings, 39% believe that if Hamas

means the opposite

 If Hamas wins the majority of PLC seats, 40% believe the peace process will be stopped or slowed down and 30% believe it would have the opposite effect

 44% believe economic conditions will become better and 22% believe they will become worse if Hamas wins a parliamentary majority; moreover, 44% believe the status of democracy will get better and 21% believe it will get worse if Hamas wins a parliamentary majority

#### (4) Domestic Conditions: Reform, Democracy, Corruption, and PA Performance

- 94% support internal and external calls for reform, and 63% believe that the PA is currently implementing fundamental reform measures while positive evaluation of PA democracy rises to 37%
- But perception of corruption is still very high reaching 87% and only 39% believe that those responsible for corruption are often charged while 95% believe public hiring is done through wasta (connections) and only 36% feel safe and secure.
- Positive evaluation of the performance of the presidency stands at 47%, police and justice system at 42% each, cabinet at 40%, PLC at 36%, and opposition groups at 51%

### (5) Peace Process and the Disengagement Plan

- Short term negotiations' priorities are organized as follows: release of prisoners, stopping the building of the barrier, return of laborers to work inside Israel, freezing of settlement construction, and removal of checkpoints
- Sharon's disengagement plan is viewed by 72% as victory for armed resistance and 66% believe that armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national rights; but only 28% believe the PA has high capacity to control conditions in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli disengagement
- Two thirds oppose continuation of armed attacks against Israelis from the Gaza Strip if the Israeli withdrawal is complete; but 52% believe that settlement building will increase in the West Bank in the coming years
- Despite strong support for the current ceasefire (77%), a majority of 60% opposes collection of arms from Palestinian factions and armed groups

actually wins a parliamentary majority in the next elections, the peace process will suffer while 30% believe it will benefit and 24% believe it will not be affected.

Findings also show that 44% do not believe that a Hamas parliamentary majority would have negative effects on economic conditions or the future of Palestinian democracy. It is noticeable that while Fateh and Hamas supporters agree (39% each) that Hamas' participation in elections is a sign of moderation, Fateh supporters are worried about the future of the peace process, economic conditions, and the future of democracy if Hamas wins a majority. Hamas supporters on the other hand are highly optimistic about the future of the economy and democracy and cautiously optimistic about the future of the peace process if Hamas wins a majority.

Findings indicate an increase in the level of positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy from 24% in June 2004 to 37% in this poll. But the percentage of support for reform calls remains very high (94%) despite the fact that a majority of 63% believes that the PA is currently implementing fundamental reforms.

But PA reform efforts do not seem to include a fight against corruption as 87% believe that corruption exists in the PA and 95% believe that wasta (or connections) is essential in public hiring. The call for reform seems to include a demand for the enforcement of law and order as only 36% say they feel that their safety and security and that of their families are guaranteed these days. Findings indicate an increase in the positive evaluation of PA performance compared to the situation in September 2004. For example, positive evaluation of the presidency has increased from 42% to 47%, for the cabinet from 33% to 40%, for the PLC from 30% to 36%, for the judiciary from 39% to 42%. A slight decrease in the positive evaluation of the performance of opposition groups

has been registered from 53% to 51% during the same period.

Findings show that release of prisoners is the main short term negotiating issue on the mind of Palestinians followed by the need to stop the separation barrier, the return of laborers to work inside Israel, the freezing of settlement construction, and the removal of checkpoints. Interest in the issue of prisoners increases in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (30%), while the issue of the barrier is more important to West Bankers (28%) than Gazans (16%) whose second most urgent issue is the return of laborers to work inside Israel (21%).

Findings also show that a majority of 72% view the Israeli disengagement plan as victory for armed resistance. Moreover, two thirds of the public continue to view armed confrontations as helping achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. These results are similar to those obtained by PSR during the last two years. But findings also show that a minority of 28% believe that the PA has a high capacity to control conditions in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal.

If the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is complete, two thirds would oppose and 30% would support the continuation of armed attacks from the Strip. Opposition to such attacks in case of a complete withdrawal stood at 59% on June 2004, 60% on December 2004,

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and 66% last March. It is noticeable that opposition to armed attacks from Gaza after a complete withdrawal is similar in the West Bank to that of the Gaza Strip (65% and 68% respectively). But the poll found that 52% believe that settlement construction will increase in the West Bank during the coming years. It is probably due to this reason that despite the widespread support for the current ceasefire (77%), a majority of 60% oppose collection of arms from armed factions.

Support for collection of arms in the Gaza Strip (37%) is similar to that in the West Bank (39%). Support increases in cities (41%) compared to refugee camps (32%), among holders of BA degree (42%) compared to illiterates (26%), among the most willing to buy a lottery ticket (48%) compared to those most unwilling to buy a lottery ticket (25%), and among supporters of Fateh (50%) compared to supporters of Hamas (26%).

