

المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية Palestinian Center for POLICY and SURVEY RESEARCH



Survey Research Unit

Poll Number (36)

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The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policyanalysisandacademicresearch.PSR was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. The center engages in several activities. It conducts academic and policy analysis studies. It organizes socio-political surveys and public opinion polls on current Palestinian political and social attitudes. It sponsors study groups and task forces on issues of critical importance to the Palestinians. Finally, it organizes conferences, public lectures, and briefings on current public policy issues. PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas.

This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah



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e-mail: pcpsr@pcpsr.org http://www.pcpsr.org In the aftermath of the Free Gaza flotilla incident, Turkey is the most popular regional country, but Hamas's popularity remains unchanged while Salam Fayyad and his government gain greater public support, and while support for compromise increases, two thirds remain pessimistic about the future of the peace process and the majority does not believe in the efficacy of alternative options to negotiations such as popular resistance or unilateral declaration of statehood

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 10 and 13 June 2010. The poll was conducted few days after the Israeli raid on the Free Gaza flotilla. It is worth noting also that the PA government of Salam Fayyad announced the cancellation of the local elections during the conduct of the poll. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

MAIN RESULTS:

Findings of the second quarter of 2010 indicate that despite the events associated with the Free Gaza flotilla and the Israeli attack on it, a significant improvement in the status of Salam Fayyad and his government has been registered. Moreover, findings also show no change in the popularity of Hamas compared to its standing in our previous poll last March. But it is worth mentioning that decision by Fayyad's government to cancel local elections scheduled for next month came during the conduct of the poll. Our findings therefore do not necessarily reflect the views of the public in the aftermath of that decision. It is likely that the cancellation of elections will have a negative impact on the standing of Fayyad and his government and the standing of Abbas and Fateh. The public is likely to view the cancellation as an indication of a major failure in state and institution building, a process led by Fayyad and his government, and an indication of fragmentation, panic and lack of leadership within Fateh.

Findings show that the public views positively the outcome associated with the Israeli attack on the Free Gaza flotilla seeing it as a victory for Palestinians and the beginning of the end or the weakening of the Gaza siege. But perhaps the biggest winner is Turkey who emerges from this as the most popular regional country. Findings also show that the decision to boycott settlements products is clearly supported by a majority of the Palestinians. But the decision to prevent Palestinian laborers from working in Israeli settlements is rejected by the majority. The opposition to preventing laborers from working in settlements is probably motivated by lack of confidence in the ability of the Palestinian Authority to find alternative jobs to settlement workers at a time when findings show that poverty and unemployment is one of the most important problems that deserve, in the eyes of the public, to be made the second top priority for the PA, right after the first priority, the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Findings also show an increase in support for a political settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters or the Geneva Initiative, but the mood remains decidedly pessimistic about the chances for success in the current negotiations or for establishing a Palestinian state along side Israel in the next five years. If negotiations fail, findings show that a majority of the public is in favor of a diplomatic initiative, such as turning to the UN Security Council or a unilateral declaration of statehood, or resort to non violent resistance while a majority opposes return to armed intifada, dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, or abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one state solution. What is most interesting however is the fact that the overwhelming majority does not believe in the efficacy of any of the measures it supports in ending occupation or halting settlement expansion. It is evident that the public is looking for a way out and so far it finds none.

1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

- 9% believe conditions in the Gaza Strip today are good or very good while 35% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good. But similar percentages, reaching about 60% in both areas say they feel that today their personal safety and security and that of their families are assured.
- Increase in support for the Fayyad government; similarly, there is an increase in the percentage of those who believe that the Fayyad government is the legitimate one. But positive evaluation of the Fayyad government decreases in two areas: political detention and right to demonstrate.
- Ismail Haniyeh's government receives public support (57%) for banning rocket launching from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns but a majority (59%) opposes the taxes it imposes on cigarettes and other products.
- In presidential election, with Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh competing, the former receives 54% and the latter 39% of the votes. But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and

Findings show that only 9% believe conditions in the Gaza Strip today are good or very good while 35% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good. But 62% of the Gazans and 60% of the West Bankers say that today they feel that their personal safety and security and that of their family are assured. In our last poll in March 2010, the percentage of those who expressed similar feelings reached 70% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank. Despite the increased perception of safety and security, 44% say they are worried that they could be hurt in their daily life at the hands of someone from Fateh or Hamas. Worry levels reach 51% in the Gaza Strip compared to 40% in the West Bank.

Despite the drop in the perception of safety and security among Gazans, positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government remains unchanged since last March at 38%. But positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government increases from 42% last March to 48% in this poll. Moreover, satisfaction with Abbas's performance increases slightly during the same period from 47% to 49%.

Perception that compared to the Haniyeh government, the Fayyad government is the legitimate one increases, with 27% indicating that the Haniyeh government is the legitimate one while 31% say the Fayyad government is the legitimate one; and 10% say both governments are legitimate and 27% say both are illegitimate. Last March, 28% said Haniyeh's is the legitimate one and only 26% said Fayyad's is the legitimate one. With regard to Abbas, now that his term as president has ended, 48% say he lost his legitimacy while 46% say he did not lose it.

The performance of the Fayyad government receives positive evaluation in the area of service delivery and negative evaluation in the area of freedoms. Three years after the establishment of the first Fayyad government, larger percentages believe conditions have become better in the areas of economy (47%), enforcement of law

Haniyeh, the former receives 65% and the latter 30% of the votes.

- If Salam Fayyad competes in the presidential race, he loses against Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Mustafa Barghouti. But he wins against Haniyeh.
- If parliamentary elections are to take place today, Fateh would receive 45% of the participants' votes, Hamas 26%, all other election lists 12%, and 18% remain undecided.
- Dealing with the West Bank-Gaza Strip split is the top priority of the Palestinian public.
- A majority of 62% gives positive evaluation to the performance of the current local councils and 56% say they will participate in new elections in the West Bank even if boycotted by Hamas.

and order (57%), educational services (54%), and health services (56%) while much smaller percentages believe conditions in these same areas have become worse (27% for economic conditions, 19% for enforcement of law and order, 18% for education, and 14% for health services). But only 30% say conditions of corruption have improved compared to 31% who say these conditions have actually worsened. On the other hand, larger percentages believe conditions have become worse in the areas of political arrests (47%) and the right to demonstrate (44%) while only 19% say conditions regarding political arrests have become better and 27% say conditions regarding the right to demonstrate have become better. But if Fateh sought to replace Fayyad with one of its own members, the largest percentage (48%) would oppose that while 43% would support it. Similarly, if Fateh asked Fayyad to appoint one of its members as a minister of finance, only 44% would support that while 48% would oppose it.

For Hamas's government in the Gaza Strip, a majority of 57% support and 38% oppose its efforts to prevent the launching of rockets against Israeli towns. Support for these efforts reaches 49% among Gazans but increases to 62% among West Bankers. On the other hand, a majority of 59% believe the taxes imposed by the Hamas government on cigarettes and other products are not reasonable while only 34% view such taxes as reasonable. Belief that the taxes imposed by the Hamas government are reasonable reaches 31% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank.

In light of the failure of Fateh and Hamas to reconcile, only 16% believe that re-unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be achieved soon while 55% say it will be achieved but only after a long time and 26% say unity will not resume at all and two separate entities will emerge.

If new presidential elections are held today, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 39% of the vote of those participating while 7% say they are undecided. The rate of participation in such election would reach 61% with 39% saying they will not participate in elections in which Abbas and Haniyeh are the only candidates. Last March Abbas received 50% and Haniyeh 40%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter would receive 30% of the participants with non-participation rate dropping in this case to 28%.

