

The **Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)** is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policy analysis and academic research. PSR was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. The center engages in several activities. It conducts academic and policy analysis studies. It organizes socio-political surveys and public opinion polls on current Palestinian political and social attitudes. It sponsors study groups and task forces on issues of critical importance to the Palestinians. Finally, it organizes conferences, public lectures, and briefings on current public policy issues. PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas.

This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

*This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah*



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**While the popularity of Abbas and Fateh increases and the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh and Hamas decreases, and while the public shows some enthusiasm for a strong American role in the peace process and greater support for the Arab Peace Initiative, Palestinians are pessimistic about the chances for the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and are less willing to accept concessions in a permanent settlement**

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13 and 15 August 2009. The poll was conducted in the aftermath of the holding of Fateh's Sixth Congress in Bethlehem and Hamas's refusal to allow Fateh members to leave the Gaza Strip to participate in the Congress. The poll examines the following topics: domestic issues such as the balance of power, Fateh's Sixth Congress, perceptions of corruption, safety and security, attitudes toward elections, confidence in the police, as well as the various issues of the peace process such as the perception of the Obama administration and views on permanent status. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email [pcpsr@pcpsr.org](mailto:pcpsr@pcpsr.org).

#### MAIN RESULTS:

Findings of the third quarter of 2009 show an increase in the popularity of Fateh and president Mahmud Abbas and a decline in the popularity of Hamas and Ismail Haniyeh, the dismissed prime minister. The rise in the popularity of Fateh and Abbas might in part be the result of Fateh's success in holding its long awaited Sixth Congress and electing a new leadership. The decline in support for Hamas might in part be the result of its refusal to allow Fateh members in the Gaza Strip to travel to Bethlehem to participate in Fateh's Sixth Congress. Findings show additional and perhaps deeper reasons for the change in the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas. For example, they show considerable improvement in public perception of personal and family security and safety in the West Bank and a noticeable decrease in public perception of the existence of corruption in PA institutions under Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. In this context, findings show some optimism about the future of Fateh in the aftermath of its Sixth Congress and about the ability of its newly elected leadership to fight corruption inside the movement and to deliver reconciliation with Hamas. But the public does not believe that the new leadership will be different from the previous one in its ability to work to end the Israeli occupation.

Findings also show public confusion regarding new presidential and parliamentary elections. A majority believes that reconciliation talks between Fateh and Hamas will fail. A majority also believes that PA president and parliament will lose their legitimacy next January when their terms end. Nonetheless, a wide majority opposes postponing the elections and a majority also opposes holding elections under the current status quo, with Haniyeh's government supervising it in the Gaza Strip and Fayyad's government supervising it in the West Bank, even if they were organized by a single unified election commission. Moreover, an overwhelming majority opposes holding separate elections in either the Gaza Strip, organized by the Haniyeh government, or in the West Bank, organized by the Fayyad government. In any case, findings show that the public has no confidence in the ability of the legislative and presidential elections to contribute to the re-unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. An overwhelming majority believes that the two sides, Fateh and Hamas, or one of them, will reject the results of any new fair and free elections if those results were not in its favor.

Findings show an increase in the percentage of those who demand a stronger American intervention in the peace process compared to the situation about nine months ago, right after the Obama victory in the US presidential elections. They also show an increase in the level of optimism about the chances that the US intervention would help push the peace process forward along with an increase in support for the Arab Peace Initiative. But findings also show a decrease in the level of support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. It is possible that the decrease represents a negative reaction to the various tough conditions attached by Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to his acceptance of the two-states solution. This decrease represents a continuation of the decline in support for this solution which we registered around the end of 2008 which might have occurred at that time as a reaction to the failure of the negotiations unleashed by the Annapolis Conference.

### **(1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions**

- **Increase in support for Abbas and a decrease in support for Haniyeh with the gap between the two increasing from 5 percentage points (49% vs. 44%) to 14 percentage points (52% vs. 38%).**
- **A similar increase is registered in the vote for Fateh against Hamas from 8 percentage points (41% vs. 33%) to 16 percentage points (44% vs. 28%).**
- **Significant improvement in the perception of personal and family safety and security; improvement is particularly noticeable in the West Bank where it has increased from 43% to 58% in one year.**

Findings indicate an increase in the percentage of those who would vote for Mahmud Abbas as president of the PA from 49% three months ago to 52% in this poll and a decrease in the vote for Ismail Haniyeh from 44% to 38%. 9% remain undecided in this poll and only 60% say they would participate in those elections. However, if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 62% of the vote and the latter 31%. 7% remain undecided and rate of participation increases to 71%. Findings also show an increase in the percentage of those who would vote for Fateh from 41% three months ago to 44% in this poll and a decrease in the percentage of those who would vote for Hamas from 33% to 28% during the same period. Vote for all other electoral lists reaches 11% and 17% remain undecided. Rate of election participation stands at 68%. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice president are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 37% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (21%), Mustafa Barghouti (9%), Salam Fayyad (7%), and Saeb Erekat (4%).