### **Results of Poll # (16)** 9-11 June 2005

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
00 ) From among the followin	g satellite new	s stations, which o	ne you watched
most during the last two mont	ths?		
1) al Arabia	7.9	6.8	9.5
2) al Jazeera	65.8	65.8	65.9
3) al Hurra	0.8	0.8	0.8
4) al Manar	8.2	8.6	7.5
5) ANN	0.2	0.4	0.0
6) Do not watch TV	6.3	6.3	6.3
7) others	3.6	4.4	2.2
8) Do not have a dish	6.9	6.4	7.7
9) DK/NA	0.3	0.4	0.2
<b>Hamas, Fateh, the Left, Indep</b> 1) Fateh candidates	endents, or th 47.1	ose nominated by 49.7	their families? 42.8
<ol> <li>With regard to the ucoming expectations regarding the ou Legislative Council? Who are</li> </ol>	tcome of these	e elections for the I	Palestinian
2) Hamas and Islamic Jihad			
candidates	37.5	34.4	42.6
3) leftest candidates (PFLP,			
DFLP, PPP, and al	1.4	1.7	1.0
Mobadara-the Initiative )			
4) Independent candidates	2.2	2.7	1.4
5) family candidates	1.8	2.7	0.4
6) Other candidates	1.3	1.5	1.0
7) DK/NA	8.6	7.4	10.7
1a) PA president Mahmud A	bbas (Abu Ma	nzin) decided to po	stpone
partliamentary election to an	unspecified da	ate, are you satisfic	ed or not satisfic
with the postponement?			
1) very satisfied	5.4	3.9	7.9
2) satisfied	38.3	37.9	38.8
3) not satisfied	36.3	37.1	34.9
4) not satisfied at all	10.0	10.1	9.9
5) DK/NA	10.1	11.0	8.5

2) Do you intend to participate in the upcoming legilative elections?

1) Yes	77.3	74.8	81.6
2) No	21.8	25.0	16.6
3) DK/NA	0.8	0.2	1.8

3) If you participate in the legislative elections, the follwing factors may or not be important in your selection of candidates. Tell us how important each one is to you: [certianly important, important, unimportant, certainly unimportant, DK/NA]

### 3-1) family relationship

1) Certainely Important	7.3	7.8	6.6
2) Important	20.6	21.0	19.9
3) Unimportant	53.4	54.4	51.9
4) Certainely Unimportant	18.5	16.6	21.4
5) No Opinion /Don't know	0.2	0.2	0.2

<u>Poll # 16 June 2005</u>

Poll # 16 June 2005				Polis
	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%	
3-2) integrity and incorruptib	ilty of candida	te		
1) Certainely Important	60.5	61.9	58.4	
2) Important	37.3	36.5	38.5	
3) Unimportant	1.5	0.8	2.4	
4) Certainely Unimportant	0.5	0.5	0.5	
5) No Opinion /Don't know	0.2	0.2	0.2	
, r				
3-3) position on the peace pro-	cess			
1) Certainely Important	33.8	36.5	29.8	
2) Important	57.1	54.3	61.3	
3) Unimportant	8.1	8.4	7.7	
4) Certainely Unimportant	0.6	0.5	0.7	
5) No Opinion /Don't know	0.4	0.3	0.5	
e) i to opinion / 2 on time ii	•••	0.0	0.0	
3-4) level of education				
1) Certainely Important	57.4	59.8	53.8	
2) Important	39.3	36.5	43.6	
3) Unimportant	2.9	3.2	2.4	
4) Certainely Unimportant	0.3	0.3	0.2	
5) No Opinion /Don't know	0.1	0.2	0.0	
3) No Opinion / Don't know	0.1	0.2	0.0	
3-5) extent of religiosity				
1) Certainely Important	48.1	44.4	53.5	
, <u> </u>	39.5	39.3	40.0	
2) Important				
3) Unimportant	11.4	15.0	6.1	
4) Certainely Unimportant	0.8	1.1	0.2	
5) No Opinion /Don't know	0.2	0.2	0.2	
3-6) political affiliation of can	didata			
/ <b>1</b>	26.0	25.8	26.2	
1) Certainely Important				
2) Important	40.1	40.4	39.7	
3) Unimportant	29.5	30.2	28.3	
4) Certainely Unimportant	3.8	2.7	5.3	
5) No Opinion /Don't know	0.7	0.8	0.5	
2.7	1. 1. 1. 4			
3-7) persoanl relationship with		0.6	4.6	
1) Certainely Important	7.0	8.6	4.6	
2) Important	20.9	19.7	22.5	
3) Unimportant	57.6	58.9	55.7	
4) Certainely Unimportant	14.2	12.6	16.5	
5) No Opinion /Don't know	0.4	0.2	0.7	
		1.0		
4) If you participate in the leg		•		
election or factional lists, to v	vhich of the fol	llowing would you	u vote?	
1) Hamas and Islamic Jihad	33.0	30.9	36.2	
list/s				
2) Fateh list	44.1	44.7	43.2	
3) leftest list (PFLP, DFLP,				
PPP, and al Mobadara-the	3.1	4.4	1.2	
Initiative )				
4) New lists that might				
include independents and	7.6	8.7	5.8	
others				