If the competition over the presidency is between Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the former would receive 34% and the latter 19% while 3% say they are undecided and the remaining percentage (44%) say they will not vote for either candidate. But if the competition is between Fayyad and Marwan Barghouti, the former would receive the same percentage as in the previous case (19%) while the latter would receive 50% with 3% undecided and 28% voting for neither. If the competition was between Fayyad and Mustafa Barghouti (the head

of al Mubadara), Fayyad's vote would increase to 30% but Mustafa Barghouti would defeat him but with only 34% of the vote; 3% say they are undecided and 32% say they will vote for neither. Fayyad however would defeat Haniyeh in a presidential elections by 36% to 32%, with 3% undecided and 30% voting for neither. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 28% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (20%), Salam Fayyad (14%) Mustafa Barghouti (10%), and Saeb Erekat (6%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 45% say they would vote for Fateh and 26% say they would vote for Hamas, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip reaches 49% and in the West Bank 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip reaches 32% and in the West Bank 22%. Last March, Fateh received 42% and Hamas 28%, which means that Hamas has not benefited from Free Gaza flotilla incident which took place only few days before the conduct of the poll.

Hamas's problem with the public remains unchanged as many believe it brings about siege and contribute to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while the public tends to believe that Fateh contributes to the lifting of the siege and the ending of the spilt. For example, findings show that if Hamas wins the next presidential and legislative elections, a majority of 62% believes this would lead to the consolidation of the siege and boycott on the Palestinian government while only 12% believe the opposite. But if Fateh wins the next elections, only 11% believe this would lead to the tightening of the siege and blockade while 56% believe the opposite. With regard to unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in case of a Hamas win, 47% believe it would lead to the consolidation of the spilt while only 23% say it would consolidate unity. By contrast, if Fateh wins, only 29% believe it would consolidate the split while 36% believe it would consolidate unity.

In this regard, what worsens conditions for Hamas is the public belief that the two issues of national unity and ending the siege should be two of the most important Palestinian priorities. In an open question about the main problems confronting Palestinians which should be the top priorities of the PA, the largest percentage (33%) mentioned the absence of national unity due to the split, while 24% mentioned poverty and unemployment, 18% mentioned the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings, and 11% mentioned corruption in some public institutions, and 10% mentioned occupation and settlement activities.

A majority of 62% gives a positive evaluation to the performance of their local councils during the past five years while only 35% give it a negative evaluation. If local elections do take place, as was planned

56% say they would participate in those elections even if boycotted by Hamas while 41% say they will not participate. Moreover, a majority of 51% believe that these elections, if they were to take place as scheduled, would be fair and free while 37% say they would not be fair or free. A larger percentage (48%) believes that if local elections are to take place on time, Fateh would win while 12% believe leftists and independents would win, Finally, a majority of 51% believe that if election do take place with Hamas boycotting it, it will lead to the consolidation of the internal split while only 17% say it would make reconciliation easier and 27% say it would have no impact on reconciliation or split.

before the cancellation of the elections by the Fayyad government,

2) Peace Process

- Increase in the percentage of support for compromise, as in the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative, but two thirds remain pessimistic about the chances for a peace settlement
- If peace talks fail, a majority supports turning to the UN Security Council, unilaterally declaring a state, or turning to non violent resistance. But a majority opposes return to armed intifada, dissolution of the PA, or abandonment of the two-state solution and adoption of the one state solution.
- Despite support for non violent resistance, the overwhelming majority does not believe its efficacy in ending occupation or halting settlement expansion.
- Moreover, despite support for unilateral declaration of statehood, only one quarter believes things will become better after the declaration while 73% believe things will become worse or remain unchanged.
- About 80% say the policy of the Obama Administration favors Israel while only 4% say it favors Palestinians.

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We address these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic activity of the US with regard to the conflict and the beginning of the proximity talks between the parties. The findings indicate an increase in support for the overall package. Palestinians are now split half between support and opposition to the overall package: 49% support and 49% oppose it. This level of support represents an increase in support of 11 percentage points from 2009.

Looking at the various items in the package, findings show a majority support for two out of the six:

- (1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 60% support or strongly support and 38% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in August 2009, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 49% and opposition at 50%.
- (2) Refugees: 48% support and 49% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas

(in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of property. In August 2009, 37% agreed with an identical compromise while 61% opposed it.

- (3) Jerusalem: 37% support and 62% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In August 2009, an identical compromise obtained 31% support and 68% opposition.
- (4) Demilitarized Palestinian State: 28% support and 70% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in August 2009, 24% support, and opposition reached 76%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.
- (5) Security Arrangements: 41% support and 57% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In August 2009, 34% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 64% opposed it.
- **(6) End of Conflict:** 63% support and 35% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in August 2009 were 55% support and 44% opposition.

Summary Table: Support for Clinton's Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2010								
	Dec 03	Dec 04	Dec 05	Dec 06	Dec 07	Dec 08	Aug 09	June 10
1) Borders and Territorial Exchange	57%	63%	55%	61%	56%	54%	49%	60%
2) Refugees	25%	46%	40%	41%	39%	40%	37%	48%
3) Jerusalem	46%	44%	33%	39%	36%	36%	31%	37%
4) Demilitarized State	36%	27%	20%	28%	23%	27%	24%	28%
5) Security Arrangements	23%	53%	43%	42%	51%	35%	34%	41%
6) End of Conflict	42%	69%	64%	62%	66%	55%	55%	63%
Overall Package	39%	54%	46%	48%	47%	41%	38%	49%

If the US under the leadership of Obama pressures Israel and the Palestinians to accept and implement this package as a permanent settlement, 48% think Palestinians should accept it, and 47% believe that they should reject it.

Findings also show an increase in support for a mutual recognition of identity: 58% support and 39% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. A year ago in June 2009, 50% supported and 49% opposed this mutual recognition of identity. Moreover, two thirds support the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative and 30% oppose it. The Saudi initiative calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees' problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our December 2009 poll 68% supported it in December and 30% opposed it.

60% of the Palestinians support yielding to American pressure to accept and implement the Arab (Saudi) Peace Initiative, while 35% oppose it. In August 2009, 58% thought Palestinians should accept such American pressure and 39% thought they should reject such pressure. As to their assessments of the other side's response to such pressure: 53% of the Palestinians think Israel will reject and 42%

think it will accept it. In the August 2009 poll, 49% of Palestinians thought that most Israelis would reject such pressure, 46% believed that most Israelis would accept it.

Despite the increased support for compromise, pessimism regarding the chances for the peace process remains very high: Two thirds of the Palestinians think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low; 32% believe the chances are medium or high. In June 2009, 69% thought that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low. Even if an agreement is reached in the current proximity talks mediated by George Mitchell, 55% of the Palestinians will not grant legitimacy to such agreement, while only 35% will. Needless to say, the fact that 48% of the public believe that the PA president has lost his legitimacy when his term as president has expired, as mentioned above, contributes in a significant manner to this conclusion regarding an agreement negotiated by the president. Belief in the legitimacy of the agreement increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (31%), among supporters of Fateh (57%) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%), and among those who work in the public sector (41%) compared to those who work in the private sector (33%). In any case, findings show that 57% are pessimistic about the outcome of these proximity talks, while 23% are optimistic.

In the backdrop of the opening of the proximity talks and the raid on the flotilla to Gaza, 31% of the Palestinians think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 23% of the Palestinians think that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop. 40% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue. Moreover, 74% are worried that they or a family member might be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. Last March, the percentage stood at 77%.

If the proximity talks fail, the option endorsed by most Palestinians is to ask the UN Security Council to recognize a Palestinian State (65%). The next most popular option (60% support) is to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state. 51% support the option to start a non-violent resistance. The other options asked about received only minority support: 44% support the resumption of the armed Intifada (54% oppose it); 39% support the dissolution of the PA if the talks fail (56% oppose it), and 27% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding instead a one-state solution (71% oppose it).

