



المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية
Palestinian Center for POLICY and SURVEY RESEARCH

Polls

Survey Research Unit

Poll Number (18)

6-8 December 2005

The **Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)** is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policy analysis and academic research. PSR was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. The center engages in several activities. It conducts academic and policy analysis studies. It organizes socio-political surveys and public opinion polls on current Palestinian political and social attitudes. It sponsors study groups and task forces on issues of critical importance to the Palestinians. Finally, it organizes conferences, public lectures, and briefings on current public policy issues. PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas.

This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah



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Findings Show That One Year After the Death of Yasir Arafat and Completion of the Israeli Unilateral Disengagement From the Gaza Strip, Support for a Permanent Settlement Along the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative Drops, but a Large Majority Continues to Support the Hudna and Fateh's Popularity Increases

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between December 6-8, 2005. The poll deals with the "tahdi'a" or calm, Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, agreement on border crossings, permanent status agreement, bombing attacks in Amman hotels, and voting intentions in the upcoming legislative elections. Total size of the sample is 1316 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (840) and the Gaza Strip (476) in 118 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

Three months after the implementation of Sharon's unilateral plan for disengagement, optimism which prevailed a year ago is now fading. Expectations that violence will stop and negotiations will resume soon drop by more than one third while the percentage of those who believe that violence will not stop and there will be no return to negotiations increases by more than 50%. Belief that a political settlement with Israel is impossible and that reconciliation between the two peoples is not possible ever has deepened. Expectations that internal and security conditions will improve are not being met as the percentage of those who feel that they lack personal safety and security is increasing. Similarly, percentage of those who believe corruption exists in the PA remains very high.

The implications of the Israeli unilateral disengagement are being strongly felt. Belief that disengagement is victory for armed struggle increases while at the same time most people view the Gaza Strip as a big prison and that conditions inside the Strip are now the same or worse than they were before the Israeli withdrawal. The greatest impact of the unilateral withdrawal and the widespread belief that it was the outcome of Palestinian armed resistance is felt on public support for a permanent settlement along the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for the compromises of this settlement has dropped considerably in this poll compared to the situation one year ago when a majority of Palestinians supported it. Apparently, some Palestinians are no longer convinced of the need to compromise as long as Israel is intent on ending its occupation unilaterally. Despite the fact that these developments do not apparently weaken support for Fateh, they do considerably increase support for Hamas. Compared to a year ago, support for Hamas has increased by about 55%.

(1) Peace Process and Permanent Settlement

- Support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters drops from 54% in December 2004 to 46% in this poll
- Drop in support for the permanent settlement is significant in all items including borders, refugees, Jerusalem, sovereignty, security arrangements, and end of conflict

Palestinian support for a permanent settlement agreement similar to that of the December 2000 Clinton Parameters, the January 2001 Taba Talks, and the Geneva Initiative drops from 54% one year ago to 46% in this poll. Support for the item on final borders -- which would be based on the 1967 lines except for about 3% of the West Bank which would be exchanged with an Israeli territory of equal size—drops from 63% to 55%. Support for the item on refugees – which would be based on UNGA resolution 194 while giving refugees five different options for permanent residency with return to Israel being subject to Israeli decision—drops from 46% to 40%. Support for the item on Jerusalem – which would make East Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state but would put Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty – drops from 44% to 33%. Support for the item on the establishment of a Palestinian state that has no army drops from 27% to 20%. Support for the item on security arrangements – which would allow Israel to use Palestinian airspace and maintain two early warning stations in Palestinian territories – drops from 53% to 43%. Support for the item on ending the conflict once the permanent status agreement is implemented – which would allow neither side to make further claims and would require both sides to acknowledge that Palestine and Israel are the homelands of their peoples – drops from 69% to 64%.

(2) Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Agreement on Border Crossings

- 83% see the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as victory for armed struggle, but support for armed attacks from the Gaza Strip does not exceed 36%
- 52% see the Israeli withdrawal as the beginning of the end of occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state and 46% do not agree
- Only 45% evaluate the situation in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal as better, 53% say it has not changed or has become worse, and 55% sees the Gaza Strip as a big prison
- 56% oppose and 41% support the agreement made with Israel on the operation of the Rafah international crossing

The overwhelming majority of Palestinians view the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as a victory for armed struggle against the Israeli occupation and 17% do not agree with that. Moreover, more than two thirds (68%) believe that armed confrontations during the intifada have helped achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not while only 29% do not agree with that.

Despite this assessment of the role of violence, the percentage of those supporting armed attacks from the Gaza Strip does not exceed 36% while 60% oppose it. Opposition to such attacks increases to 66% in the Gaza Strip compared to 57% in the West Bank. Findings also show that support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians does not exceed 40% with opposition standing at 58%. Moreover, 62% of all Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip oppose, and 33% support bombing attacks or the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip.

