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INTIFADA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINIAN POLITICS

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Behind the complexities of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, there has always existed a simple process of mutual denial. For almost 100 years, Zionists and Israelis have refused to recognize not only the rights of Palestinians to their homeland, but also the existence of the Palestinian people as a nation. Similarly, the Palestinians have refused to recognize not only the claims of the Zionists and Israelis to Palestine, but also the Jews as a people with national aspirations.

Fifty years into the conflict, a compromise was suggested by the international community and supported by the US and the USSR: a Jewish-Palestinian settlement based on a two-state solution. The two sides were asked co recognize the existence and the legitimate national rights of each other. The land itself, the land called Palestine, was to be partitioned between the two sides. The Zionists accepted the compromise; but the Palestinian side, believing Palestine to be historically Arab and Islamic, and seeing itself as constituting the popular majority and entitled to the greatest part of the Palestinian land, refused to accept the two-state solution.

Today, the situation has changed. Seen from the perspective of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), prospects for a political settlement based on a two-state solution have never been brighter. If the Israeli political establishment can be brought to support such a settlement, then a unique opportunity to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict might be created. Thirty months after the beginning of the intifada, the continuing Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories, main-stream Palestinian thinking now seems clearly committed to

an Arab-Jewish historical compromise based on the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

This report examines the main elements of the current Palestinian position; the conditions, challenges, and opportunities that compelled and motivated the Palestinian leadership to embrace that position; the possible consequences of the continuation of the status quo; and the future of the PLO peace program, as well as the future of the intifada.

The PLO h.as embarked during the past 18 months on □ new strategy, approved by an overwhelming majority during the 19th session of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), or Palestinian parliament, in Algiers in November 1988. It called for a just and durable peace and for the fulfillment of Palestinian rights while condemning terrorism. It accepted a two-state solution as embodied in the UN General Assembly resolution 181 of 1947, which divided Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, and approved UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. which recognized the existence of the state of Israel within secure boundaries and called upon Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab terrirories.1

For a long time, Palestinians' belief in the absolute justice of their cause and the feasiblity of achieving their objectives prevented them. decades after the conflict began in the late 19th Century, from seriously considering any compromise that would require them to willingly give up the greater part of their homeland. When, in the aftermath of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, the Palestinian leadership finally came to recognize the Arab-Israeli balance of power and rhe reality of continued Arab division, two factors began to force a slow process of transition to a "moderate" position. Past commitments had created popular cultural aversion to the concept of partition; time was needed, in the words of a senior FLO official, to convince the Palestinian people of the need to accept the existence of Israel "in return for a small Palestinian state in less than 23 per cent of the land which we claim' to be ours."2 And perhaps more importantly, the internal balance within the PLO's decision-making bodies, which had favored the hardline advocates and rewarded "rejectionist" tendencies, began to shift. The Palestinian intifada - itself a force for change in the stand off -- provided the necessary vehicle for new changes to be carried out and promoted.

The new PLO policy does not, however, represent a fundamental break with the past. Rather, it should be seen as a culmination of a trend that has been underway since the early 1970s. A continuous process of change toward "moderation" can be found in the resolutions and deliberations of the highest Palestinian decision-making body, the PNC, since its 12th session in 1974, and in the failure of the so-called "rejectionist" forces, both within and outside the PLO, to provide a viable alternative, despite their success in slowing the process down.3

PLO BEFORE THE INTIFADA

The first major shift in Palestinian attitude toward Israel occurred after the 1971 Jordanian-Palestinian confrontation. The PLO's defeat in that confrontation effectively put an end to its grand strategy of a "people's war," leaving the organization with no overall military strategy. This raised serious doubts about the viability of a Palestinian military option. The 1973 war with Israel only confirmed Palestinian doubts about the viability of an Arab military option that would deliver Palestine to them.

The 1973 war and the ensuing Arab-Israeli negotiations created the perception among the Palestinians that a political solution was inevitable. Therefore, it was imperative that the PLO come up with a practical and realistic political program. The PLO feared that failure to articulate such a program probably would result in the resumption of Jordanian control over the West Bank, thus effectively putting an end to Palestinian aspirations for independence and statehood.

The PLO's new program, which was adopted by the 12th Palestine National Council session in 1974, in Cairo, embraced the idea of an independent Palestinian "authority" (or srace) in part of Palestine -- essentially in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The objective of .the Palestinian leadership in 1974 was to make the PLO a realistic and viable negotiating partner in peace talks and to preclude Jordanian reassertion of sovereignty over the West Bartle In sum, the Palestinian decade of the 1970s amounted to loss of a military option and adoption of a diplomatic option. Since then, Palestinian military activities against Israel have played a minor role, if any, in serving Palestinian diplomatic and political goals.

In the early 1980s, the Israeli military invasion of Lebanon, which destroyed the political, military, and social infrastructure of the semi-independent Palestinian base in that country, confront d the Palestinian leadership with three major challenges: what would be the fate of independent Palestinian decision-making? what would be the fate of the internal balance within the structure of the Palestinian leadership? and what would be the fate of the then-existing balance between the Palestinian "inside" (i.e., the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and the Palestinian "outside" (i.e., the Palestinian diaspora)?4

Despite the loss of its relatively independent base in Lebanon, the Palestinian leadership insisted on maintaining its independent decision-making. Having decided that its independence was more valuable than its strategy, the PLO was forced to forgo any significant military role, for that might have brought the organization under Syrian control. This de<.ision led, in tum, to a Palestinian-Syrian confrontation that began in 1983 and involved, among other things, a major split with.in Fateh, the major Palestinian guerrilla group and the dominant power within the PLO. The Syrian-Palestinian political alliance was thus decisively ended.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 also greatly reduced the input of the so-called "rejectionist" forces in the PLO decision-making process. These "rejectionist" forces enjoyed a solid base of support in Lebanon before the invasion, giving them something approaching veto power over PLO decisions, a power incommensurate with their actual size or with the limited support they had enjoyed from the Palestinian people. With the loss of their Lebanon base, the "rejecrionist" strength within PLO institutions deteriorated to reflect the extent of their actual presence in the occupied territories and among Palestinians in general. On the other hand, groups which enjoyed greater grass roots support in the occupied territories and among Palestinians, such as Fateh, were able to maintain and increase their influence in PLO institutions in the post-1982 period. Moreover, the split within Fateh, which rook the more radical and leftist elements out of that guerrilla group, served to strengthen the hands of the more moderate elements within the PLO.

The post-1982Syrian-Palestinian confrontation constrained the PLO's political options and necessitated a Palestinian rapprochement with Egypt and Jordan. The change in the internal balance within the PLO's institutions and the strengthening of PLO moderates made such a switch in alliance possible. With the notable exception of a temporary setback, during the 1986-87 period, a Palestinian-Egyptian-Jordanian triple alliance of moderation was inevitable by the mid-1980s. At a time when Egypt was deep in isolation in the Arab world for altering the balance of power in the region by signing a peace treaty with Israel, the PLO leadership was the first among the Arabs to break ranks and reestablish contacts with the Egyptian regime in 1983.5 An important outcome of this rapprochement was the PLO's Cairo Declaration of 1985 in which the organization condemned terrorism and announced cessation of attacks on Israeli targets outside Israel and the occupied territories.6

At the same time, Arafat sought to improve relations with Jordan. In 1983, he negotiated an agreement with King Hussein for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to peace talks based on UN resolution 242. Opposition within the PLO for the acceptance of that resolution, however, killed the agreement. A second attempt at such coordination, in 1985, was strongly supported and encouraged by Egypt and led to the signing of the Amman Accord.7 The Accord represented the culmination of PLO efforts to meet the US administration's conditions for dialogue. It was based on acceptance of the land-for-peace principle and of a future Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.

The agreement collapsed in late 1985 under pressure from both sides to reinterpret its meaning. This development caused a break between Jordan and the PLO, leading to a Jordanian attempt to compete with the PLO for the support of Palestinians in the occupied territories and threatening the representation Status of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. A billion-dollar Jordanian "Development Plan" for the occupied territories

was announced by Amman in 1986. Other sii:;ns of Jordanian-Israeli cooperation in the West Bank led the PLO to suspect that an informal "condominium," involving the two countries, was in the makmg.8 Nonetheless, despite the failure of the two Jordanian-Palestinian attempts to come up with a unified peace strategy, the PLO leadership succeeded, during the 1983-86 period, in placing the issues of Palestinian recognition of UN resolution 242 and a future confederation with Jordan on the PLO agenda.9

The third consequence of the 1982Israeli destruction of the Palestinian base in Lebanon was the shifting of the focus of Palestinian attention from exile to the West Bank and Ga7..a. Israel's success in Lebanon necessitated the transfer and rebuilding of that base in the occupied territories. It also caused a shift in emphasis from clandestine military activities and organization in the occupied territories, found unviable under the circumstances of occupation, to grass roots political mobilization.

During the 1980s, PLO-affiliated groups, particularly Fateh, succeeded in establishing an extensive network of highly organized, politicized, motivated, and mostly unemployed young militants. These militants controlled and supervised activities of hundreds of student councils, support committees, women, and trade unions in all the villages, towns, refugee camps, and cities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The rise of these young militants to leadership roles signaled an evolution in authority in the occupied territories. For almost a decade, the traditional Palestinian political leadership on the inside, which had enjoyed little support or legitimacy, had been weakened and eventually replaced or co-opted by a more nationalist, middle-aged, and highly pragmatic and moderate pro-PLO leadership with grass roots support.10 Those leaders were found in professional organizations, among university professors, and in the Jerusalem- based Palestinian press. Now, a new, young, militant, alternative leadership was being created. It was they who ignited and have led the intifada; the prior success of the PLO's extensive political mobilization and organization efforts helped to sustain and intensify it.

The shift in the center of gravity of Palestinian politics to the occupied territories may in the long run have caused a move to radicalism. In the shon run, however, it funher strengthened the moderate tendencies within the PLO, since the inside leadership -- in comparison with the outside leadership - had gained, in the past, the reputation of being more moderate and pragmatic. Even after the eruption of the intifada, which greatly enhanced the role and influence of young militants, the middle-aged leadership, supported and encouraged by the PLO leadership and by its base in the national institutions which it controlled, maintained considerable influence. Moreover, because of its particular circumstances, the PLO "inside" has generally been more supportive than the PLO "outside" of establishing an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza; those in the diaspora, in the refugee camps of

Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, have had historical interests not necessarily well served by such a state.

