CPRS Polls - Survey Research Unit
Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Poll
On Jordanian-Palestinian Relations, 22-30 December 1997

These are the results of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian public opinion poll, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies and the Center for Strategic Studies in the Jordan University, between 22-30 December 1997. The poll deals with issues of Jordanian-Palestinian relations. The total size of the Palestinian sample of this poll is 1320 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 831 in the West Bank and 489 in the Gaza Strip. The total size of the Jordanian sample is 1500 persons constituting the national sample and an additional 300 persons constituting the refugee camps sample.

The margin of error in the Palestinian and Jordanian samples is + 3%, and the non-response rate in Palestine is 3%.

To obtain the full text of the poll as well as additional information, explanations and results, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki, at the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, Nablus Tel: 09-380383 or 09-381619; Fax: 09-380384.


Table of Contents


Analysis of the Results

The results indicate that a significant majority of Palestinians and Jordanians views the relationship between the two peoples with a positive and warm outlook and wishes to see it developed into a wider and deeper cooperation in political, economic, social and educational realms. However, it is evident that the Jordanian attitude toward the relationship is more enthusiastic and forthcoming, while the Palestinian attitude reveals some hesitation.

The poll shows that there are three reasons for the positive Palestinian outlook and three reasons for the Palestinian hesitation. The positive outlook receives impetus from the feeling that the social and historic relationship between the two sides is a special and unique one; that Palestinian-Israeli negotiations have reached a dead-end and that the involvement of Jordan into these negotiations may provide a way out of the current impasse; and finally that a wide Jordanian-Palestinian economic cooperation may have positive consequences for the deteriorating Palestinian economy.

The reasons for the Palestinian hesitation may lie in three factors: (1) the deep attachment to the Palestinian national identity and the basic need to embody the national aspiration into an independent political entity; (2) the concern about a possible loss of independence of the Palestinian decision and persisting doubts about Jordanian intentions, especially in light of Israeli repeated claims that there is a common Jordanian-Israeli interest in preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state; and (3) the feeling of some Palestinians that the deepening of Palestinian-Jordanian relations may come at the expense of the thriving Egyptian-Palestinian relations.

The differences in perceptions and attitudes can be seen in the fact that 84% of the Jordanians, whether of Palestinian or Jordanian origin, support some form of unity (such as total union, a federation, a confederation, etc.) between the two peoples, while only 70% of the Palestinians, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, support such forms of unity. Moreover, a large percentage of Jordanians (53%) compared to a minority of Palestinians (18%) supports total union between Palestine and Jordan. On the other hand, support for a confederation (the narrowest form of unity) is low in Jordan (16%) compared to Palestine (27%). See figure (1) below.

Figure (1)
Support for a form of unity - total sample (December 1997)

Compared to figures obtained form a joint poll conducted by the two centers (CPRS and CSS) in October 1995, little change has occurred on the level of Jordanian and Palestinian support for some form of unity between the two sides. However, a moderate increase has taken place in the level of Jordanian support for total union from 45% to 53%, while an important decrease has taken place in the level of Palestinian support for a confederation from 44% to 27%. See figure (2) below

Figure (2)
Support for a form of unity - total sample (October 1995)

Main Findings

1. The Future Relationship Between the Two Peoples

  • An overwhelming majority of 90% of Jordanians and 75% of Palestinians believe that the relationship between the two peoples is a unique and special one not found in the relationship between the two sides with any other Arab peoples.
  • A large majority of 84% in Jordan and 70% in Palestine supports the establishment of some form of unity between the two peoples within the framework of their future relationship. This level of support is found almost equally among residents of Gaza (71%) and the West Bank (69) in Palestine and among the Jordanian national (84%) and refugee camp (87%) samples.
  • Among those who support some form of unity, a majority in Jordan (63%, or 53% of the total Jordanian sample) supports total union where the two sides become one country, while support for total union reaches only 26% (27% in the West Bank and 24% in Gaza) or 18% of the total Palestinian sample. Support for a confederation reached 38% in the West Bank and Gaza (or 27% of the total Palestinian sample) and 19% in Jordan (or 16% of the total Jordanian sample). The federation was supported by 21% of the Palestinians and 14% of the Jordanians who support some form of unity between the two sides. No significant differences where found among Jordanians in the national vs. the refugee samples, while only minor differences where found among Palestinians in the West Bank vs. Gaza.
  • An overwhelming majority of 85% in the two sides oppose the participation of Israel in any future confederation between Palestine and Jordan.
2. Jordan, Palestine and the Peace Process

  • A majority of 57% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, vs. 50% of Jordanians, describe the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation as unsuccessful, while only 26% of Palestinians and 29% of Jordanians describe it as successful.
  • Thirty-nine percent of the Palestinians and 35% of the Jordanians expect the Palestinian-Jordanian negotiations to be better than it is now in the next three years. Twenty percent in the two sides expect the negotiations to remain as it is now.
  • Thirty-eight percent of the Palestinians compared to 16% of the Jordanians expect the peace process to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State in all or most of the West Bank and Gaza. It is worth mentioning however, that when Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were asked about their expectations regarding the establishment of a Palestinian State in the next five years, without explicitly linking that outcome to the process of negotiations, the percentage increased to 64%. Fifteen percent of Palestinians and 12% of Jordanians expect the negotiations to lead to trilateral division of responsibilities and jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza between Israel, the PNA and Jordan. About 48% in Jordan and 35% in Palestine expect the status quo to continue or develop into an expanded self-rule.
  • About 59% of the Jordanians and 43% of the Palestinians are not satisfied with the expected outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
  • About 51% in Palestine and 74% in Jordan support the involvement of Jordan in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The level of support is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip (56%) than in the West Bank (49%), but it is almost equal among the national (74%) and refugee camp (72%) samples in Jordan. About 42% of the Palestinians and 11% of the Jordanians oppose the participation of Jordan in the negotiations. Most of those who support the Jordanian participation see it as means of supporting and helping the Palestinian side, and most of those who oppose it do so for fear of compromising the independence of Palestinian decision-making.
3. Current Palestinian-Jordanian Relations

