

12 September 2024

Poll Summary Report

## Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll

**October the 7<sup>th</sup> and the current war produce massive fears of genocide, overwhelming mutual distrust and dehumanization; the events reduce support for a two-state peace solution among Israeli Jews while increasing it among Palestinians, but still only a minority support it on each side. Over 60 percent on both sides prefer a regional peace based on a two-state solution and normalization if the alternative is a regional, multi-front war. Incentives remain capable of reversing the hardline views producing strong majorities among both sides for a peace package that permanently ends the conflict**

**Palestinian support for the two-state solution is higher than the support for all other alternatives but more Israeli Jews support one unequal state under Israeli rule than the two-state solution; a trend that began in December 2022 and pre-dates the war. Unexpectedly, one-sided incentives are found to dramatically change the grim picture: the incentives raise support for a two-state solution peace package to a majority on both sides.**

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the [Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research \(PSR\)](#) in Ramallah and [the International Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation at Tel Aviv University](#) with funding from the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP. The joint poll was conducted during July 2024.

### MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

- An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (81%) think the Palestinian suffering under the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip justifies what Hamas did on October 7; only 28% of Israeli Arabs take this view. Among Israeli Jews, 84% believe Hamas' attack on October 7 justifies current Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip.
- We asked how Israelis interpreted Palestinian aims on October 7 and in the ensuing war. The vast majority of Israeli Jews (93%) attribute maximalist and genocidal aspirations to the

Palestinians' aim: 66% select "to commit genocide against us," and 27% believe the aim is to conquer land and expel the Jews. When Palestinians were asked how they interpret Israel's aim in the current war, again, a vast majority of Palestinians (88%) attribute maximalist and genocidal aspirations to Israel: 61% select "commit genocide against us," and 27% select "to conquer our land and expel the people."

- Large majorities on both sides, 72% among Israeli Jews, 68% among Palestinians, and 60% among Israeli Arabs expect escalation in the West Bank. Similarly, 58% of the Israelis (62% of Israeli Jews and 41% of Israeli Arabs) and 53% of the Palestinians believe the Gaza war will expand into a regional war.
- A slim majority of 51% of the Palestinians, 54% of Israeli Jews, and 17% of Israeli Arabs are opposed to the vision presented by the US for the future after the end of the war in Gaza. The vision was described as having four components: ceasefire/exchange of hostages/prisoners, revitalized PA to take control of the Gaza Strip, two-state solution, and regional peace and Saudi-Israeli normalization. Support for the vision stands at 83% among Israeli Arabs, 46% among Israeli Jews, and 45% among the Palestinians.
- Support for the two-state solution drops significantly among Israeli Jews and rises moderately among Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Today, 21% of Israeli Jews, compared to 34% in December 2022 and 42% in September 2020; 40% of Palestinians, compared to 33% in 2022 and 43% in 2020; and 72% of Israeli Arabs, compared to 60% in 2022 and 59% in 2020, support the concept of the two-state solution. Among all Israelis, Jews and Arabs, 31% in total support the two-state solution. This is the lowest level of support for this concept among Israeli Jews, and all Israelis, since the beginning of the *Pulse*, in June 2016 and throughout earlier years of joint polling going back to 2010. A quarter of the Palestinians, 14% of Israeli Jews, 49% of Israeli Arabs, and 21% of all Israelis, Jews and Arabs, support a one-state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians. Support among Israeli Jews for "annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians," stands today at 42% , the highest ever recorded in the *Pulse*. Among Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, support for a one-state solution without equal rights for Israeli Jews stands at 33% and 17% respectively. It is worth noting that 44% of all Palestinians and 34% of Israeli Jews do not support the two-state solution or any of its two alternatives.
- Support for the alternative of a two-state confederation among Palestinians stands today at 35%, compared to 22% two years ago. The current rise in support comes mostly from the Gaza Strip. Support for the confederation among Israelis stands at 20%, 12% among Israeli Jews and 52% among Israeli Arabs. In 2022, support for the confederation idea among all Israelis stood at 28%.
- Palestinians and Israelis were presented with a peace package identical to the one we presented to them in 2018, 2020 and 2022 and representing a modified version of the package we presented to both sides five times between 2016 and 2018. Findings show an 8-point rise in Palestinian support, a 6-point drop in Israeli Jewish support, and a 7-point rise in support of Israeli Arabs. Today, 34% of Palestinians, 25% of Israeli Jews, and 69% of Israeli Arabs support the package. The highest support among the Palestinians, at 43%, was recorded in the *Pulse* in June 2017; among Israeli Jews, at 45%, in June 2018; and among Israeli Arabs, at 91%, in June 2018. The peace package comprises: a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic, the bilateral agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states, the US and major Arab countries will ensure full implementation of the agreement by both sides, and the end of the conflict and claims. Sixty-three of Palestinians and 55% of Israelis (65% of Israeli Jews and 13% of Israeli Arabs) are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package. By contrast to *Pulse* findings in recent years, more Israeli Jews support the detailed package than those who support the two-state solution as a general, by four points.

- For the fifth time, we have conducted an experiment to test one-sided incentives intended to raise support for the two-state solution; these were tested among half of each sample. Among four out of the six unilateral incentives offered to the Palestinians can each produce a majority support among them, increasing it up to 55%. The results among Israeli Jews were even better, showing all six one-sided incentives offered to Israeli Jews leading to a majority support for the peace package, increasing it up to 60%.
- For the fourth time, we tested paired incentives, in which each side receives an incentive and must accept an incentive their side provides to the other – this was tested among the other half of each sample. These were less effective, but the findings were also promising. Five out of the six pairs increased Israeli Jewish support and one (fighting incitement in textbooks on both sides) produced a majority Jewish support for the package, increasing it from 25% to 61%. The results on the Palestinian side were almost as successful: four pairs increased support and one increased it from 34% to 54% (allowing Palestinian laborers into Israel).
- The survey examined support for four bi-lateral potential confidence building measures. Two gained a majority support among the Palestinians while none of them received majority support among Israeli Jews. The highest support Palestinians and Israelis gave, 87% and 48% respectively, was to one that called for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, the release of the Israeli hostages, and the Palestinian prisoners.
- Levels of trust in the other side are very low and declining among the Palestinians, 94% compared to 86% in 2022 believe Israeli Jews are not trustworthy; among Israeli Jews, 86%, compared to 85% in 2022, believe the same about the Palestinians. By contrast, a majority of Israeli Arabs (64%) believes that Israeli Jews can be trusted.
- Similarly, while the average score of humanity each side gives to itself is very high, 88 out of 100 among the Palestinians and 87/100 among Israeli Jews, the average score of humanity each side gives to the other side is very low, 6 out of 100 among the Palestinians and 14/100 among Israeli Jews. The gap between the two scores narrows considerably among Israeli Arabs: the average score they give the Palestinians is 64 and to Israeli Jews 54.
- As we found in the previous survey, each side perceives that its victimization is the worst compared to other peoples who have suffered from persecution and injustice (84% of Israeli Jews, 83% of Palestinians, and 62% of Israeli Arabs agree with this statement).
- A vast majority among both groups, 89% among Palestinians and 87% among Israeli Jews, see themselves as rightful owners of the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face, 830 in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and 440 in the Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 17-20 July, 2024. The sample in the Gaza Strip was interviewed 44 locations, of which 15 were randomly selected from “counting areas” in existing localities set by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 12 locations were randomly selected from among blocs, or sampling units, in built up shelters representing all such shelters, and 17 locations were randomly selected from among blocs, or sampling units, in tent shelters representing all tent shelters. In selection the shelter locations, a quota was assigned for respondents from all governorates of the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is +/-3.5%.

The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis. 500 Israeli Jews were interviewed through an online panel, with an oversample of 200 West Bank settlers, by Project Midgam. 200 Arab respondents were interviewed by iPanel, between 18-29 July. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3.34%. The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, Dr. Nimrod Rosler and Dr. Alon Yakter from Tel Aviv University and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin.

# MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provide the respective findings for these sub groups.


## (1) Israel-Gaza War:

In this section we examine the developments triggered by Hamas’ October 7 attack and the ongoing Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. We first explore public perceptions of these two developments in terms of how justified they are. Second, we explore the expectations regarding the prospects for additional violence, including in West Bank and the larger Middle East region. Third, we examine perceptions of the prospects for peace, attitudes regarding the “American vision” for peace and public preference for a regional war vs. Palestinian-Israeli and regional peace. Finally, we explore perceptions of related international developments since October 7, including views regarding international organizations and the student protest movement in American and European universities.

**1. Israeli blockade, October 7 and the justifications for the war:** An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (80%) think that Palestinian suffering under the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip justifies what Hamas did on October 7, and 17% think it does not justify Hamas’ actions. The belief that Hamas’ attack was justified is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 86% and 71% respectively. Young Palestinians between 18-29 years old are slightly more likely than those 30 years and older to view Hamas attack as justified, 51% and 46% respectively. A larger majority of Hamas supporters (62%) view the attack as justified compared to only 44% among Fatah supporters and 42% among supporters of third parties. Nearly twice as many Arab Israelis think that October 7 was not justified by the blockade on Gaza, than those who believe it was (50% compared to 27%), while 22% did not know.

Among Israeli Jews, when asked if what Hamas did on October 7 justifies what Israel has done in Gaza Strip since that time, nearly three-quarters say “definitely yes,” and another 11% say probably yes – 84% in total, close to the portion of Palestinians who justify Hamas’ actions on October 7. 13% of Israeli Jews say these events do not justify Israel’s actions.

Figure (1): **Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, and Israeli Jews views on the justifications for the attack on October 7 and the Israeli war against the Gaza Strip the followed it (% Definitely + Probably Yes)**



The sense of justification is widespread even across political communities. Among all Israelis, only the self-defined left wing (firm left as opposed to moderate) shows more people who think Israel's actions are not justified (probably or definitely not) than justified – 50% versus 44% (probably or definitely justified). However, from the moderate left, centrists, moderate right and firm right, the differences, while present, are marginal: nearly three-quarters of the moderate left say the war is justified (73%), 85% of the center, with 86% and 89% of the moderate and firm right who give these responses, respectively (definitely and probably justified). Given that in the past, the center has generally expressed significantly different attitudes from the right-wing on conflict themes, these findings represent a notable consensus of attitudes towards the justification of Israel's actions in the war since October 7.

*Gaza war casualties:* We then sought to understand how each side views the immediate consequences of the war, for its own side and for the other. To this end, we asked the Palestinians whether the numbers of war casualties on the Palestinian and Israeli sides are justified or unjustified in order to achieve the aims of October the 7<sup>th</sup>, and asked Israelis whether the number of Palestinian and Israeli casualties are justified to achieve the aims of the war.

While about half of the Palestinians (48%) said the Palestinian casualties were justified and 50% said it was unjustified, the gap between West Bankers and Gazans are wide; 66% of Gazans and 37% of West Bankers said they were justified. Referring to the Israeli casualties, a majority of 55% of the Palestinians said it is justified and 41% said it is unjustified. Here too, we find similar differences between Gazans and West Bankers, as 68% of the former and 46% of the latter think it is justified.

Over three-quarters of Israeli Jews believe the number Palestinian casualties during the war is justified; a broad majority that is consistent with findings from the Peace Index survey in January, through representing a moderate decline, from 87% at that time. One-quarter of Israeli Jews believe that the casualties on the Israeli side are justified. This attitude is differentiated by political leanings: while 14% of firm left-wing Israelis believe the Israeli casualties are justified, twice as many of the firm right-wing believe this – 31%. The majority of Arabs believe that neither the Palestinian nor the Israeli casualties are justified – 66% and 58%, respectively.

**2. Prospects for violent escalation:** When asked about the prospects for a severe escalation in the West Bank in the near future given the current state of the war and the current situation in the West Bank, 68% of Palestinians expressed the belief that the chances are very high or somewhat high while 29% said it is low or somewhat low. Here too we find a big gap in attitudes between West Bankers and Gazans, with the former expressing a much higher prospects compared to the latter, 80% and 50% respectively.

