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This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah



**Konrad
Adenauer
Stiftung**

For further information,
please contact
Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid
Ladadweh
at the Palestinian Center for
Policy and Survey Research

Ramallah, Palestine
Telephone 02 296 4933
Fax 02 296 4934

e-mail: pcpsr@pcpsr.org
<http://www.pcpsr.org>

A Total Lack of Confidence in the Annapolis Process Keeps Hamas's Popularity Stable Despite Worsening Conditions in the Gaza Strip

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during 11-16 December 2007. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. This poll release covers three issues: public evaluation of the situation in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank six months after the Hamas take over of the Gaza Strip; attitudes toward the peace process such as the Annapolis conference and the permanent settlement; and the domestic balance of power. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

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MAIN RESULTS:

Findings show that Hamas's popularity relative to Fateh's has now stabilized despite the fact that public evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip has become bleaker than it was three months ago and despite the fact that a big gap exists in the public's evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip compared to conditions in the West Bank in favor of conditions in the latter. Findings also indicate stability in public attitudes regarding Hamas's military step against Fateh and the PA in the Gaza Strip last June and regarding the legitimacy of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad.

Hamas's ability to achieve this stability might reflect public disappointment with the Annapolis conference and the process it unleashed. Findings show that only a small percentage views the conference as a success or expects a successful outcome for the negotiations it authorized. They also show that public confidence in the ability of the Palestinian leadership to conduct permanent status negotiations or implement a permanent settlement is very limited. The same lack of confidence applies to public perception of the abilities of the Israeli leadership. A slightly less pessimism applies to public perception of the ability of the two sides to implement their commitments under the Roadmap. It is interesting to note that Palestinian positive evaluation of its side's ability to implement its commitments under the Roadmap improves dramatically when assuming that the Israeli side has implemented its own obligations.

Public attitude regarding a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative remains stable as it has been since December 2005 before Hamas's electoral victory. These attitudes reflect a divided public with one half supporting and another opposing such a settlement. A small majority supported this permanent settlement only in December 2004. The drop in support for the compromises of the permanent settlement might have been a reaction to the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in September 2005.

(1) Situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank six months after Hamas's Military Takeover of the Gaza Strip

- 74% oppose Hamas's June 2007 take over of the Gaza Strip and 21% support it.
- 41% believe and 47% do not believe that Hamas is planning a similar take over in the West Bank.
- Only 8% describe overall conditions in the Gaza Strip today as good or very good and 85% describe them as bad or very bad. By contrast, 31% describe overall conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 41% describe them as bad or very bad.
- Positive evaluation of economic conditions in the Gaza Strip do not exceed 5% while 47% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good.
- Positive evaluation of democracy and human rights conditions in the Gaza Strip does not exceed 28% compared to 42% for conditions in the West Bank.
- 52% of residents of the Gaza Strip compared to 44% of the residents of the West Bank say they feel safe and secure in their homes. These percentages represent an increase in the level of perceived safety and security particularly in the West Bank (three months ago perception of safety and security reached 35% in the West Bank)
- Level of confidence is slim in the media controlled by Hamas and (19%) and Fateh (24%) while 46% do not trust either side.
- 27% say that current conditions force them to seek immigration abroad; in the Gaza Strip, the percentage stands at 32%.

Findings show that about three quarters of the public continue to oppose the military step taken by Hamas in the Gaza Strip as was the case last September. But the percentage of negative evaluation (bad or very bad) of conditions in the Gaza Strip has increased from 80% to 85% while negative evaluation of conditions in the West Bank has decreased from 45% to 41% during the same period. The gap in public evaluation of conditions in the West Bank compared to those in the Gaza Strip is very big favoring the former. For example, while 93% said economic conditions in the Gaza Strip are bad or very bad, the percentage for the West Bank was 51%. Similarly, negative public evaluation of conditions of democracy, particularly, freedom of the press, in the Gaza Strip reaches 65% compared to 44% for same conditions in the West Bank. Negative evaluation of the status of law and order in the Gaza Strip reaches 60% compared to 42% for West Bank conditions. But negative evaluations of the status of personal safety and security in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are equal standing at 45% for Gazans (commenting on the situation in the Gaza Strip only) and an identical percentage for West Bankers (commenting on the situation in the West Bank only). However, when asked about their own personal feelings of safety and security, 52% of the Gazans said they feel safe and secure in their own homes while only 44% of the West Bankers said they felt safe and secure in their own homes. Despite the fact that the percentage in the West Bank is smaller than that in the Gaza Strip, it is noticeable that it reflects a significant increase from the 35% reported in our September 2007 poll.

Negative evaluation of the overall conditions in the Gaza Strip increases among supporters of Fateh (95%) compared to supporters of Hamas (64%), among supporters of the peace process (90%) compared to those opposed to it (69%), among women (87%) compared to men (83%), among residents of the Gaza Strip (87%) compared to residents of the West Bank (84%). By contrast, negative evaluation of overall conditions in the West Bank increases among supporters of Hamas (54%) compared to supporters of Fateh (25%), among those opposed to the peace process (60%) compared to supporters of the peace process (35%), among women (44%) compared to men (37%), and among residents of the West Bank (47%) compared to residents of the Gaza Strip (30%).