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
5) Other lists (specify:)	3.7	3.2	4.4
6) DK/NA	8.4	8.1	9.0

<b>5</b> ) ]	From among the following factors, which one is the most important in
det	terming your vote for one list against another?

ground ground ground and a	-50	*****	
1) the political party or faction	8.9	8.7	9.2
it belongs to			
2) The ability of the list to	17.0	165	10.0
reach a peace agreement with	17.2	16.5	18.2
Israel			
3) The ability of the list to			
insure the continuation of the		2.7	3.4
intifada	3.0		
4) The ability of the list to	15.6	14.7	16.9
improve economic conditions	13.0	14.7	10.7
5) The ability of the list to			
fight corruption and	24.3	24.2	24.5
implement reform measures			
6) The ability of the list to	0.2	0.7	7.5
enforce law and order	8.2	8.7	7.5
7) The ability of the list to	11.6	10.4	10.4
protect national unity	11.6	12.4	10.4
8) The ability of the list to			
protect refugee rights in	9.5	10.5	8.0
negotiations	7.5	10.5	0.0
9) DK/NA	1.6	1.5	1.9
) DIXIIII	1.0	1.5	1.)

## 6) The following is a list of problems confronting the Palestinians today, tell us which one is the most important problem?

1) Spread of unemployment and poverty	34.0	30.2	40.4
2) The continuation of the occupation and its daily practices	32.6	36.8	25.8
3) Internal anarchy/ chaos	8.0	8.9	6.7
4) The spread of corruption and lack of internal reforms	24.2	22.8	26.6
5) Others (specify)	0.8	1.0	0.4
6) DK/NA	0.3	0.4	0.2

### 7) What do you want the new PLC to do? What should be its first priority?

1) reaching a peace agreement with Israel	19.6	20.8	17.6
2) improving economic conditions	20.7	19.4	22.8
3) fighting corruption and implementing reforms	26.9	25.6	29.1
4) enforcing law and order	16.4	17.5	14.5
5) protect national unity	15.5	15.5	15.6
6) others (specify)	0.8	1.1	0.4

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	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%	
8) and what should be its seco	nd priority?			
1) reaching a peace agreement	16.4	15.4	18.0	
with Israel	10	10	10.0	
2) improving economic	29.6	28.5	31.5	
conditions				
3) fighting corruption and	23.6	23.2	24.2	
implementing reforms				
4) enforcing law and order	15.8	17.5	13.1	
5) protect national unity	13.5	14.3	12.1	
6) others (specify)	1.0	1.1	0.8	
9) If we looked at the following	ng political fact	tions/ parties, whi	ch one is the	
most able to:	-g p	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	VII VIIV 10 VIIV	
9-1) Improving economic cond	ditions			
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	33.7	30.4	39.1	
2) Fateh	46.2	46.9	44.9	
3) leftest list (PFLP, DFLP,				
PPP, and al Mobadara-the	2.7	3.9	0.8	
Initiative )				
4) New lists that might	6.0	0.0		
include independents and	6.8	8.2	4.5	
others	10.6	10.5	10.7	
5) others (specify)	10.6	10.5	10.7	
9-2) Fighting corruption and i	implementing 1	reforms		
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	47.0	43.0	53.5	
2) Fateh	36.5	38.9	32.5	
3) leftest list (PFLP, DFLP,	20.0	30.9	32.0	
PPP, and al Mobadara-the	2.5	3.5	0.8	
Initiative )				
4) New lists that might				
include independents and	6.0	6.8	4.6	
others 5) others (specify)	8.0	7.8	8.5	
3) others (specify )	0.0	7.0	0.3	
9-3) Pushing the peace proces	s forward			
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	21.7	20.0	24.4	
2) Fateh	64.9	64.4	65.9	
3) leftest list (PFLP, DFLP,				
PPP, and al Mobadara-the	1.5	2.1	0.6	
Initiative)				
4) New lists that might	4.0	4.0	2.4	
include independents and	4.3	4.8	3.4	
others 5) others (specify )	7.6	8.7	5.7	
by others (specify )	7.0	0.7	3.7	
9-4) Insuring the continuation	of Intifada			
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	63.7	60.3	69.3	
2) Fateh	23.0	25.2	19.4	
3) leftest list (PFLP, DFLP,				
PPP, and al Mobadara-the	1.3	1.9	0.2	
Initiative)				
4) New lists that might	2.5	2.0	1.0	
include independents and	2.5	2.9	1.8	
others  5) others (specify)	0.5	0.6	0.2	
5) others (specify )	9.5	9.6	9.3	