The large majority of Israelis too are convinced that there will be further escalation in the West Bank. 72% of Israeli Jews believe the chances are very high (23%) or high (just under half), and 60% of Arab respondents. In total, 70% of Israelis believe the chances of severe escalation are high. Notably, there is no difference between settlers and Jews living within the Green Line regarding the chances of West Bank escalation, despite settlers being physically closer to Palestinians and often experiencing greater levels of violence.

Palestinians and Israelis were asked about the potential impact of two developments on the prospects for raising or lowering violence among Palestinians and Israelis: an Israeli re-occupation of Gaza and tight control in the near future, and reaching an accord based on two states in the near future, in two separate questions. The overwhelming majority (83%) of Palestinians think that an Israeli reoccupation of the Gaza Strip would raise violence, 11% think it would have no influence, and only 6% think it would lower violence. By contrast, a plurality of Palestinians (42%) think that a two-state accord would lower violence, with Gazans expressing greater confidence about that than West Bankers, 50% and 37% respectively. Only 26% of Palestinians, 34% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip, think an accord would raise violence and 29% think it would have no influence.



Tellingly, slightly more Israeli Jews think that a two-state accord will increase violence – a majority of 52% - compared to those in the separate question who believe re-occupation will lead to more violence (48%). One-third of Israeli Jews believe that re-occupation of Gaza will reduce violence, compared to 19% who believe a two-state accord in the near future will reduce violence. Half of the settler respondents believe that re-occupation of Gaza will lower violence, while half believe there either be no influence (26%) or that it will raise violence (24%).


By contrast, the large majority of Arab Israeli respondents believe Israeli re-occupation of Gaza will increase violence (73%), while in the separate question about whether a two-state solution will raise or lower violence, only 8% believe it will raise violence, while nearly two-thirds (65%) believe this will lower the violence.

Nearly 60% of settlers believe that reaching a two-state agreement will increase violence. This latter view confirms the near constant theme among settlers and right-wing communities that withdrawal from Gaza, and the Oslo accords, led directly to the attacks of October 7, an argument that has appeared almost daily in the media and conversations within these communities. However, the argument that re-occupation will reduce violence is successful primarily among the firm right wing: 49% believe re-occupation will reduce violence, compared to one-third (32%) who believe it will increase violence. Among all other groups, a plurality or a majority say re-occupation will increase violence, including among the moderate right-wing: 41% say reoccupation of Gaza will increase violence, compared to 37% who say it will lower violence (the remainder say it will have no impact). Among Israelis of the center, moderate and firm left, a majority or near-consensus say this will increase violence (59%, 86%, and 92%, respectively).

*Expectation that the Gaza war will expand into a regional war:* A majority of 53% of the Palestinians, 57% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip, expect the Gaza War to eventually expand into a regional war with the direct participation of Iran; 47% do not expect that. If such expansion eventually takes place, 53% (57% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip) expect the forces against Israel to win while only 20% (11% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) expect Israel and its allies to win.

Nearly six in ten Israelis (58% - almost the same portion as West Bank Palestinians) believe the Gaza war will expand into a regional war. The main variation is between Jews and Arabs – 62% of Jews think this will happen, compared to 41% of Arab respondents. However, there is only moderate variation among Jewish Israelis; among all Israelis, only the left-wing shows greater optimism for avoiding a regional war. Just one-third of the (firm) left believes the war will expand to the regional arena, compared to half of the moderate left. If such expansion to the greater region eventually takes place, 70% of Israelis (79% of Israeli Jews and 32% of Israeli Arabs) expect Israel to win; 8% (5% of Israeli Jews and 21% of Israeli Arabs) expect the other side to win.

Figure (2): **Palestinians and Israelis who expect the Gaza War to eventually expand into a regional war with the direct participation of Iran**




**3. Prospects for post-war peace:** The survey explored the impact of October 7 and the Gaza war on public perceptions of the prospects for peace and asked about attitudes regarding the US vision for post war Palestinian-Israeli and regional relations. We also asked about the preference for regional war vs. Palestinian-Israeli and regional peace.

*Impact of October 7 on peacemaking:* When asked about the impact of October 7 and the war in Gaza on the future of Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking, the Palestinians were divided with a majority of Gazans (54%) compared to less than one-third (31%) of West Bankers agreeing or somewhat agreeing that the unprecedented and extreme nature of the current war actually creates an unusual opportunity for reaching an Israeli-Palestinian agreement for peace, with international support, like after the 1973 war. In total, a majority of 55% disagreed or somewhat disagreed with that statement.

Israeli Jews expressed attitudes similar to the breakdown of West Bank Palestinians: 24% of Israeli Jews believe the extreme current war provides an opportunity for a breakthrough like after the Yom Kippur war, while Arabs are more likely to think this is the case: 52%, a slight majority, believe there can be such a breakthrough, but a high portion do not know (29%); with 20% who disagree that the war will bring a breakthrough – and 59% of Jewish Israelis who disagree about the possibility of an opportunity for breakthrough. The notion of an opportunity is stronger primarily among left-wing Israelis, for whom just over 60% agree that the current situation is an opportunity for breakthrough; centrists are more divided, but a plurality agree with the opportunity – 44%, compared to 36% who disagree. Only small minorities on the right agree (14% among the moderate right-wing, and 7% among the firm right).

Figure (3): **Agree that the current war could lead to peace, 2024**

*“Some believe that the unprecedented and extreme nature of the current war actually creates an unusual opportunity for reaching an Israeli-Palestinian agreement for peace, like after the 1973/Yom-Kippur war, with international support. Do you agree or disagree?” (AGREE)*




*US vision for peace:* The *Pulse* explored public support for the US vision for post-war Palestinian-Israeli relations. A slim majority of 51% of the Palestinians is opposed to the vision presented by the US for ending the war in Gaza and for the future. The vision was described as having four components: (1) ceasefire/hostage release/prisoners’ exchange, (2) revitalized Palestinian Authority to take charge of the Gaza Strip, (3) all sides agree to embrace the two-state solution and take meaningful and irreversible steps toward achieving that goal, and (4) regional peace and Saudi-Israeli normalization of relations. Palestinian support for the US vision stands at 45%, with Gazan support more than twice as that of West Bankers, 65% and 32% respectively. Palestinian support is also higher among females than males, 48% and 42% respectively. Surprisingly, support for the

vision among Fatah likely voters is just slightly higher than among Hamas likely voters, 49% and 47% respectively, but much higher among third party likely voters, at 58%.

Notably, nearly half of Israeli Jews (46%) in total support the four-point plan the Biden administration had advanced earlier in 2024, with the minority (11%) expressing enthusiastic support and 35% who were moderately supportive. A moderate majority of 54% of Jews are opposed. Among Arab Israelis, a consensus of 83% supported this plan. On this plan, the right-wing in Israel is sharply differentiated from other groups: Just 27% of the right (combining firm and moderate right-wing) support the Biden framework, while clear majorities of the center and left (firm and moderate) support it: 75% and 91% respectively. Consistent with most attitudes towards the conflict among Jewish Israelis, there is no gender gap, but there is a clear age differential, with younger Jewish Israelis more hardline than older groups: 34% of Jewish Israelis aged 18-34 support the plan, compared to 59% of Jewish Israelis aged 55 and above. Among Arabs in Israel, the age gap exists but is less consistent: 78% of the 18-34 group support this vision; 89% of the 35-54 year old range, and 81% of respondents 55 and above.

Figure (4): **Support for the US vision for the future after the end of the war in Gaza among Palestinians and Israelis, 2024**




When asked if the US administration under President Biden is determined to use leverage or pressure against all sides to persuade them to endorse this vision, a majority of Palestinians (58%) expressed the view that it is not; only 38% expressed the view that it is determined to do so. Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to think that the Biden administration is determined, 44% and 34% respectively.

A majority of Israelis, 57%, with surprisingly no significant variation between Jews and Arabs, believe the Biden administration is prepared to use its leverage to pressure all sides to accept this plan. Even political variation was moderate on this question; with the firm left somewhat less convinced – 49% expect the Biden administration to pressure the sides to accept the plan.

*Regional war vs. regional and Palestinian-Israeli peace:* If the choice between a regional war, including Israel, the PA, Lebanon, Yemen and possibly Iran or a regional peace deal that includes Palestinian-Israeli agreement based on a two-state solution and Arab-Israeli normalization, 65% of the Palestinians (67% in the West Bank and 63% in the Gaza Strip) and 62% of Israelis (55% of Israeli Jews and 89% of Israeli Arabs) prefer the regional and Palestinian-Israeli peace; only 29% of Palestinians (25% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) and 38% of Israelis (45% of Israeli Jews and 11% of Israeli Arabs) prefer the regional war.



Figure (5): **Palestinian and Israeli preference for regional war and regional peace based on a two-state solution and Arab-Israeli normalization**



*Is a two-state peace outcome a gain or loss for Hamas?* We asked the Palestinians to define Hamas’ loss/gain in the current war. Respondents were asked to choose between a statement that the outcome of a final status two-state accord, including normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel would be a victory for Hamas, and a statement that this same outcome would be a loss. Among Palestinians, a majority of 62% said it would be a gain for Hamas while only 18% said it would be a loss to Hamas.

When asked the same question – whether the outcome of a final status two-state accord, including normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel would be a victory or a loss for Hamas – Israelis were divided almost evenly between one-third who did not know or thought both statements were true (36% in total chose one of these uncertain responses). A majority of Arab respondents gave a “don’t know” or “both are true” response (55% in total). Among Jews, 37% thought such an outcome would be a victory for Hamas, while 32% saw it as a loss (31% gave one of the uncertain responses). There is a political division, in which 41% of left-wingers in Israeli believe such an outcome would be a loss for Hamas, while 44% of right-wingers think it would be a victory.

**4. International developments:** Finally, we explored perceptions of two important international developments that have been triggered by the Gaza war in international courts. The survey explored perceptions of two international organizations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) and perception of anti-war student protests.

*Bias in ICJ and ICC:* More than three quarters of the Palestinians (77%) strongly or somewhat agree with a statement that “international institutions such as the ICJ and the ICC are biased in favor of Western countries and the US who support Israel;” 21% disagree. More Gazans than West Bankers agree with the statement, 80% and 75% respectively.

This issue exposes a mirror image on the Israeli side, reflecting zero-sum positions: fully 87% of Jewish Israelis strongly or somewhat agree with a statement that the international institutions are biased against Israel. Only 21% of Arab respondents agree. The only political group in Israel that disagrees with the bias of the international institutions against Israel is the firm left: 28% agree, while 61% disagree. All other political groups agree with a significant majority, including two-thirds of the Israeli moderate left.

*Student protests in the US and Europe:* Almost two-thirds of the Palestinians, 75% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip, view that the student protests in the American and European

universities in solidarity with the Palestinians and opposition to Israel, and demanding divestment from Israel, as a “tipping point leading to a significant rise in support for the Palestinians in global public opinion;” while about one third (32%) view it as a “minor or temporary development that will dissipate once the war is finished with no significant lasting impact on global public opinion.” Gazans are twice more likely than West Bankers to view this development as minor, 46% and 23% respectively.

Among Israelis, many are not sure – over one-fifth of Israelis say they do not know whether the student protests in the US reflect a tipping point. On this question, variations among Jews and Arabs are moderate, with similar overall breakdowns (although Jews are more closely divided): more people believe this does represent a tipping point leading towards rising support for Palestinians in global opinion, including 42% of Jews and 50% of Arabs in Israel. 38% of Jews and 20% of Arabs consider this a passing or minor issue, and the remainder do not know.

## **(2) The two-state solution**

In the current survey, 40% of Palestinians and 21% of Israeli Jews support the general concept of the two-state solution before testing the details of the plan; 59% of Palestinians and 68% of Israeli Jews are opposed. Two years ago, 33% of the Palestinians and 34% of Israeli Jews supported this solution. Among Israeli Arabs, support stands at 72%, compared to 60% two years ago, bringing the current total Israeli average to 31%, an eight-point decline compared to 39% in 2022. As seen in Figure 6, among Jews, support for the two-state principle has seen an incremental but steady decline since June 2016, when it stood at 53%. Among Palestinians, support has varied: it fell from June to December 2016, from 51% to 44%, rose to 52% in June 2017, then declined once again to 46% and continued to decline between July 2018, in September 2020, then dropping a full 10 points in 2022, before rising seven points in the current poll. The last time both populations showed a majority (among Palestinians and the total population of Israelis) in support of a two-state solution was in June 2017. The last time Palestinians and Israeli Jews both showed majority support was a year earlier, in June 2016.