THE INTIFADA AND PLO PEACE PROGRAM

After two decades of what seemed to most Palestinians to be a permanent, brutal occupation accompanied by Arab and international indifference, the people in the West Bank and Gaw Strip in December 1987 took the struggle against Israel into their own hands. Thus began the dual process of liberation and independence that the Palestinians call the intifada. By using mostly non-violent methods,11 such as economic boycotts, commercial and labor strikes, demonstrations, and refusal to pay taxes, West Bank and Gaza Palestinians succeeded in starting a process of disengagement from Israel that for all practical purposes closed the occupied territories to Israeli civilians12 and rendered the presence of the Israeli army irrelevant in many respects.

A parallel process of indigenous, independent institution building, in areas of legislation, justice, trade, education, health, social welfare, and economic infrastructure, has led to a measure of Palestinian de facto indcpendence.13 Indeed, many state institutions are already in existence. A system of self-rule is functioning with an underground National Command center (the Unified National Command of the Intifada-UNC) making and issuing decisions and directives (in bi-monthly leaflets), and national and local popular committees executing these decisions. An underground "Popular Anny" and a "Security Service" provide strike forces to harass the Israeli army and enforce National Command decisions.

The UNC decisions and directives range in interest from currency rates, minimum wage rates, work contracts, business hours, and school schedules to the declaring of strike days, boycotts of Israeli products, confrontations with the Israeli army, and the execution of collaborators. In face of Israeli economic warfare and iron fist policies (which, by April 1990, had caused over 900 Palestinian deaths, 50,000 injuries, and a drastic drop in the standard of living), Palestinians have developed a mentality of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, gained greater self-confidence, and claimed a moral victory, thus putting Israel on the political defensive.14

Furthermore, the intifada has introduced some profound changes in regard to the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, emphasizing the centrality of the Palestinian-Israeli aspect and marginalizing the role of non-Palestinian actors like Jordan. It has abolished the informal Israeli-Jordanian quasi-partnership (the condominium), dashed any Jordanian hopes for competing with the PLO for Palestinian support, and rendered irrelevant the Israeli Labor Party's so-called "Jordan opcion."15

It has also affected Palestinian perceptions and attitudes. As rime has passed, the goals of the intifada have evolved from interim demands for measures ro alleviate the burdens of occupation into the strategic goal of independence. In January1988, local Palestinian leaders presented a 14-point memorandum setting forth demands for the release of prisoners, cancellation of taxes, ending of restrictions on the Palestinian economy, and withdrawal of any units from population centers, among others. The Israeli government refused to respond to these tactical demands. Weeks later, the strategic goal of the intifada was arriculated.16

On the other hand, a short-lived conviction that the intifada by itself can put an end to the occupation gave way to a more somber evaluation. The intifada now created the perception among Palestinians that an opportunity was at hand for reaching a settlement with Israel that would bring about an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Arafat's political advisor told an Arabic newspaper that the continuation of the intifada "will force Israel to reach a strategic decision: to sir at the negotiating table and to accept the principle of withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip."17 Many in the Palestinian leadership came to believe that the situation demanded as moderate position and a practical program capable of capitalizing on, and dealing with, the changes and dynamics unleashed by the intifada.

Several external and internal factors were responsible for new changes in the Palestinian attitude. Until 1986, the PLO's rejection of UN resolution 242 enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union. Moreover, fearful of a repetition of the Camp David diplomacy which excluded them from the Middle Ea.st peace process, the Soviets tacitly opposed a Palestinian-American dialogue. But the year 1987 witnessed a dramatic shift in the Soviet position. The Soviets made an impressive effort to improve relations with]srael; reduced military support for Syria, the most "rejectionist" Arab state and the only one with a credible military option; informed the Syrians of their opposition to any plans for military parity or war with Israel; emphasized the principle of peaceful resolution of regional conflicts; and sought a closer involvement in the Middle East region18 Bur most importantly for Palestinians, the Soviets now publicly encouraged the PLO leadership to recognize resolution 242 and to seek a dialogue with the US administration. During Arafat's visit to Moscow in April 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev openly encouraged the PLO Chairman to recognize Israel's right to exist.19 The Soviets also brokered a reconciliation between PLO's moderate leadership and its hard-line opponents, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). During October 1988, George Habash, head of the PFLP. and Naif Hawatmeh, head of the DFLP, made visits to Moscow. The Soviets publicly urged them to support a "realistic" and "flexible" program and indicated that it was time for the PLO to recognize Israel. In November 1988, the Soviets succeeded in dissuading the two hard-line groups from blocking the adoption of the PLO peace program and the moderates' explicit recognition of the state of Israel.20

The change in Soviet attitude implied the possibility of removing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from the Cold War context. The continued improvement in Soviet-American relations during 1987 and 1988 also deprived the Palestinians, especially the "rejectionists" among them, of a solid base of political and moral support and meant a loss of political maneuverability. Bur for many moderates in the PLO, the changes in Soviet policy could also be seen as beneficial. These moderates have Jong held the belief that the continuation of the Cold War would always block any moves toward a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The end of the Cold War, in the words of the Chairman of the PNC's Forei Relations Committee, "will bring peace to the Middle East." 1 PLO's second most important leader, Salah Khalaf (Abu lyad), wTote that because "global rivalry between the superpowers has receded," the international conditions for a settlement have become most suitable.22

At the regional level, the Jordanian king's decision in late July 1988, eight months into the intifada, to disengage from the occupied territories by severing administrative and legal links with the West Bank created the perception among Palestinians that a vacuum had been left behind and needed ro be filled. This elicited flurries of ideas, proposals, and initiatives from the local leadership in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. By late August, Arafat had received from the occupied territories nine drafts calling for Palestinian national independence.23 One such draft was the so-called "Husayni Document," which was published in the first half of August 1988 and called for a two-state solution and for a declaration of Palestinian independence based on UN partition resolution 181.24

For the PLO leadership in exile, the intifada provided an opportunity to regain the political initiative and to reappraise its strategy after the setbacks it confronted in its attempts to present it lf as a viable negotiating partner during the 1983-85 period. The internal and external achievements and successes of the intifada, and the international recognition of Palestin.ian centrality, gave the PLO leadership great self-confidence and uniry and made it more willing to compromise in order to break the status quo. Indeed, the inside leadership's proposals were, in part, a response to signs of change taking place within the PLO in exile. One of these signs was the publication of a document written by Arafat's closest advisor, Bassam Abu Sharif, in June L988.25 Abu Sharifs document, as ir came to be known, opened the door for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and implied PLO endorsement of a two-state solution.

The publication of the document served its purpose by emboldening the moderate-pragmatic, Fareh-affiliated leadership in the occupied territories to openly articulate a strategic initiative. The moderate PLO leadership in exile welcomed the initiative, as it forced the hands of the "rejectionists," who were not about to launch a direct challenge to the inside leadership's legitimacy at a time when Palestinians were showing signs of unity and solidarity with the intifada. Thus, when the PNC passed its November 1988 resolutions, it already had obta.ined

the necessary political legitimacy. In sum, the PNC's 1988 resolutions represented the convergence of two views. For the inside's moderate-pragmatic leadership, which had long advocated a more moderate PLO approach toward Israel, the resolutions were a victory. For the PLO in exile, it was the culmination of a trend that had been evolving, slowly but surely, since 1974.

In the occupied territories, the intifada also created conditions that led to the emergence of the Islamic movement as a major driving force in the politics of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Until the mid-1970s, the Islamists remained on the fringes of Palestinian political life in the occupied territories. Thereafter, they assumed a more activist role. By the early 1980s, the Islamic movement became an integral part of the Palestinian socio-political milieu. The success of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the establishment of several Islamic colleges in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1970s, and an Israeli policy not to impede its growth, perhaps to increase divisions in Palestinian ranks and enable a potential rival to the secular-nationalist PLO, were all responsible for the apparent success of the Islamic camp.26

But by failing to articulate a clear, militant role for itself in the confrontation against the Israeli occupation at this period, the Islamic camp could not hope to increase the size of its constituency or to seriously challenge the hegemony of the nationalist camp. The emergence of the Islamic Jihad in the early 1980s, led by young and militant Islamists who combined religious and nationalist fervor, signaled the presence of dissatisfaction, within the Islamic camp, with the strategies and attitudes of the traditional leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and most influential Islamic group in the occupied territories. The Brotherhood emphasized societal reforms and religious and moral education in the fight against occupation. While emphasizing that all Palestine is Arab and Islamic, and no part of it may be conceded to the Jews, the Brotherhood was willing to postpone armed jihad, or struggle, until the evolution of "proper conditions," such as the establishment of an Islamic state in one of the neighboring Arab countries. By contrast, Islamic Jihad advocated armed struggle and demanded immediate action against the Israeli occupation and sought an improved relationship with the nationalist camp. During the 1986-87 period, it mounted several armed operations against Israeli soldiers and operatives, thus helping start a process that led to the intifada.

Under pressure from its followers, and witnessing the success of Islamic Jihad in building a militant Islamic wing within its own camp, the Muslim Brotherhood embarked i.n the early 1980s on a new strategy that shifted its focus away from education and preaching into socio-political mobilization and organization. The shift helped to foster the emergence of a highly politicized and disaffected cadre of activists who ran an expanding network of mosques, student bodies, and professional organizations. In student elections, in the mid-1980s, the Islamic bloc, which now began to compete with the nationalist camp, gained 25 to 45 per cent of the votes in

Bir Zeit, Najah, and Hebron univcrsities.27 The establishment of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, as a political and military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, in the first weeks of the intifada, ushered in a new chapter in the role of the Islamic camp in the fight against occupation. It indicated that the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood had finally realized that it could no longer resist the pressures exerted by its young and increasingly militant constituency. To maintain its credibility as a popular fundamentalist movement, and to survive as a relevant political force, the Brotherhood had ro actively join the intifada and the popular struggle in all its forms. For that, the Islamic camp, and particularly the Brotherhood, was rewarded by in<,Teased popular support that allows it to boast a representation of no less than one-third of the population in the occupied territories, thus almost doubling the size of its pre-intifada constituency.28

The intifada presented the Islamic movement as an ideological, political, and institutional alternative to the PLO, while at the same time effectively putting an end to the search for non-Palestinian alternative leadership to represent the Palestinians. Both Harb.as and Islamic Jihad maintained their independent organizations, formal institutions, and decision-making authorities. They refused to join the UNC and issued their own separate, numbered leaflets. They also maintained their own parallel program of strikes, civil disobedience, guerrilla forces, and popular committees. In August 1988, Hamas presented itself as a separate, independent political and ideological force by issuing its own parallel charter called "The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement-Palestine.''29 Publicly, however, the lslamists neither challenged PLO legitimacy nor sought to supplant its role in any future negotiations. Furthermore, they did not deliberately seek to contradict the directives of the nationalist UNC; indeed, a good measure of coordination, and sometimes cooperation, was achieved from the earliest weeks of the intifada.

