Positive overall assessment of the Executive branch, including the President and the Cabinet, is also reflected in the evaluations for particular areas of government. 'Very good' and 'good' evaluations were especially high for the fields of education (78.4%), followed by health (66.5%) and safeguarding the security of citizens (65.4%). The percentage of respondents who give positive evaluations decline, however, in the areas of promoting democracy and protecting human rights (41.4%) and improving the economy (20.8%). See Chart 1 below for a graphic depiction of the evaluation of the government.

Chart 1
Evaluation of Areas Of Government, percentages
As with performance evaluations of the separate branches of government, discussed above, there are significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip for particular areas of government, especially in the highest evaluation category (Very Good). It is the case that Gazans are nearly twice as likely than West Bankers to give the highest level of evaluation in the areas of education (43.2% and 28.8%, respectively), security (30.5% and 16.1%, respectively) and health (31.1% and 15.4% respectively). For promoting democracy and human rights as well as the economy, however, there are no significant regional differences. There are also no significant differences in the evaluations of higher and lower educated respondents, except in one area. Lower educated respondents are much more likely than higher educated respondents to give positive evaluations to their government in the area of democracy and human rights (see Table7).

Table 7
Evaluation of Government's Performance in the Area of Democracy & Human Rights by Educational Level, percentages & counts

	Promoting Democracy & Protecting Human Rights
	V. Good	Good	Fair	Bad	V. Bad	No Opinion
Illiterate-Elementary	6.1 (19)	39.3 (123)	15.0 (47)	16.3 (51)	8.0 (25)	15.3 (48)
Preparatory-Secondary	7.6 (50)	35.9 (237)	22.2 (147)	18.6 (123)	9.7 (64)	6.1 (40)
2-Years College	8.5 (8)	26.6 (25)	25.5 (24)	21.3 (20)	16.0 (15)	2.1 (2)
B.A.-Post-Graduate	1.9 (3)	27.2 (43)	21.5 (34)	29.7 (47)	15.2 (24)	4.4 (7)

The difference between educational levels and the assessment of the government in terms of human rights and democracy, is also reflected generally in the expectations for the direction of government. As a little as one-third of all respondents believe that the Palestinian government is moving toward a democratic system with respect for human rights, whereas 38% believe that it is moving toward a combination of a dictatorship and democracy. On the positive side, only 17% believe that it is moving toward a dictatorship. Once again, there is a strong relationship between educational level and attitudes toward the direction of the government, as indicated in Table 8.

Table 8
Direction of Palestinian Government by Educational Level, percentages & counts

	Direction of Government
	Democracy	Combination	Dictatorship	No Opinion
Illiterate-Elementary	36.2 (113)	32.4 (101)	11.5 (36)	19.9 (62)
Preparatory-Secondary	34.1 (226)	38.5 (255)	16.9 (112)	10.6 (70)
2-Years College	26.6 (25)	37.2 (35)	26.6 (25)	9.6 (9)
B.A.-Post Graduate	17.7 (28)	50.0 (79)	25.3 (40)	7.0 (11)

Although most respondents agree that the government is not heading toward a democracy, 62% of those who have had direct experiences with the police and security services think that its performance is 'good' or 'very good', 13.4% 'fair' and 23.5% 'bad' or 'very bad'. (Note, these percentages are derived from only 19.6% of total respondents who said that they have had direct experience with the Palestinian police and security services.) Gazans, who have had direct experiences with the police and security services, are more likely than West Bankers to give positive evaluations (66.7% and 58.8%, respectively); while Palestinians in the West Bank are more likely to give negative evaluations (27.2% and 18.6%, respectively). Women also tend to be far less critical than men; and once again there is a negative correlation between education level and attitudes toward the police and security services.

The results of this poll show that there is a widespread belief among Palestinians that corruption exists in their government. Nearly a majority (49.3%) of all respondents believe there is corruption in the institutions and agencies of the Palestinian Authority; while only 27.1% think that there is no corruption. Moreover, of the respondents who think that there is corruption, 40.1% think it will increase, 10% think it will remain the same in the future, while 40.5% believe it will decrease. Unlike other salient issues, there is no difference in opinions between the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see attached questions), except that Gazans (42.4%) are more likely than West Bankers (37.1%) to think that corruption will decrease. Men tend to be more critical of the government on this issue than women. Respondents with higher levels of education tend to be the most critical of all, as 70.7% of respondents with a B.A. or higher degree of education think that corruption exists in the PA. There is no significant relationship, however, between educational level and expectation for corruption to increase, remain the same or decrease (see Table 9).

