CPRS Polls - Survey Research Unit
Public Opinion Poll #9
The Palestinian-Israeli Agreement, the Palestinian National Authority, and Elections
May 31, 1994
Future Outlook

The initial implementation of the Gaza-Jericho First agreement led to a degree of optimism in the Occupied Territories. A total of 29.5% of Palestinians declared that they are optimistic and another 36.9% said that they are somewhat optimistic. Consistent with our previous polls, we find a difference between the West Bank and Gaza. While 41.9% of Gazans showed an optimistic outlook, only 22.9% of West Bankers felt the same way. The higher rate of optimism in Gaza may be due to a number of factors, including the following:

  1. The initial implementation of the agreement and the withdrawal of the Israeli military to the agreed-upon locations. The arrival of the Palestinian police and their reunion with their families led to a general mood of optimism. In addition, the release of hundreds of political prisoners called for celebrations in the streets of Gaza. The same can be said about Jericho, where optimism is even higher than in Gaza.

  2. Future outlook is correlated by political affiliation. Fateh supporters are most optimistic. These supporters can be found in Gaza more than in the West Bank.

  3. The poll shows a correlation between education and occupation on the one hand and future outlook on the other hand. Optimism decreases with higher education. Housewives, relatively less educated than other groups, are more optimistic. This group is represented in the Gaza sample more than in the West Bank sample.

Palestinian Concerns

Palestinians were asked to evaluate the importance of a number of relevant issues. The poll shows that their primary concern is with unemployment and the present economic living conditions. A total of 86.2% of Palestinians felt that unemployment is a very important issue. Their second choice is related to the possible inability of the PNA to keep law and public order, with 66.7% stating that this is a very important concern. Palestinians are also concerned with the possibility of the PNA oppressing the opposition. A total of 54.8% said that this is a very important concern, and another 20.6% said that it is somewhat important. Concerning the possibility of competition between the "inside" and the returnees, 44.7% of Palestinians surveyed stated that it is a very important concern. This is followed by a concern with Palestinian women losing rights and opportunities under the PNA, with 41.2% declaring that this is a very important concern.

In relation to the issue of women's rights and opportunities, 43% of Palestinians surveyed expected that rights and opportunities for Palestinian women will increase under Palestinian authority. Only 11.3% expected that women's rights will deteriorate and another 27.3% expected that the situation will not change. We find no difference between the expectations of women and those of men in this regard. However, a wide gap exists between Gaza and the West Bank, where only 35.1% of West Bankers feel that the situation will improve, compared with 57.6% in Gaza. This may be a reflection of the recent political changes in Gaza where a Palestinian authority is expected to take charge of the general situation and create laws that will protect women's rights. This is in contrast to the years of the intifada where different political groups in Gaza placed a number of constraints on women's movements, dress, and general participation. The results may also be an indication of the way the PNA is politically perceived. Those in the opposition do not trust the PNA to make improvements in the general situation of women. The majority of those in supporting groups believe that women's rights will improve under a Palestinian authority.

The Future of the West Bank

Palestinians were asked about their expectations of the future of the West Bank in relation to the PNA. Only 13.1% expected that the rest of the West Bank will join Gaza and Jericho under a Palestinian authority within a few months. A total of 20% expected that this would take place in less than three years, another 25.4% of Palestinians surveyed expected that this will only take place in three years or more, and another 22.4% expected that Palestinian authority will not be extended over the rest of the West Bank.

The results could be an indication that Palestinians are misinformed about the agreement, which states that elections, dissolution of the civil administration, withdrawal of the military government, and the redeployment of the Israeli army outside populated areas in the rest of the west Bank should take place no later than nine months after the DoP enters into force. The DoP entered into force on October 13, 1993. However, one might argue that the responses presented here are expressing the actual expectations of Palestinians, where the negotiation process left many Palestinians doubtful about the seriousness of Israel in implementing the agreements and about the ability of the PLO to press Israel into that.

Table 3

Relationship Between Following News and Expectations of West Bank Future

              Soon (weeks   Less than 3   3 Years or    Never %       Don't Know %  
              or months) %  Years %       More %                                    
Always        15.8          23.3          24.5          20.4          16.0          
Often         8.6           19.4          26.0          25.4          20.6          
Sometimes     14.7          17.5          27.8          21.0          20.0          
Never         10.6          8.5           17.0          25.5          38.4          

Table 3 demonstrates that whether Palestinians follow the news or not really has no bearing on their expectations regarding the future of the West Bank. Again, it is not clear from this information alone whether Palestinians are aware of the specific terms of the agreement in this regard or not. There are three factors at work in this question: whether Palestinians receive and understand the news or not, whether the news media actually present accurate information or not, and whether Palestinians formulate their expectations because of or in spite of the information they receive.