The impact of the rise of Hamas and Islamic Jihad was twofold. It made imperative that the PLO demonstrate that it can produce results. In order to do so, the PLO was willing to offer major concessions; it realized that continued political stagnation in the peace process only played into the hands of the "radicals," including, but not restricted to, the Islamic groups. PLO's Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) put it this way: if Israel and the US do not deal with us now, they will eventually have to deal with the Islamists at a later stage.

On the other hand, the rise of Islam as a rival to the PLO in the occupied territories made it abundantly clear that there are limits beyond which the PLO cannot proceed without risking loss of credibility in the eyes of its constituency. One of the main reasons for PLO's success in gaining and maintaining its sole representative status has been the organization's sensitivity and responsiveness to its constituency's moods and demands. Failure to do so now, at a time when an alternative leadership was gaining in power, could prove suicidal. Therefore, Palestmian

concessions, in the form of recognition of the state of Israel and willingness to live in peace with it, were coupled with Palestinian demands for parity in the form of Israeli recognition of their right to self-determination and statehood.

PLO'S PEACE PROGRAM

The adoption by the PLO of the new strategy outlined in the November 1988 PNC "Palestinian Declaration of Independence," and "Political Communique," 30 and in Arafat's statement in Geneva in December of that year, marked an important departure from previous policy. The PNC declared the establishment of a Palestinian state, accepted UN resolutions 181, 242, and 338, and denounced terrorism. It was clear to PNC members that a declaration of statehood and independence would be an empty gesture unless it was followed by a real change in Israeli, American, and West European attitudes. In order to induce such a change, and thus achieve concrete success, the PLO was willing in 1988 to embrace what it totally rejected in 1974, when it had first embarked on its political-diplomatic strategy.

Arafat and other senior PLO officials have further clarified, elaborated, and softened PLO positions regarding several important issues such as the peace process, interim measures, PLO Charter, "right of return," future "designs," security ·arrangements, and the future relationship with Jordan and Israel. In regard to Palestinian objectives and the peace process, the PNC's Political Communique of November 1988 affirmed the belief i.n the "settlement of regional conllicts by peaceful means." It also expressed PLO's determination "to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its core, which is the question of Palestine..." The settlement should "safeguard the Palestine Arab people's rights ro return, to self-determination, and the establishment of their independent national state on their national soil, and ... institute arrangements for the security and peace of au states in the region."

Like Israel's declaration of independence, the PNC's Declaration makes no reference to national boundaries. But the Communique calls for ''the withdrawal of Israel from all the Palestinian ... territories it occupied in 1967, including Arab [East] Jerusalem," thus designating those areas as the territory of the new state. Abu Iyad was more explicit when he defined "East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip," as the land claimed for the Palestinian state.32

The Communique further affirmed "the necessity of convening the effective international conference ... under the auspices of the United Nations and the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and all parties to the conflict in the region including the [PLO]." Less than a year later, as Israel made clear its total opposition to the convening of an international conference on the Middle East, the PLO modified its position. In the "Final Statement of the PLO Central Council" of October 1989,33 the PLO approved the holding of

Palestinian-Israeli talks without the cover of the international conference. However, these talks, the statement said, "should be considered as . . a step toward convening (the international conference]."

In yet another demonstration of flexibility, Arafat's political advisor, Bassam Abu Sharif, wrote in The New York Times that the PLO seeks through "peaceful means" to secure a "negotiated settlement" leading to a "free Palestine living at peace with a secure Israel." He added that "all the problems relating to a Palestinian-Israeli settlement be worked out in talks between an Israeli delegation chosen by the Israeli government and a Palestinian delegation chosen by the PLO."34

Seeking to allay Israeli security and psychological fears, Palestinians have expressed willingness to accept interim arrangements and other confidence-building measures. For example, they have agreed to negotiate the so-called Baker Plan and the Israeli election plan for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PLO has accepted the plan proposed by US Secretary of State James Baker, which was announced in September 1989, and called for a dialogue in Cairo between Israeli and Palestinian delegations to discuss the Israeli government election proposal of May1989 and the "negotiating process."35

The Plan focuses only on a preliminary dialogue in Cairo. The dialogue, if successful, is to be followed by elections in the occupied territories to elect Palestinian representatives, who would then enter into negotiations over an interim settlement (autonomy), which would be followed by negotiations over the final status of the occupied territories. The Baker Plan does not mention the PLO by name, but it allows Egypt to consult with "Palestinians" on "all aspects" of the dialogue. It gives Israel a strong leverage over the formulation of the Palestinian delegation and the nature of its composition by stating the understanding that the dialogue would commence only after a "satisfactory list" of Palestinians has been worked out.

The Likud-led government in Tel Aviv opposed the inclusion of Palestinians from East Jerusalem or from outside the occupied territories in the Palestinian delegation. It also insisred that the agenda of the Cairo dialogue be restricted to discussion of the Israeli election plan. And it sought US assurances that the PLO wiJl not play a role in the dialogue or in the negotiations thereafter. Hard-liners in the Likud ranks imposed further Israeli restrictions, including the demand for ending the intifada before any negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians could take place.

The PLO is seeking assurances that elections and autonomy will not be used to undermine its status as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people or to undermine the intifada. In its October 1989 statement, the PLO Central Council insisted that "only the PLO has the right to select and declare a Palestinian delegation from inside and outside [the occupied

territories] for talks with Israel." Furthermore, suspecting a premeditated effort by Israel to put an end to the intifada, the PLO insisted, from the start, on the absence of any linkage between the acceptance of the Baker Plan and the future of the intifada. Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) wrote in a recent Foreign Policy article that the "intifada will not stop on the strength of a vague promise of negotiations that rules out the right of self-determination."36 The PLO also is seeking, from Israel and the US, guarantees such as international supervision and other safeguards that will assure the integrity of the elections. But most importantly, the Palestinians are insisting that all interim arrangements must be seen from the outset as steps leading eventually to their self-determination and statehood.37

It is evident that, by its November 1988 resolution, and indeed by its resolutions since the 12th session in 1974, the PNC had in effect rendered invalid significant portions of the PLO Charter. The Charter, adopted by the first PNC in 1964 and amended in 1968, considers all Palestine to be "Arab homeland." It rejects partition and considers the establishment of Israel to be illegitimate. The amended version of the Charter asserts the primacy of armed struggle as "the only way to liberate Palestine."38 By contrast, the PNC's Declaration of Independence accepts partition; and indeed, it explicitly bases the legitimacy of Palestinian statehood partly on the UN partition resolution number 181 of 1974. The Declaration states that resolution 181 "which partitioned Palestine into two scares, one Arab, one Jewish... still provides those conditions of international legitimacy that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty and national independence." Furthermore, the PNC's 1988 resolutions affirm PLO commitment to the principle of the peaceful resolution of conflict. They make no mention of armed struggle, a subject of Palestinian consensus since 1968.

Omission of continuing reference to armed struggle is seen by a leading Palestinian historian as the "sharpest" and ''most significant departure from traditional Palestinian political discourse as it has developed since the watershed of 1948.',39 Moreover, for the first time since its first session in 1964, the 1988 PNC made no mention of the Charter in its resolutions. Previous Palestinian resolutions have always invoked the Charter as a base for legitimacy. After November 1988, Palestinian resolutions - such as those of the Fateh Fifth Congress, held in Tunis in August 1989, and those of the PLO Central Council, held in Baghdad in October 1989, referred to the Declaration of Independence as a base of legitimacy. In sum, the two-state solution - implied in the PNC's Palestine state resolution (the Ten-Points Program) in 1974 and explicitly stated in the Declaration of Independence -- has superseded the Charter.40 Arafat made clear during his meeting with French President Mitterrand in May 1989 that the Charter had become outdated and was no longer operntive.41

In regard to the Palestinians' "right of return" to their homes and lands within Israel proper, Arafat indicated that the Palestinian state will be the state for "all" Palestinians, thus implying a

difference between having the right and exercising it; in other words, the "right" would be negotiable. Similarly, Faisal al-Husayni, the leading pro-PLO man in the occupied territories, wrote that "any status which resolves only the problems of the inhabitants of the occupied territories is not a solution of the Palestinian issue; the Palestinians abroad would remain refugees The importance of the Palestinian state is that it would be clear that each and every Palestinian has the right to return to live in that state and to fulfill his national aspiration within that state.'.42 Al-Husayni stated that the Palestinians were willing to discuss giving up the right of return in exchange for compensation. 43

While insisting that the "right to return" should be on the agenda "of any negotiation for the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict," Abu Iyad promises to "remain flexible regarding .its implementation." He further states that the second part of rhe phrase "right of return or compensation" is often overlooked. He adds: " we are not totally unrealistic when we consider just how this right may be implemented. For one thing, we accept that a total return is not possible. . . In addition, it is not at all sure that large numbers of Palestinians would want to 'return' to live under Israeli rule, especially if a Palestinian state existed as an alternative.44 Indeed, a Palestinian study estimates that 650,000 to 700,000 refugees now living in camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan will seek to return. The "vast majority" of these, the study estimates, will have to be repatriated in the new Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It adds that 585,000 refugees now living in camps in the occupied territories also will have to be integrated into the new state.45

Palestinians realize that, despite its clearly evident military superiority, Israel may well feel threatened by the establishment of a Palestinian state and may demand certain security arrangements. In order to allay Israeli fear that a Palestinian state may pose a potential strategic threat, the PNC's 1988 Political Communique calls upon the UN Security Council to "formulate and guarantee arrangements for security and peace between all the states concerned in the region." Arafat indicated that a "peace settlement will contain any conceivable condition necessary to guarantee Israel's security." Abu Iyad stated that the PLO will accept "any kind of local, regional, and international security guarantees and arrangements that do not encroach upon the sovereignty of any of the states involved.',46 He added that the PLO "accepts that security accords will be signed [between Israel and the Palestinian state} and security arrangements will be made to deal with ... contingencies [such as] terrorist operations against Israel...47 Hani al-Hasan, a senior PLO official, said that the PLO "has no objection to mutually agreed border modifications [in the 1948 cease-fire lines] insofar as they may be necessary for genuine Israeli security concerns and needs.'48

Likewise, the PLO realizes that the future relationship between Palestine, Jordan, and Israel will have to be based on mutual cooperation. A Palestinian state can be most viable in a context of a

Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. Jordan would provide the new state with a market for its products, land access to the Arab world in Asia, and a unity of its one people. Such a confederation had been part of the PNC's platforms since its 16th session in February 1983. The 19th session of November 1988 reaffirmed that the "future relationship between the two states of Jordan and Palestine will be [established] on confederal basis."