Findings also indicated that a larger percentage of the public does not believe that Hamas plans to take over the West Bank in the same manner it took over the Gaza Strip (47% do not believe it while 41% believe it). The percentage of those who believe that Hamas does indeed plan a military take over of the West Bank increases among residents of the Gaza Strip (45%) compared to residents of the West Bank (40%), among men (44%) compared to women (39%), among those who say they are "somewhat religious" (46%) compared to those who say they are religious (37%), among

supporters of Fateh (55%) compared to supporters of Hamas (30%), among holders of BA degree (48%) compared to those with elementary education (37%), among employees (51%) compared to housewives (38%), among those between the ages of 18-22 (47%) compared to those whose age is over 52 (35%), and among supporters of the peace process (46%) compared to those opposed to it (35%).

Public confidence in the media of the two factions, Fateh and Hamas, is small with only 19% having confidence in Hamas's media compared to 24% having confidence in Fateh's media. The largest percentage (46%) trusts neither side. Confidence in Hamas's media increases among residents of the Gaza Strip (24%) compared to residents of the West Bank (17%). Similarly, confidence in Fateh's media increases among residents of the Gaza Strip (27%) compared to residents of the West Bank (23%).

Finally, a decrease has been reported in this poll in the percentage of those who believe that separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is temporary and that the two authorities will be unified in the coming months from 29% last September to 36% in this poll. Optimism about the chances for a quick unification increases among residents of the Gaza strip (55%) compared to residents of the West Bank (25%), among residents of refugee camps (46%) compared to residents of towns and villages (27%), among the religious (44%) compared to the "somewhat religious" (27%) among supporters of Hamas (50%) compared to supporters of Fateh (33%), and among the illiterates (46%) compared to holders of BA degree (30%).

(2) Peace Process: Annapolis and the permanent settlement

- Only 11% of the Palestinians deem the Annapolis conference a success in pushing the peace process forward, 59% see it as a failure.
- Only 23% of the Palestinians believe the two sides will indeed succeed in achieving the goal of a permanent settlement before the end of 2008 and 72% believe they will not succeed.
- Only 18% believe that the other side's leadership will indeed implement their roadmap obligations, while 79% do not believe these obligations will be implemented. On the other hand 67% think that their leadership will implement these obligations if the other side implements them.
- Findings indicate stability in support of the overall package along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva

Findings show a widespread disappointment with the Annapolis conference with 59% describing it as a failure and only 11% describing it as a success. Moreover, the public does not believe that the process unleashed by the Annapolis conference will succeed, with 72% saying that the two sides will fail in reaching a permanent agreement during 2008 as indicated in the Annapolis Joint statement. Pessimism also prevails regarding Israel's willingness to implement its obligations under the Roadmap with 79% saying that Israeli leaders will not implement the commitments they took upon themselves in the Roadmap while only 18% believe they will. Even with regard to the ability of the Palestinian side under the leadership of President Mahmud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to implement its Roadmap obligations, the public is skeptical with 52% believing it can and 44% believing it can not. But if the Israeli side does implement its Roadmap obligations, 67% of the public believe that the Palestinian leadership will in this case implement its Roadmap obligations.

Confidence in the ability of the Palestinian side to implement its Roadmap obligations if Israel implements its

the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. Majorities support components related to final borders and territorial exchange (56%), end of conflict (66%), and security arrangements (51%) while minorities support other components related to refugees (39%), Jerusalem (36%), and the establishment of a state without an army (23%).

- 32% believe that it is possible and 64% think it is impossible these days to reach a permanent status agreement with Olmert's government.
- About two thirds (65%) believe that chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non existent while 32% say the chances are medium or high.
- 49% agree with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict, there would be mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. 49% disagree to this step.

own increases among supporters of Fateh (82%) compared to supporters of Hamas (46%), among supporters of the peace process (73%) compared to those opposed to it (49%), and among the "somewhat religious" (71%) compared to the religious (64%). Optimism about the ability of the Israelis and the Palestinians to reach a permanent settlement during 2008 increases among residents of the Gaza Strip (29%) compared to residents of the West Bank (19%), among supporters of Fateh (38%) compared to supporters of Hamas (7%), among the illiterates (27%) compared to holders of BA degree (19%), among employees (25%) compared to students (18%), among those over 52 years of age (27%) compared to those between 18-22 years of age (21%), and among supporters of the peace process (30%) compared to those opposed to it (5%).

Findings show stability in the position of the Palestinians toward a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative. In this poll, 47% supported such a package and 49% opposed it. Support for the same package stood at 48% in December 2006 and 46% in December 2005. From among the six elements of the package, support increases in this poll to a majority level for final borders and territorial exchange (56%), end of conflict (66%), and security arrangements (51%). Support decreases for the other three elements: refugees (39%), Jerusalem (36%), and the establishment of a state without an army (23%).

