

Survey Research Unit

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The **Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)** is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policy analysis and academic research. PSR was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. The center engages in several activities. It conducts academic and policy analysis studies. It organizes socio-political surveys and public opinion polls on current Palestinian political and social attitudes. It sponsors study groups and task forces on issues of critical importance to the Palestinians. Finally, it organizes conferences, public lectures, and briefings on current public policy issues. PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas.

This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

*This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah*



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**While Hamas wins greater public confidence and appreciation in the aftermath of the prisoner exchange deal, likely vote for the group remains unchanged and while the public opposes return to negotiations without terms of reference and a settlement freeze, support for a permanent status compromise increases**

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 15-17 December 2011. Several important developments preceded this poll: a Hamas-Israel prisoner exchange deal, an increase in settlers' violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, Palestinian submission of a request to join the United Nations, admission of Palestine as a member state at UNESCO, and Abbas-Mish'al meeting and the renewal of Fateh-Hamas reconciliation efforts including the setting of May 2012 as a date for new elections. The poll covers Palestinian attitudes regarding the prisoner exchange deal, reconciliation, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

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#### MAIN RESULTS:

Findings of the final quarter of 2011 show that Hamas has won the confidence and respect of the public in the aftermath of the prisoner exchange deal with Israel. About three quarters believe that Hamas came out winning from the deal more than Israel. Moreover 37% say their support for Hamas has increased as a result of the deal while only 10% say their support has decreased. As importantly, confidence in Hamas is expressed in the acceptance of a majority of the public of Hamas' decision in the deal to concede to Israeli conditions regarding two important issues: the exclusion from the deal of major political figures and the deportation of many released prisoners. Confidence in Hamas is also reflected in the increase in the positive evaluation of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip and in the increased popularity of Ismail Haniyeh, its potential candidate to the presidential elections. Despite all this however, the percentage of likely vote for Hamas in parliamentary elections, if one is held today, remains unchanged compared to the situation before the exchange deal.

Findings also show a limited decline in the popularity of president Mahmud Abbas and reveal a problem Fateh is likely to face in selecting a candidate for the presidency, if Abbas continues to insist on not running. The most popular alternative is Marwan Barghouti. He is also the one most able to win similar levels of support from both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. All other potential Fateh candidates receive very small percentages of support, not exceeding 7%. Moreover, most potential candidates do not have highly different levels of support in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip.

Findings also show that despite the continued public opposition to return to negotiations with Israel before it accepts terms of reference based on the 1967 borders and agrees to a settlement freeze, the public shows more willingness than any time during the past six years to accept a permanent settlement compromise based on the Geneva Initiative and the Clinton Parameters. In the meanwhile, the public strongly supports going to the UN and launching a popular non violent resistance and opposes the dissolution of the PA, a return to an armed intifada, or the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution.

### **(1) Domestic Conditions, Elections, and Reconciliation:**

- Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank (47%) is higher than positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip (26%).
- Similarly, perception that press freedom exists in the West Bank is higher, standing at 67%, than perception that it exists in the Gaza Strip, standing at 52%. Perception that people can criticize the West Bank PA without fear stands at 35% while perception that people can criticize the Gaza Hamas government stands at 24%.
- But belief that corruption exists in the West Bank PA institutions stands at 70% while belief that corruption exists in the institutions of the Gaza dismissed government stands at 60%.
- Moreover, perception of safety and security is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 69%, than in the West Bank, standing at 59%.
- Increase in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government and a decrease in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government
- Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas rises from 52% to 60% in three months.
- If new presidential elections are to be held today, Abbas would receive 55% and Haniyeh 37%.
- If new legislative elections are to be held today, Hamas would receive 29%, Fatch 43%, all other electoral lists 11%, and 17% remain undecided.
- The strongest alternative Fatch candidate to Abbas is Marwan Barghouti (54%) followed by Saeb

26% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 47% describe them as bad or very bad. By contrast, 36% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 30% describe them as bad or very bad. 67% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 28% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 52% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 36% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 35% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 24% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

However, while 70% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank, only 60% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. Moreover, perception of safety and security stands at 59% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip. These findings show an improvement in the Gaza conditions, probably reflecting perception after the prisoner exchange deal while showing deterioration of conditions in the West Bank, probably in response to an increase in settlers' violence against West Bankers.

Findings show an increase in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government and a decrease in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government. Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 41% and Salam Fayyad's at 44%. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 34% and 53% respectively. But findings show also that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 43%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 24%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 49% and 28% respectively.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 60% while 38% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. These figures stood at 52% and 44% respectively. The increase in the satisfaction with the performance of Abbas is probably reflecting public appreciation for his UN speech about three months ago. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands today at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 55% and Haniyeh 37% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 64%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 54% and Haniyeh 42% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 56% and Haniyeh 33%. These results indicate a decrease in Abbas' popularity and an increase in Haniyeh's compared to the situation three months ago when Abbas received the support of 59% and Haniyeh 34%. If the

Erikat (7%).

- Half of the public is optimistic about the chances for reconciliation and 43% believe that new elections will indeed take place in May or a little after that, but only 21% believe that a reconciliation government will be formed any time soon.
- The largest percentage (47%) opposes the exclusion of Fayyad as possible prime minister of a reconciliation government while 44% agree with the exclusion.
- 72% believe that the US and Israel will suspend financial assistance and transfer of custom funds to the PA after the formation of the reconciliation government.
- 71% believe that the PA should accept American financial assistance while 27% believe it should reject it; 64% believe that alternative sources of financial assistance do exist.

presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter would receive 30% of the participants' votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 71%. If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 73% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 43% say they would vote for Fateh, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. These results indicate a decrease of two percentage points in Fateh's popularity compared to the situation three months ago. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip in this poll stands at 35% and in the West Bank 25%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands at 43% and in the West Bank 44%.

In an open question, one without a list to choose from, respondents were asked to propose a candidate for Fateh in the next presidential elections--assuming president Abbas would not run. The largest percentage (40%) favored Marwan Barghouti while 8% favored Salam Fayyad, 5% favored Saeb Erekat, 3% favored Mohammad Dahlan, 2% favored Azzam al Ahmad, and another 2% favored Mustapha Barghouti. When respondents were asked to select a favored candidate from a list of names, 54% selected Marwan Barghouti, followed by Erekat (7%), Mahmud Al Aloul (4%), and Azzam al Ahmad (3%). 2% went to each of the following names: Abu Mahir Ghnaim, Nasir al Qidwa, Jibril al Rojoub, and Ahmad Qurie'.

Now, after the meeting between president Mahmud Abbas and Khalid Mish'al, 50% believe Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 46% believe they will not succeed. Optimism is higher in the West Bank (53%) than in the Gaza Strip (46%), among those who would vote for Hamas and Fateh (58% and 52% respectively) compared to those who do not wish to participate in new elections or those who would vote for third parties (42% and 44% respectively), among illiterates and those with primary education (66% and 58% respectively) compared to those who carry a BA degree (40%), among those who use the internet once a month or those who do not use it at all (60%) compared to those who use it on daily basis (46%).