The PLO realizes also that cooperation with Israel would be inevitable. Being positioned between the two separate pans of the state of Palestine, Israel would be needed to provide the only land link between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Arafat has indicated his willingness to extend the Jordanian-Palestinian confederation to include Israel. He envisages a future economic union between the three states based on the Benelux model. L, such a context, he calls for joint Arab-Israeli ventures and a Middle Eastern Marshall Plan.49

Faisal al-Husayni has argued that the establishment of a Palestinian state will make it possible for Israel to be part of a future "Middle East economic community" similar to the Ec.50 Abu lyad is more explicit: "Prudence and interest dictate that we cooperate over issues such as water; the movement of labor, goods, and capital; the supervision of the passage between Gaza and the West Bank, etc. [A Palestinian state] can provide a link between Israel and the Arab hi:nterland."51 The Palestinians insist, however, that the Palestinian-Jordanian-Israeli association be voluntarily negotiated by the three sovereign states.52

However, many Israelis have argued that the PLO has not really changed and that its new policy is merely a tactic. The PLO, in this Israeli view, is still committed to the so-called "strategy of stages," according to which a PLO-controlled State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be the first stage in a long frocess aiming ultimately at the liquidation of the state of Israel.53

To allay Israeli fears and suspicions of PLO's real intentions and future "designs," Abu Iyad, who has been accused by Israelis of being the mastermind behind the "strategy of stages," claims that the organization has no such "demonic scheme;" that it has "put aside the dream of establishing one democratic Arab-Jewish state in pre-1948 Palestine;" that the "two-state solution... is not the first phase of a plan to liquidate the Jewish state;" and that PLO moderation in this regard ''has come about after a continuous and difficult process of internal debate and discussion stretching back 15 years."54 Hani al-Hasan told a London audience that "we know that once we sign a [peace treaty] with Israel, it constitutes mutual recognition and we will therefore also be renouncing our right to any further struggle."55 Indeed, the Palestinian Declaration of Independence affirms that the Palestinian state will "reject the threat or use of force, violence, and terrorism" against the "territorial integrity of other states." In this regard, the PLO insists that it is "practicing self-restraint" and that its record since November 1988 shows that it is keepi.ng its commitment to renounce terrorism.56 A US State Department report, submitted to Congress on March 19, 1990, affirms that "the PLO h s adhered to its

commitment undertaken in 1988 to renounce terror."::>7 Some Israeli sources appear to agree with the conclusions of the State Department report.58

THE INTIFADA AT A CROSSROADS

As it enters the second half of its third year, the Palestinian popular uprising continues without diminution. Nonetheless, the intifada is approaching a crisis point. Its future is inextricably linked to the outcome of the on-going political process, which is seen by many Palestinians as going nowhere. As it becomes clear that a political solution is an unlikely outcome in the foreseeable future, and as the Palestinians see their costs and losses increase day after day, hopes are dashed and frustration and anger are intensified.

The mounting tension confronts the intifada with several challenges: a growing threat to Palestinian unity (as the nationalist-Islamic and moderate-extreme divisions are deepened and reinforced); an increasingly divisive debate over the means of struggle (as demands for turning the intifada into an armed rebellion become more vocal and widespread); and finally, a potentially serious reversal of the traditional historical relationship between the inside and the outside (the former becoming radicalized, the latter becoming more moderate and conciliatory).

The intifada has produced a remarkable degree of unity in ranks, greatly reducing intra-Palestinian rivalry and fostering solidarity. The early months witnessed the formation of the UNC, made up of representatives of the four major national groups - Fateh, PFLP, DFLP, and the Palestinian Communist Party. The same period also witnessed serious efforts - sometimes successful -- on the part of the nationalists and Islamists to collaborate and coordinate their activities. This unity is now coming under strain; cracks are appearing.59 In the past few months, tension within the nationalist camp has led to a serious rift within the UNC. In February 1990, the PFLP issued its own first separate intifada leaflet. Other numbered leaflets have sincefollowed.60 The contents of the leaflets reflect deep disagreements between Fateh, the largest and most powerful of the four UNC constituent groups, and the PFLP over (1) specific PLO policies, (2) the direction of the intifada, (3) the relationship between the nationalists and Islamic camps, and (4) the role of armed struggle. The PFLP expressed serious reservations about the need for Palestinian concessions as long as Israel does not reciprocate. In this regard, it has opposed the proposed Palestinian-Israeli dialogue in Cairo currently endorsed by the PLO.

A spill-over effect of the political disagreement has been a dramatic increase, in the third year of the intifada, in the number of incidents involving physical clashes between "strike forces" belonging to the two antagonist groups, leading in some cases to serious injuries.61

The PFLP has called for immediate escalation of the intifada and for intensified violent attacks on Israeli settlers and soldiers. It indicated that it has begun to issue separate leaflets because

the UNC has refused to include calls for such violent resistance in its bi-monthly directives.62 In recognition of growing Islamist popularity, and seeing the similarity in their political views, the PFLP has recently turned to fundamentalist groups to form a counterweight to Fateh. The PFLP and Islamic Jihad issued a joint intifada leaflet criticizing PLO concessions and calling for armed struggle. In March 1990, the two groups cooperated to enforce a commercial strike in the city of Bethlehem, in defiance of the UNC, which ordered shops to remain open. This tactical alliance seems to involve Hamas, although .in a lesser degree of cooperation.63

Continued political stagnation, accompanied by increased Pale5tinian suffering, have also deepened the differences between Islamic and nationalist camps. The solidarity and cooperation, clearly evident in the early period of the intifada, have considerably diminished, especially after the PNC's November 1988 resolutions. As the Islamic camp gradually and determinedly increased it power base, it came to be seen by the nationalist camp as a serious threat to its dominance. Despite the fact that the Islamic groups are not represented in any of the PLO institutions, and that they lack the infrasm1cture needed to be able to challenge nationalist hegemony at many levels, they have succeeded in gaining the support of almost a third of the population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.64 As they saw themselves as a potential alternative to the nationalists, Hamas and Islamic Jihad began to emphasize specific points of disagreement with the PLO. They rejected the PLO peace program, the Israeli election plan, the Baker plan, and the proposed Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. More seriously, independent Islamic "strike forces" were established, some of which were involved in the intra-nationalist clashes mentioned above.65

Palestinian and Israeli observers agree that in the absence of political progress, PLO influence is likely to continue to diminish as that of the Islamic groups continues to increase. One Israeli analyst argues that if Israel does not negotiate with the PLO, it will soon find itself "facing Hamas and other Muslim fanatics, with whom negotiation is virruallyimpossible."66 Another Israeli analyst wrote: "If we wait too long, the choice will not be between an Arafat who is willing to accept all, or even some of Israel's conditions, but between a Shaik Yassin [Hamas founder and leader] on the one hand and a George Habash [PFLP leader] on the other."67

A Palestinian writer, Ziad Abu Zayyad, the editor of the only Palestinian Hebrew weekly, Gesher (bridge), agrees that the continuation of the status quo means that the PLO will lose ground to the Islamic camp and that "time is working for the benefit of the Islamic movement."68 The PLO leadership itself realizes the problem. Not only does Abu Iyad agree with this assessment; Arafat admits that the "Islamists now pose a greater potential threat" to his leadership of the PLO "than did the secular opposition groups headquartered in a still-hostile Syria."69

The second most important challenge confronting the intifada is the intensified debate over its escalation. The question today in the 'Occupied territories is no longer whether the intifada

should or should not be escalated, but rather how. The inside leadership has realized that the intifada has nor yet increased the cost of continued occupation ro a point that the Israelis can not tolerate. It now seeks, through escalation, to do exactly that. Two views dominate the internal Palestinian debate in the occupied territories: one calls for a shift to a fully non-violent struggle, the other advocates a more violent intifada.

The differences over means of struggle are grounded in different Palestinian perceptions and readings of Israeli politics and culture, Israeli society's threshold for pain and suffering, and the Israeli costs and changes already generated by the intifada. Advocates of non-violence see Israel divided into two camps: one radical and ideological (Likud), the other moderate and pragmatic (Labor). Israeli society is seen as democratic (willing to abide by the rule of law), motivated by pure interests (thus sensitive to moral, political, and economic costs), and having an inflated threat perception (an "irrational" fear of Palestinians). Arab advocates of non-violence argue that the costs of the intifada on Israeli policies, economy, and society have not been insignificant. Advocates of violent escalation of the intifada, on the other hand, do not see important differences between Labor and Lik.'1.ld. Both parties are seen as committed to a "Greater Israel" ideology. In this view, the ideological motivation makes Israel willing to pay high moral, political, and economic costs to maintain control over the occupied territories. This translates into Israeli readiness to continue the oppression and human rights abuses indefinitely. It also renders irrelevant (to cost-benefit calculation) any Israeli commitment to moral and democratic principles.

While recognizing the efficacy of economic costs, advocates of violence argue that any possible Israeli economic erosion is likely to be slow and that American and Jewish economic assistance to Israel will easily compensate for the losses. Only significant increase in the number of Israeli deaths, and in the amount of pain and suffering, the argument continues, could lower the Israeli ideological motivation and thus lead Israeli leaders co rethink their position.

The strategy of non-violence, currently the dominant view espoused by the more moderate wings of the inside leadership,70 presents itself as the most effective means of struggle, given the imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians. Its advocates attribute the success of the intifada, thus far, to its non-violent nature. They argue that Israel prefers to deal with violence because it would be easier to crush a violent revolt and that armed action is simply not feasible because "there are few weapons, almost no opportunity to train, and a strong possibility that armed action would be crushed very quickly and brutally." 71 On the other hand, non-violence seeks to deprive the opponent of his sources of power and superiority. By adopting non-violence, Faisal al-Husayni wrote, "We have thus neutralized nuclear weapons, Phantoms, heavy artillery, machine guns, and automatic rifles. We have forced the other party to face us with ordinary guns and rifles, with gas, sticks, and sometimes with scones." 72

The strategy of non-violence sees the present goals of the intifada as three-fold: to escalate the process of disengagement from the Israeli occupation (through the intensification of the civil disobedience campaign), to consolidate and expand the process of indigenous state-building (through the establishment of a Palestinian provisional government), and to reduce Israeli threat perception and gain the support of Israeli public opinion (through intensified dtalogue and a shift to a fully non-violent resistance).