Support for Clinton's Permanent/Genève Initiative Framework (2003-2007)

	Dec 03	Dec 04	Dec 05	Dec 06	Dec 07
1) Borders and Territorial Exchange	57%	63%	55%	61%	56%
2) Refugees	25%	46%	40%	41%	39%
3) Jerusalem	46%	44%	33%	39%	36%
4) Demilitarized Palestinian State	36%	27%	20%	28%	23%
5) Security Arrangements	23%	53%	43%	42%	51%
6) End of Conflict	42%	69%	64%	62%	66%
Overall Package	39%	54%	46%	48%	47%

Support for this package increases in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (46%) among supporters of Fateh (63%) compared to supporters of Hamas (28%), and among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (22%).

Findings indicate a decrease in the level of support for a settlement with a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people within a context of a permanent settlement in which all issues of the conflict are resolved from 57% last September to 49% in this poll. Opposition to this mutual recognition of identity reaches 49% in this poll. This is the

first time since June 2003 that a majority fails to support this recognition of identity. The decrease in support for this compromise comes after the Palestinian leadership has refused in November an Israeli request to recognize Israel as a Jewish state as a pre condition to the Annapolis peace negotiations.

The public shows little confidence in the chances for reaching a permanent settlement with only 32% believing and 64% not believing that it is possible these days to reach a compromise solution between Abbas and Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert and that even if an agreement is reached, only 31% believe that Olmert is capable of implementing it on the ground. Also, the public shows little confidence in the ability of its own leadership to reach a permanent agreement or to implement one with only 39% believing that Abbas is strong enough to negotiate a permanent compromise settlement. Even if such a settlement is reached 42% believe and 52% do not believe Abbas has the ability to implement it on the ground.

This pessimism about the lack of ability on both sides to reach an agreement or implement one is reflected on expectations regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state during the next five years. Almost two thirds (65%) say the chances that this would happen are slim or non existent while 32% say that chances are high or medium. In June 2007, 26% believed that the chances were medium or high and 70% said the chances were slim or non existent

(3) Domestic Balance of Power:

- If new legislative elections are held today, Hamas would receive 31% of the vote and Fateh 49%. 10% and 11% remain undecided.
- Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas reaches 50% compared to 45% last September and 36% last June.
- If new elections are held today and the two candidates were Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 56% of the vote and Haniyeh 37%. But if the presidential elections were a contest between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive 63% and Haniyeh 32%.
- 42% say they agree that Haniyeh should stay as prime minister in the Gaza Strip while 52% say they do not agree with that. On the other hand, 51% say they agree that Salam Fayyad should stay as prime minister while 40% disagree with that.
- In a contest over legitimacy, 27% say that Haniyeh's government is the legitimate one

Findings show that the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas has now stabilized after a widening of the gap to Fateh's advantage took place last September. If new parliamentary elections are held today, with all factions participating, 31% would vote for Hamas's list, Change and Reform, and 49% would vote for Fateh while all other lists combined would receive 10% and 11% remain undecided. Support for Hamas reaches 33% in the Gaza Strip and 28% in the West Bank and support for Fateh reaches 52% in the Gaza Strip and 47% in the West Bank. Support for Hamas increases among women (34%) compared to men (27%) while the opposite is true for Fateh with support among men reaching 50% and among women reaching 48%. Support for Hamas increases among the religious (35%) compared to the "somewhat religious" (26%), but this is also true for Fateh with support among the religious reaching 50% and among the "somewhat religious" 47%. Support for Hamas decreases among employees (19%) and increases among students (33%) while support for Fateh increases among employees (61%) compared to students (47%). Support for Hamas increases among those working in the private sector (25%) compared to public sector (18%). Support for Fateh increases among employees of the public sector (67%) and decreases to

while 37% say Fayyad's government is the legitimate one. 11% say the two are legitimate and 21% say the two are illegitimate.

45% among employees of the private sector. Finally, support for Hamas increases among those opposed to the peace process (66%) compared to supporters of the peace process (22%) and support for Fateh decreases among those opposed to the peace process (10%) and increases among supporters of the peace process (60%).

Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas increases in this poll to 50% compared to 45% last September and 36% last June. If new presidential elections took place today and only two candidates, Abbas and Haniyeh, competed, Abbas would win 56% of the vote to Haniyeh's 37%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 63% and the latter 32%.

Findings show that 42% approve and 52% disapprove of Haniyeh remaining in his post as prime minister in the Gaza Strip while 51% approve and 40% disapprove of Salam Fayyad remaining in his post as prime minister. Parallel to this, 27% say that Haniyeh's government is the legitimate one while 37% say Fayyad's is the legitimate one. 11% view both governments as legitimate and 21% view both as illegitimate. These findings indicate a small decrease in the percentage of those who view Haniyeh's government as the legitimate one from the 30% it obtained last September while indicating no change in public perception regarding the legitimacy of Fayyad's government.