As in the 2022 *Pulse*, current support for the general two-state solution among Palestinians is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 42% and 38% respectively (support in the current poll is generally higher in Gaza for the detailed package as well). But the increased support for the concept of the two-state solution came mostly from the West Bank (10-point rise) compared to only 2-point rise in the Gaza Strip. Support for the two-state solution remains higher among Fatah voters compared to those of Hamas (42% and 29% respectively), among those aged 30 years and higher compared to young people aged 18 to 29 years old (43% and 34% respectively), among those who define themselves as “somewhat religious” compared to the “religious” (42% and 36% respectively) and among women compared to men, 42% and 38% respectively (see Figures 4 and 5 below, in the section on alternative solutions, for additional details). It is worth noting that the current support for the two-state solution among Hamas supporters is twice as much as found in the 2022 survey. In 2022, Hamas supporters favored that solution by a mere 14%. The main reason for this rise is the fact that, given the current war on Gaza, the support for Hamas among the Palestinians has increased considerably during the months before the conduct of the current poll, with almost all that increase coming from people who do not normally share Hamas’ values and many of its traditional attitudes regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Among Israelis, as in the past, the most significant variations are found between Jews and Arabs, and within the Jewish community, between the ideological and demographic groups, particularly by levels of religious observance. Israelis are highly polarized along ideological lines: 81% of those who consider themselves left-wing support the two-state solution in a general question, which has not significantly changed despite the war; in 2022, 83% of left-wingers supported this approach. However, the war has had a significant impact on the two other ideological groups. Centrists in Israel generally showed majority support for the two-state solution in recent years; for example, and 56% supported it in 2022 (although this represented a six-point decline from 2020); at present just

43% of centrists support this approach, a 14-point decline. The portion of self-defined Israeli right-wingers who support a two-state solution dropped by over 60% since the 2022 survey, from 16% to 6% in the current survey. In addition, the lowest support rates among the Jewish population – only 10% – can be found among those living in the West Bank. Among all Israelis, 20% define themselves as left wing, 23% consider themselves centrist, and 52% right wing; however, among the Jewish population, 63% self-define as right-wing and just 12% consider themselves to be left-wing, while the number of centrists is 23%.

Demographic differences are most significant between levels of religious observance among Jews, and these groups also reflect the major decline in support following the war. At present, 36 percent of secular Jewish Israelis support the two-state solution, a 21-point decline from 2022, over twice the size of the decline between 2020 and 2022 (a 9-point drop). In this survey, 43% of Jews identified as secular. Among the next “level” of religious observance, Jewish traditionalists (masorti – one-third of the Jewish sample), just 17% support the two-state solution, which reflects only a minor difference from 20% who supported it in 2020; over three-quarters of this group are opposed (77%). Only 3% of national religious and 1% of Haredi Israelis support a two-state solution, both down from already very low rates in 2022 (14 percent among national religious and 8 percent of Haredi Israelis, respectively, supported a two-state solution then. National religious are 12% of the Jewish population and Haredi represent 10%. Over 90 percent of both groups oppose the two-state solution at present.

Further, over roughly the last decade, there has been a consistent trend of more right-leaning attitudes among all younger Israelis compared to older groups. Accordingly, just 19 percent of 18–34 year old respondents support the two-state solution, with a significant difference in the intensity of support - among the youngest (18-24), just 1% “strongly” support it, compared to 8% among the 25–34-year-old Israelis. Support for this solution rises steadily with each age group: 30 percent of 35–44-year-olds support it among Israelis, and 41% of 45-54 year olds. Nearly half of older Israelis, 55 and older, support this solution (48%) - the highest of all age groups.


However, the differentiation is more significant by age among Jews. Just 8% of the young cohort, 18-35 year old Jewish Israelis support a two-state solution, while fully 83% are opposed. The oldest Israeli Jews, 55+, still show a majority who are opposed, but the margin is smaller: 58% who are opposed, compared to 38% who support a two-state solution.

One of the main reasons for the trend of young Jews expressing more rightwing views is the higher levels of religious observance among young Israeli Jews. Among 18–34-year-olds, just one-third identify as secular, compared to 56% among Jews 55 and up. More than twice as many of the 18–34-year-old Israeli Jews are either religious or Haredi, as the oldest group (32% versus 14%, respectively).

Arab Israeli respondents also show the pattern of somewhat lower support among the younger groups, though the difference is smaller. Among 18–34-year-old Arab respondents, 59% support the two-state solution, and 19% oppose it – similar to 2022 but with a very slight rise in support and decline in opposition. As in the past, over one-fifth (22%) of young Arabs in Israel say they do not know. Among the older age group, from 35 to 55 fully 85 percent support two states, and 69% of the 55+ group. Opposition among both is very low.

Figure 6: Support for the concept of the two-state solution among Palestinians and Israelis

Increased support among Palestinians and Israeli Arabs and decrease among Israeli Jews



*Support linked to low perceived feasibility.* To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two-state solution. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 10% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years; 26% say the chances are medium; and 62% of Palestinians say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews a large majority of 72 percent believe the chances are low or very low – surprisingly, this is 16 points *lower* than 2020 (88%). Among Israeli settlers, three-quarters believe the chances of establishing a Palestinian state are low or very low, also somewhat lower than in 2022 (89%). Arab respondents in general are somewhat more optimistic, but a small majority still believe the chances are low or very low (52%). This too is a clear decline in the pessimistic view, relative to over two-thirds of Arabs in Israel who held this view in 2022. Among all Israelis, 18% gave “medium” chances to the establishment of a Palestinian state, and 7% give high or very high chances to the creation of a Palestinian state over the next five years - a four-point rise compared to 2022.

As in the past, respondents were asked in a separate question if they believe that the two-state solution is still possible, in light of recent political developments and the settlement spread. Among Israeli Jews, the findings indicate a rise in the percentage of those who believe it is no longer feasible, from 45% in 2020 to 53% in 2022 and ten points higher - 63% - today. However, among Arab respondents, 58% think the two-state solution is still viable, surprisingly 12 points higher than in 2020 (46%) today compared to 45% two years ago. As a result, 27% of all Israelis believe it is feasible, while 56% believe it is not; four years ago, in September 2020, 43% thought it was viable and the same amount thought it was not. Among the Palestinians, 62%, compared to 70% in 2022, believe the two-state solution is no longer viable or practical, while 35% (compared to 27% in 2022) believe the two-state solution is viable.

Notably, among Israeli Jews there is a stark contrast between younger and older respondents, as on many issues related to the two-state solution. As noted, this age differentiation has been found among Jewish Israelis for a number of years, going back over a decade; mainly due to growing up during a time when there have been no peace negotiations, and far-right wing Israeli governments have campaigned against a Palestinian state, as well as the higher portion of young people who are religiously observant. Finally, the war has had an impact on young Jewish Israelis too: in 2022, 20% of Jews aged 18-34 believe this solution is still possible, but at present, just 13%; nearly three quarters of young Jewish Israelis, 73%, believe it is no longer feasible. Among the oldest Jewish respondents aged 55+, over one-quarter believe the two-state solution is still viable, while 56%

believe it is not. Among Arab Israelis the age trend is less consistent, but still the youngest group is less likely to see the two-state solution as viable: 49%, compared to 66% among the middle age range (35-55).

Among Palestinians, there is less variation in responses to the question of viability, but here too, young respondents tend to be less optimistic than the older age groups. Two-thirds of the 18-23-year olds believe the two-state solution is no longer viable while 60% of those whose age is 30 years or older believe the same.

### (3) Alternatives to the two-state solution:


*Two competing alternatives to the two-state solution: one democratic and one undemocratic state*

The joint poll sought to ascertain the level of support for other solutions to the conflict and in doing so, ascertain the breakdown of Palestinians and Israelis regarding two alternatives to the two-state solution: one democratic state with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians and one state in which one side or the other dominates the entire region and the other side is denied equal rights. In the survey, each respondent was asked each question separately. Among the Palestinians, as shown in the following figure, support for the two-state solution, at 40%, remains higher than the support for the one unequal state, at 33% compared to 30% two years ago, and the one equal or democratic state, at 25%, compared to 23% two years ago.

Among all Israelis, support for the two-state solution, at 31%, is higher than the one equal or democratic state at 21% (a decline of five points from 2022). Among Israeli Jews, support for this one equal state stands at 14%, down from 20% in 2022, compared to 49% among Israeli Arabs. In 2022, for the first time, Jewish Israeli support for full annexation of the West Bank without giving the Palestinians full citizen rights - in practice, one unequal, undemocratic state - overtook support for the two-state solution by three points (37% to 34%). At present the gap has grown: 42% of Israeli Jews support West Bank annexation without rights - double the portion who support two states.

Israeli Arabs were asked the same question as Palestinians, about support and opposition for one unequal and undemocratic state of Palestine in which Jews do not have full citizen rights.: only 17% of Israeli Arabs expressed support and 55% opposition; 28% did not know or did not provide an answer. These responses are similar to 2022, with a slight decline in support and rise in opposition by Israeli Arabs to the unequal Palestinian state.

**Figure 7: Support for the two-state solution and two alternatives among Palestinians and Israeli Jews, 2017 to 2024**





Our next step was to examine the support for the a single (binational) equal state, and single unequal state *as alternatives to the two-state solution* by quantifying those who support one of these two options exclusively, without also supporting the more democratic option – either two states or a single equal state – in these three questions (two states, one equal state, and one unequal state). This analysis gives the two-state solution priority by showing the total number of supporters, while anyone who supports both two states and a version of one state is “counted” only in the two-state category, leaving a smaller group of those who support a different option exclusively: either one equal state, and one unequal or undemocratic state, to avoid overlap, to ascertain the size of each constituency.


In this method, while the size of those who support the two-state solution remains unchanged, the size of those who support the one democratic state becomes smaller because we remove from among them those who supported the two-state solution in the first question. Similarly, the size of support for the one non-democratic state becomes smaller than it was initially because we remove from among them those, if any, who also supported the two-state **and** the one democratic state solutions.

An important advantage of this analysis is shown in the two pie charts in figure 3. The pies show that the largest constituency among the Palestinians (44%) and the second largest among Israeli Jews (34%) is that of “other,” referring to respondents who, on average, either rejected all options or responded “do not know” in all three questions. In other words, this group which could be called “the undecided” or those who support a fourth, yet undefined, solution is not yet endorsing the two most important alternatives to the two-state solution. In 2022, the size of this group stood at 47% among the Palestinians and 27% among Israeli Jews. This finding does not necessarily represent bad news for the future of the two-state solution as almost half of the total increase in Palestinian support for the two-state solution (3 percentage points) came from this group, and that half of the decrease (7 percentage points) in Israeli Jewish support for the two-state solution moved to this group rather than embrace a clearly defined alternative.

Among Israeli Jews, the largest constituency is the one that supports an unequal state, standing at 36% compared to 34% in 2022. Among the Palestinians, the second largest constituency is the one that supports the two-state solution. Support for one equal democratic state drops among Palestinians and Israeli Jews to a mere 8% for each side when supporters of the two solutions are removed from it. This means that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian supporters of the one equal democratic state (as indicated above, 25% supported this solution when asked separately about it) are *also* supporters of the two-state solution with the size of the overlap standing at 17 percentage points of the total population, i.e., 17% of all Palestinians simultaneously support the two-state solution and the one democratic state solution. Among Israeli Jews, the original support for one democratic state, when the question is asked separately, stood, as shown above, at 14% which means that the majority of the supporters of the one equal state among Israeli Jews are in fact opposed to the two-state solution, as the size of the overlap stands at 6% only, i.e., only 6% of Israeli Jews simultaneously support the two-state solution and the one democratic state solution.


Figure 3 also shows that support for the one unequal state drops when going through this process of elimination. But the drop, by 25 points, is most dramatic among the Palestinians while the change in the Israeli Jewish case is small, standing at 5 points.