Despite the optimism expressed by half of the public, only 21% expect to see the formation of a reconciliation government or a government of experts within days or weeks. 46% expect one to be formed after a long time and 27% believe one will never be formed. Percentage of those who believe a reconciliation government will be formed in few days or weeks increases in the Gaza Strip (24%) compared to the West Bank (19%), among those who describe themselves as religious (24%) compared to those who describe themselves as somewhat religious (17%), among those who would vote for Hamas and Fateh (25% and 22% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in elections (16%), among the illiterates (34%) compared to those who carry a BA degree (17%), and among those who use the internet on daily basis (23%) compared to those who use it once a month or not at all (13%).

With regard to presidential and parliamentary elections, now proposed for May 2012, 43% expect them to be held on time or a little after that

while 47% believe elections will not be held around that time. 47% oppose the exclusion of Salam Fayyad from leading the government of reconciliation or experts while 44% agree to his exclusion as Hamas wishes. Percentage of opposition to the exclusion of Fayyad increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (46%), among supporters of the peace process (53%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (31%), among those who would vote for Fateh (64%) compared to those who would vote for Hamas (27%), among holders of BA degree (52%) compared to illiterates (44%), and among those who work in the public sector (56%) compared to those who work in the private sector (47%).

If a government of reconciliation or experts is formed soon, 72% expect the US government to punish the PA by suspending financial support. A larger percentage (80%) believes Israel too would most likely suspend transfer of custom money to the PA. But a smaller percentage (52%) expects the EU to suspend financial support when a government of reconciliation or experts is formed. Findings also show that a large majority (71%) believes that under the present conditions the PA should accept American financial assistance while 27% believe it should reject it. In case the PA rejected American assistance or if the assistance stopped for some other reason, 64% believe the PA will find alternative sources in the Arab World and friendly countries while 33% believe it will not find alternative sources. The percentage of those who believe the PA should accept American assistance increases among those who describe themselves as somewhat religious (74%) compared to those who describe themselves as religious (66%), among supporters of the peace process (75%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (61%), and among those who would vote for Fateh (80%) compared to those who would vote for Hamas (60%). The belief that the PA will find alternative sources of assistance to that of the US increases in the Gaza Strip (68%) compared to the West Bank (61%), among those opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to those who support the peace process (62%), and among holders of BA degree (67%) compared to illiterates (41%).

## **(2) Hamas-Israel Prisoner Exchange Deal:**

- About three quarters believe that Hamas came out winning more than Israel in the prisoner exchange deal and 37% say that their support for Hamas has increased after the deal.
- A majority agrees that Hamas was right to agree to Israel's tough conditions in the prisoner exchange deal such as those that stipulated that top political leaders would not be released or that some would be deported.

About three quarters of the public believe Hamas came out winning more than Israel in the prisoner exchange deal while only 22% believe Israel won more out of the deal. Moreover, 37% say their support for Hamas has increased after the exchange deal while 50% say their support did not change and only 10% say their support decreased. Percentage of those who say their support for Hamas has increased rises in the West Bank (41%) compared to the Gaza Strip (32%), among those who describe themselves as religious (45%) compared to those who describe themselves as somewhat religious (32%), among those who oppose the peace process (54%) compared to those who support the peace process (33%), among those who would vote for Hamas (76%) compared to those who would vote for Fateh, third parties, those who have not decided yet to whom they would vote, and those who will not participate in new elections (21%, 32%, 26%, and 33% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (36%) compared to those who work in the public sector (30%), and among those who use the internet once a month or not at all (39%) compared to those who use it on daily basis (30%).

A majority of 55% believe that Hamas was right to agree to Israel's condition that stipulated that top leaders like Ahmad Sa'dat, Ibrahim Hamid, and Marwan Barghouti would be excluded from the exchange deal while 40% believe that Hamas should not have agreed to this condition. Similarly, a majority of 53% believe that Hamas was right to agree to Israel's condition that a number of released prisoners would be deported while 43% believe that Hamas should not have agreed to this condition. Percentage of those who believe that Hamas should have accepted the condition that no top political leaders should be released increases in the West Bank (57%) compared to the Gaza Strip (52%), among those who describe themselves as religious (60%) compared to those who describe themselves as somewhat religious (53%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (71%) compared to supporters of the peace process (51%), among those who would vote for Hamas (76%) compared to those who vote for Fateh and third parties (44% and 47% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (60%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (53%), among the illiterates (60%) compared to holders of BA degree (52%), and among those who use the internet once a month or do not use it at all (62%) compared to those who use it on daily basis (53%).

## (2) Peace Process

- Rise in support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative from 40% a year ago to 50% in this poll. A majority supports compromises related to borders and territorial exchange and end of conflict (63% each), half supports proposed security arrangements, but only a minority supports compromises related to refugees (45%), Jerusalem (40%), and the establishment of a state without an army (32%).
- 59% support and 39% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative.
- 63% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non-existent and 36% believe the chances are medium or high.

Findings show that 50% support and 49% oppose a package of a permanent status agreement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for this package stood at 40% in December 2010. The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) final borders and territorial exchange; (2) refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) a demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) security arrangements; and (6) end of conflict. We have been addressing these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic stalemate throughout 2011.

Findings, as the summary table below shows, indicate that the public rejects three items in the package and accept the other three. The following is a summary of the items and the attitudes to each:

**(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange:** 63% support or strongly support and 36% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2010, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 49% and opposition at 50%.

**(2) Refugees:** 45% support and 53% oppose a refugee settlement in

which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2010, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 57% opposed it.

**(3) Jerusalem:** 40% support and 59% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2010, an identical compromise obtained 36% support and 63% opposition.

**(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State:** 32% support and 67% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2010, 24% support, and opposition reached 74%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

**(5) Security Arrangements:** 50% support and 49% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2010, 38% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 61% opposed it.

**(6) End of Conflict:** 63% support and 35% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in December 2010 were 58% support and 41% opposition.

**Summary Table: Support for Clinton's Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2011**

	Dec 2003	Dec 2004	Dec 2005	Dec 2006	Dec 2007	Dec 2008	Aug 2009	June 2010	Dec 2010	Dec 2011
1) Borders and Territorial Exchange	57%	63%	55%	61%	56%	54%	49%	60%	49%	63%
2) Refugees	25%	46%	40%	41%	39%	40%	37%	48%	41%	45%
3) Jerusalem	46%	44%	33%	39%	36%	36%	31%	37%	36%	40%
4) Demilitarized State	36%	27%	20%	28%	23%	27%	24%	28%	24%	32%
5) Security Arrangements	23%	53%	43%	42%	51%	35%	34%	41%	38%	50%
6) End of Conflict	42%	69%	64%	62%	66%	55%	55%	63%	58%	63%
<b>Overall Package</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>54%</b>	<b>46%</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>50%</b>

Support for the package is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 53%, than in the West Bank, standing at 47%, among supporters of the peace process (54%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (37%), among those who would vote for Fateh, third parties, and those who will not participate in new elections (62%, 54%, and 47% respectively) compared to those who would vote for Hamas or those who are undecided regarding whom they will vote for (36% and 43% respectively), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (54%) compared to those who are over 50 years of age (44%), and among those who use the internet on daily basis (59%) compared to those who use it once a month or never (38%).