The public is divided in its evaluation of the implication of the Israeli withdrawal on the national goal of ending occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state: 52% see the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as a beginning for achieving that goal and 46% do not agree with that. Moreover, only 45% evaluate the situation in the Gaza Strip after disengagement as better than before, 28% see it unchanged, and 25% see it worse.

Specifically, while only 30% say that the Gaza Strip has become free and open, 55% say it has become a big prison and 11% see no change.

This negative outlook applies also to the performance of the PA in the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal. 55% see this performance as remaining unchanged compared to PA performance under Israeli occupation or becoming worse and 40% evaluate the performance of the PA as better than before. This negative evaluation is also evident in the opposition of 56% and the support of 41% to the Rafah Crossing's agreement. Opposition to the agreement is clear when it comes to European presence with only 40% supporting such presence and 58% opposing it. Despite this, 58% say the agreement strengthens Palestinian sovereignty; 37% disagree with that.

The public sees the future in negative terms with regard to control of border crossings and settlements in the West Bank. Only one third expects, and 62% do not expect, Israel to continue to implement the agreement on the crossings. Similarly, the majority (58%) expects and 13% do not expect, Israel to close the Rafah crossing if bombing attacks or rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip. Moreover, despite the fact that 59% expect, and 36% do not expect, Israel to carry out a further unilateral disengagement steps from other areas in the West Bank in the future, only 42% expect the evacuation of most or some settlements in the West Bank and 45% expect Israel to build more settlements.

(3) Calm, Collection of Arms, and Optimism about the Future

- 80% support and 18% oppose the extension of the current "Tahdi'a" or calm
- 47% support the collection of arms from armed factions and 51% oppose it. In the Gaza Strip, support for collection of arms reaches 54%
- But support for collection of arms from armed factions in the Gaza Strip only reaches 63%
- 82% support and 17% oppose the merging of armed militias into the PA security services
- Level of optimism continues to drop

Findings show strong support for the continuation of the calm with 80% support and 18% opposition. Moreover, a similar percentage (75%) supports, and 23% oppose, the current ceasefire. Percentages of support for extending the "calm" period and for the ceasefire are larger in the Gaza Strip (86% and 77% respectively) than in the West Bank (77% and 74% respectively). But findings show that a majority of 51% opposes the collection of arms from armed groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and 47% support it. When it comes to collection of arms from armed groups in the Gaza Strip only, overall support increases to 63% and opposition drops to 34%. Support for collection of arms from armed groups in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is greater in the Gaza Strip (54%) than in the West Bank (43%). In the Gaza Strip, support for collection of arms from Gazan armed groups reaches 68% compared to 61% in the West Bank. Support for collection of arms from the Gaza Strip increases among supporters of Fateh (78%) compared to supporters of Hamas (41%) and among those who are willing to buy lottery tickets (79%) compare to those who are not willing to do so (46%).

A large majority of 82% supports and 17% oppose the absorption of members of armed groups from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fateh into the Palestinian security services so that they would become part of the PA. Support for this measure reaches 84% in the Gaza Strip compared to 80% in the West Bank.

Findings show a significant decrease in the level of optimism regarding the possibility of a return to negotiations and cessation of violence in the near future from 25% in June to 19% in this poll. One year ago, this percentage stood at 30%.

(4) Bombing Attacks in Amman's Hotels

- 88% oppose and 9% support the bombing attacks that took place in Amman hotels in Jordan in November 2005
- 78% view these attacks as criminal acts condemned by Islam and 10% view it as martyrdom attacks

88% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip oppose, and 9% support, the bombing attacks that took place in Amman hotels last November. 78% see these attacks as criminal acts condemned by Islam while 10% see them as martyrdom operations supported by Islam. Belief that these attacks are martyrdom acts is greater in the Gaza Strip (14%) than in the West Bank (8%), among men (12%) than women (8%), among students (20%) compared to housewives (7%) and laborers (8%), among the unmarried (17%) compared to the married (9%), among the youngest (18%) compared to the oldest (4%), and among supporters of Hamas (18%) compared to supporters of Fateh (7%).

(5) Upcoming Legislative Elections and Other Domestic Issues

- 78% say they will participate in the upcoming legislative elections, and among those, 50% say they will vote for Fateh, 32% say they will vote for Hamas, 9% for other lists, and 9% are undecided
- 37% view poverty and unemployment as the most pressing problem facing Palestinians today followed by the practices of Israeli occupation forces and the spread of corruption (25% each)
- Satisfaction with the performance of Abu Mazin stands at 62% and dissatisfaction 34%

If elections are held today, findings show that 78% of the Palestinians would participate (compared to 74% last September). Among those intending to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections, 50% will vote for Fateh, 32% for Hamas, 9% for other factions and groups including independents, and 9% remain undecided. Last September, Fateh received 47% of the vote, while Hamas received 30%, other factions 11%, and 11% were undecided. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Fateh increases from 47% to 53% during the same period. Among the whole population (those intending and those not intending to participate in the elections), support for Fateh reaches 45% and Hamas 28%. Last September, support for Fateh stood at 39% and Hamas at 27%. Support for Fateh in the Gaza Strip increases from 40% to 49% during the same period.