**Figure 8: Support for the two-state solution and two alternative options among Palestinians and Israeli Jews, 2024 – Elimination Method of Analysis**



On the Palestinian side, only minor differences are found between Gazans and West Bankers in their preferences for the two-state solution. Similarly, as figure 4 below shows, the largest percentage, equally in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 44% and 45% respectively, shows no support to the two-state solution or its two alternatives. But the two areas differ in the way they view the two proposed alternatives, one democratic state and unequal or non-democratic state, with about 10% of Gazans but only 6% of West Bankers favoring a one democratic state. Similarly, while 12% of West Bankers prefer a one non democratic state compared to only 3% among Gazans. As the chart also indicates, religiosity negatively affects support for the two-state solution; a finding that is consistent with previous surveys. But it has a little impact on the preference for “others.” Unlike the previous poll in 2022, the current one did find significant variation associated with the age groups, with the youth favoring it less than the older age group. Support for the two-state solution stands at 34% among the 18-29 years old compared to 43% among those whose age is 30 and above. The percentage of those among the youth who prefer “others” stands at 48% compared to 42% among the older generation. Only minor differences are found in the level of support for the two alternatives.


**Figure 9: Support among Palestinians for the two-state solution and two alternative options by region, age, and religiosity, elimination analysis, 2024**



Gaps also emerge when looking at the Palestinian political affiliation or vote preferences (Figure 5), with likely voters of third parties and Fatah showing majority support for the two-state solution (65% and 42% respectively) while supporters of Hamas standing at 29% and unaffiliated and undecided at 42%. It is worth noting that the highest support among Hamas voters (53%) goes to “other” solutions.

Surprisingly, even among likely voters who are Fatah supporters, the largest percentage (45%) is the one that did not support the options offered and fall into the “other” group.

**Figure 10: Support among Palestinians for the two-state solution and two alternative options by political affiliation, elimination analysis, 2024**




As in all previous surveys, the Israeli public is extremely divided internally over the two-state solution. As noted, the preference for annexation of the West Bank without providing full rights has clearly overtaken support for two states among the Jewish population. The era in which two states was broadly understood as the acceptable paradigm appears over, at least for the current phase. However, attitudes are still in flux and populations remain heavily polarized.

Compared to other solutions, such as one democratic state or a two-state confederation, the two-state solution still enjoys a higher level of overall support, 31% among all Israelis and 21% for Israeli Jews.

The findings among Jewish and Arab Israelis show a fundamentally different picture. Among Jewish Israelis, the largest group supports a single unequal state following Israeli annexation and only partial rights for Palestinians – 36%. These respondents did not overlap with the group supporting either democratic option: 21% of Jews chose the two-state solution, and of those who did not choose two states, 8% chose one democratic state – these respondents did not simultaneously support two states. The remainder, 34%, did not provide an answer for any of the questions regarding democratic or non-democratic solutions.


As in previous years, the portion of those who choose an unequal non democratic state (after the implementation of the elimination process that removed all respondents who supported the two-state solution and those who supported the one-democratic state) is highest among the national religious group (60%) Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) (54%). Those who refrain from choosing any solution is highest, at 37%, among the secular Jews, a significant rise from 19% in 2022. Similarly, as in previous years, secular Israeli Jews were the only Jewish community in which a larger group chose the two-state solution over any of the other solutions (one equal or unequal state).

**Figure 11: Support among Israeli Jews for the two-state solution and two alternative options by religiosity, elimination analysis, 2024**




It is important to note the change within Israeli Jewish political camps regarding the two-state solution. In the past, a majority of centrists supported this, while a consistent portion of the moderate self-defined right supported it as well (between one-fifth and one-quarter). At present, only the Israeli Jewish left shows a majority. Centrist support is now a minority, (see Figure 12), and among the Jewish moderate right, support has declined to 11%, compared to only 2% among the right, although this still preserves the distinction that has been consistent over time between these two groups of right-wingers. Jewish Israelis who define themselves as “right” support the unequal or non-democratic state by 52% followed by “others” (35%). It is worth noting that the size of the moderate right category in this poll is 27% (a 7-point decline from 2022), the right is 35% (a slight rise), the “center” 23%, the moderate left 10%, and the left 3% of the Jewish sample.

**Figure 12: Support among Israeli Jews for the two-state solution and two alternative options by ideology, elimination analysis, 2024**



Finally, when looking at Israeli Arabs, as the pie in Figure 13 shows, support for the two-state solution, as indicated above, is high, at 72% followed by “other” at 20% and one democratic state at 7%.

Figure 13: Support for the two-state solution and two alternative options among Israeli Arabs, 2024




**Confederation:** The confederation approach was not included in previous analysis of alternatives to the two-state solution as it is rather an alternate version of two states. The confederation idea has been tested in the joint survey since December 2016, when it was asked in a general way with minimal explanation, then in later surveys with somewhat more detail. In the current survey, the question provided a summary of the main featured of the confederation: “the creation of two states, Palestine and Israel, which enter into a confederation whereby citizens of one country are allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of the other but each national group votes only in its state for elections. There would be freedom of movement for all, with the required security arrangements, and Jerusalem is not divided but serves as the capital of two states. Israel and Palestine would deal jointly with security and the economy.”

Since testing began, support rose among the Israeli public from 28% in December 2016, to a high of 39% in late 2017. In the 2020 survey, this support reverted back to 30% among Israelis, almost precisely the range of support among Palestinians from December 2017 onwards (28% in December 2017 and 29% in 2020). In 2020, support among Israeli Jews stood at 28% and among Israeli Arabs at 44%. In 2022, total support among all Israelis was 28% in favor (although support has rebounded to nearly 60 percent among Arabs), and 22% among all Palestinians. In the current poll, support for the confederation among the Palestinians stands at 35%.

As shown in figure 14, findings indicate that support for the confederation is higher among Palestinians than Israelis, 35% and 20% and respectively. But significant variations emerge within both groups: while only 28% of West Bankers support the confederation concept, 45% of Gazans indicate support. Among Israelis, only 12% of Jews support it while a majority of 52% of Israeli Arabs support it - consistent with Arab results showing a majority for democratic peace frameworks in general. Opposition to the package among Palestinians stands at 75% and among Israelis at 64% (73% among Israeli Jews).




**Figure 14: Support for two-state confederation, WB, Gaza, total Israel, Israeli Jews, and Israeli Arabs, 2024**



Among Israeli Jews, ideology and religiosity play a significant role. The only populations that support the confederation approach with a majority in the past were left-wingers in general, and left-wing Jewish Israelis – among the latter group, support rose steadily since testing began, until the current survey found a decline, clearly a result of the war. Among Israeli left-wing Jews, which rose as high as 66% in 2022, before dropping down to 35% in 2024.


There is also a majority among Palestinian non-religious respondents and Israeli Arabs (These two are small portions of each population: non-religious Palestinians are just 5 percent of the total Palestinian population and Arabs make up about 17% of Israel’s adult population).

**Figure 15: comparing Israeli Jewish support for the confederation by ideology, religiosity, and age, 2024**



Similarly, support among the Palestinians varies based on political affiliation. At 60% supporters of third parties, or “others,” is the highest followed by Fatah supporters, at 34%, and Hamas at 31%. Two years earlier, support for the confederation among the likely Hamas’ voters did not exceed 10%. As we indicated above when discussing the increased support of Hamas’ likely voters for the two-state solution, the main reason for this rise is the fact that, given the current war on Gaza, the support for Hamas among the Palestinians has increased considerably with almost all that increase coming from people who do not share Hamas’ values and many of its traditional attitudes regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Religiosity seems to play a minor role with a majority of the “not religious,” a very small group, indicating support (59%) followed by the religious and the somewhat religious. Traditionally, the religious have been the most opposed to the two-state solution. Unlike our findings in 2022, young Palestinians are slightly less likely to support the confederation than older Palestinians, 33% and 37% respectively.

Figure 16: comparing Palestinian support for the confederation package by political affiliation (Fatah, Hamas, third party, undecided), religiosity, and age, 2024



Compared to support for two states, support is lower for a confederation; Among the Palestinians, support for the confederation in the current poll is 5 points lower than the support for the concept of the two-state solution. The support of Israeli Jews is 8 points lower for a confederation at a present than for the two-state solution, with 13% for the confederation compared to 21%.

Since the confederation was not a well-known approach when testing began, support has been erratic and seems to follow the general pessimistic mood regarding political solutions to the conflict.

In 2022, we found that support for this plan remained similar to overall support for one democratic equal state and lower than overall support for an unequal nondemocratic state, where one side annexes the whole land and the other side is given only limited rights. This general pattern holds in 2024.

#### (4) Detailed permanent status peace package

##### Detailed peace packages for implementation

As in all six previous surveys of the current series of joint polls, Palestinians and Israelis were asked in this survey to support or oppose a detailed combined peace package based on the two-state solution, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The package included 11 items addressing all issues of the so-called permanent status negotiations, such as borders, security, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees and several other matters, such as mutual recognition, end of conflict, external guarantees, and the Arab Peace Initiative.


Palestinians and Israelis were asked to respond first to each item separately, as component parts; following the 11 items they were asked if they support or opposed the combined package, and given a short summary of the basic elements.

- Total Israeli support is only slightly lower than in 2022, at 34%, compared to 37% - a figure that has held mostly steady since 2020. But support among Israeli Jews dropped once again, from 36% to 31% between 2020 and 2022, to 25% today (see Figure 17 below). The total average remained similar due to a significant recovery of support by Israeli Arabs, which had dropped dramatically in 2020, but which now stands at 69%, 7 points higher than in 2022. Jewish Israelis' support however has declined relative to both the original and enhanced plan examined in July 2018: at that time, the "original" package that did not incorporate the strong incentives received 46% support from all Israelis, while the enhanced detailed two-state agreement – the one tested in the current survey – was supported by a majority of 53% among all Israelis (45% of Israeli Jews). Therefore, support among the Israeli population for the

identical plan fell 20 points between 2018 and 2024 - but the decline was well underway prior to the current war.

- Palestinian support for the package, standing at 34%, represents an 8-point increase, compared to 26% two years ago and 27% four years ago. But it is significantly lower than the 2018 findings when support stood at 42%. Today, a majority of 63% opposes the package.
- As the case with the general support for the concept of a two-state solution, there has generally been more support in Gaza for the detailed package, than in the West Bank. The dynamic remains consistent in 2024, with 43% of Gazans supporting the package, fully 14 points higher than West Bank respondents. The lower support among West Bankers is consistent with our findings in 2022 which we attributed at that time to an increase in hardline views generated by the increased number of armed clashes with the Israeli army during 2022. These attacks have dramatically increased since 2023 immediately after the formation of the current Israel government. The higher levels of support among Gazans is probably due to desire to find a way out of the current war even if the cost is high.

**Figure 17: Support for the combined peace package among Palestinians and Israelis between 2016-2024**



*Items of an agreement.* A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the eleven components of the package follows (non-italicized questions were asked of Israeli Jews and if no other wording appears, also for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Italics refer to the questions worded separately for Palestinians; some of the Palestinian wordings were used for Israeli Arabs). The effects of the war are particularly significant regarding the decline in support for component elements of the two-state package, among Israeli Jews, as seen below.

1. **Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side. 41% of Israeli Jews support this, a 22-point decline from 2022.** Three quarters of Arab Israelis support this (74%).

*Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side.* 36% of Palestinians support mutual recognition and 62% of Israeli Arabs support mutual recognition. Palestinian support stood at 28% in 2022.

2. **The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry).** Only 11% of Palestinians support this item compared to 13% in 2022. Among Israeli Jews, 44% support this item, just a slightly 3-point decline, and among Israeli Arabs 53% support it - notably, a 16-point increase from 2022.
3. **The future Palestinian state will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures. The state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law.** Among the Palestinians, support stands at 40% compared to 33% in 2022. Among Israeli Jews: 60% support this, and 70% of Arab respondents.
4. **A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides.** Among Palestinians, 31% support this component compared to 34% in 2022; Israeli Jews support stands at 43% - a 10-point drop from 2022, and Israeli Arab support at 77% - a twenty-point rise.
5. **The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years.** 28% of Palestinians support this; support is much higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 50% and 13% respectively. In 2022, support for this item stood at 20%. Among Israeli Jews 24% support it, compared to one-third in 2022, and among Israeli Arabs, 61% support this item - once again a rise since 2022.
6. **The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange of similar size. Israel will evacuate all other settlements.** 34% of Palestinians support this (25% among West Bankers and 47% among Gazans). Palestinian support stood at 24% in 2022. 21% of Israeli Jews and 55% of Arabs support it.
7. **West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Just 14% of Jews support this item.**

*East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of the Israel.* 24% of Palestinians support this (16% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip). Palestinian support stood at 16% in 2022. 62% of Israeli Arabs support this item.

