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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the preparation for the holding of the first phase of local elections in rural areas and small towns in the West Bank but without a confirmation of the date for holding the second phase of local elections in cities and big towns. Hamas prevented the holding of the local elections in the Gaza Strip. The first phase of local elections was held in the West Bank on 11 December, the last day of the field work, in 154 localities and the participation rate stood at 66% according the Palestinian Central Elections Commission. The number of participants stood at 262,827 voters. This period witnessed also various violent incidents in Palestinian universities and the death of one student. Israel classified 6 Palestinian human rights NGOs as terrorist organizations. The UK labeled Hamas as a terrorist organization. This press release addresses some of these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2021 show that while the public is pessimistic about the prospects of holding parliamentary or presidential elections in the near future, it is optimistic that the second phase of local elections will take place soon. The second phase of local elections is now set to take place in cities and big towns on 26 March 2022. The findings show that Fatah is more popular than Hamas in West Bank cities that will participate in the second phase of the local elections while Hamas is more popular in the Gazan cities that might participate in the second phase of the local elections.  Nonetheless, the findings show that the overall domestic balance of power between Fatah and Hamas has not changed compared to 

our findings of September 2021. Hamas is more popular than Fatah, and Ismail Haniyyeh easily wins against president Abba and prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh in one to one competitions. But Marwan Barghouti, also from Fatah, wins against Haniyyeh with two-thirds voting for him. Three quarters of the public demand the resignation of president Abbas.

What is noticeable however is that despite the stability in the domestic balance of power, there is a clear disappointment in Hamas’ leadership indirectly expressed by the public compared to the situation six and even three months ago. The findings show that the percentage of those who choose Hamas to represent and lead the Palestinian people has declined significantly and the gap between those who choose Hamas compared to those who choose Fatah, under Abbas’ leadership, has now narrowed to 11 percentage points in favor of Hamas; in September, the gap stood at 26 points in favor of Hamas and in June, a month after the Hamas-Israel May 2021 war, the gap stood at 39% in favor of Hamas. The percentage of those who believe that neither Fatah, under Abbas, nor Hamas deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people has now increased considerably.

In this poll, we have asked about various political solutions to the conflict with Israel and about the confidence building measures that seek to improve the daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The findings show the following:

• The majority is still opposed to the two-state solution. But support for this solution has increased compared to the September 2021 findings and decreased compared to the October 2021 findings.  
• The two-state solution remains the one with the largest percentage of support compared to other solutions, including that of the one-state solution in which the two sides, Palestinians and Israeli Jews, enjoy equal rights; support for the one-state solution is higher than one quarter and less than one third.
• There is a clear majority, higher than 60%, in favor confidence building measures that improves Palestinian daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the current level of support is higher than that of September 2021 when we first asked about the issue.

Findings also show that despite a two-third opposition to a resumption of unconditional bilateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, a large minority approaching about half of the public is in favor of a resumption of such negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Moreover, despite the opposition of the majority to the resumption of dialogue between the US and PA, a large minority approaching half of the public believes that the US is the most effective in influencing the decisions of the Palestinians and the Israelis on the matter of the renewal of the peace process. Also on the peace process, findings show a decrease in the percentage of those who believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and an increase in the percentage of those who believe that negotiation is the most effective. Nonetheless, armed struggle is viewed as more effective than negotiations.

Findings also show that the largest percentage of respondents believes the main Israeli motivation behind the labeling of six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations is to weaken the ability of these organizations to document Israeli violations of human rights and to weaken the PA efforts to take Israelis to the International Criminal Court.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• Pessimism about holding national elections and optimism about holding local elections
• Fatah wins against Hamas in West Bank cities and Hamas wins in Gaza Strip cities
• In presidential elections, Ismail Haniyyeh wins against president Abbas and prime minister Shtayyeh but loses against Marwan Barghouti
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas wins 38% of the vote and Fatah 35%
• 34% see Hamas, and 23% see Fatah, more deserving to represent and lead the Palestinians 

70% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 27% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 52% (62% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Nonetheless, a majority of 59% (68% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) expect the holding of the second stage of local elections in cities and big towns in the near future; 34% do not expect that.

Fatah is more popular than Hamas (38% to 30%) in West Bank cities which will participate in the second phase of local elections while Hamas is more popular than Fatah (47% to 29%) in the cities in the Gaza Strip that might participate in the second phase of local elections.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 35% and Haniyeh 58% of the votes (compared to 56% for Haniyeh and 34% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 33% of the votes (compared to 34% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 52% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 65% and from among those Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 52% and from among those the former receives 33% and the latter 59%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received 31% and Haniyyeh 60%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 35% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 5% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 27% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 21% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 78% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 38% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 37% and Fatah at 32%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 27% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 38% three months ago).

In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 34% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 36% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 45% selected Hamas, 19% Fatah under Abbas, and 28% said neither side deserves such a role. In this poll, the percentage of those selecting Hamas for representation and leadership is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (30%), among those whose age is 50 years and above (35%) compared to the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (30%), among Hamas supporters (89%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (6% and 15% respectively), in refugee camps and cities (39% and 34% respectively) compared to villages (28%), among professionals and students (43% and 36% respectively) compared to laborers (30%), among those who work in the public sector (36%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (31%), among those with the lowest income (37%) compared to those with the highest income (24%), among the religious (47%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (18% and 24% respectively).  

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31% and in the Gaza Strip at 5%; but perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 79% and the West Bank at 51%.
• 27% want to emigrate; the percentage stands at 31% in the Gaza Strip and 23% in the West Bank.
• 84% say there is corruption in the institutions of the PA and 69% say there is corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip
• Only one third is optimistic about the prospects of reconciliation; and 56%  view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 79% and in the West Bank at 51%. 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 31% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 21% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 36% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 83% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 61% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

A minority of 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 59% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (56%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 34% viewed it as an asset.  Looking at the prospects of reconciliation, 33% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic. Three months ago, optimism stood at 32%.

After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 71% expect failure; only 23% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29% of the public expect success and 65% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 69% expects failure and 27% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 27%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Maan (10%), Palestine Today (9%), al Mayadeen (4%), and al Arabiya (3%).

(3) The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• A majority in the West Bank says it has already received the Covid-19 vaccination and about one quarter in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip does not want to take the vaccine.
• 77% are satisfied with the efforts of the PA government to make the vaccine available but only 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the virus.

 58% (68% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 18% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24% say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.  An overwhelming majority of 77% (87% in the Gaza Strip and 71% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 21% are dissatisfied.  But only 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 42% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, only 45% expressed satisfaction.

The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 69% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 69% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 39%.

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• 39% support the two-state solution and 59% are opposed; support for a one-state solution reaches up to 29%.
• To break the deadlock, 56% support popular non-violent resistance, 50% support a return to armed intifada, and 48% support dissolving the PA
• 61% view positively the confidence building measures between the PA and Israel that aim at improving livening conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• The largest percentage (42%) views armed struggle as the most effective means of ending the occupation
• 61% say the international, regional, and local conditions does not make it possible to resume peace negotiations, but 46% support a resumption of negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet
• The largest percentage believes that the Israeli classification of Palestinian human rights organizations as terrorist aims at weaking the efforts of these organizations to document Israeli violations 

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 36%.   When asked about their preferences regarding a political solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from among three specific solutions, one third (33%) preferred the “two state solution, the state of Palestine next to the state of Israel,” 16% preferred a “one state solution, from the River to the Sea, with equal rights to Jews and Arabs,” and 11% preferred a one state solution in which the status of the Palestinians would be “the same as the status of the inside Palestinians,” and 32% preferred other solutions, such as “historic Palestine,” or “full Palestine,” or “independent Palestine,” and others. In this context, reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 29% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 65% expressed opposition. Support for the one-state with equal rights in the West Bank (30%) compared to the Gaza Strip (27%), among youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (32%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (29%), among supporters of Fatah (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (17% and 30% respectively), in villages and small towns (44%) compared to refugee camps and cities (26% and 27% respectively), among women (30%) compared to men (27%), and among laborers and students (36% and 33% respectively) compared to employees and professionals (24% each).

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 56% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 50% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 61% said it looks positively, while 33% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 56% of the public said it viewed these measures positively. Support for confidence building measures is higher in the West Bank (66%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among those whose age is 50 years or higher (62%) compared to the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (52%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (74% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (51%), in villages and cities (66% and 61% respectively) compared to refugee camps (56%), among women (64%) compared to men (59%), among businessmen (67%) compared to students (55%), among those who work in the private sector and the non-governmental institutions (64%) compared to those who work in the public sector (47%), among the married (62%) compared to the unmarried (56%), and among those whose has the highest income (68%) compared to those with the lowest income (52%).  

A majority of 59% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 42% chose armed struggle, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 48% chose armed struggle and 28% chose negotiations.

A majority of 61% thinks that current international, regional, and local conditions does not make possible a resumption of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis while 35% think that these conditions make a resumption of negotiations possible.  Under current conditions, a majority of 66% opposes and 26% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 46%; 49% are opposed. Support for a return to negotiations under a Quartet sponsorship is higher in the West Bank (47%) compared to the Gaza Strip (45%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (69% and 68% respectively), compared to supporters of Hamas (32%), in villages (50%) compared to refugee camps and cities (45% and 46% respectively), among students and businessmen (53% and 52% respectively) compared to professionals and employees (38% and 44% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (49%) compared to those who work in the private and nongovernmental sectors (45%), among those with the highest income (55%) compared to those with the lowest income (40%), and among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (59% and 48% respectively) compared to the religious (43%).  

56% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Yet, when asked about the country or party that is most influential in convincing the Palestinian and Israeli sides to return to the peace process, 46% said the US, 33% said Arab countries such as Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, or Qatar, 10% said Europe, and 3% said Russia.

We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 38% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 19% selected the loss of the will to fight.

When asked about the country or party most responsible for derailing the peace process in the region, 65% said it is Israel, 15% said it is the US, 15% said it is Arab countries, and 3% said Palestine.

We asked the public about its views on the reason Israel labelled six Palestinian human rights NGOs, such as Al Haq and Addameer, as terrorists organizations. The largest percentage (40%) said the Israeli decision aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights; 20% said it aimed at weakening the PA-led campaign to try Israelis at the International Criminal Court; 17% said it aimed at weaking the ability of these NGOs to document PA violations of human rights in the West Bank; 11% said it aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Hamas’ violations of human rights in the Gaza Strip, and another 11% said it aimed at weakening the PFLP.   

In reaction to the UK government decision to label Hamas as a terrorist organization and the idea of boycotting British products, 49% expressed the belief that such a boycott would be effective in forcing the UK government to rescind its decision while 45% think the boycott would not be effective. The belief in the efficacy of the boycott of British products is higher in the West Bank (52%) compared to the Gaza Strip (45%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (54%) compared to those whose age is 50 or higher (45%), in villages (57%) compared to refugee camps and cities (46% and 48% respectively), and among women (52%) compared to men (47%).  

