Elections, Negotiations, Strike, Refugee Camps, Criticism of the PNA
May 18-20, 1995
President of the PNAThere is no appreciable change in the support for Arafat in this poll, which is now at 55.4% (see Table 20). There is a difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where support for Arafat is 14% less in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. There are no noticeable changes among the other people mentioned in the poll. Support for Arafat comes less from those with university degrees, where it is 45% compared with 62% among those with only primary education. Also, support for Arafat is roughly equal between men and women. As for Ahmed Yassin, women (16.6%) support him more than men (9.5%). As for Hayder Abdel Shafi and George Habash, the support for them comes mainly from educated men.
Table 20
Comparison of PNA President Election Results
Arafat % Yassin % Abdel Shafi % Habash % Other % Nov 1994 44.2 19.7 08.9 06.8 20.4 Dec 1994 48.5 18.4 08.6 05.8 18.7 Feb 1995 53.4 14.6 10.0 03.6 18.4 Mar 1995 56.5 13.5 07.6 03.2 19.2 May 1995 55.4 11.9 08.4 04.0 20.2
Political AffiliationThere was no noticeable change in the percentage of support for various political groups where the popularity of Fateh is still higher than other groups. The opposition groups (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, and DFLP) still command 21.6% of the votes. As for independents and those not specifying a particular affiliation, they comprise 23.3% of the respondents. As for Feda, the latest poll indicates that its support is almost nonexistent (see Table 21).
Table 21
Political Affiliation by Place of Residence
PPP % Hamas % Fateh % Is. DFLP % PFLP % Is Nat Other No one %
Jihad % Ind Ind % %
%.
Nablus 01.8 14.1 53.1 01.8 01.8 03.5 01.9 04.4 00.9 16.8
T'lkrm 00.1 14.4 47.5 01.5 04.2 02.7 04.4 02.0 06.5 15.6
Jenin --- 08.5 50.0 06.1 04.9 06.1 01.2 06.1 04.9 11.0
Jericho --- 16.0 36.0 --- 04.0 08.0 08.0 --- --- 28.0
Ram.'h 01.0 07.7 47.1 01.0 01.0 02.9 01.0 05.8 19.2 13.5
Hebron 01.6 19.5 37.4 03.3 01.6 03.3 02.4 04.1 08.1 18.7
B'hem 06.8 04.1 44.6 01.4 01.4 09.5 02.7 13.5 04.1 10.8
J'salem 01.2 11.0 36.6 03.7 02.4 06.1 06.1 08.5 03.7 20.7
Gaza N 01.5 13.2 60.3 01.5 --- 07.4 01.5 01.5 05.9 07.4
Gaza C 01.3 11.8 59.2 02.6 01.3 04.6 02.0 03.3 05.3 08.6
Gaza M 02.4 15.7 55.1 02.4 01.6 03.9 01.6 00.8 07.1 09.4
Gaza S 01.5 07.7 49.2 03.1 --- 07.7 04.6 04.6 06.2 13.8
N: North; C: City; M: Middle; S: South *The margin of error is higher for smaller samples.
Focus on Tulkarm Refugee CampMore than 10,000 Palestinians live in the Tulkarm Refugee Camp, and it seems clear from previous election experiences that all political parties in Palestinian society are represented. Our study has revealed that the Tulkarm Refugee Camp reflects the variance that exists in Palestinian society.
The results of the poll reveal the following (See Table 22):
Table 22
- Support for Fateh and Yassir Arafat is similar to that in the population as a whole, while support for Hamas is slightly higher than in the general population. As for Ahmed Yassin, his support is much higher than average reaching 22% compared with 17% in the rest of the camps. As for Hayder Abdel Shafi and George Habash, support for them in the camp is similar to society in general. We also find that support for DFLP in the camp is higher than average, as 4% of the respondents showed support for this group. Support for PFLP (2.3%) and PPP (0.6%) in the camp is less than average.
- Views of electing female candidates in the camp are similar to those in the larger society. Another similarity between the refugee camp and the rest of society concerns views of the strike, where a majority want to cancel the strike altogether or transform it to a yearly occasion. Also, views towards the potential for fair elections are similar.
- Listening to the Voice of Palestine in the camp is much less than average, where the percentage of those who chose Voice of Palestine as their first choice was 25% compared with 37% in the population as a whole and 32% in the rest of the camps.
- The residents of the camp felt that it is possible to criticize the PNA without fear more than the rest of the sample, where 66% of the camp residents declared such a view compared with 50% of the population and 54% of the other camps.
