The West Bank and Gaza Strip, September 29-30, 1994
Evaluation of Palestinian National Authority (PNA)The poll results confirm that Palestinians are giving the PNA the benefit of the doubt. A total of 40.8% said that it is early to make any judgement about the performance of the PNA. A total of 30.9% gave the PNA a positive evaluation where they said that they are satisfied with its performance. In contrast, 21.2% said they they are dissatisfied. A similar satisfaction rate exists in both the West Bank (30%) and Gaza Strip (32.1%). However, dissatisfaction in the Gaza Strip is higher, where 26.5% said that they are dissatisfied. This is compared with 17.6% in the West Bank.
The results obtained from the Gaza Strip portray a significant degree of polarization. Residents of Gaza City are most satisfied with the PNA, while the residents of the southern part of the Gaza Strip (ie., Rafah) are most dissatisfied. Only 16.5% of the residents in this area said that they are satisfied with the performance of the PNA, compared with 42% in Gaza City. Positive evaluation for the PNA can be found in the north of the West Bank (i.e., Jenin and Nablus). In Jericho, however, there is a split where 26% said that they are dissatisfied and 22% said that they are satisfied. It is interesting to notice the differences in the various regions in the Gaza Strip and to compare the situation in Gaza City with that of Jericho where people are less satisfied with the PNA. This is possibly due to the fact that most of the PNA activities are seen and felt most in Gaza City and not in Jericho or in the rest of the Gaza Strip .
Table 10
Area of Residence by Evaluation of PNA Performance
Satisfied % Not Satisfied % Too Early % No Opinion %
Nablus 32.5 13.7 46.2 7.6
Tulkarm 24.0 14.6 52.1 9.3
Jenin 40.6 12.5 36.5 10.4
Jericho 21.7 26.1 52.2 ---
Ramallah 23.5 20.2 47.9 8.4
Hebron 37.2 22.1 31.7 9.0
Bethlehem 24.4 19.2 44.9 11.5
Jerusalem 25.0 17.1 42.1 15.8
Gaza North 37.0 32.6 26.8 3.6
Gaza City 41.8 13.5 41.1 3.6
Gaza Middle 29.2 23.9 43.4 3.5
Gaza South 16.5 38.5 42.2 2.8
Satifaction with the PNA is high among farmers (43.8%), the unemployed (38.1%), and housewives (34%). Dissatisfaction is higher among employees where 29.6% of them said that they are dissatisfied and 20.2% said that they are satisfied.Evaluation of the PNA is also correlated with place of residence where the results show that villagers are most supportive followed by residents of refugee camps, cities, and towns. It is also noticeable that there is an inverse relationship between education and satisfaction with the PNA. A total of 37.5% of those with less than 9 years of education said that they are satisfied. This is compared with 17.6% among those with a bachelors degree.
The poll results show that satisfaction with the PNA is correlated with political affiliation where supporters of Feda and Fateh are most satisfied with the PNA. It is however noticeable that 46.7% of the suppporters of People's Party are dissatisfied with the performance of the PNA. (Table 11)
Table 11
Political Affiliation by Evaluation of the PNA
Satisfied % Not Satisfied % Too Early % No Opinion %
PFLP 10.6 53.2 29.8 6.4
Fateh 48.0 8.5 38.7 4.8
Islamic Jihad 16.2 48.6 35.2 ---
PPP 20.0 46.7 33.3 ---
Hamas 16.9 33.1 38.7 11.3
DFLP 13.3 40.0 40.0 6.7
Feda 50.0 8.3 33.3 8.4
Islamic Inds 13.6 13.6 63.6 9.2
Nationalist Inds 16.9 26.8 49.3 7.0
Others 23.7 22.9 46.6 6.8
No One 21.6 23.5 42.0 12.9
Evaluation of the oppositionPalestinians are generally dissatisfied with the performance of the opposition. A total of 33.5% said that they are dissatisfied and 33.1% said that it is early to evaluate its performance. Only 19.5% declared that they are satisfied with the performance of the opposition. Satisfaction with the performance of the opposition in the West Bank is slightly higher than in Gaza.
