Joint Palestinian - Israeli Press Release
12 December, 2004
JOINT† PALESTINIAN† ISRAELI† PRESS †RELEASE
FIRST SERIOUS SIGNS OF OPTIMISM SINCE THE START OF THE† INTIFADA
Table of contents:
for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Palestinian Center , Hebrew University , conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between November 30 and Jerusalem December 6, 2004.*
The poll was designed to examine Palestiniansí pre-election attitudes and voting intentions and Israelisí assessments of the Palestinian elections in the post Arafat era.
Both publics were also asked about the Israeli disengagement plan and the possibility of resuming the Quartetís roadmap process.
This is the tenth joint poll in an ongoing research project on the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 in the wake of the
The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the
, currently at the US Institute of Peace, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1319 Palestinians in 120 locations in the Hebrew University West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalemwas interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted December 1 - 5. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of the general Israeli public with 604 Israelis (sampling error of 4%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between November 30 and December 6.
The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-2964933 or email firstname.lastname@example.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 202-429-3870 or email email@example.com.
* This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah.
Joint Palestinian - Israeli Public Opinion Poll, December 2004
Summary of Results
- The poll shows that if presidential elections were to be held today, the results would be close with Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) receiving 40% of the votes and Marwan Barghouti receiving 38%. Mustafa Barghouti would receive 6% while all the other candidates would receive a total of 3% for all of them combined. 13% have not decided yet. The poll shows Abbas winning in the Gaza Strip (48% vs. 34% for Marwan Barghouti), but Marwan Barghouti wins in the
West Bank(40% vs. 35% for Mahmud Abbas). These results represent the voting intentions of those planning to participate in the vote on January 9, 2005. The findings show that the level of non participation is going to be low (10%).
- Mahmud Abbas is seen as the candidate most capable of reaching a peace agreement with
, improving the economic conditions, and enforcing law and order. Marwan Barghouti is viewed as the candidate most capable of protecting the right of return. The public evaluation of the ability of the two candidates to maintain national unity and prevent internal infighting is similar for both. Israel
- If Hamas nominates Mahmud Zahhar as its candidate in the presidential elections, 28% say they would vote for him. And if the competition for the presidency is between Zahhar, Abbas, and Marwan Barghouti, 34% prefer Barghouti, 29% Abbas, and 24% Zahhar. The overwhelming majority (83%) of those who selected one of the three believe that the person they have chosen would be able to lead the Palestinian people under the current conditions.
- 30% want to see Marwan Barghouti becoming the head of Fateh, while 26% want to see Mahmud Abbas and 7% want Farouq Qaddoumi as head of the movement. In the Gaza Strip, support for Abbas as head of Fateh reaches 31% (compared to 22% in the
West Bank) and for Barghouti 28% (compared to 31% in the West Bank), and for Qaddoumi 5% (compared to 9% in the West Bank).
- The poll shows a significant increase in the popularity of Fateh from 29% last September to 40% in this poll. The increase is higher in the Gaza Strip, from 24% to 38%. The popularity of Hamas in the
West Bankand the Gaza Strip combined drops from 22% last September to 18% in this poll. In the Gaza Strip, Hamasí popularity drops from 30% to 22%. The total level of support for all Islamists (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) drops in the West Bankand the Gaza Strip from 32% to 24% during the same period.
∑ The Israeli public is following the coming elections in the Palestinian Authority (PA) with much curiosity and interest. While aware of Marwan Barghoutiís popularity in the Palestinian race, only 24% of the Israelis think that Barghouti should be released from prison if a compromise solution with the Palestinians necessitates it. 72% of the Israelis oppose such a step.
∑ Three quarters of the Israeli public believe that orderly elections in the Palestinian Authority will be beneficial for
while only 12% believe they will be detrimental. 70% of the Israelis will see orderly elections in the Palestinian Authority as a step forward toward democracy there and 72% believe that a democratic Palestinian regime will increase the chances for peace. Israel
∑ More generally 81% of the Israeli public believe that major political reforms and greater democracy in the Palestinian Authority are important or very important for making progress in the peace process. However Israelisí expectations that a democratic system will eventually be established in the Palestinian Authority or a future
are quite low. 57% believe that the chances for this to happen are very slim or slim, 32% give it a medium chance and only 10% think it is highly probable. As to the current situation, about three quarters of the Israeli public think that the current state of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority is bad or very bad. Palestinian State
- Evaluating Arafatís contribution to Palestinian society, over 80% of the Palestinians are satisfied with his contribution to promoting the status of the Palestinian cause, with his contribution to protecting Palestinian rights vis-ŗ-vis
, and with his contribution in providing basic services such as health and education. †65% are satisfied with his contribution to democracy in the PA and with his contribution to instituting law and order. 54% are satisfied with his contribution to ending the Israeli occupation and 51% with his contribution to fighting corruption in the PA. Israel
- In the post Arafat period, more Palestinians believe that the situation will be better rather than worse in the following areas: provision of basic services such as health and education, building public institutions able to enforce law and order, and building an Authority with democratic governance. More Palestinians believe that the situation will be worse rather than better after Arafat, when it comes to the areas of protecting Palestinian rights in negotiations with
, in promoting the international status of the Palestinian cause, and in fighting corruption in the PA. Palestinians are split half about the future being better or worse on the issue of ending the Israeli occupation. Israel
- Half of the Palestinians expect Arafatís death to weaken Fateh while one quarter expects it to strengthen Fateh.
