

## Public Opinion Poll #7 Palestinian Elections and the Hebron Massacre

March 20, 1994

This is the seventh public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. This poll focuses on the subjects of the negotiations, international protection for Palestinians, settlements, national council elections, and political affiliations. SRU conducts a monthly public opinion poll regarding the peace process, the Declaration of Principles, political attitudes, and elections. The poll results are published independently and with unit analysis in both Arabic and English. They provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinions and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. They also serve as a historical record of Palestinian attitudes at the various political stages.

### Introduction

This poll presents a record for Palestinian sentiments in the Occupied Territories and a document expressing a decisive phase in the history of the Palestinian people after the massacre at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, which resulted in the death of more than fifty Palestinians and the wounding of at least 200 others, according to Palestinian sources. Subsequent protests resulted in more deaths, injuries, and curfews.

It should be pointed out here that the interviews for this poll were conducted on the 20th of March (Sunday), less than one month after the massacre. It was obvious that the reaction was still strong in the Occupied Territories, where demonstrations and clashes continued. Here, it is important to mention some important events that took place on the same day which had an influence on the results and the fieldwork process:

1. Hebron was still under curfew
2. Ramallah experienced strong clashes and curfew was imposed on the center of town during the morning
3. Nablus was the site of big demonstrations, stone-throwing, and teargas
4. Armed clashes occurred in Gaza City and in other areas throughout the Strip
5. On the political track, the PLO continued to refrain from participation in the official negotiations with Israel in protest to the massacre. The PLO put the conditions of settler evacuation from Hebron, their disarming, and procedures to protect Palestinians on its return to the negotiations.

At the same time, and after waiting nearly one month, the UN Security Council reached a decision on Resolution 904. The resolution called for protection and security for the Palestinians and the presence of international observers in Hebron. It also called for the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Territories, including Jerusalem. The Resolution demanded that Israel make all arrangements to confiscate settler weapons.

Undoubtedly, Palestinian feelings and their opinions after the massacre in Hebron are beyond stating in a poll or in a research project. Still, the enclosed results capture, as accurately as possible, Palestinian reaction to the nature of events on the ground.

Enclosed are the results of the most recent public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank (including Arab Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip.

## Methodology

In an attempt to deal with daily events in the Occupied Territories (i.e., shooting, teargas, demonstrations, curfew, and roadblocks imposed by the Israeli military) and to promote the scientific value of the research, CPRS fieldworkers adopted several procedures, which are as follows:

1. Conducting interviews in the city of Hebron, its villages and its refugee camps in spite of the imposed curfew. Our fieldworkers, residents of the city of Hebron, went from one house to another and conducted interviews with residents. The Hebron area was divided into three polling districts (city, north, and south). A sample of villages and refugee camps was selected by CPRS researchers according to population size and degree of "development." For example, the sample for the north of Hebron included: Hahoul (a developed town), Beit Ummar and Tafouh (developed villages), and al-Aroub (a refugee camp). Each one of these residential areas was further divided into a number of blocks depending on the distribution pattern of housing units. Each block was assigned a specific number of questionnaires which were distributed on the basis of an enumeration system developed for identifying and selecting housing units. These procedures were also used in the areas of Bethlehem and Jerusalem.
2. After conducting 30% of the interviews of the Ramallah area in the city center (where the poll usually takes place), a contingency plan had to be followed due to the curfew imposed on the city center while the poll research was taking place. A sample of villages and camps was selected for the three districts in Ramallah. The sampling technique used in Hebron was used in Ramallah.
3. In the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted in nearly all residential areas (see Table).
4. In the north of the West Bank, interviews were conducted in major towns (Nablus, Tulkarm, Jenin, and Qalqilya). Interview stations that attracted villagers and refugee camp residents were selected.

## Polling 'Electoral' Districts

One of the objectives set for this poll is to attempt to project Palestinian voting patterns in the case of democratic elections. Therefore, 1978 Palestinians were interviewed. A total of 1286 questionnaires were received from the West Bank and 692 questionnaires were received from the Gaza Strip.

