Armed AttacksA total of 44% respondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip opposed armed attacks, compared with 33% who supported them and 23% who declared that they had no opinion on the topic. Although some respondents were simply unsure of their opinion on this issue, there were fieldworkers who reported that some of the respondents choosing "no opinion" were afraid to answer the question or remarked on the question's sensitivity, implying that support for these attacks may actually be higher than the results indicate. In the February poll, the percentage of respondents supporting such attacks was 46%, with opposition standing at 33%. This might be attributed to the fact that the Beit Lid attack had an influence on the increase in support for attacks, especially since it came after increased frustrations over settlement expansion, which decreased with the passing of time and the inability of these attacks to achieve positive results. Also, the closure and the economic hardship which followed the Beit Lid attack may have caused some Palestinians to reconsider their position. (See Chart 3) There was no noticeable difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip in this regard. There is a direct relationship between education and support for these attacks where the percentage of support is higher among the educated groups than among those with the least education. Also, percentage of support among those with university degrees is higher than the percentage of opposition, which is not true for the general population. (See Table 13)
Table 13
Attitude Towards Armed Attacks by Education
Support % Oppose % No Opinion %
Up to 9 years 26.8 50.6 22.6
Tawjihi (9-12 years) 35.7 38.4 25.7
2-year college 40.9 32.1 27.0
University Degree(s) 47.0 35.2 17.8
Support for these attacks is higher among men than among women (See Table 14) and is higher in refugee camps than in other areas.Table 14
Attitude Towards Armed Operations by Gender
Support % Oppose % No Opinion %
Male 35.0 42.1 22.9
Female 30.4 44.7 25.0
Also we find that the percentage of support for these attacks among students is higher than the percentage of opposition. The same is true for employees. (See Table 15)Table 15
Attitude Towards Armed Operations by Occupation
Support % Oppose % No Opinion %
Students 51.2 28.1 20.7
Waged Laborers 35.8 37.2 27.0
Housewives 28.0 47.9 24.1
Employees 39.4 36.9 23.7
Merchants 34.9 41.6 23.5
Farmers 25.0 49.9 25.1
Craftspeople 24.5 48.8 26.7
Professionals 38.3 42.6 19.1
Unemployed 38.7 43.0 18.3
Retired 27.8 33.3 38.9
Single respondents were more supportive of these attacks than married respondents. Support is also higher among youths. (See Table 16)Table 16
Attitude Towards Armed Attacks by Marital Status
Support % Oppose % No Opinion %
Single 36.2 35.2 28.7
Married 32.4 45.2 22.4
Although support is high among opposition groups, it is not insignificant among supporters of Fateh.Table 17
Attitude Towards Armed Attacks by Political Affiliation (Selected Groups)
Support % Oppose % No Opinion %
Fateh 25.0 55.4 19.7
Hamas 60.4 20.1 19.5
Islamic Jihad 61.3 25.8 12.9
DFLP 28.6 42.9 28.6
PFLP 52.9 31.4 15.7
Islamic Inds. 25.8 38.7 35.5
Nationalist Inds. 40.0 40.0 20.0
Support for armed attacks is higher in the areas of Bethlehem, Nablus, Hebron, Gaza North, and Gaza South than in the other areas. (See Table 18)Table 18
Attitude Towards Armed Attacks by Area of Residence
Support % Oppose % No Opinion %
Nablus 33.3 47.7 18.9
Tulkarm 26.1 44.3 29.5
Jenin 25.8 50.6 23.6
Jericho 24.0 36.0 40.0
Ramallah 28.8 41.4 29.7
Hebron 36.0 42.6 21.4
Bethlehem 40.5 29.7 29.7
Jerusalem 35.5 34.2 30.3
Gaza North 38.6 47.1 14.3
Gaza City 32.2 49.7 18.1
Gaza Middle 31.4 39.3 29.3
Gaza South 40.0 40.0 20.0
Extending the Palestinian Authority to JeninMost Palestinians (52%) oppose the proposal to extend the Palestinian Authority to Jenin before other areas. Opposition to this suggestion is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Jenin is no different in its level of support for this idea than other areas of the West Bank. (See Table 19)