Table 9
Corruption in the PA by Educational Level , percentages & counts

	Corruption in PA Institutions & Agencies
	Yes	No	Will Increase/Remain	Will Decrease
Illiterate-Elementary	34.1 (107)	36.6 (115)	46.5 (65)	32.1 (45)
Preparatory-Secondary	49.4 (327)	28.9 (191)	44.6 (139)	40.2 (158)
2-Years College	64.1 (59)	16.3 (15)	47.8 (32)	43.3 (29)
B.A.-Post Graduate	70.7 (111)	7.0 (11)	48.0 (60)	40.0 (50)

* The Don't Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 9, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Despite a low evaluation of the government in the areas of democracy, the economy and the perception that there is corruption in PA institutions, most people in the West Bank (50.5%) and Gaza Strip (55.5%) agree that the President's popularity has increased since election day. On the other hand, a sizable percentage of the total population believes that his popularity has remained the same (20.4%) or decreased (21.3%).

Perceptions on the President's popularity are strongly related to people's attitudes toward continuing the peace process with Israel, expectations that the negotiations will lead to a State in the near future and general optimism or pessimism (see Table 10).

Table 10
President's Popularity and Attitudes toward the Peace Process, Statehood and General Outlook, percentages & counts*

	President's Popularity Since his Election
	Increased	No Change	Decreased
Continue Peace Process Support Oppose	78.6 (502) 17.2 (110)	73.1 (182) 20.9 (52)	48.3 (125) 46.7 (121)
Expect Palestinian State Yes No	63.2 (402) 23.4 (149)	49.4 (123) 32.1 (80)	25.8 (67) 60.8 (158)
General Outlook Optimistic Pessimistic	62.5 (400) 33.6 (215)	48.2 (120) 44.6 (111)	34.1 (89) 61.3 (160)

* The Don't Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 10, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

As indicated in Table 10, respondents who think that the popularity of the President has increased since his election are also more likely to support the continuation of the peace process, expect a State and have optimism toward the future. The relationship is inverted for those who think his popularity has decreased. They are, overall, more critical and pessimistic. Interestingly, however, support or opposition toward the peace process is not related to the perception that the President's popularity has decreased since the elections, as nearly the sapercentage of supporters (48.3%) and opponents (46.7%) think his popularity has declined. The respondents who think that the President's popularity has not changed tend to be slightly more optimistic, have higher expectations that the negotiations will result in a State, and by a wide majority, support continuing negotiations with Israel.

There are even stronger and clearer linear relationships between attitudes toward these same issues and the evaluation of the Presidency, as a branch of government. This could indicate that respondents' personal feelings toward President Arafat, as a leader, are less critical than their attitudes toward the Presidency as an institution. In other words, the division between supporter and opponents of continuing negotiations with Israel becomes clearer when respondents are asked to evaluate the Presidency as an institution of the Palestinian Authority (see Table 11).

Table 11
Evaluation of the Presidency and Attitudes toward the Peace Process, Statehood and General Outlook, percentages & counts*

	Evaluation of Presidency
	Very Good/Good	Fair	Bad/Very Bad
Continue Peace Process Support Oppose	80.7 (709) 15.1 (133)	52.7 (78) 40.5 (60)	27.1 (32) 66.9 (79)
Expect Palestinian State Yes No	60.5 (531) 24.3 (213)	50.0 (74) 20.3 (30)	17.8 (21) 70.3 (83)
General Outlook Optimistic Pessimistic	59.1 (521) 36.3 (320)	42.3 (63) 53.0 (79)	29.4 (35) 66.4 (79)

* The Don't Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 11, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Noting the strength of the statistical and numerical relationships presented in Table 11, it is clear that Palestinians who support the continuation of the peace process, expect a State in the near future and are optimistic evaluate the President's performance positively. Conversely, those who assess the performance of the President negatively, are more likely to oppose continuing negotiations with Israel, not expect a State and be pessimistic. In other words, and to summarize, the President's popularity, as well as the assessment of the Executive branch of government, is strongly related to Palestinians' position on the peace process. The more a person favors the President, both as a national personality and as the representative of government, the more likely s/he is to be in support of continuing negotiations.