- Support for continuing the negotiations in the Tulkarm Camp (61%) is similar to the population (65%) and the rest of the camps (64%). Opposition to the negotiations is slightly higher, in general, than in the rest of the areas.
- Tulkarm Camp is similar to other camps in view of the future of the camps, where the idea of keeping the camps with improvements in their conditions was supported by 60% of the residents of Tulkarm Camp and 57% of the residents of other camps. Support for this idea in cities and villages was approximately 43%.
- If the opposition calls for a boycott of the elections, 66% of Tulkarm Camp intends to participate in the elections compared with 58% of the population and 63% of other camps.
Comparative View of Refugee Camps, Tulkarm Camp, Experimental Group, and Control Group
Camps % Tulkarm Experimental Control LCL * UCL**
Camp % Group % Group %
Possible to criticize 48 66 59 75 -0.299 -0.021
PNA without fear
Support for 65 61 59 65 -0.205 0.086
continuing
negotiations
Intend to participate 61 66 56 79 -0.365 -0.095
in elections, even if
boycott called
Do not believe 18 18 14 23 -0.206 0.026
elections will be fair
Believe elections 23 30 28 31 -0.168 0.108
will be fair
Willing to elect a 65 70 72 69 -0.108 0.168
woman
Listening to Israeli 26 26 20 32 -0.252 0.012
radio
Listening to Voice of 35 25 31 18 0.003 0.257
Palestine
Support improving 56 59 67 50 0.023 0.317
living conditions in
camps
Support for 36 38 38 38 -0.146 0.146
Abolishing Strike on
9th of each month
Affiliated with 23 23 27 18 -0.034 0.214
Islamic faction
(Hamas, Jihad,
Islamic independents)
Support for Hamas 16 16 18 13 -0.058 0.158
Support for Fateh 48 51 53 49 -0.111 0.191
Support for Ahmed 15 22 27 16 -0.012 0.232
Yassin
Support for Yassir 56 54 52 57 -0.200 0.100
Arafat
*LCL: lower confidence limit **UCL: upper confidence limit
B. Effect of Researcher Appearance on the RespondentIn order to carry out fieldwork in the Tulkarm camp, we divided the camp into 24 sampling units, of which we chose twenty in which to conduct polling. In an effort to lower the percentage of error in results, SRU conducted an experiment to assess the extent of the influence of the researchers' appearance on the respondents' answers. We sent to the Tulkarm Camp two groups of fieldworkers: an experimental group with exclusively "Islamic" appearance and a control group of our typical group of fieldworkers. Each group was assigned ten of the twenty sampling units. The experimental group was instructed to greet the respondents with "Assalam aleykum" and begin each interview by saying "bism allah". The control group was instructed not to alter their previous routine.
Our fieldworkers reported that respondents' reactions to both groups were no different from those in previous polls. They felt that the majority of the respondents behaved in a "normal" way and payed no attention to the appearance of the fieldworkers. In term of the results of the Tulkarm Camp Poll, as indicated in the table above, they show that Ahmed Yassin received 27% of the vote from those respondents interviewed by the experimental group. However, he received 17% of the vote from the respondents interviewed by the control group. Hamas received 17% of the vote from the experimental group and 13% in interviews with the control group. In contrast, Fateh received more votes (53%) from the respondents interviewed by the experimental group than those interviewed by the control group (49%). As for Arafat, he received 52% of the vote from the respondents interviewed by the experimental group and 57% from the respondents interviewed by the control group. These statistics can be compared with 50% support for Arafat in the West Bank and 56% in refugee camps. However, these results do not confirm or refute the effect of researcher appearance on the respondent since there is a need for additional statistical tests. The last two columns in Table 22 represent a 95% confidence interval for the experimental group (P1) and the control group (P2) or P1-P2. The first column represents the lower confidence limit (LCL) and the second column represents the upper confidence limit (UCL). It is possible through this test to know if the difference between the two groups is statistically significant or not. If LCL<0 and UCL>0, then P1 - P2 could be zero and this case will be a result of sampling error. On the other hand, if LCL>0 and UCL>0 or LCL<0 and UCL<0, then it is possible to say that there is a strong indication that the variance in the results is due to the affect of the researcher on the respondent. Looking at the results of this test, it is possible for us to conclude that we have strong evidence that the differences in percentages are due to the effect of researcher appearance on the respondent in four cases:
With regard to the rest of the questions, there is no strong evidence of the effect of the researcher's appearance on the respondent since (P1 -P2) could be zero (i.e., between LCL and UCL) and therefore the variance in the results is due to sampling error.