Poverty/unemployment is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today in the eyes of 37% of the public, followed by corruption and Israeli occupation measures (25% each), and finally internal anarchy and chaos (12%). Last September, poverty/unemployment received 40%, occupation and corruption received 25% each, and internal anarchy received 8%. From among a list of eight vital considerations for voting in the parliamentary elections, # 1 is the ability to fight corruption

- Popularity of Marwan Barghouti reaches 30% as vice president, followed by Dahlan (14%), Ismail Hanyieh (13%), and Mahmud Zahhar (11%)
- Popularity of Fateh stands at 45% and Islamists 35%
- 86% believe there is corruption in the PA

receiving 30%, # 2 the name or party affiliation of the list with 15%, # 3 and 4 ability to improve economic conditions and ability to reach a peace agreement with Israel with 13% each, # 5 ability to maintain national unity with 9%, # 6 ability to enforce law and order with 8%, # 7 ability to protect refugees' rights in negotiations with 7%, and finally # 8 ability to insure continuation of the intifada with 4%. This order is similar to the September findings with the exception of the first consideration which three months ago received 24%.

In a detailed comparison of the ability of the different groups to deliver on seven of the vital voters' considerations, Fateh is seen as the most able in five and Hamas in two. These results are similar to those we obtained last September with Fateh widening the gap against Hamas in its favor. Fateh is perceived as the most able to improve the economy (receiving 50% vs. 30% for Hamas), to push the peace process forward (receiving 66% vs. 21% for Hamas), to protect national unity (receiving 47% vs. 36% for Hamas), to protect refugees' rights (receiving 48% vs. 36% for Hamas), and to enforce law and order (receiving 56% vs. 31% for Hamas). Hamas is perceived as the most able to fight corruption (receiving 48% vs. 36% to Fateh) and to insure the continuation of the intifada (receiving 64% vs. 24% to Fateh).

Public satisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas stands at 62% compared to 64% last September. In this survey 34% say they are not satisfied with Abbas' performance. In a closed question, in a contest for the office of PA president between Mahmud Abbas, Mahmud Zahhar, and Mustafa Barghouti, Abbas comes first with 41% followed by Zahhar with 21% and Barghouti with 19%. These results are similar to those obtained in our last poll in September. In another closed question with a list of 8 candidates, in a contest over the office of vice president, Marwan Barghouti receives the greatest level of support with 30% followed by Mohammad Dahlan with 14%, Ismail Haniyyah (13%), Mahmud Zahhar (11%), Mustafa Barghouti (8%), Saeb Erikat and Farouq Qaddoumi (6% each), and finally Ahmad Qurai (3%). The percentages for the September poll were as follows: 24% for Marwan Barghouti, 9% for Dahlan, 13% for Haniyyah, 14% for Zahhar, 9% for Mustafa Barghouti, 6% for Erikat, 8% for Qaddoumi, and 6% for Qurai. In a closed question with a list of five candidates, in a contest over the office of prime minister, Marwan Barghouti comes first with 36% followed by Zahhar with 20%, Mustafa Barghouti with 14%, Dahlan with 11%, and Qurai with 6%. Last September, Marwan Barghouti received 30%, Zahhar 22%, Mustafa Barghouti 17%, Dahlan 8%, and Qurai 8%.

Findings show that 86% believe corruption exists in the PA; among those, 58% expect corruption to increase or remain the same in the future. The poll also shows only 35% feel they and their families are safe and secure and 64% do not feel that. Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy reaches 35%.

Results of Poll # (18)

6-8 December 2005

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
00) From among the following satellite news stations, which one you watched most during the last two months?			
1) al Arabia	5.5	5.4	5.7
2) al Jazeera	68.1	67.3	69.5
3) al Hurra	0.6	0.2	1.3
4) al Manar	7.2	9.0	4.0
5) Palestine TV	5.5	4.6	6.9
6) Do not watch TV	5.6	5.1	6.3
7) Others	2.2	2.5	1.7
8) Do not have a dish	5.0	5.7	3.8
9) DK/NA	0.4	0.1	0.8
1) With regard to the upcoming parliamentary elections, what are your expectations regarding the outcome of these elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council? Who are the likely winners, those nominated by Hamas, Fateh, the Left, Independents, or those nominated by their families?			
1) Fateh candidates	53.0	53.0	52.9
2) Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates	31.0	29.9	33.0
3) Leftest candidates (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and al Mobadara-the Initiative)	0.9	1.4	0.0
4) Independent candidates	2.7	2.4	3.2
5) Family candidates	1.9	2.3	1.3
6) Other candidates	0.6	0.6	0.6
7) DK/NA	10.0	10.5	9.0
2) Do you intend to participate in the upcoming legislative elections?			
1) Yes	78.1	76.3	81.3
2) No	19.9	22.0	16.4
3) DK/NA	2.0	1.8	2.3
3) If you participate in the legislative elections and if you were asked to vote to election or factional lists, to which of the following would you vote?			
1) Hamas and Islamic Jihad list/s	32.1	32.3	31.7
2) Fateh list	49.7	47.7	52.9
3) Leftest list (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and al Mobadara-the Initiative)	2.4	2.8	1.8
4) New lists that might include independents and others	5.4	6.1	4.3
5) Other lists (specify: -----)	1.6	1.2	2.3
6) DK/NA	8.8	9.9	7.1
4) From among the following factors, which one is the most important in determining your vote for one list against another?			
1) The political party or faction it belongs to	15.2	14.3	16.6
2) The ability of the list to reach a peace agreement with Israel	12.5	12.8	12.1
3) The ability of the list to insure the continuation of the intifada	3.5	4.1	2.5