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 41% view ending the occupation and building a Palestinian state as the most vital national goal
• The largest percentage (33%) view Israeli occupation as the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today 

41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (26%; 15% in the Gaz Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 22% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 20% said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 5%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 26% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the internal violence, and 10% said it is the split or division.

 4-6 June 2015

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 4 and 6 June 2015. The period before the poll witnessed the failure of the reconciliation government efforts to reunify the institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a debate among Palestinians over the decision to drop the demand for expelling Israel from FIFA, the formation of a right wing government in Israel under prime minister Netanyahu, the publication of the corruption court decision asserting as unconstitutional Abbas decision to lift the immunity of  Mohammad Dahlan and the publication of news reports indicating that Hamas and Israel have indirectly been negotiating a long term ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. This press release covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reconciliation, the Gaza war, the peace process, FIFA, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2015 indicate a high level of frustration among Gazans, with half of the respondents stating that they are considering emigration from the Gaza Strip. This is the highest percentage ever recorded in our polls. Findings also show an additional decline (particularly in the Gaza Strip) in satisfaction with the achievements of the latest Gaza war. Despite this, Hamas does better than Fatah in hypothetical elections in the Gaza Strip and Ismail Haniyeh wins against Abbas in a presidential election in the Strip. In the West Bank Abbas and Fatah are more popular than Haniyeh and Hamas.  It is worth mentioning that the public is divided equally on the significance of the electionvictory of Hamas’ student bloc at Birzeit University. Half of the respondents believes that the outcome of this election reflects the trend among the overall public while the other half believes that it reflects the trend among students only.

Given the internal dispute within Fatah regarding Mohammad Dahlan, our findings show that his popularity in the Gaza Strip is relatively high, coming in third place after Ismail Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti in hypothetical elections in which Abbas does not participate. Dahlan’s popularity in the West Bank however is much lower, almost non-existent. In this context, we found that Abbas’ decision to lift Dahlan’s immunity and bring him to trial for corruption finds significant support in the West Bank while opposition to the decision is widespread in the Gaza Strip.

Findings show that the public is unhappy with the outcome of the FIFA battle over Israel’s membership. The largest percentage, around one third, believes that Israel came out a winner while a little over a fifth believes that the Palestinian side came out a winner in that battle.

Finally, findings show that a slight majority continues to support the two-state solution but that no more than a third believes that a Palestinian state alongside Israel can be established through negotiations. Instead, an overwhelming majority supports submitting a complaint against Israel to the ICC and joining more international organizations. Two thirds believe that a popular non-violent resistance is the most effective means of changing the status quo.

(1) Palestinian Elections:                                  

• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 46%.
• Satisfaction with Abbas rises from 40% to 44%.
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 39%, Hamas 35%, third parties combined 11%, and 16% are undecided.
• 66% want legislative and presidential elections in few to six months.
• 47% think that the victory of Hamas’ student bloc at Birzeit University reflects the general trend among the Palestinian public.

If new presidential elections are held today and only two candidates were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% (compared to 48% three months ago) and the latter 46% (compared to 47% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 46% and Haniyeh 50%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 44%. Meanwhile, the level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbasrises to 44% (compared to 40% three months ago). Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 50% in June 2014 in the aftermath of the Shati reconciliation declaration but before the Gaza war.  Satisfaction with Abbas increases in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (34%), in villages and towns (59%) compared to refugee camps and cities (39% and 41% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (54%) compared to those between 18 and 28 years old (43%), among non-refugees (48%) compared to refugees (38%), among the illiterates (55%) compared to holders of BA degree (41%), andamong supporters of Fatah (77%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (13% and 41% respectively).

If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 58% and the latter would receive 36% of the participants’ votes. Three months ago, Barghouti received 58% and Haniyeh 38%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 25%, Barghouti 38%, and Haniyeh 34%. In an open question, 26% said they prefer to see Marwan Barghouti president after Abbas and 20% said they prefer to see Ismail Haniyeh, 4% said they prefer Dahlan, 3% said they prefer Rami al Hamdallah, another 3% selected Mustapha Barghouti, and 2% said they prefer Khalid Misha’al.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 35% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 16% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 39%. In June 2014, just before the Gaza war, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 44% (compared to 36% three months ago). In the West Bank vote for Hamas stands at 32% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 36% (compared to 41% three months ago). A majority of 66% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 10% want them to take place after a year or more, and 21% do not want elections.

47% believe that the outcome of the latest student elections at Birzeit University, in which Hamas’ student bloc won, only reflects the trend among university students, while an identical percentage believes that it reflects a trend among the general public. In explaining the outcome of those elections at Birzeit University, 14% said Fatah’s student bloc lost because Fatah, the movement, lacks credibility and is rife with corruption. 23% said the loss was due to internal disputes within Fatah’s student body or due to its mismanagement of its internal affairs or bad performance inside the university. 12% said it was due to rising Hamas popularity due to the war on Gaza or because the performance of Hamas’ student body was satisfactory. The belief that the outcome of Birzeit elections reflects a trend among the general public is higher in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (45%), among those between the ages of 18 and 28 (50%) compared to those over 50 years of age (42%), among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (31%), among the religious (52%) compared to the somewhat religious and non-religious (45% and 24% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (78%) compared to supporters of Fatah (26%).

(2) Domestic Conditions, salary payment crisis, and ISIS:

• Positive evaluation of West Bank conditions stands at 30% and Gaza Strip conditions at 14%; perception of security stands at 54% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip.
• 50% of Gazans and 25% of West Bankers say they seek immigration.
• Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions stands at 79%.
• Belief that there is press freedom in the West Bank stands at 23% and belief that there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip stands at 18%.
• 39% support the decision of the Corruption Court to refuse to try Dahlan for corruption but 46% support the decision of president Abbas to lift his immunity and try him.
• 84% see ISIS as a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 10% believe it does represent true Islam.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 14% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 30%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 46%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 54%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 50%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 25%. Desire to emigrate is higher in refugee camps and cities (35% each) compared to villages and towns (26%), among those between the ages of 18 and 28 (45%) compared to those over 50 years (13%), among holders of BA degree (41%) compared to illiterates (17%), and among students (52%) compared to merchants and farmers (17% and 18% respectively). Desire to emigrate is specially high among Gazan youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (60%), Gazan students (66%), and among unmarried Gazans (68%).

Al Jazeera viewership is the highest, standing at 23%; Al Arabiyya stands at 8%. Viewership of PA’s Palestine TV stands at 20% and Hamas’al Aqsa TV at 12%. Maan-Mix viewership stands at 18%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%.  Furthermore, only 23% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 18% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip. 32% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. 30% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

In light of the recent decision of the Corruption Court to reject the decision of PA president Abbas to lift the immunity of Mohammad Dahlan and to try him for corruption, 39% said they support the court’s decision and 46% said they support the decision of the president to lift the immunity. When asked about the corruption charges against Dahlan, 58% said they thought the charges were true and 19% said they were untrue. 23% said they do not know. Support for the court’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (36%), among men (44%) compared to women (35%), among those whose age is over 50 (41%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 (37%), and among supporters of Hamas (45%) compared to supporters of Fatah (33%).

An overwhelming majority of 84% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 10% believe it does represent true Islam. 6% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 14% (compared to 8% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.

(3) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza:

• Pessimism about the chances for a successful reconciliation continues to rise reaching today 59%; optimism stands at 38%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 35% and dissatisfaction at 59%.
• 52% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip but only 24% believe that Hamas is responsible for the weak performance of the reconciliation government.
• More than 70% say that the reconciliation government should pay the salaries of the civil and security sectors that worked for the previous Hamas government.
• 65% say that the reconciliation government, not Hamas, should be in charge of the security and police sector in the Gaza Strip and 76% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the full command of the reconciliation government.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 38% and pessimism at 59%. Three months ago optimism stood at 42% and pessimism at 54%.Moreover, satisfaction with the implementation of the reconciliation agreement stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Similarly, a year after its establishment, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 35%; dissatisfaction stands at 59%.Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 28%. It is worth mentioning thata year ago, right after its establishment, 61% had confidence in the reconciliation government.

47% (56% in the Gaza Strip) want to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 36% (26% in the Gaza Strip) prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. The same applies to the crossings with Israel with 48% (56% in the Gaza Strip) wishing to place them under the control of the reconciliation government. 43% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and 33% want it placed in the hands of Hamas.

52% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip and 35% reject this claim. But the belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 24% while 32% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 13% blame the head of the reconciliation government. When asked who was responsible for the return of the ministers of the reconciliation government from the Gaza Strip without being able to assume their responsibilities over their ministries, 46% said it was the reconciliation government and the president and 35% said it was Hamas.

75% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salary of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (72%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salary of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government.65% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; 28% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  76% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the previous Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 20% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

48% believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 46% believe it is an achievement. A year ago, right after the formation of the reconciliation government, 50% said the PA was an achievement and 45% said it was a burden. The drop in the level of optimism regarding the future of reconciliation is probably one of the reasons for the drop in the belief that the PA is a Palestinian achievement.

(4) Gaza War:

• 63% support Hamas’ indirect negotiations with Israel for a long term hudna.
• 59% believe that Hamas has won the last Gaza War but satisfaction of the war achievements drops to 35%.
• 63% support continued rocket launch for Gaza if the siege and blockade continue.

63% support indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel to reach a long term hudna, or truce, in the Gaza Strip in return for lifting the siege and 32% oppose such negotiations. Support for such negotiations rises in the Gaza Strip (68%) compared to the West Bank (61%), and among supporters of Hamas (74%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (57% each).

Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War stands at 59%; 25% believe the two sides were losers. Among Gazans, only 47% say Hamas came out a winner.Nine months ago, 69% of all Palestinians said Hamas came out a winner. By contrast, the percentage of satisfaction with war achievements compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip does not exceed 35% and dissatisfaction at 63%.Despite that, a majority of 63% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.

(5) The peace process

• 51% support the two-state solution and 48% oppose it.
• 34% support the one-state solution and 64% oppose it.
• 54% oppose and 44% support a mutual recognition of national identity of the states of Israel and Palestine.
• 86% support submitting a complaint against Israel to the International Criminal Court.
• 67% support popular non-violent resistance and 49% support return to an armed intifada.

Findings show that a slight majority of 51% supports and 48% oppose the two-state solution. A larger majority of 55% believes that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion. Similarly, 72% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent. Despite this, only 34% support, and 64% oppose, a one-state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equal rights. Findings also show that 52% support the Arab Peace Initiative and 44% oppose it. But a majority of 54% opposes a mutual recognition of national identity of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people; 44% support it.