Findings also show that 51% of the public believe that a majority among Palestinians supports a settlement along these lines while 41% believe a majority opposes it and 8% say it does not know the position of the majority. Yet, only 30% believe that a majority among Israelis support such a package while 61% believe a majority of Israelis opposes it. Perhaps for this reason, and others, only 37% believe that it is possible these days to reach a permanent settlement with Israel while 62% believe that it is impossible to reach such a settlement. Moreover, 63% of the public is pessimistic about the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years: 63% believe chances to be slim or non-existent and 36% believe them to be medium or high.

### **(3) Alternatives to Negotiations and Going to the UN:**

- 78% support and 20% oppose President Abbas' position which views as useless any negotiations with Israel without a prior agreement on terms of reference and a settlement freeze and that therefore, Palestinians need to go to the UN to obtain international recognition of their state.
- In the absence of negotiations, 78% supports going to the UN Security Council to obtain membership, 61% supports resort to popular non violent resistance, and 58% supports a unilateral declaration of statehood; but only 28% support abandoning the two state solution in favor of one state solution, 34% support the dissolution of the PA, and 41% support return to armed intifada and confrontations.

Findings show an overwhelming support for the position advanced by PA president seeing no point in returning to negotiations with Israel without a prior Israeli acceptance of a specific term of reference (i.e., acceptance of the 1967 borders with swap) and settlement freeze and that in the meanwhile the PA should go to the UN seeking an international recognition of a Palestinian state. This position is supported by 78% and opposed by 20%. Support increases in the West Bank to 83% and decreases in the Gaza Strip to 70%. We proposed six different options for Palestinians as alternatives to negotiations: a majority supported three, going to the UN Security Council, resort to popular non violent resistance, and unilateral declaration of statehood, while opposing the other three, dissolution of the PA, abandoning the two state solution, and return to armed intifada. The biggest level of support (78%) went to going to the UN Security Council to obtain membership while 22% expressed opposition. A majority of 61% also supported resort to popular non violent resistance while 38% opposed it. 58% supported a unilateral declaration of statehood while 41% opposed it. By contrast, only 28% supported abandoning the two state solution in favor of a one state solution while 71% opposed it. Moreover, only 34% supported the option of dissolving the PA and 65% opposed it. Finally, 41% supported and 58% opposed return to armed intifada.

Findings show that a large majority (72%) believes that a mere

- A mere declaration of statehood will not change any thing on the ground or make things worse in the eyes of 72% of the public, therefore, when declaring a state, two thirds say the PA should impose its sovereignty even if such a step leads to a clash with occupation and settlers.
- When declaring a state or after UN General Assembly vote recognizing Palestine as a state, 71% want the PA to assert control over the Allenby Bridge crossing with Jordan even if such a step leads to suspension of travel across the bridge.
- Only 36% believe that popular non violent resistance will be able to end occupation or stop settlement construction, but 52% believe that large scale peaceful demonstrations would contribute to speeding up the end of occupation.
- 68% believe that there is a practical benefit for Palestinians in winning state membership in UNESCO and 28% do not believe that.
- 63% believe the Palestinian side should seek recognition of Palestine as an observer state from the UN General Assembly and 31% do not believe that.
- 77% believe that Israel will suspend transfer of customs' funds to the PA if the UN General Assembly recognized Palestine as a state and 20% do not believe that.
- After a UN General Assembly recognition of Palestine as a state, the public is split into three groups on the best means of forcing Israel to end its occupation of Palestinian territories: 32% for negotiations, 31% for massive peaceful demonstrations, and 30% for armed attacks.

**(4) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:**

- 48% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation and build a state

declaration of statehood will not change any thing on the ground or that it will make things worse; therefore, when declaring a state, two thirds of the public want the PA to exercise sovereignty throughout the entire West Bank even if such a measure leads to a confrontation between the PA and the Israeli army and settlers. Moreover, an international recognition of Palestine as a state, requires in the eyes of 71% of the public a Palestinian assertion of sovereignty over the Allenby crossing with Jordan even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing. Findings also show that while 61% do not believe that popular non violent resistance by itself is capable of ending occupation or stopping settlement construction, 52% believe that large scale peaceful demonstrations can contribute to speeding up the ending of occupation.

Findings also show that a majority (63%) is in favor of going to the UN General Assembly today to obtain recognition of Palestine as an observer state while 31% oppose this step. An overwhelming majority of 77% believes that Israel will suspend transfer of custom funds to the PA if the UN General Assembly recognized Palestine as a state. After such recognition, findings show Palestinians divided into three groups over the best means of forcing Israel to end its occupation: 32% want to return to negotiations, 31% want large scale popular non violent demonstrations, and 30% want a return to armed attacks.

48% believes that the *first* most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe



and 30% believe it should be to obtain the right of return

- 28% believe the first problem confronting Palestinians today is the continuation of Israeli occupation while 32% believe it is poverty and unemployment

that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. Three months ago, at the peak of Palestinian UN statehood bid 59% viewed statehood within the 1967 borders as the most vital goal. It is likely that the stalemate in the UN drive to gain statehood and membership has somewhat reduced public interest in it compared to the situation three months ago.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is the spread of poverty and unemployment, selected by 32% of the public, while 28% believe that it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities. Among Gazans, the top three problems are: the continuation of occupation, selected by 30%, followed by the continuation of the siege on the Gaza Strip and poverty and unemployment (26% for each). Among West Bankers, the top three problems are: poverty and unemployment, with 36% selecting it, followed by continuation of occupation, selected by 27%, and corruption, selected by (27%).

#### **(6) Regional Issues: Egypt and Iran**

- Despite the expected electoral victory of Islamists in Egypt, 60% expect the continuation of the implementation of the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel while 39% expect the treaty to be annulled
- 48% expect and 48% do not expect Israel to carry out a military strike against Iran in the coming months
- After an Israeli military strike against Iran, 56% expect a combined Iranian-Hizballah military response and 23% expect an Iranian response only

Findings show that a majority of the Palestinian public (60%) does not believe that an expected Islamist electoral victory will lead to a meaningful change in the relationship between Egypt and Israel, particularly regarding the peace treaty between the two sides, while 39% believe it will lead to a big change including the annulment of the peace treaty.

Findings also show that in light of the talk about the Iranian nuclear developments, the public is divided into two halves regarding the chances of an Israeli military strike to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities. If indeed Israel does carry out such a strike, 56% believe that Iran and Hizballah together will respond by carrying out a military retaliation against Israel, 23% believe that Iran alone will retaliate against Israel, 9% believe that Hizballah alone will retaliate, and 9% believe that neither Iran nor Hizballah will retaliate. Findings also show that 48% of the public believe that Hamas and Islamic Jihad should retaliate against Israel if it carries out a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.