But findings show that support for non violent resistance does not indicate a belief in its efficacy. Despite the fact that it is supported by 51%, as mentioned above, only 27% believe that it can contribute to ending occupation or halting settlement construction while 71% believe it can not. Moreover, 44% believe that the boycott on products

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> produced in settlements, a non violent resistance measure, will hurt the proximity talks, 28% believe it will benefit the talks and 25% believe it will have no impact. Similarly, support for a unilateral declaration of statehood does not indicate a belief that such a declaration would change Palestinian conditions for the better. Indeed, only one quarter believes that conditions would improve after such declaration while 32% say conditions will remain the same while the largest percentage (41%) believes conditions for Palestinians will become worse. Over and above all this, the overwhelming majority (80%) believes the US will not recognize the new unilaterally declared state while only 15% believe the US will recognize it. When asked about the policy of the Obama administration, 79% said it favored Israel, 4% said it favored the Palestinians, and 13% said it favored both sides.

3) Attack on the Free Gaza flotilla

- 43% say Turkey is the regional country most supportive of the **Palestinians**
- 63% say the Palestinians came out winners in the aftermath of the Israeli attack on the Freedom Flotilla

In an open question about the regional country seen as the most supportive of the Palestinians and their cause, 43% mentioned Turkey while only 13% mentioned Egypt, followed by 6% for Iran, 5% for Saudi Arabia, 5% for Syria, 3% for Lebanon, and 2% for Jordan. Turkey is slightly more popular in the Gaza Strip (45%) than in the West Bank (41%). It is interesting to note that Egypt has been mentioned by 25% of Gazans compared to only 6% of West Bankers. Turkey's popularity increases in refugee camps (54%) compared to cities (41%), among supporters of Hamas (52%) compared to supporters of Fateh (36%), and among students (53%) compared to laborers (38%).

A majority of 63% believe the Palestinian side is the one who came out the winner from the Free Gaza flotilla incident while 27% believe Israel came out the winner and 9% believe none of them came out a winner. Moreover, a majority of 60% believe that in the aftermath of the incident, the Gaza siege will be weakened or ended while only 18% believe it will be strengthened.

While a majority of 72% support and 26% oppose a boycott of settlements' products, only 38% support and 60% oppose preventing Palestinian laborers from working in settlements. While the Gaza Strip and the West Bank support the boycott of settlements' products equally, support for preventing laborers from working in settlements is greater in the Gaza Strip, reaching 45%, than the West Bank (34%). Support for preventing Palestinian laborers from working in settlements is also greater in cities (40%) and refugee camps (38%) than in rural areas (30%), among supporters of Hamas (46%) compared to supporters of Fateh (40%), and among holders of BA degree (41%) compared to illiterates (33%).

4) Boycott of settlements' products and work in settlements

- 72% support and 26% oppose boycott of settlements' products
- But only 38% support and 60% oppose a ban on Palestinian labor in settlements

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		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
00)	From among the following satellite months?	news stations, which	one you watched mo	ost during the last two
	1) Al Arabia	10.4	7.7	14.8
	2) Al Jazeera	60.5	66.3	50.9
	3) Al Hurra	0.9	1.3	0.2
	4) Al Manar	2.3	3.3	0.7
	5) Palestine TV	8.3	6.2	11.7
	6) Al-Aqsa TV	7.2	4.7	11.3
	7) Do not watch TV	6.7	7.2	5.8
	8) Others	2.3	2.7	1.8
	9) Do not have a dish	0.8	0.5	1.2
	10) No Opinion/Don't know	0.7	0.2	1.5
01)	In general, how would you describe Strip these days?	e conditions of the Pal	estinians in the Pal	estinian areas in Gaza
	1) Very good	1.6	1.3	2.1
	2) Good	7.2	5.7	9.6
	3) So so	13.7	9.1	21.3
	4) Bad	42.1	47.6	33.1
	5) Very bad	33.5	33.4	33.7
	6) DK/NA	1.9	3.0	0.3
02)	In general, how would you describ West Bank these days?	e conditions of the Pa	alestinians in the Pa	alestinian areas in the
	1) Very good	8.0	3.4	15.6
	2) Good	26.5	22.1	33.7
	3) So so	29.7	35.6	19.8
	4) Bad	24.0	28.4	16.7
	5) Very bad	8.8	9.9	7.0
	6) DK/NA	3.1	0.6	7.2
03)	Generally, do you see yourself as:			
	1) Religious	46.8	40.6	57.0
	2) Somewhat religious	50.5	56.5	40.7
	3) Not religious	2.5	2.8	1.9
	4) DK/NA	0.2	0.1	0.5
		10		

		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
04)	Generally, do you see yourself as:			
	1) Supportive of the peace process	70.6	64.8	80.1
	2) Opposed to the peace process	14.4	16.8	10.3
	3) Between support and opposition	13.9	16.9	9.0
	4) DK/NA	1.2	1.5	0.6
05)	Do you think that there is corruption in	PA institutions u	nder the control of I	President Abu Mazin?
	1) Yes	65.3	66.9	62.7
	2) No	18.6	14.7	24.9
	3) DK/NA	16.1	18.4	12.4
06)	How would you evaluate the current Authority under Abu Mazin? Would y		racy and human rig	ghts in the Palestinian
	1) Very good	6.2	3.8	10.2
	2) Good	31.1	27.6	36.8
	3) Neither bad nor good	24.1	26.1	20.9
	4) Bad	21.5	23.9	17.5
	5) Very bad	12.0	12.7	10.7
	6) DK/NA	5.1	5.9	3.9
07)	Would you say that these days your seasured?	curity and safety	, and that of your fa	amily, is assured or not
	1) Completely assured	9.2	6.9	13.0
	2) Assured	51.3	52.8	48.9
	3) Not assured	32.2	34.8	28.0
	4) Not assured at all	6.8	4.8	10.1
	5) DK/NA	0.4	0.7	0.0
08)	Tell us how do you evaluate the performage Gaza Strip? Is it good or bad?	mance of the dism	nissed government o	f Ismail Haniyeh in the
	1) Very Good	9.7	8.6	11.6
	2) Good	28.2	24.8	34.0
	3) Neither good nor bad	22.5	22.0	23.4
	4) Bad	18.3	18.6	17.8
	5) Very Bad	8.6	6.3	12.3
	6) No Opinion/Don't know	12.7	19.8	1.0
09)	Tell us how do you evaluate the perfo good or bad?	rmance of the go	vernment headed b	y Salam Fayyad ? Is it
	1) Very Good	10.2	11.1	8.7
	2) Good	37.7	37.9	37.5
	3) Neither good nor bad	22.2	22.7	21.3
	4) Bad	15.8	14.2	18.5
	5) Very Bad	5.6	4.2	8.0
	6) No Opinion/Don't know	8.5	9.9	6.1
		11		

		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
10)	Are you satisfied or not satisfied with president of the PA?	the performance	e of Mahmud Abba	s since his election as
	1) Very satisfied	6.5	4.7	9.4
	2) Satisfied	42.8	45.6	38.2
	3) Not satisfied	34.3	35.0	33.2
	4) Not satisfied at all	12.6	10.3	16.3
	5) DK/NA	3.9	4.4	2.9
11)	If new presidential elections are to take and Ismail Haniyeh was nominated by l	_		as nominated by Fateh
	1) Mahmud Abbas	54.3	54.9	53.5
	2) Ismail Haniyeh	38.9	36.3	42.5
	3) DK/NA	6.7	8.8	3.9
12)	And if the competition was between M representing Hamas, whom would you	_	ti representing Fate	h and Ismail Haniyeh
	1) Marwan Barghouti	65.0	65.6	64.2
	2) Ismail Haniyeh	29.7	27.2	33.0
	3) DK/NA	5.3	7.2	2.9
13)	If you were to select a vice president, candidates?	whom would yo	u select from amon	g the following list of
	1) Ismail Haniyeh	19.6	16.7	24.5
	2) Salam Fayyad	14.3	16.2	11.1
	3) Marwan Barghouti	28.3	26.0	32.0
	4) Mustafa Barghouti	9.5	9.1	10.0
	5) Saeb Erekat	5.6	4.9	6.7
	6) Others (specify:)	6.8	7.4	5.9
	7) DK/NA	16.0	19.7	9.8
15)	If new elections agreed to by all factions PLC elections were nominated, for who	•		at took part in the last
	1) Alternative	1.3	1.4	1.2
	2) Independent Palestine	2.8	3.2	2.3
	3) Abu Ali Mustafa	2.7	3.3	1.7
	4) Abu al Abbas	0.4	0.2	0.7
	5) Freedom and social justice	0.6	1.0	0.0
	6) Change and reform	26.0	22.2	31.7
	-			

	Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %	
7) National coalition for justice and democrac	ey 0.2	0.3	0.0	
8) Third way, headed by Salam Fayyad	2.2	2.9	1.1	
9) Freedom and independence	1.2	1.1	1.5	
10) Palestinian justice	0.1	0.2	0.0	
11) Fateh	44.6	41.8	48.9	
12) None of the above/ DK/NA	17.9	22.5	11.0	

16) After the separation between Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas and the government of Ismail Haniyeh remained in power in Gaza and considered itself the legitimate government while president Abu Mazin formed a new government headed by Salam Fayyad followed by a new government headed by Fayyad and it too considered itself legitimate. What about you, which of the two government you consider legitimate, the government of Haniyeh or the government of Abu Mazin and Fayyad?