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
4) The ability of the list to improve economic conditions	12.7	10.8	15.9
5) The ability of the list to fight corruption and implement reform measures	30.4	29.9	31.2
6) The ability of the list to enforce law and order	8.1	8.4	7.6
7) The ability of the list to protect national unity	9.3	10.4	7.6
8) The ability of the list to protect refugee rights in negotiations	6.5	7.3	5.0
9) DK/NA	1.8	2.0	1.5
5) The following is a list of problems confronting the Palestinians today, tell us which one is the most important problem?			
1) Spread of unemployment and poverty	37.3	33.8	43.5
2) The continuation of the occupation and its daily practices	24.8	32.1	12.0
3) Internal anarchy/ chaos	12.3	9.7	17.0
4) The spread of corruption and lack of internal reforms	24.7	23.3	27.1
5) Others (specify---)	0.5	0.7	0.2
6) DK/NA	0.3	0.4	0.2
6) If we looked at the following political factions/ parties, which one is the most able to:			
6-1) Improving economic conditions			
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	30.4	28.6	33.4
2) Fateh	50.2	51.4	48.1
3) Leftest list (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and al Mobadara-the Initiative)	2.8	3.9	0.8
4) New lists that might include independents and others	5.1	4.5	6.1
5) Others (specify ----)	11.5	11.5	11.6
6-2) Fighting corruption and implementing reforms			
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	47.9	46.5	50.4
2) Fateh	35.6	36.6	33.8
3) Leftest list (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and al Mobadara-the Initiative)	2.3	2.9	1.3
4) New lists that might include independents and others	4.7	4.8	4.6
5) Others (specify ----)	9.5	9.3	9.9
6-3) Pushing the peace process forward			
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	20.9	18.9	24.6
2) Fateh	66.4	67.7	64.1
3) Leftest list (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and al Mobadara-the Initiative)	1.6	2.1	0.6
4) New lists that might include independents and others	2.6	3.0	1.9
5) Others (specify ----)	8.5	8.4	8.8
6-4) Insuring the continuation of Intifada			
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	63.6	63.3	64.1
2) Fateh	23.6	23.8	23.3
3) Leftest list (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and al Mobadara-the Initiative)	1.9	2.5	0.8
4) New lists that might include independents and others	2.5	2.3	2.9
5) Others (specify ----)	8.4	8.1	8.8

	Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
6-5) protecting national unity			
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	36.1	37.3	34.0
2) Fateh	47.0	45.9	49.0
3) Leftest list (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and al Mobadara-the Initiative)	3.0	3.7	1.7
4) New lists that might include independents and others	3.7	3.5	4.0
5) Others (specify ----)	10.2	9.7	11.2
6-6) Protecting refugee rights in negotiations			
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	36.3	38.2	32.8
2) Fateh	48.2	45.8	52.4
3) Leftest list (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and al Mobadara-the Initiative)	2.4	3.3	0.8
4) New lists that might include independents and others	1.8	1.9	1.7
5) Others (specify ----)	11.3	10.7	12.2
6-7) Enforcing law and order			
1) Hamas/Islamic Jihad	30.7	30.5	31.2
2) Fateh	55.8	56.6	54.3
3) Leftest list (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and al Mobadara-the Initiative)	2.0	2.5	1.1
4) New lists that might include independents and others	1.9	1.8	2.1
5) Others (specify ----)	9.6	8.6	11.4
7) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the performance of Mahmud Abbas since his election as president of the PA?			
1) Very satisfied	10.6	8.8	13.7
2) Satisfied	51.8	53.0	49.7
3) Not satisfied	23.2	24.1	21.7
4) Not satisfied at all	10.6	9.2	13.1
5) DK/NA	3.7	4.8	1.9
8) If new presidential elections were to take place in the PA, whom do you prefer to see president of the PA?			
1) Mahmoud Abbas	41.0	39.3	44.0
2) Mahoud Zahhar	20.9	20.8	21.1
3) Mustafa Barghouti	19.0	20.8	16.0
4) Others	8.1	6.9	10.1
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	11.0	12.3	8.8
9) And if you were to select a vice president, whom would you choose?			
1) Mahmoud Zahhar	11.0	11.0	10.9
2) Mohammad Dahlan	13.7	4.4	30.1
3) Marwan Barghouti	29.8	34.6	21.3
4) Mustafa Barghouti	8.1	10.3	4.4
5) Ahmad Quri'	2.9	3.2	2.3
6) Ismael Haneyeh	13.3	11.2	17.1
7) Saeb Erikat	6.1	7.0	4.4
8) Farouq Qaddomi	5.9	7.4	3.4
9) Others	1.1	1.3	0.6
10) No Opinion /Don't know	8.1	9.7	5.5