Table 19 Attitude Towards Jenin Proposal by Area of Residence
Support % Oppose % No Opinion %
Nablus 42.3 44.1 13.5
Tulkarm 36.7 51.1 12.2
Jenin 38.2 51.1 12.2
Jericho 45.8 50.0 04.2
Ramallah 33.3 46.8 19.8
Hebron 39.6 47.0 13.5
Bethlehem 29.3 49.3 21.3
Jerusalem 27.6 56.6 15.8
Gaza North 31.4 57.1 11.4
Gaza City 23.1 64.7 12.1
Gaza Middle 25.9 46.0 28.1
Gaza South 16.0 64.0 20.0
We find that opposition to the proposal is higher among men than women and in the cities than in villages and camps. (See Table 20)Table 20
Attitude Towards Jenin Proposal by Place of Residence
Support % Oppose % No Opinion %
City 31.5 55.3 13.3
Town 40.1 47.3 12.6
Village 33.8 49.9 12.3
Refugee Camp 29.4 51.8 18.8
Also, opposition to the proposal is higher than support among all political factions. (See Table 21)Table 21
Attitude Towards Jenin Proposal by Political Affiliation (Selected Groups)
Support % Oppose % No Opinion %
Fateh 39.8 47.8 12.4
Hamas 22.8 63.5 13.7
Islamic Jihad 29.0 64.8 06.2
DFLP 16.6 50.1 33.3
PFLP 22.9 61.4 15.8
Islamic Inds. 29.7 59.2 11.2
Nationalist Inds. 23.5 66.6 10.0
The Economic SituationMost Palestinians (53%) declared that their economic situation had deteriorated since the peace process and Oslo Agreement, compared with 36% who believed that their economic situation has remained the same and only 8% who believe that their situation has improved. Although there is no difference between the West Bank and Gaza in the percentage of respondents whose economic condition has deteriorated, more respondents in Gaza declare that their situation has improved than in the West Bank. If we compare these percentages with the expectations expressed in the June 1994 poll, we find a large gap, where 36% expected that their economic situation would improve as a result of the peace process and only 13% expected that it would deteriorate. Residents of Gaza South and Hebron are more likely to feel that their economic situation has deteriorated. (See Table 22)
Table 22
View of Economic Situation by Area of Residence
Better % Worse % No Change % No Opinion %
Nablus 05.4 46.4 43.8 04.5
Tulkarm 04.4 55.6 37.8 02.2
Jenin 03.3 56.7 40.0 ---
Jericho 04.0 56.0 40.0 ---
Ramallah 01.8 37.8 58.6 01.8
Hebron 04.1 66.1 26.7 03.1
Bethlehem 05.3 60.0 32.0 02.7
Jerusalem 02.6 38.2 55.3 03.9
Gaza North 18.6 61.4 18.6 01.4
Gaza City 17.9 49.7 29.5 02.9
Gaza Middle 14.3 50.0 30.7 05.0
Gaza South 08.0 68.0 24.0 ---
The poll shows that the perception of economic deterioration is higher among the least educated and decreases with education. (See Table 23)Table 23
View of Economic Situation by Education
Better % Worse % No Change % No Opinion %
up to 9 years 08.8 58.8 30.0 02.4
9-12 years 07.4 48.7 41.8 02.2
2-year college 10.0 45.5 40.9 03.6
University degree(s) 08.0 38.9 49.3 03.8
We find that married respondents are more likely to perceive that their economic situation has deteriorated than single respondents. (See Table 24)Table 24
View of Economic Situation by Marital Status
Better % Worse % No Change % No Opinion %
Single 05.7 44.7 47.1 02.5
Married 08.5 55.5 33.7 02.3
The feeling of economic deterioration is widespread among all factions, but supporters of Hamas and other opposition groups are more likely to express such a perception. (See Table 25)Table 25
View of Economic Situation by Political Affiliation (Selected Groups)
Better % Worse % No Change % No Opinion %
Fateh 11.4 47.6 39.7 01.2
Hamas 03.2 70.5 24.3 02.1
Islamic Jihad 12.6 58.0 25.1 04.2
DFLP 05.6 60.9 33.6 ---
PFLP 13.3 56.5 30.2 ---
Islamic Inds. --- 57.4 40.8 01.8
Nationalist Inds. 04.9 44.5 40.6 10.0
Palestinian National AuthorityThe poll results showed that 37% evaluate the performance of the Palestinian National Authority as "excellent" or "good", whereas 30% said that it was "fair" and 17% declared that it was "weak" or "bad."