Palestinian Police and Security Forces

The majority of respondents (50.6%) believe that the Palestinian police will treat all Palestinians equally. Only 16.8% felt that the police will oppress the Palestinian opposition. The difference between the West Bank and Gaza is further affirmed here where 61.4% of Gazans felt that the police will be fair and only 44.8% of West Bankers felt the same way.

In Gaza, the Palestinian police is visible and trying to bring public order to the streets. The need for immediate stability in Gaza resulted in a hope for harmony between the police and all political groups. Gazans witnessed a warm welcome for the police by all groups, including Hamas, where 33.5% of its supporters in the West Bank and Gaza felt that the Palestinian police will treat all Palestinians equally (See Table 4). Among Hamas supporters in Gaza, there was a major shift in attitudes towards the police. In December, 53% of Gaza Hamas supporters said that the police will oppress the opposition. This is compared with 12.3% this month. The arrival of the Palestinian police and the welcome they received even from opposition group supporters might have led Gazans to be optimistic about the role of the police. It is also important to note that most policemen arriving in Gaza have a large number of family members living there. The results may also be expressions of fear and hope about the future of Palestinian society.

Table 4

Relationship Between Political Affiliation and Perception of Palestinian Police and PNA

                 Equal Treatment  Oppress          Not Sure         Other            
                                  Opposition                                         
PFLP             13.8             40.7             37.4             8.1              
DFLP             21.9             50.0             28.1             ---              
Hamas            33.5             35.8             25.0             5.8              
I. Jihad         21.1             43.9             31.6             3.4              
Fateh            71.7             5.4              18.9             4.0              
Feda             70.8             4.2              25.0             ---              
H.al-Sha'b       41.7             16.7             37.5             4.1              
I. Ind.          30.6             27.1             38.8             3.5              
Nat'l Ind        47.4             7.3              40.1             5.2              
Other            39.2             9.8              27.5             23.5             
No one           36.8             16.9             37.8             8.5              

Elections

The results of this poll confirm a Palestinian desire for elections; support for the use of elections has increased from an average of 72% in previous polls to 79.9%, while support for appointment by the PLO declined from 16.5% in April to 13%. This could be another indication of the attitude towards the list of appointed members to the PNA.

More Palestinians declared that they want to participate in the elections for PISGA (71.6%). It seems that the implementation of the agreement and the latest appointment by the PLO prompted many Palestinians to want to voice their opinion toward the political developments at this stage. In addition, previous CPRS polls indicate that the closer the election date becomes (July or October 1994) support for elections increases.

Political Affiliation

The recent developments led to an overall increase in the popularity of Fateh. Support for this group reached 44.4% compared with 37.8% last month (a 6.6% increase). Significant gains for Fateh have been made in Gaza with a 12.9% increase from last month. In the West Bank, however, support for Fateh has only slightly increased (2.7%). The popularity of Hamas has declined, with most of the decline in Gaza. This poll shows a 12.3% support for Hamas compared with 15.9% in last month's poll. In Gaza, Hamas lost 4.3% of its support, compared with 3.3% in the West Bank. In Gaza, the popularity of the PFLP went down from 9.5% to 6.5%. We can also witness a decline in support for independents in Gaza.

Fateh has a majority of support, more than 50%, in the following districts: Gaza E. (Khan Younis area) with 61.8%, Gaza B (al-Rimal) with 53.6%, Gaza D (Deir Balah and Bureij) with 53.3%, Gaza F (Rafah) with 51.7%, and Jericho with 50%. Hebron is least supportive of Fateh with 29.9% of the vote, followed by Jerusalem with 31.7% and Ramallah with 35%. Support for Hamas can be found in Jericho (20%), Hebron (17.7%) and Rafah (17.2%).