A civil disobedience campaign would involve, among other things, (1) total boycott of the so-called Israeli Civil Administration and non-collaboration with the military authorities, (2) refusal to pay taxes and other Israeli imposed fines and fees, (3) increased reliance on Palestinian resources accompanied by the tightening of the economic boycott of Israeli products, (4) reintroduction of peaceful mass demonstrations. Its advocacy is based on the belief that the intifada has already helped break the Palestinian dependence on Israeli economic, social and administrative infrastructure. Civil disobedience, strongly advocated by Mubarak Awad, the deported head of the Jerusalem-based Palestinian Center for the Study of Non-violence, seeks to make the Palestinians "unrulable" and, at the same time, increase Israeli political, economic, moral, and social costs of continued occupation.73

Palestinian attempts to carry out civil disobedience campaigns during the frrst two years of the intifada have produced mixed results. Efforts to fully isolate the Israeli Civil Administration and carry out a tax revolt did not succeed. Oppressive Israeli policies, accompanied by administrative counter-measures, were successful in preempting many UNC civil disobedience plans. By requiring permits and licenses - issued by the Civil Administration after presented with proof that taxes have been paid -- for every conceivable activity, the Israelis achieved two goals at once: they maintained a vital link with the population and, ar the same time, foiled a comprehensive tax revolt campaign. In the Gaza Strip, the Israelis forced Gazans to change their ID cards and car licenses. Cars entering Israel were required to carry marked stickers. In July-August 1989, the Israelis began issuing magnetic ID cards. Local leadership of the intifada, in the Gaza Strip, demanded a boycott of the Israeli efforts. Palestinian "strike forces" tried to confiscate the magnetic cards, but after a few weeks they decided to end the boycott and the confiscation. Thus, two years into the intifada, one Palestinian observer concluded: 'The Palestinian community which would have had to bear the brunt of a campaign of civil disobedience was not willing to go along with ii.''74

However, there were many successes. Hundreds of Palestinian employees of the Civil Administration, particularly tax collectors and policemen, resigned in response to calls by the UNC. Beit Sahur, a Palestinian town in central West Bank, emerged triumphant after a lengthy tax revolt, despite Israeli countermeasures that included large-scale confiscation of goods and machinery. Most importantly, however, Israel's response to Palestinian civil disobedience

campaigns, the "iron fist" policy, has cost the Jewish state externally and internally. At the diplomatic level, Israel has suffered from international isolation and has lost some valuable public opinion support. Domestically, it has suffered increased political polarization as rhe intifada "has reinforced and deepened the political divisions u1 Israel."75 On the other hand, plls have shown increased public support, since the intifada began, for territorial compromise and talks with the PLO. One poll has shown less Israeli public objection to the establishment of a Palestinian state.76 Some analysts interpret these results as reflecting a gradual softening in the Israeli public attitude which will, sooner or later, find expression in the policy of the Israeli government toward talking with the PLO and trading land for peacc.77

At the economic level, as a result of Palestinian boycott of Israeli products, total Israeli sales to the West Bank and Gaza of about S1 billion a year dropped by 30 to 50 per cent during the fust two years of the intifada. Also significantly affected have been t0urism, the construction industry, and Israelis' willingness to invest inside Israel. As a result, the Israeli economy has shown signs of slowing down. Rate of economic growth, which reached 5.2 per cent in 1987, declined to 1.6 percent in 1988 and 0.6 percent in 1989. Race of unemployment has risen from 6.1 per cent in 1987 to 9.5 in 1989.79 A former Israeli minister of economic planning put the economic cost of the intifada's first two years at $ 1.5 billion.80 During the same period, Israeli Defense Forces have spent over half a billion dollars of its own budget (money which has been allocated for other defense-related matters) to fight the inrifada.81

The consolidation and expansion of the state-and institution-building process, the second leg of the non-violence strategy, involve the establishment of "parallel" and alternative institutions and a Palestinian "provisional government· that would replace those of the occupation. Sari Nusseibah, a Bir Zeit University professor, is the most articulate and vocal advocate of state-building. The PLO leadership in Tunis is currently examining a proposal, made by several moderate leaders, both inside and outside, to formally establish and declare a provisional Palestinian government. By "declaring the setting-up of a state or government structure," Nusseibah wrote, the Palestinians ''would consolidate the structures of the developing national authority which is competing to replace the occupation authority ...[and] consolidate the image and essence of the intifada as a constructive, not destructive, force.”82

Perhaps most importantly, a Palestinian provisional government would seek to prevent the intifada from descending into anarchy. Competing strike and police forces, popular armies, popular committees, social and judicial institutions are continuously Springing out. Despite repeated PLO and UNC calls for an end to the killing of collaborators, the executions continue unabated.83 Aside from presenting the Palestinians with a single voice, the provisional government would seek to bring order and centralization in the occupied territories. Finally, a declared government would seek to create "facts" on the ground, which would, in tum,

strengthen the position of the Palestinians i.n negotiations over the future status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Many observers have noted that the process of stare-building thus far has been the most important and most successful dimension of the intifada.84 Many Palestinians would like to see that success maintained and enhanced.

The third and most recent leg in the triad of non- violence is the Palestinian fight for Israeli public opinion. Palestinian leaders realize that the intifada has not yet produced an important shift in Israeli public opinion. Indeed, surveys have shown a majority of Israelis supporting tough measures, aimed at restricting Israeli press freedom and inhibiting Palestinian movement and expression. An American-Israeli survey, conducted in February 1990. showed 63 per cent support for banning intifada-related reports because they might harm Israel's image. For example, most respondents were "against publishing articles or pictures of soldiers mistreating Palestinians;" most (51 per cent) supported allowing Israeli intelligence agents to "interrogate Arabs using methods that should not be employed against Jews:" and most (49 percent against 47 percent) favored blowing up homes of Palestinians suspected of "security offenses" before the courts have determined their guiit.85 Another survey found most Israelis (52 percent in November 1989, compared with 38 per cent only six months earlier) favoring the "transfer" of Palestinians out of the occupied territories unless the intifada ends peacefully, soon.86

Advocates of non-violence argue that, despite these setbacks and obstacles, ultimately the success of the intifada "'will depend in large measure on changing the minds of the Israelis. Faisal al-Husayni is leading the Palestinian efforts in this direction. He wants the third year of the intifada to be the year in which the Palestinians focus their attention on Israel and seek to win "the fight for Israeli public opinion."87 Husayni and other Palestinian leaders want to launch an educational campaign aimed at (1) explaining the changes in Palestinian thinking, (2) showing the seriousness of the Palestinian commitment to a political settlement based on an historical compromise, and (3) pointing out the genuine Palestinian concessions in this regard, to the Israeli people. They argue that a peaceful intifada, coupled with an intensive educational campaign and joint efforts by Palestinian and Israeli peace groups, can "push the Israeli government to negotiate with the PLO, so as to bring an end to (the) conflicr."88

But the essence of the fight for Israeli public opinion lies in the Palestinian emphasis on affecting Israeli threat perception. To reduce Israeli fears, advocates of non-violence seek to present the Palestinians as unmenacing. To do that, they need to turn the intifada into a fully non-violent struggle; they realize that even minor violence might block any attempt to affect Israeli threat perception. Violent incidents are seen as counter-productive: they increase Palestinian costs and suffering and leave a negative impact on Israeli public opinion. After a visit to the occupied territories in 1989, Gene Sharp, a professor at Harvard University and a leading authority on non-violence, concluded that violent incidents trigger "highly disproportionate and

irrational responses [among the Israelis].'' These responses "block the message that Palestinians want the Israelis to hear, help arouse support among Israelis for harsh repression, and promote greater willingness among the soldiers to carry out (or exceed) orders to beat or shoot”-89 Faisal al-Husayn’s tactic is to “convince Israelis that we are not going to destroy them or throw them in the sea, that they can live with the Arab World... The only solution is to go on making it clear to the Israelis that the intifada is not using weapons."90

The ultimate tactic in the battle for Israeli public opinion is the Palestinian concentration on showing the erosion in the social and moral values of Israeli society and in its commitment to democratic and humanist ideals. Indeed, the intifada has contributed to a rise in the level of violence in Israeli society. An Israeli report found that "in the first half of 1989, violent crime of all types seemed to be spiraling out of control." "Serious" crimes, violent crimes, offenses against human life, dangerous drug dealing, and forced sexual assaults rose 28 per cent, 14 er cent, 190 per cent, 50 per cent, and 135 per cent, respectively. 91

The rise in domestic Israeli violence has been accompanied by a change in values. One Israeli observer, Ze'ev Schiff, argues that the intifada has witnessed "the brutalization of an entire generation of soldiers."92 Meanwhile, more Israelis are becoming insensitive and accustomed to scenes of soldiers' brutality.93 A greater sense of intolerance has been detected in the Israeli society. Indeed, one Israeli survey shows some 39 per cent of Israelis admitting that they harbor racist attitudes toward Arabs.94 Palestinians conclude: "The camps of peace and democracy now realize they muse save, not the Palestinian people from IsraeU occupation, but the Israeli people from the Israeli occupation. They now must fight to defend their future."95

To sum up, Palestinian advocacy of non-violence hopes to affect the balance between Israeli costs and motivation.96 It seeks to make continued occupation and iron-fist policies highly expensive at three levels: political (external isolation and internal division), economic (boycott of Israeli products, non-payment of taxes, extended military service, and low rates of economic growth), and moral (oppression, collective punishment, denial of political rights, and violation of human rights). At the same time, it seeks to reduce Israeli motivation to keep control over the West Bank and Gaza by offering concessions and lowering Israeli threat perception. However, Palestinians realize that the process of affecting the Israeli cost-motivation calculus is a long and sometimes frustrating one; some Palestinians speak of a three-to-five year period. They also realize that in a society with a high ideological motivation, lowering the threat perception and offering concessions might not significantly affect the calculus; hence Palestinian interest in, and hope for, the emergence of an Israeli Labor government. Labor is seen as more pragmatic and less ideological; Likud as committed to the "Greater Israel" ideology. Labor is thus perceived as more amenable than Likud to external influence.