Results of Poll # (26)**11-16 December 2007**

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
00) From among the following satellite news stations, which one you watched most during the last two months?			
1) Al Arabia	8.6	7.9	10.0
2) Al Jazeera	53.2	61.3	39.1
3) Al Hurra	0.2	0.3	0.0
4) Al Manar	1.7	2.2	0.8
5) Palestine TV	13.5	8.6	22.0
6) Al-Aqsa TV	11.3	6.3	20.0
7) Do not watch TV	6.1	6.5	5.4
8) Others	2.4	3.2	1.0
9) Do not have a dish	2.8	3.5	1.7
9) No Opinion/Don't know	0.2	0.3	0.0
01) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the performance of Mahmud Abbas since his election as president of the PA?			
1) Very satisfied	8.1	6.9	10.1
2) Satisfied	41.5	42.3	40.1
3) Not satisfied	32.9	30.8	36.5
4) not satisfied at all	12.8	14.2	10.4
5) DK/NA	4.7	5.8	2.9
02) If new presidential elections are to take place today, and Mahmud Abbas was nominated by Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh was nominated by Hamas, whom would you vote for?			
1) Mahmoud Abbas	55.8	56.2	55.3
2) Ismael Haneyyeh	36.7	35.2	39.0
3 DK/NA	7.4	8.6	5.7
03) And if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti representing Fateh and Ismael Haneyyeh representing Hams, whom would you vote for?			
1) Marwan Barghouti	63.4	64.5	61.5
2) Ismael Haneyyeh	32.2	29.7	36.1
3) No Opinion/ Don't know	4.4	5.7	2.4
05) If new elections agreed to by all factions are held today and the same lists that took part in the last PLC elections were nominated, for whom would you vote?			
1) alternative	1.3	1.5	0.8
2) independent Palestine	3.4	4.4	1.8
3) Abu Ali Mustafa	3.7	4.4	2.6
4) Abu al Abbas	0.1	0.2	
5) freedom and social justice	0.2	0.2	
6) change and reform	30.5	28.7	33.3
7) national coalition for justice and democracy	0.2	0.3	
8) third way	0.8	1.1	0.2
9) freedom and independence	0.3	0.4	0.3
10) Palestinian justice	0.1	0.2	
11) Fateh	49.0	46.9	52.3
12) none of the above/ DK/NA	10.5	11.7	8.6

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
06) Hamas carried out a military step in mid June against security headquarters belonging to the PA in the Gaza Strip and succeeded after that in controlling the Strip. Do you approve or disapprove of what Hamas did?			
1) Strongly approve	5.2	5.1	5.5
2) Approve	16.1	13.5	20.5
3) Disapprove	44.6	42.7	47.8
4) Strongly disapprove	29.6	33.6	22.7
5) DK/NA	4.5	5.1	3.5
07) President Mahmud Abbas dismissed the government of Ismail Haniyeh after the Gaza events about three months ago. But the prime minister of the dismissed government remained in his position in the Gaza Strip. Do you approve or disapprove of his decision to stay in his position?			
1) Strongly approve	8.1	7.9	8.4
2) Approve	33.9	31.6	38.0
3) Disapprove	37.4	35.8	40.0
4) Strongly disapprove	14.4	16.8	10.2
5) DK/NA	6.3	8.0	3.4
08) Moreover, President Abbas appointed an emergency government headed by Salam Fayyad. After the ending of the emergency period and due to the inability of the PLC to convene, the government of Fayyad became a care taker one. Do you approve or disapprove of the continued functioning of this government?			
1) Strongly approve	8.4	8.0	9.0
2) Approve	42.9	43.5	41.7
3) Disapprove	31.2	29.1	34.9
4) Strongly disapprove	8.5	8.9	7.9
5) DK/NA	9.1	10.5	6.5
09) Now after the events in the Gaza Strip and the separation between the Palestinian authorities in Gaza and the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank, what do you expect to happen in the future? Will the separation remain or will the two authorities be unified?			
1) the two authorities will be unified in the next few months	35.6	24.7	54.7
2) the two authorities will be unified but within a year or two	21.7	25.9	14.5
3) the two authorities will not be unified soon or in the next two years	17.2	19.6	13.2
4) separation between the West Bank and Gaza will be consolidated and will become permanent	16.9	19.2	12.9
5) DK/NA	8.5	10.6	4.7