Table 5

Political Affiliation by Place of Residence

          PFLP %   Feda %  Hamas %   DFLP %   Fateh %  I.      H       Is     N Ind %  O'er   No      
                                                       Jihad   el-Sha  Inds            %      one %   
                                                       %       b %     %.                             
Nablus    5.6      ---     14.6      3.5      45.5     0.5     0.5     3.5    11.1     2.0    13.2    
T'lkrm    1.9      2.5     13.2      ---      46.5     0.6     0.6     7.5    12.6     1.9    12.7    
Jenin     7.9      1.3     7.2       2.0      47.4     0.7     0.7     2.0    11.2     3.3    16.3    
Jericho   5.0      5.0     20.0      2.5      50.0     ---     2.5     2.5    12.5     ---    ---     
Ram.'h    8.1      2.0     9.1       2.0      35.0     3.0     1.0     3.0    20.3     4.1    12.4    
Hebron    9.1      1.7     17.7      1.7      29.9     6.1     1.3     10.4   14.7     1.3    6.1     
B'hem     9.9      2.7     12.6      3.6      47.7     3.6     3.6     5.4    7.2      0.9    2.8     
J'salem   4.0      2.4     4.8       0.8      31.7     3.2     5.6     8.7    19.8     5.6    13.4    
Gaza A    8.6      ---     10.4      2.5      46.6     7.4     0.6     3.1    4.3      3.1    13.4    
Gaza B    3.2      1.1     8.4       1.1      58.9     1.1     1.1     3.2    9.5      4.2    7.2     
Gaza C    9.1      ---     15.2      ---      50.5     2.0     1.0     1.0    4.0      7.1    10.1    
Gaza D    6.7      ---     12.0      2.7      53.3     5.3     ---     ---    2.7      1.3    16.0    
Gaza E    2.9      ---     10.1      ---      60.9     2.9     1.4     5.8    4.3      ---    11.7    
Gaza F    6.3      1.4     17.4      0.7      51.4     4.2     0.7     2.1    3.5      2.1    10.2    


Appendix A

1. How would you evaluate the Palestinian-Israeli agreement concerning Gaza 
and Jericho signed in Cairo at the beginning of this month (May 4, 1994)?
                                            Total  West Bank  Gaza 

a. Excellent                                13.6%    10.7%    19.3%
b. Good                                     26.0%    23.7%    30.7%
c. Fair                                     17.7%    17.1%    19.0%
d. Inadequate                               22.6%    24.1%    17.3%
e. Bad                                      17.6%    21.3%    10.0%
f. Not Sure                                 03.5%    03.1%    03.7%
2. Are you satisfied with the list of appointed members in the Palestinian 
National Interim Authority?
a. Yes, I'm satisfied                       17.7%    15.4%    22.2%
b. I'm satisfied with most of them          19.9%    20.3%    19.4%
c. I'm satisfied with a few of them         26.1%    26.8%    25.1%
d. No, I'm not satisfied                    23.5%    27.1%    17.3%
e. I don't know                             12.8%    10.4%    16.0%
3. After the initial implementation of Gaza-Jericho First, I view the 
future with:
a. Optimism                                 29.5%    22.9%    41.9%
b. Optimism to a certain extent             36.9%    39.7%    31.8% 
c. Pessimism                                21.4%    25.8%    13.0%
d. Not sure                                 12.2%    11.6%    13.3%
4. At this stage, my most important concern in relation to internal 
Palestinian affairs is: 
a. Lack of employment opportunities and a decrease in standard of living
1. very important                           86.2%    84.3%    89.8%
2. important to a certain extent            09.5%    10.3%    07.9%
3. not important                            02.8%    03.7%    01.0%
4. no opinion                               01.5%    01.7%    01.3%
b. Possible repression of the opposition groups by Palestinian government 
and police
1. very important                           54.8%    58.5%    47.7% 
2. important to a certain extent            20.6%    20.4%    20.8%
3. not important                            14.6%    13.1%    17.6%
4. no opinion                               10.0%    08.0%    14.0%
c. Chaos and the inability of the Palestinian authority to maintain control
1. very important                           66.7%    68.4%    63.6%
2. important to a certain extent            16.1%    15.4%    17.2%
3. not important                            11.2%    10.6%    13.1%
4. no opinion                               06.0%    06.0%    06.1%
d. Competition between Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and those 
returning from the diaspora
1. very important                           44.7%    44.5%    45.2%
2. important to a certain extent            26.0%    26.6%    24.7%
3. not important                            21.3%    21.9%    20.3%
4. no opinion                               08.0%    07.0%    09.7%
e. Loss of a large part of women's rights and opportunities under 
Palestinian control
1. very important                           41.2%    42.2%    39.4%
2. important to a certain extent            22.4%    23.0%    21.1%
3. not important                            27.1%    26.0%    29.2%
4. no opinion                               09.3%    08.8%    10.3%
5. Other (Specify)                          05.1%    04.6%    06.1%
5. When do you expect that the rest of the West Bank will join Gaza and 
Jericho under Palestinian authority?
a. Very soon (in a few weeks                13.1%    13.0%    13.2%
or months)
b. In less than three years                 20.0%    20.0%    20.0%
c. After a number of years                  25.4%    22.7%    30.6%
(three years or more).
d. I don't think that Palestinian           22.4%    26.2%    10.3%
authority will be extended 
to the rest of the West Bank.
e. I don't know                             19.1%    18.1%    20.9%
6. Under Palestinian authority, I think that Palestinian women's rights 
and opportunities within Palestinian society
a. Will increase                           43.0%    35.1%    57.6%
b. Will stay the same                      27.3%    32.2%    18.2%
c. Will decrease                           11.3%    14.0%    06.0%
d. I don't know                            18.4%    18.7%    18.2%
7. In relation to Palestinian police and security forces located in Gaza and
Jericho,
a. I think that they will treat all        50.6%    44.8%    61.4%
Palestinians equally.
b. I think that they will oppress          16.8%    20.7%    09.6%
Palestinian opposition.
c. Not sure                                26.7%    28.9%    22.7%
d. Other (specify)                         05.9%    05.6%    06.3%
8. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose the members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?

