Armed Attacks, Peace Process, Elections, Unemployment, March 29-31, 1996
Results
Armed Attacks and the Peace ProcessThe presence of strong opposition against armed attacks seems to reflect the presence of similarly strong support for the continuation of the peace process and a wide-spread belief that such attacks impede the progress the peace process. Only a small minority positively regards one of the results of the recent armed attacks, that is, separation. Moreover, it seems that most of the Palestinians fear that such attacks may lead to a Likud election victory. Many Palestinians think that Labor is a better peace partner. Opposition to armed attacks is reflected in a decrease in support for opposition forces. Many Palestinians blame these opposition forces for the difficulties encountered after the attacks, despite the fact that the majority blames Israel first.
However, there is a slight increase in support for such attacks reflecting perhaps the desire of most Palestinians to see a mutual end to violence.
Security Measures and Internal Conflict
The poll results indicate that opposition to the measures taken by the PNA may reflect the worried mood of the Palestinian street which fears that such measures may lead to internal conflict. This opposition is also reflected in decreased support for the PNA and for Fateh. Some blame the PNA for the current difficulties.
Elections
The results confirm the findings reported by the Central Election Commission and the CPRS exit poll regarding the high level of turn out especially in the Gaza Strip and the low level of participation in Jerusalem. It seems that the reports of possible irregularities in the elections led to a rise in the percentage of those who are dissatisfied with the election process. The results confirm our previous conclusion that most of the opposition supporters participated in the elections and that political reasons were not the main factor behind non-participation.
UnemploymentThe results of the poll show that the unemployment rate in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is 49%, a 20% increase since December 1995. The rates are 60% for the Gaza Strip and 44% for the West Bank. As in previous cases, the unemployment rate almost doubles as a result of an Israeli imposition of closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Education Elementary 64.2% Bachelor 33.7% Occupation Student 37.5% Waged Laborer 63.9% Farmers 59.4% Participation in elections Participant 58.3% Non-participant 36.6% Position on negotiations Support 61.5% Oppose 24.5% Position on armed attacks Support 32.7% Oppose 61.3% Political affiliation Pro peace camp 67.0% Opposition camp 27.6% Undecided 41.3% The results of this poll confirm the findings reported by the Central Election Commission and the CPRS exit poll, regarding the high level of turn out especially in the Gaza Strip (Gaza North at 96%), and the low level of participation in Jerusalem (38%). They also confirm our previous conclusion (see our exit poll analysis) that most of opposition supporters participated in the elections. Participation in the cities was slightly higher than in villages; women's participation was slightly less than men's; and older people had a higher turn out rate than younger ones. As summarized in Table 3, the figures for participation and non-participation for each of these categories of respondents were similar. Note, the findings also indicate that supporters of negotiations, non-violence and the "pro-peace camp" were more likely to participate in elections than their counterparts.
Table # (3)
Participation in the Elections by selected variables
Area of residence Nablus 73.1% Ramallah 67.5% Jerusalem 38.2% Gaza North 95.6% Place of residence City 79.5% Village 71.9% Gender Male 80.7% Female 74.5% Age 18-22 72.6% 51 and above 79.0% Position on negotiations Support 81.5% Oppose 66.7% Position on armed attacks Support 68.7% Oppose 80.4% Political affiliation Pro Peace camp 86.3% Opposition camp 59.1% Undecided 69.8% It seems that the non-participation in the elections was not motivated by opposition to the peace process. Most respondents gave other reasons for non-participation such as being busy or not finding transportation. However, if one considers answers, such as "did not find good candidates" or "I have doubted the fairness of the elections", as having political implications then the conclusion might be that more people boycotted the elections for unexpressed political reasons. Moreover, over 40% had "other" reasons for non-participation; some of those "other" reasons may indeed have political implications. Furthermore, since there is a strong relationship between non-participation and opposition, it is warranted to assume that more people did not go to the polls due to political motivation than the results indicate. (See table # 4).
Table # (4)
Non-participation in elections because of opposition to peace process by selected variables:
Age 18-22 12.2% 43-50 4.9% Education Elementary 5.5% Bachelor 35.3% Occupation Students 31.6% Housewives 7.7% Employees 22.7% Position on the peace process Support 3.4% Oppose 29.7% Position on armed attacks Support 23.2% Oppose 6.5% Political affiliation Pro peace camp 7.5% Opposition camp 29.5% Undecided 13.5%
Support for NegotiationsThe results indicate that support for the continuation of negotiations (at 78%) is higher than previously found, despite the Israeli measures taken in the aftermath of the armed attacks. One must remember that negotiations are now about permanent status issues and not transitional arrangements. Permanent status talks are probably considered a Palestinian demand which the Israelis may try to avoid. Indeed, the Israelis suspended the peace talks in the aftermath of the recent attacks and there was concern that Israel may try to postpone the starting of the permanent status talk until after the Israeli elections.
As Table 5 shows, however, previously found trends remain valid. For example, Gaza North is more supportive of negotiations than Hebron. People with bachelor degrees tend to be less supportive than people with elementary education. Also participation in elections, opposition to armed attacks, and support for the "pro-peace" camp are positively related to support for continued negotiations. Also note, even among sympathizers of the opposition factions, a majority support the continuation of the peace talks. As with other issues, the undecided remain in the middle between the two camps with some 71% support for the talks.
Table # (5)
Support for the continuity of negotiations by selected variables:
Hebron 71.4% Gaza North 86.6% Education Elementary 86.0% Bachelor 67.0% Occupation Student 69.0% Unemployed 80.0% Retired 92.3% Participation ielections Participant 81.5% Non-participant 66.7% Position on armed attacks Support 57.3% Oppose 85.5% Political Affiliation Pro Peace camp 88.3% Opposition camp 55.4% Undecided 70.9% The results indicate that despite deep concern about PNA security measures (see below), there has been almost no change in level of support or opposition to the PNA. While 24% increased their support, 23% decreased it. An additional 44% said they support the PNA and that there has been no change in their position. Only 9% said their has been no change in their opposition stance. Altogether, some 33% voiced opposition to the PNA. As expected, Table 6 shows support for PNA in students is higher than support for PNA in farmers. Also participation in elections, opposition to armed attacks, and support for negotiations and the "pro-peace" camp are associated positively with support for the PNA.
Table # (6)
Support for the PNA by selected variables:
Education Elementary 76.2% Bachelor 53.5% Occupation Students 50% Employees 64% Farmers 72% Participation in elecions Participant 72.2% Non-participant 41.1% Position on negotiations Support 78.2% Oppose 24% Position on armed attacks Support 42.1% Oppose 76.3% Political Affiliation Pro Peace camp 79.3% Opposition camp 36.3% Undecided 60.5%
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