Poll # 16 June 2005				
	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%	
9-5) protecting national unity	266	22.2	42.0	
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	36.6	33.3	42.0	
2) Fateh	43.3	44.5	41.4	
3) leftest list (PFLP, DFLP,	2.7	2.6	1.0	
PPP, and al Mobadara-the	2.7	3.6	1.2	
Initiative)				
4) New lists that might		6.7	2.6	
include independents and	5.5	6.7	3.6	
others	11.0	11.0	11.7	
5) others (specify)	11.8	11.9	11.7	
0 6) Protecting refugee rights in	, nogotiation	n		
<ul><li>9-6) Protecting refugee rights in</li><li>1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad</li></ul>	36.4	36.0	37.0	
2) Fateh	43.5	41.1	47.5	
3) leftest list (PFLP, DFLP,	43.3	41.1	47.3	
	2.7	3.9	0.8	
PPP, and al Mobadara-the	2.1	3.9	0.8	
Initiative)				
4) New lists that might	4.0	<i>5</i> 0	2.2	
include independents and	4.8	5.8	3.2	
others	12.5	13.1	11.5	
5) others (specify)	12.5	13.1	11.5	
9-7) Enforcing law and order				
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	31.7	29.5	35.6	
2) Fateh	52.3	52.4	52.3	
3) leftest list (PFLP, DFLP,	32.3	J2. <del>T</del>	32.3	
PPP, and al Mobadara-the	1.9	2.9	0.2	
Initiative )	1.7	2.)	0.2	
4) New lists that might				
include independents and	4.7	5.6	3.2	
others	4.7	3.0	5.2	
5) others (specify)	9.2	9.6	8.7	
s) others (specify	). <b>2</b>	7.0	0.7	
10) Whom do you propose as the	he leader of I	Fateh's list to the l	egislative	
elections (excluding the president			C	
1) Mahmoud Zahhar	1.5	2.3	0.2	
2) Mohammad Dahlan	5.0	1.5	10.9	
3) Marwan Barghouti	13.6	17.5	7.1	
4) Mustafa Barghouti	2.7	3.8	1.0	
5) Ahmad Qurai'	3.8	4.5	2.6	
6) Saeb Erikat	1.3	1.8	0.4	
7) Farouq Qaddomi	4.2	4.4	3.8	
8) Others	11.4	11.0	12.1	
9) No Opinion /Don't know	56.5	53.3	61.8	
11) If you find that the choices in the legislative elections are between two lists,				
one Fateh led by Marwan Bar		ie for Hamas led b	y Mahmud al	
Zahhar, to which list you woul	d vote?			
1) Fateh list led by Marwan	47.2	47.1	47.4	
Barghouti	- ,		- ,	
2) Hamas list led by Mahmud	37.9	36.3	40.5	
al Zahhar				

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
3) Neither one	11.3	13.5	7.7
4) DK/NA	3.4	3.0	4.0

12) With regard to the following issues, if you compare the situation before and after the elections of Mahmud Abbas as the president of the PA, would you say things have improved, worsened or remained the same? [improved a lot, improved somewhat, did not change, worsened somewhat, worsened a lot, DK/NA]

12-1) Economic conditions in	the Palestinian	territories	
1) improved a lot	2.5	2.5	2.4
2) improved somewhat	25.1	25.3	24.6
3) did not change	51.1	52.1	49.5
4) worsened somewhat	13.0	12.2	14.3
5) worsened a lot	7.4	6.9	8.3
6) DK/NA	0.8	0.8	0.8
12-2) The state of law and or	der		
1) improved a lot	2.3	2.5	1.8
2) improved somewhat	26.8	27.9	25.1
3) did not change	45.2	45.1	45.5
4) worsened somewhat	15.5	13.9	18.0
5) worsened a lot	8.5	8.6	8.3
6) DK/NA	1.7	1.9	1.4
12-3) The fight against corru	ption in the PA		
1) improved a lot	2.5	2.5	2.4
2) improved somewhat	28.2	26.2	31.6
3) did not change	49.5	51.6	45.8
4) worsened somewhat	10.2	9.0	12.2
5) worsened a lot	5.7	6.2	4.9
6) DK/NA	3.9	4.5	3.0
12-4) Occupation measures s	uch as checkpoii	nts, closure, and c	curfews
1) improved a lot	3.5	4.4	2.0
2) improved somewhat	45.1	42.9	48.7
3) did not change	35.7	35.4	36.2
4) worsened somewhat	8.8	9.5	7.7
5) worsened a lot	5.8	6.5	4.4
6) DK/NA	1.1	1.3	0.8
12-5) Settlement building in t	the West Bank a	nd the Gaza Strij	)
1) improved a lot	1.1	1.3	0.6
2) improved somewhat	12.8	9.3	18.6
3) did not change	47.0	47.8	45.7
4) worsened somewhat	22.9	22.8	23.0
5) worsened a lot	13.0	15.3	9.1
6) DK/NA	3.3	3.5	3.0
12-6) Intra Palestinian relatio	ons, e.g., nationa	l unity	
1) improved a lot	4.8	4.0	6.1
2) improved somewhat	37.9	33.9	44.4
3) did not change	38.9	43.4	31.5