It is interesting to find that dissatisaction with the performance of the opposition is also high among supporters of the opposition groups. For example, 33% of PFLP supporters and 27% of Islamic Jihad supporters are dissatisfied. (Table 12)
Table 12
Political Affiliation by Evaluation of Opposition
Satisfied % Not Satisfied % Too Early % No Opinion %
PFLP 40.4 33.0 22.3 4.3
Fateh 16.3 40.4 28.3 15.0
Islamic Jihad 27.0 27.0 29.7 16.2
PPP 13.3 40.0 46.7 ---
Hamas 30.1 25.2 31.7 13.0
DFLP 33.3 26.7 40.0 ---
Feda 25.0 33.3 41.7 ---
Islamic Inds 11.4 22.7 45.5 20.5
Nationalist Inds 14.1 43.7 33.8 8.5
Others 17.7 27.7 44.6 10.0
No One 14.2 23.5 38.9 23.5
Students and merchants are most satisfied with the performance of the opposition and farmers and specialists are most dissatisfied. Evaluation of the opposition is correlated with place of residence where dissatisfaction is higher among town residents followed by city, village, and refugee camp residents.
Armed OperationsPalestinians were asked about their position regarding armed operations by some Palestinian factions against Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. A total of 32.7% of the respondents said that they support the continuation of such operations while 55.8% said that they don't support such continuation. Only 11.5% said that they have no opinion on the subject. Support for the continuation of armed operations against Israeli targets is higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. A total of 38.8% of Gazans said that they support the operations, compared with 28.6% in the West Bank. West Bankers may not be as supportive because they fear that these operations could bring a halt to the negotiations before the West Bank joins Gaza and Jericho under Palestinian authority. There are also more refugee camp residents in Gaza than in the West Bank, and there is more support for the operations in refugee camps than elsewhere, as discussed below. There is a correlation between area of residence and view of armed operations against Israeli targets. Support for the continuation of these operations is higher in the north and south of Gaza. (Table 13) The least support, however, is in Gaza City itself. There is less support for such operations in the north of the West Bank than in the south.
Table 13
Area of Residence by Support for Armed Operations in Gaza and Jericho
Yes % No % No Opinion %
Nablus 22.4 69.0 8.6
Tulkarm 20.8 62.5 16.7
Jenin 20.2 71.3 5.5
Jericho 21.7 52.2 26.1
Ramallah 29.4 56.3 14.3
Hebron 37.2 49.7 13.1
Bethlehem 38.5 48.7 21.8
Jerusalem 31.6 61.8 6.6
Gaza North 53.3 40.1 6.6
Gaza City 19.3 64.3 16.4
Gaza Middle 38.9 54.9 6.2
Gaza South 45.9 41.3 12.8
The poll results show an inverse relation between age and support for armed operations where 41.2% of the age group 18-22 declared their support for the continuation of these operations. In contrast, 22.4% of those over 50 declared their support for such operations. It is also correlated with education where support for the continuation is higher among the educated, for example 39.2% of those with 2-year college supported the continuation of armed operations compared with 29.4% among those with 9 years of education or less. The most support for armed operations is in refugee camps. However, this support is roughly equal to opposition, where 44.9% of refugee camp residents support the continuation and 44.5% oppose it. The least support for the continuation is among town residents followed by city and village residents.Palestinians were asked about their position regarding the preferred extent of the participation of women in elections. The choices for this question were: participation through voting, candidacy, and a number of seats reserved for women; voting and candidacy only; voting only; and no participation at all. A total of 54% of respondents chose the first option, 17.8% the second, and 16.1% the third. Only 12.1% said that women should not participate at all in elections. Support for the participation of women is higher in the West Bank than in Gaza. Of the West Bank respondents, 57.2% chose the first option, compared with 49.3% in Gaza. The only significant difference between genders was in the first option, with more women (58.4%) choosing this option than men (49.7%).