**PSR Poll No. 42**  
**15-17 December 2011**

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>00 )</b>	<b>From among the following satellite news stations, which one you watched most during the last two months?</b>		
1) Al Arabia	13.9%	8.2%	23.3%
2) Al Jazeera	51.1%	61.5%	34.1%
3) Al Hurra	1.0%	0.6%	1.6%
4) Al Manar	1.7%	2.1%	1.0%
5) Palestine TV	13.5%	13.7%	13.0%
6) Al-Aqsa	9.4%	4.3%	17.9%
7) Do not watch TV	5.6%	5.6%	5.7%
8) Others	2.9%	3.4%	2.2%
9) Do not have a dish	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%
10) DK/NA	0.3%	0.2%	0.5%
<b>01)</b>	<b>In general, how would you describe conditions of the Palestinians in the Palestinian areas in Gaza Strip these days?</b>		
1) Very good	5.4%	4.8%	6.4%
2) Good	20.9%	18.5%	24.7%
3) So so	24.1%	22.6%	26.4%
4) Bad	32.9%	37.3%	25.8%
5) Very bad	14.1%	12.6%	16.6%
6) DK/NA	2.6%	4.2%	0.1%
<b>02)</b>	<b>In general, how would you describe conditions of the Palestinians in the Palestinian areas in the West Bank these days?</b>		
1) Very good	7.7%	4.9%	12.4%
2) Good	28.1%	27.7%	28.8%
3) So so	31.7%	32.5%	30.3%
4) Bad	24.1%	28.8%	16.5%
5) Very bad	5.6%	5.9%	5.2%
6) DK/NA	2.7%	0.2%	6.7%
<b>03)</b>	<b>Generally, do you see yourself as:</b>		
1) Religious	43.6%	39.9%	49.6%
2) Somewhat religious	52.7%	57.2%	45.4%
3) Not religious	3.2%	2.4%	4.3%
4) DK/NA	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%
<b>04)</b>	<b>Generally, do you see yourself as:</b>		
1) Supportive of the peace process	61.0%	58.9%	64.4%
2) Opposed to the peace process	18.8%	19.3%	18.1%
3) Between support and opposition	18.9%	20.2%	16.7%
4) DK/NA	1.3%	1.6%	0.9%
<b>5)</b>	<b>Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions under the control of President Abu Mazin?</b>		
1) Yes	70.4%	72.5%	67.0%
2) No	19.7%	16.8%	24.5%
3) DK-NA	9.9%	10.7%	8.5%
<b>06)</b>	<b>Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions under the control of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip</b>		

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
1) Yes	60.2%	55.3%	68.2%
2) No	20.9%	18.4%	25.0%
3) DK-NA	18.9%	26.3%	6.7%
<b>07) In your view, is there a press freedom in the West Bank?</b>			
1) Yes	23.4%	22.6%	24.9%
2) To some extent	44.0%	42.4%	46.5%
3) No	28.3%	29.9%	25.8%
4) DK-NA	4.2%	5.2%	2.7%
<b>08) In your view, is there a press freedom in the Gaza Strip?</b>			
1) Yes	15.9%	14.0%	19.0%
2) To some extent	36.5%	32.4%	43.2%
3) No	35.9%	35.4%	36.8%
4) DK-NA	11.7%	18.2%	1.0%
<b>09) In your view, can people in the West Bank today criticize the authority without fear?</b>			
1) Yes	34.6%	36.1%	32.1%
2) No	61.5%	60.5%	63.1%
3) DK-NA	4.0%	3.5%	4.9%
<b>10) In your view, can people in the Gaza Strip today criticize the authority without fear?</b>			
1) Yes	23.7%	23.2%	24.5%
2) No	65.7%	61.1%	73.3%
3) DK-NA	10.6%	15.7%	2.2%
<b>11) Would you say that these days your security and safety, and that of your family, is assured or not assured?</b>			
1) Completely assured	8.8%	5.4%	14.5%
2) Assured	53.9%	53.4%	54.6%
3) Not assured	31.5%	36.0%	24.2%
4) Not assured at all	5.6%	5.3%	6.2%
5) DK/NA	0.2%	0.0%	0.5%
<b>12) Do current political, security, and economic conditions lead you to seek emigration abroad?</b>			
1) Certainly seek to emigrate	11.6%	7.2%	18.9%
2) Seek emigration	19.4%	16.5%	24.1%
3) Do not seek emigration	33.4%	35.7%	29.7%
4) Certainly do not seek emigration	35.2%	40.5%	26.4%
5) DK/NA	0.4%	0.1%	1.0%
<b>13) Tell us how do you evaluate the performance of the dismissed government of Ismail Haniyeh in the Gaza Strip? Is it good or bad?</b>			
1) Very Good	11.0%	8.4%	15.3%
2) Good	30.1%	35.2%	21.7%
3) Neither good nor bad	28.0%	26.8%	30.0%
4) Bad	13.7%	10.8%	18.5%
5) Very Bad	7.2%	3.2%	13.9%
6) No Opinion/Don't know	10.0%	15.6%	0.6%

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>14) Tell us how do you evaluate the performance of the government headed by Salam Fayyad? Is it good or bad?</b>			
1) Very Good	8.5%	8.6%	8.4%
2) Good	35.7%	39.3%	29.8%
3) Neither good nor bad	28.5%	28.0%	29.2%
4) Bad	16.5%	14.5%	19.8%
5) Very Bad	5.6%	3.5%	9.2%
6) No Opinion/Don't know	5.2%	6.1%	3.7%
<b>15) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the performance of Mahmud Abbas since his election as president of the PA?</b>			
1) Very satisfied	9.2%	8.5%	10.3%
2) Satisfied	50.5%	58.8%	36.8%
3) Not satisfied	29.2%	25.0%	36.0%
4) Not satisfied at all	8.8%	5.0%	15.0%
5) DK/NA	2.3%	2.6%	1.9%
<b>16) If new presidential elections are to take place today, and Mahmud Abbas was nominated by Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh was nominated by Hamas, whom would you vote for?</b>			
1) Mahmoud Abbas	55.4%	56.2%	54.1%
2) Ismael Haniyyah	36.7%	33.4%	41.8%
4) DK/NA	7.9%	10.4%	4.2%
<b>17) And if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti representing Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh representing Hamas, whom would you vote for?</b>			
1) Marwan Barghouti	64.3%	65.6%	62.4%
2) Ismael Haniyyah	29.6%	27.2%	33.2%
4) DK/NA	6.1%	7.2%	4.4%
<b>19) If new elections agreed to by all factions are held today and the same lists that took part in the last PLC elections were nominated, for whom would you vote?</b>			
1) Alternative	0.7%	0.4%	1.0%
2) Independent Palestine	3.6%	4.3%	2.6%
3) Abu Ali Mustafa	2.5%	1.8%	3.6%
4) Abu al Abbas	0.5%	0.5%	0.6%
5) Freedom and social justice	0.7%	1.1%	0.1%
6) Change and reform	28.7%	24.8%	34.8%
7) National coalition for justice and democ	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
8) Third way(headed by salam fayyad)	1.8%	2.7%	0.6%
9) Freedom and independence	1.2%	1.2%	1.3%
10) Palestinian justice	0.2%	0.0%	0.4%
11) Fateh	43.3%	43.8%	42.5%
12) None of the above/ DK/NA/ Do not remember	16.7%	19.5%	12.3%
<b>20) Who do you think is most suitable presidential candidate for Fateh if president Mahmud Abbas decided not to nominate himself in the next presidential elections?----- (open ended)</b>			
1) Marwan Barghouti	40.2%	38.0%	43.8%
2) Salam Fayyad	8.0%	11.2%	2.7%