1) Haniyehs' government is the legitimate one	26.7	26.5	27.0
2) Abu Mazin's and Fayyad government is the legitimate one	30.5	29.9	31.6
3) Both governments are legitimate	10.3	11.0	9.3
4) Both governments are not legitimate	26.6	25.3	28.7
5) DK/NA	5.9	7.3	3.5

17) Mahmud Abbas's term as president of the Palestinian Authority ended last January 2010 without new elections being held on that date. Did he or did not he lose his legitimacy as president of the PA?

1) Certainly lost legitimacy	18.8	18.6	19.2
2) Lost legitimacy	29.0	30.3	26.9
3) Did not lose legitimacy	37.9	37.8	38.1
4) Certainly did not lose legitimacy	8.3	5.0	13.7
5) DK/NA	6.0	8.3	2.1

18) If Salam Fayyad nominated himself for the presidency of the PA and the competition was between him and president Abbas, whom would you elect?

34.0	29.4	41.6
19.3	21.1	16.4
43.8	45.0	41.8
2.9	4.5	0.2
	19.3 43.8	19.3 21.1 43.8 45.0

19) And if the completion was between Fayyad and Marwan Barghouti?

1) Fayyad	19.1	21.2	15.7
2) Marwan Barghouti	49.7	41.2	63.8
3) Neither one	27.8	33.0	19.2
4) DK/NA	3.4	4.7	1.4

		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
20)	And if the completion was between Ferryal	and Ismail Hay	nivah?	
20)	And if the completion was between Fayyad		•	
	1) Ismail Haniyeh	32.0	27.4	39.7
	2) Fayyad	35.5	34.8	36.7
	3) Neither one	29.5	33.9	22.3
	4) DK/NA	3.0	3.9	1.3
21)	And if the completion was between Fayyad	and Mustafa B	Sarghouti, the head	d of al Mubadara?
	1) Fayyad	30.4	32.5	27.1
	2) Mustafa Barghouti	34.0	28.2	43.6
	3) Neither one	32.4	35.4	27.4
	4) DK/NA	3.1	3.9	1.9
22)	If Hamas wins next legislative and president tightening of the international boycott of the		•	ead to the lifting or to
	1) Will lead to the lifting of the boycott	12.3	9.1	17.6
	2) Will lead to the tightening of the boycott	62.1	63.6	59.7
	3) Conditions will stay as they are today	20.9	21.2	20.5
	4) DK/NA	4.6	6.1	2.1
23)	And what about the unity between the Westhe next legislative and presidential election and the Gaza Strip or will it lead to consolidation of WBGS unity 2) Will lead to consolidation of WBGS split	s lead to conso dating the split 22.9 47.2	lidation of unity be between the two 21.9 45.1	etween the West Bank areas? 24.7 50.7
	3) Conditions of WBGS will stay as they are today	23.7	25.1	21.4
	4) DK/NA	6.1	7.9	3.2
24)	And what if Fatch wins new legislative and lifting or to tightening of the international b	•		
	1) Will lead to the lifting of the boycott	56.3	43.3	77.8
	2) Will lead to the tightening of the boycott	11.0	12.8	8.0
	3) Conditions will stay as they are today	29.4	39.9	12.0
	4) DK/NA	3.3	4.0	2.2
25)	And what about the unity between the West next legislative and presidential elections le and the Gaza Strip or will it lead to consolid	ead to consolic	dation of unity be	tween the West Bank
	1) Will lead to consolidation of WBGS unity	35.9	29.9	45.7
	2) Will lead to consolidation of WBGS split	29.0	26.7	32.8
	3) Conditions of WBGS will stay as they are today	30.6	37.7	18.9
	4) DK/NA	4.5	5.7	2.6

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		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
26)	[do not ask residents of refugee camps in the		-	41 46 0
	How do you evaluate the performance of the	ne local counc	al in your area durii	ig the past five years?
	1) Very good	9.8	12.9	5.5
	2) Good	52.5	56.4	47.3
	3) Bad	25.4	22.2	29.8
	4) Very bad	9.9	6.6	14.5
	5) DK/NA	2.4	1.9	3.0
27)	[Ask only West Bank respondents outside i	refugee camps	s]	
	Next month, local elections were held in th	e West Bank,	which means it will	take place before the
	achievement of reconciliation but all factio	ns will partic	ipate except Hamas.	Are you going to vote
	or not vote in those elections?			
	1) Certainly will participate	12.9	12.9	
	2) Will participate	43.1	43.1	
	3) Will not participate	29.8	29.8	
	4) Certainly will not participate	11.1	11.1	
	5) DK/NA	3.2	3.2	
28)	Do you think the upcoming local elections	will be fair or	unfair?	
	1) Certainly fair	5.5	6.4	4.0
	2) Fair	45.2	45.7	44.2
	3) Unfair	31.3	29.4	34.5
	4) Certainly unfair	5.2	5.1	5.4
	5) DK/NA	12.8	13.4	11.9
29)	In your opinion, who is likely to win in the	upcoming lo	cal elections in the V	Vest Bank: candidates
	from Fateh, candidates from the left and in	dependents,	or family candidates	?
	1) Fateh	47.7	50.8	42.5
	2) Left and independents	11.5	8.1	17.1
	3) Family	20.9	23.6	16.4
	4) DK/NA	20.0	17.5	24.0
30)	Hamas has announced its intentions not t			_
	next month in the West Bank. Do you be reconciliation closer or will it consolidate so		ding of these election	ons will help to make
	1) Certainly will make reconciliation closer	6.3	5.3	8.0
	2) Will make reconciliation closer	10.4	10.5	10.3
	3) Will have no impact	27.3	30.0	22.7
	4) Will consolidate separation	42.2	40.4	45.3
	5) Certainly will consolidate separation	8.4	6.7	11.1
	6) DK/NA	5.4	7.1	2.6

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		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
31)	The dismissed government in the Gaza Stri in order to increase its revenues. Tell us w unreasonable?			
	1) Certainly reasonable	9.6	9.3	10.1
	2) Reasonable	24.5	26.5	21.2
	3) Unreasonable	36.1	37.6	33.5
	4) Certainly unreasonable	22.4	15.4	33.9
	5) DK/NA	7.5	11.2	1.3
32)	The dismissed government in the Gaza Strip rockets against Israeli towns in order to main you support or oppose this government step	ntain calm on t		
	1) Certainly support	12.1	13.8	9.4
	2) Support	44.9	48.4	39.1
	3) Oppose	28.6	25.4	34.0
	4) Certainly oppose	9.5	6.2	14.9
	5) DK/NA	4.8	6.1	2.6
33)	The Palestinian society confronts today varies settlements, the spread of unemployment at between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Strip and the closure of its border crossings others. Tell us, what in your opinion, is the p must be on the top priority of the Palestinian	nd poverty, the the continuation s, the spread of problem you see	e lack of national upon of the siege and for for the siege and for the formula in pu	unity due to the split blockade of the Gaza blic institutions, and
	1) Continuation of occupation and settlements,	9.9	11.6	7.2
	2) Spread of unemployment and poverty	23.9	25.2	21.8
	3) Lack of national unity due to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip	32.9	31.2	35.8
	4) Continuation of the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its border crossings	17.8	10.0	30.7
	5) The spread of corruption in public institutions	11.2	15.4	4.2
	6) More than one choice	1.2	1.9	0.0
	7) DK/NA	0.8	1.1	0.4
	8) Other	2.3	3.7	0.0
34)	To what extent are you worried or not worri in your daily life by other Palestinians such a	ed that you or	•	•
	1) Very Worried	11.8	8.6	16.9
	2) Worried	32.5	31.7	33.7
	3) Not worried	39.0	42.7	32.9
	4) Not worried at all	16.5	16.8	16.0
	5) DK/NA	0.3	0.2	0.5
	J) DIN/INA	0.3	U.Z	0.3

