Joint Poll in year 2023:
Support for a two-state solution among Palestinians and Israelis s declines to just one-third on each side, along with growing opposition to the detailed items of a permanent peace agreement for implementing a two-state solution. Slightly more Israeli Jews support one unequal state under Israeli rule than the two-state solution; but both publics still prefer two states to any other democratic framework for resolving the conflict. Pairs of reciprocal incentives can raise support somewhat on both sides, showing some flexibility particularly among the Israelis. But trust is declining to new low points, and a majority of Palestinians reject four proposed confidence building measures while a majority of Israelis accepts half of them.
Joint Poll in year 2020:
- Despite stable levels of support for a two-state solution, the two publics display substantial hardening of attitudes regarding a permanent peace package that implements that solution. Nonetheless both publics still prefer two states to any other framework for resolving the conflict. Pairs of zero-sum incentives can raise support somewhat on both sides, showing some flexibility. But trust is declining, and the majority of Palestinians, but also Israelis, agree that annexation will hinder progress towards peace.
PressRelease Table of findings
Final Report/ January 2019:
- Role of Public Opinion in the Resilience/Resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Khalil Shikaki and Dahlia Scheindlin
Policy Papers
1) Khalil Shikaki, “Peace versus the People,” Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Fall 2017
https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/modi-in-israel/
2) Khalil Shikaki, “Do Palestinians Still Support the two-State Solution?” Foreign Affairs, September 2018
3) Khalil Shikaki and Dahlia Scheindlin, Two-State or One-State, English, Carnegie_Baker, fall 2018
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CarnegieBaker_TwoStatesOrOne.pdf
4) Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, “Trump Peace Plan,” ME Brief, the Crown Center for ME Studies, Brandeis University, April 2109
http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb126.pdf
5) خليل الشقاقي وداليا شيندلين، دولتان أم دولة واحدة
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Palestine_Report_ARA.TXT.pdf
Summary Tables:
1) Table 1_ support of the general public for the original and modified packages and components
2) Table 2_ support of the problematic constituencies to package and components
3) Table 3_ Incentives to garner public support
4) Table 4_ incentives to garner problematic constituencies support
5) Table 5_ response of problematic constituencies to modified package
6) Table 6_ impact of paired incentives on support for package
7) Table 7_ sacred values and problematic constituencies
8) Table 8_ impact of positive perceptions of the other on TSS and package
9) Table 9_ impact of perception of the other on TSS and package
10) Table 10_ Palestinian and Israeli public support for TSS, one-state, and confederation
11) Table 11_ impact of elite perception on attitudes
Joint elite Polls:
- Joint Elite Poll 2: Elites on both sides are influenced by their perceptions of their society, and also by their perceptions of opinion on the opposing side: Those who believe their side or the other side is supportive of a two-state solution are more willing to take action and speak out in favor. But Palestinian and Israeli elites are just as divided by ideological attitudes and party identification as the general public on both sides; they may be more committed to their own attitudes over time than the general public, but also show a greater gap between theoretical positions and support for detailed policies. Pre-existing ideology influences reactions to new information about their own and the other side’s support for a two-state solution.
- Joint Elite Poll 1: Elites on both sides are influenced by their perceptions of their society, and also by their perceptions of opinion on the opposing side: Those who believe their side or the other side is supportive of a two-state solution are willing to take action and speak out in favor. But Palestinian and Israeli elites are just as divided by ideological attitudes and party identification as the general public on both sides. Pre-existing ideology influences reactions to new information about their own and the other side’s support for a two-state solution.
Joint Poll in year 2018:
- Capitalizing on previously tested incentives, a modified permanent peace plan receives greater Israeli and Palestinian support surpassing the approval received for the original peace plan during the past two years even as support for the two-state solution falls to the lowest levels during the same period; but pairing previously tested zero-sum incentives yields mixed results.
Joint Poll in year 2017:
- Support for the two-state solution in principle falls below half for Palestinians and Israeli Jews – 46% of both populations support this solution today; Arab citizens of Israel are the only population showing a strong majority in favor (83%). Palestinian attitudes become more pessimistic in general and support for militancy rose following US President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Jewish Israeli support for two states has not changed since June 2017 (47% in June). Still both sides prefer the two-state solution to all other conflict resolution options. Although only a minority of Israelis and Palestinians support the detailed package for implementation – 40% of Palestinians and 43% of Israelis (just 35% among Jews) – the opposition is still flexible: a package of incentives tested among those opposed to the solution showed that nearly half of Jews and 40% of Palestinians might change their minds to support the agreement under the right conditions, bringing support to a majority on both sides.
- Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Elite Poll: Elites on both sides are influenced by their perceptions of their society, and also by their perceptions of opinion on the opposing side: Those who believe their side or the other side is supportive of a two-state solution are willing to take action and speak out in favor. But Palestinian and Israeli elites are just as divided by ideological attitudes and party identification as the general public on both sides. Pre-existing ideology influences reactions to new information about their own and the other side’s support for a two-state solution.
- Support for the two state solution rises among Palestinians but declines among Israeli Jews, while support for a comprehensive peace agreement remains unchanged among Palestinians but drops among Israeli Jews. But a package of incentives shows that attitudes are flexible on both sides, and motivates significant shift in favor of the peace package leading to majority support on both sides. Unilateral recognition of each side’s national claims is one of the most effective incentives for both. However, perceived lack of feasibility remains closely linked to rejection of the two-state solution and its package of implementation. 29 June-1 July, 2017
Joint Poll in year 2016:
- A majority of Israelis and just under half of Palestinians still support the two state solution in principle, but under half on both sides support the detailed framework for its implementation. However, despite mutual fear, distrust and pessimism regarding the likelihood and feasibility of the two-state solution, a majority of Palestinians and Israelis may support comprehensive peace agreement that ends the conflict if offered additional symbolic or concrete incentives. December 8 - 10, 2016
- slight majority of Israelis and Palestinians support the two-state solution. However, they do not trust each other, have disparate views on the terms of a permanent settlement, underestimate the level of compromise on the other side, and view its intentions as threatening. Nonetheless, at least a quarter of the opposition to a permanent settlement on both sides is flexible and it is likely that its opinion might be changed with the right incentives.2-4 June 2016