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
3) Saeb Erekat	4.9%	2.5%	8.9%
4) Mohammad Dahlan	2.8%	0.3%	7.0%
5) Azzam El-Ahmad	1.7%	0.6%	3.5%
6) Ahmad Qurai'	0.9%	0.6%	1.6%
7) Jibrib Roujoub	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%
8) Mahmoud Aloul	0.7%	1.1%	0.0%
9) Abu Maher Ghnaim	0.6%	0.5%	0.7%
10) Mustafa Barghouti	2.0%	3.1%	0.3%
11) Naser Qidweh	0.7%	0.7%	0.5%
12) Tayyeb Abdul Rahim	0.3%	0.5%	0.0%
13) Others	3.1%	3.2%	3.1%
14) DK/NA	14.1%	22.7%	0.0%
15) No one	19.1%	14.2%	27.3%
<b>21-1</b>	<b>From among the following vital national goals, which in your view should the first most important one and which should be the second most important goal that the Palestinian people should strive to achieve?</b>		
1) Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital	47.7%	44.3%	53.2%
2) Obtain the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages	29.5%	31.5%	26.2%
3) Establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians	9.1%	9.9%	7.7%
4) Build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings	13.7%	14.2%	12.9%
<b>21-2</b>	<b>From among the following vital national goals, which in your view should the first most important one and which should be the second most important goal that the Palestinian people should strive to achieve?</b>		
1) Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital	20.7%	22.0%	18.5%
2) Obtain the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages	40.5%	40.1%	41.1%
3) Establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians	20.3%	18.0%	24.0%
4) Build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings	18.6%	19.9%	16.4%
<b>22)</b>	<b>After the meeting between president Abbas and head of Hamas, Khalid Misha'al last month, and the agreement between the two sides to implement the reconciliation agreement. In your view, will the two sides succeed this time</b>		

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>in implementing the agreement and unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	3.2%	2.7%	4.2%
2) Yes	47.0%	50.2%	41.7%
3) No	36.7%	35.8%	38.2%
4) Certainly no	9.0%	8.1%	10.4%
5) DK/NA	4.1%	3.2%	5.5%
<b>23) What do you expect to happen between Palestinians and Israelis now after the Palestinians have been admitted at UNESCO as a member state?</b>			
1) The two sides will return soon to negotiations	27.1%	26.4%	28.2%
2) The two sides will return to negotiations but some armed attacks will continue	28.2%	25.6%	32.6%
3) The two sides will not return to negotiations and armed attacks will continue	19.9%	18.8%	21.7%
4) The two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks	18.6%	23.6%	10.4%
5) DK/NA	6.1%	5.6%	7.0%
<b>24) The Palestinian society confronts today various problems, like the continuation of occupation and settlements, the spread of unemployment and poverty, the lack of national unity due to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the continuation of the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its border crossings, the spread of corruption in public institutions, and others. Tell us, what in your opinion, is the problem you see as the most fundamental, the one that must be on the top priority of the Palestinian Authority?</b>			
1) Continuation of occupation and settlements,	28.2%	27.0%	30.1%
2) Spread of unemployment and poverty	32.3%	36.3%	25.9%
3) lack of national unity due to the split	2.2%	1.4%	3.6%
4) Continuation of the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its border crossings	13.4%	5.7%	26.0%
5) The spread of corruption in public institutions	22.2%	27.4%	13.6%
6) Others (----- )	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%
7) DK/NA	1.0%	1.5%	0.2%
<b>25) After Abbas-Mishaal meeting last month and the agreement they reached to start implementing the reconciliation agreement, when do you think a reconciliation government or a government of experts will be established?</b>			
1) Within days	2.1%	1.4%	3.1%
2) Within weeks	18.6%	17.1%	21.2%
3) After a long time	46.3%	46.6%	0.46
4) It will not be established	27.0%	29.0%	0.24
5) DK/NA	6.0%	6.0%	0.06

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>26) Do you think presidential and parliamentary elections will take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the proposed date of May 2012 or a little after that?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	3.0%	2.5%	3.7%
2) Yes	40.2%	42.4%	36.6%
3) No	33.6%	35.7%	30.0%
4) Certainly no	13.2%	10.6%	17.6%
5) DK/NA	10.0%	8.7%	12.1%
<b>27) If new parliamentary and presidential elections were to take place now, who do you think will win, Fateh or Hamas or others?</b>			
1) Fateh	41.3%	45.4%	34.6%
2) Hamas	27.6%	27.1%	28.4%
3) others	17.4%	13.0%	24.6%
4) DK/NA	13.7%	14.5%	12.4%
<b>28) If a reconciliation government or a government of experts is formed soon, do you think the US will punish the PA by suspending financial support?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	25.4%	28.6%	20.2%
2) Yes	46.8%	46.6%	47.2%
3) No	19.1%	17.9%	21.1%
4) Certainly no	3.2%	2.5%	4.5%
5) DK/NA	5.4%	4.4%	7.0%
<b>29) And what about Israel, will it too punish the PA by suspending financial transfers to it?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	30.7%	33.6%	25.9%
2) Yes	49.3%	48.7%	50.3%
3) No	14.3%	13.1%	16.1%
4) Certainly no	1.8%	1.7%	2.1%
5) DK/NA	3.9%	2.8%	5.5%
<b>30) And what about the EU, will it too punish the PA by suspending financial transfers to it?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	14.5%	14.6%	14.3%
2) Yes	37.3%	36.6%	38.5%
3) No	36.9%	38.2%	34.7%
4) Certainly no	4.1%	4.7%	3.2%
5) DK/NA	7.2%	5.9%	9.3%
<b>31) Under present conditions, do you think the PA should accept or reject American financial assistance?</b>			
1) Certainly accept	13.6%	14.0%	13.1%
2) Accept	56.9%	55.7%	58.9%
3) Reject	23.0%	25.0%	19.6%
4) Certainly reject	4.1%	3.4%	5.2%
5) DK/NA	2.4%	1.9%	3.2%
<b>32) If the PA were to reject American financial assistance, or if this assistance was to be suspended for one reason or another, do you think the PA will find alternative financial support from Arab and friendly countries?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	10.0%	8.7%	12.0%