Poll # 16 June 2005	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
4) worsened somewhat	11.2	10.2	12.9
5) worsened a lot	5.2	6.1	3.6
6) DK/NA	2.0	2.4	1.4
12-7) The status of democracy		_	
) improved a lot	2.3	2.7	1.8
2) improved somewhat	22.3	19.4	27.1
3) did not change	53.3	56.1	48.5
) worsened somewhat	11.1	9.9	13.1
s) worsened a lot	7.2	8.1	5.7
6) DK/NA	3.8	3.8	3.8
12-8) Release of prisoners by	Israel		
1) improved a lot	3.9	4.0	3.6
2) improved somewhat	49.8	48.2	52.3
3) did not change	33.2	33.2	33.1
4) worsened somewhat	6.4	6.3	6.5
5) worsened a lot	5.6	7.2	3.0
6) DK/NA	1.2	1.1	1.4
13) And if you were to evalua	ite the situation	n in general since t	the election of
Mahmud Abbas, would you s		_	
the same?	2.2	2.2	2.4
1) improved a lot	3.3	3.2	3.4
2) improved somewhat	44.7	44.5	45.1
3) did not change	38.8	40.0	36.8
4) worsened somewhat	7.8	6.5	9.9
5) worsened a lot	4.2	4.6	3.4
6) DK/NA	1.3	1.2	1.4
14) Are you satisfied or not s	atisfied with th	ne performace of M	Iahmud Abbas
since his election as president	of the PA?		
1) very satisfied	5.8	5.5	6.3
2) satisfied	54.5	54.1	55.2
3) not satisfied	27.6	27.0	28.5
4) not satisfied at all	7.7	7.9	7.5
5) DK/NA	4.5	5.6	2.6
15) If new presidential electio	ns were to take	e place in the PA, v	whom do you
prefere to see president of the		0.0	
1) Mahoud Zahhar	7.7	8.2	6.9
2) Mahmoud Abbas	24.2	24.0	24.6
3) Mohammad Dahlan	2.8	0.6	6.5
4) Marwan Barghouti	12.3	13.6	10.3
5) Mustafa Barghouti	5.8	6.3	4.8
6) Farouq Qaddomi	3.3	3.6	2.8
7) Others	8.3	8.0	8.7
8) No Opinion/ Don't know	35.5	35.6	35.4
16) And if you were to select a	a vice presiden	t, whom would voi	u choose?
<b>16) And if you were to select a</b> 1) Mahmoud Zahhar	a vice presiden 3.3	t, whom would you 3.5	u choose? 2.8
16) And if you were to select a  1) Mahmoud Zahhar  2) Mohammad Dahlan	_	-	

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	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
4) Mustafa Barghouti	3.9	3.5	4.4
5) Ahmad Quri'	4.8	5.0	4.6
6) Ismael Haneyeh	2.4	1.1	4.6
7) Saeb Erikat	3.2	3.2	3.2
8) Farouq Qaddomi	2.2	2.3	2.0
9) Others	13.8	15.6	10.7
10) No Opinion /Don't know	51.7	53.3	49.1

## 17) With regard to current negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, which issue in the short run should in your view be the first priority?

1) Freezing Israeli settlements	12.8	11.8	14.5
2) Return of laborers to work in Israel	16.2	13.1	21.4
3) Removal of checkpoints	9.8	13.0	4.6
4) Release of more prisoners	33.5	29.8	39.6
5) stop the building of the wall	23.7	28.1	16.4
6) others (specify:)	2.8	3.3	2.0
7) DK/NA	1.1	1.0	1.2

### 18) How do you evaluate the visit of Mahmud Abbas to Washington, do yo see it useful or not useful to Palestinian interests?

1) certainly useful	4.1	3.8	4.6
2) useful	34.8	31.9	39.8
3) neither useful nor not useful	17.3	20.4	12.1
4) not useful	22.5	22.2	23.0
5) certainly not useful	7.7	8.2	6.9
6) others (specify:)	13.6	13.6	13.5

# 19) Do you see Sharon's plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel or don't you see it as a victory?

1) Definitely this is a Palestinian victory	35.7	30.8	43.8
2) Think this is a Palestinian victory	36.3	36.7	35.6
3) Think this is not a Palestinian victory	20.1	23.6	14.1
4) Definitely this is not a Palestinian victory	5.9	6.5	4.8
5) DK/NA	2.0	2.2	1.6

## 20) And how do you think most Palestinians see Sharon's plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza? Do most Palestinians see it or don't see it as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle?