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
10) After the separation between Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas and the government of Ismail Haniyeh remained in power in Gaza and considered itself the legitimate government while president Abu Mazin formed a new government headed by Salam Fayyad and it too considered itself legitimate. What about you, which of the two government you consider legitimate, the government of Haniyeh or the government of Abu Mazin and Fayyad?			
1) Haniyehs' government is the legitimate one	26.8	23.2	33.2
2) Abu Mazin's and Fayyad government is the legitimate one	36.8	36.4	37.5
3) Both governments are legitimate	10.7	11.9	8.6
4) Both governments are not legitimate	21.1	22.6	18.4
5) DK/NA	4.6	5.9	2.3
11) Fateh and Hamas and the two authorities in Gaza and the West Bank are currently engaged in a competition to win public support and confidence through the use of media such as Palestine TV and al Aqsa TV stations. When you hear news from the two sides, which side you trust more, the news spread by Hamas and Haniyeh's government or the news spread by Fateh and the Abu Mazin's and Fayyad's government?			
1) Trust Hamas and Haniyeh's government	19.4	16.7	24.2
2) Trust Fateh and Abu Mazin's and Salam's governemtn	24.2	22.5	27.1
3) Trust both sides	4.5	4.9	3.7
4) Trust neither side	45.9	47.8	42.6
5) DK/NA	6.0	8.1	2.4
12) Do you think Hamas plans to take control of the West Bank by force in the same way it took control over the Gaza Strip?			
1) Certainly it plans to do that	20.0	18.7	22.4
2) it plans to do that	21.4	20.8	22.5
3) it does not plan to do that	37.4	35.9	40.0
4) Certainly it does not plan to do that	9.1	9.6	8.4
5) No opinion/Don't know	12.0	15.1	6.8
13) In general, how would you describe conditions of the Palestinians in the Palestinian areas in Gaza Strip these days?			
1) Very good	1.9	2.3	1.2
2) Good	6.0	6.4	5.4
3) So so	5.9	5.8	6.1
4) Bad	30.3	33.7	24.2
5) Very bad	55.0	50.3	63.1
6) DK/NA	0.9	1.5	
14) In general, how would you describe conditions of the Palestinians in the Palestinian areas in the West Bank these days?			
1) Very good	5.6	3.0	10.1
2) Good	24.9	18.9	35.5
3) So so	26.5	31.0	18.5
4) Bad	28.4	34.0	18.6
5) Very bad	12.1	12.7	11.1
6) DK/NA	2.5	0.5	6.2

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
15) Generally, do you see yourself as:			
1) Religious	48.9	40.2	64.1
2) Somewhat religious	47.0	55.3	32.6
3) Not religious	3.6	3.8	3.4
4) DK/NA	0.4	0.7	
16) Generally, do you see yourself as:			
1) Supportive of the peace process	68.7	64.4	76.2
2) Opposed to the peace process	16.0	16.8	14.6
3) Between support and opposition	14.7	17.9	9.2
4) DK/NA	0.6	0.9	
17) Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions under the control of President Abu Mazin?			
1) Yes	77.8	77.4	78.4
2) No	12.7	10.6	16.5
3) DK/NA	9.5	12.0	5.1
18) If yes, will this corruption in PA institutions under the control of President Abu Mazin increase, decrease or remain as it is in the future?			
1) Will increase	42.2	48.6	31.3
2) Will remain as it is	14.3	14.4	14.1
3) will decrease	36.8	29.9	48.8
4) DK/NA	6.7	7.2	5.8
19) Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions under the control of Ismail Haniyeh's government?			
1) Yes	57.9	57.4	58.8
2) No	26.7	23.7	32.0
3) DK/NA	15.3	18.9	9.2
20) If yes, will this corruption in PA institutions under the control of Ismail Haniyeh's government increase, decrease or remain as it is in the future?			
1) Will increase	55.2	57.6	51.2
2) Will remain as it is	13.5	13.6	13.3
3) will decrease	21.5	17.7	28.0
4) DK/NA	9.8	11.1	7.4
21) Would you say that these days your security and safety, and that of your family, is assured or not assured?			
1) Completely assured	8.1	5.2	13.3
2) Assured	38.7	38.6	38.8
3) Not assured	41.9	44.0	38.2
4) Not assured at all	11.1	12.0	9.4
5) DK/NA	0.3	0.3	0.3
22) Do current political, security, and economic conditions lead you to seek emigration abroad?			
1) Certainly seek to emigration	13.2	9.8	19.3
2) Seek emigration	14.1	15.1	12.3
3) Do not seek emigration	29.9	27.2	34.5
4) Certainly do not seek emigration	42.3	47.3	33.4
5) DK/NA	0.5	0.6	0.5

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
23) What do you expect to happen now between Palestinians and Israelis, after the Annapolis Conference?			
1) Negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop	17.6	17.0	18.5
2) Negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue	41.5	37.3	48.8
3) Armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations	32.4	34.4	29.0
4) DK/NA	8.5	11.2	3.8
24) There is a proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinians people. Do you agree or disagree to this proposal?			
1) Definitely agree	6.3	6.8	5.6
2) agree	42.7	43.9	40.5
3) disagree	34.0	30.2	40.4
4) definitely disagree	14.5	15.6	12.5
5) DK/NA	2.6	3.5	0.9
25) And what is the Palestinian majority opinion on this issue? Do most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support or oppose the recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people at the end of the peace process?			
1) Majority supports	43.0	41.8	45.3
2) Majority opposes	47.5	48.0	46.8
3) DK/NA	9.4	10.2	8.0
26) And what is the Israeli majority opinion on this issue? Do most Israelis support or oppose the recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people at the end of the peace process?			
1) Majority supports	40.2	39.0	42.3
2) Majority opposes	48.0	48.4	47.3
5) DK/NA	11.9	12.7	10.4
27) Now 40 years after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, what in your view are the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years? Are they high, medium, low, or none existent?			
1) None existent	26.5	25.5	28.2
2) Low	38.5	39.6	36.7
3) Medium	27.0	26.1	28.6
4) High	5.2	5.1	5.2
5) DK/NA	2.8	3.7	1.3