Palestinian views on the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state vary: 36% think that armed action is the most effective, 32% think negotiations is the most effective, and 26% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective.

In the absence of a peace negotiation, 82% support joining more international organizations. 86% support the submission of a complaint against Israel to the International Criminal Court. Moreover, two thirds (67%) support a popular non-violent resistance. A slight majority of 52% opposes, and 46% support, the dissolution of the PA. 51% opposes and 49% support a return to an armed intifada.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 78%. 21% are not worried. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of 81% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population or deny them their rights. When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 69% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967 while 23% said it was to conquer the state of Israel or conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.

An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 50% believe that Israel intends to destroy al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 18% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 9% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 13% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.  More than half of the public (52%) believes that Israel will indeed succeed in implementing its plans for al Haram al Sharif and 44% believe it will not succeed.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state is the first most vital Palestinian goal and 30% believe the first goal is to obtain the right of return for the refugees.
• 29% say that the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and an identical percentage says that it is poverty and unemployment.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end the Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of the occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 29% of the pubic; an identical percentage believes it is poverty and unemployment. 22% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; and 15% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

(7) Other issues: FIFA, boycott, Israeli right wing government, and the nuclear agreement with Iran

• Israel won more than the Palestinians in the FIFA battle.
• An overwhelming majority supports the campaign to boycott Israel.
• After the formation of right wing government in Israel, 79% are pessimistic about the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
• The nuclear deal with Iran is good for Israel but bad for the Arabs.

FIFA: in the FIFA battle over Israeli membership in the international football federation, 33% believe that Israel came out as the winner and 22% believe the Palestinian side came out as the winner. 10% believe both sides were winners, 4% believe both sides were losers, 15% believe neither side won or lost, and 17% did not know or did not express an opinion.

Boycott of Israeli products: 86% support the campaign to boycott Israel and impose sanctions on it and 88% say they have stopped buying Israeli products, such as those manufactured by Tnuva or Strauss, and 64% believe that the boycott of Israeli products will be effective in helping to end the Israeli occupation.

Israeli right wing government: in the wake of the formation of a new right wing government led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, 79% of the public feel pessimistic about the future of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Nuclear agreement with Iran: 36% of the public believe that the framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, signed between the US and Iran, is a bad agreement for the Arabs and 25% believe it is a good agreement for the Arabs. 25% believe it is neither good nor bad. When asked if the agreement is good or bad for Israel, 50% said it was good and 24% said it was bad; 12% said it was neither good nor bad.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 29 June and 1 July 2017. Internally, the period before the poll witnessed various important developments: the PA instituted a partial deduction, about 30% of the salary, on payments to its public sector in the Gaza Strip; the PA partially stopped covering the cost of Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip; Hamas elected Ismail Haniyeh as the head of its Political Bureau and Yahya Sinwar as head of the movement in the Gaza Strip; Hamas engaged in negotiations with the group led by Mohammad Dahlan in an effort to ease conditions in the Gaza Strip; and Hamas also issued a new document reflecting its current principles and positions. Moreover, Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails carried out a hunger strike. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, and national reconciliation. It also covers some aspects of the peace process and intra Arab relations. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2017 show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public rejects the recent PA measures to deduct part of the salaries of its public sector in the Gaza Strip and to stop covering the cost of Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip. The largest percentage view these measures as aiming at imposing economic hardships on the population in order to force it to reject Hamas’ rule. Very few people think the PA has taken these measures due to the financial problems it currently faces. Findings also show a semi consensus against the termination of the PA payments to the security prisoners in Israeli jails; 

but half of the public believes that the PA will indeed acquiesce to the external pressure and suspend the payments.

The largest percentage of the public is opposed to any Hamas-Dahlan agreement that would lead the two sides to share the administration of the Gaza Strip, fearing that such an agreement would lead to the complete separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting however, that a majority of Gazans would support such an agreement, if one is indeed reached.

After the Trump’s visit to Palestine and Israel, most of the public remain pessimistic about the future of Palestinian-Israeli relation and the Palestinian-American relation. But it is worth noting that the level of support for a return to an armed intifada has declined significantly during the past three months. Perhaps the decline is due to public perception of the negligible outcome of such attacks, such as knifings and shooting, on the Israeli side. In other words, the public might view them as ineffective and counterproductive given the fact that the last attack has led to the denial of access to Jerusalem and holy places during the month of Ramadan.

Finally, findings show that the overwhelming majority believes that the Arab World has turned away from the Palestine cause and has become an ally of Israel against Iran. On intra-Arab matters, the public stands with Qatar against the measures taken by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE against it.

(1) The Crisis of electricity in Gaza and the reduction in the salaries of PA employees in the Gaza Strip:

• 84% oppose PA measure to stop covering costs of electricity to Gaza
• 88% oppose the reduction of salary payments to PA employees in the Gaza Strip
• Most of the public believe that the aim of the PA is to pressure the Gazans and punish Hamas

An overwhelming majority of 84% are opposed to the measure taken by the PA to stop covering the Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip; only 10% support that measure. Opposition to the measure increases in the West Bank (87%) compared to the Gaza Strip (80%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (93% and 90% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (73%), among the illiterates (87%) compared to those who hold BA degree (83%), and among students (87%) compared to employees (77%).

Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 88% are opposed to the step taken by the PA, reducing the amount of salary payments to its employees in the Gaza Strip; only 8% support the step. 40% believe that the step has been taken by the PA in order to impose economic pressure on the Gazans in order to force them to reject Hamas’ rule; 37% believe the PA aimed at punishing Hamas in order to force it to accept its conditions for reconciliation, and 16% believe that the PA has taken the step due to the difficult financial conditions it faces. The belief that the PA seeks to impose economic difficulties on Gazans is higher in the Gaza Strip (44%) compared to the West Bank (37%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (47% each) compared to supporters of Fatah (32%), among the married (41% compared to the unmarried (37%), and among the holders of BA degree (46%) compared to those who finished elementary school only (34%).

(2) Hamas-Dahlan meetings, the election of Haniyeh and Sinwar, reconciliation, and the reconciliation government:

• 50% believe that a Hamas-Dahlan agreement would lead to the total separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• 48% oppose and 40% support a Hamas-Dahlan agreement
• 78% believe that the PA pressure on Gaza and Hamas will not succeed in achieving PA goals
• 47% want and 38% do not want Hamas to accept PA and Abbas’ conditions for reconciliation
• 64% are pessimistic about the chances for reconciliation
• 61% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government

50% believe that a Hamas-Dahlan agreement to create a joint administration for the Gaza Strip, if true, would lead to the total separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 38% believe that such an agreement would not lead to the total separation between the two areas. The belief that it will lead to the total separation between the two areas stands at 51% in the West Bank and 50% in the Gaza Strip. This percentage rises to 55% among men compared to 46% among women, 56% among Fatah supporters, 50% among supporters of third parties, and 46% among Hamas supporters. It stands at 56% among holders of BA degree compared to 34% among the illiterates, and 60% among the employees compared to 42% among housewives.

48% indicate that they would be opposed to such an agreement between Hamas and Dahlan while 40% indicate that they would be supportive. Support for such an agreement stands at 61% in the Gaza Strip compared to only 29% in the West Bank. Similarly, support is higher among the youth, between the ages of 18 and 22 (38%) compared to those whose age is 50 or above (32%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (64% and 53% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (35%), among holders of BA degree (44%) compared to illiterates (15%), among refugees (48%) compared to non-refugees (33%), and among those who work in the public sector (45%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (36%).

78% believe that the PA measure that suspended payment to cover the cost of Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip, and similar other measures to pressure Hamas, will not succeed in ending the separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; only 13% think such measures can succeed in ending the separation.  Nonetheless, 47% of the public demand that Hamas accept the conditions put forward by the PA and Abbas if such acceptance can lead to improving conditions in the Gaza Strip; 38% demand that Hamas reject such conditions.

31% believe that the election of Ismail Haniyeh and Yahiya Sinwar as Hamas leaders will weaken the chances for reconciliation; 25% believe it will lead to strengthen the chances; and 33% think it will have no impact on the chances for reconciliation.  Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 27% and pessimism at 64%. These findings are similar to those obtained three months ago.

26% say they are satisfied and 61% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 56%.

(3) PA payments to Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails:

• 91% oppose the suspension of PA payments to Palestinian security prisoners
• But 44% expect the PA to stop making the payments to the security prisoners

91% are opposed to the suspension of PA payments to Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails; only 7% support such measure. Nonetheless, 46% believe that the PA will not stop making those payments to Palestinian security prisoners while 44% believe it will stop making them.  The belief that the PA will indeed stop the payments is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (43%), among men (47%) compared to women (41%), among the youth, between 18-22 years old (50%) compared to those who are 50 years old or higher (38%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (50% and 46% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (39%) among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (35%), and among the employees (46%) compared to housewives (40%).

(4) Prisoners’ hunger strike:

• 57% believe that the prisoners’ hunger strike has been partially successful
• 69% believe that the strike has improved the leadership position of Barghouti

57% believe that the hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails has partially succeeded while 28% believe it fully succeeded; 13% believe it has failed. Nonetheless, 69% believe that the hunger strike has enhanced the leadership status and role of Marwan Barghouti among the Palestinians while only 12% believe it has not done that. In fact, the strike did not improve the standing of Barghouti since the level of support for him in this poll, compared to that of Haniyeh or Abbas, did not change significantly, as we see below.

(5) Hamas’ new document:

• Half of those who have heard about the new Hamas document believes that it deviates from Hamas’ position as reflected in the charter and the other half believes that it maintains the same positions as in the charter
• 30% believe that Hamas’ principle motivation behind the release of the new document is to present itself as a moderate movement

The majority (53%) has not heard about Hamas’ new document; but 21% (of the total sample) believe the new document differs from some of Hamas’ basic principles and positions; 20% (of the total sample) believe it has maintained Hamas’ traditional principles and positions.  30% believe that the primary motivation behind the publication of the new document is Hamas’ desire to present itself to the world as a moderate movement; 18% believe that Hamas sought to reiterate its traditional positions as outlined in its original charter of 1987; and 16% think that Hamas sought to document the recent positions that the movement has adopted since it issued its original charter. 

(6) Presidential and parliamentary elections: 

• 62% want president Abbas to resign
• Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 61%
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, each receives 45%
• In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 59% and the latter 35%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 39%, Hamas 29%, and third parties combined 10% of the vote

62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago demand for Abbas resignation stood at 61% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 39% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 36% (41% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).