N.B. "Fair" in this context has the connotation of neither good nor bad, not the connotation of "just." The actual Arabic word is ãÊæÓØ(mutawassit) which is literally "middle." Those interested in comparing these results with previous results should be advised that in the last poll, the same word was translated as "average," although it had been rendered in previous polls as "fair." CPRS believes that "fair" is a better translation, as long as it is not mistakenly understood as "just."
Positive evaluation of the PNA's performance is higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. Also, when compared with the results of the poll we conducted in December 1994, there is a general increase in the positive evaluation of the PNA where the percentage of those who declared at that time that the performance was "excellent" or "good" was 31% compared with 37% now. (See Table 26) With the exception of Fateh supporters, the largest percentage of supporters of each political group chose "fair."
Table 26
Evaluation of the PNA by Political Affiliation (Selected Groups)
Excellent % Good % Fair % Weak % Bad % Don't Know %
Fateh 20.0 33.1 26.7 06.4 03.0 10.7
Hamas 06.7 09.1 33.3 13.9 18.2 18.8
Islamic Jihad 03.2 16.1 25.8 22.6 19.4 12.9
DFLP 09.5 23.8 33.3 09.5 19.0 04.8
PFLP 03.9 19.6 25.5 21.6 21.6 07.8
Islamic Inds. 06.5 09.7 45.2 09.7 06.5 22.6
Nat'list Inds. 01.7 15.0 41.7 18.3 11.7 11.7
Positive evaluation of the PNA is more widespread among non-refugees than among refugees. (See Table 27)Table 27
Evaluation of the PNA by Refugee Status
Excellent Good % Fair % Weak % Bad % Don't
% Know %
Refugee 12.8 20.8 32.7 10.8 08.9 14.0
Non-refuge 15.0 25.2 26.8 07.7 07.9 17.4
e
Election for PNA PresidentThe percentage of support for Yassir Arafat this month was 56.5%, compared with 53.4% last month. Support for Ahmed Yassin and George Habash declined compared with last month. Support for Hayder Abdel Shafi declined slightly. (See Table 28) This poll confirms that the percentage of support for Arafat is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, whereas support for Yassin is roughly equal in the two areas (with a slightly more in the West Bank).
Table 28
Comparison of PNA President Election Results
Arafat % Yassin % Abdel Shafi % Habash % Other %
Nov 1994 44.2 19.7 08.9 06.8 20.4
Dec 1994 48.5 18.4 08.6 05.8 18.7
Feb 1995 53.4 14.6 10.0 03.6 18.4
Mar 1995 56.5 13.5 07.6 03.2 19.2
Despite the fact that we do not question respondents concerning their motives for choosing their candidates, the percentages might be a function of the following: 1) Fateh is the group with the most support, and we find that most Fateh supporters cast their vote for Yassir Arafat. 2) The question deals with elections for the PNA, which has already been established, and some supporters of opposition groups consider the question inappropriate since they intend to boycott such elections. 