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
28) Now, after the separation of the Gaza and the West Bank, continued functioning of the Haniyeh's government in Gaza, and the formation of the Salam Fayyad government, tell us what is your evaluation of the status of the following conditions in the Gaza Strip today? Are they good or bad?			
28-1 Economic conditions such as poverty and unemployment in the Gaza Strip			
1) Very Good	0.8	0.9	0.7
2) Good	4.6	4.6	4.7
3) Bad	36.7	40.7	29.6
4) Very Bad	56.6	51.9	64.7
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	1.3	1.9	0.3
28-2 Enforcement of law and order in the Gaza Strip			
1) Very Good	7.9	6.1	11.1
2) Good	27.5	21.2	38.4
3) Bad	31.2	33.8	26.7
4) Very Bad	28.9	32.0	23.4
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	4.5	6.9	0.4
28-3 Status of democracy, particularly with regard to freedom of the press in the Gaza Strip			
1) Very Good	4.3	3.3	6.1
2) Good	23.8	19.1	32.0
3) Bad	31.5	32.4	29.9
4) Very Bad	33.0	35.3	28.9
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	7.4	9.9	3.0
28-4 Safety and security for you and your family in the Gaza Strip			
1) Very Good	-	-	12.9
2) Good	-	-	43.0
3) Bad	-	-	23.7
4) Very Bad	-	-	20.1
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	-	-	0.3
29) And what about the same conditions in the West Bank? tell us what is your evaluation of the same conditions in the West Bank? Are they good or bad?			
29-1 Economic conditions such as poverty and unemployment in the West Bank			
1) Very Good	2.6	1.6	5.3
2) Good	44.5	37.1	65.1
3) Bad	40.0	47.1	20.3
4) Very Bad	10.8	13.4	3.6
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	2.1	0.8	5.6
29-2 Enforcement of law and order in the West Bank			
1) Very Good	4.6	5.5	2.0
2) Good	49.8	48.0	55.0
3) Bad	33.2	35.6	26.8
4) Very Bad	9.1	9.6	7.8
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	3.3	1.4	8.5

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
29-3 Status of democracy, particularly with regard to freedom of the press in the West Bank			
1) Very Good	4.2	4.6	3.2
2) Good	46.6	44.8	51.6
3) Bad	31.8	32.3	30.3
4) Very Bad	12.5	13.8	8.7
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	4.9	4.4	6.2
29-4 Safety and security for you and your family in the West Bank			
1) Very Good	-	3.5	-
2) Good	-	51.2	-
3) Bad	-	35.3	-
4) Very Bad	-	9.3	-
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	-	0.8	-
30) There is currently talk about conducting Palestinian-Israeli negotiations with the aim of establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the Palestinian state and Israel on the remaining issues such as permanent borders, refugees, holy places in Jerusalem, and others. Do you support or oppose the participation of the Palestinian Authority in such negotiations?			
1) Strongly support	9.3	8.4	10.9
2) support	54.0	52.8	56.1
3) oppose	24.8	24.7	24.9
4) Strongly oppose	8.0	9.4	5.7
5) DK/NA	3.9	4.7	2.4
31) How would you evaluate the current status of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority under Abu Mazin? Would you say it is:			
1) Very good	6.3	4.6	9.3
2) Good	36.2	36.2	36.2
3) neither bad nor good	19.4	21.3	16.0
4) Bad	22.6	22.5	22.7
5) Very bad	11.8	11.0	13.4
6) DK/NA	3.7	4.4	2.4
32) How would you evaluate the current status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip under Ismail Hanyieh government? Would you say it is:			
1) Very good	6.0	3.8	9.8
2) Good	21.8	18.1	28.1
3) Fair	12.3	12.0	13.0
4) Bad	31.1	34.3	25.7
5) Very bad	19.9	19.6	20.3
6) DK/NA	8.9	12.3	3.0