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
2) Yes	53.7%	52.3%	56.0%
3) No	25.7%	30.0%	18.7%
4) Certainly no	6.9%	6.1%	8.3%
5) DK/NA	3.7%	2.9%	5.0%
<b>33) Fateh and Hamas have agreed that the next prime minister should be acceptable to the two sides and should not be affiliated with either party. There is talk that Fayyad would be excluded because Hamas objects to his selection. Do you approve or disapprove the exclusion of Fayyad from heading the reconciliation government or the government of experts?</b>			
1) Certainly disapprove	8.5%	6.6%	11.7%
2) Disapprove	38.4%	39.2%	37.0%
3) Approve	37.5%	39.2%	34.7%
4) Certainly approve	6.8%	4.6%	10.4%
5) DK/NA	8.9%	10.5%	6.1%
<b>34) In the prisoners' exchange deal between Israel and Hamas, Israel insisted on, and Hamas accepted, the condition that the list of released prisoners would not include senior leaders such as Saadat, Ibrahim Hamid, Marwan Barghouti, and others. Do you think Hamas should or should not have accepted this Israeli condition?</b>			
1) Certainly should have accepted	14.1%	12.7%	16.4%
2) Should have accepted	41.2%	44.4%	35.9%
3) Should not have accepted	26.8%	27.6%	25.5%
4) Certainly should not have accepted	13.3%	11.5%	16.2%
5) DK/NA	4.6%	3.8%	6.0%
<b>35) Moreover, Israel insisted on, and Hamas accepted, the condition that some of the release prisoners would be deported. Do you think Hamas should or should not have accepted this Israeli condition?</b>			
1) Certainly should have accepted	12.4%	10.7%	15.2%
2) Should have accepted	41.0%	44.1%	36.0%
3) Should not have accepted	30.3%	32.0%	27.5%
4) Certainly should not have accepted	13.1%	10.9%	16.7%
5) DK/NA	3.2%	2.2%	4.7%
<b>36) Looking at the prisoners' exchange deal, who do you think came out winning more, Israel or Hamas?</b>			
1) Certainly Hamas	22.8%	20.1%	27.3%
2) Hamas	51.6%	54.7%	46.4%
3) Israel	18.4%	19.5%	16.7%
4) Certainly Israel	3.1%	2.7%	3.7%
5) DK/NA	4.1%	2.9%	6.0%
<b>37) Now after the prisoners exchange between Hamas and Israel, did your support for Hamas increase, stayed the same, or decreased?</b>			
1) Increased	37.3%	40.6%	31.7%
2) Stayed the same	49.9%	50.9%	48.2%
3) Decreased	9.6%	6.4%	14.8%
4) DK/NA	3.3%	2.0%	5.3%



	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
38) From among the following list, whom do you think is most suitable to be Fateh's presidential candidate in case president Abbas insisted on not nominating himself in the next presidential elections?			
1) Abu Mahir Ghnaim	1.7%	1.9%	1.4%
2) Mahmud Aloul	3.5%	4.7%	1.4%
3) Marwan Barghouti	53.5%	53.0%	54.1%
4) Nasir al Qidwa	1.9%	1.3%	2.9%
5) Salim al Za'noon	0.6%	0.5%	0.7%
6) Jibreel al Rojoub	1.5%	1.6%	1.3%
7) Saeb Erikat	6.7%	5.8%	8.3%
8) Azzam al Ahmad	2.5%	1.1%	4.7%
9) Ahmad Qurie'	2.3%	2.2%	2.4%
10) Others	12.1%	13.5%	9.7%
11) DK/NA	13.8%	14.2%	13.1%

39-1) When Palestinians and Israelis return to final status negotiations the following items might be presented to negotiators as the elements of a permanent compromise settlement. Tell us what you think of each item then tell us what you think of all combined as one permanent status settlement

1. An Israeli **withdrawal** from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with the attached map {show map}.
2. An independent Palestinian state would be established in the areas from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state **will have no army**, but it will have a strong security force but an international multinational force would be deployed to insure the safety and security of the state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other.
3. **East Jerusalem** would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that will come under Israeli sovereignty.
4. With regard to the **refugee** question, both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those areas. The number of refugees returning to Israel will be based on the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees will be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of properties.
5. When the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the **end of the conflict** and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples 6. The Palestinian state will have **sovereignty** over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli will be allowed to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state for an indefinite period of time and its responsibility will be to insure the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including its international border crossings.

Now that you have been informed of each element of the permanent compromise settlement, tell us what you think of each of its item. Do you agree or disagree with it.

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>Item #1: withdrawal to 1967 borders with territorial swap</b>			
1) Strongly agree	10.8%	6.4%	18.1%
2) Agree	52.4%	49.2%	57.8%
3) Disagree	27.0%	33.0%	17.2%
4) Strongly disagree	8.7%	10.6%	5.7%
5) DK/NA	1.0%	0.8%	1.2%
<b>39-2) Item #2: a state without an army but with international forces</b>			
1) Strongly agree	3.9%	2.5%	6.2%
2) Agree	28.4%	30.9%	24.2%
3) Disagree	48.0%	50.9%	43.1%
4) Strongly disagree	18.9%	14.9%	25.6%
5) DK/NA	0.8%	0.8%	0.9%
<b>39-3) Item #3: East Jerusalem as capital of the state of Palestine after it is divided</b>			
1) Strongly agree	4.1%	2.5%	6.7%
2) Agree	35.9%	39.6%	29.9%
3) Disagree	42.3%	43.9%	39.9%
4) Strongly disagree	16.5%	13.2%	21.9%
5) DK/NA	1.2%	0.9%	1.7%
<b>39-4) Item #4: refugees with five options for permanent residence</b>			
1) Strongly agree	4.5%	2.3%	8.2%
2) Agree	40.5%	40.3%	40.8%
3) Disagree	38.2%	42.0%	31.9%
4) Strongly disagree	14.5%	13.7%	15.8%
5) DK/NA	2.3%	1.7%	3.4%
<b>39-5) Item #5: end of conflict</b>			
1) Strongly agree	11.3%	5.9%	20.2%
2) Agree	52.0%	53.5%	49.5%
3) Disagree	26.6%	31.3%	18.9%
4) Strongly disagree	8.8%	8.0%	10.2%
5) DK/NA	1.3%	1.4%	1.2%
<b>39-6) Item #6: a sovereign state with security arrangements</b>			
1) Strongly agree	9.5%	3.8%	19.0%
2) Agree	40.5%	39.7%	41.9%
3) Disagree	37.5%	43.8%	27.0%
4) Strongly disagree	11.6%	11.6%	11.6%
5) DK/NA	0.8%	1.0%	0.5%
<b>39-7) Item #7: the combined elements as one permanent status settlement</b>			
1) Strongly agree	7.1%	3.8%	12.4%
2) Agree	42.4%	43.5%	40.7%
3) Disagree	39.1%	42.7%	33.4%
4) Strongly disagree	9.8%	8.7%	11.6%
5) DK/NA	1.6%	1.3%	2.0%
<b>40) And what is the Palestinian majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support or oppose this combined final status package?</b>			
1) Majority supports	50.9%	48.2%	55.5%

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
2) Majority opposes	41.4%	43.2%	38.5%
3) DK/NA	7.7%	8.6%	6.0%
<b>41) And what is the Israeli majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Israelis support or oppose this combined final status package?</b>			
1) Majority supports	29.8%	28.7%	31.5%
2) Majority opposes	60.5%	62.5%	57.2%
3) DK/NA	9.8%	8.9%	11.3%
<b>42) Generally speaking is it possible or impossible to reach these days a final status settlement with Israel?</b>			
1) Definitely possible	3.5%	1.8%	6.3%
2) Think it is possible	33.3%	29.2%	40.1%
3) Think it is impossible	41.3%	44.9%	35.3%
4) definitely impossible	20.5%	23.4%	15.8%
5) DK/NA	1.4%	0.7%	2.5%
<b>43) Now more than 40 years after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, what in your view are the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years? Are they high, medium, low, or none existent?</b>			
1) None existent	22.0%	23.3%	19.9%
2) Low	41.2%	39.0%	44.7%
3) Medium	31.4%	33.3%	28.3%
4) High	4.3%	3.1%	6.2%
5) DK/NA	1.1%	1.2%	0.9%
<b>44) To what extent are you worried or not worried that you or a member of your family could be hurt by Israel in your daily life or that your land would be confiscated or home demolished?</b>			
1) Very Worried	26.4%	29.2%	21.7%
2) Worried	43.7%	43.2%	44.6%
3) Not worried	25.4%	24.5%	26.8%
4) Not worried at all	4.3%	3.0%	6.4%
5) DK/NA	0.3%	0.2%	0.5%
<b>45) What do you think are the aspirations of Israel for the long run?</b>			
1) Withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security	7.2%	6.7%	8.0%
2) Withdrawal form part of the occupied territories after guaranteeing its security	9.6%	9.0%	10.6%
3) Annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinian citizens	21.8%	19.5%	25.7%
4) Extending the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expelling its Arab citizens	60.2%	64.0%	54.0%
5) DK/NA	1.2%	0.8%	1.7%