1) Most Palestinians see it as a victory for the Palestinians	73.3	70.4	78.0
2) Most Palestinians don't see it as a victory for the	20.2	23.0	15.4
Palestinians 3) DK/NA	6.4	6.4	6.3

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%	
21) How would you evaluate the capacity of the Palestinian Authority to				
control matters in the Gaza S	Strip after Israe	el's disengagement	there?	
1) High capacity	28.4	25.1	34.0	
2) Reasonable capacity	44.4	43.6	44.7	
3) Low capacity	16.8	19.8	11.7	
4) no capacity at all	7.9	8.6	6.7	
5) DK/NA	2.9	2.9	2.8	

#### 22 What do you expect to happen with the settlements in the West Bank, in the coming years??

1) Most settlements will be evacuated	6.7	5.3	8.9
2) Some settlements will be evacuated	26.3	26.1	26.7
3) The number of settlements will remain as it is today	12.3	12.2	12.3
4) Some settlements will be added	26.4	28.6	22.7
5) Many settlements will be added	25.2	25.2	25.1
6) DK/NA	3.2	2.5	4.3

### 23) If Israel disengages fully in the Gaza strip, including the evacuation of all settlements and the Philadelphi route, and if it lifts the air and sea blockade on the Gaza strip, would you under these conditions support or oppose carrying out armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip?

1) Definitely support	6.9	7.4	6.1
2) support	23.4	23.5	23.1
3) oppose	53.1	53.9	51.6
4) Definitely oppose	13.4	11.4	16.8
5) DK/NA	3.3	3.8	2.4

#### 24) What do you expect to happen now after Abu Mazin's visit to the US and after the setting of mid August as the date for evacuating Gaza settlements and four settlements in the West Bank?

1) Negotiations will resume			
soon enough and armed	22.8	18.3	30.4
confrontations will stop			
2) Negotiations will resume			
but some armed attacks will	52.2	52.6	51.6
continue			
3) Armed confrontations will			
not stop and the two sides will	17.5	20.8	11.9
not return to negotiations			
4) DK/NA	7.4	8.2	6.1

### 25) Palestinians are currently debating the issue of the collection of arms from armed Palestinian groups and factions, stipulated in the Road Map as a PA commitment. Do you support or oppose such a collection of arms?

	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
1) Strongly support	9.9	9.0	11.5
2) support	27.8	29.5	25.1
3) oppose	42.9	43.3	42.1
4) strongly oppose	16.9	15.7	19.0
5) DK/NA	2.4	2.5	2.0

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Poli # 16 June 2003	FF : 10 /	TTY (TO LO)	
	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
26) How soon do you think wil	l a political se	ettlement between	Israel and the
Palestinians be achieved?			
1) A political settlement is not	45.6	44.2	47.8
possible ever			.,,,
2) only in many generations	22.3	22.4	22.1
to come			
3) only in the next generation	6.9	7.9	5.3
4) only in the next decade	2.9	3.2	2.4
5) in the next few years	16.2	17.2	14.6
6) DK/NA	6.1	5.1	7.9
27) Who came out the winner is	in the ongoing	g armed conflict th	at has started in
September 2000 between Isr			
1) Israel	17.3	22.2	9.1
2) the Palestinians	34.5	25.0	50.4
3) Both	4.9	4.7	5.1
4) Neither	41.8	46.8	33.4
5) DK/NA	1.6	1.3	2.0
3) DICIVI	1.0	1.5	2.0
28) And what do the majority			
opinion, who came out the w			
1) Israel	18.7	24.6	8.9
2) the Palestinians	46.8	34.8	66.8
3) Both	2.1	2.3	1.8
4) Neither	28.7	34.7	18.6
5) DK/NA	3.7	3.6	3.8
29) Do you support or oppose	the current m	utual cease fire wi	th Israel?
1) Definitely support	17.8	16.4	20.3
2) Support	58.7	57.8	60.2
3) Oppose	18.9	20.5	16.2
4) Definitely oppose	3.3	3.4	3.0
5) DK/NA	1.3	1.9	0.2
30) If a peace agreement is rearecognized by Israel, would y			
reconciliation between Israel			
1) Would strongly support	15.2	14.3	16.8
2) Would support	59.4	61.1	56.7
3) Would oppose	17.9	17.0	19.4
4) Would strongly oppose	5.8	5.7	6.1
5) DK/NA	1.6	1.9	1.0
21) If a magain agreement is use	ahad and a Da	alastinian stata is a	stablished and
31) If a peace agreement is rea recognized by Israel, how so			
two people will be achieved?			
1) Reconciliation is not			
possible ever	42.3	39.0	47.8
2) Only in many generations			
to come	22.2	22.7	21.5
3) Only in the next generation	10.3	11.6	8.1
4) Only in the next decade	5.4	6.7	3.2
5) In the next few years	14.3	15.0	13.0
,			
6) DK/NA	5.5	5.0	6.5

	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%			
32) In your opinion, is lasting	32) In your opinion, is lasting peace possible between Israelis and					
Palestinians?						
1) Definitely possible	1.8	1.5	2.4			
2) Possible	24.1	25.8	21.3			
3) Impossible	44.8	46.4	42.1			
4) Definitely impossible	27.6	24.6	32.6			
5) DK/NA	1.7	1.7	1.6			

33) And what about the majority of Israelis, do they, in your opinion, believe that lasting peace is possible between Israelis and Palestinians?