- **A decrease in the belief that corruption exists in Abbas-controlled PA institutions from 72% a year ago to 68% today.**
- **60% believe that Abbas loses his legitimacy when his term ends next January if no new elections are held and 59% believe the PLC too will lose its legitimacy on that date if no new elections are held.**
- **Overwhelming majority (72%) opposes holding separate elections in the West Bank alone and an even higher percentage (79%) opposes separate elections in the Gaza Strip alone; 54% oppose unified West Bank-Gaza Strip elections under the current split. Moreover, 70% believe that Fateh and Hamas will reject the outcome of any free and fair elections if it was unfavorable to them. 60% oppose postponing elections.**
- **A majority of 58% believes that the Cairo dialogue will fail and only 12% believe the unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will resume soon.**
- **After Fateh's Sixth Congress, percentage of optimists about the future of Fateh is higher than percentage of pessimists.**
- **Among those who were subject to attack or robbery, majority does not submit complaints to the police; among those who submit complaints, overwhelming majority (73%) says it is not satisfied with the police performance.**

Findings indicate a significant improvement in public perception of personal and family safety and security in the West Bank, standing today at 58% compared to 43% one year ago, 35% two years ago, and 25% four years ago (just few months before the last parliamentary elections in January 2006). Findings also show some improvement in the perception of personal and family safety and security in the Gaza Strip, standing today at 63% compared to 54% one year ago, 49% two years ago, and 55% four years ago (immediately after the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and few months before the last parliamentary elections). Moreover, findings show a continued decline in the perception that corruption exists in PA institutions under the control of Abbas and Fayyad, standing today at 68% compared to 72% one year ago, 80% two years ago, and 87% four years ago (few months before the last parliamentary elections).

60% say PA president Abbas loses his legitimacy when his term ends next January if no new elections are organized and 30% say he does not. Similarly, 59% say the Palestinian Legislative Council loses its legitimacy next January when it too comes to the end of its term. While an overwhelming majority (72%) opposes the holding of separate elections in the West Bank alone and a larger majority (79%) opposes holding separate elections in the Gaza Strip alone, and while a majority of 58% believes that the Fateh-Hamas dialogue in Cairo will fail-- and about one third believes that unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will not be resumed and two entities will be established while 12% say unity will resume soon and a majority of 53% says unity will resume but only after a long time-- a majority of 54% opposes the holding of election in all Palestinian territories next January under the current status quo of political split (assuming one is possible) with the presence of two separate governments, one in the West Bank and one in the Gaza Strip. 41% support such elections. In the meanwhile, a majority of 60% opposes the postponement of elections for a year or more and 36% support it. Support for conducting legislative and presidential elections jointly in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but under the current conditions of political split, increases among women (44%) compared to men (37%), among supporters of the peace process (44%) compared those who oppose the peace process (32%), and among illiterates (60%) compared to holders of a BA degree (40%).

In addition to public confusion regarding elections, the public has no confidence in the ability of elections to contribute to national unification. 70% believe that both Fateh and Hamas, or one of them, will reject the results of a fair and free elections if these results favored its opponent. Only 22% say the two sides will accept those results. However, the overwhelming majority of the respondents (83%) say they themselves would accept the results of a fair and free election even if they favored those whom they did not vote for.

53% say they are worried that they or a member of their family would be hurt by other Palestinians, from Fateh or Hamas, and 46% say they are not worried. Respondents in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are equally worried. Three months ago, respondents in the Gaza Strip were more worried than respondents in the West Bank (65% to 50%)

which means that the level of worry has dropped considerably in the Gaza Strip and increased slightly in the West Bank.

In the aftermath of Fateh's Sixth Congress, 39% say Fateh will become stronger and more unified in the future and 22% say it will become weaker and more fragmented and 34% say it will remain unchanged. 40% say the newly elected Fateh leadership will be more able than the previous leadership in achieving reconciliation with Hamas and 22% say it will be less able to do so. Similarly, 43% say the new leadership will be more able than the previous one to fight corruption within Fateh while 21% think the opposite. But only 27% say the new leadership will be more able to work toward ending occupation and 28% say it will be less able than the previous leadership. Belief that Fateh will become stronger and more unified increases in the Gaza Strip (48%) compared to the West Bank (34%), among supporters of the peace process (47%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (16%), and among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas (16%).

9% of the public say they have, and 91% say they have not, been victims of attacks or robbery by other Palestinians during the past year. Among those, 40% say they have submitted a complaint to the police and security services and 58% say they have not. 41% of those who did not submit a complaint say the reason they did not submit one is that they do not trust the police while 43% say the police can not do anything to help them and 11% say they did not want to make the issue public. 26% of those who did submit a complaint say they were satisfied with the police work in the investigation to uncover the circumstances of the crime while 73% say they were not satisfied. The percentage of those who submitted complaints is higher in the West Bank (52%) than in the Gaza Strip (25%). Among those who did not submit a complaint to the police, 57% in the Gaza Strip and 22% in the West Bank say the reason for this is the lack of trust in the police. The levels of satisfaction with the performance of the police among those who submitted a complaint stands at 21% in the Gaza Strip and 28% in the West Bank.

## **(2) Peace Process**

- **49% accept and 49% reject a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict have been resolved.**
- **69% believe that the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent**
- **Eight months after Obama became the president of the US, 64% say US policy favors Israel, 7% say it favors the Palestinians; but 61% want the US to play a stronger role in the peace process and 29% do not want the US to intervene in the**

Findings show conflicting trends among Palestinians regarding the peace process. For example, while support increases for the Arab peace initiative and while demand for a stronger American role in the peace process rises, support continues to drop for compromises entailed in a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Findings indicate continued even split regarding mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people in return for recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after resolving all issues of the conflict with 49% supporting it (compared to 50% in the last poll three months ago) and 49% opposing it. Findings also show continued pessimism about the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state along side the state of Israel during the next five years with 69% believing that the chances are slim or nonexistence (compared to 69% three months ago) and 30% believing that the chances are medium to high.