- The question regarding ability to criticize the PNA without fear, since the LCL and UCL are both less than zero. This coincides with expectations, that the sample interviewed by the experimental group would say that people cannot criticize the authority without fear more than the sample obtained by the control group.
- The question regarding participation in the elections where the LCL and UCL are less than zero. This also corresponds with the above-mentioned expectations.
- Support for improving the conditions in the refugee camps where LCL and UCL are higher than zero.
- The question on Listening to Voice of Palestine since LCL and UCL are higher than zero. This does not coincide with the expectation that the sample interviewed by the experimental group would be less likely to choose Voice of Palestine.
The experiment as conducted did not confirm the issue at hand: the influence of the fieldworkers' appearance on the respondents. The present experiment has shown the need for further testing that is more rigorous. There is a need for replication, a larger sample size, comparable samples, and a more effective introduction of the independent variable (i.e., appearance). At this point, we are unable to settle the debate over the issue of the influence of appearance on respondents' answers, but the data that we obtained will be used in future testing.
Total West Bank Gaza
*Unemployment rate 36.0% 27.0% 39.0%
1. The radio station that I listen to more than others is (rank from 5 being the most listened to and 1 the least listened to)... (figures here are percentage of population answering 5 to each choice - see analysis for complete rankings)
a. Voice of Israel 25.6% 24.3% 27.7% b. Radio Jordan 13.2% 16.4% 07.9% c. Voice of Palestine 37.4% 43.8% 26.9% d. Radio Monte Carlo 13.9% 10.4% 19.8% e. Egypt 06.1% 02.8% 11.4% f. others 03.9% 02.4% 06.3%
2. A person (such as yourself) can criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear. (Do you agree with this statement?)
a. Yes 50.3% 55.2% 42.2% b. Somewhat 17.2% 15.0% 21.0% c. No 18.9% 16.1% 23.6% d. Don't know 13.4% 13.6% 13.0%
3. Do you support the continuation of the current peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel?
a. Yes 65.0% 63.2% 68.0% b. No 22.7% 23.1% 21.9% c. Not sure 12.3% 13.5% 10.1%
4. With regard to the refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, I support...
a. keeping them as 21.6% 21.9% 21.3% they are until a final agreement is reached concerning them. b. transferring the 24.7% 26.3% 22.0% residents to new housing projects c. keeping them with 47.3% 43.1% 54.3% improvements in their living conditions. d. other (specify) 06.3% 08.7% 02.4%
5. With regard to the strike on the ninth of each month, I support...
a. abolishing it 37.5% 38.7% 35.4% b. keeping it 22.6% 21.6% 24.3% c. transforming it to a 34.6% 34.2% 35.2% yearly occasion. d. Other (specify) 05.3% 05.5% 05.1%
6. Do you believe that the general political elections for the Palestinian Self-Governing Council will be fair?
a. Yes 27.6% 25.3% 31.6% b. Somewhat 22.6% 23.7% 20.7% c. No 19.1% 20.9% 15.9% d. Don't know 30.8% 30.1% 31.8%
7. If the Palestinian opposition calls for a boycott of the elections for the National Authority Council, I ...
a. will boycott the elections 20.5% 21.0% 19.6% b. will participate in the elections 58.3% 57.7% 59.2% c. have no opinion 21.2% 21.1% 21.3%
8. If a Palestinian woman ran for elections, are you ready to vote for her?
a. Yes, if she is qualified 71.2% 74.1% 66.3% b. No, a man is probably 17.5% 15.1% 21.4% more qualified. c. No, I do not support women's 09.6% 08.8% 10.8% candidacy. d. Other (specify) 01.7% 01.9% 01.4%
9. If an independent election to choose the president of the Palestinian Authority takes place and the following nominate themselves, you will choose:
a. Ahmed Yassin 11.1% 11.9% 11.8% b. Yassir Arafat 55.4% 50.1% 64.3% c. Hayder Abdel Shafi 08.4% 08.6% 08.2% d. George Habash 04.0% 04.1% 03.9% e. Other (Specify) 20.2% 25.3% 11.8%
10. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:
a. DFLP 01.9% 02.4% 01.0% b. PPP 01.6% 01.6% 01.7% c. Fateh 49.2% 44.8% 56.6% d. PFLP 04.9% 04.7% 05.3% e. Hamas 12.3% 12.1% 12.6% f. Feda 00.3% 00.3% 00.2% g. Islamic Jihad 02.5% 02.5% 02.4% h. Islamic independents 02.6% 02.9% 02.2% i. Nationalist independents 04.5% 05.8% 02.4% j. Other (specify) 06.5% 06.8% 06.1% k. None of the above 13.6% 16.0% 09.5%
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