### **The West Bank**

For the purposes of this poll, the West Bank was divided into 8 "areas" which were further divided into 18 "districts". The population size for these districts ranges from 75,000 to 105,000 (except in Jericho and Nablus (West)), depending on the population distribution pattern. CPRS researchers planned to conduct 70 to 90 interviews in each district, according to population size. For each area, the total sample size is much higher.

#### The West Bank

District	Population size **	Sample size	Sample distribution *
Nablus city	85,375	92	100% Towns
Nablus East	81,995	59	89% Villages, 11% R.Camps
Nablus West	63,628	77	92% Villages, 8% R.Camps
Nablus Total	230,998	228	

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample distribution
Tulkarm (North) R. Camps	105,694	67	25% Towns, 64% Villages, 11%
Tulkarm (South)	96,738	70	33% Towns, 67% Villages
Tulkarm Total	202,432	137	

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Jenin (East) R. Camps	96,721	87	54% Towns, 34% Villages, 12%
Jenin (West)	100,490	64	100% Villages
Jenin Total	197,211	151	

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Jericho R. Camps	25,957	41	55% Towns, 24% Villages, 21%

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Ramallah (North)	76,983	51	84% Villages, 16% R. Camps
Ramallah (South) R.Camps	77,533	72	37% Towns, 50% Villages, 13%
Ramallah (City) Camps	75,178	96	82% Towns, 10% Villages, 8% R.
Ramallah Total	229,694	219	

District	Population size	Sample Size	Sample Distribution
Hebron (North)	82,947	72	84% Villages, 16% R. Camps
Hebron (South)	80,073	72	88% Villages, 12% R.Camps
Hebron (City)	96,545	69	100% Towns
Hebron Total	259,565	213	

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Bethlehem (City) R.Camps	68,646	74	33% Towns, 51% Villages, 16%
Bethlehem (Vicinity) R. Camps	70,273	75	10% Towns, 74% Villages, 16%
Bethlehem Total	138,919	149	

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Jerusalem (Vicinity) R.Camps	81,730	74	49% Towns, 42% Villages, 9%
Jerusalem (City)	83,580	74	14% Towns, 86% Villages
Jerusalem Total	165,310	148	

\* (a complete list of villages and camps included in each district may be obtained from CPRS.)

#### **The Gaza Strip**

The Gaza Strip was divided into 3 "areas" (North, Middle, South) and 7 polling "electoral" districts as shown below:

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Jabalia & North & Nazli	141,915	113	Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia Village Project, Jabalia RCamp, Al-
Gaza city (A) Nasr	90,000	91	Al-Shati', Sheikh Radwan, Al-
Gaza city (B)	110,000	90	Al-Rimal, Al-Sabra, Al-Daraj
Gaza city (C) Shuja'iyah	1001,000	88	Al-Tofah, Al-Zaytoun, Al-
North Total	441,915	381	

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Middle Camps	116,600	115	Al-Bureij, Al-Magazi, Nuseirat, Zawaydeh, Deir El-Balah

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Khan Yunis Qararah,	140,514	115	Khan Yunis (Camp and City)
Rafah & Camp	102,346	80	Bani Suhaila, Khaza, Abasan. Rafah (Camp and City)
South Total	242,860	195	

\* CPRS estimates are based on the figures provided by "Palestinian Population Handbook" by the "Planning and Research Center 1993".

This division allows for an understanding of voting patterns for (a) the whole Occupied Territories, (b) the West Bank and Gaza separately, (c) each major area, and (d) each district.

This, we believe, helps in the formulation of a Palestinian electoral system. It also contributes to a more representative sample.

Naturally, CPRS researchers realize that if elections were to be held, they would not necessarily be based on "electoral districts". We also understand that electoral districts may be divided in various other ways. However, we believe that this poll captures, as accurately as possible, the political map in the Occupied Territories.

In addition, interested individuals may obtain the results of the voting patterns in each one these areas according to place of residence (city, village, and refugee camp) by contacting CPRS.