- peace process.
- If the US intervenes strongly in the peace process, 56% expect such intervention to lead to success and 26% expect it to fail to move the process forward.
  - 64% support the Arab (or Saudi) Peace Initiative and 34% oppose it; 58% believe the Palestinian side should accept an American intervention to pressure both the Palestinians and the Israelis to accept and implement this initiative and 39% believe the Palestinians should reject such intervention.
  - 38% support and 61% oppose a package containing the articles of a permanent status settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative, but 45% believe the Palestinian side should accept an American intervention to pressure the two sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians, to accept and implement this solution.
  - Only 35% believe that if the Arab countries offered confidence building measures to Israel, such measures would encourage it to offer concessions to Palestinians and 61% believe such Arab measures will have no impact.
  - If it was shown that Arab confidence measures were needed to push Israel to offer concessions to the Palestinians, 41% agree and 56% disagree that Arabs should in this case adopt such confidence building measures.

Findings show rise in support for the Arab peace initiative from 57% in our last poll, three months ago, to 64% in this poll. Opposition to the initiative dropped from 40% to 34%. But support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva initiative declines to 38%, with opposition standing at 61%. Support for this plan stood at 41% and opposition at 57% last December. As the table below indicates, support drops for five out of six items of the settlement. The table also show continued decline for the settlement, one that was recorded last December. Support for this permanent settlement had stabilized during the period between December 2005 and December 2007 after a big increase in December 2004.

### Support for Clinton Parameters-Geneva Initiative Permanent Settlement

2003-2009

	Dec 03	Dec 04	Dec 05	Dec 06	Dec 07	Dec 08	Aug 09
1) Borders and Territorial Exchange	57%	63%	55%	61%	56%	54%	49%
2) Refugees	25%	46%	40%	41%	39%	40%	37%
3) Jerusalem	46%	44%	33%	39%	36%	36%	31%
4) Demilitarized State	36%	27%	20%	28%	23%	27%	24%
5) Security Arrangements	23%	53%	43%	42%	51%	35%	34%
6) End of Conflict	42%	69%	64%	62%	66%	55%	55%
Overall Package	39%	54%	46%	48%	47%	41%	38%

Findings show that 49% support and 50% oppose the item related to borders whereby Israel withdraws from all the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel. They also show that 37% support and 61% oppose the item related to refugees whereby refugees would be given five choices for permanent resettlement that would include an unlimited return to the Palestinian state and a limited return to Israel while providing compensation to all. They also show that 31% support and 68% oppose the item related to Jerusalem whereby East Jerusalem would be the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty and the Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. Support for the item related to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety reaches 24% and opposition 76%. Findings also show that 34% support and 64% oppose the item related to security arrangements whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over

its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. Finally, 55% support and 44% oppose the compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side.

Despite continued decline in support for the permanent settlement described above, findings show a rise in the demand for stronger American role in the peace process from 57% last December to 61% in this poll and a decrease in the opposition to such intervention from 35% to 29%. The increased support for an American intervention comes despite the fact that 64% believe that eight months after the election of Obama as the US president, US policy remains more supportive of Israel and only 7% believe it is more supportive of the Palestinians. The reason for this might be due to the increase in the percentage of those who believe that such an intervention would be successful in pushing the peace process forward from 49% in December 2008 to 56% in this poll, while expectations of failure dropped from 30% to 26%.

Findings also show that a majority of 58% believes that the Palestinian side should accept an American intervention to push the Israeli and Palestinian sides to accept and implement the Arab peace initiative while 39% believe it should reject it. Moreover, 45% believe that the Palestinian side should accept an American intervention to push the Israeli and Palestinian sides to accept and implement a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative as described above.

The poll asked also about possible Arab normalization of relations with Israel. Only 35% believe that if Arab countries were to take confidence building steps (such as allowing commercial relations) this would encourage Israel to make concessions to Palestinians and 61% think such steps would have no impact on Israel. If it was proven that such steps were indeed needed in order to push Israel to make concessions to Palestinians, 41% agree and 56% disagree that in this case Arab countries should take those steps. Support for taking such steps increases among supporters of the peace process (44%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (29%) and among supporters of Fateh (53%) compared to supporters of Hamas (35%).