1) Definitely they do	2.3	2.1	2.6
2) They do	25.3	26.3	23.7
3) They do not	46.6	48.0	44.1
4) Definitely they do not	20.8	18.7	24.3
5) DK/NA	5.1	5.0	5.3

34) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I....

1) Strongly support	11.3	9.5	14.4
2) Support	35.0	32.5	39.3
3) Oppose	42.7	44.5	39.7
4) Strongly oppose	8.1	9.9	5.1
5) DK/NA	2.9	3.6	1.6

35) Do you believe that armed confrontations so far has helped achieved Palestinian national and political rights in ways that negotiations could not achieve?

1) Definitely yes	16.4	13.3	21.5
2) Yes	49.7	47.6	53.0
3) No	27.1	31.5	19.6
4) Definitely no	5.1	5.7	4.0
5) DK/NA	1.8	1.8	1.8

36) In your view what is the meaning of the readiness of Hamas to participate in the upcoming legislative elections. Does it mean for example that Hamas is now more or less willing to accept the peace process with Israel?

1) reflects more willingness	40.2	35.0	49 0
to accept the peace process	40.2	33.0	٦٧.0
2) reflects less willingness to	19 7	20 4	18.4
accept the peace process	17.7	20.4	10.4
3) reflects no change in	33.7	37.5	27.3
Hamas position	33.1	37.5	27.5
4) DK/NA	6.4	7.2	5.3

37) And what are your expectations regarding the future of the peace process if Hamas wins the majority of the PLC seats in the legislative elections?

1) the peace process will slow	39.3	38.1	41.5
down or stop 2) the peace process will			
accelerate	29.6	27.4	33.2
3) the peace process will not	24.3	27.8	18 4
be affected		_,	10
4) DK/NA	6.8	6.8	6.9

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West Bank% Gaza Strip%

38) And what are your expectations regarding the future of the Palestinian
economic conditions? Will they become better or worse if Hamas wins the
majority of the PLC seats in the legislative elections?

Total%

1) the economic conditions	44.4	38.9	53.4
will improve			
2) the economic conditions	21.6	22.2	20.6
will worsen 3) the economic conditions			
will not be affected	26.2	30.8	18.4
4) DK/NA	7.8	<b>8</b> 1	7 3
+) DK/NA	7.0	0.1	1.5

## 39) And what are your expectations regarding the future of democracy in Palestine if Hamas wins the majority of the PLC seats in the legislative elections? Will Palestinian democracy become better or worse?

1) Palestinian democracy will	43.7	37.7	53.8
become better	43.7	31.1	33.0
2) Palestinian democracy will become worse	21.3	19.6	24.1
3) Palestinian democracy will not be affected	27.3	34.2	15.8
4) DK/NA	7.7	8.5	6.3

# 40) There are internal and external calls for wide and fundamental domestic reforms and changes in the institutions and authorities of the Palestinian Authority. Do you support or oppose these calls?

1) Strongly support	35.3	34.1	37.4
2) Support	58.2	59.2	56.7
3) Oppose	4.5	4.8	3.8
4) Strongly oppose	0.8	0.8	0.6
5) DK/NA	1.2	1.1	1.4

### 41) In your view, does the PA carry out these days wide and fundamental domestic reforms and changes in its institutions and authorities?

1) certainly yes	11.2	11.8	10.3
2) yes	52.0	50.3	54.8
3) no	26.6	27.4	25.4
4) certainly no	5.8	5.7	5.9
5) DK/NA	4.4	4.8	3.7

### 42) Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions?

1) Yes	86.5	87.6	84.6
2) No	8.5	7.5	10.1
3) DK/NA	4.9	4.7	5.3

### 43) If yes, Will this corruption in PA institutions increase, decrease or remain as it is in the future?

1) Will increase	38.3	37.5	39.7
2) Will remain as it is	16.2	17.4	14.1
3) will decrease	38.9	38.3	40.0
4) DK/NA	6.6	6.8	6.2