If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 7%; Khalid Mishal and Rami al Hamdallah (5% each), and Salam Fayyad and Mustapha Barghouti (3% each); and Saeb Erekat at 1%. It is worth mentioning that Barghouti was preferred over all others by 33%. It is also worth mentioning that Dahlan (who, in this poll, is preferred over all others by 18% in the Gaza Strip compared to only 1% in the West Bank) has not gained more support in the Strip, in comparison to his standing three months ago, as a result of the agreement he has been reported to have made with Hamas.  

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, each would receive 45% of the vote (compared to 47% each three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 39% of the vote (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 55% (compared to 50% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 50% (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh 40% (compared to 45% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 41% and Haniyeh 32%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 35%. Here too, it is worth mentioning that support for Barghouti against Haniyeh and Abbas stood at 40% three months ago and 59% against Haniyeh alone, figures that are very similar to his current standing.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 64% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 24% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 35% (compared to 34% three months ago) and for Fatah at 36% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 24% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 36% three months ago).

(7) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and in the West Bank at 24%
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 43% and in the West Bank at 53%
• 47% of Gazans and 23% of West Bank seek to emigrate

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 24%. 47% of the public believe that conditions in the Gaza Strip would improve if Hamas accepted PA and Abbas conditions for reconciliation.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 43%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 53%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 38% and in the West Bank at 50%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 47%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 23%.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Maan TV (at 14%), Palestine TV and Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) (at 13%), al Aqsa TV (at 11%), Al Arabiya and al Quds TV at 5% each), and al Mayadeen at 3%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%. Moreover, only 36% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 58% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.

(8) The peace process:  

• Support for a return to an armed intifada drops from 51% three months ago to 39% in this poll
• After Trump’s visit, 51% believe that Palestinian-Israeli relations will worsen
• Similarly, 50% believe that Palestinian-American relations will worsen
• 43% believe that the election of Haniyeh and Sinwar to Hamas leadership will lead to escalation with Israel

In the absence of peace negotiations, 74% support joining more international organizations, 54% support non-violent popular resistance, 39% support a return to an armed intifada, and 44% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 51%. Support for return to armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (35%), among men (44%) compared to women (34%), and among supporters of Hamas (66%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (27% and 42% respectively).

After the visit of the US president, Trump, to Palestine and Israel, 51% believe that Palestinian-Israeli relation will continue to deteriorate, 13% think it will improve, and 33% think it will remain unchanged.  Similarly, 50% think Palestinian-American relation will continue to deteriorate, 11% think it will improve and 34% think it will remain unchanged.

43% believe that the election of Ismail Haniyeh and Yahiya Sinwar to Hamas’ leadership roles will lead to escalation in Hamas-Israel relations; 15% think it will lead to greater calm in the relation, and 30% think it will have no impact on Hamas-Israel relation.

(9) The Arab World and the Qatar crisis:

• 80% of the public think that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own concerns and that Palestinian is no longer its principle cause
• 67% stand against the measure taken against Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE

80% (compared to 76% three months ago) say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 18% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principal cause. Similarly, 68% (compared to 59% three months ago) believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 21% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

Two thirds (67%) of the public is opposed to the steps taken by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE against Qatar and only 12% support them. Support for Qatar is higher in the West Bank (71%) compared to the Gaza Strip (61%), among men (69%) compared to women (65%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (70%) compared to those whose age is 50 or above (65%), and among supporters of Hamas (79%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (60% and 64% respectively).

(10) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 43% believe that the most vital goal of the Palestinian people should be the ending of occupation and the building of a state
• In the eyes of 28% of the public, the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is corruption within the PA

43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the Wet Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 16% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 28% of the public while 24% believe it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 20% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 3-7 September 2024. The period prior to the poll witnessed the continuation of the war on the Gaza Strip and the failure of all attempts to reach a ceasefire. Talk about the “day after” continued without much progress due to the Israeli government's rejection of the idea. Meanwhile, clashes escalated in the West Bank between the Israeli army and Palestinian armed groups, especially in the northern West Bank. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank also continued and entrances to most towns and villages were closed in order to prevent residents from accessing main roads. Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages in unprotected areas in areas B and C also continued. Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas, in Tehran, and Iran announced its intention to avenge his death but had not done so by the time of the completion of the data collection for this survey.  Hamas chose Yahiya Sinwar as its head, replacing Ismail Haniyeh. The Palestinian factions announced the so-called “Beijing Declaration” to unite the internal ranks. President Mahmoud Abbas announced from Ankara his intention to visit the Gaza Strip.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted with residents in specific areas where there was no on-going daily fighting, including Khan Younis area, the central Gaza Strip and all its shelters, but not the northern besieged Gaza Strip and other areas of fighting in the central Gaza Strip and in Rafah. This poll covers all of the above issues as well as other issues such as domestic conditions and the internal balance of power, the peace process and the alternatives available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

The sample size of this survey was 1200 people, of whom 790 were interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank (in 79 residential locations) and 410 in the Gaza Strip (in 41 locations).  The margin of error stands at +/-3.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

As in our previous three polls since October 7, most of the questions in this poll, covering the third quarter of 2024, revolve around the events of that day and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war and the Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, the unprecedented human suffering of the Gaza Strip's residents, the debate regarding the future of the Gaza Strip after the war, public satisfaction with the performance of the various parties during the war, and West Bankers’ fears of the probability of the war spilling over from Gaza to the West Bank. It should be noted that the samples in all four surveys does not include residents of the northern Gaza Strip who have remained in their homes since the beginning of the war due to the inability of our researchers to reach them and the lack of reliable data on their numbers and whereabouts in that area. The current poll, as in the previous three polls, covers the consequences of the war on the internal balance of power, support for the Palestinian leadership, Palestinian-Israeli relations, and the political process.

While a majority continues to view Hamas’ decision to carry out the October 7 attack as “correct,” that majority is now smaller than it has been since the first poll, indeed becoming a minority in the Gaza Strip. The fears of the war finally reaching the West Bank, the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip, with declining hopes for a quick ceasefire might have contributed to this and similar findings in this poll, many of which were evident in our previous poll three months ago.

Despite the declining favorability of October 7, the majority of the public continues to believes the attack and the following war have placed the Palestinian issue at the center of global attention. Findings also continue to show that the majority of the public, but one that is smaller than in the past, expects Hamas to win the war on Gaza; for the first time however, the majority of Gazans no longer believe that, a trend we saw in the previous poll.  The vast majority does not view President Abbas's statements regarding his intention to visit Gaza as an indication of a policy change regarding the war and the future of the Gaza Strip. Demand for Abbas' resignation remains overwhelming even as it drops slightly. Hamas’ popularity drops a little while Fatah’s rises slightly. Findings show significant rise in support for the two-state solution in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Support for armed struggle declines and support for negotiations rise. In both cases however the change is not dramatic.

Humanitarian conditions: We start with the humanitarian and living conditions in the central and southern Gaza Strip. There has been no change in the percentage of those who have lost relatives in this war as about 80% of Gazans say that at least one of their family members has been killed or injured. The survey shows improvements in some indicators that have been monitored, such as access to food and water. In the current poll, the overwhelming majority indicates that they have moved several times from one shelter to another, with 85% moving two to six times.

Support for the attack on October 7: Once again, findings show decline in the overall support for the October 7 Hamas offensive. The decline, by 13 percentage points, is significant in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but more so in the latter dropping by 18 points, standing today at 39%. In our previous poll, the drop in the positive view of the attack of October 7 stood at 14 percentage points. It is important to note that support for this attack does not necessarily mean support for Hamas and does not mean support for any killings or atrocities committed against civilians. Indeed, almost 90% of the public believes Hamas men did not commit the atrocities depicted in videos taken on that day. Support for the attack however seems to come from another motive: findings show that more than two thirds of the Palestinians believe that the attack has put the Palestinian issue at the center of attention and eliminated years of neglect at the regional and international levels.

Ceasefire and who comes out the winner: Half of the Palestinians expect Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement in the next few days. As we did in the previous two polls, we asked in the current one about the side that would emerge victorious in this war. Half of the public expect Hamas to win compared to two thirds three months ago. It is worth noting that decline is greater in Gaza, dropping by 20 points, from 48% to 28%. This decrease comes after the earlier 8-point decrease in the previous poll in the Gaza Strip. The drop in the West Bank, by 14 points, is also significant, standing today at 65%.

Who will control Gaza after the war:

A majority of 57% says that when the war ends, Gaza will remain under Hamas’ control. This percentage drops to 37% in the Gaza Strip of Gazans saying Hamas will actually control that area, compared to a much higher percentage (70%) in the West Bank. Three months ago, 46% of Gazans said Hamas will control the Gaza Strip after the war. When asked about what the public prefer, 58% (73% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) said they prefer the return of Hamas, 20% chose the Palestinian Authority, 4% chose the Israeli army, and 12% chose to bring the Gaza Strip under the control of international forces.   When we specifically asked about support for the return of the PA to control the Rafah Crossing and the Gaza Strip after a ceasefire, 70% expressed opposition and 27% supported it. Support in the Gaza Strip rises to 42% compared to only 17% in the West Bank. The idea of an Arab security deployment in Gaza to assist the PA security forces is opposed by two-thirds of the public, compared to three quarters three months ago.

Satisfaction with the performance of various parties during the war:  As we did in our previous polls, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with Hamas' performance drops to 61% (75% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Yahiya Sinwar (54%; 70% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip). As for satisfaction with Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate went to Yemen, as we found in our previous polls, today at 69% (78% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Hezbollah (44%), Qatar (43%), Iran (33%), Jordan (23%), Egypt (20%), UAE (19%), and Saudi Arabia (15%). The findings show a 16-point drop in satisfaction with Iran's performance, which seems to be due to the belief of the overwhelming majority that it will not retaliate for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on its soil. A majority of more than three quarters (76%) believes that Iran will not retaliate against Israel for that assassination. For the international actors, China received the highest satisfaction (26%), perhaps for its role in organizing the Beijing reconciliation meeting, followed by Russia (19%), the United Nations (13%), and the United States (5%).

President Abbas visit to the Gaza Strip: An overwhelming majority of the public (77%) believes that President Abbas' announcement of his intention to visit the Gaza Strip does not mean a positive change in how the PA henceforth deals with the current war on the Gaza Strip while 20% believe it does. When asked about the measures the PA leadership should take today to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip, "the formation of a national unity government to negotiate with Israel and the international community to end the war and rebuild the Gaza Strip in the future," came first, followed by "achieving immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip," and finally, to "lead a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the residents of Gaza in cooperation with Egypt and the international community."