## PSR Poll No. 33

13-15 August 2009

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>00) From among the following satellite news stations, which one you watched most during the last two months?</b>			
1) Al Arabia	10.0	7.4	14.4
2) Al Jazeera	53.6	61.6	39.6
3) Al Hurra	0.2	0.2	0.2
4) Al Manar	2.2	3.1	0.7
5) Palestine TV	12.8	11.4	15.2
6) Al-Aqsa TV	9.4	4.5	17.8
7) Do not watch TV	8.5	8.4	8.6
8) Others	2.4	2.1	2.8
9) Do not have a dish	0.8	1.1	0.2
10) No Opinion/Don't know	0.2	0.1	0.5
<b>01) In general, how would you describe conditions of the Palestinians in the Palestinian areas in Gaza Strip these days?</b>			
1) Very good	2.6	2.6	2.6
2) Good	11.3	11.3	11.2
3) So so	15.4	17.4	11.9
4) Bad	35.3	36.7	32.7
5) Very bad	32.8	27.8	41.6
6) DK/NA	2.7	4.3	
<b>02) In general, how would you describe conditions of the Palestinians in the Palestinian areas in the West Bank these days?</b>			
1) Very good	7.6	5.1	12.0
2) Good	26.4	23.6	31.3
3) So so	26.5	31.8	17.4
4) Bad	24.5	26.8	20.5
5) Very bad	10.9	11.7	9.5
6) DK/NA	4.0	0.9	9.3
<b>03) Generally, do you see yourself as:</b>			
1) Religious	47.1	38.0	63.0
2) Somewhat religious	49.7	58.1	34.9
3) Not religious	2.9	3.3	2.1
4) DK/NA	0.4	0.6	0.0
<b>04) Generally, do you see yourself as:</b>			
1) Supportive of the peace process	65.9	59.2	77.6
2) Opposed to the peace process	18.5	21.5	13.2
3) Between support and opposition	14.3	17.9	7.9
4) DK/NA	1.3	1.4	1.2
<b>05) Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions under the control of President Abu Mazin?</b>			
1) Yes	67.5	71.1	61.2
2) No	20.3	16.6	26.7
3) DK/NA	12.3	12.4	12.1

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>06) If yes, will this corruption in PA institutions under the control of President Abu Mazin increase, decrease or remain as it is in the future?</b>			
1) Will increase	50.5	57.0	37.5
2) Will remain as it is	17.6	17.9	16.9
3) Will decrease	25.5	19.2	38.2
4) DK/NA	6.4	5.8	7.4
<b>07) How would you evaluate the current status of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority under Abu Mazin? Would you say it is:</b>			
1) Very good	6.9	5.5	9.4
2) Good	29.5	26.7	34.4
3) Neither bad nor good	24.7	26.1	22.3
4) Bad	22.2	24.2	18.8
5) Very bad	12.9	13.8	11.4
6) DK/NA	3.8	3.7	3.8
<b>08) How would you evaluate the current status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip under Ismail Hanyieh government? Would you say it is:</b>			
1) Very good	5.7	4.6	7.4
2) Good	22.7	20.9	25.9
3) Fair	19.1	18.8	19.6
4) Bad	23.8	25.8	20.2
5) Very bad	19.3	16.5	24.2
6) DK/NA	9.5	13.3	2.8
<b>09) Would you say that these days your security and safety, and that of your family, is assured or not assured?</b>			
1) Completely assured	8.7	5.8	13.7
2) Assured	51.1	52.1	49.4
3) Not assured	32.8	35.8	27.6
4) Not assured at all	7.2	6.2	9.0
5) DK/NA	0.2	0.1	0.4
<b>10) Tell us how do you evaluate the performance of the dismissed government of Ismail Haniyeh in the Gaza Strip? Is it good or bad?</b>			
1) Very good	7.6	6.9	8.9
2) Good	29.7	26.2	35.8
3) So so	22.3	21.4	23.8
4) Bad	21.9	22.5	20.7
5) Very bad	7.7	6.3	10.3
6) DK/NA	10.8	16.7	0.5
<b>11) Tell us how do you evaluate the performance of the government that was headed by Salam Fayyad until recently when he formed a new government? Is it good or bad?</b>			
1) Very good	6.3	6.3	6.3
2) Good	31.4	31.3	31.4
3) So so	24.1	23.1	25.8
4) Bad	22.6	22.5	22.7
5) Very bad	8.0	8.0	8.2
6) DK/NA	7.6	8.8	5.5



	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>12) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the performance of Mahmud Abbas since his election as president of the PA?</b>			
1) Very satisfied	5.4	4.3	7.5
2) Satisfied	42.6	42.0	43.6
3) Not satisfied	34.0	33.6	34.6
4) Not satisfied at all	14.7	15.8	12.7
5) DK/NA	3.3	4.3	1.6
<b>13) If new presidential elections are to take place today, and Mahmud Abbas was nominated by Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh was nominated by Hamas, whom would you vote for?</b>			
1) Mahmud Abbas	52.4	52.8	51.9
2) Ismail Haniyeh	38.3	36.4	40.8
3) DK/NA	9.3	10.9	7.3
<b>14) And if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti representing Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh representing Hamas, whom would you vote for?</b>			
1) Marwan Barghouti	62.2	66.4	56.1
2) Ismail Haniyeh	31.2	26.7	37.6
3) DK/NA	6.6	6.9	6.3
<b>16) If new elections agreed to by all factions are held today and the same lists that took part in the last PLC elections were nominated, for whom would you vote?</b>			
1) Alternative	1.3	0.9	1.8
2) Independent Palestine	3.2	3.7	2.6
3) Abu Ali Mustafa	4.1	5.2	2.6
4) Abu al Abbas	0.2	0.0	0.4
5) Freedom and social justice	0.4	0.5	0.3
6) Change and reform	28.0	24.6	33.2
8) Third way	1.0	1.4	0.3
9) Freedom and independence	0.2	0.4	0.0
10) Palestinian justice	0.4	0.7	0.0
11) Fateh	44.2	41.4	48.5
12) None of the above/ DK/NA/ Do not remember	16.9	21.2	10.2
<b>17) After the separation between Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas and the government of Ismail Haniyeh remained in power in Gaza and considered itself the legitimate government while president Abu Mazin formed a new government headed by Salam Fayyad and it too considered itself legitimate. What about you, which of the two governments you consider legitimate, the government of Haniyeh or the government of Abu Mazin and Fayyad?</b>			
1) Haniyehs' government is the legitimate one	28.1	27.4	29.1
2) Abu Mazin's and Fayyad government is the legitimate one	27.6	25.5	31.4
3) Both governments are legitimate	10.9	11.4	10.0
4) Both governments are not legitimate	28.2	29.6	25.7
5) DK/NA	5.3	6.1	3.7
<b>18) From among the following three Palestinian priorities, which in your opinion is the most important one today?</b>			
1) Gaza reconstruction	16.4	17.2	15.0
2) Reconciliation and reunification of the West Bank and the	56.6	57.6	54.9
3) Return to quite and opening of Gaza crossings	26.1	23.9	29.9
4) DK/NA	0.9	1.3	0.2