## Data Collection

The fieldworkers worked under difficult conditions, as they had to deal with the curfew in Hebron and shooting and roadblocks in various areas. With much experience and training, these fieldworkers could deal with the difficult conditions and conduct the interviews to complete the study within the time constraints. The poll couldn't have been accomplished if it were not for the determination of the fieldworkers. In this respect, researcher Fayez S., from Hebron, said, "I feel the importance of this endeavor. The danger surrounding the work makes it all worthwhile. I was determined to complete this fieldwork in spite of the difficult conditions." Amal A., also a fieldworker from Hebron, has said, "It is personally fulfilling to conduct this kind of research; the curfew imposed by the Israelis made the work dangerous." Another Hebron fieldworker, Ni'meh S., summarized, "We were determined to conduct this poll under the most difficult conditions in the history of this area."

The general conditions in the Palestinian street were captured through the eyewitness accounts of our fieldworkers. Jamal Rabaya'h stated, "In spite of three weeks passing since the Hebron massacre, the situation in the Palestinian street can be described as a revolution." Regarding the conditions that Hebron citizens are living under, fieldworker Jamal S. stated, "I have witnessed what my ears have never heard before, and my eyes have never seen before...how difficult the conditions the people live under are. What made it more difficult is the lack of infant formula for the children in some houses. I didn't feel the fear in spite of the curfew; I was trying to be strong. The people, however, were stronger than I ever expected."

To complete the data collection process, the choice of interview stations was based on our previous experience in the last six polls. To ensure the representation of Palestinians in all districts, the focus was on areas that attracted villagers and refugee camp residents. Data collectors carried with them an exhaustive list of villages and refugee camps in each district. This allowed them to reach their target sample as efficiently as possible.

In the Gaza Strip, field workers visited almost all towns, villages, and refugee camps (as indicated in the previous table). Here, around 50% of the interviews were conducted in households to ensure the representation of women. The rest of the interviews were conducted in public places.

In general, the public forum of interviews contributed to a 10% non-response rate which was not included in the sample. A large number of non-respondents were women, probably due to cultural constraints. Some nonrespondents, we believe, are reluctant to state their political affiliation out of fear or ambivalence.

The majority of our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on sampling techniques, survey methods, scientific research, and field work. Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. Fifty percent of our data collectors were female so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. All interviews took place on the same day and were conducted on a face-to-face basis. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 30) to allow for careful interviewing.

Researchers were instructed to refrain from the following:

1. Conducting interviews in public institutions such as trade unions, offices of political parties, women and student organizations, government offices, etc.
2. Interviewing their acquaintances and giving questionnaires to a group of acquaintances.
3. Conducting multiple interviews at the same time.
4. Interfering with the respondents answers even if they seemed "illogical." If asked to explain a vague item, they must refer to a standard definition provided to them by CPRS. Otherwise, they must leave it up to the respondent to interpret the ambiguity.

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is less than 3%, and the confidence level is higher than 95%.

## Sample Distribution

(expressed as a % of the total sample)

<b>Area of Residence</b>			
West Bank	City		36.2%
"including Jerusalem"			65%
	Village		45.9%
			35.0%
Gaza Strip	Refugee Camps		17.9%

  

<b>Age</b>		<b>Sex</b>		<b>Education</b>	
18-24	26.8%			Up to 9 years	29.0%
25-31	32.0%			(elem./prep)	
32-38	18.2%	Males	66.8%	Up to 12 years	34.5%
39-45	11.9%	Females	33.2%	(Tawjihi)	14.7%
46-52	5.3%			2 year College	20.4%
53+	5.8%			University (BA)	1.4%
				MA + Phd.	

  

<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Refugee Status</b>	<b>Occupation</b>
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Single	32.0%	Refugee	43.0%	Laborers	13.4%
Married	65.6%	Non-Refugee	57.0%	Merchants	12.2%
Divorced & Widowed	2.4%			Craftsmen	15.6%
				Students	11.2%
				Housewives	13.2%
				Farmers	2.6%
				Employees*	19.2%
				Specialists**	6.0%
				Unemployed	6.6%
				Retired	0.5%

\* Employees: Schoolteacher, Government Employee, Nurse, Lower-level Company Employee, Secretary, etc.

\*\* Specialists: University Teacher, Engineer, Doctor, Lawyer, Pharmacist, Executive, etc.