  • In a comparison between the relationship between the PNA and each of Jordan, Egypt and Syria, Palestinians described the Palestinian-Egyptian relations asthebest (very good: 39%), followed by relations with Jordan (19%), and Syria (4%). In Jordan, however, relations between Jordan and the PNA were rated as the best (very good: 40%) followed by relations with Egypt (17%) and Syria (10%). See table (1) and figure (3) below:

Table (1)
Evaluation of the samples of Palestine and Jordan to relations between them and with other Arab countries

Palestinian Citizens
Jordanian Citizens
The Relationship Between PNA and…
The Relationship Between the Jordanian Govt. & ….
Very good
Good
Very good
Good
Egyptian Government
39%
44%
Egyptian Government
17%
61%
Jordanian Government
19%
58%
PNA
40%
47%
Syrian Government
4%
29%
Syrian Government
10%
47%

Figure (3)
Percentages of Palestinians who describe PNA relations with Egypt, Jordan,

  • In a comparison between the relationship between Yassir Arafat and each of the leaders of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, Palestinians rated Arafat's relations with Husni Mubarak as the best (very good: 29) followed by Arafat's relations with King Hussein (11%) and Hafiz al-Asad (4%). In Jordan, however, Jordanians rated King Hussein relations with Arafat as the best (very good: 34%) followed by the King's relations with Husni Mubarak (26%) and Hafiz al-Asad (10%). It is worth mentioning that respondents to these questions were not offered options to select from and the questions were therefore open-ended. See table (2) and figure (4) below.

Table (2)
Palestinian and Jordanian evaluation of the relationship of their leaders with each other and with other Arab leaders

Palestinian Citizens
Jordanian Citizens
The Relationship Between Arafat and …..
The Relationship Between Hussein and ….
Very good
Good
Very good
Good
Husni Mubarak
29%
51%
Husni Mubarak
26%
63%
King Hussein
11%
59%
Yasser Arafat
34%
53%
Hafiz Assad
4%
26%
Hafiz Asad
10%
61%

Figure (4)
Percentages of Palestinians who describe Arafat's relations with Husni Mubarak, King Hussein, and Hafiz al-Asad as "very good"
  • When asked whether cooperation between Jordan and Palestine in different issue-areas existed, a larger majority of Jordanians responded in the affirmative. See table (3) below.

Table (3)
Cooperation and coordination exist between the PNA and the Jordanian Government in the following areas
Palestinian Citizens
Jordanian Citizens
Facilitation and encouragement of trade
64%
72%
Supervision of Islamic places in Jerusalem
60%
80%
Negotiations with Israel
63%
71%
Unifying Educational curricula
52%
54%
Unifying legislation and laws
40%
47%
4. Steps To Strengthen Relations

  • In Palestine, 74% agree that there are steps that the Jordanian Government should take to strengthen relations with the PNA, and in Jordan only 38% agree with that. On the other hand, 53% of the Palestinians agree that there are steps that the PNA should take to strengthen relations with Jordan, and in Jordan, only 33% agree with that.
  • Among the steps that can be taken, 59% of the Palestinians and 82% of the Jordanians agree that the PNA should give preferential treatment to Jordanian products in Palestinian markets. Support for a similar step by the Jordanian Government regarding Palestinian products reached 68% among Palestinians and 83% among Jordanians as shown in table (4).

Table (4)
Degree of support for cooperation and unification steps in Palestine and Jordan

Support in Palestine
Support in Jordan
Palestine giving preferential treatment to Jordanian products
59%
82%
Jordan giving preferential treatment to Palestinian products
68%
83%
Unification of educational curriculum
64%
87%
Unification of laws and legislation
50%
77%
Trade relations: abolition of restrictions on trade and abolition of tariffs
94%
Not Available

  • Support for unification steps in the areas of education, laws and legislation is higher in Jordan than in Palestine as shown in table (4) above. But it is evident that the Palestinians are highly supportive of cooperation in trade relations than in non-economic areas.
5. Palestinian and Jordanian Passports

Several questions dealing with passports were asked in Palestine only:

  • The poll found that 23% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza carry Jordanian passports only (3% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank), and that 89% of those would like to obtain Palestinian passports also.
  • About 18% carry Palestinian passports only (28% in the Gaza Strip and 12% in the West Bank) and that 63% of those would like to obtain Jordanian passports also.
  • About 8% carry Jordanian and Palestinian passports at the same time (0.3% in the Gaza Strip and 13% in the West Bank).
  • In other words, the Palestinian passport is carried now by 29% of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and 25% of the Palestinians in the West Bank. The Jordanian passport is carried by 3% of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and 50% of Palestinians in the West Bank.
  • About 46% of the Palestinians in the two areas do not carry any passports. About 56% of those would like to obtain Palestinian passport only while only 3% would like to obtain Jordanian passport only. The percentage of those who would like to obtain the two passports together is 41% (35% in the Gaza Strip and 46% in the West Bank).

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