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>19) Mahmud Abbas's term as president of the Palestinian Authority ends in January 2010, if no new presidential elections take place on that date, does he lose or does not lose his legitimacy as president of the PA?</b>			
1) Certainly loses legitimacy	17.4	16.1	19.5
2) Loses legitimacy	42.3	44.2	38.9
3) Does not lose legitimacy	26.9	25.3	29.6
4) Certainly loses legitimacy	3.5	2.8	4.8
5) DK/NA	10.0	11.6	7.2
<b>20) Similarly, the Palestinian Legislative Council's term ends in January 2010, if no new legislative elections take place on that date, does it lose or does not lose its legitimacy?</b>			
1) Certainly loses legitimacy	15.6	13.8	18.6
2) Loses legitimacy	43.2	44.4	41.1
3) Does not lose legitimacy	27.7	26.9	29.1
4) Certainly loses legitimacy	2.6	2.2	3.3
5) DK/NA	10.9	12.7	7.8
<b>21) If president Abbas calls for new legislative and presidential elections to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on its constitutionally-mandated date in January 2010 but Hamas's dismissed government refused to allow it in the Gaza Strip, do you support or oppose holding elections in the West Bank only?</b>			
1) Certainly support	3.9	3.2	5.2
2) Support	21.5	24.4	16.5
3) Oppose	52.0	53.9	48.7
4) Certainly oppose	20.0	15.6	27.9
5) DK/NA	2.5	2.9	1.7
<b>22) And what if Hamas's dismissed government calls for new legislative and presidential elections to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on its constitutionally-mandated date in January 2010 but Salam Fayyad's government refused to allow it in the West Bank, do you support or oppose holding elections in the Gaza Strip only?</b>			
1) Certainly support	2.7	2.0	3.9
2) Support	15.9	16.6	14.6
3) Oppose	58.2	61.7	52.0
4) Certainly oppose	20.3	15.9	28.1
5) DK/NA	2.9	3.8	1.4
<b>23) If Fateh-Hamas dialogue fails to lead to the formation of a national unity government, do you support holding legislative and presidential elections on its constitutionally-mandated date in early 2010 in agreement between the two sides under the supervision of a single election commission whereby Hamas's dismissed government in Gaza insures conduct of elections in the Gaza Strip and Salam Fayyad's government in the West Bank insures conduct of elections in the West Bank?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	6.5	6.9	5.8
2) Yes	34.1	34.0	34.4
3) No	37.2	39.1	33.9
4) Certainly no	17.0	14.3	21.5
5) DK/NA	5.1	5.6	4.3

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>24) In light of the failure of the Fateh-Hamas dialogue so far, there is talk about postponing legislative and presidential elections for a period of more than one year. Do you support or oppose this postponement?</b>			
1) Certainly support	4.5	5.0	3.6
2) Support	31.0	34.1	25.7
3) Oppose	46.8	44.8	50.1
4) Certainly oppose	13.2	10.8	17.3
5) DK/NA	4.6	5.3	3.4
<b>25) Given the power struggle, the infighting over jurisdiction, and the security chaos that followed the last legislative elections in 2006, what are your expectations for what might happen if new free and fair legislative and presidential elections take place? Will Fateh and Hamas accept or reject the results of such elections if they were in favor of the other side?</b>			
1) Both sides will accept the results	21.8	22.2	21.1
2) Both sides will reject the results	54.4	53.6	55.8
3) Hamas will accept and Fateh will reject the results	6.3	6.2	6.4
4) Fateh will accept and Hamas will reject the results	9.2	9.0	9.4
5) DK/NA	8.4	8.9	7.4
<b>26) And what about you? Will you accept the results of the next legislative and presidential elections if the elections were free and fair but the results came in favor of the side you did not vote for?</b>			
1) Certainly will accept	47.7	49.3	45.0
2) Think I will accept	35.5	34.5	37.2
3) Think I will not accept	9.3	8.1	11.4
4) Certainly will not accept	3.6	4.2	2.6
5) DK/NA	3.9	3.9	3.7
<b>27) After conducting new legislative and presidential elections, In your view, the newly elected PLC should enjoy</b>			
1) Same powers as those of the newly elected President	32.9	34.0	31.0
2) Greater powers than those of the newly elected President	38.0	40.1	34.2
3) Less powers than those of the newly elected President	21.5	17.6	28.4
4) DK/NA	7.6	8.3	6.4
<b>28) To what extent are you worried or not worried that you or a member of your family could be hurt in your daily life by other Palestinians such as those affiliated with Fateh or Hamas?</b>			
1) Very Worried	18.1	14.9	23.7
2) Worried	34.8	38.5	28.3
3) Not worried	30.9	29.4	33.4
4) Not worried at all	15.3	15.9	14.4
5) DK/NA	0.9	1.3	0.2
<b>29) Can any side in the conflict between Fateh and Hamas obtain unilaterally a solution in its favor by military or by other means?</b>			
1) Yes, Hamas can	7.0	5.8	9.3
2) Yes, Fateh can	7.3	6.8	8.3
3) Neither side can and dialogue is required	58.6	58.3	59.1
4) The conflict cannot be solved neither unilaterally nor by dialogue	22.1	23.9	19.0
5) DK/NA	5.0	5.3	4.4