The alternate Palestinian view on escalating the intifada calls for a shift toward violence and armed struggle. Advocacy of violence, a wide-spread minority view, favors the gradual incorporation of firearms into the intifada "arsenal," not as a replacement for non-violence, but as an additional weapon. While some Palestinians ca.11for the use of violence against selected Israeli targets, others speak of "hit-and-run" operations. Some call for use of firearms outside areas where non-violent tactics are successful; others call for the gradual transformation of the intifada into an all-out armed rebellion.97

The advocates of violence are led by the PFLP and Islamic Jihad, and supported by Hamas and Fateh hardliners in the occupied territories.98 Grass--roots support for the use offireanns is on the rise, reflecting people's frustration with the pace of progress in rhe political ocess and growing skepticism about the efficacy of non-violence.

The violent components of the intifada, in this view, have contributed to whatever successes it has achieved. On the Palestinian side, scenes of young stone-throwers bravely confronting heavily-armed Israeli soldiers have helped set examples and affected Palestinian morale and helped the whole people overcome its fear. As one Palestinian observer put it, "they feel now they are equal to Israelis... Israelis are no more the superrnen".100

On the Israeli side, daily violent confrontations with Palestinian children have affected the morale of the army. Stone and-fire-bomb-throwing on major West Bank and Gaza highways have helped re-establish the green line in the consciousness of most Israelis, as they decide not to risk travel on these dangerous roads. The execution of collaborators, another violent component of the intifada, has reduced the ability of Israeli intelligence agencies to gather information about the uprising and its leadership, thus making it impossible to put an end to the resistance. Finally, to the outside world, stone-throwing confrontations and resulting Palestinian deaths have attracted the attention of the international media and helped co regenerate the image of David and Goliath.

Furthermore, the skeptics argue, Palestinians suffer whether their struggle is violent or non-violent. The problem, from an Israeli point of view, is noc in the means of struggle, but in its goal. Israelis' ideological motivation and value system - wruch put the goal of continued Israeli control over the occupied territories above other goals like democracy, morality, economic growth, and support of world public opinion - can only be affected by making them bleed. Advocacy and support of violence is, therefore, based on the assumption that only a repeat of what happened to the Israeli army in Southern Lebanon, in the aftermath of the 1982 invasion, would force the Israeli government to reconsider its position and realize the folly of continued occupation. It is also based on the assumption that a turn to violence is feasible - in terms of availability of firearms - and would not be countered by a disproportionate Israeli response. In a

worst-case scenario, the argument goes, a mutual blood-bath and wholesale "transfer of Palestinians would lead to Arab and international intervention.

The third challenge confronting the intifada, as it enters the second half of its third year, is the changing relationship between the inside and outside wings of the Palestinian leadership. The intifada is still evolving. It is not yet clear how the process of evolution, and the changes already generated by the intifada, will eventually affect the balance between the two wings of the Palestinian leadership. Thus far, despite its demonstrated ability to successfully wage and lead a prolonged struggle against occupation, the inside l dersrup has made it clear that it has absolutely no desire to cut itself off from the PLO leadership or to present itself as an alternative leadership. Indeed, the unity of ranks between the two wings of the national leadership has never been stronger. The inside leadership's UNC is an extension of the constituents' mother organizations in exile. Its formation was made possible by agreement in the outside; its continued functioning is conditional on the existence of that agreement. Furthermore, the pro-PLO moderate "independents," who are not represented in the UNC, rely greatly on support and encouragement from the PLO on the outside. Only the third component of the inside leadership, the leaders of the Islamic groups, are not covered by the umbrella of the PLO. But even they have not publicly challenged PLO's legitimacy as the representative of the Palestinian people. Unable to provide a leader with national stature, they too have remained limited in their leadership aspirations despite the impressive gains made in the past 30 months.

It was an Israeli policy to keep the Palestinians under occupation powerless and leaderless. Deportation of emerging leaders was the preferred strategy; it prevented the emergence of nationally recognized leaders with grass roots support. During the first two years of the intifada, some 60 nationalist and Islamic leaders, many of whom were fust-line, were deported. The ner outcome has been to drive an already faceless leadership deeply underground and to increase the inside's dependence on the outside for leadership and direction.

It is the unity of *purpose* between those inside and those outside that is coming under increasing strain. The change in leadership pattern inside, which began in the early to mid-1980s and was accelerated by the end of the decade, fostered radicalism and militancy in the occupied territories. The intifada strengthened the position of the young militants as the role of the middle-aged moderates began to decline. One analyst described the change as a "social revolution" causing "permanent shifts in the social order."101

A second "shift" has been in the rise of Islamic militancy, as Hamas and Islamic Jihad greatly expanded their power base. As the political process remains deadlocked, the net outcome of the "social revolution" has been a reversal of the traditional relationship between the inside and the outside; the inside has gradually abandoned moderation while the outside has embraced it. Today, the militants in the nationalist and Islamic camps are voicing increasingly harsh criticism

of PLO policies. "Under these circumstances," wrote one perceptive analyst, "the old-time seasoned leadership of the PLO may well start looking better to the Israelis than the revolutionary and radical zeal of the younger street fighters - Islamic or not."102

Observing that the PLO in Tunis has shown more flexibility than the "activists" inside coward the Shamir 1989 election plan, another analyst concluded: "If in 1988 the net effect of the resident [i.e., inside] Palestinians' empowerment had been to help push the leadership [in Tunis] toward political moderation, then its effect throughout 1989 was largely to put a brake on the leadership's move toward moderation."103

THE FUTURE OF THE PLO PEACE PROGRAM

In the debate about the future of the PLO peace program, two scenarios have emerged: one envisages a push toward a more moderate and stay-the-course line, while the other envisages a pull toward a reversal of policy and development of a PLO hard-line position.

Several factors encourage a continuation of moderation_ First, the current policy represents, as this paper has argued, the culmination of a well-established trend, a continuous process that has developed and evolved over a 15-year period. Recent international, regional, and internal developments have helped foster the process along. The current PLO leadership, which has engineered this approach, is still very much in charge of the organization's institutions; it is not likely to admit defeat or to be ousted from office any time soon.

Second, the current policy reflects the "particularism" of the occupied territories (i. e., the inside's traditional support for a Palestinian state), enjoys the support of the inside's moderate-pragmatic leadership, and is backed by a majority of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As long as the inside remains the focus of Palestinian politics, and as Jong as the balance between the inside's moderates and radicals remains in favor of the former, the current PLO policy will remain in place for the foreseeable future.

Third, the desire to maintain the gains achieved by the intifada - such as the international support and change in public opinion, US recognition of and dialogue with the PLO, and the new support for Palestinian statehood in Western Europe - precludes a return to a more hawkish position.

Finally, the case for moderation is strengthened by the belief, on the part of its advocates, that the current policy does not preclude the resort to armed struggle in the future, if and when it becomes abundantly clear that Israel and the US are unwilling to accept Palestinian self-determination and to negotiate Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. As mentioned earlier, armed struggle has long been a subject of Palestinian consensus. Thus, while endorsing

PNC's moderation and Arafat's diplomatic campaign, Fateh's Fifth Congress, convened in Tunis in August 1989, reaffirmed its ''commitment to armed struggle as a strategic option," to be resorted to when the need arises.104 While confirming current PLO policy of unilateral restraint, Abu lyad has made it clear that the organization "has not forfeited [the] right to resort to arms" in the future:105

On the other hand, several factors pull toward a hard-line position. First, the continuation of the status quo is likely to leave the PLO with no alternative but to concentrate on rhe intifada and to seek its escalation. Escalation requires cooperation and coordination between the pro-PLO nationalist groups and the non-PLO Islamic groups. The Islamic option involves a clear and definite reversal of current PLO policy. The Islamists are demanding fundamental changes in the PLO position. Hamas insists that the PLO withdraw its acceptance of partition and the principle of territorial compromise; withdraw its recognition of the state of Israel; reaffirm the validity and binding nature of the PLO Charter and modify it "in accordance with the faith of the Muslim Palestinian people;" and finally, assign 50 per cent of the PNC seats to representatives of the fundamentalist group.106

Second, as the Palestinian partnership with Egypt and Jordan becomes a non-productive one, the Syrian option becomes attractive. Syria is the only Arab state with a relatively viable military capacity. Syria can also provide a vehicle through which the PLO can reclaim its lost military and political base in Lebanon. A Syrian-PLO rapprochement may also mean the end of the split in Fateh and may bring back, under the PLO umbrella, those pro-Syrian "rejectionist" groups currently outside the PLO. The leaders of the Syrian-based Palestinian National Salvation Front-PNSF (including Col. Sa'id Musa of "Fateh Uprising; Ahmad Jibril of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and Isam al-Kadi, head of the Sa'iqa) have expressed willingness to consider reconciliation and reunion with the PLO. However, Syria and the pro-Syrian Palestinian groups are demanding major concessions from the PLO leadership, including structural changes in the PLO decision-making process that would give them more voice in determining PLO policies. They are also demanding major changes in PLO's policy toward Israel the US, and the peace settlement.

Finally, pressure is mounting from within the PLO itself to review the current policies of the organization. The pressure is coming not only from the DFLP and the PFLP, the two major partners of Fateh in the PLO institutions, but also from within Fateh itself. George Habash, the leader of the PFLP, has called upon his partners in the PLO to return to armed struggle and to reject the US and Israeli election plans. The elections to Fateh Central Committee and Fateh Revolutionary Council, which took place in August 1989, produced a strong showing amonlfl those favoring armed struggle and opposing further concessions.1 Furthermore, there are signs that the Palestinians in exile are making progress in their efforts to end their paralysis and

resume a more active role in the confrontation against Israel. The PLO is currently rebuilding its military base in Southern Lebanon. It has now over 10,000 armed men, and new young recruits from the refugee camps in Southern Lebanon are joining its armed forces every day. The PLO's success in rebuilding its military forces has prompted some PLO commanders to urge Arafat to abandon his "suspension" of anned attacks against Israel from Lebanon.108

The success of the outside in regaining the initiative, partial and temporary though it might be, could threaten the "particularism" of the inside, as new outside demands and pressures are generated and as the PLO is forced to develop ne-.v responses. In the inside, on the other hand, radicalism is on the rise. A recent survey of opinion among 20 leading pro-PLO professors, professionals, and union leaders in the West Bank and Gaza found a majority expressing frustration with the pace of progress in peace talks and demanding a reconvening of the PNC and a reappraisal of current PLO policies.109

Moreover, the pressure from the militants is much stronger. In the past, moderates used to justify calls for moderation by pointing to the particular suffering of the people under occupation. Today, however, many of the young militants, who control the streets and demand violent escalation, justify their opposition to Arafat's prohibition against the use of firearms in the intifada by arguing that "Arafat does not live here; he does not experience our daily agony."11 Finally, although the balance of power inside remains in favor of the nationalist camp, the PLO will soon have co share power with the militant Islamic groups. Recognizing the growing frustration, PLO leaders have recently expressed willingness to reconsider their policies. Arafat indicated that the PLO may resort to new measures to achieve its goals, that the PLO Executive Committee had indeed discussed other options, and that a PNC session may convene in the next half of 1990.111

CONCLUSION

Seen in light of the century-old Palestinian-Jewish conflict, the current PLO policy represents a fundamental transformation of Palestinian attitude. International and regional developments since the early 1970s are panly responsible. Changes in the balance of power within the Palestinian national movement has made the transformation possible. Needless to say, the intifada haS played an important role in forcing the PLO to develop new flexibility and to articulate a pragmatic political program. In the short-run, the intifada injected an element of fluidity in the Palestinian position. What is significant today is not only what is being said and done, but also the environment within which Palestinian concessions are made and communicated, and the expectation that more concessions are feasible and desirable.