8. **In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty.** 13% of Israeli Jews support the Old City arrangement, a 5-point decline.

*In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian quarters and al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty.* 22% of Palestinians support the division of the Old City (13% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip). Palestinian support for this item stood at 16% in 2022. 57% of Israeli Arabs support this.

9. **Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.** 57% of Palestinians support this (52% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip). In 2022, Palestinian support stood at 37%. This item receives the lowest support from Israeli Jews out of all the items tested: just 8% of Jews support the arrangement on refugees, down from 11% in 2022, and among Israeli Arabs 62% support it.
10. **The agreement will include formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides.** Among the Palestinians, support stands at 45% (33% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip). In 2022,

support stood at 34%. Israeli Jews support this item by 35%, down ten points. 69% of Israeli Arabs support this item.

11. **The agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states.** Among the Palestinians, support stands at 46% (38% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip). In 2022, support stood at 35%. 44% of Israeli Jews support this, a 14-point decline, and 71% of Israeli Arabs support it.

*Perception of social support for package.* After considering all the detailed items included in a two-state peace plan and being asked to support or oppose each one, as well as the total package, each side was asked how they perceive the support of majority of their fellow citizens for the two-state package. On both sides, respondents were accurate in their assessment, but the percentage expressing the belief that the majority supports the package is smaller than the percentage that expressed actual support. Only Israeli Arabs were inaccurate in their assessment as the majority expressed much greater optimism than warranted by the actual findings.

Israelis were asked whether they believe the majority of Israeli Jews support or oppose it – just 7% said they believe the majority of Israeli Jews support it, a decline of 50% from 2022 who gave this response. Settlers living in the West Bank showed a lower rate, with just 3% who believe Jewish Israelis support it, also a 50% decline. But a much larger minority of Israeli Arabs, 57%, expressed the view that a majority of Israeli Jews support it. These assessments have declined somewhat from previous surveys since 2016. In 2020, 18% of Jewish Israelis had optimistic impressions compared to 23% in 2018 and 36% before that. However, the perception of majority support is lower than reality; in fact, 25% of Jews support the total two-state package in the current survey – more than three times the portion who believe a majority of Jews support it. In other words, Israeli Jews believe that many fewer people support the package than the rate who support it in reality. In an unusual finding, Jewish Israeli support for the total detailed package is slightly higher than support for the general two-state concept (25% to 21%, respectively), a reversal from previous years in which support for the general idea tended to decline after hearing the details, among Israeli Jews, in most surveys in this series.

When Palestinians were asked if most Palestinians would support the plan, 34% stated that most would support it. This is exactly the percentage of actual support among the Palestinians. In 2022, perception of the Palestinian majority support stood at 25%.


*Regional and demographic trends.* The internal breakdowns of each population show which sub-groups respond differently to the peace plan. Among Palestinians, there are variations in responses primarily by region, political affiliation, levels of religious observance, and age (see Figure 18 below).

- As in previous surveys, Gaza respondents are more supportive of the agreement. 42% of all Gazans supported the peace plan. Among West Bank respondents, 29% supported the plan. It is worth noting that support for the two-state solution concept among Gazans in the current survey is also higher than it is among West Bankers, as indicated earlier. However, while support in the West Bank for the concept of the two-state solution is higher than the support they give to the detailed package, support of Gazans to the concept and the detailed package is almost the same, 42% and 43% respectively.
- Among Fatah supporters, 38% support the package, an 8-point decrease compared to our findings in 2022. Support among Hamas voters rose from 13% in 2022 to 22% in the current poll. The highest support for the package, at 72%, is among the supporters of third parties.
- Support for the package is higher among those who are less religious, and lower among those who are more religious. Among Palestinians who define themselves as “not religious” half (50%) support the package. Support among the religious stands at 33%.



- Young Palestinians between 18 and 22 years of age, which in past surveys were associated with hardline views, show the least level of support for the package than older age groups, 27% and 36% respectively.


**Figure 18: Palestinian support for the combined package based on selected indicators, 2024**



Among Israeli Jews, as shown in Figure 19, the internal breakdowns of the population show variations similar to those related to the general question about a two-state solution. These patterns are consistent over the years, with higher support among the left, low support on the right; higher support among secular Jews, but only a minority who support it among all other more religious groups. As indicated earlier, Arabs in general support the detailed two-state package at a higher rate than Jews (69%).

- A majority of left-wing Jewish Israelis (77%) and 45% of centrists support the total package. Among the right-wing, just 8% supports the detailed package. Similarly, only 8% of settlers support the package.
- The religiosity divide remains strong among Jews: Among seculars, 43% support this, a 9-point decline from 2022, but just 16% among traditionalists (masortim) and fewer among the religious and ultra-orthodox (9% and 2% respectively).
- Consistent with attitudes towards the general two-state solution, there is a significant age gap: 13% of the youngest Jewish Israelis (18-34) support it, and more than twice as many, 40% of Jewish respondents 55 and above support the detailed package.


**Figure 19: Israeli Jewish support for the combined package based on selected indicators, 2024**



*Feasibility - doubts.* Beyond demographic and political differences that typically characterize those who support or oppose the two-state solution and the detailed package, background attitudes are also clearly linked to support. The perception of viability is important. Among Israelis who believe that the **two-state solution is still viable**, 68% support the two-state solution; among those who think it is not viable due to political developments and settlement spread, only 11% support it. Similarly, as shown in Figure 20, the perception of viability is also clearly linked to support or opposition to the detailed package for a two-state solution: 63% of Israelis who believe the solution to be feasible, also support the package, but just 14% of those who think this solution is no longer viable.

Among the Palestinians who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 46% support the package declining to 27% among those who believe it is no longer viable. Nonetheless, the fact that a majority of those who think this package remains feasible is still opposed to it demonstrates the hardline attitudes among the Palestinians in the current poll.

**Figure 20: Support for the peace package linked to feasibility of the two-state solution (TSS), 2024**



## (5) ONE-SIDED and PAIRED incentives

As in our 2022 and 2020 joint poll, the current survey includes an experiment that aimed at testing the value of incentives. The experiment was conducted in two versions, one in which the incentives were paired, one component for one side and a second component for the other side, and one in which the incentives were one-sided. Half the sample was offered the paired incentives while the other half was offered the one-sided incentives. The incentives, paired and unpaired, were offered to the respondents regardless of their support or opposition to the peace package. As one would expect, the one-sided incentives did much better in changing the attitudes of both sides when compared to the change produced by the paired incentives.


### 1. ONE-SIDED incentives:

In the current poll, we went back to the original one-sided incentives in order to assess attitudinal change over the past several years by the compare findings with those obtained during the early years of the Pulse. The purpose of this exercise is to assess the extent of reversibility of hardline attitudes if certain conditions are met. The incentives listed below for each side are identical to those offered to that side in the paired incentives minus the price paid in return for receiving them. As indicated above, they were offered to half the sample, those who did not answer the paired incentive questions; they were also offered to those who supported and those who opposed the peace package. The current findings continue to demonstrate the highly positive role played by such incentives but they also show important negative differences that recent developments might have highlighted, particularly those related to security.

**Among the Palestinians:** The following list of ONE-SIDED incentives were offered to the Palestinian side

1. Israel will agree to end its military presence in the territories of the Palestinian state: 54% of all respondents indicated more willingness to support the peace package and 45% indicated less willingness to support it.
2. The state of Israel will agree to combat incitement against Palestine and if necessary, make changes in school textbooks to remove any such incitement, and to call for tolerance and reconciliation and to fight against violence: 44% of all respondents indicated more willingness to support the peace package and 54% indicated less willingness to support it.
3. Israel will allow an agreed number of Palestinian laborers to continue to work in Israel if they wish to do so: 65% of all respondents indicated more willingness to support the peace package and 34% indicated less willingness to support it.
4. The State of Israel acknowledges the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine: 50% of all respondents indicated more willingness to support the peace package and 50% indicated less willingness to support it.
5. Palestinian refugees in camps and in the Palestinian state will receive monetary compensation as well as homes and land in their country of residence that will allow them to be settled and rehabilitated: 54% of all respondents indicated more willingness to support the peace package and 44% indicated less willingness to support it.
6. Israel will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners after the full implementation of the agreement: 66% of all respondents indicated more willingness to support the peace package and 32% indicated less willingness to support it.

**Figure 21: Palestinian support and opposition for the peace package: original or baseline support opposition and after each ONE-SIDED incentive**



The average net portion of those Palestinians who changed from rejection to support is relatively high, standing at 43%, with significantly less variation in response to the different incentives. The

following table summarizes the change generated by the ONE-SIDED incentives for those Palestinians who opposed the peace package and those who supported that package:

	<b>Those who Opposed the 2- state peace package</b>	<b>Those who Supported the 2- state peace package</b>
	Now, <b>more likely</b> to support it	Now, <b>less likely</b> to support it
1. Israel carries out full military withdrawal	<b>43%</b>	<b>25%</b>
2. Israel combats incitement	<b>30%</b>	<b>28%</b>
3. Israel allows Palestinian laborers to continue to work	<b>54%</b>	<b>11%</b>
4. Historic links, character, and equal rights:	<b>37%</b>	<b>27%</b>
5. Palestinian refugees compensated and receive homes and lands in Palestine	<b>40%</b>	<b>18%</b>
6. Israel releases Palestinian prisoners	<b>55%</b>	<b>11%</b>

**Among the Israelis:** The following list of ONE-SIDED incentives were offered to the Israeli side. From the list of unilateral incentives, once again the issue of changing textbook incitement is still the strongest, but by a minimal margin - all incentives caused a majority of Israeli Jews to say it would make them more likely to support an agreement.

The Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation with Israeli security forces: 57% of Jewish Israelis say this would make them more likely to support an agreement in total, compared to 43% who said it would make them less likely.

The state of Palestine will agree to combat incitement against Israel and if necessary, make changes in school textbooks to remove any such incitement, and to call for tolerance and reconciliation and to fight against violence: 60% of Jewish Israelis said this would make them more likely to support an agreement, and 40% less likely.


Palestine will allow Israeli factories to continue operating in its territory if they wish to do so. 52% of Jewish Israelis would be more likely to support an agreement with this condition, and 48% less likely.

The Palestinian state recognizes Israel as the state of the Jewish people while affirming equal rights for the Arab citizens of Israel: 59% of Jewish Israelis say this made them more likely to support an agreement; 41% less likely.

Jews who had to leave Arab countries following the establishment of the state of Israel will receive monetary compensation: 56% of Jews say this made them more likely to support an agreement, and 44% less likely.

Palestinian leadership will commit to consolidating all armed factions into one single security force while disarming any other faction: 51% more likely, and 49% less likely.

**Figure 22: Israeli Jewish support and opposition for the peace package: original or baseline support opposition and after each ONE-SIDED incentive**



The following table summarizes the change generated by the ONE-SIDED incentives for those Israeli Jews who opposed the peace package and those who supported that package:

	Those who Opposed the 2-state peace package	Those who Supported the 2-state peace package
	Now, <b>more likely</b> to support it	Now, <b>less likely</b> to support it
1. Palestine ongoing security cooperation	<b>41%</b>	<b>10%</b>
2. Palestine combats incitement in textbooks	<b>46%</b>	<b>12%</b>
3. Israeli factories keep operating in territory	<b>37%</b>	<b>18%</b>
4. Palestine recognizes Israel/Jewish people:	<b>46%</b>	<b>16%</b>
5. Jews from Arab countries - compensation	<b>46%</b>	<b>18%</b>
6. Palestine consolidate armed factions, disarm others	<b>34%</b>	<b>12%</b>

## 2. Paired incentives:

For the paired incentives, we separately paired some of the reciprocal incentives in order to determine their benefits as well as the harm they might cause to the support for the peace package. In the first four surveys of the *Pulse*, during 2016-2017 period, most of the incentives proposed were developed specifically for one side or the other. To offset the possibility that an incentive for one side, such as the zero-sum, or one-sided measures, might alienate the other side, in the June 2018 and September 2020 and December 2022 surveys, and in the current one we paired incentives to show a combination of reciprocal costs and benefits to each side. The incentives were paired based in part on the priorities attached to them by the two publics, drawing on six items, representing some of the top-ranked incentives from the previous surveys of the *Pulse*. All six of the current pairs were tested in 2022 and were relatively successful among Israelis but were met with limited success among the Palestinians.