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>46) According to the Saudi plan, Israel will retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and a Palestinian state will be established. The refugees' problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194 which allows return of refugees to Israel and compensation. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. Do you agree or disagree to this plan?</b>			
1) Certainly agree	5.5%	3.0%	9.5%
2) Agree	53.4%	56.2%	48.8%
3) Disagree	29.3%	31.4%	25.9%
4) Certainly Disagree	9.9%	7.2%	14.3%
5) DK/NA	1.9%	2.2%	1.4%
<b>47) There is a proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinians people. Do you agree or disagree to this proposal?</b>			
1) Certainly agree	4.5%	3.6%	5.9%
2) Agree	47.8%	52.6%	40.0%
3) Disagree	35.0%	35.3%	34.6%
4) Certainly Disagree	11.8%	8.0%	18.1%
5) DK/NA	0.8%	0.5%	1.4%
<b>48-1) Now that negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis have stopped, would you support or oppose the following option in the search for achieving Palestinian rights?</b>			
<b>Going to the Security Council to obtain a recognition of a Palestinian state</b>			
1) Certainly support	19.7%	16.5%	24.9%
2) Support	57.8%	61.9%	51.1%
3) Oppose	19.3%	19.1%	19.6%
4) Certainly oppose	2.5%	1.7%	3.9%
5) DK/NA	0.6%	0.8%	0.4%
<b>48-2) Unilaterally declare the establishment of a Palestinian state</b>			
1) Certainly support	13.0%	10.4%	17.4%
2) Support	45.4%	49.0%	39.6%
3) Oppose	36.6%	36.9%	36.2%
4) Certainly oppose	3.9%	2.7%	5.7%
5) DK/NA	1.0%	1.0%	1.1%
<b>48-3) Abandon the two state solution and demand the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis</b>			
1) Certainly support	4.1%	2.7%	6.3%
2) Support	24.0%	26.3%	20.4%
3) Oppose	55.8%	58.8%	51.0%
4) Certainly oppose	14.8%	10.9%	21.1%
5) DK/NA	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%
<b>48-4) Resort to popular non violent and unarmed resistance</b>			
1) Certainly support	8.0%	5.0%	13.1%
2) Support	53.0%	57.0%	46.4%

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
3) Oppose	31.8%	34.2%	27.9%
4) Certainly oppose	6.2%	3.1%	11.2%
5) DK/NA	1.0%	0.7%	1.4%
<b>48-5) Return to the armed intifada and confrontations</b>			
1) Certainly support	9.7%	6.1%	15.7%
2) Support	31.4%	24.9%	42.2%
3) Oppose	49.1%	59.2%	32.4%
4) Certainly oppose	8.5%	8.7%	8.2%
5) DK/NA	1.3%	1.1%	1.5%
<b>48-6) Dissolve the Palestinian Authority</b>			
1) Certainly support	6.4%	3.4%	11.4%
2) Support	27.5%	28.7%	25.4%
3) Oppose	48.7%	51.9%	43.4%
4) Certainly oppose	15.9%	14.7%	18.0%
5) DK/NA	1.5%	1.4%	1.8%
<b>49) If the Palestinian side unilaterally declares the establishment of a Palestinian state without an agreement with Israel, do you think such a declaration will lead to actual change on the current conditions in the Palestinian areas with regard to settlements and control of the occupation forces over roads and crossings in the West Bank?</b>			
1) Certainly lead to positive change	1.9%	1.6%	2.5%
2) Will lead to change to the better	23.3%	22.9%	24.0%
3) Will not lead to any change, positive or negative	27.1%	20.2%	38.3%
4) Will lead to negative change	36.2%	42.4%	26.0%
5) Certainly will lead to negative change	8.8%	10.0%	6.8%
6) DK/NA	2.7%	2.9%	2.5%
<b>50) If the Palestinian side unilaterally declared an independent Palestinian state or after the General Assembly recognizes Palestine as a state, do you think the PA president and his government should enforce Palestinian sovereignty over all the territories of the West Bank, for example by opening roads in area C or by starting to build an airport in the Jordan valley, or by deploying Palestinian security forces in area C, even if this lead to confrontation with the Israeli occupation forces and settlers?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	10.9%	9.4%	13.3%
2) Yes	55.6%	56.2%	54.6%
3) No	24.9%	27.3%	21.0%
4) Certainly no	5.0%	5.0%	4.9%
5) DK/NA	3.6%	2.0%	6.3%
<b>51) If the Palestinian side unilaterally declared an independent Palestinian state or after the General Assembly recognizes Palestine as a state, do you think the Palestinian side should insist on assuming control of the Allenby Bridge terminal from the Israeli side even if this lead to the closure of the terminal and the cessation of Palestinian movement across the bridge to and from Jordan?</b>			
1) certainly yes	14.6%	13.2%	16.9%
2) yes	56.1%	56.6%	55.3%
3) no	21.9%	23.7%	18.9%

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
4) certainly no	3.7%	4.0%	3.1%
5) DK/NA	3.8%	2.6%	5.8%
<b>52) In light of the successes achieved by the peaceful revolts in Arab countries like Egypt and Tunisia, do you think that if a peaceful popular revolution is to erupt against the occupation and the settlements in the West Bank it would be capable of ending occupation or stopping settlements?</b>			
1) Certainly capable	5.0%	2.7%	8.9%
2) Capable	31.3%	27.2%	38.0%
3) Incapable	49.6%	56.6%	38.1%
4) Certainly incapable	11.5%	12.1%	10.6%
5) DK/NA	2.6%	1.5%	4.4%
<b>53) If no agreement is reached on the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and armed confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis erupted, do you think they will help achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not?</b>			
1) Certainly they will help	7.5%	5.1%	11.5%
2) Will help	41.1%	37.5%	47.1%
3) Will not help	42.0%	47.3%	33.2%
4) Certainly they will not help	6.6%	7.1%	5.9%
5) DK/NA	2.8%	3.1%	2.4%
<b>54) Palestine has been recognized as a member state in UNESCO. Do you think such recognition confer any practical benefits for the Palestinians?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	13.3%	13.3%	13.4%
2) Yes	54.2%	56.0%	51.1%
3) No	20.7%	22.1%	18.4%
4) Certainly no	6.9%	4.8%	10.2%
5) DK/NA	5.0%	3.9%	6.8%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>West Bank</b>	<b>Gaza Strip</b>
<b>55) After the Palestinian failure to obtain a majority vote at the Security Council thereby failing to gain full membership at the UN, do you think the Palestinian side should seek instead to upgrade the status of the PLO to an observer state by seeking a General Assembly vote?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	9.7%	9.2%	10.5%
2) Yes	53.7%	58.6%	45.6%
3) No	25.8%	25.4%	26.6%
4) Certainly no	5.2%	3.9%	7.2%
5) DK/NA	5.6%	2.9%	10.1%
<b>56) Israel threatens now and then to suspend transfer of Palestinian custom funds. Do you think Israel will suspend the transfer if the General Assembly recognized Palestine as a state?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	20.2%	20.0%	20.6%
2) Yes	57.2%	57.1%	57.3%
3) No	17.7%	18.5%	16.5%
4) Certainly no	1.8%	2.0%	1.4%
5) DK/NA	3.1%	2.4%	4.2%
<b>57) In your view, will a state of Palestine become or will not become a member of the UN next year in 2012?</b>			
1) Certainly will become a UN	5.2%	3.1%	8.6%