The pragmatic leadership of the West Bank and Gaza, with its reputation for moderation, has been pressuring the PLO to translate intifada achievements into political gains that will bring an end to the Israeli occupation. Furthermore, the PLO realizes that the continuation of the status quo may intensify the intifada and may eventually lead to the rise of Islamic groups to dominance in the occupied territories. To maintain its position, the PLO, having no ocher viable political alternative, must continue to show flexibility in the hope of generating a political process that would bring about an acceptable solution.

In the long-run, however, the dynamics of the intifada are likely to generate radicalism at the grass roots level; indeed, this is already the case. As the intifada escalates in the form of increased resistance, defiance, civil disobedience, and violence, and as the Israeli response escalates in kind, increased radicalism at the popular level is being generated. In the absence of progress in the peace process, and as the PLO continues to maintain its current policy, popular radicalism is being translated into a shift of allegiance to radical and Islamic groups.

In its attempt to maintain its leadership role, the PLO faces a dilemma: on one hand, it needs progress in peace talks so badly that it is willing to be highly flexible and forthcoming; on the other hand, fear of continued immobility in the peace process, despite its concessions and flexibility, may only lead to loss of leadership and the rise of the Islamic movement to dominance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip -- the exact outcome the PLO seeks to prevent. As the PLO strategy fails to generate new dynamics and to produce significant changes in Israeli official attitudes, the perception among Palestinians grows that moderation does not pay.

[May1990]

NOTES

1. Palestine National Council's 1988 resolutions are reproduced in Journal of Palestine Studies, no. 70 (Winter 1989), pp. 213-23. •

2. Hani al-Hasan, Yasir Arafat's politicaladvisor, in the London-based al-Hayat, December 15, 1989.

3. On changes in the PLO position, see Mohammad Muslih, ''Toward Coexistence: The Political Program of the Palestine National Council," Journal of Paleszine Satdies, no. 80 (Spring 1990). See also, Alain Gresh, The PLO, The Sm1ggle Wichin: Towards an Independent State, 2nd ed., (London: Zed Books, 1988); and Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

4. Roughly one half of the five million Palestinians live in exile outside historical Palestine. An excellent analysis of the effects of the 1982 Israeli invasion is in Yeiid Sayigh, 'Struggle Within, Struggle Without: the Transfonnation of PLO Politics Since 1982," International Affairs,vol.65, no. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 247-71.

5. On December 22, 1983, Arafat met in Cairo, for the first time since Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977, with the President of Egypt, Husni Mubarak. See The Washington Post, December 23. 1983.

6. See The New York Times, November 8, 1985.

7. Text of the Accord is published The New York Times, February 24, 1985.

8. On the intensification of the Jordanian-PLO competition for the allegiance of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, see The New York Times, July 9,1986.

9. Sayigh, pp. 260-61.

10. The best and most comprehensive study is Emile Sahliyeh, In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988).

11. Although the intifada has an important violent component, such as the use of stones and fire bombs and the brutal execution of collaborators, tbe essence of the Palestinian popular uprising is non-violent. On non-violence, the intifada, and the media propensity to concentrate on the violent aspects of the 30-monch old uprising, sec Robert Ashmore, "Nonviolence As An Intifada Strategy," American Arab Affairs, no. 32 (Spring 1990), p. 1. On intifada methods and tactics, see also Gene Sharp, "111e Intifada and Nonviolent Struggle," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 19, No. 1, (Autumn 1989). On causes and consequences, see Ann Mosely Lesch, "The Palestinian Uprising - Causes and Consequences," Field Staff Repons, Africa/Middle East, No. 1, 1988-89; Don Peretz, "The Intifada The Palestinian Uprising," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1988), pp. 964-980; Jim Ledennan, "Dateline West Bank: Interpreting the Intifada,' Foreign Policy, no. 72 (Fall 1988), pp. 230-46; and Aaron David Miller, "Palestinians and the Intifada: One Year Later,' Current History, (Fall 1989), pp. 73-76.

12. On the closure of the occupied territories to Israelis and the restoration of the Green Line, Israel's prc-1967 borders, and the redivision of Jerusalem in the Israeli consciousness, see Graham E. Fuller, The West Bank of Israel: Point of No Return? R-3777-OSD, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, August 1989), pp. ll-12; and Mark Tessler, "The Intifada and Political Discourse in Israel,' Journal of Palestine Studies, no. 79 (Winter 1990), p. 45.

13. Fuller, pp. 16-17.

14. .Ibid. See also Lesch.

15. Israeli Labor Party, refusing to talk to the PLO and seeking an Arab interlocutor to speak for the Palestinians, hoped for a political settlement with Jordan based on a territorial compromise and the return of Jordanian sovereignty co the populated parts of the West Bank.

16. Lesch, p. 8.

17. Interview with Hani al-Hasan in A/-Hayat, 15 December 1989.

18. See The New York Times, December 12, 1989.

19. David Remn.ick, "Gorbachev Prods Arafat On Recognizing Israel," The Waslungwn Post, April 11, 1988.

20. See The Los A11,geles Times, Nov.19, 1988.

21. The Jerusalem Post, December 13, 1989.

22. Salah Khalaf (Abu lyad), "Lowering the Sword." Foreign Policy, no. 78 (Spring 1990), p. 93. Not all PLO officials agree with this analysis, however. As the implications of the change in Soviet policy regarding Jewish emigration to Israel and possible settlement in the occupied territories became clear in the first months of 1990, a more pessimistic evaluation emerged. A senior PLO official complained that the USSR has "surrendered its role" in tbe Middle East region to the US. The region is therefore "falling into American hands.' Statement by the PLO Ambassador to Jordan. AJ-Tayib Abdel Rahman, in Al-Anba (Kuwait) 9 February 1990.

23. Al-Anba (Kuwait) Aug. 28, 1988.

24. The document was published in The Jerusalem Pos 1, Aug. 12, 1988.

25. The document was published in n,e Jerusalem Post, June 24, 1988.

26. On the Israeli role on the rise of the Islamic camp, see Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising --Israel's Third Front (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1990), chapter eight, especially pp. 223-228. Schiff and Ya'ari wrote; "... many Israeli staff officers believed that the rise of fundamentalism in Gaza could be exploited to weaken the power of the PLO.... Any damage (that fundamentalism] might cause, the prevailing theory held, would be more than offset by the good [it] would do in finally neutralizing the PLO…. The fundamentalists had indeed sapped the strength of the PLO in Gaza. But they soon surpassed it in indoctrination toward fanatic zeal, which from Israel's standpoint was far more menacing than anything the nationalists could show for their e[fons. . . . Early in the uprising, a number of Israeli experts changed their thinking and came to the conclusion that the fundamentalists posed a far greater threat than the PLO." Yehuda Litani, former Middle East affairs editor of The Jerusalem Post,

reported similar conclusions. During the intifada, "Leading Israeli security figures" have come to realize that the Islamic camp was a fiercer ·enemy of Israel than ... the PLO." Yehuda Litani, "Militant Islam in the West Bank and Gaza: New Outlook, vol. 32, nos. 11-12 (November-December 1989), p. 41.

27. See Sahliyeh, especially chapter 8. See also Mohammad Shadid. "The Muslim Brotherhood Movemem in the West Bank and Gaza," Third World Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 2 (April 1988); and M. Steinberg, "The PLO and Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism," Jerusalem Quarterly, no.52(1989), pp. 37-54.

28. See also Schiff and Ya'ari, chapter 8. Israeli experts' estimate of the size of the Islamic bloc can be found in The Jerusalem Post, November 28, 1989, and February 15, 1990.

29. Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 233-237.

30. See footnote 1.

31. The New York Tmzes, December 15, 1988. In Geneva, Arafat accepted resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel's right to exist as a state in the Middle East, and renounced terrorism.

32. Salah Khalaf, p. 98.

33. Reproduced in Journal of Palesci11e Studies, no. 74 (Winter 1990), pp. 154-58.

34. The New York Times, November 8, 1989; see also Arafa1's statement in The New York Times, June 25, 1989.

35. The New York Times, December 7, 1989.

36. Salah Khalaf, p. 100.

37. See Salah Khalafs statements in The New York Times, April 26, 27, 1989. See also the declaration issued by 80 leading Palestinians from the occupied territories printed in The Washington Post, April 27, 1989, and Arafat's statement in The New York Times, May 3, 1989. See PLO's "assumptions" which accompanied its acceptance of the Baker Plan in Joumal of Palestine Studies, 74 (Winter 1990), pp. 158-59. Abu Iyad wrote that the intifada will stop the moment a finn commitment.is made to give the Palestinian people their political rights, including the right of self-determination in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Salah Khalaf, p.100.

38. The PLO Charter is reproduced in Leila S. Kadi, Basic Political Docum:ms of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movemem (Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1969).

39. Rashid Khalidi, 'The Resolutions of the 19th Palestine National Council,'' Journal of Palestine Studies, no. 79 (Winter 1990), pp. 29-12.

40. Abu Jyad wrote: "The PNC's endorsement of the two-state solution supersedes the one-state objective mentioned in the Palestinian National Charter." Salah Khalaf, p. 99.

41. Arafat used the French word caduque (obsolete, or null); See The New York Times, May 3, 1989. Arafat also confirmed that the Palestinian Declaration of Independence superseded the PLO Charter.

42. Faisal al-Husayni, "A New Face to the Middle East," New Outlook, vol. 32, nos. 11-12, {November-December 1989), p. 15.