Respondents were asked directly if these pairs – an incentive to their own side coupled with a benefit to the other side – raised or lowered their support for an agreement. All respondents were asked these questions, not only those who rejected the agreement. The goal was to see whether, in a real situation



where people are likely to learn of all benefits/incentives offered to all sides, respondents of either disposition would switch: would supporters defect and oppose an agreement, would rejectionists possibly switch towards support? And for those who had not made up their mind, could the mutual incentives convince them to support an agreement, or push them to oppose it?

The following is the list of pairs tested:

**1. Security cooperation and Israeli military presence:** The Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation with Israeli security forces, and Israel in return will agree to end its military presence in the territories of the Palestinian state

**2. Combat incitement:** The state of Palestine and the state of Israel will agree to combat incitement against the other and if necessary, make changes in school textbooks to remove any such incitement, and to call for tolerance and reconciliation and to fight against violence

**3. Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories:** Israel will allow an agreed number of Palestinian laborers to continue to work in Israel if they wish to do so, and Palestine will allow Israeli factories to continue operating in its territory if they wish to do so

**4. Historic links, character, and equal rights:** State of Israel acknowledges the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine and recognition by the Palestinian state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people while affirming equal rights for the Arab citizens of Israel

**5. Jews from Arab countries and homes and lands to refugees:** Jews who had to leave Arab countries following the establishment of the state of Israel will receive monetary compensation; Palestinian refugees in camps and in the Palestinian state will receive monetary compensation as well as homes and land in their country of residence that will allow them to be settled and rehabilitated

**6. Palestinian prisoners and one security force:** Israel will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners after the full implementation of the agreement, and Palestinian leadership will commit to consolidating all armed factions into one single security force while disarming any other faction

Since all respondents, both those who supported the package and those who opposed it, received these questions, those who said the item raised their support but who already supported the initial agreement were set aside, and the same for those who were initially opposed and remained opposed following the incentive question. Focusing on those who switched sides, we then calculated new levels of predicted support following each pair.

Comparing just those who opposed the plan in the current survey, the average responses for the paired, mutual incentives is as follows:

**Among Israeli Jews**, respondents displayed wide variation in their assessment of the incentive pairs. Broadly speaking, those who opposed the detailed two-state peace package at the start reacted in similar ways to those who supported the two-state peace package: The strongest incentive pairs, those that were most successful in convincing the opposition camp, were also the least likely to cause supporters of the initial plan to defect.

Among those opposed to the detailed peace package, among Israeli Jews, the incentive of combatting incitement and changing textbooks if needed – in both the Palestinian and Israeli state – was the most attractive to the opposition respondents: almost half (49%) said it made them more likely to support a peace plan, although this is a decline since 2022 when nearly six-in-ten gave this response.. A relatively low segment of the initial supporters would defect based on this condition, 11%, but this is more than double the potential defection since 2022, another sign of the negative impact of the war on attitudes, since more supporters of a peace plan are less firmly committed. However, the strong preference for the incentive regarding removing incitement in Palestinian textbooks has consistently been the strongest incentive for Israeli Jews to change their mind towards supporting an agreement, and this trend continues.

From a measure viewed as highly symbolic, the next most successful incentive pair addressed Israeli security needs, by stating that the Palestinians will continue security cooperation, while Israel will remove its military presence in the Palestinian areas (30% of Jewish Israeli respondents who were initially opposed were more likely to support a deal). Two items were almost tied for the third-ranked, with approximately one-quarter of those opposed who said the paired item made them more likely to support an agreement: allowing Israeli factories to remain inside the West Bank, while allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel (26%) and another symbolic measures: mutual recognition of the national, religious and historic links between each group and the land (24%). The paired incentive of compensation for Jews who left Arab countries and compensation for Palestinian refugees caused 19% of Israeli Jews opposed to a solution to change their mind, but the concession towards refugees generated a backlash against the agreement from those originally supported it: 36% of those said they would be less likely to support an agreement. But the least successful paired incentive was the proposal for Israel to release all Palestinian prisoners, while the Palestinian leadership would consolidate armed factions and disarm all others. This reflects a prevailing Israeli fear of releasing Palestinian prisoners, a concept that has stable support only in the context of hostage release. Over half of the original supporters of an agreement would be less likely to support it in light of this pair.

The following table summarizes the change generated by paired incentives for those Israeli Jews who opposed the peace package and those who supported that package:

	<b>Those who Opposed the 2-state peace package</b>	<b>Those who Supported the 2-state peace package</b>
	Now, <b>more likely</b> to support it	Now, <b>less likely</b> to support it
1. Security cooperation and Israeli military presence	<b>30%</b>	<b>34%</b>
2. Combat incitement	<b>49%</b>	<b>11%</b>
3. Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories	<b>26%</b>	<b>14%</b>
4. Historic links, character, and equal rights:	<b>24%</b>	<b>36%</b>
5. Jews from Arab countries and homes and lands to refugees	<b>19%</b>	<b>36%</b>
6. Palestinian prisoners and one security force	<b>6%</b>	<b>56%</b>

Thus overall, an average of 26% Israeli Jews changed their minds from rejection of the full package to support based on the incentive pairs, but this average contains wide deviation among the different items offered. The average represents a decline of 4 points from 2022, which is notable but smaller than the decline of 15 points between 2020 and 2022.

**Among Palestinians**, the average portion of those who changed from rejection to support is just 26%, with significantly less variation in response to the different incentives. In 2020, 21% and in 2022, 12% made the switch from rejection to support based on incentive pairs.

The following table summarizes the change generated by the incentive pairs for those Palestinians who opposed the peace package and those who supported that package:


	<b>Those who Opposed the 2-state peace package</b>	<b>Those who Supported the 2-state peace package</b>
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	Now, <b>more likely</b> to support it	Now, <b>less likely</b> to support it
1. Security cooperation and Israeli military presence	<b>21%</b>	<b>33%</b>
2. Combat incitement	<b>22%</b>	<b>42%</b>
3. Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories	<b>41%</b>	<b>21%</b>
4. Historic links, character, and equal rights:	<b>16%</b>	<b>45%</b>
5. Jews from Arab countries and homes and lands to refugees	<b>29%</b>	<b>36%</b>
6. Palestinian prisoners and one security force	<b>27%</b>	<b>30%</b>

This finding reflects the fact that each side is offered a benefit but it comes packaged together with an item for the other side, a quid pro quo which is apparently viewed as a significant concession to the other side and dampens enthusiasm compared to the original incentives. At the same time, the fact that on both sides and for each incentive-pair, some portion of opposition switched to support means that there is some potential.

Therefore, the next valuable comparison is the original level of support in the current survey, or baseline support and opposition, for the permanent status package, among the two societies, compared to the new levels of support following each pair. In other words, the analysis below calculated all defections from support to opposition, along with switchers from opposition to support, to determine the new levels of support or opposition. The graphs in Figure 17 show the findings for the Israeli Jewish side.

**Figure 23: Israeli Jewish support and opposition for the peace package: original or baseline support and opposition and after each PAIRED incentive, 2024**



**On the Israeli side**, as in the previous two surveys in 2020 and 2022, the shift to more support among the opposition and defections among supporters based on the pairs ultimately shows a fairly successful set of incentives, measured by the finding that five of the six pairs tested generated higher levels of overall support (those who said the item raised their support for the current plan, when those

originally opposed were added to the original supporters), among Israeli Jews – see Figure 17. Support for the detailed plan stood at 25%, and, the least successful pair caused a deficit – meaning that more people turned against it than those who changed their mind in support; this was the incentive pair regarding the release of Palestinian prisoners while Palestinians consolidate military forces. However, of the five that caused a greater net support, one of them generated a net absolute majority of 61% who supported the total package (removing incitement from textbooks mutually); this one also generated the lowest opposition, with a net 39%, significantly lower than the baseline opposition (65%).

As in 2020 and 2022, the second most effective pair was the notion that Israeli owned factories could remain in the new Palestinian state, while Palestinian workers would be allowed to continue coming to Israel – though at a lower rate than in 2022, when 60% of all Israeli Jews to say it made them more likely to support the plan; in 2024 just 41% of all Jewish respondents said it raised their support. In 2020, 71% said this paired incentive made them more likely to support the peace package. This item also caused the net support to shift to 41%, relative to the 25% baseline; still, nearly 60% opposed the package.


The pair containing symbolic and non-symbolic incentives, involving Israeli recognition of Palestinian historic and religious attachment to the land, Palestinian recognition of Israel’s Jewish character, and assertion of equal rights for Israeli Arabs brought total support up nearly ten points to 34%, but not a majority among Israeli Jews; however, the pair that ensured continued security cooperation but called for the Israeli army’s withdrawal from the Palestinian state caused net support to rise to 39% (from 25%), with 61% opposed.

The pair in which Israeli Jews from Arab countries were compensated for lost property while Palestinian refugees were provided with financial compensation as well as homes and lands in the country of their permanent residence raised overall support to 31%. The pair that required Israel to release Palestinian security prisoners while requiring the Palestinian side to have monopoly over force in the future state caused total net support to drop to 16% among Israeli Jews, with 84% in total now opposed to a deal with these added terms.

**Among Palestinians**, unlike the findings in 2022, the current *Pulse* shows greater effectiveness in successfully changing the attitudes of Palestinians as five out of six pairs proved effective, as shown in the figure below in increasing support for the package from the baseline of 34%. This outcome indicates significant softening of Palestinian attitudes as only two of these pairs were successful in 2022.


This outcome indicates significant hardening of Palestinian attitudes as the three pairs that were tested in 2020 and in the current experiment produced less success compared to two years ago: mutually combating incitement, Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories, and security cooperation and Israeli army withdrawal. As indicated earlier, total support for the package stood at 26%. While all three repeat pairs produced tangible gains in 2020 beyond the baseline, only one, laborers and factories, added more support beyond the baseline, adding 5-points to the baseline (compared to 18-points in 2020). The second successful pair proposed, Palestinian prisoners and Palestinian unification of armed forces, raised the baseline by 1-point only. All other pairs failed to increase support. In fact, four did the opposite, diminishing support to the package to 13%, a 13-point drop, in the least successful pair, the one linking settlers to Palestinian refugees

**Figure 24: Palestinian support and opposition for the peace package: original or baseline support opposition and after each PAIRED incentive**



It is worth pointing out, as shown in figure 25 below, that the most successful pair for the Palestinians, laborers and factories, is the second most successful for the Israelis as can be seen in the comparative figure below. The greatest level of polarization is produced by the two pairs on combating incitement and the release of prisoners/consolidation of Palestinian armed forces, as it increases the gap in support between the two sides from 9-points, in the baseline, to 27 and 26 points respectively.


**Figure 25: Palestinian and Israeli Jewish support for the package: baseline support and after each PAIRED incentive, 2024**



### Conclusions regarding incentives:


A comparison between the Palestinian responses to two sets of incentives, the one-sided and the paired, as shown below, show significant variations. None of the one-sided incentives led to a reduced level of support compared to the baseline while two of the paired incentives either failed to improve the baseline or led to a reduced level of support. Despite the fact that the gap is widest between the one-sided incentive of the release of Palestinian prisoners and the paired incentive which adds the cost of unifying the Palestinian security forces, these two are in fact among the most successful of all, paired or unpaired. The least successful unpaired incentive, Israeli measures against incitement, shows the narrowest gap with its relevant paired incentive, with the added cost of Palestinian measures against incitement.

**Figure 26: How Palestinians responded to PAIRED vs. ONE-SIDED incentives, 2024** (% of net support after additions and defections from baseline support)



The same pattern can be seen when examining the Israeli findings. In general, the unilateral incentives regarding Palestinian actions to raise support for the peace package are significantly more successful than the paired incentives representing both an incentive and a concession. In a highly consistent finding, the issue of combating incitement is the most successful in either the unilateral or the paired version, although since unilateral incentives were stronger in general, several other incentives achieved a similar level of support when those convinced by the incentive were added to baseline support.