		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
35)	Given the failure of the dialogue between I future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip		nas, what are you	r expectations for the
	1) Unity will resume in the near future	15.5	12.7	20.3
	2) Unity will resume but will take a long time	55.3	56.6	53.3
	3) Unity will not resume and two separate entities will emerge	26.1	26.3	25.8
	4) DK/NA	3.0	4.5	0.6
36)	Three years have passed since the establishm see the situation in the following areas has be		_	•
	36-1 Economic conditions			
	(1) Certainly better	9.9	5.6	16.9
	(2) Better	37.0	34.8	40.7
	(3) No change	20.0	22.7	15.7
	(4) Worse	22.9	27.8	14.7
	(5) Certainly worse	4.4	6.7	0.5
	(6) DK/NA	5.9	2.5	11.5
	36-2 Enforcement of law and order by the P	alestinian secu	rity services	
	(1) Certainly better	9.2	8.2	10.8
	(2) Better	47.8	52.8	39.4
	(3) No change	17.4	18.0	16.3
	(4) Worse	16.4	13.6	20.9
	(5) Certainly worse	2.8	3.0	2.4
	(6) DK/NA	6.5	4.4	10.1
	36-3 Corruption in government institutions			
	(1) Certainly better	4.5	3.5	6.1
	(2) Better	25.5	26.7	23.5
	(3) No change	25.3	27.1	22.4
	(4) Worse	25.1	24.2	26.6
	(5) Certainly worse	5.4	6.4	3.7
	(6) DK/NA	14.2	12.2	17.7
	36-4Quality of education			
	(1) Certainly better	9.4	8.2	11.5
	(2) Better	44.8	42.8	48.1
	(3) No change	22.0	23.3	19.8
	(4) Worse	14.0	18.1	7.3
	(5) Certainly worse	3.6	4.7	1.7
	(6) DK/NA	6.2	2.9	11.6

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		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
	26 5 Quality of health convices			
	36-5 Quality of health services (1) Cortainly better	8.6	6.4	12.1
	(1) Certainly better			12.1
	(2) Better	47.8	47.4	48.3
	(3) No change	22.4	26.0	16.3
	(4) Worse	10.2	12.2	7.0
	(5) Certainly worse	3.3	3.9	2.1
	(6) DK/NA	7.9	4.1	14.2
	36-6 Cases of political arrests			
	(1) Certainly better	2.2	2.0	2.5
	(2) Better	16.8	18.0	14.9
	(3) No change	19.9	22.1	16.2
	(4) Worse	34.8	33.4	37.1
	(5) Certainly worse	12.3	11.1	14.3
	(6) DK/NA	14.0	13.4	14.9
	36-7 Exercising the right to demons	trate		
	(1) Certainly better	3.1	2.0	4.8
	(2) Better	23.7	23.2	24.4
	(3) No change	17.7	19.0	15.6
	(4) Worse	33.4	35.0	30.9
	(5) Certainly worse	10.5	9.5	12.2
	(6) DK/NA	11.6	11.4	12.1
37)	Fatch wishes to have ministers in I Fatch leaders as a minister of finance		t; do you support o	r oppose appointing a
	1) Certainly support	6.5	4.8	9.2
	2) Support	37.4	33.4	44.1
	3) Oppose	35.9	40.5	28.4
	4) Certainly oppose	12.4	11.4	13.9
	5) DK/NA	7.8	9.9	4.4
38)	And what about replacing Fayyad oppose such a step?	with a Fateh leader a	as prime minister?	Would you support or
	1) Certainly support	6.0	3.7	9.8
	2) Support	36.6	32.1	43.8
	3) Oppose	38.5	42.5	31.9
	4) Certainly oppose	9.4	9.8	8.8
	5) DK/NA	9.5	11.9	5.7

		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
39)	Recently the Palestinians started a boycot In your opinion, will this boycott hurt or l			ents in the West Bank.
	1) Definitely hurt	5.9	5.5	6.5
	2) Hurt	38.3	38.6	37.9
	3) Benefit	23.3	25.6	19.4
	4) Definitely benefit	4.3	4.7	3.7
	5) Will have no impact	24.8	21.7	29.9
	6) Don>t read: DK/NA	3.5	3.9	2.7
40)	Do you support or oppose the sale of prod	lucts produced	l in Israeli settlemer	nts in the West Bank?
	1) Certainly support	5.1	4.4	6.3
	2) Support	20.9	21.2	20.3
	3) Oppose	55.0	57.1	51.5
	4) Certainly oppose	16.7	15.0	19.4
	5) DK/NA	2.4	2.3	2.5
41)	And what about work in settlements? Do from working in the Israeli settlements in	• • •		ng Palestinian workers
	1) Certainly support preventing work in settlements	11.0	6.8	17.8
	2) Support preventing work in settlements	27.3	27.3	27.4
	3) Oppose preventing work in settlements	46.4	49.0	42.2
	4) Certainly oppose preventing work in settlements	13.6	15.2	11.0
	5) DK/NA	1.7	1.6	1.7
42)	Last month Israeli-Palestinian proximity t PA president and chairman of the PLO lo these negotiations, in your view, would su	eads the Pales	tinian team. If an a	
	1) Certainly yes	5.9	4.1	8.8
	2) Yes	29.1	27.0	32.6
	3) No	40.6	42.3	37.7
	4) Certainly no	14.7	14.0	15.8
	5) DK/NA	9.7	12.6	5.1
43)	With regard to the proximity talks betwee about the outcome of these talks?	en the PA and	Israel, do you feel o	ptimistic or pessimistic
	1) Certainly optimistic	1.4	0.6	2.9
	2) Optimistic	21.3	20.6	22.4
	3) Neither optimistic nor pessimistic	18.6	19.5	17.1
	4) Pessimistic	44.3	46.7	40.3
	5) Certainly pessimistic	12.6	10.9	15.4
	6) DK/NA	1.7	1.6	1.9
		40		

19 _

Total % West Bank % Gaza Strip % Last week, Israel attacked the Free Gaza flotilla while on its way to Gaza killing nine of the foreign activists on board and diverting the ships to Ashdod port. If you were to evaluate this episode and its aftermath in terms of winnings and losses or successes and failures, who in your view came out a winner, the Palestinians or the Israelis? 9.6 1) Certainly the Israelis 11.2 12.1 15.9 2) The Israelis 15.4 16.5 3) The Palestinians 44.8 43.9 46.4 4) Certainly the Palestinians 17.9 16.1 21.0 5) Neither side 9.0 10.7 6.2 6) DK/NA 1.2 1.8 0.2 And what is your expectation regarding the future of the Gaza siege after this attack, while the siege become harsher, weaker, or will it be ended? 17.9 19.2 15.7 1) Harsher 2) Weaker 39.3 40.0 38.1 3) End 20.7 18.1 25.1 4) The attack will have no impact 20.0 19.7 20.5 5) DK/NA 2.1 3.1 0.6 46) What do you expect to happen between Palestinians and Israelis now after the start of the proximity talks with American mediation and after Israel's raid on the flotilla to Gaza? 1) Negotiations will resume soon enough 226 217 24 1 and armed confrontations will stop 2) Negotiations will resume but some 39.7 36.4 45.1 armed attacks will continue 3) Armed confrontations will not stop and the 30.6 33.7 25.4 two sides will not return to negotiations 7.2 4) DK/NA 8.3 5.3 47) Now more than 40 years after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, what in your view are the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years? Are they high, medium, low, or none existent? 1) None existent 31.8 31.3 32.6 2) Low 34.8 36.4 32.3 26.2 25.0 28.1 3) Medium 5.5 5.4 5.7 4) High 1.9 1.3 5) DK/NA 1.7 To what extent are you worried or not worried that you or a member of your family could be hurt by Israel in your daily life or that your land would be confiscated or home demolished? 1. Very Worried 29.0249 35.8 44 5 468 2 Worried 406 3. Not worried 20.5 22 2 17.7 4. Not worried at all 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.DK/NA 0.4 0.6 0.2