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
10) Now that the first two phases of the local elections have taken place, what do you expect to happen in the next phases in September and December of this year? Who are the likely winners, those nominated by Hamas, Fateh, the Left, Independents, or those nominated by their families?			
1) Fateh candidates	47.4	48.4	45.6
2) Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates	40.3	38.5	43.5
3) Leftest candidates (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and al Mobadara-the Initiative)	0.6	1.0	0.0
4) Independent candidates	1.9	1.9	1.9
5) Family candidates	3.1	4.4	0.8
6) Other candidates	0.6	0.4	1.1
7) DK/NA	6.1	5.5	7.2
11) How do you see the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip? Do you see it or do not you see it as the beginning of the end of the occupation and the establishment of the state?			
1) Certainly see it as the beginning	15.2	10.5	23.6
2) See it as the beginning	36.6	37.4	35.2
3) Do not see it as the beginning	37.4	40.7	31.6
4) Certainly do not see it as the beginning	8.5	8.4	8.8
5) DK/NA	2.2	3.0	0.8
12) How do you evaluate the general situation in the Gaza Strip today, three months after the Israeli withdrawal? Is it better or worse or as it was before the withdrawal?			
1) Much better	3.7	3.3	4.4
2) Better	41.1	41.8	39.8
3) As it was before	28.0	30.6	23.4
4) Worse	18.3	15.5	23.2
5) Much worse	6.2	4.4	9.3
6) DK/NA	2.7	4.3	0.0
13) And if you were to evaluate in particular the status of the freedom of movement in the Gaza Strip how would describe it? For example, has the Gaza Strip become a big prison or has it become free and open more than it was before, or has it remain the same?			
1) Certainly a big prison	17.3	15.7	20.0
2) A big prison	37.4	40.9	31.4
3) Free and open	29.8	24.4	39.2
4) Certainly free and open	1.2	1.3	1.1
5) Neither this nor that, it remained the same	10.8	12.8	7.4
6) DK/NA	3.5	4.9	1.1
14) And what about the movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Is it better or worse or as it was before?			
1) Much better	1.2	1.2	1.3
2) Better	17.8	21.3	11.6
3) As it was	49.6	49.5	49.7
4) Worse	23.8	20.6	29.5
5) Much worse	3.6	2.8	5.1
6) DK/NA	4.0	4.7	2.9
15) And what about the situation in the West Bank? Are things better or worse or the same?			
1) Much better	1.4	1.9	0.6

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
2) Better	15.1	20.6	5.3
3) As it was	41.6	47.6	30.9
4) Worse	28.5	23.7	37.1
5) Much worse	10.5	5.6	19.2
6) DK/NA	2.9	0.6	6.9
16) How do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Authority during the last three months since the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Do you see it has improved, remained the same, or become better?			
1) Certainly better	3.8	4.5	2.5
2) Better	36.4	40.8	28.6
3) As it was	34.2	32.7	36.8
4) Worse	14.8	11.7	20.4
5) Certainly worse	6.0	3.2	10.9
6) DK/NA	4.8	7.2	0.6
17) Now, that the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has been completed, do you support or oppose continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip against Israeli targets?			
1) Strongly support	6.5	5.1	8.9
2) Support	29.3	32.4	23.8
3) Oppose	48.9	48.5	49.6
4) Strongly oppose	11.2	8.5	16.0
5) DK/NA	4.1	5.5	1.7
18) Do you see the evacuation of the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel or don't you see it as a victory?			
1) Definitely this is a Palestinian victory	45.9	37.5	60.8
2) Think this is a Palestinian victory	36.6	41.8	27.2
3) Think this is not a Palestinian victory	13.9	16.4	9.3
4) Definitely this is not a Palestinian victory	3.2	3.5	2.7
5) DK/NA	0.5	0.7	0.0
19) What do you expect to happen with the settlements in the West Bank, in the coming years?			
1) Most settlements will be evacuated	11.7	8.0	18.1
2) Some settlements will be evacuated	30.7	30.4	31.2
3) The number of settlements will remain as it is today	7.2	8.6	4.6
4) Some settlements will be added	26.9	28.6	23.8
5) Many settlements will be added	18.4	19.3	16.9
6) DK/NA	5.2	5.1	5.3
20) What do you expect to happen now after Israel evacuated all settlements in the Gaza Strip and four in the West Bank and after Parliamentary elections have been announced for early next year both in the PA and Israel.			
1) Negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop	19.1	16.6	23.5
2) Negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue	56.0	54.6	58.6
3) Armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations	20.5	24.3	13.7
4) DK/NA	4.4	4.5	4.2

