The Palestinian-Israeli Pulse is a joint poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah jointly with the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) and  the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University.   Funding for the Pulse was provided by the European Union (EU), the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah, and the UNDP/PAPP on behalf of the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine.   Five joint polls have been conducted during the period between June 2016 and June-July 2018. The Palestinian sample size ranged between 1270 and 2150 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. The Israeli sample ranged between 900 and 1600 Israelis, with occasional oversamples of settlers and Arab citizens. The margin of error ranged between +/-2.5% and +/-3%. 

The surveys tested the details of a permanent peace agreement, incentives for those who were opposed to the agreement, perceptions of the other and levels of mistrust and fear of the other, and alternative scenarios to the two-state solution, including both equal and unequal versions of one state, and a confederation of two states.

The polls were planned and supervised by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, Walid Ladadweh, head of PSR’s polling unit, Dr. Tamar Hermann, the academic director of IDI’s Guttman Center for Surveys, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin and Dr. Ephraim Lavie from TSC.

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of European Union (EU), the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah, the UNDP/PAPP, or the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine.

Role of Public Opinion in the Resilience/Resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Khalil Shikaki*, Dahlia Scheindlin**

*Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Ramallah, Palestine - **Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University

Had Palestinian and Israeli negotiators reached a peace agreement any time during the past two decades, public opinion on both sides would have supported it. The same is probably true today, but reaching that support will be more difficult, as the starting point – the initial base of support – is weaker. Today, political leaders would need to work harder to win over a sufficient portion of the opposition on both sides. They will need  adjustments or additions to the agreement, and external guarantees will be important as well. Under the right circumstances, a majority on both sides can support a permanent peace agreement. The public therefore, is not  a direct obstacle to peace.

But at the same time, the public is not a driving force for peace on either side. The people are not taking the lead to demand progress from their leaders. Public despair helps sustain the conflict and ensure its perpetuation. Indeed, large portion of Israelis and Palestinians have elected, or would elect leaders who are unlikely to move ahead on peace at all.  Public opinion in both Palestine and Israel is therefore not an impediment to an agreement but it will not drive one forward without a significant change of circumstances.

The guiding question of this research has been whether public opinion can be channeled away from the prevailing sense of inertia and despair. The study has sought to leverage the potential for public support, seeking all means by which the majority can still support  peace.

To do this, we examine the following aspects here:

• What has happened to support for the two-state solution, and what are the main reasons for the erosion of support over the years? Who are the constituencies driving the decline in support? 
• What is the map of opinions at present regarding the detailed items of a two-state agreement, which items present the greatest obstacles for each side – keeping each side apart? 
• Are attitudes flexible and dynamic? Experience over the decades with actual changes in policy and negotiations indicates that they are. On this basis, we have asked throughout the project – can we confirm that attitudes are still flexible? What can shift the dynamics of slow erosion of support, and how can we reach a majority who state that they would support an agreement in the future? 

1. The Bad News: Declining support for the two-state solution and reasons for the shift  

Over the three years of the project, support for a two-state solution has fallen steadily on both sides – not a precipitous crash but a slow decline.

The past decade has witnessed significant hardening of views among Palestinians and Israelis. Recent survey research findings^[1] show an illustrative example, as in Chart 1 below. The findings show a drop in support for the two-state solution, during the period between 2006 and June 2018, from 71% among the Palestinians to 43% today and a parallel drop in Israeli support from 68% to 49%.   This is the lowest level of support for this concept among the two publics during the past two years of the Pulse, the lowest in more than a decade, when a steady decline in support began, and the lowest in almost two decades of joint Palestinian-Israeli survey research.

The most troubling aspect of the decline in the level of support for the two-state solution is the fact that the youth in particular are the least supportive. As chart 2 below shows, Palestinians and Israeli Jews between the ages of 18 and 24 are the least supportive of the idea. In fact, among Israeli Jews, only 27%, compared to 51% among those who are over 55 years or older, are still supportive. While, among the Palestinians, the gap for same two groups in narrower, 41% to 55% respectively. The fact that age is such a decisive factor is highly instructive.  This could mean that the future will bring even lower levels of support for this solution.

Other findings confirm the trend of decline in support for compromise. For example, support for a comprehensive peace agreement package, along the terms of the Clinton Parameters of 2000, the Geneva Initiative of 2003, and the outcome of the 2008 bilateral negotiations between the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, has also dropped over the past 15 years.[1] For example, while in December 2004, right after the death of Yasser Arafat, support for a comprehensive peace package stood at 54% among Palestinians and 57% among Israeli Jews, attitudes shifted by December 2014 when only 38% of the Palestinians and 41% of Israeli Jews supported that same package. In June 2018, in response to a similar-- but not identical—package, only 37% of the Palestinians and 39% of Israeli Jews gave their support (46% among all Israelis, factoring in high support from Arab citizens of Israel).

Still, the constituency for a two-state solution is still the largest on both sides, relative to those who support only some other approach.

Explaining the Decline

We identify three main sources of opposition and decline.

First, as in the past, part of the opposition to a two-state resolution emerges from the value system of minority groups who are highly motivated and highly opposed for ideological reasons:  the national-religious and Haredi Israelis and the Palestinian Islamists. Most Palestinians, close to 70%, are in fact secular nationalist, not Islamists. Similarly, nearly 80% of Israelis are secular or traditionalists; only about one-fifth to one-quarter are religious or ultra-religious. However, traditionalists are significantly more likely to oppose peace than secular Jews as well, albeit for somewhat different reasons from the hardline, ideological opposition of the  most religious Israelis.

Second, mutual perceptions of each side are generally poor; only a minority on each side expresses trust in the other or believes the other side supports peace. The majority on both sides believes that the other side does not want peace, is not trustworthy, does not support the two-state solution, and believes that the other side entertains deep-seated but hidden long term aspiration to wipe out the other side from existence.

Third,  the main development over the last two years is a clear decline in perceptions that the two-state solution is even viable. At present, the two publics are highly skeptical about whether it is possible to reach a two-state solution given the wide-ranging spread of settlements: in June 2018, a majority of Palestinians (56%) and a plurality of Israelis (47%) say it is no longer feasible, in a mild upward trend on both sides. Indeed, the perception of viability is a critical driver of support for compromise. The decline in perceived viability goes hand in hand with a decline in support, as shown in the following graph.

This decline in both perceived viability and support is clear when considering trends on the Israeli side: there is a clear decline on these measures among the left, seculars and to some extent the centrist population, more so than on the right (who begin at a lower rate and remained mostly constant). These communities are not ideologically opposed to a two-state solution – but their perception that it is no longer viable is causing them to lose hope and therefore support.

1. Mapping the opposition: Which aspects of negotiations and peace are obstacles? 

On several critical issues, Israelis today are much more of a problem than the Palestinians; and on others, the Palestinians pose a greater problem.

In the most general sense, the Israelis are content with the status quo of continued occupation while the Palestinians are highly dissatisfied with it. This gap is most striking when observing the responses to a question about the overall conditions of life in Palestine and in Israel. Israelis show general contentment, with about half who say things are good and only 18% in June 2018 who say things are actually bad or very bad (the remainder are in-between); while just 15% among Palestinians say conditions are good – the vast majority, 62%, say conditions are bad. The more content Israelis are with the status quo they are the more likely the Israeli public will continue to support right wing politics and politicians. Most Israelis, including the mainstream, remain opposed to dismantling settlements, a critical requirement in any peace agreement.  