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>30) Do you expect the dialogue in Cairo among the various factions to succeed in ending the current West Bank-Gaza Strip split?</b>			
1) Certainly will succeed	2.6	2.2	3.2
2) Will succeed	34.6	32.9	37.5
3) Will fail	43.4	43.6	43.1
4) Certainly will fail	14.1	14.2	13.8
5) DK/NA	5.4	7.1	2.5
<b>31) The most difficult issue in the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas is the platform of the national unity government. Fateh demands the formation of a government that accepts all previous agreements between the PLO and Israel while Hamas is opposed to that. What do you think? Do you agree or disagree with Fateh's demand?</b>			
1) Certainly agree	8.5	6.9	11.1
2) Agree	40.5	39.1	43.0
3) Disagree	37.3	39.6	33.1
4) Certainly disagree	8.0	7.2	9.5
5) DK/NA	5.7	7.1	3.3
<b>32) In the dialogue regarding the entry of Hamas into the PLO, Fateh demands that Hamas must accept all previous agreements between the PLO and Israel while Hamas is opposed to that. What do you think? Should Hamas accept or not accept this Fateh demand in order to gain entry into the PLO?</b>			
1) Hamas should accept the agreements	46.1	43.2	51.1
2) Hamas should not accept the agreements	44.4	45.9	41.7
3) DK/NA	9.5	10.9	7.2
<b>33) Given the failure of the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas, what are your expectations for the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?</b>			
1) Unity will resume in the near future	11.5	9.0	15.9
2) Unity will resume but will take a long time	53.2	54.2	51.6
3) Unity will not resume and two separate entities will emerge	32.1	33.4	29.7
4) DK/NA	3.2	3.5	2.7
<b>34) Now that Fateh's Sixth congress has been held, with a 20 year delay, what are your expectations regarding the future of Fateh?</b>			
1) Will emerge stronger and unified	39.0	34.0	47.6
2) Will emerge weaker and fragmented	21.9	23.7	18.8
3) Will remain as it is today	33.9	37.2	28.0
4) DK/NA	5.3	5.0	5.6
<b>35) Fateh's Sixth Congress has elected new Central Committee and Revolutionary Council. What is your opinion of the new leadership of Fateh, will it be more or less able than the previous leadership in carrying out the following:</b>			
<b>35-1 Achieving reconciliation with Hamas</b>			
1) Will be more able	40.1	36.2	46.9
2) Will be less able	21.7	21.1	22.8
3) Will be the same as the previous one	32.4	36.7	24.9
4) DK/NA	5.8	6.0	5.5
<b>35-2) Fighting corruption inside Fateh</b>			
1) Will be more able	43.4	40.6	48.3
2) Will be less able	21.3	20.8	22.3
3) Will be the same as the previous one	29.5	33.0	23.5
4) DK/NA	5.8	5.7	5.9

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>35-3 Working to end the Israeli occupation</b>			
1) Will be more able	27.3	24.1	33.0
2) Will be less able	28.4	27.2	30.5
3) Will be the same as the previous one	38.0	42.4	30.2
4) DK/NA	6.3	6.3	6.4
<b>36) Have you or any one in your family been attacked physically or your home, land, car, or shop been stolen or attacked by another Palestinian during the last year?</b>			
1) Yes	9.1	8.1	10.8
2) No	90.5	91.6	88.7
3) Refused to answer	0.4	0.3	0.4
<b>37) If the answer is yes, have you made a complaint to the Palestinian police or any other security service?</b>			
1) Yes	40.2	52.2	24.9
2) No	58.3	46.7	72.9
3) Refused to answer	1.6	1.1	2.2
<b>38) If the answer is no, what is the reason for not making a complaint?</b>			
1) Do not trust the police or the security services	40.8	21.8	56.9
2) They can do nothing about it	43.4	50.6	37.4
3) Did not want the matter to become public knowledge	10.6	16.3	5.7
4) Other	5.1	11.2	0.0
<b>39) If the answer is yes, are you satisfied with the performance of the police or the other security services with regard to the investigation and the uncovering of the circumstances of the attack?</b>			
1) Yes	25.8	27.5	21.2
2) No	72.5	70.0	78.8
3) DK/NA	1.8	2.5	0.0
<b>40) There is a proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinians people. Do you agree or disagree to this proposal?</b>			
1) Certainly agree	6.8	6.3	7.6
2) Agree	42.5	43.3	41.2
3) Disagree	35.0	35.1	34.8
4) Certainly disagree	14.3	13.4	15.8
5) DK/NA	1.4	2.0	0.5
<b>41) And what is the Palestinian majority opinion on this issue? Do most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support or oppose the recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people at the end of the peace process?</b>			
1) Majority supports	47.3	45.3	50.7
2) Majority opposes	46.7	48.5	43.5
3) DK/NA	6.0	6.2	5.8
<b>42) And what is the Israeli majority opinion on this issue? Do most Israelis support or oppose the recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people at the end of the peace process?</b>			
1) Majority supports	37.3	35.9	39.7
2) Majority opposes	56.0	57.2	53.7
3) DK/NA	6.7	6.8	6.6