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
21) The opening of the Rafah Crossing has been among the things that have been agreed upon in the Palestinian-Israeli agreement on crossings and movement. The Rafah crossing will be operated by the PA and Egypt under the supervision of European Union observers. Israel will monitor the crossing through video broadcasts. Generally do you support or oppose the agreement between the Pa and Israel with regard to the Rafah crossing?			
1) Strongly support	5.2	5.0	5.5
2) Support	36.3	38.9	31.6
3) Oppose	42.2	42.7	41.4
4) Strongly oppose	14.0	10.1	20.9
5) DN/NA	2.4	3.3	0.6
22) And more specifically, do you support or oppose the presence of the Europeans on the crossing?			
1) Strongly support	3.0	2.4	4.0
2) Support	36.9	37.3	36.1
3) Oppose	44.1	46.2	40.3
4) Strongly oppose	14.0	11.1	19.2
5) DK/NA	2.1	3.0	0.4
23) Do you expect Israel to continue or not continue to implement the agreement on crossings and movement?			
1) Certainly will continue	2.7	2.4	3.4
2) Will continue	30.2	27.9	34.2
3) Will not continue	54.3	57.9	48.1
4) Certainly will not continue	7.4	6.7	8.6
5) DK/NA	5.3	5.1	5.7
24) Generally speaking, do you see the agreement on crossings strengthening or weakening Palestinian sovereignty?			
1) Certainly strengthening it	7.2	6.1	9.3
2) Strengthening it	51.1	50.2	52.7
3) Weakening it	31.0	31.9	29.5
4) Certainly weakening it	6.0	6.3	5.5
5) DK/NA	4.6	5.5	3.0
25) What do you expect to happen to the agreement on operating the Rafah crossing arrived at as part of the agreement regarding crossings and movement if bombing attacks or launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip were to take place? Do you for example, expect this to lead to the closing of the crossing?			
1) Certainly will lead to the closing of the crossing	46.0	45.7	46.4
2) Will lead to the closing of the crossing	38.6	40.8	34.6
3) Will not lead to the closing of the crossing	10.6	8.7	13.9
4) Certainly will not lead to the closing of the crossing	2.1	1.8	2.7
5) DK/NA	2.7	3.0	2.3
26) If these attacks occurred in the future, would you support or oppose them?			
1) Strongly support	6.5	5.9	7.6
2) Support	26.5	29.7	20.9
3) Oppose	53.4	51.9	56.1
4) Strongly oppose	8.0	5.9	11.8
5) DK/NA	5.6	6.7	3.6
27) The period of quite (ceasefire) ends at the end of this month. Do you support or oppose extending it?			
1) Strongly support	20.7	15.5	29.7

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
2) Support	59.3	61.2	56.1
3) Oppose	15.5	17.9	11.2
4) Strongly oppose	2.2	2.3	2.1
5) DK/NA	2.3	3.1	0.8
28) Palestinians are currently debating the issue of the collection of arms from armed Palestinian groups and factions, stipulated in the Road Map as a PA commitment. Do you support or oppose such a collection of arms?			
1) Strongly support	14.3	9.0	23.8
2) Support	32.4	33.6	30.4
3) Oppose	38.2	42.4	30.8
4) Strongly oppose	12.5	11.7	13.9
5) DK/NA	2.5	3.3	1.1
29) Do you support or oppose the current mutual cease fire with Israel?			
1) Definitely support	16.3	12.3	23.4
2) Support	58.9	62.1	53.4
3) Oppose	19.8	20.9	17.9
4) Definitely oppose	2.9	2.3	4.0
5) DK/NA	2.1	2.5	1.3
30) In his speech in front of the PLC, president Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) said that after the end of the occupation of the Gaza Strip, there will be only one armed force, that of the PA. After the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, do you support or oppose collection of arms from armed factions in the Gaza Strip so that the only armed force in Gaza would be that of the Palestinian security services?			
1) Certainly support	19.5	15.0	27.4
2) Support	43.8	45.5	40.7
3) Oppose	26.8	29.8	21.5
4) Certainly oppose	7.2	6.1	9.3
5) DK/NA	2.7	3.6	1.1
31) If a peace agreement is reached, and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel, would you support or oppose the efforts to reach full reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinian state?			
1) Would strongly support	12.7	10.5	16.5
2) Would support	62.7	64.4	59.7
3) Would oppose	17.9	19.0	16.0
4) Would strongly oppose	5.1	3.9	7.2
5) DK/NA	1.6	2.1	0.6
32) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian people and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, how soon do you think will reconciliation between the two peoples be achieved?			
1) Reconciliation is not possible ever	41.8	40.3	44.3
2) Only in many generations to come	17.4	18.4	15.6
3) Only in the next generation	12.5	12.9	11.8
4) Only in the next decade	7.4	7.2	7.8
5) On the next few years	11.5	11.3	11.8
6) No Opinion /Don't know	9.5	9.9	8.6