3) The choices offered are limited despite the fact that respondents have the option of choosing "other." Therefore, the percentages should be understood as relative popularity rather than absolute popularity. Arafat has a slight advantage because of being the incumbent and PLO Chairman, and having the highest name recognition value. Some fieldworkers report that many people, while severely critical of Arafat's policies, vote for him nonetheless. To many, he still symbolizes the Palestinian search for identity and statehood. Ahmed Yassin is not perceived as an official leader, but rather as a figurehead, by some of the population, including Hamas supporters. The fact that he is currently imprisoned by the Israelis may also make some of the population unlikely to consider voting for him as a realistic choice. Hayder Abdel Shafi was not as well known, even among the educated, until his role in the negotiations. Also, he has declared that he will not run for election. George Habash has been outside of the West Bank and Gaza for a long time and also suffers from illness. Support for Abdel-Shafi increases with education, while support for Arafat is highest among those with no more than 9 years of education. As shown in Table 2, 80% of the respondents have no more than 12 years of education. All of these factors give, in the question and in reality, Arafat an advantage over the other candidates and may influence the choices of respondents.Ahmed Yassin received his highest support in the Hebron area as 21% of the respondents chose him as PNA president. In the rest of the sample, he received around 13%. Yassir Arafat, despite winning the majority of the votes in Hebron (51%), got a percentage that is less than his average. In Ramallah, he received 38% of the vote and in Jerusalem he received 46% of the vote. George Habash received his highest support in the Hebron area (5.3%) compared with 1.8% in the other areas of the West Bank. Hayder Abdel Shafi had no noticeable difference in his level of support. (See Table 29)
Table 29
Election of PNA President by Area of Residence
Yassin% Arafat % Abdel Shafi% Habash % Other %
Nablus 11.7 66.7 05.4 00.9 15.3
Tulkarm 17.0 54.5 11.4 03.4 13.6
Jenin 08.3 75.0 06.0 --- 10.7
Jericho 08.0 60.0 04.0 04.0 24.0
Ramallah 13.5 37.8 10.8 02.7 35.1
Hebron 20.5 47.4 08.6 05.3 18.2
Bethlehem 13.3 50.7 06.7 01.3 28.0
Jerusalem 14.5 46.1 05.3 01.3 32.9
Gaza N. 08.6 48.6 08.6 14.3 20.0
Gaza City 14.0 64.0 05.8 02.9 13.4
Gaza Mid. 13.6 63.6 07.9 00.7 14.3
Gaza S. 12.0 50.0 08.0 04.0 26.0
As expected, support for Arafat came primarily from Fateh supporters. (See Table 30)Table 30
Election of PNA President by Political Affiliation (Selected Groups)
Yassin % Arafat % Abdel Shafi % Habash % Other %
Fateh 02.1 85.8 05.9 00.2 06.1
Hamas 70.6 12.3 03.7 --- 13.5
Is. Jihad 51.6 22.6 06.5 03.2 16.1
DFLP 14.3 33.3 09.5 09.5 33.3
PFLP 02.0 15.7 07.8 68.6 05.9
Is. Inds 22.6 25.8 12.9 --- 38.7
Nat'l Inds. 06.7 36.7 41.7 --- 15.0
As shown in Table 31, support for both Ahmed Yassin and George Habash decreases with age.Table 31
Election of PNA President by Age
Yassin % Arafat % Abdel Shafi % Habash % Other %
18-22 18.9 54.6 06.6 03.6 16.3
23-26 20.0 55.5 07.8 05.3 11.3
27-30 13.7 56.3 08.3 04.5 17.3
31-35 10.5 57.9 06.9 05.1 19.7
36-42 11.8 57.7 10.4 01.7 18.4
43-50 13.1 58.1 04.5 01.8 22.5
51+ 07.8 55.9 07.0 00.8 28.6
ElectionsMost respondents (75%) chose general political elections as the preferred means to select the members of the PISGA Council. A further 20% chose appointments, whether by the PLO leadership or by the leadership of the various factions on a quota basis. Support for elections increases with education, while the opposite is true for appointments, as shown in Table 32.