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>43) Now 40 years after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, what in your view are the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years? Are they high, medium, low, or none existent?</b>			
1) None existent	29.3	32.2	24.1
2) Low	39.3	38.5	40.8
3) Medium	25.8	23.6	29.6
4) High	3.8	3.7	4.0
5) DK/NA	1.8	2.0	1.6
<b>44) Now after about eight months since he became president, how do you view the policy of President Obama? Do you see it supportive of the Palestinians, the Israelis or both?</b>			
1) Supportive of Israel	63.8	63.4	64.6
2) Supportive of the Palestinians	6.9	5.6	9.0
3) Supportive of both sides	23.3	23.8	22.5
4) DK/NA	6.0	7.2	3.9
<b>45) What do you want president Obama to do? Do you want him to play a stronger role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process or do you want him not to intervene in the peace process?</b>			
1) I want a stronger role for the US in the peace process	60.7	60.5	61.1
2) I want the US to continue to play its current role in the	6.1	4.8	8.4
3) I want the US not to intervene in the peace process	29.4	29.3	29.6
4) DK/NA	3.8	5.5	1.0
<b>46) If the US under president Obama plays a strong role in the peace process, do you think this would bring about a successful or failed Palestinian-Israeli peace process?</b>			
1) Certainly will lead to successful process	26.2	22.1	33.5
2) Think it will lead to successful process	29.7	31.9	25.9
3) Will not have an impact	14.9	17.6	10.2
4) Think it will lead to failed process	17.8	14.6	23.3
5) Certainly will lead to failed process	7.9	9.3	5.3
6) DK/NA	3.5	4.5	1.9
<b>47) Who in your opinion would benefit more if the US intervened strongly in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, Israel or the Palestinians?</b>			
1) Israel	61.3	61.1	61.7
2) Palestinians	9.7	9.4	10.2
3) Neither side	4.0	4.4	3.3
4) Both sides	22.4	22.2	22.8
5) DK/NA	2.6	2.8	2.1
<b>48) According to the Saudi plan, Israel will retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and a Palestinian state will be established. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194 which allows return of refugees to Israel and compensation. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. Do you agree or disagree to this plan?</b>			
1) Certainly agree	10.6	8.5	14.2
2) Agree	53.2	52.5	54.3
3) Disagree	23.3	25.3	19.8
4) Certainly disagree	10.8	10.9	10.6
5) DK/NA	2.1	2.7	1.1

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>49) If the US under president Obama decides to pressure the Palestinians and the Israeli sides to accept and implement the Arab or Saudi Peace Initiative, do you think the Palestinian side should accept or reject this American intervention</b>			
1) Accept	57.9	57.1	59.3
2) Reject	38.7	39.0	38.1
3) DK/NA	3.5	3.9	2.6

<b>50) What in your opinion will be the attitude of most Israelis to such American intervention - would they accept or reject it?</b>			
1) Accept	45.9	45.4	46.7
2) Reject	49.2	49.6	48.5
3) DK/NA	4.9	5.0	4.8

**51) When Palestinians and Israelis return to final status negotiations the following items might be presented to negotiators as the elements of a permanent compromise settlement. Tell us what you think of each item then tell us what you think of all combined as one permanent status settlement**

1. An Israeli withdrawal from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with the attached map {show map}.
2. An independent Palestinian state would be established in the areas from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security force but an international multinational force would be deployed to insure the safety and security of the state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other.
3. East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that will come under Israeli sovereignty.
4. With regard to the refugee question, both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those areas. The number of refugees returning to Israel will be based on the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees will be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of properties.
5. When the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples 6. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli will be allowed to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state for an indefinite period of time and its responsibility will be to insure the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including its international border crossings.