Table 14
Gender by Attitude Towards Extent of Participation of Women in Elections
Voting, Voting and Voting Only % No
Candidacy, and Candidacy % Participation %
Quota %
Male 49.7 19.1 17.6 13.6
Female 58.4 16.5 14.6 10.5
There is a direct correlation between education and support for the participation of women in elections. With regards to occupation, the retired are more supportive of the first option, followed by students and employees. In contrast, 21.9% of farmers in the sample said that women should not participate in any form. The north of the West Bank is less supportive of women's participation than the middle and south. In Gaza, however, support for women's participation is higher in the north than in the center and south. In regard to political affiliation, support for women's participation is higher among the supporters of the People's Party, PFLP, Feda, and DFLP. They are followed by Fateh, nationalist independents, Islamic independents, and "others." The least support is found in Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and "no one."Table 15
Poliical Affiliation by Attitude Towards Extent of Participation of Women in Elections
Voting, Voting and Voting Only % No
Candidacy, and Candidacy % Participation %
Quota %
PFLP 78.7 10.6 2.1 8.6
Fateh 57.6 21.2 11.6 9.6
Islamic Jihad 37.8 24.3 21.6 16.3
PPP 73.3 26.7 --- ---
Hamas 37.9 9.7 32.3 20.1
DFLP 66.7 6.7 20.0 6.6
Fida 100.0 --- --- ---
Islamic Inds 52.3 15.9 22.7 9.1
Nationalist Inds 59.2 21.1 12.7 7.0
Other 46.9 22.3 21.5 9.3
No One 42.8 12.6 22.6 22.0
Palestinian-Jordanian Future RelationsThe poll results indicate that the majority (60.5%) of Palestinians support an independent Palestinian state as opposed to a complete union with Jordan (20.9%) or a confederation (16.3%). Support for independence is much higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. In Gaza 72.7% supported such an option, compared with 52.3% in the West Bank. There are 46.4% of West Bank respondents supportive of complete union (26.4%) or confederation (19.0%). Support for a union with Jordan is highest in Nablus, Tulkarm, and Hebron. Traditionally these cities have shown strong pro-Jordanian tendencies due to close family and commercial ties. Support for a confederation is strongest in Jerusalem.
Table 16
Area of Residence by Attitude Towards Palestinian-Jordanian Future Relations
Two States % Complete Unity % Confederation % Other %
Nablus 39.7 31.9 22.4 6.0
Tulkarm 49.0 31.3 19.7 ---
Jenin 56.3 25.0 16.7 2.0
Jericho 52.2 21.7 26.1 ---
Ramallah 63.0 16.8 17.6 2.6
Hebron 55.9 33.8 9.0 1.3
Bethlehem 60.3 16.7 21.8 1.2
Jerusalem 39.2 25.7 32.4 2.7
Gaza North 72.3 12.4 8.8 6.5
Gaza City 75.2 12.8 11.3 0.7
Gaza Middle 67.3 14.2 17.7 0.8
Gaza South 75.2 11.0 11.0 1.8
There is a direct correlation between age and support for a form of unity with Jordan, as indicated by Table 17.Table 17
Age by Attitude Towards Future Palestinian-Jordanian Relations
Two States % Complete Unity % Confederation % Other %
18-22 68.7 15.7 13.6 2.0
23-26 71.3 15.6 11.9 1.2
27-30 66.1 13.6 14.7 5.6
31-35 61.6 14.6 19.8 4.0
36-42 54.0 24.7 19.3 2.0
43-50 58.7 25.8 15.5 ---
51+ 41.5 36.5 20.0 2.0
Support for union with Jordan is higher among the least educated, the retired, specialists, farmers, and among town residents. The results of the poll show that PFLP supporters are most supportive of independence, while Islamic independents and supporters of Feda are most supportive of a form of unity with Jordan.Table 18
Political Affiliation by Attitude Towards Future Palestinian-Jordanian Relations
Two States % Complete Unity % Confederation % Other %
PFLP 80.9 8.5 7.4 3.2
Fateh 61.8 17.7 19.0 1.5
Islamic Jihad 59.5 21.6 10.8 8.1
PPP 73.3 13.3 13.3 ---
Hamas 64.5 21.0 12.1 2.4
DFLP 53.3 33.3 13.3 ---
Fida 50.0 33.3 16.7 ---
Islamic Inds 47.7 34.1 15.9 2.3
Nationalist Inds 62.0 18.3 19.7 ---
Other 55.0 25.2 16.8 3.4
No One 49.7 29.8 15.5 5.0
ElectionsThe poll results indicate that consistent with previous findings, 79% of respondents prefer elections as the means to select their representatives. Only 12.4% preferred appointment by the PLO. With regards to participation in the elections, 74.1% indicated their intention to participate. This is a higher percentage than what was obtained in the previous poll in August, where 65.1% indicated their intention to participate. It is interesting to find that supporters of the opposition are intending to participate as well, as indicated by Table 19.