Palestinians show significant flexibility on a critical issue for Israelis: demography and the maintenance of a Jewish majority. Nearly half of the Palestinians is willing to accept a permanent agreement that allows only one hundred thousand refugees, rather than all 6 million, to return to their homes and property inside Israel. On the other hand, the majority of Palestinians opposes mutual recognition of the two-states as the homeland of their peoples, and show strong commitment to the principle of the right of return to ’48 Israel – which prompts high resistance and backlash from Israelis. Further, the geo-political division between Gaza/Hamas and the West Bank/PA and the inability to transition to a democratic political system and a pluralistic civil society constitute an impediment to mutual confidence-building with Israeli society.

When examining the specific items of a two-state agreement as based on previous rounds of negotiations and adjusted over time the pattern of gaps between the two sides is clear. The two sides are highly polarized or mutually rejectionist over the issues of:

• Demilitarization of the Palestinian state (59% Israelis support this, Palestinians reject it with just 20% support)
• Refugee arrangement of a two-state solution (48% of Palestinians support it, but just 21% of Israeli Jews)
• The issue of dividing Jerusalem along the lines of the two-state plans receives only minimal support, between one-fifth and one-quarter on both sides and the majority of both sides reject it; this finding has been consistent throughout the period of the project
• Even the basic issue of borders to divide the land based on mutual territorial swaps receives the support of a minority on both sides, albeit more than the Jerusalem compromises

2. Encouraging Signs: why the public is not an impediment to peace  

Despite the inauspicious starting point, three positive indicators remain: public preference for diplomacy is relatively high, no other concept is more popular than the two-state solution, and incentives designed to increase support for compromise have proven to be highly effective.

First, despite the alarming developments regarding the substance of peace, the preference of the two publics is for peaceful means of conflict resolution. By June 2018, over forty percent of the Palestinian (41%) and Israeli public (45%) preferred reaching a peace agreement as the best means of changing the status quo. Only one-quarter (27%) of Palestinians and one- fifth of Israelis preferred violence or armed struggle as the preferred means of change. However, there are dangers here too: The portion of Israelis who believed “a definitive war” is the next step has risen eight points over the last year, from June 2017. The portion of Palestinians who support uprising rose sharply in December 2017, then dropped dramatically again in June. This shows how quickly both publics can come to support military strategies. Following the brinksmanship in Gaza in November, it is likely that large portions on both sides could come to support a new war.

The second positive indicator is that despite the gradual decline in support for the two-state solution, this approach remains by far, the most preferred solution by the two publics.  As one can see in the following figures, alternatives, such as a democratic one-state solution, an apartheid one-state reality (one in which one side controls the entire land and denies equal rights to the other side), and expulsion (one in which one side expels or “transfers” the population of the other side) remain less popular than the two-state solution. The core constituencies for the strongest of these alternatives on each side, those who would support these, and only these alternatives, are less than half the size of the two-state constituency (19% of Israeli Jews support one equal state compared to 43% for two states; 17% of Palestinians support the transfer approach, compared to 43% for two states), as seen in the figures below.

A closer examination of the split within the Palestinian side shows that support for the two-state solution is greater than the support for any of the alternatives in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and most importantly among supporters of all factions except Hamas: among Hamas supporters in 2018, the highest portion support none of the approaches, and a slightly higher portion support expulsion than two states. The most religious support two states at a lower rate than the less religious – similar to Israeli Jews.

 A similar examination of the Israeli Jewish side shows that support for the two-state solution is highest only among secular and traditional Jews, but not among the religious (who prefer apartheid over all other) and the Ultra-Orthodox (where the two states constituency is the same size as those who support an apartheid approach). When looking at the Israeli political spectrum, support for the two-state solution is highest among those who place themselves on the left and the center but not among those who place themselves on the right. Those who place themselves on the right side of the Israeli political spectrum prefer apartheid over all others.

This affirms the initial observation that while the population of both sides can still come to support two states, the process of getting there is held back by specific minorities who form the hard core of opposition on both sides.

The third and most important factor is the consistent finding over the last two years of survey research that support for a comprehensive agreement can be significantly increased, to levels that exceed two thirds on both sides, if various constituencies are given a stake in its success. For Palestinians, the most effective incentive, the one that persuades the greatest number of those who initially opposed an agreement, is the release of Palestinian prisoners as part of the agreement. This incentive alone causes over half of the opposition to change their minds and support an agreement, increasing total support for the comprehensive package to 70%. Similarly, access to the Israeli labor market and free movement for the two peoples between the two states are almost as effective. Intangible incentives, when offered to Palestinians, can be as effective. For example, an Israeli acknowledgement of the historic and religious roots of the Palestinians in historic Palestine or the Israeli recognition of the Arab and Islamic character of the Palestinian state is highly effective.

Similarly, an Israeli acknowledgement of responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem and/or an Israeli apology to the refugees for the suffering they have endured since 1948 can change the attitudes of a large minority of those opposed to compromise. Finally, leadership can play a significant role in increasing Palestinian support for compromise: Marwan Barghouti’s support for a comprehensive peace package can convince a third of the Palestinian opposition to switch position from opposition to support. 

Similarly, on the Israeli side, both tangible and intangible incentives can increase the level of support for such a comprehensive package that implements the two-state solution from a large minority to approximately two-thirds. Effective tangible incentives include the following: compensation to Israeli Jews who left property behind in Arab countries when they immigrated to Israel after 1948 and assurance of permission for all Jews to visit the Temple Mount )al Haram al Sharif) and Palestinians changing textbooks to remove incitement against Jews; a defense treaty with the US, and peace, normal relations, and economic ventures with Arab countries. Ongoing security cooperation with Palestinians raises total support to nearly 60%. A combination of two such incentives can increase the support among Israeli Jews to more than 60%. Intangible incentives such as a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and an acknowledgement of the Jewish historic and religious ties to the land are also highly effective. Public endorsement of the peace package by leaders, such as Netanyahu, can also be an incentive to change minds of nearly 30% of those who oppose the plan.

Improving the agreement

In our fifth survey in the series and after two years of testing, in a pilot test, the top three incentives that were effective on both sides were incorporated into the basic agreement itself.  None of these three are inherently controversial, and are perceived by both sides as win-win aspects rather than as a concession to the other:

• Ensuring that the Palestinian state would be democratic
• Providing guarantees from Arab countries and the US
• Full normalization and greater integration into the Arab Middle East following an agreement, as per the Arab Peace Initiative 

The results of this pilot experiment showed a success for the research process: when tested among half of the sample as the core two-state peace plan, while the other half of respondents were offered only the original plan, the improved plan performed significantly better. Among Palestinians, 42% supported the new plan, five points higher than those who supported the original one; among Israelis the improved plan reached a majority for the first time in this phase of polling: 53% - although only 45% among Israeli Jews. By contrast, the original plan received the support of 46% of all Israelis but only 39% of Israeli Jews. Most importantly, the new plan achieved much stronger results among key constituencies within Israel – such as self-defined centrists, who went from 44% to 58% support when the two half-samples were compared. But gains were also clear among the toughest groups of ideologically opposed respondents. On the Palestinian side the gains were fairly even across different sectors but especially – and critically – among the religious respondents, and the youngest (18-22).

Changing minds

In the final survey, we also conducted a second experiment, a continuation of the pilot test mentioned above. Taking the eight most successful incentives on each side, we moved a step beyond the optimism of positive incentives and told each side about a corresponding incentive that would be offered to the other side. The goal was to mirror a realistic scenario in which each side will have to confront the other side getting incentives and gains that it might not like, but simultaneously enjoying its own incentives. Would support for the agreement based on incentives for each side, but alongside incentives for the other side change the dynamics?