**Figure 27: How Israeli Jews responded to paired vs. one-sided incentives, 2024** (% of net support after additions and defections from baseline support)




## (6) Confidence building measures

We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about their support for a list containing confidence building measures that the Palestinian and the Israeli sides can jointly take to improve the Palestinian-Israeli environment and promote healthy conditions for a resumption of viable peace negotiations:

1. A permanent ceasefire in Gaza in return for the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners: 87% of the Palestinians support this measure and 12% oppose it. Arab Israeli respondents showed a similar response rate, with 80% who support this and 16 who oppose it. By contrast, just 41% of Israeli Jews support this, and the plurality, 47%, are opposed.
2. A newly elected Israeli government declares its commitment to a two-state solution as the only mean to end the conflict; and a newly elected unified Palestinian government declares its commitment to two-state solution as the only mean to end the conflict: 56% of the Palestinians support it and 42% oppose it. Again, Jewish Israelis are mostly opposed: 31% support this and 56% are opposed. Nearly three-quarters of Arab Israelis, 73%, support this.
3. Israel arrests settlers suspected of violence or killing of Palestinians, or of property destruction, and those found guilty are given significant jail sentences; and a new Palestinian leadership disavows violence against Israeli civilians, including condemning such violence on October 7: 45% of the Palestinians support it and 51% oppose it. In a similar pattern to Palestinians, 40% of Israeli Jews support this, and 51% oppose it. Once again 70% of Arab respondents support this.
4. Palestinians will stop going to the International Criminal Court and Israel will allow the PA to build new communities in Area C of the West Bank: 36% of the Palestinians support it and 61% oppose it. Among Israeli Jews, this item had the lowest support, just 22%. This likely reflects widespread Jewish Israeli rejection of the ICC's legitimacy in general, as seen in other findings in this survey, which therefore weakens the incentive factor of Palestinians ceasing their claims in that court. However, Israeli Jews are also likely responding to the measure of allowing Palestinians to build in Area C. Arab respondents were somewhat less enthusiastic about this measure, with 57% who support it, 19% who were opposed, and one-quarter who gave a "don't know" response.

In other words, among Palestinians, two of the measures examined received a majority support while the other two received limited support. On the other hand, among Israeli Jews, two measures received moderate support, but still faced more opposition: a ceasefire/hostage release deal (41%) and Palestinian disavowal of violence, including October 7, alongside Israeli apprehending violent settlers (40%).

Figure 28: support for confidence building measures among Palestinians and Israeli Jews





Among Palestinians, the support for CBMs in general is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, with the exception of the one on the recommitment to the two-state solution where support is similar in both areas. Support is higher among Hamas supporters in all but the one on two-state solution where Fatah supporters are slightly more likely to support it. Supporters of third parties, or others, show the highest level of support for all four CBMs. Religiosity plays almost no role in three out of the four CBMs. The somewhat religious show greater support than the religious on the recommitment to the two-state solution. Finally, age show limited variation, with a little more support among those whose age is 40 years or higher for the ICC and area C measure. All other measures receive similar support from both sides.

Table 1:

**Palestinian support for each of the CBMs based on selected indicators**

	<b>West Bank</b>	<b>Gaza Strip</b>		<b>Fatah</b>	<b>Hamas</b>	<b>Others</b>	<b>Undecided</b>
<b>ICC and area C</b>	30%	45%		33%	38%	62%	29%
<b>Permanent ceasefire, hostage/prisoner release, withdrawal of forces</b>	87%	88%		80%	88%	91%	90%
<b>New Isrl &amp; Pal gov'ts commit to two states</b>	55%	56%		56%	54%	74%	62%
<b>Israel arrests/convicts setter suspects, Pals disavow violence</b>	40%	52%		44%	45%	57%	44%

	<b>Religious</b>	<b>somewhat religious</b>	<b>not religious</b>		<b>18-39</b>	<b>40 +</b>
<b>ICC and area C</b>	35%	35%	48%		34%	38%
<b>Permanent ceasefire, hostage/prisoner release, withdrawal of forces</b>	90%	87%	74%		88%	86%
<b>New Isrl &amp; Pal gov'ts commit to two states</b>	50%	60%	43%		56%	54%
<b>Israel arrests/convicts setter suspects, Pals disavow violence</b>	46%	45%	47%		44%	46%

Table 2: Israeli support for each of the CBMs based on selected indicators

	Israeli Jews	Settlers	Israeli Arabs	Left	Center	Right
ICC and area C	23%	11%	57%	71%	40%	9%
Permanent ceasefire, hostage/prisoner release, withdrawal of forces	45%	25%	80%	91%	62%	27%
New Isrl & Pal gov'ts commit to two states	32%	13%	73%	84%	55%	15%
Israel arrests/convicts setter suspects, Pals disavow violence	41%	27%	70%	86%	66%	22%

	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Haredi	18-34	55+
ICC and area C	40%	10%	7%	6%	14%	41%
Permanent ceasefire, hostage/prisoner release, withdrawal of forces	57%	39%	18%	12%	34%	52%
New Isrl & Pal gov'ts commit to two states	52%	18%	15%	2%	20%	46%
Israel arrests/convicts setter suspects, Pals disavow violence	62%	29%	19%	13%	28%	66%

## (7) Diplomacy and negotiations:

In this section, we explore attitudes regarding the prospects for an agreed diplomatic resolution to the conflict, the extent to which newly elected governments on both sides can and should enter final status negotiations, and the role, if any, that Marwan Barghouti, the Fatah leader who is now serving several life sentences in an Israeli jail, can play in peace making. The findings show that majorities on both sides are opposed to a return to peace negotiations.

**Diplomatic vs. military path:** Given the consistent and unambiguous decline in support for all forms of agreed political resolution of the conflict (setting aside the growth in support for unilateral dominance of one side, which would not happen by a political agreement), we sought to step back and assess whether the public on each side believes there is any agreed diplomatic resolution to solve the conflict, or whether the only solution is military force. The aim was to assess whether Israelis and Palestinians believe that a negotiation process is even capable of reaching a permanent status agreement between the two sides, regardless of the specific political design.

We therefore asked the Palestinians about their views on whether there is a diplomatic or a military way out of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and about their perception of the majority views on this issue among the Israelis. The Palestinians are evenly divided on the diplomatic way, 48% agree that such a way does indeed exist while another 48% disagree. Here too Gazans are more optimistic with 60%, compared to 39% among West Bankers, thinking that such a way exists. But when asked about the military way out of the conflict, a majority of Palestinians, 61%, with minor differences between West Bankers and Gazans, agree that such a way exists; only 34% disagree.


When asked about their perception of the views of Israelis on these issues, Palestinians were divided, with 49% expressing the view that the majority of the Israelis think a diplomatic way exists and 46% who disagreed that Israelis believe in a diplomatic path. When asked about the military way, a majority, 59% of Palestinians, disagreed that Israelis believe in the military path, and 35% agreed that Israelis believe there is a military solution. It is worth noting that 71% of Gazans, compared to 51% of West Bankers, disagree with the statement that a majority of Israelis believe a military solution exists.

Israeli Jews are fairly pessimistic about the prospects of a diplomatic path out of the conflict through a political agreement, with just 31% who agree; still this is more than double the number who self-define as left wing (12% among Jews, 20% of the total population), meaning that many who are not self-defined leftists still support diplomacy and a political agreement to end the conflict. Among all Israeli left-wingers, 83% agree that there is a diplomatic path, but also 52% of centrists (although only 43% of centrists currently support a two-state solution). In a consistent pattern regarding high support for peace in most indicators, 71% of Arab Israelis agree that there is a diplomatic path.

However, more than double the number of Israeli Jews believe in the military path as the portion who believe in diplomacy: 63% (compared to 31% for diplomacy). One-quarter of Jewish Israelis (26%) disagree that there is a military solution as the only way out; but just 15% of Arab Israelis agree with the military path.

Israeli Jews are significantly less likely to see Palestinians as believing in the diplomatic path, than Palestinians assessment of Israelis. Only 15% of Israeli Jews believe Palestinians believe in the diplomatic path, compared to 62% of Israeli Arabs. Over half of Jewish Israelis (53%) see Palestinians as believing only in a military solution, while 29% disagree. Among Arabs, 22% believe Palestinians think there is only a military solution, but a large portion, nearly 30%, do not know.

Figure (29): **Palestinians and Israeli views on the role of diplomacy vs. violence**




**An elected government and peacemaking:** A majority of 59% of the Palestinians (63% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) say that if the Palestinians elect a new leadership, the elected government will not have the capacity to reach and implement a peace agreement with Israel; only 37% think it definitely or probably will have the capacity to do so. A majority of Israelis concur with the Palestinian majority view: 70% believe that a new Palestinian government will not be able to reach and implement peace, including 79% of Jews, and one-third of Arabs respondents. Just 17% of Israelis in total believe that the Palestinian elected government will have the capacity to reach peace (10% of Jews, and nearly half of the Arab respondents, 46%).

When asked if the newly elected government should try to reach a final status agreement with Israelis to resolve the Israeli Palestinian conflict, even if it means Palestinians will make some compromises, the Palestinians were divided: a majority of Gazans (57%), compared to one third of West Bankers, thinks it definitely or probably should. In total, a majority of 54% said it definitely or probably should not and 43% said it should. It is worth noting that even among Fatah likely voters, the majority (57%) remains opposed to the resumption of negotiations and making compromises. But it is a slightly smaller majority compared to that of Hamas' likely voters (60%). Israeli Arab respondents were also asked this question, as the figure below indicates, support for the resumption of negotiations is identical to the one we found among Gazans, 57%.


Figure (30): **Support for the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under a newly elected Palestinian government (% , Definitely + Probably should)**

*If Palestinians elect a new government, should it try to reach a political final status agreement to resolve the Israeli Palestinian conflict even it means Palestine will make some compromises*



Among Israelis, only the Jewish population was asked if a newly elected government should try to reach a final status solution in order to resolve the conflict, even if this means making compromises; 31% of Israeli Jews said it definitely or probably should seek such a solution, ten points higher than those who support a two-state solution in principle (21%); however, a majority of 61% said probably or definitely not. Not surprisingly, this response was heavily differentiated by ideological self-identification, with variations for every gradation on the left to right scale – indicating a fundamentally different world view and aims for the future. It is important to note that on this more general question regarding the vision of reaching a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, rather than the specific question of a two-state solution, the majority in favor characterizes both the left and the center (52% in total support this aim), with a sharp drop off among even the moderate right-wing – fewer than one in five of that group support this aim.

Figure (31): **Israeli Jews: Newly elected Israeli government should try to reach final status resolution, with compromises (% , Definitely + Probably should)**




Thus, in total, Israeli Jews and Palestinians express opposition to a new government prioritizing a political final status resolution that includes compromise.

**Barghouti and peace negotiations with Israel:** Asked if Marwan Barghouti is released by Israel and he becomes the elected president of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, do you think he should enter negotiations to achieve a peace agreement with the state of Israel, half of the Palestinians (48%) said he should while the other half (48%) said he should not. Once again, the gap in attitude between Gazans and West Bankers is wide: 58% of Gazans said he should while only 42% of West Bankers said the same.

Among Israelis, there is little indication that Barghouti represents a symbol of peacemaking, though attitudes are fundamentally opposed between Jewish and Arab respondents. Since he has been in Israeli prison for about 20 years, the question reminded Israelis briefly about his identity, as a former negotiator later jailed for his role in attacks against Israelis; and asked if they support or oppose Israel releasing Barghouti in order to replace Mahmoud Abbas as president, if he commits to leading a peace process with Israel. Just 12% of Jewish Israelis support releasing him and fully 88% were opposed, leaving little room for significant variations. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of Arab respondents in Israel supported his release. Among Arabs, there is a slight variation by age – among the 18-34 year old group, 64% supported his release, compared to nearly 80% among those 35 and up; this could reflect less awareness or symbolism of his identity for the younger age group.