Fear in the West Bank of the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank:77% of West Bankers say they fear the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank while 23% do not fear such a war. 63% of West Bankers believe that if the war spreads to the West Bank, Israel will succeed in destroying most of its cities, as it did in the Gaza Strip.  Despite this, 67% believe that Israel will not win a war in the West Bank if it moves there from the Gaza Strip. When asked who would bring the war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, 90% of West Bankers think it could be the government of Netanyahu and settlers, 3% think it could Hamas, and 5% think it could be armed groups in the West Bank. When asked, what would be the aims of Israel if the war were to move to the West Bank, the largest percentage (33%) said “to commit genocide against the population;” 31% said “to eradicate the armed resistance;” 25% said “to expel the population to Jordan,” and 10% said “to eliminate the Palestinian Authority.”

Support for Palestinian factions: When asked which political party or movement they support, the largest percentage (36%) said they prefer Hamas, followed by Fatah (21%), 6% selected third parties, and 29% said they do not support any of them or do not know. Three months ago, 40% said they support Hamas and 20% said they support Fatah. Support for Hamas today stands at 37% in the West Bank (compared to 41% three months ago) and for Fatah at 18% (compared to 17% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas stands at 35% (compared to 38% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 26% (compared to 24% three months ago).

Support for Palestinian leaders: If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Yahiya Sinwar of Hamas, Barghouti would receive 32% of all respondents followed by Sinwar at 31% and Abbas at 6%; the remaining respondents say they will not participate in the elections. If only two candidates were in the competition for the presidency, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah and Yahiya Sinwar of Hamas, turnout would drop significantly and in this case, Sinwar stands at 41% and Abbas at 13% and the rest do not wish to participate in the elections. If the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti of Fatah and Sinwar of Hamas, turnout would rise to 67%. In this case, the vote for Barghouti among the entire public would be 35% and for Sinwar 32%. When asked to select a successor to Abbas, the largest percentage (37%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti, 30% said they prefer Yahiya Sinwar, 10% chose Mohammed Dahlan, 5% chose Mustafa Barghouti, and 15% said they do not know or chose someone other than those listed.

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas: Satisfaction with Abbas' performance stands at 18%, compared to 12% three months ago, and dissatisfaction with 81%. A majority of 84% want the president to resign. Today, 90% of West Bankers and 75% of Gazans demand the resignation of the president.

The new government of Mohammad Mustafa: An overwhelming majority (69%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to carryout. In all of the reform items we asked about, we found that Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but a majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of the reforms agenda items.

The Beijing Declaration: An overwhelming majority (72%) believes that Beijing's Declaration issued by Palestinian factions will not be implemented soon while 24% believe it will be implemented soon. When those who believe that the Beijing's declaration will not be implemented were asked who they think will obstruct implementation, 39% say it is Fatah headed by President Abbas and 36% believe it is Hamas. 40% say China’s role in domestic Palestinian issue is “medium,” 38% say it is small, and only 17% say it is big. 57% says they welcomes a greater role for China in such issues as reconciliation.

Support for the two-state solution:  Support for the concept of the two-state solution continues to rise, standing today at 39%. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 32%. Rise in support for this solution in the current poll came from both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to 39% and 38% respectively. Support for a Palestinian state rises to 59% when it is not linked to the “two-state solution” and when the borders of the state are identified as those of 1967. We asked about the public support for three possible solutions to the conflict: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the solution of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel, and a one-state solution in which the Jews and Palestinians live with equality, 51% (49% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, while 19% (14% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip) prefer a confederation between two states. 10% (11% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the establishment of a single state with equality between the two sides. 21% said they did not know or did not want to answer.

Support for Armed struggle: We presented the public with three ways to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective one: 48% (50% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) chose "armed struggle"; 30% (24% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) chose negotiations; and 15% (11% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip) chose popular peaceful resistance. These results indicate a decrease of 6 percentage points in support for armed struggle, a 5 percentage point increase in support for negotiations. The drop in support for armed struggle comes from the Gaza Strip, where this percentage drops by 20 points, essentially reverting to its level of support six months ago.

• For the fourth time since October 7, we asked respondents from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip what they thought of Hamas' decision to launch the October 7 attack, whether it was correct or incorrect: 54%, compared to 67% three months ago, in June 2024, and 71% six months ago, in March 2024, said it was the right decision. The decrease in this percentage came from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where it stands today at 64% in the West Bank, a decrease of nine percentage points, and 39% in the Gaza Strip, compared to 57% three months ago, a decrease of 18 percentage points.  Six months ago, 71% of Gazans said that Hamas’ decision was “correct.”
• As we found in the previous poll, the decrease in this percentage this time also came mostly from the Gaza Strip where it stands today at 39% compared to 57% three months ago and 71% six months ago.

• Despite a 13 percentage point drop in favorable views of the decision to attack on October 7, the belief that the war on Gaza since October 7 has "revived international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that it may lead to increased recognition of the Palestinian state" remained higher than the favorability rate, at 68%, and only 30% said they did not believe so.
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (70%) believes that international recognition of Palestine and decisions of international organizations and courts help establish Palestinians' right to an independent state while 28% believe they do not. Nonetheless, an overwhelming majority (79%) believes that the current US administration under Biden will not recognize the state of Palestine this year while 18% believe it will.

• 69% of Gazans say they have enough food for a day or two; 31% say they don't have enough food for a day or two. These results show an improvement over the results we obtained three months ago when 64% said they had enough food for a day or two. It is important to recall that the data collection did not include the northern besieged area of the Gaza Strip, which is reportedly experiencing increasing famine.
• 57% of Gazans say that one or more members of their family were killed during the current war, and in a separate question, 69% say that one or more members of their family were injured during this war. When combining the answers to the two questions and omitting the overlap, the results show that 78% report that one or more of their family members have been killed or injured, and only 22% report that none of their family members have been killed or injured.

• We asked residents of the Gaza Strip how often they had to move from one shelter to another since the war began on October 7, 2023: 40% said it ranged from two to three times, 45% said it ranged from four to six times, 11% said it was more than ten times, and 3% said it was once.

• When asked if Hamas had committed the atrocities seen in the videos shown by international media displaying acts or atrocities committed by Hamas members against Israeli civilians, such as killing women and children in their homes. The overwhelming majority (89%) said it did not commit such atrocities, and only 8% said it did.

• 50% expect Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement in a few days while 48% do not expect that.
• As we did in our previous three polls since the war, we asked in the current poll about the party that will emerge victorious in this war. Half of the public expects Hamas to win, compared to 67% three months ago and 64% six months ago. It is worth noting, as the figure below shows, that fewer Gazans, at just 28% today, expect Hamas to win compared to the results three and six months ago, when those percentages stood at 48% and 56%, respectively. Hamas's expectation of victory has also dropped significantly in the West Bank, where today it stands at only 65% compared to 79% three months ago. It is also worth noting that while 4% in the West Bank expect Israel to win the current war, a quarter of Gazans expect Israel to win.

• We asked respondents to speculate about the future of the Gaza Strip the day after the end of the current war. A majority of 57% says it will come under Hamas’ control. As we found in the previous poll, there are significant differences between West Bankers and Gazans, with only 37% of Gazans saying Hamas will actually control that area, compared to a much higher percentage (70%) in the West Bank. Three months ago, 46% of Gazans said Hamas will control the Gaza Strip after the war. Only 9% believe that the Israeli army will be in control of the Gaza Strip; 17% believe that the PA will return to control the Gaza Strip; and 13% believe it will come under international control.
• When asked about the likelihood that the public would prefer to happen after the war, 58% (73% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) said they prefer the return of Hamas, 20% chose the Palestinian Authority, 4% chose the Israeli army, and 12% chose to bring the Gaza Strip under the control of international forces.   Three months ago, 71% of the West Bankers and 46% of Gazans said they prefer to see Hamas remaining in control.
• When asked about support and opposition to the return of President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip and its control of the Rafah crossing after a ceasefire, 70% opposed it and 27% supported it. Support in the Gaza Strip rises to 42% compared to only 17% in the West Bank.
• We asked about the public's attitude towards the deployment of an Arab security force from Egypt and Jordan in the Gaza Strip to assist the Palestinian security forces. Opposition to such a security force drops to 66%, compared to 75% three months ago, and support stands today at 32% today. Three months ago, support stood at 23%.

• An overwhelming majority of the public (77%) believes that President Abbas' announcement of his intention to visit the Gaza Strip does not mean a positive change in how the PA henceforth deals with the current war on the Gaza Strip while 20% believe it does.
• We asked the public for the second time what political measures the PA leadership should take today to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip. We presented the public with three options: reconciliation, the formation of a national unity government, and the provision of humanitarian services. First came "the formation of a national unity government to negotiate with Israel and the international community to end the war and rebuild the Gaza Strip in the future," with 42% opting for it, compared to 33% three months ago. Second was "achieving immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" with 38% selecting it.  The third option, chosen by only 16%, was for the PA to "lead a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the residents of Gaza in cooperation with Egypt and the international community." It is worth noting that support for the formation of a national unity government stands at 52% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank.

• As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:

1. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with Hamas' performance drops to 61% (75% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Yahya Sinwar (54%; 70% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip), Fateh (26%; 25% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip), the PA (22%; 30% in the Gaza Strip and 18% in the West Bank), president Abbas (18%; 13% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip), and the new prime minister Muhammad Mustafa (15%; 23% in the Gaza Strip and 10% in the West Bank).  Three months ago, satisfaction with Sinwar in the Gaza Strip stood at 50% and with Hamas at 64%.

A large majority in the West Bank (75%) is satisfied with Hamas’ decision to replace its head, Ismail Haniyyeh, with Yahiya Sinwar. Two thirds (65%) of Gazans say they are dissatisfied; only 32% are satisfied with Sinwar's selection.  Moreover, a majority of 53% of all the public believes that Hamas' policy under Sinwar will not change while 29% believe it will become closer to Iran, and 10% believe it will become closer to Egypt and Qatar.

2. As for satisfaction with Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate went to Yemen, as we found in our previous polls, today at 69% (78% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Hezbollah (44%), Qatar (43%), Iran (33%), Jordan (23%), Egypt (20%), UAE (19%), and Saudi Arabia (15%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction in the current and previous polls in the West Bank and Gaza. Significant in this poll is the decline in satisfaction with Yemen, Hezbollah, Qatar and Iran. It is also useful to note that satisfaction with Yemen and Hezbollah rises in the West Bank while decreasing in the Gaza Strip; in contrast, satisfaction with Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia rises in the Gaza Strip and decreases in the West Bank, while satisfaction with Iran is equal in both regions.

The significant drop in satisfaction with Iran's performance, a 16-point drop, seems to be due to the belief of the overwhelming majority that it will not avenge the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on its soil. A majority of more than three quarters (76%) believes that Iran will not retaliate against Israel for assassinating Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran while 20% believe it will take revenge. Belief that Iran will retaliate against Israel increases in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank at 27% and 15% respectively.

If Iran attacks Israel in response to its assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on its soil, 44% of the Palestinians believe that the war will extend into a broad regional war, but a slim majority of 51% (54% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip) believes that Iran's response will be limited as it did five months ago.