The basic finding is that these pairs showing mutual gains in addition to the regular plan for a two-state peace, were not as successful as one-sided gain. All respondents were asked about the pairs, and some stated that the paired incentives made them more likely to support an agreement  - others said it made them less likely. This was the case on both sides. The survey therefore calculated the net gain for support of an agreement after adding those who switched to the original level of support or opposition.

For the Israelis, six of the eight pairs were able to raise the total support and four of them pushed total support over 50%. The pair offering to change Palestinian textbooks, while Israelis would do the same, raised support to 61%.

For Palestinians, the pairs were not as successful: just two of them raised support above the original level, but not by a significant margin. Further, in all cases, opposition to the plan remained higher than support. Still, the findings affirmed earlier tests – the strongest incentive pair involved the release of Palestinian prisoners.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The most critical factor leading to declining support for a two-state agreement is the perceived lack of feasibility. Breaking down the reasons for this perception we find different aspects on the two sides: For Israelis, the sense that the status quo is good enough leads to complacency. For Palestinians, the sense that settlement spread has gone too far, abandonment by the US as a negotiator (and increasingly by the Arab world) is leading to the conclusion that there is no hope.

Both of these can be changed: The American-led peace framework that is expected to be released can remind Israelis that even the American President believes that reaching a resolution is a priority that cannot be permanently deferred.

For Palestinians – the plan is unlikely to provide true independence and sovereignty, but it can be an opportunity to respond by proposing the right kind of plan as long as attention will be focused on the issue. The core elements of that plan can be drawn from the successful items that have emerged from this research.

Raising the level of perceived feasibility is key.

Beyond that, two further recommendation are worth pursuing: Any regional development that will contribute either to increased likelihood of reaching a plan or successful implementation of a plan, should be considered a top priority. Strengthening the institutions of Palestinian political and civic life is such an aspect: it will provide greater immediate benefit to Palestinians, but also significantly strengthens the prospects for both Israeli and Palestinian acceptance of a two-state solution at any point. And in reality it will probably make that solution more sustainable.

The final recommendation is to continue searching for incentives that are mutually acceptable. Our research will continue this process through survey experiments based on policy analysis. The more new ideas that can be incorporated into an old plan, or adjustments that are perceived as mutually beneficial, the greater the possibility that visionary leaders in the future will have a basis for making peace.

The results of the recent Israeli elections last November led to a fundamental change in the Israeli political and partisan map, with the right and the extreme right winning a majority in the Knesset of 64 seats out of 120. This victory allowed Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party to form the government in coalition with the "Religious Zionism" list, which includes the three most radical and racist Israeli parties, and with the religious fundamentalist movements "Shas" and "United Torah Judaism." This government is the most right-wing and extreme government in Israel's history. For the first time, the "Religious Zionism" movement won a large number of seats and became, with its fourteen members of the Knesset, the third list in the parliament. This victory gave its leaders Bezalel Smotrich, leader of the "Religious Zionism" party, Itamar Ben-Gvir, head of the "Jewish Power" party, and Avi Maoz, leader of the "Noam" party, the power to dictate their conditions to Netanyahu so that he could establish a stable government. The price that Netanyahu has paid will be at the expense of the Palestinians primarily and at the expense of the image and nature of Israel, its political system, and certain sectors of the Israeli society.

The current composition of the government undoubtedly demonstrates that it will work against any Palestinian aspiration for an independent state in the immediate and long-term. The Likud party and its leader, Netanyahu, embrace the principle of "conflict management" and "economic peace" contained in the Trump’s “Deal of the Century," which was originally drafted in full harmony with the position of Netanyahu and the Israeli right. Netanyahu completely rejects the withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and refuses to divide Jerusalem or "give up" any part of it on the grounds that "full and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel," as stated in the Nation-State Law enacted by the Knesset in 2018. He wants to impose Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and the settlements in the West Bank, while retaining in Israel's hands full and absolute security control over all of historic Palestine. The Likud and the current government reject the return of any Palestinian refugees within Israel's borders, and consider Arab countries responsible for them. In conclusion, the Likud and the government consider that the conflict is not over part of historic Palestine, but over all of it, and that it is an existential conflict, not just over borders.

The tripartite "religious-Zionist" list is more hardline than the Likud, rejecting any political process that allows the establishment of a Palestinian state that its electoral platform calls a "state of terror." It wishes to "impose Israeli sovereignty over all areas of the Land of Israel," or historic Palestine.

In reality, we are dealing with an extreme right-wing government that engraves on its banner the killing of the idea of a political settlement based on the two-state solution on the borders of the fourth of June 1967. Instead, it will seek with all its strength to permanently block this idea. All the coalition parties, especially the trio of Netanyahu, Smotrich and Ben Gvir, do not even support maintaining the bad status quo as it is, but will escalate things further. They certainly pose a grave and immediate threat to Palestinian national rights and aspirations.

This paper aims to shed light on the changes taking place in the Israeli policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict after the formation of the new government, the extent of its threat and impact on the reality in the Palestinian territories and on the overall national cause. But it mainly addresses what Palestinians can and should do to avoid the risks resulting from the developing threat and preserve national rights. It takes into consideration the magnitude of the domestic Israeli, regional and international opposition to the fledgling government's policy. 

The coalition agreements signal the birth of a "new Israel," one that is more extreme, racist and obscurantist and far removed even from the democracy that Israel used to claim for itself in front of Western societies. The agreement with Ben Gvir stipulates that he will take over the Ministry of Public Security with broad powers renaming it the "Ministry of National Security." It includes control over the Green Police, Green Patrols, the Law Enforcement Authority on the Territories, and the "Border Guard" unit operating in the West Bank, which is normally under the responsibility of the Central Command of the occupation army. It allows the establishment of a large national guard. His party holds the Ministry of Development of the Negev and the Galilee, to which was added “national immunity,” with an annual budget of 2 billion shekels. The Directorate of Planning under his party’s control is responsible for the "normalization" of settlements; i.e., placing them under the control of the various relevant ministries rather than the army and the defense ministry. The Ministry of Heritage is responsible for all archaeological sites in Israel, as well as those in the West Bank. It was also agreed to enact a law repealing the "disengagement" law and to legalize the settlement of Homesh, which was dismantled and recently returned to by settlers. Other settlements outposts will be legalized, including Avitar, located on Beita village, and more than 60 other outposts they call "Young Settlements" belonging to the "Hilltop Youth" gangs.

Then came the agreement with Smotrich's "Religious Zionism" party to take over as alternate finance minister, the Ministry of Immigration and Absorption and the Ministry of National Missions. A minister from his party will be placed at the Ministry of Defense and will be responsible for the Civil Administration as well as “Office of the Coordinator” in the Palestinian territories, the Settlement Brigade, the National Service and the Preparatory Schools for the army thereby removing them from the responsibility of the army. The minister in charge of all these missions will be in direct coordination with the prime minister. The party holds the chairmanship of the Special Committee on the Constitution, Law, the Judiciary and the Religious Service. He will also chair the Reform Committee that leads the judiciary reform.

Thus, Smotrich can in effect implement his annexation program by transferring the powers of the Civil Administration out of the Ministry of Defense to the civilian departments of the government, so that the settlements are placed outside the responsibility of the army and treated as areas located inside Israel. In this case, Israeli law would apply to them, which means a silent or "de facto" annexation that Smotrich urges. In other words, the settlement enterprise and creeping annexation will proceed at a rapid pace.