		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
49)	What do you think are the aspirations of Isi	real for the	long rur?	
49)			_	
	1. Withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security	9.4	6.2	14.5
	2. Withdrawal form part of the occupied territories after guaranteeing its security	9.3	10.5	7.4
	3. Annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinian citizens	19.0	16.7	22.8
	4. Extending the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expelling its Arab citizens	59.9	63.3	54.5
	5. DK/NA	2.4	3.3	0.8
50)	If peace negotiations fail, would you in the search for achieving Palestinian rights?	is case supp	oort or oppose the fo	ollowing option in the
	50-1 Going to the Security Council to obtain	n a recognit	ion of a Palestinian s	tate
	1) Strongly support	13.4	12.2	15.4
	2) Support	51.2	52.7	48.8
	3) Oppose	24.4	23.4	25.9
	4) Strongly oppose	7.9	8.2	7.3
	5) DK/NA	3.1	3.5	2.6
	50-2 Unilaterally declare the establishment	of a Palesti	nian state	
	1) Strongly support	9.7	9.7	9.8
	2) Support	50.4	51.2	49.1
	3) Oppose	31.2	30.2	32.8
	4) Strongly oppose	6.0	5.0	7.6
	5) DK/NA	2.7	4.0	0.7
	50-3 Abandon the two state solution and d and Israelis	emand the	establishment of one	state for Palestinians
	1) Strongly support	4.0	4.2	3.7
	2) Support	22.8	24.5	20.0
	3) Oppose	52.4	52.9	51.7
	4) Strongly oppose	18.3	15.2	23.4
	5) DK/NA	2.5	3.3	1.2
	50-4 Resort to popular non violent and una	rmed resist	ance	
	1) Strongly support	6.4	6.2	6.7
	2) Support	44.9	47.2	41.0
	3) Oppose	35.3	33.9	37.7
	4) Strongly oppose	10.5	9.2	12.6
	5) DK/NA	3.0	3.5	2.0
		21		

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		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %			
	50-5 Return to the armed intifada and confrontations						
	1) Strongly support	11.5	9.8	14.3			
	2) Support	32.7	29.4	38.1			
	3) Oppose	42.5	46.3	36.2			
	4) Strongly oppose	11.3	12.1	10.0			
	5) DK/NA	2.0	2.3	1.4			
	50-6 Dissolve the Palestinian Authorit	y					
	1) Strongly support	9.8	10.8	8.0			
	2) Support	29.1	27.6	31.5			
	3) Oppose	41.7	43.3	39.0			
	4) Strongly oppose	14.8	13.0	17.7			
	5) DK/NA	4.7	5.2	3.8			
51)	Do you think the direction the PA is calling to occupation is capable of ending occupation.	•		of peaceful resistance			
	1) Certainly capable	2.1	2.0	2.4			
	2) Capable	24.3	23.5	25.7			
	3) Incapable	53.1	56.0	48.3			
	4) Certainly incapable	17.7	15.3	21.8			
	5) DK/NA	2.7	3.2	1.8			
52)	Prime minister Fayyad says that a Pales			-			
	in 2011 with or without an agreement w	·		-			
	1) Certainly share it	8.7	8.1	9.6			
	2) Share it	44.8	46.9	41.3			
	3) Do not share it	34.5	34.5	34.4			
	4) Certainly share it	9.0	7.5	11.4			
	5) DK/NA	3.1	3.0	3.2			
53)	If negotiations with Israel fail, do you declaring the establishment of an independent with Israel?	-	•	_			
	1) Certainly approve	9.5	9.3	9.7			
	2) Approve	53.5	55.9	49.6			
	3) Do not approve	27.0	25.9	28.8			
	4) Certainly do not approve	6.8	6.2	7.9			
	5) DK/NA	3.2	2.7	4.0			

		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
54)	If at the end of 2011 the Palestinian side up state without an agreement with Israel, do you the current conditions in the Palestinian occupation forces over roads and crossings in	you think such n areas with ro	a declaration will egard to settlemen	lead to actual change
	 Certainly lead to positive change Will lead to change to the better Will not lead to any change, positive or negative Will lead to negative change Certainly will lead to negative change DK/NA 	2.3 22.4 32.4 32.8 7.8 2.4	2.3 20.2 32.0 35.4 7.6 2.5	2.3 25.9 33.1 28.3 8.1 2.2
55)	If we imagine that the Palestinian side uni at the end of 2011 the establishment of a Parecognize the state?	•	_	
	 Certainly yes Yes No Certainly no DK/NA 	1.7 12.8 52.3 27.8 5.5	1.4 12.1 52.4 28.6 5.5	2.1 13.9 52.1 26.5 5.4
56)	Now, after about 18 months since he became Barak Obama: do you see it supportive of Is	-	•	evaluate the policy of
	 Israel Palestinians Both DK/NA 	78.6 3.9 13.0 4.5	76.9 3.3 14.2 5.6	81.4 4.9 11.0 2.6
57)	What do you want president Obama to d Palestinian-Israeli peace process or do you v	•		O .
	1) I want a stronger role for the US in the peace process 2) I want the US to continue to play its	65.5 4.6	63.2 4.7	69.3 4.4
	current role in the peace process 3) I want the US not to intervene in the peace process 4) DK/NA	27.4 2.4	29.1 3.0	24.7 1.6
58)	If the US under president Obama plays a str bring about a successful or failed Palestinia	rong role in the	e peace process, do	
	1) Certainly will lead to successful process	31.0	32.1	29.3
	2) Think it will lead to successful process	32.6	31.9	33.6
	3) Will not have an impact	13.6	14.3	12.6

____ 23 _

		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
	4) Think it will lead to failed process	14.6	13.8	15.9
	5) Certainly will lead to failed process	5.0	3.6	7.1
	6) DK/NA	3.2	4.3	1.5
59)	Who in your opinion would benefit more i peace process, Israel or the Palestinians?	f the US inte	rvened strongly in	the Palestinian-Israel
	1) Israel	57.2	56.7	58.0
	2) Palestinians	15.2	13.7	17.7
	3) Neither side	4.8	4.6	5.3
	4) Both sides	21.2	23.0	18.4
	5) DK/NA	1.5	2.0	0.6
60)	How informed you consider yourself about the Israeli conflict?	the following	initiatives and soluti	ions to the Palestinian-
	60-1 The Arab Peace (or Saudi) Initiative			
	1) I am informed of almost all the details	8.7	7.4	10.8
	2) I am informed generally but with few details	18.2	17.2	19.8
	3) I have heard about it but do not know the details	40.8	43.2	37.0
	4) I have not heard about it	32.3	32.2	32.4
	60-2 Clinton Parameters for the permanent	t settlement		
	1) I am informed of almost all the details	3.3	3.4	3.2
	2) I am informed generally but with few details	9.8	9.4	10.4
	3) I have heard about it but do not know the details	25.0	28.0	20.2
	4) I have not heard about it	61.9	59.3	66.1
	60-3 The Geneva Initiative			
	1) I am informed of almost all the details	5.4	5.5	5.3
	2) I am informed generally but with few details	10.2	9.2	11.8
	3) I have heard about it but do not know the details	33.7	34.5	32.3
	4) I have not heard about it	50.7	50.7	50.6
	60-4 The Roadmap			
	1) I am informed of almost all the details	11.1	9.7	13.3
	2) I am informed generally but with few details	23.7	23.9	23.3

	Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %	
3) I have heard about it but do not know the details	43.6	44.9	41.5	
4) I have not heard about it	21.7	21.6	21.8	

61) According to the Saudi plan, Israel will retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and a Palestinian state will be established. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194 which allows return of refugees to Israel and compensation. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. Do you agree or disagree to this plan?