## Remarks

### First: The Massacre in Hebron

Palestinians perceive the Hebron massacre as an outcome of cooperation between the killer, Baruch Goldstein, settlers' groups, and the Israeli army. A majority of Palestinians (50.8%) said that Goldstein carried out the massacre with a terrorist group and the Israeli army (IDF) at the same time. Another 14.6% believe that he carried out the massacre with a terrorist group only and a further 29.2% believe that he carried out the massacre with the cooperation of the IDF. This leads us to conclude that the majority of Palestinians feel that responsibility for the massacre lies, at least in part, with the Israeli military.

### Second: Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations

Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have a number of reservations about returning to the negotiations with Israel, where as much as 38.5% of them said that they are against returning to the negotiations outright. At the same time, 38.8% stipulated that return should be contingent upon guarantees of international protection for the Palestinians. Another 17.2% said that they support the return to the negotiations with no prior conditions.

The poll shows that Palestinians are concerned primarily with settlements. When asked the question about returning to negotiations, while postponing the discussion of the issue of settlements to the final status negotiations, 55.3% of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories voiced their opposition. Another 30.8% demanded the evacuation of settlers from the city of Hebron prior to returning to negotiations. In general, 86.1% of Palestinians have reservations about postponing the discussion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Naturally, opposition to postponing the issue of settlements was strongest in Hebron, where only 2.3% thought that the issue should be postponed, 62.4% felt that it should not, and 22.1% felt that postponing the issue in general would be acceptable if the settlers in Hebron were removed prior to final status negotiations. In Jericho, the majority of respondents (68.3%) felt that a postponement was acceptable contingent upon the prior evacuation of the Hebron settlers. In Jerusalem, only 3.4% of respondents supported postponing the discussion of settlements.

### Third: PLO Performance

In regard to PLO performance after the Hebron massacre, the largest percentage (48.1%) of Palestinians see it as less than adequate. Another 23.1% evaluated the performance of the PLO as fair and another 18.8% said that it was generally good. There is a clear correlation between education level and evaluation of PLO performance, with the more educated Palestinians being much more likely to evaluate the PLO's performance as less than adequate. (see [Appendix](#)) With regard to area, the strongest contrast in this regard was between Jericho and Hebron. In Jericho, 26.8% of respondents rated the performance as generally good, 56.1% as fair, and only 14.6% as less than adequate. In contrast, only 2.9% of Hebron respondents rated it as generally good, 18.6% as fair, and 55.2% as less than adequate.

#### **Fourth: Future Outlook**

It was not unexpected that the majority of Palestinians are pessimistic about the future. The poll results show that 51.2% of Palestinians are pessimistic, while another 28.3% are not sure. It seems that the Hebron massacre and its aftermath had an influence on Palestinian future outlook. Our February poll, taken five days before the massacre, showed that 36.7% of Palestinians were pessimistic, 14.5 percent lower than the current figures.

The percentage of those who declared that they were optimistic in February was 39%, compared with 20.5% this month, a difference of 18.5%. Once again, the strongest contrast was between Hebron and Jericho. In Jericho, 24.4% identified themselves as optimistic, 17.1% as pessimistic, and 58.5% as not sure. In contrast, Hebron respondents identified themselves as optimistic at a rate of only 6.2%. The overwhelming majority of Hebron respondents (72.4) identified themselves as pessimistic and another 21.4% as not sure.

The results of this poll confirm the differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip in terms of their future outlook. Our February poll showed that pessimists in the West Bank comprised 40.3%, ten points higher than the Gaza percentage (29.9%). This poll shows an even wider gap between the two areas, with 57.1% identifying themselves as pessimistic in the West Bank, compared with 40.1% in the Gaza Strip (a 17 point difference). In contrast, only 15.8% in the West Bank identified themselves as optimistic in the current poll, compared with 30.8% in the Gaza Strip.

We have previously hypothesized that this difference is due to the fact that many Gazans foresee changes in relation to the Israeli occupation, while it is unclear to West Bankers if they will actually benefit from the peace agreement. It is obvious that the Hebron massacre intensified the feeling of uncertainty over the future, especially among West Bankers. The future of the West Bank itself is not clear. The DoP states that the status of the West Bank, excluding Jericho, will be determined through final status negotiations. Also, in the West Bank settlements seem to be more pervasive and permanent.

This difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip may also be due to the fact that "independents" and "others" demonstrate pessimistic outlook. These "groups" are more prevalent in the West Bank than in Gaza and most responsive to changes on the ground.

#### **Fifth: Elections**

Palestinians were asked about the best means to select the West Bank and Gaza members of the Palestinian National Council (should an opportunity to select these representatives occur). The vast majority of respondents (more than 80%) indicated that elections were the best means to select these members. Only 9% supported appointments by the leadership of the PLO and another 9% supported appointments on the basis of quota.

### **Sixth: Political Affiliation**

The Hebron massacre had a negative impact on the popularity of Fateh among Palestinians, especially in Hebron. Our February poll indicated 42% support for Fateh compared with 36.4% three weeks after the massacre.

Taking into consideration the results of this poll and those of the previous CPRS polls, it is obvious that the popularity of Fateh is more effected by political changes and events on the ground than all other groups. This may be due to the fact that Fateh has the largest support among Palestinians, from a wide spectrum of the population, some of whom may be only peripherally committed to the organization. Some Palestinians equate the PLO with Fateh and in general, criticism of the PLO's performance effects Fateh's popularity the most. Also, the status of negotiations with Israel directly affects the largest faction in the PLO, which is Fateh.

The popularity of Hamas has been slightly affected by the Hebron massacre. Support for Hamas among Palestinians increased from 13.9% in February to 15.6% in March. Support for both Hamas and Fateh is clear in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas has 19.8% support and Fateh has 40.1%. As to the rest of the political factions, we notice that their popularity among Palestinians is somewhat consistent.

If we compare the popularity of a coalition of groups supporting the DoP (Fateh, Fedayeen, and Hizb el-Sha'b) with that of a coalition of groups opposed to the DoP (Hamas, PFLP, DFLP, and Islamic Jihad), we notice that the latter would win the following districts: Hebron North (Halhoul, Beit Ummar, Tafouh, and Al-Aroub refugee camp), Hebron City, Hebron South (Yatta, Al Samou', Dora, and Al-Fawwar refugee camp), Gaza City C (Al-Tofah, Al-Zaytoun, and Al-Shuja'iyah), and Tulkarm South (Qalqilya, Salfit, and surrounding villages). Strongly competitive areas include: Jabalia and North, Rafah, and the city of Bethlehem.

We also notice that Hamas is popular in the district of Gaza City C, where a little more than 33% of the respondents indicated their support, with 35% for Fateh. Hamas is also popular in the suburbs of Bethlehem, with 26.5% of respondents indicating their support. In the North of Hebron, Hamas alone was able to gather more support (25%) than Fateh (18.1%).

Looking at this poll and previous CPRS polls, we are able to come to the following conclusions:

1. Fateh will face its strongest competition in Hebron.
2. In the Gaza Strip, while it is polarized, the situation with regard to political affiliation is both volatile and complex.
3. In the West Bank, "independents" and "others" will play a major role in any election.
4. Fateh might be able to draw on the support of Nationalist Independents.

Hamas, however, has the potential to attract the votes of Islamic Independents, Palestinians who say that they will not vote for any of the political groups, and those who refused to participate in the poll. This leads us to say that support for Hamas might be higher than 15.6%.

## Palestinian Elections and the Hebron Massacre

### 1. Do you support the PLO returning to the peace talks with Israel?

	Total	West Bank	Gaza
a. yes	17.2%	14.5%	22.2%
b. no	38.5%	39.5%	36.7%
c. yes, with guaranteed international protection for Palestinians.	38.8%	39.6%	37.2%
d. don't know	05.5%	06.4%	03.9%

### 2. Do you support continuing the negotiations, given the postponement of discussion of settlements to the final status (after April 13, 1996)?

a. yes	07.7%	08.0%	08.7%
b. yes, if settlers are removed from Hebron.	30.8%	28.5%	33.9%
c. no	55.3%	56.3%	52.4%
d. don't know	06.2%	07.2%	05.0%