The coalition agreements that enabled Netanyahu to establish his government are tied to the enactment of new laws and the amendment of others, including basic laws. The so-called “Smotrich Law” allows him to separate the Civil Administration and supervise the settlers and the areas they occupy, i.e. a large part of Area C, from the Ministry of Defense and place them under his supervision and the responsibility of the Prime Minister. This could Include the appointment of the head of the Civil Administration and the head of the Coordination office.

The new laws and coalition agreements that inform the government's platform have significant implications for the nature of Israel's political system. The platform reflects an extreme racist ideology that rejects the idea of a political settlement. One of the most important paragraphs of the government's program states that “the Jewish people have an exclusive and unquestionable right to all areas of the Land of Israel. The government will promote and develop settlement in all parts of the Land of Israel — in the Galilee, the Negev, the Golan, Judea and Samaria." This provision does not at all observe the existence of the Palestinian people or any of their rights, does not abide by any agreement or any of the provisions or norms of international law, including those governing the role and powers of the occupying power. Instead, it will seek a silent de facto annexation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Nor does it care about the status of the Palestinian Authority (PA) or even the possibility of its collapse. It does not give weight to coordination with the PA or cooperation with it in solving problems on the ground. 

The Israeli government's program and the coalition agreements that were implemented even before the government took the oath of allegiance in parliament do not allow any room for the Palestinians to cooperate with this government, appease it, or be patient with it. It has become clear that the Palestinians cannot deal with the new government like its predecessors or continue Palestinian-Israeli coordination. This government undermines all the foundations of Palestinian-Israeli relations and poses a threat to Palestinian national rights and interests.  It is natural that we should define our relationship with the Israeli Government on the basis of Palestinian interests. In this context, it seems only logical that we should be in a clash with this government. This conclusion is derived from the fact that the aggressive and destructive policies of the new government leave no room for any other alternative. The new government seeks to destroy all the foundations and possibilities of a peaceful solution and a political settlement of the conflict on the basis of the two-state solution on the borders of June 1967. We are in fact in a race against time. The changes that could occur on the ground, politically and legally, will be irreversible over time.

The inevitable confrontation with the Israeli government's policy and aggressive measures should take place within the framework of careful Palestinian planning and creative initiatives. It should go beyond the usual demands and appeals addressed to the international community and various other parties. We cannot afford to waste more time and maintain a waiting policy. We must take the initiative. Such an initiative should be built around the following ten steps that should constitute the Palestinian response to the new Israel.

First, we urgently need the Palestinian leadership in the PLO, and President Mahmoud Abbas in particular, as well as the leadership of Hamas, to take a definitive decision to begin the process of building national unity.  All Palestinian forces are required to agree on a joint program based on the demand of expelling the occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state on the borders of June 1967.  Disagreement over tactical issues should have by now  narrowed to the farthest extent. Unity could begin by activating the PLO's “interim leadership” framework, which includes all factions as well as the PLO Executive Committee and some independents, to reassure Hamas that it is part of the unified political reaction of the Palestinian people until legislative elections are held and the Palestine National Council is reconstituted. A national unity government could be formed and it could start its work by preparing for general elections. In order to increase flexibility and create an atmosphere of trust between the various parties, the separation between the legislative and presidential elections may be acceptable to the Fatah leadership, meaning that no date is set soon for the election of the president, and to give a chance for unity within the framework of the legislative body and the government. This gradual unfolding of the election process is wise given the prevailing concern about the candidacy of Marwan Barghouti against President Mahmoud Abbas.

Second, we must break free from the shackles of Oslo, which no longer exists in the Israeli government's program. The announcement of the suspension of compliance with some of the obligations of Oslo that Israel cares about is consistent with the decisions of the Palestinian Central Council, such as the cessation of security coordination that has already been announced, which must be adhered to in full. Consideration should also be given to the transformation of the current PA, the one created by Oslo, to a PLO-led government of the State of Palestine in order to rehabilitate that organization, which must be reconstituted and activated as a result of a general election.

Third, we must call upon the Arab League to reemphasize the Arab Peace Initiative and to urge the Arab states to stop normalization with Israel in the light of its violation of international agreements. In this context, it is necessary to restore coordination and alliance relations with Arab countries within the framework of the League, with a special focus on influential Arab countries that are more closely tied to the Palestinian cause, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, in order to ensure the return of Arab financial and political support for the Palestinian people. This component of the Palestinian initiative can be built on the tripartite summit held in Egypt between President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, King Abdullah II, and President Mahmoud Abbas on 17 January 2023. The Palestinian leadership must do everything possible to restore Arab solidarity and unify the Arab position in support of the Palestinian cause on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative. Encouraging in this context is the Saudi position that rejects normalization with Israel as long as there is no real progress towards the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Fourth, the PA must embark a large-scale international diplomatic campaign to secure international recognition of the State of Palestine on the borders of June 1967. The real international response to Israel's annexation measures should be to confirm the recognition of the State of Palestine as a full member state under occupation and to stop unilateral Israeli measures in the occupied Palestinian territories. This should be taken in the context of the General Assembly resolution 19/67, which recognizes the State of Palestine as a non-member state of the United Nations. Security Council resolution 2334 sets a clear and unequivocal boundary between the occupied territories within the 1967 borders and Israel and considers everything Israel is doing in the occupied territories illegal and contrary to international law. This should be done despite the fact that UN resolutions remain unfortunately symbolic and do not rise to the level of actual pressure on Israel. It should be noted that some countries and private companies boycotted settlements based on such international decisions and resolutions. In this context, it is important to recruit support for this effort from the Palestinian and Arab diaspora communities.

Fifth, we should appeal to all international organizations concerned with the conflict, including human rights organizations, and focus in particular on the Human Rights Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), to issue political and legal positions against the Israeli occupation and its violations and to prosecute Israel and its political and security leaders for the crimes they commit against the Palestinian people.

Sixth, we must implement the decision of the Palestinian Central Council to freeze recognition of Israel and to link such recognition to an Israeli recognition of the right of our people to an independent state in the territories occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem. Such a position represents an important moral step, a new political basis for dealing with the occupying authorities and a ground for future political negotiations. Most importantly, the Palestinian leadership must adapt to the difficult and painful reality that will most likely emerge, including enduring sanctions that Israel has begun to talk about simply for going to the ICJ to demand a legal advisory opinion on the continued Israeli occupation in the Palestinian territories.

Seventh, the Palestinian initiative should take advantage of the contradiction that has begun to appear in public between the position of the US administration and that of the new Israeli government. In particular, we should pay clear attention to the US warnings against any Israeli policy that may undermine the two-state solution and the US opposition to the policy of settlement expansion. This US position was evident in Secretary of State Antony Blinken's speech at the conference of the moderate Jewish organization, J Street, in Washington on 4 December 2022. We should also take note of the apparent contradiction between a large portion of the Jewish community in the US and the Netanyahu government on political matters related to annexation in the West Bank and on domestic issues related to religious imposition and undermining the foundations of democracy and liberalism in Israel. Moreover, we must work intensively in the American arena through those bodies in charge of the American file as well as the Palestinian, Arab and Islamic diaspora communities. We need to develop relations with the members of Congress of Palestinian and Arab descent to influence the position of the US Administration and Congress and provide mechanisms that could allow for American pressure on Israel, and in international forums.

Eighth, we should work intensively in the Israeli arena, capitalize on the unprecedented internal division in Israel, and coordinate intensively with the opposition to Netanyahu and the Palestinian citizens of Israel to contribute to the mobilization of the Israeli public opinion against the government and its policies. These policies pose a threat to the entire region, including Israel. The goal should be to generate popular pressure on the government to stop the process of annexation and settlement expansion. Twenty human rights organizations in Israel have warned against the annexation policy that the Israeli government intends to implement, out of interest in maintaining the State of Israel as a "Jewish" state, that is, with a large Jewish majority. Moreover, 10 Israeli organizations have expressed willingness to cooperate with international bodies to criminalize this Israeli annexationist policy.