Poll # 16 June 2005	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
44) In your view, are official			-
often charged or brought to			<b></b>
1) Certainly yes	6.1	5.2	7.5
2) yes	33.2	32.8	33.9
3) no	44.3	45.5	42.2
4) certainly no	13.0	12.7	13.4
5)DK/NA	3.5	3.8	3.0
45) Would you say that thes		urity and safety, ar	nd that of your
family, is assured or not ass			
1) Completely assured	2.4	1.5	4.0
2) Assured	33.4	25.0	47.4
3) Not assured	51.8	59.6	38.7
4) Not assured at all	12.1	13.5	9.7
5) DK/NA	0.3	0.4	0.2
46) In your opinion, is there	a freedom for t	the press in our cou	ıntry?
1) yes	22.9	19.5	28.5
2) to some extent	35.7	41.3	26.3
3) no	38.8	37.0	41.7
4) DK/NA	2.7	2.2	3.4
47) In your opinion, can peo	ple in the West	Bank and Gaza to	day criticize the
PA without fear?			
1) yes	51.3	50.7	52.2
2) no	45.5	47.0	42.9
3) DK/NA	3.2	2.2	4.9
48) How would you evaluate		•	and human
rights in the Palestinian Aut	•	•	
1) Very good			4.9
2) Good	33.8	35.6	30.8
3) Fair	29.7	28.6	31.6
4) Bad	20.5	19.8	21.9
5) Very bad	10.2	10.7	9.3
6) DK/NA	2.1	2.4	1.6
49) In general, how do you e	-	formance of:	
49-1) Palestinian Legislative		2.0	4.0
1) Very good	4.2	3.9	4.9
2) Good	32.1	33.7	29.6
3) Neither good nor bad	29.6	30.2	28.5
4) Bad	18.3	18.3	18.4
5) Very bad 6) DK/NA	10.7 5.0	8.6 5.3	14.2 4.5
	4		
49-2) The Palestinian cabine		2.0	4.0
1) Very good	3.9	3.9	4.0
2) Good	36.5	35.9	37.4
3) Neither good nor bad	29.7	29.5	30.2
4) Bad	17.9	19.2	15.8
5) Very bad	7.8	6.7	9.7
6) DK/NA	4.0	4.9	2.6

FOII # 10 June 2003	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%
49-3) The Judicial authorities			
1) Very good	5.9	5.8	6.1
2) Good	36.1	35.0	37.9
3) Neither good nor bad	23.7	24.0	23.1
4) Bad	18.8	19.9	17.0
5) Very bad	10.2	9.2	11.7
6) DK/NA	5.4	6.1	4.3
49-4) Security services and po	lice		
1) Very good	5.9	5.6	6.5
2) Good	36.5	33.6	41.3
3) Neither good nor bad	24.3	25.1	23.1
4) Bad	20.1	22.3	16.4
5) Very bad	9.9	9.3	10.9
6) DK/NA	3.3	4.1	1.8
49-5) The institution of the pro	esidency		
1) Very good	6.7	6.7	6.7
2) Good	40.2	39.4	41.5
3) Neither good nor bad	25.2	26.3	23.3
4) Bad	13.9		
	7.0	13.8 6.3	14.0 8.1
5) Very bad			
6) DK/NA	7.1	7.5	6.3
49-6) Opposition factions and	-		
1) Very good	8.9	7.4	11.3
2) Good	42.3	40.1	46.0
3) Neither good nor bad	27.3	28.1	25.9
4) Bad	9.9	11.3	7.7
5) Very bad	4.5	4.4	4.9
6) DK/NA	7.1	8.7	4.3
50) After holding legislative el	ections in July	y, whom do you pro	efere to see as a
prime minister?			
1) Mahmoud Zahhar	4.9	4.7	5.1
2) Mahmoud Abbas	1.7	1.7	1.8
3) Mohammad Dahlan	3.3	0.7	7.7
4) Marwan Barghouti	6.8	8.1	4.7
5) Mustafa Braghouti	3.4	3.9	2.6
6) Ahmad Qurai'	9.1	8.0	10.9
7) Ismael Haneyeh	1.4	0.4	3.0
8) Saeb Eirkat	1.7	2.2	1.0
9) Farouq Qaddomi	1.0	1.2	0.6
10) Others	11.1	13.3	7.5
11) No Opinion /Don't know	55.5	55.8	55.1
I I I NO Uninion / Don I know/			

your personal experience, you would say:

1) To large extent, jobs are obtained through wasta	80.5	75.5	88.9
2) Jobs are sometimes obtained through wasta	14.0	17.5	8.3

Poll # 16 June 2005	Polls

1 011 # 10 June 2003				1 0113
	Total%	West Bank%	Gaza Strip%	
3) Jobs are obtained without wasta	1.8	2.1	1.4	
4) Do not know of a personal experience	3.0	4.1	1.0	
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	0.7	0.8	0.4	
52) Which of the following pol	litical parties (	do you support?		
1) 1 PPP	0.6	0.6	0.6	
2) PFLP	2.7	3.0	2.2	
3) Fateh	41.2	41.6	40.5	
4) Hamas	30.1	26.9	35.4	
5) DFLP	0.9	1.3	0.2	
6) Islamic Jihad	2.6	3.3	1.4	
7) Fida	0.1	0.1	0.0	
8) National Inititiative (Mubadara)	0.2	0.4	0.0	
9) Independent Islamists	2.8	2.2	3.8	
10) Independent Nationalists	3.2	4.1	1.6	
11) None of the above	14.9	15.5	13.8	
12) Other, specify	0.8	1.0	0.4	