1) Certainly agree	12.8	11.0	15.9
2) Agree	54.1	55.5	51.8
3) Disagree	20.9	22.0	19.2
4) Certainly disagree	9.2	8.3	10.7
5) DK/NA	2.9	3.2	2.4

62) If the US under president Obama decides to pressure the Palestinians and the Israeli sides to accept and implement the Arab or Saudi Peace Initiative, do you think the Palestinian side should accept or reject this American intervention

1) Accept	59.9	59.5	60.5
2) Reject	35.5	35.2	35.9
3) DK/NA	4.7	5.3	3.6

63) What in your opinion will be the attitude of most Israelis to such American intervention – would they accept or reject it?

1) Certainly accept	9.5	8.1	11.8
2) Accept	32.9	32.2	34.2
3) Reject	47.0	49.7	42.6
4) Certainly reject	6.3	5.9	7.0
5) DK/NA	4.3	4.2	4.4

64) There is a proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlemnet of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinians people. Do you agree or disagree to this proposal?

1) Definitely agree	6.0	6.1	5.8
2) Agree	52.0	52.4	51.4
3) Disagree	29.3	30.4	27.5
4) Definitely disagree	10.1	8.3	13.0
5) DK/NA	2.6	2.8	2.3

Total % West Bank % Gaza Strip %

A-1) I am going to read to you a summary of the main items of a permanent Palestinian-Israeli peace treaty negotiated between the legitimate representatives of both sides. After reading each item, tell us what you think of each of its item. Do you agree or disagree with it:

An independent and sovereign Palestinian state would be established and would live side by side with the state of Israel in peace, security, and cooperation. The full implementation of this agreement in its entirety will mean the end of conflict between the two states, Israel and Palestine

1) Strongly agree	12.0	11.8	12.4
2) Agree	63.2	65.6	59.5
3) Disagree	17.4	16.8	18.3
4) Strongly Disagree	6.9	5.0	9.8
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	0.5	0.8	0.0

A-2) Security of the Palestinian state will be guaranteed. While the two states, Israel and Palestine, will have the right to self defense, they will enter into a non-aggression treaty; the Palestinian state will enact laws to limit its own armaments in accordance with the agreement, and will receive guarantees from the UNSC for its security and safety. Israel will be allowed to establish an early warning system in the Palestinian state to prevent a surprise attack

1) Strongly agree	7.7	7.4	8.1
2) Agree	57.5	60.5	52.6
3) Disagree	27.3	26.5	28.5
4) Strongly Disagree	6.6	4.3	10.3
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	1.0	1.4	0.4

A-3) The borders of the Palestine state will be those of the 1967 but will include land swaps, about 2-3%, that are equal in size and that will take into consideration Palestinian and Israeli needs. For example, it will allow Palestinians to have a corridor between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and will expand the size of the Gaza Strip to reduce its population density. And will allow the Israelis to annex some settlements adjacent to the Green Line.

1) Strongly agree	5.1	4.3	6.4
2) Agree	38.5	38.5	38.5
3) Disagree	42.7	44.3	40.2
4) Strongly Disagree	11.9	10.9	13.5
5) No Opinion /Don't Know	1.7	1.9	1.4

A-4) Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it, Israel will allow the return of about 150,000 as part of a program of family unification, and all others will be compensated. The two sides will agree that this implements UN resolution 194.

1) Strongly agree	7.8	7.5	8.3
2) Agree	50.0	54.3	43.0
3) Disagree	31.1	28.9	34.6
4) Strongly Disagree	10.7	9.0	13.6
5) DN/NA (Do not read)	0.4	0.4	0.5

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		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
A-5)	East Jerusalem will be the capital of t of Israel. Inside East Jerusalem, Pales return for equal territorial swap Jewis	tinian areas will c	ome under Palestin	ian sovereignty and in
	 Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree No Opinion /Don't Know 	6.3 32.1 45.4 15.9 0.4	5.4 35.2 45.6 13.3 0.6	7.6 27.3 45.2 20.0 0.0
A-6)	In the Old City, Holy places belonging Church of the Holy Sepulcher will com "Wailing Wall" will come under Israel	ne under Palestinia		
	 Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree No Opinion /Don't Know 	7.7 39.2 39.3 13.2 0.7	6.3 44.9 38.1 9.9 0.8	9.8 30.1 41.2 18.3 0.5
A-7)	I would like you to tell me if you woul by the Palestinian president in a refere	_	nst such a peace tre	aty if presented to you
	 Certainly for (Go to A10) For (Go to A10) Against Certainly against NO/DK 	27.8 29.2 20.9 19.7 2.3	27.2 31.0 21.6 18.1 2.1	28.8 26.3 19.8 22.4 2.7
A-8)	If in addition to the above items in the return all Arab countries supported the	_	_	_
	1) For 2) Against 3) NO/DK	21.9 73.7 4.4	27.9 67.1 5.0	13.1 83.5 3.4
A-9)	If in addition to the above items in the of the refugee problem, would you sup		-	sibility for the creation
	1) For 2) Against 3) NO/DK	31.5 63.6 5.0	37.7 57.7 4.6	22.0 72.5 5.5
A10)	And what is the Palestinian majority settlement? Do most Palestinians in final status package?	_		_
	1) Majority supports	58.4	61.5	53.4
	2) Majority opposes3) DK/NA	34.2 7.4	29.2 9.3	42.2 4.4

Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %

A11) And what is the Israeli majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Israelis support or oppose this combined final status package?

1) Majority supports	32.0	27.7	38.9
2) Majority opposes	59.1	62.3	54.0
3) DK/NA	8.9	10.0	7.1

A-12) If the US under president Obama decides to pressure the Palestinians and the Israeli sides to accept and implement this compromise permanent settlement as outlined above listed items, do you think the Palestinian side should accept or reject this American intervention?

1) Accept	56.0	57.9	52.9
2) Reject	40.1	37.9	43.6
3) DK/NA	3.9	4.1	3.5

- B) When Palestinians and Israelis return to final status negotiations the following items might be presented to negotiators as the elements of a permanent compromise settlement. Tell us what you think of each item then tell us what you think of all combined as one permanent status settlement
 - 1. An Israeli withdrawal from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with the attached map {show map}.
 - 2. An independent Palestinian state would be established in the areas from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security force but an international multinational force would be deployed to insure the safety and security of the state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other.
 - **3. East Jerusalem** would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that will come under Israeli sovereignty.
 - **4.** With regard to the **refugee** question, both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those areas. The number of refugees returning to Israel will be based on the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees will be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of properties.
 - 5. When the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples
 - **6.** The Palestinian state will have **sovereignty** over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli will be allowed to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state for

Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
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an indefinite period of time and its responsibility will be to insure the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including its international border crossings.

Now that you have been informed of each element of the permanent compromise settlement, tell us what you think of each of its item. Do you agree or disagree with it.