**Now that you have been informed of each element of the permanent compromise settlement, tell us what you think of each of its item. Do you agree or disagree with it.**

**51-1) Item #1: withdrawal to 1967 borders with territorial swap**

1) Strongly agree	5.4	4.5	6.9
2) Agree	43.2	39.2	50.2
3) Disagree	35.4	39.6	28.3
4) Strongly Disagree	14.6	15.0	13.9
5) DK/NA	1.3	1.6	0.7

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>51-2) Item #2: a state without an army but with international forces</b>			
1) Strongly agree	1.2	1.0	1.6
2) Agree	22.3	21.5	23.7
3) Disagree	53.3	54.4	51.5
4) Strongly Disagree	22.2	21.9	22.8
5) DK/NA	1.0	1.2	0.5
<b>51-3) Item #3: East Jerusalem as capital of the state of Palestine after it is divided</b>			
1) Strongly agree	1.6	1.4	2.1
2) Agree	29.2	28.7	29.9
3) Disagree	45.5	47.7	41.8
4) Strongly Disagree	22.5	20.7	25.7
5) DK/NA	1.1	1.5	0.5
<b>51-4) Item #4: refugees with five options for permanent residence</b>			
1) Strongly agree	2.5	1.4	4.5
2) Agree	34.2	32.0	38.1
3) Disagree	40.7	45.3	32.8
4) Strongly Disagree	20.0	18.1	23.2
5) DK/NA	2.5	3.1	1.4
<b>51-5) Item #5: end of conflict</b>			
1) Strongly agree	6.8	5.5	9.1
2) Agree	47.9	43.5	55.5
3) Disagree	29.9	35.7	19.8
4) Strongly Disagree	13.9	13.6	14.4
5) DK/NA	1.5	1.7	1.2
<b>51-6) Item #6: a sovereign state with security arrangements</b>			
1) Strongly agree	3.1	1.7	5.5
2) Agree	31.2	24.5	42.7
3) Disagree	45.3	54.0	30.2
4) Strongly Disagree	19.1	18.3	20.4
5) DK/NA	1.4	1.5	1.2
<b>51-7) Item #7: the combined elements as one permanent status settlement</b>			
1) Strongly agree	2.4	1.3	4.4
2) Agree	35.4	28.6	47.1
3) Disagree	43.0	49.9	31.0
4) Strongly Disagree	17.8	18.6	16.4
5) DK/NA	1.4	1.6	1.2
<b>52) And what is the Palestinian majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support or oppose this combined final status package?</b>			
1) Majority supports	43.1	37.7	52.5
2) Majority opposes	49.6	54.7	40.9
3) DK/NA	7.2	7.6	6.6
<b>53) And what is the Israeli majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Israelis support or oppose this combined final status package?</b>			
1) Majority supports	41.3	39.5	44.3
2) Majority opposes	51.5	52.9	49.0
3) DK/NA	7.3	7.5	6.8



	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>54) If the US under president Obama decides to pressure the Palestinians and the Israeli sides to accept and implement this compromise permanent settlement as outlined above in the six items, do you think the Palestinian side should accept or reject this American intervention?</b>			
1) Accept	44.5	42.7	47.7
2) Reject	51.8	53.2	49.3
3) DK/NA	3.7	4.0	3.0
<b>55) What in your opinion will be the attitude of most Israelis to such American intervention - would they accept or reject it?</b>			
1) Accept	47.8	46.2	50.6
2) Reject	46.7	48.2	44.0
3) DK/NA	5.5	5.6	5.4
<b>56) There is talk about activating the Arab Peace Initiative as the US administration has asked some Arab countries to take confidence building measures toward Israel (such as trade and allowing Israeli commercial planes access to Arab airspace) in order to encourage it to make concessions to the Palestinians (such as freezing settlement construction, removing checkpoints, and stopping home demolition). Do you think that if Arab countries do take such measures this will indeed encourage Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	5.4	4.2	7.4
2) Yes	29.9	29.0	31.4
3) No	41.0	42.3	38.7
4) Certainly no	20.3	21.5	18.3
5) DK/NA	3.4	3.0	4.2
	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>57) If it was indeed shown that Arab confidence building measures such as those described above would be necessary to push Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians, would you say that Arab states in this case should take such confidence building measures?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	5.1	4.1	6.8
2) Yes	35.5	35.3	35.8
3) No	42.7	45.3	38.1
4) Certainly no	13.0	11.8	15.0
5) DK/NA	3.7	3.4	4.4
<b>58) What do you expect to happen between Palestinians and Israelis now given the American involvement in the conflict in recent months?</b>			
1) Negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop	20.5	21.1	19.6
2) Negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue	46.5	45.1	48.9
3) Armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations	28.5	28.5	28.5
4) DK/NA	4.5	5.3	3.0
<b>59) If you were to select a vice president, whom would you select?</b>			
1) Ismail Haniyeh	21.1	16.8	28.7
2) Salam Fayyad	6.8	5.8	8.4
3) Marwan Barghouti	36.5	37.6	34.7
4) Mustafa Barghouti	9.3	9.9	8.3
5) Sa'eb Uraikat	4.1	3.9	4.4
6) Other	6.8	7.0	6.5
7) NA/DK	15.3	18.9	9.1

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>60) Which of the following political parties do you support?</b>			
1) PPP	0.9	1.0	0.7
2) PFLP	4.7	5.2	3.8
3) Fateh	33.7	30.7	38.8
4) Hamas	18.9	15.2	25.4
5) DFLP	0.2	0.4	
6) Islamic Jihad	1.8	2.4	0.9
7) Fida	0.1	0.1	
8) National Initiative (Mubadara)	1.7	2.4	0.5
9) Independent Islamists	2.9	2.7	3.3
10) Independent Nationalists	3.1	3.8	1.8
11) None of the above	31.7	36.0	24.2
12) Others	0.4	0.3	0.7