43. The Los Angeles Times, February 11,1989.

44. Salah Khalaf, pp. 100, 103.

45. George Abed, "The Economic Viability of a Palestinian State," Journal of Palestine Studies, no. 79 (Winter 1990), pp. 6-7, 16.

46. Salah Khalaf, p. 96.

47. Ibid., p. 99.

48. The Jerusalem Post, December 13, 1989; also, in al-Qabas (Kuwait), December 13, 1989.

49. See Arafat's interview on "Sixty Minutes," CBS News, February 19, 1989, and in Vanity Fair, February [989.

50. Al-Husayni, p. 15.

51. Salah Khalaf, pp. 108-109.

52. See the PNC's 1988 Communique; and Salah Khalaf, pp. 99-100.

53. For a discussion of Israeli fears and suspicions, see Paul Lalor, Towards a Palestinian £miry (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1989); Jaffa Center for Strategic Studies Study Group, The Wes1 Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1989); and Ze'ev Schiff, Security for Peace: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with the Palestinians, Policy Papers no. 15 (Washington, DC Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989).

54. Salah Khalaf, pp. 97, 98, 106.

55. The Jerusalem Post, December l3, 1989.

56. Salah Khalaf, p. 110.

57. The Jerusalem Post, March 21, 1990. Similarly, see Caryle Murphy, "PLO Seen Keeping Its Commitments,' The Washington Post, December 22, 1989.

58. Israel Defense Forces' Q1ief of Staff Dan Shomron told the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on March 20, 1990, that "no proof is available' that Fateh "has been involved in military action against Israel [since November 1988)." The Jerusalem Post, March 21, 1990. Israel's defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin, refused ro equate the intifada with terrorism. See The Jerusalem Post, February 18, 1990.

59. For an evaluation of the second year of the intifada, see Daoud Kuttab, "The Ups and Downs of the Second Year," Middle East International, December 15, 1989, pp. 15-16.

60. See the Jerusalem Post, March 1, 27, and April 2, 1990.

61. Some dozen incidents had occurred in the first six months of 1990; very few, if any, had been reported in the first two years of the intifada. Information is based on conversations with activists. See also The Jerusalem Post, March 23, 1990.

62. See The Jerusalem Pose, March 1, 1990.

63. Based on conversations with activists. See also. The Jerusalem Post, March 27, 1990; and Joel Greenberg, "Marxist and Moslem Fundamentalists in Areas Join io Move Against Fateh,' The Jerusalem Post, April 2, 1990.

64. Hamas' gains are mentioned in The Jerusalem Post, November 28,1989, and February 15,1990. Israeli defense officials estimated that if West Bank and Gaza elections were held at the end of 1989, Hamas would have won 30 per cent of the votes, compared " with 60 to 65 per cent for Fateh. The nationalists tend to dispute the accuracy of these estimates.

65. Interviews with activists. One Israeli official in the Civil Administration predicted "direct confrontation and violence" in the Gaza Strip between the nationalists and Islamists, if and when negotiations began between Israel and the PLO. The Jerusalem Post, February 15, 1990.

66. Yehuda Litani, p. 40.

67. Susan Hattis Rolef, "Peace Move Or Camouflage,' The Jerusalem Post, March 8, 1990. Rolef is the editor of the Israeli Labor Party monthly, Spectrum.

68. Ziad Abu Zayyad, "Interview," New Outlook, vol. 32, nos. 112-12 (November-December 1989), p. 29.

69. Helena Cobban, "The PLO and the Intifada,' The Middle East Journal, vol. 44, no. 2, (Spring 1990), p. 231.

70. Among the well-known names one finds: Faisal al-Husayni, head of the Arab Studies Society; Sari Nuseibah, a Bir Zeit University professor; Radwan Abu Ayyash, head of Arab Journalist Association; Hanna Siniora, editor of Fajr daily; Mubarak Awad, the deported head of the

Palestinian Center for the Study of Noa-violence; Fayez Abu Rahmeh, a prominent Gaza lawyer and member of PNC; and Dr. Hayder Abdel Shafi, head of the Red Crescent Society in Gaza. Although not as committed to a fully non-violent snuggle, the UNC bas in recent months been emphasizing the intifada's non-violent components.

71. Kuttab, "The Ups and Downs,' pp. 15-16. See also Abu Zayyad, pp. 28--29.

72. Al Husayni, p. 14.

73. The term "unrulable" is used by Gene Sharp, p. 13. See also, Mubarak Awad, "Nonviolent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 13, no. 4, (Summer 1984), pp. 23-36; and Awad's remarks in a panel discussion on the West Bank and Gaza at the National Conference On Nonviolent Sanctions, sponsored by the Albert Einstein Institution, held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 8-11, 1990.

74. Kuttab, "The Ups and Downs... " p. 16.

75. Mark Tessler, p. 44. Tessler found that the intifada has solidified existing orientations: right-wing advocates of territorial maximalism have become more hawkish; left-wing advocates of territorial compromise have become more dovish; p. 52. A survey conducted in late 1989 by Israel's Institute for Military Studies (IIMS) reported that when Israelis were asked: "Has your position changed since the start of the intifada?" 21 per cent said they were more dovish," 28 per cent were 'more hawkish," and 51 per cent were unchanged. Reuven Gal, director of HMS, at the National Conference on Nonviolent Sanctions, mentioned in footnote 73above.Also cited in Robert Ashmore, p. 99.

76. Polls conducted for 77,e New York Times indicate an increase from 41 per cent in April 1987 to 54 per cent in March 1989 in support of territorial compromise. During the same period, p 11 public willingness to consider talks with the PLO has increased from 42 to 58 per cent. The New York Times, April 2, 1989, cited in Tessler. Reuven Gal's survey, mentioned in footnote 75 above, reported a more modest change, from 34 per cent in support of territorial compromise to 38 per cent. However, the survey found that Israeli youth were becoming more hawkish, with a majority of 45 per cent (against 35 per cent) opposing territorial compromise. Gal reported that, almost two years after the intifada, only 47 per cent of the Israelis were totally opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state, compared with 54 per cent in December 1987.

77. See, for example, Tessler.

78. The Los Angeles Times, December 3, 1989. Palestinian boycott of Israeli and third party products cannot total because Israel controls the production and importation of many essentials, such as flour, fuel, and raw material.

79. For details, sec Joel Brinkley, "Israel's Economy Hurt By Uprising, The New York Times, November 5, 1989.

80. Peretz Kidron, "The Price Israel Has to Pay,' Middle East International,

December 15, 1989, p. 19.

81. The Jerusalem Pose, December 29, 1989.

82. The Guardian, December 9, 1989.

83. Some 200 Palestinians accused of collaboration with the Israeli military and inteUigence authorities were executed by May1990. Most killings occurred after the first year of the intifada. The Jerusalem Post, April 3, 1990.

84. See, for example, Fuller; and Israeli journalist Daniel Rubinstein's remarks at the National Conference on Nonviolent Sanctions mentioned in footnote 75 above.

85. The survey was conducted by Israel-Diaspora Institute; findings were published in The Jerusalem Posi, March 6, 1990.

86. Ha'aretz, November 10, 1989.

87. The Jerusalem Post, March 21, 1990. See also Husayni's statement cited in Ashmore, p. 6.

88. See statement by Palestinians in The Jerusalem Post, March 6. 1990.

89. Sharp, p. 7.

90. Cited in Ashmore, p. 90.

91. Andy Goldberg, "Why Israeli Society Is Becoming More Violent,' The Jerusalem Posi, December 22, 1989.

92. Ha'aretz, June 16, 1989. Schiff wrote, "Feelings of hatred, desire for revenge, yearning to use more force, up to unlimited use of Jive ammunition - ail run rampant…. The dulling of senses and loss of sensitivity are another striking phenomenon among the troops."

93. See Andy Goldberg. On the amount of stress the intifada caused on different groups of Israelis, left, right, religious, IDF officers, and Israeli Arabs, see Ayala M. Pines, "Israeli Burnout and the Intifada," New Outlook, vo. 32, nos. 11-12 (November-December 1989), pp. 34-36.

94. Conducted by Reuven Gal. See footnote 75.

95. Statement by al-Husayni, cited in Ashmore, p. 101.

96. An excellent analysis of the relationship between costs and motivation, in the Palestinian-Israeli situation, is in Emmanuel Sivan, "Isr.ie!'s Decolonization Crisis,' New OU/look, vol. 32, nos. 11-12 (November-December 1989), pp. 16-19.

97. Based on conversations with activists. See also Ashmore, p. 99; and Daoud Kuttab, "The Ups and Downs," p. 16.

98. Leaflets issued by Islamic Jihad and PFLP explicitly call for armed struggle and killing of soldiers and settlers. During the second year of the intifada. Islamic Jihad took responsibility for violent attacks on Israelis in Jerusalem and for the diversion of an Israeli civilian bus on the Jerusalem highway in which 16 Israelis were killed. Hamas, which has a military arm called "Al-Mujahidun A-Filastiniyyun," has taken responsibility for the killing of collaborators and two Israeli soldiers during 1989. Hamas' intifada leaflet number 54, issued in March 1990, spoke of the "road o[Jihad," and called upon Islamic movements to prepare 'Jihad brigades."

99. In his 1989 visit to the occupied territories, Gene Sharp noticed an increased advocacy of violence. After a visit to West Bank and Ga1,a in January 1990, Robert Ashmore. reponed "widespread Palestinian endorsement of violent escalation." See Sharp, p. 9, and Ashmore, p. 99.

100. Jamil Hamad, a Palestinian journalist and correspondent for Time magazine, cited in Ashmore, p. 4.

101. Fuller, p. 23. The moderates were able, however, to adjust to the circumstances of the intifada and to articulate a role for themselves. For example, they outlined, and lobbied for, strategies for the non-violent escalation of the intifada and were instrumental in its institutionalization. The moderates also maintained contacts with Israeli peace groups, foreign diplomats, and Jerusalem-based international and Israeli media. See Fuller., pp. 19-22; and Cobban, pp. 229-21, 224.

102. Fuller, p. 23.

103. Cobban, p. 233.

104. See Lamis Andoni, "The PLO: A Hard-Line Tone," Middle East international, no. 357, August 25, 1989, p. 11.

105. Salah Khalaf, p. 110.

106. The Jerusalem Post, April 13, 1990.

107. See Andoni, p. 95

108. See 77ie New York Times, April 2, 1990.

109. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 4 February 1990.

110. Another Palestinian predicted: "If Arafat does not escalate [violently], he is finished. Cited in Ashmore, p. 99.

111. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 12 February 1990.

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