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
member			
2) Will become a UN member	47.0%	48.2%	44.9%
3) Will not become a UN member	35.9%	37.4%	33.6%
4) Certainly will not become a member	6.4%	5.7%	7.6%
5) DK/NA	5.5%	5.6%	5.3%
<b>58) President Abbas says that there is no point in returning to negotiations without an acceptable term of reference (i.e., return to lines of 1967 with swaps) or a freeze on settlement construction and that he intends to go to the UN ONE MORE TIME to seek a recognition of a Palestinian state. Do you support or oppose this Palestinian intention?</b>			
1) Certainly support	14.3%	12.1%	17.9%
2) Support	63.5%	70.5%	51.9%
3) Oppose	17.0%	14.0%	22.0%
4) Certainly oppose	3.2%	2.0%	5.2%
5) DK/NA	2.0%	1.4%	3.0%
<b>59) And after the UN issues its recognition of the Palestinian state how do you think Palestinians can force the Israelis to withdraw from the territories of the Palestinian state?</b>			
1) Popular peaceful demonstrations that would break through check points and block roads used by army and settlers	31.4%	27.2%	38.2%
2) Armed attacks on army and settlers	29.9%	24.6%	38.5%
3) Return to negotiations with the Israeli government	31.8%	39.9%	18.5%
4) Other (specify: ----- )	2.3%	3.2%	0.9%
5) DK/NA	4.6%	5.1%	3.8%
<b>60) After the recognition of the Palestinian state in September, if large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and Jerusalem in order to break through check points and close army and settler roads, do you think you will participate in such demonstrations? [to be asked only to West Bank including East Jerusalem residents]</b>			
1) Certainly yes	13.8%	13.8%	0.0%
2) Yes	41.1%	41.1%	0.0%
3) No	37.2%	37.2%	0.0%
4) Certainly no	6.4%	6.4%	0.0%
5) DK/NA	1.6%	1.6%	0.0%
<b>61) If such large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, do you think they would contribute to speeding the process of ending Israeli occupation?</b>			
1) C yes	6.5%	4.4%	10.0%
2) Yes	45.0%	40.0%	53.3%
3) No	37.7%	45.8%	24.5%
4) Certainly no	8.4%	8.0%	9.2%
5) DK/NA	2.3%	1.8%	3.0%
<b>62) Given the big electoral victories achieved by Islamists in the first round of</b>			

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>Egyptian elections, what do you expect to happen now regarding the relationship between Egypt and Israel or regarding the peace treaty between the two countries? For example, do you expect that:</b>			
1) Egypt and Israel will return to armed conflict and peace treaty will be cancelled	14.8%	14.1%	15.9%
2) After the elections, the Egyptian government will work to cancel the peace treaty but there will be no return to armed conflict	24.3%	18.8%	33.2%
3) After the elections, the Egyptian government will respect the peace treaty and will improve relations with Israel	17.1%	14.2%	21.8%
4) There will be no change in the relationship between Egypt and Israel or with regard to the peace treaty	43.2%	51.7%	29.1%
5) DK/NA	0.7%	1.2%	0.0%
<b>63) Lately, there has been talk about an Israeli military strike against Iran's facilities, do you think that Israeli will actually carry out such strike in the coming months?</b>			
1) Certainly will strike	6.4%	5.1%	8.5%
2) Will strike	41.3%	40.1%	43.3%
3) Will not strike	38.2%	41.2%	33.4%
4) Certainly will not strike	9.8%	8.8%	11.4%
5) DK/NA	4.3%	4.8%	3.3%
<b>64) If Israel were to carry out a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, what do you think will happen after that?</b>			
1) Iran alone will retaliate by striking back against Israel proper	23.3%	19.6%	29.4%
2) Iran and Hizballah will retaliate by striking back against Israel	56.4%	60.8%	49.1%
3) Hizballah alone will retaliate by striking back against Israel	8.7%	8.1%	9.6%
4) Neither Iran nor Hizballah will retaliate by striking back against Israel proper	8.5%	8.3%	8.8%
5) DK/NA	3.1%	3.2%	3.1%
<b>65) If Israel were to carry out a military strike against Iran, do you think Hamas and Islamic Jihad should retaliate by carrying out a military strike against Israel?</b>			
1) Certainly yes	11.5%	11.5%	11.4%
2) Yes	36.5%	40.6%	29.8%
3) No	33.2%	33.6%	32.6%
4) Certainly no	12.6%	7.7%	20.7%
5) DK/NA	6.2%	6.6%	5.5%
<b>66) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I....</b>			
1) Certainly support	10.2%	4.8%	19.1%
2) Support	35.5%	30.7%	43.4%



	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
3) Oppose	45.2%	52.5%	33.3%
4) Certainly oppose	7.2%	10.1%	2.4%
5) DK/NA	1.9%	1.9%	1.8%
<b>67) Which of the following political parties do you support?</b>			
1) PPP	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
2) PFLP	3.2%	3.2%	3.3%
3) Fateh	36.3%	35.0%	38.4%
4) Hamas	19.7%	16.5%	25.0%
5) DFLP	0.5%	0.3%	0.7%
6) Islamic Jihad	2.6%	1.5%	4.4%
7) Fida	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%
8) National Initiative (Almubadara)	1.3%	1.6%	0.7%
9) Independent Islamist	1.6%	1.1%	2.4%
10) Independent nationalist	2.6%	2.3%	3.3%
11) Third way headed by Salam Fayyad	1.2%	1.4%	0.9%
12) None of the above	30.5%	36.5%	20.6%
13) Others	0.4%	0.6%	0.0%
<b>68) If you use the internet to surf social sites like Facebook, Twitter, and various groups or to access email, how many times do you normally do that?</b>			
1) More than once a day	8.5%	6.1%	12.5%
2) Daily	19.3%	15.3%	25.8%
3) Between 2-5 times weekly	10.4%	8.4%	13.6%
4) Once a week	6.5%	7.1%	5.7%
5) Once a month	4.6%	5.8%	2.6%
6) Others (specify -----)	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%
7) Does not apply—I have no email and do not visit social sites	50.5%	57.2%	39.6%