3. For the international actors, China received the highest satisfaction (26%), perhaps for its role in organizing the Beijing reconciliation meeting, followed by Russia (19%), the United Nations (13%), and the United States (5%).

• 77% of West Bankers say they fear the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank while 23% do not fear such a war. 63% of West Bankers believe that if the war spreads to the West Bank, Israel will succeed in destroying most of its cities, as it did in the Gaza Strip.
• Despite this, 67% believe that Israel will not win a war in the West Bank if it moves there from the Gaza Strip, but 25% believe it will win it. When West Bankers are asked what they would do if the war moved to the West Bank, would they move with their families to Jordan or stay in the West Bank, 90% of West Bankers say they will remain in the West Bank while 8% say they will go to Jordan.
• When asked who would bring the war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, 90% of West Bankers think it could be the government of Netanyahu and settlers, 3% think it could Hamas, and 5% think it could be armed groups in the West Bank.
• When asked, what would be the aims of Israel if the war were to move to the West Bank, the largest percentage (33%) said “to commit genocide against the population.” The second motivation attributed to Israel, selected by 31% of the public, was “to eradicate the armed resistance;” the third, selected by 25% was “to expel the population to Jordan,” and 10% said “to eliminate the Palestinian Authority.”

• If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Yahiya Sinwar of Hamas, turnout would be 69%. Vote for Marwan Barghouti among all public, voters and non-voters, stands at 32%, followed by Sinwar (31%) and Abbas (6%). Among voters only, i.e. among those who actually intend to vote in the presidential elections, Barghouti receives 46%, Sinwar 44%, and Abbas 9%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti among voters stood at 56%, Hamas candidate 36%, and Abbas 6%.

• If only two candidates were in the competition for the presidency, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah and Yahiya Sinwar of Hamas, turnout would drop to 55%. In this case, Sinwar stands at 41% and Abbas at 13%. Among voters actually participating in the elections, Sinwar receives 74% and Abbas 24%. Three months ago, only 20% among the actual voters chose Abbas and 76% chose Hamas’s candidate.

• If the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti of Fatah and Sinwar of Hamas, turnout would rise to 67%. In this case, the vote for Barghouti among the entire public would be 35% and for Sinwar 32%. Among voters actually participating in the elections, Barghouti receives 52% and Sinwar 47%. These results indicate a 7-point decrease in the percentage of votes for Barghouti and an 8-point increase in the vote for the Hamas candidate.

• In a closed question, we asked the public to choose the person it deems appropriate as President Abbas's successor from a predetermined list of options. The largest percentage (37%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti, 30% said they prefer Yahya Sinwar, 10% chose Mohammed Dahlan, 5% chose Mustafa Barghouti, and 15% said they do not know or chose someone other than those listed.
• Satisfaction with President Abbas' performance stands at 18% and dissatisfaction at 81%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 11% in the West Bank (compared to 8% three months ago) and in the Gaza Strip at 27% (compared to 19% three months ago).
• 84% want President Abbas to resign while 15% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 89% said they want the president to resign, and nine months ago 84% said they want him to resign. Today, 90% of the demand for the president's resignation comes from the West Bank and 75% comes from the Gaza Strip.

• When asked which political party or movement they support, the largest percentage (36%) said they prefer Hamas, followed by Fatah (21%), 6% selected third parties, and 29% said they do not support any of them or do not know. Three months ago, 40% said they support Hamas and 20% said they support Fatah. Twelve months ago, support for Hamas stood at 22% and Fatah at 26%. These results mean that support for Hamas over the past three months has decreased by 4 percentage points, while support for Fatah has risen by one point over the same period. Support for Hamas today stands at 37% in the West Bank (compared to 41% three months ago) and for Fatah at 18% (compared to 17% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas stands at 35% (compared to 38% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 26% (compared to 24% three months ago).

• But if new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, 65% say they will participate in them, and among the public at large, 29% say they will vote for Hamas, 18% for Fatah, 4% for third parties, and 15% have not yet decided. Among voters actually participating in the elections, support stands at Hamas at 45%, Fatah at 27%, third parties at 5%, and 22% are undecided on whom they will vote. Compared to the results we obtained three months ago, the current results among voters actually participating in the elections indicate a decrease of 3 percentage points for Hamas and a rise of one percentage point for Fatah. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Hamas among voters participating in the elections stands at 42% (compared to 44% three months ago), and vote for Fatah among voters participating in the elections stands at 33% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 48% (compared to 48% three months ago) and Fatah among voters participating in elections stands at 23% (compared to 21% three months ago).

• 43% (compared to 51% three months ago) believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 19% (compared to 16% three months ago) believe that Fatah led by president Abbas is the most deserving. About a third, (32%) compared to 27% three months ago, believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership. A year ago, 27% said Hamas is the most deserving of it, 24% said Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is the most deserving, and 44% said that both movements do not deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people.

An overwhelming majority (69%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to carry out. By contrast, 22% believe it will succeed in doing so. Three months ago, 72% said the new government would not succeed in carrying out reforms.

• We also asked the public about its expectations for the new government, such as carrying out specific reforms announced by this government or meeting the priorities of the public:

1. 75% believe that the government will not succeed in pushing for reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
2. 72% believe it will not succeed in improving economic conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
3. 73% believe it will not succeed in holding legislative and presidential elections
4. 71% say it will not succeed in providing relief for the Gaza Strip and reconstruction in the future

It is important to note, as the following figure shows, that in all of these measures, Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but the majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of these reforms.

• Al Jazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine as 60% selecting it as the one they watched the most during the past two months. Due to the current war conditions, residents of the West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to watch Aljazeera, 80% and 30% respectively. The second most popular stations are Al-Aqsa and Palestine Today (3% each), followed by Palestine, Al-Arabiya, Ma'an and Al-Mayadeen TV (2% each).
• A majority of 66% (compared to 69% three months ago) believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 30% (compared to 27% three months ago) believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people. A year ago, 62% said the PA is a burden and 35% said it was an achievement.
• We asked the public in the West Bank about its personal and family safety and security. The findings show that only 9% feel safe and secure while 90% feel unsafe and unsecure. Three months ago, the perception of safety stood at 13% and 12 months ago at 48%.

An overwhelming majority (72%) believes that the Beijing's Declaration issued by Palestinian factions in July will not be implemented soon while 24% believe it will be implemented soon. When those who believe that the Beijing's declaration will not be implemented were asked who they think will obstruct implementation, 39% say it is Fatah headed by President Abbas and 36% believe it is Hamas.

• We asked the public about its assessment of China's role in domestic Palestinian affairs, is it big or small? 40% say it is “medium,” 38% say it is small, and only 17% say it is big. When asked whether or not respondents welcome a broader Chinese role in Palestinian domestic affairs, such as reconciliation, a majority of 57% says it welcomes it while 40% say it does not.
• We asked the public which regional or international party has the greatest influence on the decisions of the Hamas leadership today. The largest percentage (38%) says it is Iran, 20% say it is Qatar, 3% say it is Egypt, and 2% say it is Russia. Four countries received a single percentage point: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United States. 30% select "none of the above."
• When asked about the most influential regional or international party on the decisions of the PA leadership today, the largest percentage (28%) say it is Israel, 25% say it is the US, 11% say it is Egypt, 7% say it is Qatar, followed by Saudi Arabia (4%), Jordan (3%), and 14% select "none of the above."

• 39% support and 58% oppose the concept of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 32%. Rise in support for this solution in the current poll came from both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to 39% and 38% respectively.

• But when asked about support or opposition to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied in 1967, i.e. defining the borders of the state and without linking it to the two-state solution, support rises to 59% (60% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip), while 37% do not support the establishment of such a state.
• Support for a two-state solution is usually linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for a Palestinian state. Today, 57% (compared to 65% three months ago) believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion, but 39% (compared to 34% three months ago) believe it remains practical. Moreover, 69% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent and 30% believe the chances are medium or high.
• When asked about the public's support or opposition to specific political measures to break the deadlock, 57% supported joining more international organizations, 45% supported resorting to unarmed popular resistance, 51% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 49% supported the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, and 22% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 63% supported a return to confrontations and an armed intifada, 49% supported unarmed popular resistance, 62% supported the dissolution of the PA, and 22% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We asked about the public support for three possible solutions to the conflict: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the solution of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel, and a one-state solution in which the Jews and Palestinians live with equality, 51% (49% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, while 19% (14% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip) prefer a confederation between two states. 10% (11% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the establishment of a single state with equality between the two sides. 21% said they did not know or did not want to answer.
• We presented the public with three ways to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective one: 48% (50% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) chose "armed struggle"; 30% (24% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) chose negotiations; and 15% (11% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip) chose popular peaceful resistance. As shown in the figure below, these results indicate a decrease of 6 percentage points in support for armed struggle, a 5 percentage point increase in support for negotiations, and a decrease of one percentage point in support for peaceful resistance. The drop in support for armed struggle comes from the Gaza Strip, where this percentage drops by 20 points, essentially reverting to its level of support six months ago.

• 41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages; 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; and 11% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%; 38% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; 30% said it is the Israeli occupation; 11% said it is corruption; 10% said it is unemployment; and 9% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, 50% (45% in the West Bank and 57% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; and 28% said it is the Israeli occupation.

14-16 December 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during December 14-16, 2006. The poll deals with several issues including armed confrontations, ceasefire, negotiations, permanent peace, Arab Initiative, performance of the government and the president, early elections, and the domestic balance of power. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults, 830 in the West Bank and 440 in the Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Poll findings show a considerable increase in the level of public dissatisfaction with the performance of the Hamas government. More importantly however, the findings show a greater increase in the level of dissatisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas. These developments might explain the poll finding of a high level of support for early parliamentary and presidential elections. The poll shows that if such elections were to take place today, vote for Fateh would be almost identical to the vote it received about one year ago in the January 2006 elections. But the vote for Hamas would be lower than it received in those elections. But the poll shows a large percentage of undecided (10%) voters which indicates that Hamas might be able to regain the votes it has lost. This conclusion is supported by the finding that shows a tie in the race for the presidency between Fateh’s candidate Mahmud Abbas and Hamas’ Isma’il Haniyeh. The considerable support the prime minister receives indicates that the dissatisfaction with the Hamas government does not necessarily mean blaming it for the current conditions. Moreover, the stability in the support for Fateh indicates that those who are dissatisfied with Hamas have not yet shifted their loyalty to Fateh, perhaps because they are also dissatisfied with the nationalist movement.

Findings show relative stability in public attitude regarding the peace process and armed confrontations despite the continued decline in confidence in the role played until now by armed confrontations in achieving national rights and despite the great level of support for a ceasefire. A large percentage of Palestinians believe that armed action can play a positive role in ending occupation despite the overwhelming support for the Gazaceasefire agreement and for extending it to the West Bank. 