Table 19
Political Affiliation by Intention to Participate in Elections
Yes % No % Not Sure %
PFLP 63.8 28.7 7.5
Fateh 86.5 7.6 5.9
Islamic Jihad 54.1 21.6 24.3
PPP 100.0 --- ---
Hamas 60.5 25.0 14.5
DFLP 46.7 26.7 26.7
Fida 91.7 8.3 ---
Islamic Inds 79.5 13.6 6.9
Nationalist Inds 77.5 8.5 14.0
Other 75.4 10.0 14.6
No One 51.2 31.5 17.3
Political AffiliationThe results of the poll indicate an increase (3.8%) in the popularity of Fateh among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, we notice a decline (3.8%) in the popularity of Hamas and an increase (1.3%) in the popularity of PFLP. Independents and others seem to comprise 1/3 of the Palestinian community where 33.1% of the respondents indicated that they support Islamic independents, nationalist independents, others, or no one.
It was noticeable that the percentage of support for Hamas in this poll stands at 10.7%, less than the average support it enjoyed in previous CPRS polls, where for example, support for Hamas in August was 13.9%. This difference of 3.8% is close to the margin of error (3%) and it might not have any statistical significance, which is to say that the popularity of Hamas as indicated in this poll is an expression of this specific sample that we obtained through household interviews and if we repeat the process of sampling we will probably be able to obtain the percentage for average support for Hamas (other variables held constant). Therefore, from a scientific perspective, there is no basis for exaggerating this decline. For example, the popularity of Fateh has ranged from 46% to 34% (a difference of 12%) where in some areas at certain times its popularity has reached 20%, but on average, its popularity has been 40%.
The decline in the popularity of Hamas is in part due to fear as the current political changes have created an atmosphere of uncertainty. In addition, the sample distribution that resulted from household interviews (not public forum) is the main factor that led to the decline in the representation of Hamas (the increase in the popularity of Fateh, independents, and others) among the respondents. It was clear that there was an increase in the representation of some social groups at the expense of other social groups. For example, the groups that gained higher representation are housewives ([[arrowup]] 18%), older individuals (defined as 43 and over, [[arrowup]]10%), and those with the least education (defined as 12 years or less of education, [[arrowup]]16%). The results of previous polls and the current poll indicate that these groups tend to affiliate with the mainstream in Palestinian society, i.e. Fateh and tend to be less politicized where they would tend to select options such as "others" and "no one." As for the groups whose representation declined in the current sample, they are the young (defined as 18-22 years, [[arrowdown]]7%), students ([[arrowdown]]2.7), college and university graduates ([[arrowdown]]13.6%), and village residents ([[arrowdown]]6%). These groups more than others tend to support Hamas and the opposition in general than the members of the other groups. For example, support for the opposition among students is roughly equal to support for Fateh among students.
The changes in the current sample representation rates described above actually allowed for a more representative sample of the Palestinian community as a whole, as compared with the existing data on Palestinian society. (Palestine Population Handbook, Ziad Abdeen and Hasan Abu-Libdeh, Jerusalem, 1993; Statistical Abstract of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 1992; Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank, and Arab Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions, FAFO, 1993)
AgeTable 20 shows the sample distribution obtained through household interviews (September 1994) and compares it with the June 1994 poll obtained primarily through public forum interviews and with the existing statistics.
Table 20
Age Sample Distribution
West Gaza
Bank % Strip
Sept June Sept June
Age 1994 1994 1992 1994 1994 1992
18-22 19.7 23.3 21.8 20.6 18.1 22.4 23-26 11.4 18.1 16.4 15.0 19.6 17.1 27-30 12.9 16.9 14.5 16.2 15.4 13.6 31-35 12.2 12.3 13.0 12.0 12.3 11.3 36-42 10.3 11.2 08.0 14.6 13.9 11.2 43-50 13.0 08.8 06.7 11.6 09.9 6.4 51+ 20.4 09.2 19.6 10.2 10.8 18.0
The table shows a closer representation to the actual demographic figures in this sample than in the previous one. If we weight the sample to correct for discrepancies, the popularity of Hamas will increase slightly, reaching 11%.Gender
Table 21 shows an almost equal representation of men and women in the current sample, which almost perfectly matches the demographic figures.