Ninth, the Palestinian factions and popular forces must develop mechanisms and programs of large-scale non-violent popular resistance to allow for significant popular participation in hindering and disrupting the settlement program. We saw examples of this resistance in Beita and in the face of the threat of forced evacuation of Khan al-Ahmar and in the previous examples such as the village of Bab al-Shams. Since a majority of settlers comes to the occupied territories to obtain economic privileges, disrupting their daily life should be our goal. In this context, cooperation can be made with Israeli organizations that oppose the policy of annexation and settlement construction and support the rights of the Palestinian people.

Tenth, we should design a Palestinian development plan that aims at strengthening the steadfastness of the Palestinian citizens on their land, especially in Area C, which will be targeted more than ever. This plan should provide farmers and Bedouins with the means of resilience and survival, such as access to water, energy and animal feed. It should propose projects for land reclamation and cultivation, especially in the Jordan Valley, and provide financial incentives, whether by the government or international donors in cooperation with the government.

These are the main components of a Palestinian confrontational strategy based on on-ground activities as well as political and diplomatic offensives that seek to reshape the current relationship with the occupation authorities. The strategy aims to build on the PA decision to suspend security coordination. But it is not restricted to PA efforts. Factions, political parties, popular organizations, and civil society organizations, should join forces to carry out this national confrontational strategy.

PressRelease  

Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU) and the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah. 

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

• A majority of both Israelis (53%) and Palestinians (52%) support the two-state solution. Palestinian support has risen since December 2016, when 44% supported the solution in principle; among Jews support stood at 50% in December declining to 47% in the current poll.
• Still, fewer people support three possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights, one state without rights, and expulsion or “transfer.”
•  Only 43% of Palestinians (hardly any change from December, when 42% supported it) and 32% of Israeli Jews (a nine-point decline from the previous survey) support a permanent peace agreement package, along with 83% of Israeli Arabs – typical of the high level support from Israeli Arabs in previous surveys. In total, 41% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, a family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims. Fifty-three percent of Israelis and 54% of Palestinians are opposed to the two-state comprehensive package.
• The skepticism about the package appears closely related to serious doubts about feasibility. Palestinians and Israelis are both divided almost equally about whether a two state solution is still possible, or whether settlements have expanded too much to make it viable. Among all Israelis, nearly half believes the solution is still viable (49%), while 44% think settlements have spread too much for it to be viable. Among Palestinians, 52% say the two state solution is no longer viable, while 44% think it is. But fully 71% and 79% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, respectively, do not expect a Palestinian state to be established in the next five years.
• Despite the majority rejection of the two state implementation package, their opposition can be shifted significantly based on added policy incentives. For example, 43% of Jews who are opposed would change their minds if the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state, including the historic and religious ties to the land – bringing total support to a 58% majority.  Almost the same portion of Palestinians, 42%, would change their minds to support the agreement if Israel recognized the Arab and Muslim character of the Palestinian state. When the Palestinians who change their minds for this item are added to original supporters, 66% - nearly two thirds – support the agreement.
• When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, both Palestinians and Israelis choose “reach a peace agreement” by a clear plurality, in almost identical numbers: 44% and 45%, respectively. However, just over one-fifth of Palestinians called for an armed struggle against Israel, and 12% of Israelis sought a definitive war with the Palestinians.

The Palestinian sample size was 1,200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between 29 June-1 July, 2017. The number of interviewees in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 780 and in the Gaza Strip 420. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 902 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between 11 June – 6 July, 2017. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 650, West Bank settlers 100, and Israeli Arabs 150. The Israeli settler and Israeli Arab samples were deliberately increased in order to allow for detailed analysis of their attitudes. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these two groups in the Israeli society. The data file was further reweighted to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is 3%.  The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie. 

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provided the respective findings for these sub groups.   

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Two-state solution: Today, a slim majority of Palestinians and Israelis support the two state solution stated as a general principle, without details, in almost identical numbers: 52% of Palestinians and 53% of all Israelis. However, in the current survey, fewer than half of Israeli Jews support the principle – 47%. The Jewish respondents are evenly divided between support and opposition, which stands at 46% (another 8% did not give an opinion). The finding for support among Israeli Jews has declined in mild increments from June 2016, when it stood at 53%, to 50% in December. Over this time there was a decline in support among Israeli Arabs as well but the portion still stands at 81%, a large majority in favor – this increases the weighted average for all Israelis to the current 53% majority. Among Palestinians support rose eight points from December 2016, when 44% supported the basic two state solution in principle, to over half at present. Forty-five percent of Palestinians oppose the principle of two states. Significant differences are seen by region: in the West Bank, 48% support the two state solution, while in Gaza, 61% support it.

Perceptions of public support. When asked if they believe their own societies support the two state solution, 28% of Jews believe the majority of Israelis support it, unchanged from December, and 53% believe the majority opposes it; thus perceptions of their society are inaccurately weighted towards rejection, rather than the reality of evenly divided opinions. Among Israeli Arabs, 51% think that most Israeli Jews support the principle of a two state solution

On average the Palestinian perceptions of both Palestinian and Israeli attitudes towards the two state solution are as divided as the publics actually are, on both sides. Nearly half of Palestinians, 48%, think the majority of their fellow Palestinians support the two state solution, and 43% think the majority opposes it. Similarly, 42% of Palestinians think the majority of Jewish Israelis support this solution and 45% think they oppose it.

Feasibility. To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two state solution. These findings help to explain why large portions are skeptical. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 5% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years. Fully 71% of Palestinians say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews even a larger majority of 79% think the chances are low or very low, 43% of Israeli Arabs take this view, and the weighted average for all Israelis is 72% who do not believe a state will be established in that time. The remainder, fewer than one-fifth of Israelis and just over one-fifth of Palestinians, say the chances are “medium.”

Further, the view that the two-state solution is no longer even feasible can increasingly be heard in general social and public discourse. We tested this belief directly, asking respondents on both sides whether settlements have expanded too much, making a two-state solution impossible, or whether settlements can still be dismantled or evacuated and therefore the solution is still viable. Among Palestinians, a slight majority of 52% believes the solution is no longer viable – this rate is higher in the West Bank, 56%, compared to 46% of Gaza residents. Once again Israelis are divided, with 49% among both Jews and Arabs who think the solution is still viable, compared to 43% of Jews who think it is not, and 49% of Arabs.

Since settlements are commonly considered the primary obstacle to a future Palestinian state, Israelis were asked additionally the key question of whether they support or oppose evacuating settlements. The question explained in detail that most plans involve dismantling settlements outside the main blocs in the West Bank, requiring anywhere between 30,000-90,000 settlers to move – these are conservative numbers and neutral language. The survey found that a majority of 54% of Israeli Jews opposed the evacuation. Among settlers, 84% opposed it, with high intensity: 68% said they “strongly” opposed, and 16% “somewhat” opposed. Among Jews living inside the Green Line, 52% opposed evacuating settlements outside the bloc. Nearly three-quarters of Israeli Arabs respondents support this (73%).

Separately, all Israeli Jews were asked about cultural and economic boycott of Israel and its impact on the Israeli government policy toward the two-state solution. About one-third of these respondents said that if such boycotts worsen, Israel should change its policy and work towards a two state solution.