Table 32
Attitude Towards Method of PISGA Selection by Education
PLO Appt. % Appt. by Factions % Elections % Other %
up to 9 years 17.3 06.1 69.5 07.0
9-12 years 14.1 04.4 78.9 02.7
2-yr college 08.0 03.2 86.4 02.4
bachelor's 03.3 08.9 84.0 03.8
grad. degree(s) 09.5 09.5 71.4 09.5
As for participation in elections, 74% of the respondents declared that they intend to participate in the elections. The majority of the supporters of all political groups intend to participate in elections. (See Table 33)Table 33
Attitude Towards Election Participaton by Political Affiliation
Yes % No % Not Sure %
DFLP 74.9 22.4 02.7
PPP 94.3 05.7 ---
Fateh 84.0 07.8 08.2
PFLP 77.1 08.4 14.5
Hamas 62.1 27.0 10.9
Feda 100.0 --- ---
Islamic Jihad 70.7 10.5 18.9
Islamic Independents 70.3 22.2 07.5
Nationalist Independents 86.1 08.9 04.9
Political AffiliationWe notice that support for Fateh is consistent in comparison with last month where it was 49.5%, after an increase in recent months. As for the opposition factions (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, and DFLP), we notice a continuing decrease in their popularity, especially among the leftist groups. The collective popularity for opposition groups does not exceed 20%, compared with 29% in November of 1993. The decline in support for the opposition extends to include groups that usually are the most supportive of the opposition groups. Among students, we find that support for the opposition dropped from 31% in December of 1994 to around 24% in both February and March 1995. The results of this poll confirmed what we found in previous polls, that support for Islamicist groups is higher among women than men. The same applies to PPP. As for Fateh and the PFLP, support for these groups is higher among men than women. Among those with bachelor's degrees, support for the opposition declined from 31% to 16.3%. At the same time, we notice a 10% increase in support for Fateh among this group. Opposition groups received their highest level of support in Hebron, where 31.2% of the respondents support the opposition, compared with 17% in the rest of the West Bank. (See Table 34)
Table 34
Political Affiliation by Place of Residence
PPP % Hamas % Fateh % Is. DFLP % PFLP % Feda % Is Nat Other No one
Jihad % Ind Ind % % %
%.
Nablus --- 11.0 59.6 01.8 01.8 00.9 --- 01.8 07.3 02.8 12.8
T'lkrm 01.1 13.5 51.7 04.5 03.4 02.2 01.1 04.5 02.2 02.2 13.5
Jenin 01.1 06.8 65.9 01.1 01.1 01.1 --- 02.3 04.5 03.4 12.5
Jericho --- 04.0 56.0 --- --- 08.0 --- --- 04.0 12.0 16.0
Ram.'h 00.9 12.0 28.7 00.9 01.9 01.9 00.9 01.9 06.5 29.6 14.8
Hebron 00.8 18.0 40.2 06.1 02.8 04.3 00.3 04.4 06.4 02.8 13.0
B'hem 01.4 06.8 41.9 02.7 02.7 --- --- 06.8 08.1 12.2 17.6
J'salem --- 10.5 34.2 03.9 03.9 01.3 --- 02.6 06.6 22.4 14.5
Gaza N --- 14.3 44.3 --- --- 18.6 --- 01.4 01.4 11.4 08.6
Gaza C 00.6 16.2 56.1 01.2 --- 02.9 --- 01.2 01.2 05.2 15.6
Gaza M 00.7 12.9 58.3 00.7 --- 00.7 00.7 00.7 03.6 09.4 12.2
Gaza S 02.0 14.0 40.0 02.0 04.0 08.0 --- 04.0 --- 20.0 06.0
N: North; C: City; M: Middle; S: South
Focus on HebronThis poll included 284 respondents from Hebron from 16 different areas. After studying the results, we can draw the following conclusions:
Similarities:
-Contrary to popular belief and our previous findings, support for unity with Jordan (whether complete or confederation) is less in Hebron than in the rest of the West Bank. However, support for this idea remains high in Nablus and Jericho.
-With regard to view of the future, Hebron is not very different from other areas of the West Bank. However, there is an increase in both optimism and pessimism than in other areas, meaning that fewer respondents chose "not sure."
-Support for armed attacks in Hebron is not higher than average. In fact, opposition to these attacks is slightly higher in the Hebron area than in the rest of the West Bank and Gaza.
-There is no significant difference between Hebron and the rest of the West Bank concerning views of the PNA.
Differences:
-Opposition to continuing negotiations in Hebron is higher than in other areas .