B-1)	Item #1: withdrawal to 1967 borders with t	erritorial swap		
	1) Strongly agree	6.5	6.1	7.2
	2) Agree	53.9	49.8	60.7
	3) Disagree	28.3	33.3	19.8
	4) Strongly Disagree	9.9	8.4	12.3
	5) No Opinion /Don't Know	1.5	2.3	0.0
B-2)	Item #2: a state without an army but with in	nternational forces		
	1) Strongly agree	2.3	1.3	4.1
	2) Agree	26.1	25.4	27.5
	3) Disagree	52.6	55.7	47.5
	4) Strongly Disagree	17.7	16.4	19.9
	5) No Opinion /Don't Know	1.1	1.2	1.0
B-3)	Item #3: East Jerusalem as capital of the sta	te of Palestine afte	er it is divided	
	1) Strongly agree	3.6	2.7	5.2
	2) Agree	33.4	36.4	28.4
	3) Disagree	43.6	43.2	44.2
	4) Strongly Disagree	18.0	15.6	22.1
	5) No Opinion /Don't Know	1.3	2.0	0.0
B-4)	Item #4: refugees with five options for perm	anent residence		
ĺ	1) Strongly agree	4.6	3.4	6.5
	2) Agree	43.1	43.2	43.0
	3) Disagree	35.6	36.8	33.7
	4) Strongly Disagree	13.6	12.4	15.7
	5) No Opinion /Don't Know	3.0	4.1	1.2
B-5)	Item #5: end of conflict			
	1) Strongly agree	5.1	4.2	6.7
	2) Agree	57.7	58.0	57.2
	3) Disagree	25.5	27.8	21.6
	4) Strongly Disagree	9.3	7.4	12.6
	5) No Opinion /Don't Know	2.4	2.7	2.0
		29		
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		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
B-6)	Item #6: a sovereign state with secu	rity arrangements		
	1) Strongly agree	5.8	4.4	8.0
	2) Agree	35.1	31.9	40.6
	3) Disagree	42.9	46.5	36.9
	4) Strongly Disagree	14.1	14.3	13.9
	5) No Opinion /Don't Know	2.0	2.9	0.6
B-7)	Item #7: the combined elements as o	one permanent status	settlement	
	1) Strongly agree	3.4	2.8	4.4
	2) Agree	45.1	41.6	51.0
	3) Disagree	36.4	40.5	29.5
	4) Strongly Disagree	12.5	13.0	11.6
	5) No Opinion /Don't Know	2.7	2.2	3.5
B-8)	And what is the Palestinian majori settlement? Do most Palestinians i final status package?	• •		_
	1) Majority supports	49.3	47.1	53.2
	2) Majority opposes	42.2	42.3	42.1
	3) DK/NA	8.4	10.6	4.7
B-9)	And what is the Israeli majority settlement? Do most Israelis support	_		_
	1) Majority supports	36.5	34.5	39.9
	2) Majority opposes	55.6	58.5	50.7
	3) DK/NA	7.9	7.1	9.4
B-10)	If the US under president Obama de and implement this compromise per the Palestinian side should accept of 1) Accept	manent settlement as	outlined above list	_
	2) Reject	47.3	47.4	47.2
	3) DK/NA	4.7	5.5	3.3
65)	The US administration of Barak construction in East Jerusalem and think the performance of president administration under Bush? 1) Certainly better 2) Better 3) The same as Bush	l pressed Abbas to e	nter proximity talk	s with Israel. Do you
	0,2.00 00000 00 20000	.,	17.5	

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		Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
	4) Worse	13.6	15.1	11.1
	5) Certainly worse	4.4	4.0	5.1
	6) DK/NA	2.9	3.3	2.3
66)	Do you think president Obama is toward the establishment of a Pal	•		and that he is working
	1) Certainly yes	2.2	2.0	2.7
	2) Yes	28.8	28.1	30.0
	3) No	48.6	48.3	49.1
	4) Certainly no	13.9	13.9	14.0
	5) DK/NA	6.4	7.8	4.2
67)	From among the countries in the of the Palestinians and their just in	_	which one you view	as the most supportive
	1.Turkey	42.6	41.2	44.8
	2. Lebanon	3.2	4.5	1.0
	3. Iran	5.6	6.6	4.0
	4. Egypt	13.3	6.1	25.0
	5. Jordan	1.9	2.1	1.6
	6. Saudi Arabia	5.1	5.0	5.3
	7. Iraq	0.9	1.2	0.5
	8. Syria	4.5	4.7	4.0
	9. Venezuela	1.7	2.6	0.3
	10.France	1.7	2.2	0.9
	11.Other	4.1	4.6	3.4
	12.More than one choice	1.0	1.6	0.0
	13.DK/NA	2.6	4.0	0.2
	14.None	11.8	13.6	8.9
68)	Concerning armed attacks agains	t Israeli civilians insid	e Israel, I	
	1) Strongly support	10.5	8.2	14.4
	2) Support	33.3	28.0	41.9
	3) Oppose	46.5	51.6	38.1
	4) Strongly oppose	7.4	8.6	5.5
	5) DK/NA	2.3	3.7	0.2
69)	Which of the following political pa	arties do you support?		
	1) PPP	0.4	0.5	0.2
	2) PFLP	2.8	3.1	2.3
	3) Fateh	34.6	32.3	38.4
		31		

Polls

	Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %	
4) Hamas	18.9	15.3	24.7	
5) DFLP	0.1	0.1	0.2	
6) Islamic Jihad	1.6	1.2	2.3	
7) Fida	0.1	0.1	0.0	
8) National Initiative (Mubadara)	8.0	0.9	0.5	
9) Independent Islamists	2.2	1.5	3.4	
10) Independent Nationalists	4.0	4.8	2.7	
11) Third Way, headed by Salam Fayyad	1.1	1.2	0.9	
12) None of the above	32.3	37.3	24.0	
13) Other, specify	1.1	1.7	0.2	

PSR Methodology:

Palestine is divided into several strata with each representing the towns, cities, villages, and refugee camps in the 16 governorates (muhafazat). Palestine is also divided into "counting areas," or clusters, with each containing a number of families (ranging from 80 to 160 families in each cluster). The number of families in each cluster designates the size of that cluster. The 1997 census provides detailed data on the families as well as detailed maps showing every house in each cluster. The total number of clusters in Palestine is 3200.

PSR sampling process goes trough three stages (1) randomly selecting population locations (clusters or blocs) using probability proportionate to size; (2) randomly selecting households from the population locations using updated maps; (3) selecting a person who is 18 years or older from among the persons in the house using Kiesh tables' method. The sample should be self-weighting, but we do make sure that the age groups we obtain are similar to those in the society using data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Reweighing is done if necessary.

A sample of 127 clusters is randomly selected using probability proportionate to size. Clusters are organized according to size (number of families) and geographic location (West Bank-Gaza Strip) in order to insure representation of all strata and clusters of all sizes. After selecting the cluster samples in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 10 homes are selected in each cluster using systemic sampling. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults. The third stage in the sampling process occurs inside the house. Using Kish table, PSR fieldworkers select an adult (over 18 years of age) from among the adults in the house for the interview. Interviewees are assured of complete confidentiality before starting the interview.

Since the sample is a multistage one, two components constitute the variance in the estimates: the within-cluster variation and variation among clusters. We reduce the within-cluster variation by increasing the sample size selected from each cluster or bloc. By increasing the number of clusters selected, the error resulting due to variation among clusters is reduced. Among-cluster variation constitutes the biggest source of sampling error, while the error resulting from the within-cluster variation is negligible relative to the one among clusters. Hence, in this case the margin of error is dependent on the number of clusters considered in the survey. The number of clusters (127) and the number of households in each cell (10) ensure a maximum 3% sampling error.

Our non-response rate ranges between 2% to 9%. The non-response rate is calculated based on the number of household rejections and the number of persons not willing to complete the questionnaire relative to the total sample. In order to prevent errors caused by non-response, we have used over the years three methods: (1) rigorous training of fieldworkers; (2) testing the questionnaire before going to the field; and (3) quality control measures to test the reliability and suitability of fieldworkers.

In order to encourage respondents to talk freely, we assure them of complete anonymity. Respondents do not give their names and filled questionnaires are placed in a folder where they are mixed with all others; it is not possible to trace a specific questionnaire to a certain respondent.

In order to maximize the chances to enter all homes in the sample, two fieldworkers, a male and a female or two females, conduct every interview. By this method we almost double the cost of fieldwork, but we also overcome social difficulties that may prevent a male/female from entering a home that does not have males/females at the time of interview.