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
33) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I....			
1) Strongly support	9.4	6.7	14.1
2) Support	30.3	30.3	30.2
3) Oppose	49.6	52.3	44.7
4) Strongly oppose	8.7	7.9	10.1
5) DK/NA	2.1	2.7	0.8
34) Do you believe that armed confrontations so far has helped achieved Palestinian national and political rights in ways that negotiations could not achieve?			
1) Definitely yes	24.5	15.6	40.3
2) Yes	43.9	46.5	39.2
3) No	25.5	30.2	17.1
4) Definitely no	3.2	3.6	2.5
5) DK/NA	2.9	4.1	0.8
35) Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions?			
1) Yes	86.0	85.9	86.2
2) No	8.7	8.7	8.7
3) DK/NA	5.3	5.4	5.1
36) If yes, Will this corruption in PA institutions increase, decrease or remain as it is in the future?			
1) Will increase	46.8	46.7	46.9
2) Will remain as it is	11.3	12.1	10.0
3) Will decrease	34.3	32.8	36.9
4) DK/NA	7.5	8.3	6.1
37) Would you say that these days your security and safety, and that of your family, is assured or not assured?			
1) Completely assured	3.0	1.9	5.1
2) Assured	31.9	26.6	41.1
3) Not assured	51.5	57.0	41.8
4) Not assured at all	13.3	14.0	12.0
5) DK/NA	0.3	0.5	0.0
38) How would you evaluate the current status of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority? Would you say it is:			
1) Very good	2.9	2.9	3.0
2) Good	31.7	32.5	30.2
3) Fair	28.1	27.1	30.0
4) Bad	22.0	23.5	19.2
5) Very bad	14.3	12.4	17.5
6) DK/NA	1.1	1.6	0.2
39) After holding the coming legislative elections, whom do you prefer to see as a prime minister?			
1) Marwan Barghouti	36.1	39.5	30.0
2) Mahmoud Zahhar	20.2	19.0	22.4
3) Ahmad Qurai'	6.2	6.3	5.9
4) Mohammad Dahlan	11.1	3.7	24.3
5) Mustafa Braghouti	13.5	16.7	7.8
6) Others, -----	3.1	3.5	2.3
7) No Opinion /Don't know	9.8	11.2	7.4

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
40) The US, Russia, the European Community and the UN, the so called "Quartet", have put forward a "Roadmap" for the implementation of a final settlement within 3 years. The plan includes political reforms in the Palestinian Authority, including a constitution and election of a strong Prime Minister, stopping the incitement and violence on both sides under the Quartet's supervision, a freeze on settlements and the establishment of a Palestinian State within provisional borders. The next phase will see negotiations on the final borders under the auspices of an international conference. Do you support or oppose this initiative?			
1) Strongly support	5.5	4.1	8.1
2) Support	54.3	53.3	56.1
3) Oppose	28.0	30.8	23.1
4) Strongly oppose	7.8	6.8	9.5
5) Don't know/No answer	4.4	5.0	3.2
41) Some argue that the best solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the establishment of one state (for Palestinians and Israelis) in all of historic Palestine while others argue that the solution is in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and another state for the Israelis. Which view do you support?			
1. The establishment of one state for the Palestinians and the Israelis	5.8	6.0	5.5
2. The establishment of two states one for the Israelis and one for the Palestinians	31.1	32.5	28.7
3. I do not support either solution; instead, I support return of all Palestine to Palestinians	61.5	59.8	64.6
4. No opinion/ Do not know	1.6	1.8	1.3
42) When Palestinians and Israelis return to final status negotiations the following items might be presented to negotiators as the elements of a permanent compromise settlement. Tell us what you think of each item then tell us what you think of all combined as one permanent status settlement [read the card and after reading each item ask the respondent about his or her view of that item] Now that you have been informed of each element of the permanent compromise settlement, tell us what you think of each of its item. Do you agree or disagree with it.			
42-1) Item #1: withdrawal to 1967 borders with territorial swap			
1) Strongly agree	7.7	7.0	8.9
2) Agree	47.7	51.0	41.8
3) Disagree	30.3	29.2	32.3
4) Strongly Disagree	12.2	10.5	15.2
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	2.1	2.3	1.9
42-2) Item #2: a state without an army but with international forces			
1) Strongly agree	1.2	1.2	1.3
2) Agree	18.6	19.4	17.3
3) Disagree	54.9	57.0	51.3
4) Strongly Disagree	23.6	20.3	29.3
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	1.7	2.2	0.8
42-3) Item #3: East Jerusalem as capital of the state of Palestine after it is divided			
1) Strongly agree	2.9	2.7	3.2
2) Agree	30.4	32.4	26.8
3) Disagree	44.4	46.7	40.3
4) Strongly Disagree	20.6	16.1	28.5
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	1.8	2.0	1.3
42-4) Item #4: refugees with five options for permanent residence			
1) Strongly agree	3.5	2.4	5.5
2) Agree	36.2	35.1	38.1