Table 21
Gender Sample Distribution
Male Female Sept June Society Sept June Society 1994 % 1994 % 1992/3% 1994 % 1994 % 1992/3 % 50.3 58.8 50.2 49.7 41.2 49.8
EducationTable 22 shows that the representation of the least educated in our current sample has increased to become closer to that of society. However, the representation of the educated in the sample is still higher than that found in society. The educated tend to vote for Hamas more than the uneducated as shown in previous polls. If we weight for this variable, there will be a slight decline (0.1%) in Hamas support.
Table 22
Education Sample Distribution
Years of September 1994 % June 1994 % Society Education 1992/3 % 0-9 30.2 44.9 62.8 10-12 32.6 32.2 27.2 13+ 37.2 22.9 10.0
It is clear that part of the decline in Hamas support can be attributed to sample selection procedures, underlying the importance of sample selection and other issues of methodology in assessing credibility of survey results.
1. One year after the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles (Oslo Agreement) my general economic situation has
Total West Bank Gaza
a. Improved 09.2% 07.5% 11.8% b. Worsened 40.8% 35.6% 48.5% c. Not changed 50.0% 56.9% 39.7%
2. With regard to the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, one year after the signing of the Declaration of Principles (Oslo Agreement),
a. My support for the Israeli- 23.3% 24.0% 22.3% PLO negotiations has increased. b. My support for the Israeli- 17.2% 15.0% 20.5% PLO negotiations has decreased. c. My position has not changed 20.1% 17.7% 23.7% and I am still opposed to the negotiations. d. My position has not changed 28.5% 30.3% 25.7% and I am still supportive of the negotiations. e. I don't Know 10.9% 13.0% 07.8%
3. With regard to the performance of the Palestinian National Authority, four months after its establishment,
a. I am satisfied with it 30.9% 30.0% 32.1% b. I am not satisfied with it 21.2% 17.6% 26.5% c. It is too early to judge it 40.8% 42.7% 38.0% d. I have no opinion 07.1% 09.7% 03.4%
4. With regard to the performance of the opposition four months after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in Gaza and Jericho,
a. I am satisfied with it 19.5% 17.5% 22.6% b. I am not satisfied with it 33.5% 35.3% 30.9% c. It is too early to judge it 33.1% 31.7% 35.1% d. I have no opinion 13.9% 15.5% 11.4%
5. Do you support the continuing resort of some Palestinian factions to armed operations against Israeli targets in Gaza and Jericho?
a. Yes 32.7% 28.6% 38.8% b. No 55.7% 59.2% 50.6% c. No opinion 11.6% 12.2% 10.6%
6. With regard to the role of Palestinian women in the coming political elections...
a. I support their participation 54.0% 57.2% 49.3% through voting, candidacy, and a guaranteed number of seats. b. I support their participation 17.8% 18.4% 16.9% through voting and candidacy. c. I support their participation 16.1% 12.9% 20.9% through voting only. d. I do not support their participation 12.1% 11.5% 12.9%in any form.
7. With regard to future Palestinian-Jordanian relations, I support the establishment of...
a. Two independent states: 60.5% 52.3% 72.7% Palestine and Jordan. b. Complete unity between Jordan 20.9% 26.4% 12.6% and Palestine. c. Confederation between Jordan 16.3% 19.0% 12.2% and Palestine. d. Other (specify) 02.3% 02.3% 02.5%
8. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose the members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?
a. Appointment by PLO leadership 12.4% 13.8% 10.2% b. Appointment by political groups 05.6% 05.6% 05.6% on a quota basis. c. Political Elections 79.0% 77.3% 81.6% d. Other 03.0% 03.3% 02.6%
9. Will you participate in the election for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?
a. Yes 74.1% 75.0% 72.8% b. No 15.3% 16.5% 13.6% c. Not sure 10.6% 08.5% 13.6%
10. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:
a. PFLP 07.6% 07.1% 08.5% b. Fateh 42.8% 44.6% 40.0% c. Islamic Jihad 03.0% 02.6% 03.6% d. People's Party (Hizb el-Sha'b) 01.2% 00.8% 01.8% e. Hamas 10.1% 08.7% 12.1% f. DFLP 01.2% 01.6% 00.6% g. Feda 01.0% 01.2% 00.6% h. Islamic independents 03.6% 03.0% 04.4% i. Nationalist independents 05.8% 05.3% 06.5% j. Other (specify) 10.6% 10.4% 11.0% k. None of the above 13.1% 14.7% 10.9%
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