Figure (32): **Palestinian and Israeli perception of the role of Barghouti in peace making**



## (8) Conflict experiences:

**Worry and Fear:** Most Palestinians (78%, compared to 60% in November 2022) expressed worry and fear that they or a member of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished or that they would be expelled or prevented from reaching their land behind the separation barrier or wall; 21% expressed little or no worry.


In the current survey, 52% of Israeli Jews said they “greatly or very greatly” “fear being harmed by a Palestinian terror attack, rocket fire or war,” a moderate decline from 2022 (61%). 48% responded that they share this concern only a little or not at all. However, these findings are still higher than in 2020 when only 42% said they were worried.

**Experiencing conflict-related violence:** A majority among Palestinian participants (58%) said they have witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict once (21%) or more than once (37%). A majority of 52% indicated that they have been hurt in violent incidents related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at least once, with the percentage in the Gaza Strip standing at 55%; 48% indicated they have not been hurt. When asked how often a family member has been hurt in such incidents, 68% said once (22%), few times (25%) or several times (21%). The percentage in the Gaza Strip is much higher than that in the West Bank for those having a family member killed or injured at least once, 89% and 54% respectively.

We asked the Jewish-Israeli side about witnessing of casualties related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are considerable differences between Jewish settlers and non-settlers regarding the question of being hurt in such incidents. As shown in Figure 33, 33% of non-settler Jews in total reported they have witnessed injuries or deaths related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict once (15%) or more than once (18%), while nearly half (48%) of settlers have witnessed such casualties once (17%) or more than once (31%). Compared to Palestinians, fewer non-settler Jews were exposed to conflict-related violence, while settlers – who are the immediate neighbors of Palestinians – still have not witnessed conflict related injuries or death at the same rate. It is worth noting that while the percentage of Palestinians who witnessed injuries and deaths many times is 19%, the equivalent percentage among the settlers is 7%, and among Israeli non-settler Jews 2%. When asked how often a close family member has been hurt in conflict-related incidents, 24% said either once (16%), few times (7%) or several times (1%).

Figure (33): **Palestinians, settlers, and non-settler Jews who personally experienced or personally witnessed injuries or deaths related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict**

*“Have you personally experienced or personally witnessed injuries or deaths”*



## **(9) How Israelis and Palestinians view each other and trust levels:**

We asked the two sides about the aspiration of the other side in the current war in addition to a separate question about the long-term aspirations of both its own side and those of the other side. We also asked about how each side evaluates its own side's humanity and that of the other side. The survey also explored trust levels and probed the extent of zero-sum beliefs about the nature of the conflict, who owns the land, and perception of victimhood. The overall findings show a marked decline in perceptions of the other and in the level of trust.

### **1. Aspirations of the two sides in the current war and for the long-term:**

We asked the Palestinians about the aspirations of Israel in the *current war* in the Gaza Strip since October 7. The vast majority (88%) attributed maximalist and genocidal aspirations to Israel, with 61% selecting "to commit genocide against us," and 27% selecting "to conquer our land and expel the people." Only 8% selected "to conquer our land without expelling people," and 2% selected "to defend itself and regain security."

Among Israeli Jews, when asked about Palestinian aims on October 7 and in the current war, there is a sweeping consensus among Israeli Jews ascribing the most extreme aims to Palestinians – close to a mirror image of the Palestinian responses to the parallel question. Two-thirds of Israeli Jews (66%) believe the Palestinians' aim on October 7 and the ensuing war was to commit genocide. Over one-quarter, 27%, of Israeli Jews believe the aim is to conquer land and expel the people – 93% in total. Just 7% in total, in a near-even breakdown, believed the Palestinian aim was to defend itself, or to conquer land without expelling people.

We also asked about the long-term aspirations of the Israelis and the Palestinians. The findings show similarities to those obtained in 2022. When asked in the current poll about their views on the *long-term* aspirations of the state of Israel, Palestinians attributed to it extreme and maximalist goals, with 82% (compared to 85% in 2022) selecting the two extreme goals: 64% (compared to 53% in 2022) selected "extending the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expelling its Arab citizens," and 18% (compared to 25% in 2022) selected "annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinian citizens." Only 17% selected moderate Israeli goals: 9% selected "withdrawal from part of the territories it occupied after guaranteeing its security," and 8% selected "withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security."

Surprisingly, despite the current war in the Gaza Strip, the current poll, like the previous poll, finds Gazans more likely than West Bankers to attribute moderate goals to Israel, 29% and 8% respectively. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to attribute maximalist goals to Israel, 88% and 71% respectively.

When asked about their views on the long-term aspirations of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, the current poll shows similar findings to those obtained in 2022. In the current poll, selecting from four options, 47% (compared to 37% in 2022) selected the two moderate views, the regaining some (26%, identical to that of 2022) or all (21% compared to 25% in 2022) territories conquered in the 1967 war and 40% (compared to only 37% in 2022) selected the other two, conquer the state of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine (14% compared to 13% in 2022) and conquer the state of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (26% compared to 24% in 2022); 12% in the current poll said they do not know. In the current poll, while only about a third (32%) of West Bankers select the more hardline and extreme view, a majority of 55% of Gazans selected that same view. This is similar to the 2022 findings when 30% of West Bankers, compared to 46% of Gazans, selected the hardline view.



In December 2022, one-quarter (26%) of Israeli Jews believed the Palestinians' main long-term aspiration was to take over the entire state of Israel from pre-'48 borders. This portion has dropped in half, to 13%; correspondingly, the portion who believe Palestinians hold the most extreme position – that they want to conquer Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population, rose from 40% to 64%. In total, in 2022 nearly two-thirds of Israeli Jews believed Palestinians hold one of these maximalist positions. In 2024, over three-quarters of Israeli Jews in total believe that Palestinians hold one of the two most extreme aims. Only 13% in total believe that Palestinians hold moderate aims of retaking some or all of the territories Israel captured in 1967.

Also in 2022, 42% of Israeli Jews assessed their own side, Israel, as holding one of two maximalist goals (a significant rise from just one-third of Israeli Jews, in 2017): either annexing all of the West Bank and expelling the Palestinians (18%) or annexing it without giving rights to the Palestinians there (24%). Interestingly, in 2024, these findings have not changed significantly: 41% of Israeli Jews name one those two extreme aims. However, the positions of the lesser and more extreme options are reversed: at present, one-quarter (24%) say that Israel's aim is to annex all the land and expel Palestinians, while 17% say the aim is to annex the land without giving full rights.

By contrast, over twice as many Arab respondents in Israel believe that Palestinians aspire to one of the two moderate aims – retaking part of the '67 territories (15%) or all of them (28%) – in total, 43%, compared to just 21% in total who ascribe the extremist aspirations to Palestinians.

## **2. De-humanizing the other side:**

Seeking to understand the whether each side is able to humanize the other, or whether dehumanization is prominent among the two populations, we asked Palestinians and Israelis to select a number from 0 to 100 in which they can locate the level of humanity on their side and that of the other side. De-humanizing the other is a well-documented index of perceptions enabling parties to take violent actions, even in its most extreme forms against their rival group.

The results show one of the most symmetrical mirror images – each side almost completely dehumanizes the other, and completely humanizes itself. This is another indication of mutual zero-sum attitudes not only towards the conflict but at the human level. When characterizing their side, 83% of the Palestinians selected the number 80 or higher and 17% selected numbers less than 80. On average, Palestinians gave themselves a score of 88 out of 100 on the humanity scale. When characterizing the Israeli side, only 1% selected the number 80 or higher; 71% selected the number 0 and 27% selected a number between 1 and 50. On average, Palestinians gave Israeli Jews a score of 6 out of 100 on the humanity scale.

Similarly, among Israeli Jews, 80% chose a score of 80 or higher, in assessing the humanity of their own side, and 41% gave Jewish Israelis the top score of 100. The average score of Israeli Jews for Israeli Jews' humanity level was 87 (from 0-100). There were only minor variations on this question, with more settlers who gave Jews the top score (56%), compared to 40% among Jews living inside the Green Line. Typically, the greatest variation broke down by levels of religious observance, with the rate of ultra-Orthodox Israelis who gave Jewish Israelis the score of 100 nearly double the rate among seculars (60% and 32%, respectively). Interestingly, the ultra-Orthodox are the outlier – even among the national religious Israelis, 46% gave Jewish Israelis the stop score, 14 points less than among the ultra-Orthodox. However, among all Jewish Israelis, over 90% give their own group a score above 50, generally seen as a middle point.

Just over half of the firm self-defined left (as opposed to “moderate” left) give Jewish Israelis a score of 51 to 100, above the halfway mark.

Notably, Arabs in Israel were split over their assessment of the humanity of Israeli Jews. 47% gave a score of 50 (the mid-point) or lower, while a majority, 53% gave a score above 50. On average, Israeli Arabs give Israeli Jews a score of 54 out of 100 and gave the Palestinians a score of 64 out of 100 in the humanity scale.

These responses should be understood to contain two possible interpretations: inherent qualities, or assessment of the behavior of the other. For example, Jewish Israelis might believe they themselves inherently contain high levels of humanity, while Arab citizens may be expressing the opinion that Israeli Jews are behaving in an inhumane way (i.e., in Gaza).


However, Jewish Israeli views regarding the humanity of Palestinians show sweeping negative assessments, as a mirror image of the Palestinian view of Israeli Jews. Just 2.7% give a score above 80 for Palestinians. 92% give a score of 50 or lower; and among those, 42% gave the lowest possible score (zero). The average score was 14 (from 0-100). The portion who gave a score of zero to Palestinians regarding levels of humanity is higher among settlers (56%), and highest among the ultra-Orthodox (70%). There is hardly any difference between traditionalists and national religious Israelis – 57% and 58%, respectively, give Palestinians a score of zero humanity, and 41% of seculars. The age gap is also prominent: 59% of young Israeli Jews (18-34) gave a score of zero, compared to 41% of those 55 and above.

### 3. Trust and Zero-Sum Conflict:

As in previous recent surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. Among Palestinians, a solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy (94% - an 8-point increase from the 2022 finding); only 6% think Israeli Jews are trust-worthy. Among Israeli Jews, 86% disagree with a statement “Palestinians can be trusted,” which is among the worst results obtained by the *Pulse*, though statistically unchanged from 2022, with 10% of Israeli Jews who think the Palestinians are trust-worthy, as in 2022 (11%). Israeli Arabs are much more willing to trust Israeli Jews than Palestinians: 64% agree that Israeli Jews can be trusted, but 21% disagree.

Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 67% of Israeli Jews currently agree, mostly unchanged the high rate we found in 2022 (65%, then a significant rise from 2020), 45% of Israeli Arabs agree (unchanged since 2020), and 73% of Palestinians (compared to 71% in 2022) agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization. Only 26% of the Palestinians and 25% of Israeli Jews think the conflict is not zero sum.

Figure 34: Israeli Jewish and Palestinian perceptions of the other, 2017-2024



### 4. Who owns the land:


We asked both publics who they think owns the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river (i.e., the whole land of Israel/Palestine). Participants could respond that they see the land as

belonging to one side more than the other by giving it a higher score on the scale of 1 to 6, or giving both a high score thus indicating it belongs to both equally. Our findings indicate that both Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians see the entire land as belonging entirely to their group through high and identical scores (91% among the Palestinians and 92% who gave the top two scores, indicating that the land belongs to their group).

Israeli Arabs are more divided: 15% thinks the land belongs to Jews (the top two scores on a scale of 1-6), but only 44% thinks the land belongs to the Palestinians. Only 28% of Israeli Arabs think the land belongs to Israeli Jews.

The majority among the Jewish and Palestinian publics negate the idea that the land belongs to the other side as well, thus perceiving the territory as exclusive to them. Two thirds (75%) of Israeli Jews believe the land does not belong to Palestinians (combining the top two scores), while among Palestinians 92% think the land does not belong to the Jews.

Figure 35: How much does this land belong to the following groups



**5. Victimhood:** Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and Palestinians believe that their victimization is the worst compared to other people that suffered from persecution and injustice, 84%, 62%, and 83% respectively. This finding highlights another mirror image of attitudes held on each side, that by definition exclude others. The experience of being the worst victim explains why each side justifies its actions, as seen in other questions of the survey, and negates the idea that the opponent also experiences victimhood.



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