### 3. Do you think that the settler who carried out the Hebron massacre \_\_\_\_\_?

a. acted alone	01.3%	01.0%	02.3%
b. acted with a group of terrorists	14.6%	12.8%	17.9%
c. acted with the cooperation of the IDF.	29.2%	25.8%	33.8%
d. b and c	50.8%	56.0%	41.6%
e. don't know	04.1%	04.4%	04.4%

### 4. How do you evaluate the PLO's performance after the Hebron massacre (the way the PLO dealt with the consequences of the massacre)?

a. generally good	18.8%	18.0%	20.9%
b. fair	23.1%	23.1%	24.5%
c. less than adequate	48.1%	48.6%	46.1%
d. don't know	10.0%	10.3%	08.5%

### 5. Taking into consideration the political and economic conditions facing the country (the occupied territories) and the current Palestinian - Israeli negotiations, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?

a. optimistic	20.5%	15.8%	30.8%
b. pessimistic	51.2%	57.1%	40.1%
c. not sure	28.3%	27.1%	29.1%

### 6. If elections were held today, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:

a. DFLP	02.5%	03.0%	01.1%
b. Fateh	36.4%	34.8%	40.1%
c. Hamas	15.6%	14.1%	19.8%
d. PFLP	07.3%	06.1%	08.6%
e. Feda	02.0%	02.6%	00.6%
f. Islamic Jihad	03.6%	03.6%	03.5%
g. Hizb el-Sha'b	02.0%	02.4%	01.0%
h. Islamic independents	07.9%	09.0%	05.3%
i. National independents	11.1%	12.5%	09.4%
j. Other (specify)	01.1%	01.1%	01.2%
k. no one	10.5%	10.8%	09.4%

**7. In your opinion, the best way to select the West Bank and Gaza Strip members of the Palestine National Council is:**

a. general elections	77.2%	80.2%	72.3%
b. PLO appointment	10.6%	09.0%	14.6%
c. appointment by political groups on the basis of a quota system	09.9%	08.9%	10.0%
d. other	02.3%	01.9%	03.1%

\*The following question was optional:

**8. If elections to choose the members of the Palestine National Council take place within the West Bank and Gaza Strip...**

a. I would support them as an alternative to PISGA elections.	33.4%	36.7%	25.4%
b. I would support them if they were not as an alternative to PISGA elections.	29.5%	30.3%	30.8%
c. I would support them if the elected members were also members of PISGA.	24.7%	23.9%	25.7%
d. other (specify)	12.4%	09.1%	18.1%



**Political Affiliation by Area of Residence**

	DFLP %	Fateh %	Hamas %	PFLP %	Feda %	I.Jihad %	H.Sha'b %	I.Inds. %
Nat'lst	Other %	No %						
Inds. %		one %						
Nablus	3.2	39.2	15.3	4.5	---	1.4	0.5	4.1
13.5	1.3	17.0						
Tulkarm	4.1	30.3	15.9	3.4	1.4	3.4	1.4	6.2
13.1	3.5	17.3						
Jenin	1.4	49.0	8.8	6.1	---	2.0	1.4	8.2
9.5	---	13.6						
Jericho	2.4	46.3	17.1	2.4	9.8	4.9	7.3	2.4
7.4	---	---						
Ramallah	4.1	33.6	5.0	10.9	4.5	3.2	4.1	5.9
15.9	2.3	10.5						
Hebron	0.9	23.0	20.7	4.7	3.3	8.0	1.4	21.6
10.8	---	5.6						
Bethlehem	2.8	35.2	19.0	5.6	1.4	4.2	2.1	9.9
13.4	---	6.4						
Jerusalem	4.8	33.8	13.1	7.6	5.5	2.1	5.5	7.6
11.7	0.7	7.6						
Gaza	1.6	39.3	18.1	8.8	0.5	4.7	0.5	5.8
10.2	0.8	9.7						
North								
Gaza	---	38.3	22.6	10.4	0.9	1.7	3.5	8.7
4.3	2.6	7.0						
Middle								
Gaza	2.1	40.5	17.9	10.0	1.6	2.6	1.1	4.2
7.4	0.5	12.1						
South								