a. Appointment by PLO leadership           13.0%    11.8%    15.3%
b. Appointment by political groups         04.5%    04.2%    05.1%
on a quota basis.
c. Political Elections                     79.9%    81.2%    77.2%
d. Other                                   02.6%    02.8%    02.4%
9. Will you participate in the election for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?
a. Yes                                     71.6%    70.2%    74.1%
b. No                                      15.7%    16.7%    13.9%
c. Not sure                                12.7%    13.1%    12.0%
10. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:
a. PFLP                                    06.6%    06.7%    06.5%
b. Feda                                    01.3%    01.8%    00.5%
c. Hamas                                   12.3%    12.2%    12.6%
d. DFLP                                    01.7%    02.0%    01.2%
e. Fateh                                   44.4%    40.1%    52.4%
f. Islamic Jihad                           03.1%    02.6%    04.2%
g. Hizb al-Sha'b                           01.3%    01.6%    00.8%
h. Islamic independents                    04.7%    05.8%    02.6%
i. Nationalist independents                10.8%    14.1%    04.7%
j. Other (specify)                         02.7%    02.6%    03.1%
k. None of the above                       11.1%    10.5%    11.4%

Appendix B

Polling Districts
The West Bank
The West Bank was divided into 8 areas and 18 polling districts as follows:
     District       Population     Sample      
                    size **        size        
Nablus city          85,375         86          
Nablus East          81,995         40          
Nablus West          63,638         78          
Nablus Total        230,998        204         

    District       Population    Sample     
                   size          size       
Tulkarm (North)    105,699        88         
Tulkarm (South)     96,738        75         
Tulkarm Total      202,432       163        

    District       Population    Sample     
                   size          size       
Jenin (East)        96,721        82         
Jenin (West)       100,490        80         
Jenin  Total       197,211       162        

    District       Population    Sample     
                   size          size       
Jericho             25,957        40         

    District       Population    Sample     
                   size          size       
Ramallah (North)    76,983        66         
Ramallah (South)    77,533        58         
Ramallah (City)     75,178        84         
Ramallah Total     229,694       208        

    District       Population    Sample     
                   size          size       
Hebron (North)      82,947        84         
Hebron (South)      80,073        75         
Hebron (City)       96,545        84         
Hebron Total       259,565       243        

    District       Population    Sample     
                   size          size       
Bethlehem (City)    68,646        65         
Bethlehem(Vicinity) 70,273        66         
Bethlehem Total    138,919       131        

    District       Population    Sample     
                    size         size       
Jerusalem (Vicinity) 83,580       75         
Jerusalem (City)     81,370       74         
Jerusalem Total     165,310      139        

* (a complete list of villages and camps included in each district may be obtained from CPRS.)
The Gaza Strip
The Gaza Strip was divided into 6 polling districts as shown below:
    District    Population     Sample      Sample Distribution                 
                size           size**                                          
Gaza A          141,915        179         Jabalyia Camp, Jabalyia Village, al-Nazla    
Gaza B          150,000        105         Rimal                               
Gaza C          151,000        106         Zaytoun, Sabra                      
Gaza D          116,600         78         Deir al-Balah Camp, Deir al-Balah, Bureij
Gaza E          140,514         68         Khan Younis City, Abbasan al-Kabir  
Gaza F          102,346        148         Rafah Camp                          

* CPRS estimates are based on the figures provided by Palestinian Population Handbook (Jerusalem: Planning and Research Center, 1993).
** The sample distribution in Gaza was based on the population distribution among refugee camps, cities, and villages and not on the basis of population size in the various regions.
*** In addition, interested individuals may obtain the results of the voting patterns in each one of these areas according to place of residence (city,village, and refugee camp) by contacting CPRS.

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