            Trends favoring peace remain. Despite divisions of opinion over the two state solution and implementation, the public on both sides prefers peace to violence at present. When given four options for what should happen next, nearly half – 45% – of Palestinians said there should be a peace agreement, more than double the portion who chose armed struggle (21%). The findings are similar for Israelis, 45% chose peace, nearly four times as many as those who chose “a definitive war,” against Palestinians, just 12%.

Three competing alternatives to the two-state solution: One state with equal rights, one state without equal rights (apartheid), and expulsion or “transfer”

The joint poll sought to ascertain the breakdown of Palestinians and Israelis regarding various alternatives to the two-state solution. Three alternative options were offered: (1) one state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians (one state), (2) one state solution in which one side or the other is denied equal rights (apartheid),  (3) a single state in which the other side is “transferred” or expelled from the entire territory of historic or Mandatory Palestine (expulsion). It should be noted that for options two and three, Israeli Arabs were asked questions identical to those asked of Palestinians, i.e., in which rights of Jews are denied in the second option and expulsion is applied to Jews in the third option.

The findings show a high level of overlap: in other words, a single respondent often supported more than one of the three alternative options. In the following analysis we sought to identify a “core constituency” for each alternative option: i.e., the greatest number of respondents who would support the most desirable response – for the purposes of this analysis, the two-state solution – even if they support other responses. We then quantified the greatest number who supported the second, third and least desirable options.

To explain how this was done - in the first stage of the analysis, respondents who support a two-state solution are removed from the constituencies that support any of the other alternatives. In a second stage, those who support a one-state solution are removed from the constituencies that support either or both of the remaining two alternatives, apartheid and expulsion. In the final stage, we separate the remaining two groups by removing those who support apartheid from the constituency that supports expulsion.  

As the two pies below show, the largest constituency is the one that supports the two state solution. Once those respondents are excluded from the sample and the remaining public is assigned one alternative at a time, the public splits almost equally on each side, between the three alternatives without any one emerging as the most preferred. The category called “other” refers to respondents who either rejected all options or responded “do not know.”

 A closer examination of the split within the Palestinian side shows that aside from the support for the two-state solution, only minor differences exist between Gazans and West Bankers in their preferences for the three alternatives. But gaps do emerge when looking at the political affiliation or vote preferences. Yet even here, support among Hamas voters for the two-state solution emerges as the biggest followed by expulsion.

A similar examination of the Israeli Jewish side show that support for the two-state solution is highest only among secular and traditional Jews, but not among the religious (who prefer apartheid over all other) and the Ultra-Orthodox (who prefer expulsion over all other). But when looking at the political spectrum, support for the two-state solution is higher than all others among all except the right (who prefer apartheid).

Finally, when looking at Israeli Arabs, as the pie below shows, support for the two-state solution, as indicated above, is overwhelming, followed by support for the one state solution. This means that, as in the case of Israeli Jews and Palestinians, once the overlap in the Israeli Arab sample is removed, little support remains for these two alternatives.

Confederation: For the second time, we tested an alternative to the traditional two-state solution in the form of a confederation between two states. In December 2016, the question was asked without a significant explanation of what this would mean. In the current survey we provided more detail about the idea, in the following form:

“Some people recommend the following solution: the creation of two states, Palestine and Israel, which enter into a confederation whereby citizens of one country are allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of the other but each national group votes only in its state for elections. There would be freedom of movement for all, and Jerusalem is not divided but serves as the capital of two states. Israel and Palestine would deal jointly with security and the economy..  

The new concept does not immediately appeal to Jews: 26% of Jewish Israelis said they would support the confederation of two states, a six point increase from six months ago, when the question did not provide the details above, but asked about support for the following:

“a confederation between the state of Israel and the state of Palestine whereby citizens of one country would be free to reside in the territory of the other and live under its own laws and where two the states jointly decide on matters of political, security and economic policy.”

Palestinian attitudes towards the more detailed confederation idea rose three points from December, to 37% support, but a majority, 58%, opposed. As is the case for all possible solutions,  support for the confederation idea is highest among Israeli Arabs, at 61%, with 35% opposed.

Detailed package for implementation  

Palestinians and Israelis were then asked to support or oppose a detailed combined package of a permanent settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. They responded first to each item separately, as component parts; following nine such items they were asked if they support or opposed the combined package, and given a short summary of the basic elements. Findings show that the level of support for the package reflects the change of opinion seen among each population regarding the general two-state solution: it has increased slightly among Palestinians, and decreased somewhat among Israelis. At present: 43% of the Palestinians support the full package (40% among West Bankers, who show no change from December – and half of Gazans. Among Gaza respondents, this represents a steady seven-point rise from June 2016 and December 2016; the current higher rate in Gaza accounts for the rise of the overall figure). Among all Israelis, 41% support this package: 32% among Israeli Jews and 83% among Israeli Arabs. Six months ago, 41% of Israeli Jews and 88% of Israeli Arabs supported the package.

In the current survey, 60% of Jews inside the Green Line and 80% of settlers oppose this package (61% for all Israeli Jews). 54% of Palestinians oppose the combined package, unchanged from six months earlier.

Items of an agreement. A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the package follows (non-italicized questions were asked of Israeli Jews and if no other wording appears, also for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Italics refer to the questions worded separately for Palestinians; some of the Palestinian wordings were used for Israeli Arabs):

1) Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side. 66% of Israeli Jews support this, including 45% of West Bank settlers.

Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side. Nearly half, 49%, of Palestinians support mutual recognition. In Gaza 56% support it, and 45% support it in the West Bank. Over three quarters of Israeli Arabs support mutual recognition, or 76%.

2) The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry). Fewer than one quarter of Palestinians support this (23%), and three-quarters oppose the demilitarized state. Among Israeli Jews, 61% support this item, and half of Israeli Arabs.

3) A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Among Palestinians, 39% support this, but over half of Gazans: 52%, while one-third of West Bank respondents support the multinational force. Israeli Jews were evenly divided, with 47% for and 49% against this item; among Israeli Arabs, 63% supported it.

4) The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. One-third of Palestinians support this, and nearly twice as many Gazans as West Bank Palestinians (47%, compared to 25%, respectively). Just over one-third of Israeli Jews support this (35%) and 59% of Israeli Arabs.

5) The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. 34% of Palestinians support this, with a similar pattern: half of Gazans (51%) and 26% of West Bank respondents). 37% of Israeli Jews support this, and 59% of Arabs.

6) The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel. Just under one third of Palestinians support the territorial exchange, again twice as many Gazans as West Bank Palestinians). 37% of Israeli Jews support this, and 59% of Israeli Arabs, the same breakdown of support for the concept of a territorial exchange.

7) West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Just over one-fifth (22%) of Jews support this item, and only 8% among West Bank settlers. 

 East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of the Israel. 29% of Palestinians support this, with very little distinction between West Bank and Gazan respondents. .Nearly two-thirds of Israeli Arabs support this (64%).

8) In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. Just over one-quarter of Israeli Jews support the Old City arrangement, with 69% opposed.

In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian quarters and al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. Here again, just over one-quarter of Palestinians support the division of the Old City, with only small differences between Gaza and the West Bank. The same portion of Palestinians are opposed as Jewish Israelis: 69%. Over half of Israeli Arabs support this (53%).

9) Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.  A majority of Palestinians support this, 55%, and 40% are opposed. This item shows a very large difference between Gazans – nearly three-quarters (72%) support it – and West Bankers: just 47%. This item receives the lowest support from Israeli Jews out of all the items tested: 18%, fewer than one-fifth, support the arrangement on refugees, while 77% are opposed. Israeli Arabs show the opposite trend: 81% support it, with 18% opposed.