Findings show an overwhelming preference among Fateh and Hamas voters for conducting negotiations for permanent peace and end of conflict while only a small minority prefers a track for an interim or partial settlement. But the public is divided over the substance of a permanent settlement with one half supporting and one half opposing a settlement along the lines of the Geneva Initiative and the Clinton Parameters. Support for the Arab or Saudi Initiative and for a settlement based on a two-state solution in which the Palestinians recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israel recognizes Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people is greater than support for one along the lines of the Geneva Initiative.  

Despite public preference for a permanent deal track, a majority of 58% would support an agreement that would create a Palestinian state in the whole Gaza Strip and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations over permanent issues such as final borders, Jerusalem, and refugees. 

(1) Armed Confrontations and Ceasefire

• 85% support and 14% oppose the current Gaza Ceasefire agreement and identical percentages (85% and 14%) support and oppose extending it to the West Bank.
• The public is divided in its evaluation of the outcome of the last round of armed confrontations but the largest percentage (46%) believes that the two sides or none of them came out a winner.
• Similarly, the public is divided in identifying who benefits more from the ceasefire, Israel or the Palestinians; but the largest percentage (36%) believes the two sides or none of them benefit from it.
• The public is also divided over who benefits domestically from the ceasefire, Fateh or Hamas; but the largest percentage (58%) believes that both or none of them benefit from it.
• The public is divided into two halves in the evaluation of the role of rocket launching from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns with 48% believing it serves and 48% believing it hurts Palestinian interests.
• Despite the fact that 57% of the public believe that a role does exist for violence in ending Israeli occupation, only 49% believe that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of respondents (85%) supports the ceasefire agreement currently observed in the Gaza Strip while only 14% oppose it. Similarly, 85% support and 14% oppose extending the agreement to cover the West Bank as well. The widespread support for the ceasefire might reflect a decrease in the positive evaluation of the role of violence in achieving national rights. Findings show that the public is split into two equal halves on this matter with 49% believing that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. This percentage stood at 54% six months ago and at 68% one year ago. 

Belief that armed confrontations serve Palestinian interests increases among men (56%) compared to women (44%), among students (61%) compared to housewives (43%), among those who would definitely refuse to buy a lottery ticket (59%) compared to those who would definitely agree to buy a lottery ticket (37%), among supporters of Hamas (62%) compared to supporters of Fateh (37%), and among those who define themselves as opponents of the peace process (74%) compared to those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (43%).

Findings show that the public does not view the outcome of the armed confrontations that preceded the ceasefire as a Palestinian victory with only 24% seeing it that way and a similar percentage (27%) seeing it as an Israeli victory. The largest percentage (29%) believes that no one came out a winner and 18% believe that both sides came out winners. When evaluating the previous period of the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns, the public becomes divided into two equal halves with 48% believing that it served national interests and an identical percentage believing it hurts the national interests. 

When determining who the beneficiaries from the current ceasefire are, one third believes the Palestinians benefit more and 29% believe the Israelis benefit more. One quarter believes that the two sides benefit and 11% believe neither side benefits. With regard to domestic actors, 21% believe Mahmud Abbas and Fateh benefit more from the ceasefire while 15% believe that Isma’il Haniyeh and Hamas benefit more. 34% believe both sides benefit and 24% believe that neither side benefits.

With regard to expectations in the aftermath of the ceasefire, only 19% believe the two sides will return to negotiations and violence will stop soon while 38% believe that negotiations will be resumed but some violence will continue. 37% believe armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. It is worth mentioning that the percentage of those who believed that armed confrontations will not stop and negotiations will not be resumed soon stood at 26% three months ago. The increased pessimism about the future might explain the finding regarding the future of the peace process with 57% believing that there is a positive role for violence in ending occupation (21% believe the peace process has failed in ending occupation and should be stopped and Palestinians should instead resort to violence while 36% believe that the peace process should not be stopped but at the same time violence too should not be stopped). By contrast, only 38% believe that armed attacks have no positive role to play in ending occupation (27% believe that the peace process has not failed and should be given more time and in the meanwhile violence should be stopped while 11% believe that armed attacks are responsible for the stagnation in the peace process and if stopped peace making would be more successful.

Belief that the peace process has failed and should be replaced with armed attacks increases among men (25%) compared to women (16%), among holders of BA degree (20%) compared to illiterates (12%), among those who definitely would not buy a lottery ticket (29%) compared to those who would definitely buy one (15%), among supporters of Hamas (32%) compared to supporters of Fateh (10%), and among those who define themselves as opponents of the peace process (50%) compared to those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (15%).

(2) Negotiations and Permanent Status

• 62% believe that the government led by Hamas should conduct peace negotiations with Israel and 34% believe it should not.
• 58% support and 40% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people in the context of a permanent settlement and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
• 48% support and 49% oppose a package of permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters, Taba negotiations, and the Geneva Initiative. But support for the various elements of the package ranges between 28% and 63%.
• 49% support and 45% oppose the plan known as the Road Map.
• 81% prefer a permanent status track of negotiations that would lead to permanent peace and end of conflict while only 16% prefer a track that would lead to an interim settlement that would postpone the resolution of some issues such as refugees.
• But a majority of 58% would support and 37% would oppose an interim agreement that would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the whole Gaza Strip and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations over permanent issues such as final borders, Jerusalem, and refugees.
• 59% support the Arab or Saudi Initiative and 38% oppose it.

Findings show that the majority of the respondents (62%) supports and 34% oppose peace negotiations between a Hamas-led government and Israel. A majority of 58% supports and 40% oppose a permanent settlement that would resolve all issues of the conflict in which Palestinians would recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis would recognize Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.  A similar percentage (59%) supports and 38% oppose the Arab (or Saudi) Initiative which calls for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab land including Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the solution of the refugee problem based on UN resolution 194 which allows refugees to return to Israel and their compensation in return for recognition of Israel by all Arab countries and recognition of Israel’s right to live within secure borders and the signing of a peace agreement and the establishment of normal relations with Israel.

But the public is divided into two equal halves with regard to a permanent settlement along the lines of the Geneva Initiative, the Clinton Parameters, and the Taba negotiations with 48% supporting such a settlement and 49% opposing it. Six months ago, support for such a settlement stood at 44% and opposition at 53%. But as the table below shows, the highest level of support for this package stood at 54% in December 2004. Current support for the item dealing with withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 with equal territorial swap stands at 61% and opposition at 37%. Support for the item dealing with the establishment of a Palestinian state without an army but with international forces deployed for its protection stands at 28% and opposition at 70%.  Support for the item on dividing East Jerusalem stands at 39% and opposition at 59%. Support for a refugee settlement stands at 41% and opposition at 54%. Support for ending the conflict stands at 63% and opposition at 34%. Finally, support for security arrangements stands at 42% and opposition at 55%.  46% of the public believes that a majority of Palestinians supports this package and 39% believe that a majority rejects the package and 15% do not know. Similarly, 43% believe a majority of Israelis supports the package and 39% believe a majority in Israel rejects it.

Support for a Permanent Settlement Framework along the Lines of the Geneva Initiative, the Clinton Parameters, and the Taba Negotiations

(2003-2006)

Support for the package increases slightly in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (46%), among those who definitely would buy a lottery ticket (63%) compared to those who would definitely not buy a lottery ticket (32%), among supporters of Fateh (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas (34%), and among those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (58%) compared to those who define themselves as opponents of the peace process (16%).

Findings also show that 49% support the Road Map and 45% oppose it. Last September, support for this plan stood at 52% and opposition at 42%.

Findings show that an overwhelming majority (81%) prefers a track of negotiations that would focus on reaching a permanent status agreement that would end the conflict and create permanent peace while only 16% prefers a track that would focus on reaching an interim agreement that would create a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while postponing the settlement of other issues such as refugees. But if an agreement is actually reached on the establishment of a Palestinian state in the whole Gaza Strip and 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel on the remaining issues such as final borders, refugees, and holy places, a majority of 58% would support it and 37% would oppose it.

The poll found that 39% of the Palestinians view Olmert’s speech in which he stated his willingness to evacuate settlements and withdraw from large areas as contributing to the peace process while 37% view it as not contributing to the peace process and 19% view it as having no effect on the peace process.  By contrast, a majority of 59% view the statement by Isma’il Haniyeh in which he offered Israel a long term Hudna of ten years or more in return for an Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state as contributing to peace, and 22% viewed it as not contributing to peace and 13% viewed it as having no effect on the peace process.  

(3) Governmental Performance, Early Elections, and Balance of Power

• Satisfaction with the performance of the Hamas government drops from 42% three months ago to 33% today. Similarly, satisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas drops from 55% three months ago to 40% in this poll.
• More than 90% describe current Palestinian conditions as bad or very bad and only 2% describe it as good.
• 48% agree and 47% disagree that Hamas government should resign, and 61% support and 37% oppose the holding of early parliamentary and presidential elections.
• A majority of 56% agrees with Fateh and the president that PA president has the right to call for early elections and 38% agree with Hamas that he does not have that right.
• After one year since the electoral experience early this year, a majority of the Palestinians is still in favor of democracy: 53% say it is appropriate for the Palestinians and 43% say it is inappropriate.
• If early parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 36% of the vote, Fateh 42%, and all others 12%. 10% remain undecided. Three months ago, Hamas received 38% and Fateh received 41%.
• If early presidential elections were to take place today and only two were to compete, Mahmud Abbas from Fateh and Isma’il Haniyeh from Hamas, Abbas would receive 46% of the vote and Haniyeh would receive 45%. 9% remain undecided.  But if the race was between Marwan Barghouti from Fateh and Khalid Mish’al from Hamas, Barghouti would receive 57% and Mish’al would receive 36%. 7% remain undecided.

Findings show that satisfaction with the performance of the Hamas government has dropped significantly compared to where it was three months ago, from 42% to 33%. Drop in satisfaction covers all aspects of government work: enforcing law and order dropped from 41% to 27%, reforming the PA and fighting corruption dropped from 46% to 35%, reducing the plight of occupation and confronting Israeli settlement policy and the building of the separation barrier from 33% to 26%, and improving economic conditions, such as resolving the salaries problem, from 26% to 23%. It is interesting to note that 39% of those who voted for Hamas in the January 2006 elections say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the Hamas government while 30% of those who say they would vote for Hamas if new elections are held are dissatisfied with the performance of the Hamas government. It is also noticeable that satisfaction with the performance of the government is greater in the Gaza Strip (37%) than in the West Bank (31%).