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
33) According to the Saudi plan, Israel will retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and a Palestinian state will be established. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194 which allows return of refugees to Israel and compensation. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. Do you agree or disagree to this plan?			
1) Certainly agree	7.9	7.4	8.7
2) agree	56.9	55.8	58.8
3) disagree	23.3	23.2	23.5
4) Certainly disagree	8.7	9.1	8.1
5) DK/NA	3.2	4.6	0.9
34) If a peace agreement is reached, and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel, would you support or oppose the efforts to reach full reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinian state?			
1) Would strongly support	7.5	7.1	8.2
2) Would support	61.7	61.8	61.6
3) Would oppose	21.3	20.8	22.1
4) Would strongly oppose	7.2	7.4	7.0
5) DK/NA	2.2	2.9	1.1
35) Now after the Annapolis meeting -- which was called for by the US and attended by the PA, Israel, and several Arab states—has been concluded, how do you assess its outcome? Has it succeeded or failed in pushing the peace process forward?			
1) Certainly it has succeeded	1.2	0.6	2.1
2) it has succeeded	10.0	8.8	12.1
3) it has not succeeded or failed	20.9	22.4	18.3
4) it has failed	34.4	32.5	37.5
5) certainly it has failed	24.2	23.2	25.9
6) DK/NA	9.3	12.3	4.1
36) And what are your expectations regarding the chances for the success or failure of the negotiations launched by Annapolis conference? Will it succeed or fail in ending Israeli occupation?			
1) certainly will succeed	1.2	0.8	1.9
2) will succeed	21.0	19.3	23.8
3) will fail	47.5	48.3	46.0
4) certainly will fail	22.0	21.6	22.7
5) DK/NA	8.3	9.9	5.6
37) Is president Mahmud Abbas strong enough to be able to negotiate a permanent settlement with the Israeli side including a permanent agreement on borders, refugees and Jerusalem?			
1) certainly yes	4.7	4.4	5.3
2) yes	33.9	32.9	35.6
3) no	41.2	42.2	39.5
4) certainly no	16.2	15.6	17.2
5) DK/NA	4.0	4.9	2.5

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
38) And if he succeeds in reaching a permanent agreement on all the issues, does Abbas has the capacity to implement the agreement on the ground?			
1) certainly yes	5.1	4.9	5.5
2) yes	37.2	37.9	36.1
3) no	38.8	38.2	40.0
4) certainly no	13.0	11.6	15.5
5) DK/NA	5.8	7.5	2.8
39) In your view, is it possible or impossible these days to reach a compromise permanent status agreement with the Olmert government?			
1) Certainly possible	2.5	2.2	3.0
2) Possible	29.2	28.7	30.1
3) Impossible	43.7	39.5	51.0
4) Certainly impossible	19.9	23.7	13.3
5) DK/NA	4.7	5.9	2.5
40) And if Olmert succeed in reaching a permanent agreement with the Palestinian side, does he have the capacity to implement it on the ground?			
1) certainly yes	3.6	4.0	2.9
2) yes	27.5	27.3	27.9
3) no	43.6	40.5	48.8
4) certainly no	20.2	21.4	17.9
5) DK/NA	5.1	6.7	2.4
41) The Joint Palestinian-Israeli statement issued during the Annapolis conference stated that the two sides will engage in permanent status negotiations aiming at reaching a peace treaty based on the establishment of two states: the state of Palestine and the state of Israel. Do you approve or disapprove of this goal?			
1) certainly approve	5.0	4.9	5.3
2) approve	53.1	54.3	51.1
3) disapprove	29.3	27.2	33.1
4) certainly disapprove	8.9	8.7	9.2
5) DK/NA	3.7	5.0	1.4
42) The joint statement also stated that the two sides will seek to conclude the permanent status negotiations before the end of 2008. Do you think they will indeed succeed in achieving that on the period indicated?			
1) certainly will succeed	1.3	1.0	1.7
2) will succeed	21.8	18.4	27.7
3) will not succeed	53.7	53.2	54.7
4) certainly will not succeed	18.5	21.6	13.0
5) DK/NA	4.7	5.8	2.8

Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
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- 43) **When Palestinians and Israelis return to final status negotiations the following items might be presented to negotiators as the elements of a permanent compromise settlement. Tell us what you think of each item then tell us what you think of all combined as one permanent status settlement**
1. *An Israeli **withdrawal** from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with the attached map {show map}.*
 2. *An independent Palestinian state would be established in the areas from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state **will have no army**, but it will have a strong security force but an international multinational force would be deployed to insure the safety and security of the state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other.*
 3. ***East Jerusalem** would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that will come under Israeli sovereignty.*
 4. *With regard to the **refugee** question, both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those areas. The number of refugees returning to Israel will be based on the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees will be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of properties.*
 5. *When the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the **end of the conflict** and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples*
 6. *The Palestinian state will have **sovereignty** over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli will be allowed to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state for an indefinite period of time and its responsibility will be to insure the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including its international border crossings.*

Now that you have been informed of each element of the permanent compromise settlement, tell us what you think of each of its item. Do you agree or disagree with it.

43-1) Item #1: withdrawal to 1967 borders with territorial swap

1) Strongly agree	4.6	4.9	4.2
2) Agree	51.2	49.1	54.8
3) Disagree	26.1	26.5	25.3
4) Strongly Disagree	15.7	16.7	14.1
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	2.4	2.8	1.7

43-2) Item #2: a state without an army but with international forces

1) Strongly agree	1.7	2.2	0.9
2) Agree	21.0	21.2	20.8
3) Disagree	47.9	44.8	53.2
4) Strongly Disagree	28.3	30.4	24.6
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	1.1	1.4	0.5