	Total%	West Bank %	Gaza Strip%
3) Disagree	40.3	44.7	32.6
4) Strongly Disagree	17.0	14.7	21.1
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	3.0	3.1	2.7
42-5) Item #5: end of conflict			
1) Strongly agree	10.4	9.0	12.9
2) Agree	53.5	55.0	51.0
3) Disagree	24.0	25.3	21.8
4) Strongly Disagree	10.0	8.5	12.7
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	2.1	2.3	1.7
42-6) Item #6: a sovereign state with security arrangements			
1) Strongly agree	6.1	5.3	7.6
2) Agree	36.6	39.5	31.4
3) Disagree	39.1	40.9	35.9
4) Strongly Disagree	16.0	11.7	23.6
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	2.2	2.6	1.5
42-7) Item #7: the combined elements as one permanent status settlement			
1) Strongly agree	4.3	2.7	7.2
2) Agree	41.6	42.7	39.7
3) Disagree	37.2	39.5	33.1
4) Strongly Disagree	13.0	11.8	15.2
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	3.8	3.2	4.9
43) And what is the Palestinian majority opinion on this issue? Do most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support or oppose the recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people at the end of the peace process?			
1) Majority supports	42.9	42.8	43.0
2) Majority opposes	46.8	45.9	48.3
3) DK/NA	10.4	11.4	8.6
44) And what is the Israeli majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Israelis support or oppose this combined final status package?			
1) Majority supports	33.4	32.5	35.0
2) Majority opposes	51.8	51.2	53.0
3) DK/NA	14.7	16.3	12.0
45) How soon do you think will a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians be achieved?			
1) A political settlement is not possible ever	44.0	40.8	49.6
2) Only in many generations to come	23.0	24.3	20.7
3) Only in the next generation	8.2	9.4	6.1
4) Only in the next decade	4.3	4.7	3.8
5) Only in the next few years	14.3	14.0	15.0
6) No Opinion /Don't know	6.1	6.8	4.9
46) Do you expect Israel to carry out further unilateral disengagements from additional areas in the West Bank in the future?			
1) Certainly it will	9.7	7.2	14.1
2) It will	49.3	50.8	46.6

	Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
3) It will not	29.5	31.9	25.3
4) Certainly it will not	6.4	5.0	8.9
5) DK/NA	5.1	5.1	5.1
47) There is a proposal to absorb the members of armed groups belonging to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fateh into the security services whereby all armed forces become part of the Palestinian Authority. Do you support or oppose this proposal?			
1) Strongly support	26.4	20.7	36.5
2) Support	55.2	59.6	47.5
3) Oppose	13.6	15.0	11.2
4) Strongly oppose	3.2	2.8	4.0
5) DK/NA	1.6	2.0	0.8
48) Several bombing attacks took place in Amman hotels last month leading to the death of more than 50 people. A know group belonging to al Zarqawi branch of al Qa'eda took responsibility for these attacks. Do you support or oppose those attacks?			
1) Strongly support	1.8	1.1	3.2
2) Support	7.4	7.2	7.8
3) Oppose	54.6	55.1	53.8
4) Strongly oppose	32.9	33.6	31.6
5) DK/NA	3.3	3.1	3.6
49) In your view, what is the position of Islam toward these attacks? Does it see them as martyrdom acts and hence supports or does it see them as criminal acts and hence condemns?			
1) Martyrdom acts it supports	10.3	8.2	14.0
2) Criminal acts it condemns	76.8	80.3	70.6
3) DK/NA	13.0	11.5	15.4
51) Ariel Sharon has left the Likud party and formed a new party. How do you evaluate the impact of this development on the chances for the peace process? Will it push them forward or backward? Or will it have no impact on the peace process?			
1) It will certainly push it forward	4.7	2.7	8.0
2) It will push it forward	15.3	14.6	16.7
3) It will have no impact	35.3	33.7	38.2
4) It will push it backward	20.3	22.1	17.1
5) It will certainly push it backward	16.1	18.4	12.0
6) DK/NA	8.3	8.5	8.0
52) Which of the following political parties do you support?			
1) PPP	0.7	0.8	0.4
2) PFLP	1.9	2.5	0.8
3) Fateh	45.0	43.0	48.7
4) Hamas	27.7	27.1	28.9
5) DFLP	0.4	0.5	0.2
6) Islamic Jihad	2.6	3.1	1.7
7) National initiative (almubadara)	0.6	0.8	0.2
8) Independent Islamists	4.3	5.0	3.0
9) Independent Nationalists	3.7	3.3	4.4
10) None of the above	12.7	13.5	11.4
11) Other, specify	0.3	0.4	0.2