-With regard to the Jenin proposal, the Hebron area gave it the most support and the least opposition.
-There is a great difference between Hebron and the rest of the West Bank and Gaza when examining the economic situation as 66% of the residents in Hebron felt that their economic situation had deteriorated, compared with 53% in the general sample and 49% in the rest of the West Bank.
-Ahmed Yassin and opposition groups received their highest level of support in Hebron.
-Support for elections and participation in them is higher in Hebron than in other areas.
Total West Bank Gaza
*Unemployment rate 38.0% 35.0% 43.0%
1. With regard to future Palestinian-Jordanian relations, I support the establishment of...
a. two independent states 65.8% 62.3% 71.6% b. complete unity between Palestine 15.4% 17.5% 12.0% and Jordan. c. confederation between Palestine 13.9% 14.5% 12.9% and Jordan. d. Other (specify) 04.9% 05.7% 03.5%
2. Given the political and economic circumstances here, and the Palestinian- Israeli negotiations, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?
a. Optimistic 49.1% 46.0% 54.2% b. Pessimistic 31.9% 34.9% 26.9% c. Not Sure 19.0% 19.1% 18.9%
3. Do you support the continuation of the current peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel?
a. Yes 66.6% 65.2% 69.0% b. No 21.4% 22.2% 19.9% c. No opinion 12.0% 12.6% 11.1%
4. With regard to armed attacks against Israeli targets, I...
a. support them 32.5% 31.7% 33.8% b. oppose them 43.5% 42.7% 44.7% c. have no opinion 24.0% 25.6% 21.5%
5. With regard to the Israeli proposal to give the Palestinian Authority municipal and economic authority in Jenin (before the other areas of the West Bank) I...
a. support it 32.4% 37.2% 24.5% b. oppose it 52.0% 48.8% 57.4% c. have no opinion 15.6% 14.0% 18.1%
6. Following the peace process and implementation of autonomy in Gaza and Jericho, my economic situation and standard of living has...
a. improved 08.4% 03.9% 15.7% b. worsened 52.7% 52.0% 53.8% c. stayed the same 36.4% 41.8% 27.5% d. don't know 02.5% 02.3% 03.0%
7. What is your evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian National Authority?
a. Excellent 14.0% 11.8% 17.6% b. Good 23.2% 23.6% 22.4% c. Fair (see note p.17) 29.5% 26.9% 33.7% d. Weak 09.1% 09.3% 08.8% e. Bad 08.3% 07.3% 09.9% f. Don't Know 15.9% 21.1% 07.6%
8. If an independent election to choose the president of the Palestinian Authority takes place and the following nominate themselves, you will choose:
a. Ahmed Yassin 13.5% 14.0% 12.7% b. Yassir Arafat 56.5% 54.6% 59.7% c. Hayder Abdel Shafi 07.6% 07.8% 07.2% d. George Habash 03.2% 02.5% 04.2% e. Other (Specify) 19.2% 21.1% 16.2%
9. In your opinion, the best way to choose the members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority is...
a. Appointment by PLO leadership 14.0% 12.4% 16.6% b. Appointment by political groups 05.6% 05.0% 06.5% on a quota basis.c. Political Elections 75.4% 77.6% 71.8% d. Other 05.0% 05.0% 05.1%
10. Will you participate in general political elections to choose the members of the PISGA Council?
a. Yes 74.1% 77.4% 68.8% b. No 14.1% 14.1% 14.1% c. Not sure 11.8% 08.5% 17.1%
11. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:
a. DFLP 01.6% 02.3% 00.5% b. PPP 00.7% 00.8% 00.7% c. Fateh 49.5% 47.3% 52.9% d. PFLP 03.6% 02.5% 05.3% e. Hamas 12.4% 11.1% 14.5% f. Feda 00.3% 00.4% 00.2% g. Islamic Jihad 02.1% 02.8% 00.9% h. Islamic independents 02.4% 03.0% 01.4% i. Nationalist independents 04.4% 06.0% 01.8% j. Other (specify) 10.0% 10.4% 09.2% k. None of the above 13.0% 13.4% 12.6%
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