Perception of social support for package. On both sides, respondents also perceive their own societies support for the plan to be low. Palestinians are more likely to say that among other Palestinians the majority supports the plan – 39% believe this, compared to 43% of Palestinians who actually support it – a slight difference. Over half (51% ) of Palestinians believe the majority of Palestinians oppose it – close to the reality of 54%. Among Israeli Jews, however, a high portion accurately believe the majority rejects the agreement: 71%. Although 32% of Israeli Jews support the plan, fewer than half that number – 15% - believe that the majority supports it.

It is interesting to note that among Israeli Jews, a higher portion think Palestinians would accept the combined package, than those who think the majority of Jews support it: 35% say that the majority of Palestinians support the package. Similarly, 46% of Palestinians think the majority of Israelis support the package – higher than the portion who believe their own side has majority support. This could indicate that they believe the agreement to be advantageous to the other side – and could further explain the doubts for those who are opposed.

Regional and demographic trends. The higher support among Gaza residents for each item is consistent with their overall higher support for the full package. This trend has been consistent since June 2016. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that the findings show no difference in support between refugees and non-refugees (43% and 44% respectively). Support for the package drops to 37% among those between the ages of 18 and 22 years compared to all other age groups where support ranges between 43%-45%. Moreover, support for the package is higher among those who define themselves as “not religious” and “somewhat religious” (60% and 44%, respectively) compared to those who define themselves as religious (40%). Fatah voters and voters of third parties support the package with large majorities (58% and 57% respectively) compared to only 28% among Hamas voters. 

Just 18% of Israeli settlers support the full package, but even fewer national religious Jews: only 7%, which is even lower than the Haredi level of support of 12%. The findings reflect a very consistent religious-secular divide, with nearly half (46%) of secular Jews who support the full package. Among Israeli Arabs, there is almost no variation based on levels of religious observance. A second demographic divide is found between younger and older Jews. One-quarter of the 18-34 year old Jews support the package, compared to 37% among those above 55. However, young secular Jews support it at the same rate as other seculars: 45%.  

Among all Israelis, with Jews and Arabs combined, support varies most of all depending on where respondents place themselves on the right-left political continuum: Nearly 80% of those who consider themselves left-wing support the full package (78%), a slim majority of centrists (51%), and 22% of right-wingers.

Feasibility - doubts. Beyond demographic and political differences that typically characterize those who support or oppose the two-state solution and the detailed package, background attitudes are also clearly linked to support. In the previous survey, it became clear that trust in the other side was a powerful factor, and the belief that the other side wants peace. It also became clear that the perception of viability was important, therefore in the current survey we offer deeper analysis of this factor.

Among Israeli Jews who believe that the two state solution is still viable, 53% support the combined package. Further, for Israeli Jews, support for the agreement rises in part on whether the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

Feasibility - doubts. Beyond demographic and political differences that typically characterize those who support or oppose the two-state solution and the detailed package, background attitudes are also clearly linked to support. In the previous survey, it became clear that trust in the other side was a powerful factor, and the belief that the other side wants peace. It also became clear that the perception of viability was important, therefore in the current survey we offer deeper analysis of this factor.

Among Israeli Jews who believe that the two state solution is still viable, 53% support the combined package. Further, for Israeli Jews, support for the agreement rises in part on whether the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

Among the Palestinians who believe that the two state solution is still viable, 64% support the combined package. Further, support for the agreement rises incrementally the more the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

Peace Incentives: Changing minds

Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible,” that is, whether additional policy items can act as incentives to change their minds in favor. To this end, we developed a series of policies that could be added to an agreement, and proposed them to respondents who originally said they opposed the full, detailed package. As noted above, this included 61% of Israeli Jews, 15% of Israeli Arabs, and 54% of Palestinians.

Each side was offered seven incentives. Some of the incentives were similar, reflecting either the same policy or a parallel item. Three items tested the same policy: making the Israeli-Palestinian agreement part of the Arab Peace Initiative; including joint Palestinian-Israeli economic ventures; and both sides were asked about the other side removing incitement from their education textbooks, as an incentive. One item was a policy area specifically favorable to one side: for Israelis – allowing the Israeli air force access to Palestinian airspace, and for the Palestinians, release of all prisoners. A fifth incentive stated that the agreement would include a gesture by each side, of a particularly sensitive aspect of the other side’s experience: an apology for the suffering of Palestinian refugees, and the recognition of Jewish holy sites in “Judea and Samaria.” Finally, each side was told that the other side would recognize the national and religious character of its state.

The items were tested as follows (italics indicates questions asked of Palestinians). Once again these questions were asked only among those who opposed the full package of the detailed two state agreement.

1) And if the agreement is part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 27% of Israeli Jews who opposed the agreement at first, said that they would now support it. Added to those who already support the agreement (32%), nearly half of Israeli Jews would support it with this item.

If in addition to the above items of the permanent settlement package, Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty? Nearly one-quarter of Palestinians who did not support the initial package said they would support it if this case (24%).

2) And if the agreement allows for joint Israeli-Palestinian economic ventures? One-quarter of Israeli Jews (25%) said this would make them support the agreement.

And if the agreement allows for joint Palestinian-Israeli economic ventures? Over one-quarter (27%) of Palestinians said they would support the agreement with this item.

3) And what if the Palestinians agree to change school textbooks to remove incitement against Jews? Over one-third of Jewish Israelis who initially opposed the agreement said they would support if it this item was included.

And what if the Israelis agree to change school textbooks so that they not include incitement against Palestinians? Nearly one-third (32%) of Palestinians opposed would support the agreement if it included this item.

4) What if the agreement allows the Israeli air force full access to Palestinian airspace? 30% of Israeli Jews would support the agreement with this item.

And if the agreement mandates the release of all Palestinian prisoners? Among those opposed, fully 56% said they would change their minds and support an agreement if all prisoners were released. Combined with those who support the original agreement already, close to three-quarters of Palestinians in total (73%) could support the agreement if it includes this incentive.

5) And if the agreement recognizes Jewish holy sites in Judea and Samaria and specifies that Jews have full rights to visit those places with security guarantees? One-third of Jewish Israelis would support the agreement in this case.

And if Israel agrees to apologize for the suffering the conflict has inflicted on the Palestinian refugees? 32% of Palestinians said this would make them change their minds and support an agreement.

6) And if the agreement states that the Palestinians explicitly recognize Israel as a Jewish state, and recognize the Jewish historic and religious ties to the land of Israel? For this item, 43% of Israeli Jews said they would change their minds from opposing to supporting the agreement. When added to the original number of supporters of the original agreement, 58% of Israeli Jews in total would support the package if it includes this incentive.

And if the agreement entails Israeli recognition of the Arab and Islamic character of the Palestinian state? Almost the same portion of Palestinians as Israeli Jews, 42%, said they would change their minds and support the original agreement based on this addition, bringing total Palestinian support to nearly two-thirds (66%).

7) And if Prime Minister Netanyahu declared his support for the package? 29% of Israeli Jews said they would support the agreement in that case.

And if Marwan Barghouti declared his support for the package? 34% of Palestinians said they would support the package in that case.

Israeli Arabs were asked about the incentives according to the Palestinian versions. However the number who initially opposed the agreement was very low – just 24 respondents. The breakdowns therefore are not statistically significant; however it is worth noting the most successful initiatives: three-quarters said they would change their minds in the case of joint Palestinian-Israeli economic ventures, and two-thirds said they would support it if incitement against Palestinians in Israeli textbooks is changed. The results above are shown in the following graphs:

Willingness of Israeli Jews who opposed to the peace agreement package to change position and support the combined package based on various incentives  

In all, between one-quarter to 43% of Jews who were opposed to an agreement said they would change their minds and support it based on one of these incentives. Among Palestinians, from one-quarter to 56% of those who rejected the agreement could change their minds. With added support, several of the incentives could convince enough respondents to reach a majority, or even a strong majority. This indicates significant flexibility and openness of attitudes; it also implies that rejection of the two state implementation package is not entirely ideological, but can be changed with the right policies. Mutual recognition is a powerful incentive for both parties – while for Palestinians, releasing the prisoners Israel currently holds is the most powerful.

2) Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Negotiation Framework and Third Parties: The previous survey from December showed that the large majority of both Israelis and Palestinians believe the current US administration to be pro-Israel rather than neutral/balanced, or pro-Palestinian – about two-thirds of Israelis and over three-quarters of Palestinians.

In this context, it is valuable to consider alternatives to the US-brokered negotiation processes that characterized the last two decades. In the last two surveys, we tested five models for a multi-lateral approach to negotiations: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led peace process; 3) an EU-led peace process; 4) a UN-led peace process; 5) and finally, a US-Russian-led peace process. Findings show that in both surveys, Palestinians are most receptive to the first, or Arab regional, approach (31% in December and the current June 2017 survey) followed by a UN and an EU approaches (17% and 10% respectively at present); 7% selected a US-led multi-lateral process, and 5% choose an American-Russian led peace process.

Israeli Jews preferred a US-led peace process consistently in both surveys (32%), while 19% selected a US-Russian approach, and 17% selected a regional approach led by Arab states. A UN-led process was selected by just 5% of Israeli Jews in both surveys and support for an EU-led process is just 2% - this reflects ongoing perceptions in Israeli society that both bodies are biased against Israel, a theme regularly repeated in public discourse.

Among Israelis Arabs, the Arab-led regional approach had the highest support, with over one-quarter (26%) who selected this option. 18% chose an EU process and the same portion preferred a US-led process; 15% selected a UN led process and 9% chose the US-Russian approach.

When all Israeli respondents are considered together, an Arab-led regional process ranks second choice, with 19% who preferred this approach – which is the top preference of both Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. 

3) How Israelis and Palestinians View Each Other

We asked the two sides about perceptions of both the other, and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does, whether they trust and whether they fear the other side, and for the first time since 

June 2016, what they believe are the goals of both their side and the other side. We probed the extent of zero sum beliefs. The picture is mostly consistent with trends in our recent surveys.

Does the other side want peace? Among Palestinians, 44% agree that most Israelis want peace, a rise from December 2016, when 38% of the Palestinians felt this way. One-third (33%) of Israeli Jews think most Palestinians want peace, a decline from December, when 41% of Jews agreed with the statement that “most Palestinians want peace.” Among Israeli Arabs 54% agree that most Palestinians want peace, and 52% agree that Israeli Jews want peace.

Aspirations of each side: The majority on both sides believe that the opposing side has maximalist and destructive aspirations in the conflict.

Nearly one-quarter (24%) of Israeli Jews believe the Palestinians’ main aspiration is to take over the entire state of Israel from pre-’48 borders, and nearly forty percent (38%) believe that Palestinians want to conquer Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population. In total, 62% of Israelis believe Palestinians hold one of these maximalist positions.

In the eyes of the Palestinians, these assessments are inaccurate; in fact the strong plurality of Palestinians, 42%, believe that the long-term aspiration of the PA/PLO is to regain some of the territory from 1967, and another 19% believes the goal is to regain all of the ’67 territories; thus 61% combined view the PA as seeking more moderate goals. Just 11% believe the PA/PLO holds the extreme aspiration of conquering all of Israel and destroying the Jewish population, and 13% cites conquering all of Israel – one-quarter in total.

Among Palestinians, 57% believe Israel wants to extend its borders from the river to the sea and expel the Palestinian population. Another 21% believes Israel wants to annex the West Bank but deny the Palestinians political rights. Together, 78% believe Israel holds a maximalist position. There are significant differences between Palestinians in the West Bank and in Gaza regarding perception of Israeli aspirations: 42% of Gazans believe that Israel seeks a more moderate goal to withdraw from all (21%) or part (21%) of the territories it occupied in 1967, but just 9% of West Bankers combined, for both goals. By contrast, 69% of West Bank respondents held one of the two most extreme view of Israeli goals: extending its borders and expelling the Palestinians – but just one-third of Gazans.

In the eyes of the Israelis, these perceptions are inaccurate. Just one-third of Israeli Jews believes that their state holds the maximalist goals of either annexing all of the West Bank and expelling the Palestinians (14%) or annexing it without giving rights to the Palestinians there (20%) – one third in total.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: As in previous recent surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. Among Palestinians a solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy (87% - unchanged from 86% in December 2016). Israeli Arabs are deeply divided on this: 50% disagree that Israeli Jews can be trusted, and 49% agree.

On the Israeli Jewish side, over three-quarters (77%) believe that Palestinians cannot be trusted, up from 71% in December, and just 18% agreed with the statement that they can be trusted.

Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 53% of Israeli Jews (compared to 51% in December), 44% of Israeli Arabs (four points higher than December), and 72% of Palestinians (also up four points) agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization.

Fear: More Palestinians fear Israeli soldiers and armed settlers more than they fear Israeli Jews. Half agreed with the statement “I feel fear towards Israeli soldiers and armed settlers,” but 40% agreed with the statement made about Jews. This trend is nearly unchanged from December. There are significant differences between West Bank and Gaza respondents: 57% from the West Bank fear soldiers and settlers, while just 36% of Gazans do – this could reflect the fact that West Bankers have more significant daily contact with such figures; although it is also consistent with milder attitudes among Gaza in general.

Among Israelis, a larger majority of two-thirds agree with the statement “I feel fear toward Palestinians,” unchanged from December 2016. Among settlers fully three-quarters agree. Regarding Arab-Jewish relations among Israeli citizens, nearly half of Jews agree that they fear Israeli Arabs, and one-quarter of Israeli Arabs agree with a statement that they fear Israeli Jews; 73% disagree.

General Conditions of the two sides: 55% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the Palestinian territories as bad or very bad; the portion of those in Gaza who feel life condition are bad has risen 10 points since December, to nearly three-quarters (72%). Among Israelis, settlers are the most satisfied population, with 64% who say the country’s condition is good or very good, relative to 54% among both Jews (and the total for Israelis) who say the conditions are good or very good. Half of Israeli Arabs said conditions are good; around 30% among all Israeli groups, and nearly one-quarter of Palestinians, say conditions are “so-so.”

(4) Values and Goals

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Jews were asked about the values of: (1) a Jewish majority, (2) Greater Israel, (3) Democracy, (4) Peace. Among Israeli Jews, a Jewish majority is seen as the most important value (31%), followed by democracy (19%). The portion who chose democracy rose between June and December 2016, and has now decreased back to the June 2016 level. However, the number who chose peace rose from December, from 23% to 29% in June – close to the level of one year ago (32% in June 2016). Although “Greater Israel” is ranked lowest of the four, the portion of those who select this as the highest priority has grown in a mild but steady trend from one year ago: from 10% in June 2016, to 14% in December and 17% in the current survey.

Among the Palestinians, we asked about the following goals: (1) Israeli withdrawal and establishing a Palestinian state, (2) Obtaining right of return for refugees to ’48 Israel, (3) Establishing a democratic political system, (4) Building a pious or moral individual and religious society. For Palestinians, the ranking has been stable, with almost no change over the course of the year. The top priority for Palestinian goals remains Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem (43% chose this), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (29%), building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (16%) and building a democratic political system (13%).