**Political Affiliation by District in the West Bank**

	DFLP % Other %	Fateh No %	Hamas %	PFLP %	Feda %	I.Jihad %	H.Sha'b %	I.Inds. %
Nat'lst	Inds. %	one %						
Nablus E	3.4	55.9	11.9	3.4	---	3.4	---	---
15.3	1.7	5.0						
Nablus W	5.3	37.3	18.7	6.7	---	2.7	1.3	5.3
4.0	---	18.7						
Nablus	1.1	28.0	15.1	3.2	---	---	---	5.4
20.4	2.2	24.6						
Tulkarm N	3.1	36.9	15.4	1.5	1.5	3.1	1.5	6.2
10.8	6.2	13.8						
Tulkarm S	4.3	27.5	18.8	5.8	1.4	2.9	1.4	7.2
11.6	1.4	17.7						
Jenin E	---	49.4	7.2	7.2	---	2.4	1.2	9.6
8.4	---	14.6						
Jenin W	3.1	50.0	9.4	4.7	---	1.6	1.6	6.3
12.5	---	10.8						
Jericho	2.4	46.3	17.1	2.4	9.8	4.9	7.3	2.4
7.4	---	---						
Ramallah N	5.0	45.0	5.0	7.5	2.5	---	2.5	---
12.5	2.5	17.5						
Ramallah S	4.2	30.6	4.2	12.5	11.1	5.6	2.8	8.3
15.3	---	5.4						
Ramallah	3.7	30.8	5.6	11.2	0.9	2.8	5.6	6.5
17.8	3.7	11.4						
Hebron N	1.4	18.1	25.0	5.6	4.2	5.6	---	19.4
11.1	---	9.6						
Hebron S	1.4	26.4	19.4	4.2	1.4	6.9	1.4	22.2
12.5	---	4.2						
Hebron	---	24.6	17.4	4.3	4.3	11.6	2.9	23.2
8.7	---	3.0						
B'lehem	4.0	28.0	12.0	8.0	2.7	6.7	4.0	12.0
16.0	---	6.6						
B'lehem	1.5	42.6	26.5	2.9	---	1.5	---	7.4
10.3	---	7.3						
vicinity								
J'salem	8.6	28.6	5.7	5.7	8.6	2.9	11.4	11.4
8.6	2.9	5.6						
vicinity								
Jerusalem	3.6	36.0	15.3	8.1	4.5	1.8	3.6	6.3
12.6	---	8.2						

#### Party Affiliation by District in the Gaza Strip

	DFLP % Other %	Fateh No %	Hamas %	PFLP %	Feda %	I.Jihad %	H.Sha'b %	I.Inds. %
Nat'lst	Inds. %	one %						

Jabalia	4.5	38.7	13.5	18.0	0.9	3.6	1.8	7.2
6.3	0.9	4.6						
& North								
Gaza (A)	1.1	37.4	13.2	8.8	---	1.1	---	4.4
16.5	---	17.5						
Gaza (B)	---	45.3	15.1	3.5	---	7.0	---	7.0
12.8	2.3	7.0						
Gaza (C)	---	35.1	33.8	1.3	1.3	7.8	---	3.9
5.2	---	11.7						
Middle	----	38.3	22.6	10.4	0.9	1.7	3.5	8.7
4.3	2.6	7.0						
Camps								
K.	3.5	41.7	15.7	7.0	2.6	3.5	1.7	2.6
8.7	0.9	12.1						
Yunis &								
Camps								
Rafah &	---	38.7	21.3	14.7	---	1.3	---	6.7
5.3	---	12.0						
Camps								

## Appendix

### EVALUATION OF PLO PERFORMANCE BY EDUCATION LEVEL

	Good %	Fair %	Less than Adequate %	Don't Know %
up to 9 Years (Elem. Prep)	21.1	21.8	40.3	16.8
up to 12 Years (tawjihi)	19.0	26.5	47.2	7.3
2 Year College	17.8	20.7	54.9	6.6
University Degree	15.7	22.0	56.8	5.5
Masters & PhDs	4.2	29.2	62.5	4.1