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
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43-3) Item #3: East Jerusalem as capital of the state of Palestine after it is divided			
1) Strongly agree	2.2	2.6	1.5
2) Agree	33.5	34.6	31.6
3) Disagree	37.3	35.4	40.6
4) Strongly Disagree	25.7	25.8	25.6
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	1.2	1.6	0.7
43-4) Item #4: refugees with five options for permanent residence			
1) Strongly agree	2.4	2.8	1.7
2) Agree	37.0	37.3	36.4
3) Disagree	36.3	34.0	40.2
4) Strongly Disagree	20.9	21.3	20.2
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	3.3	4.4	1.5
43-5) Item #5: end of conflict			
1) Strongly agree	8.7	10.5	5.5
2) Agree	57.4	56.8	58.5
3) Disagree	18.0	17.1	19.5
4) Strongly Disagree	14.1	13.2	15.7
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	1.8	2.3	0.8
43-6) Item #6: a sovereign state with security arrangements			
1) Strongly agree	6.1	6.9	4.7
2) Agree	44.9	44.5	45.7
3) Disagree	29.6	28.7	31.2
4) Strongly Disagree	17.3	17.2	17.6
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	2.1	2.8	0.9
43-7) Item #7: the combined elements as one permanent status settlement			
1) Strongly agree	2.2	2.8	1.1
2) Agree	45.2	42.9	49.2
3) Disagree	32.1	32.9	30.7
4) Strongly Disagree	17.2	17.2	17.2
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	3.3	4.2	1.7
44) And what is the Palestinian majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support or oppose this combined final status package?			
1) Majority supports	44.8	42.2	49.2
2) Majority opposes	46.3	47.7	44.0
3) DK/NA	8.9	10.1	6.8
45) And what is the Israeli majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Israelis support or oppose this combined final status package?			
1) Majority supports	36.1	34.0	39.8
2) Majority opposes	53.2	54.2	51.5
3) DK/NA	10.7	11.8	8.8

Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
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46) People's evaluations of the future chances of the peace process and the armed struggle vary. For example, some believe that the peace process is a failure and that only way to end the occupation is the resort to armed attacks while others believe that armed attacks are responsible for the failure of the peace process. What about you? Which of the following four views you support:

1) the peace process is not successful in ending occupation and should be stopped in favor of resort to armed action	21.1	21.2	20.8
2) the peace process should not be stopped because it still might succeed, but at the same time armed action should continue	35.8	31.2	43.8
3) the peace process has not failed and should be given more time and in the meanwhile armed action should be stopped	25.7	31.0	16.4
4) armed action is responsible for the stagnation of the peace process and if it is stopped, the peace process would make progress	12.0	9.9	15.6
5) DK/NA	5.5	6.7	3.4

47) The US, Russia, the European Community and the UN, the so called "Quartet", have put forward a "Roadmap" for the implementation of a final settlement within 3 years. The plan includes political reforms in the Palestinian Authority, including a constitution and election of a strong Prime Minister, stopping the incitement and violence on both sides under the Quartet's supervision, a freeze on settlements and the establishment of a Palestinian State within provisional borders. The next phase will see negotiations on the final borders under the auspices of an international conference. Do you support or oppose this initiative?

1) Strongly support	3.3	2.9	3.9
2) Support	46.3	45.0	48.4
3) Oppose	34.8	33.3	37.4
4) Strongly oppose	11.1	12.2	9.1
5) Don't know/No answer	4.6	6.5	1.3

48) The joint Palestinian-Israeli statement issued by the Annapolis meeting stated that the two sides will immediately start implementing their commitments under the Road Map and that the US will be the monitor and referee of the extent to which the two sides implement these commitments. Are you confident the Israeli side will implement its commitment under the Road Map?

1) certainly it will implement them	1.7	1.4	2.1
2) will implement them	16.1	12.6	22.1
3) will not implement them	52.3	50.1	56.3
4) certainly it will not implement them	26.2	31.4	17.2
5) DK/NA	3.7	4.4	2.4

Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
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49) And do you think the Palestinian side under Abu Mazin and Salam Fayyad's government have the capacity to implement Palestinian commitments under the Road Map?

1) Certainly have the capacity	6.9	7.7	5.6
2) have the capacity	45.1	44.5	46.2
3) does not have the capacity	34.3	32.5	37.3
4) certainly does not have the capacity	9.2	9.7	8.4
5) DK/NA	4.4	5.5	2.5

50) And are you confident that the Palestinian side will implement its commitments under the Road Map if Israel implements its commitments?

1) certainly it will implement them	14.5	16.8	10.5
2) will implement them	52.7	50.8	56.1
3) will not implement them	22.7	20.8	26.0
4) certainly it will not implement them	6.0	6.4	5.2
5) DK/NA	4.1	5.2	2.2

51) Which of the following political parties do you support?

1) PPP	1.8	2.3	1.0
2) PFLP	3.0	3.3	2.7
3) Fateh	36.2	34.7	38.9
4) Hamas	20.5	18.8	23.6
5) DFLP	0.6	0.9	
6) Islamic Jihad	1.2	1.5	0.7
7) National Initiative (Mubadara)	1.3	1.9	0.2
8) Independent Islamists	4.2	2.2	7.6
9) Independent Nationalists	2.7	2.9	2.5
10) None of the above	28.0	31.1	22.8
11) Other, specify	0.4	0.5	0.2