- 72% believe that Arafat died of poison and most of those believing in this (64%) believe that
is the party responsible for the poisoning while 22% believe that a Palestinian party is responsible. Israel
∑ With Arafatís departure from the scene and with the renewed political activity in the region, a sense of increased realism and cautious hope seems to settle in. 61% of the Israelis and 53% of the Palestinians believe that Arafatís death increases the chances for reaching a political settlement in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, and only 7% of the Israelis and 23% of the Palestinians think the chances might decrease.
∑ †62% of the Israelis and 52% of the Palestinians believe that it is possible to negotiate now a compromise settlement with the other sideís current leadership. A majority in both publics (52% Israelis and 56% Palestinians) also believe that their current leadership is strong enough to convince its constituency to accept a compromise settlement. 68% of the Palestinians but only 30% of the Israelis believe that the other sideís leadership is strong enough to convince its own public. Israelisí perceptions of the weakness of the current Palestinian leadership might explain the sharp increase in their willingness to negotiate also with Hamas. 47% of the Israelis support negotiations also with Hamas if required to reach a compromise settlement, while 51% oppose it. This constitutes a sharp increase from March 2004 where only 20% thought
should negotiate its withdrawal from the Israel strip also with Hamas while 77% opposed it. Clearly, the recent decline in suicide bombings inside Gaza , together with signs from Hamas that it may become a responsible political actor in the Palestinian Authority, are related to this significant change. Consistent with these accommodating positions, 89% of the Israelis and 80% of the Palestinians support a cease fire while 71% of the Israelis and 80% of the Palestinians support an immediate return to the negotiations table. 76% of Israelis and 83% of the Palestinians expect now negotiations to resume with or without some violence continuing, compared to 63% among Israelis and 72% among Palestinians who believed so in June 2004. This cautiously optimistic mood however is quite fragile and can easily collapse given the serious internal political challenges both leaderships face and the difficult issues they will soon have to face if negotiations resume. Israel
∑ Support for the Quartetís roadmap is basically stable with a slight increase since December 2002 soon after it has been made public. 63% of the Israelis and 59% of the Palestinians support it compared to 59% of Israelis and 54% of Palestinians who supported it in 2002. Moreover both sides have also become more optimistic about the ability to implement the roadmap after a period of increased doubts. †64% of the Israeli public and 48% of the Palestinian public now believe that the roadmap plan can still be implemented compared to only 43% Israelis and 28% Palestinians who believed so in June 2004.
∑ Consistent with the support for the roadmap two thirds of the Israeli public also support the dismantling of most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, while 31% oppose such a step. These levels of support increased gradually since the beginning of the Intifada exceeding 60% since November 2002.
∑ †In the same vein, a majority of Israelis (62%) support
ís disengagement plan, with 34% opposing it. Support for the plan has slightly decreased since June 2004 when it stood at 66%. The majority of Israelis (63%) also prefer to see the disengagement negotiated with the Palestinian Authority. Sharon
∑ Once the disengagement takes place Israelis are split half about the Palestinian Authorityís capacity to control matters in the
strip, but only 27% expect Palestinian internal fighting to happen in Gaza following the disengagement. Among Palestinians, 71% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Authority has a high or enough capacity to control matters in the Gaza Strip, but only 29% think it has high capacity and 59% are worried about internal Palestinian fighting after Gaza ís disengagement. Israel
∑ The framing of intractable conflictsí outcomes can play a part in their dynamics. It is thus important to track perceptions of such outcomes. Among Israelis, 42% see the disengagement plan as a Palestinian victory compared to 53% who reject this interpretation. Among Palestinians however 75% do see the disengagement plan as a Palestinian victory compared to only 23% who donít see it as such. As to the ongoing conflict since the beginning of the Intifada, 55% of the Israelis and 44% of the Palestinians think that neither side came out a winner in the ongoing conflict and only smaller percentages think they won (35% Palestinians and 23% of the Israelis). Finally, 61% of the Israelis do not believe that the current Intifada has helped achieve Palestinian national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve, while 64% among Palestinians do believe that armed confrontations have helped them achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not.
∑ Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside
drops from 54% last September to 49% in this poll. Opposition to such attacks increases from 44% to 48%. A majority of 58% says that it would support and 38% say it would oppose taking measures by the PA to prevent armed attacks against Israelis if an agreement on a mutual cessation of violence is reached. 82% support such an agreement on mutual cessation of violence. Israel
∑ 42% of the Israelis and 32% of the Palestinians believe that the reelection of Bush as
president for another four years will increase the chances for a political settlement of the conflict. 48% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians believe it will have no impact and 13% of the Israelis and 34% of the Palestinians believe it will decrease those chances. US
∑ As to the American support for
, 76% of the Palestinians and 41% among Israelis think that the second Bush administration will be more supportive of Israel during the next four years, 39% of Israelis and 12% of Palestinians believe there will be no change, and 13% of Israelis and 9% of Palestinians believe American support for Israel will decrease. Israel
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