Dissatisfaction however is not restricted to the performance of the Hamas government. Satisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas has also dropped significantly in three months from 55% to 40%. As the case had been three months ago, more than 90% describe the current Palestinian conditions today as bad or very bad and only 2% describe it as good. Moreover, 87% say they and their families do not feel secure or safe in the PA and 87% say they believe corruption exists in the PA and 69% of those say that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future. It is worth noting that belief that corruption will increase or remain the same dropped significantly to 28% in the first poll, conducted in March 2006, after Hamas’ electoral victory. The huge increase to the current level indicates that the public has reached the conclusion that given the current internal dynamics, Hamas’ control over the parliament and government does not necessarily mean it has the capacity to fight corruption.

For all these reasons, the poll found half of the public (48%) wanting the Hamas government to resign while the other half (47%) remains opposed to that. Moreover, a majority of 61% support and 37% oppose the conduct of early parliamentary and presidential elections. More importantly, 56% of the public agrees with Fateh and Abbas that the PA president has the right to call for early elections while 37% agree with Hamas that he does not have that right. It is interesting to note that despite public frustration with current conditions, Palestinians are still committed to democracy with 53% saying that given the experience of the last year since the elections, democracy is indeed appropriate for Palestine and 43% say it is inappropriate.

If parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 36% of the vote (compared to 38% three months ago), Fateh would receive 42% (compared to 41% three months ago), all other lists combined would receive 12% (compared to 9%) three months ago). 10%, compared to 12% three months ago, are undecided. Support for Hamas compared to Fateh increases in the Gaza Strip (43% vs. 41% for Fateh) and decreases in the West Bank (32% vs. 43% for Fateh). Support for Hamas also increases in refugee camps (41% vs. 40% for Fateh) and decreases in towns and villages (34% vs. 45% for Fateh) and in cities (36% vs. 41% for Fateh). Support for Hamas also increases among women (42% vs. 40% for Fateh) and decreases among men (30% vs. 45% for Fateh). Support for Hamas also increases among those who definitely would not buy a lottery ticket (50% vs. 27% for Fateh) and decreases among those who definitely would buy a lottery ticket (19% vs. 58% for Fateh). Support for Hamas also increases among those between 33 and 42 years of age (44% vs. 33% for Fateh) and decreases among those between 18 and 32 years of age (34% vs. 48% for Fateh), among those between 43 and 52 years of age (35% vs. 42% for Fateh), and among those over 52 years of age (28% vs. 42% for Fateh). Support for Hamas increases significantly among those who define themselves as opponents of the peace process (74% vs. 5% for Fateh) and decreases significantly among those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (29% vs. 52% for Fateh). Support for Hamas and Fateh is close among those in the private sector (35% for Hamas and 37% for Fateh), but support for Hamas decreases significantly among those in the public sector (24% vs. 55% for Fateh).

If new presidential elections are to take place today with only two candidates participating, Isma’il Haniyeh from Hamas and Mahmud Abbas from Fateh, public vote would split equally among the two with Haniyeh receiving 45% and Abbas 46%. Haniyeh receives 49% of the vote in the Gaza Strip and 43% of the vote in the West Bank; Abbas receives 44% in the Gaza Strip and 47% in the West Bank. But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti from Fateh and Khalid Mish’al from Hamas, Mish’al would receive 36% and Barghouti 57%. Barghouti receives a majority of the vote in the Gaza Strip (58% vs. 37% for Mish’al) and in theWest Bank (56% vs. 35% for Mish’al).....Full Report

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2021 show the centrality of domestic issues on shaping public attitudes. Three developments in particular are worth observing: the killing of the political activist Nizar Banat by PA security services, the manner in which PA security services dealt with protests during the last few months, and the residual impact of the last Hamas-Israel war of May 2021. Findings also show the great importance attached by the public to the issue of prisoners in Israeli jails. Impacted by all of the above, findings reflect continued PA loss of status and support.

A large majority rejects that the notion that the killing of Banat was a mistake unintentionally made by security officers. Instead, the public is confident that the death of the political activist was premediated, ordered by the political or security leadership. Because of that, the public is not 

satisfied with the step taken by the PA to ensure justice by putting all security officers involved on trial. The public is also angry with the manner in which the PA cracked down on public protests that demanded justice in the Banat case. In fact, three quarters view the behavior of the security services as a violation of liberties and human rights.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public has been following, on daily basis, the news regarding the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel. The overwhelming majority views the prisoners’ behavior, even after they were captured, as inspiring to the Palestinians to rise and take the initiative to resist the occupation.  Yet, on this issue of public consensus, one in which the PA is not a party, the Palestinian leadership and the security establishment do not come out looking good at all. While the public is easily convinced by Hamas’ proclamations and plans for freeing the prisoners, the PA is distrusted with the majority believes that the PA security services would not defend the prisoners.

The impact of the May 2021 confrontations in Jerusalem and the war between Hamas and Israel is still strongly felt in this poll. An overwhelming majority still thinks Hamas came out the winner and that Hamas goal has been to defend East Jerusalemites and al Aqsa Mosque. Indeed, the largest percentage (but not the majority) believes that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people. The majority calls upon Hamas to relaunch rockets against Israel if East Jerusalemites are expelled from their homes in the city or if restrictions are imposed on Palestinian access to al Aqsa Mosque. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that now, after three months have passed since our last poll, we do see some decline in some of those indicators that measure the ascendance of Hamas. In almost all indicators, we see a small decline ranging between two to eight percentage points.

If new presidential and parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would do relatively well compared to Fatah. This is particularly true for a presidential election, assuming president Abbas is Fatah’s candidate. The outcome would be dramatically different and more beneficial to Fatah if its candidate for the presidency is Marwan Barghouti. Most importantly for Fatah, findings show a significant increase in the demand for Abbas’ resignation, with almost 80% making the demand, an unprecedent PSR finding.

Findings show that in the context of increased Covid-19 infection rates, the majority is in favor of mandatory vaccination; but opposition is slightly more than a third. Yet, even among those who reject making vaccination mandatory to all of the public, a minority favors making it mandatory to those working in the public sector such as schools and ministries.

Findings on the peace process show continued but slow decline in support for the two-state solution. They also show high levels of support for armed struggle as the best means of ending the occupation with almost half of the public endorsing this position. Consistent with that we find a slim majority opposing a resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Despite this, a majority of Palestinians view positively the confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

(1) Prisoners escape from the Gilboa prison:

• 86% followed up the news of the six Palestinian prisoners who escaped from the Gilboa prison; 87% think the event will serve as an inspiration to the Palestinians
• 81% think that Hamas will succeed in freeing the six prisoners in a prison exchange deal with Israel
• But 68% think the Palestinian Authority would not have protect the prisoners if they had succeeded in entering the West Bank

An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (86%) says that it has heard about and followed on daily basis the news about the escape of the six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel and the capture of some of them while 12% say they did that occasionally and only 2% say they have not heard about or followed the news. Similarly, 87% say the escape of the six prisoners and the capture of some of them will serve as an inspiration to Palestinians outside the prison to take the initiative and actively work toward the ending of occupation; only 7% think the escape and capture will have the opposite impact of bringing frustration and despair; 5% say it will have no impact.

81% believe that Hamas will soon succeed in making a deal with Israel on a prisoners’ exchange that will include the release of the escaped and recaptured prisoners; 14% believe no such exchange will take place soon. The belief that Hamas will soon reach a prisoners’ exchange deal with Israel which would include the release of the six prisoners is higher in the West Bank (83%) compared to the Gaza Strip (77%), among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (76% and 78% respectively), and among the religious and the somewhat religious (85% and 80% respectively) compared to the non-religious (55%).

On the other hand, if the escaped prisoners managed to reach the Palestinian territories, only 24% think the PA security services would in this case protect them while 68% think they would not do so. The belief that the PA security services would not protect the escaped prisoners is higher in the West Bank (70%) compared to the Gaza Strip (66%), among the holders of BA degree (75%) compared to the illiterates (57%), among professionals, merchants, and laborers (76%, 75%, and 69% respectively) compared to farmers and students (58% and 60% respectively), among those working in the private sector (73%) compared to those who work in the public sector (57%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (90% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (46%), and among the religious and the somewhat religious (70% and 68% respectively) compared to the non-religious (51%).

(2) The death of Nizar Banat:

• 63% believe the death of Nizar Banat was a deliberate measure ordered by the PA political or security leaders, not an intentional mistake
• 69% believe the PA measures taken to ensure justice in the Banat case are not sufficient
• 74% believe that the arrest of demonstrators is a violation of liberties and human rights

A majority of 63% of the public believes that the killing of Nizar Banat soon after his arrest by PA security officials was a deliberate measure ordered by the PA political or security leaders while only 22% believe it was an unintentional mistake by those who arrested him. The belief that the killing of Nizar Banat was a deliberate act of PA leadership is higher in the West Bank (64%) compared to the Gaza Strip (61%), among men (65%) compared to women (61%), among professionals and students (72% and 68% respectively) compared to merchants, farmers, and employees (53%, 58%, and 60% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (65%) compared to those who work in the public sector (53%), among supporters of Hamas (93%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (39% and 61% respectively), and among the religious (67%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (61% and 52% respectively).

A large majority of 69% feels the measures taken by the PA to ensure justice in the Banat case, including putting on trial all 14 security officials who took part in his arrest, are insufficient; only 20% think they are sufficient. Moreover, a majority of 63% support and 28% oppose the demonstrations that erupted after the death of Banat demanding the departure of the president from office and the removal of his government. Almost three quarters (74%) believe the steps taken by the PA security services in arresting the demonstrators who demanded justice for Banat is a violation of liberties and human rights while only 18% view these measures as a legitimate enforcement of law and order.

(3) Three months after the Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

• 71% believe that Hamas came out a winner in its last war with Israel
• Two thirds believe that the launching of rockets by Hamas at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque
• 45% believe that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people; only 19% believe Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving

An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (71%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 3% think Israel came out a winner; 21% say no one came out a winner and 3% think both sides came out winners. Three months ago, 77% thought Hamas came out the winner. Moreover, 63% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 29% think it did not. Three months ago, 65% said Hamas has achieved its declared goal

Two thirds think that Hamas’ decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 10% think it came as a protest against the PA cancelation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 19% think Hamas’ decision was motivated by these two drivers. Three months ago, 72% thought that Hamas’ decision came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque.

In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 45% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while only 19% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 28% think neither side deserve such a role. Three months ago, 53% thought Hamas is more deserving of representation and leadership and 14% thought Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is the more deserving.

If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 60% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 20% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 13% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

(4) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 73% demand the holding of presidential and legislative elections, but 56% do not think such elections will take place soon
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 34% of the vote and the later 56%; if the elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 55% and the latter 39%
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 24% and demand for his resignation stands at 78%
• If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 37% of the popular vote and Fatah 32%

Almost three quarters (73%) say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 23% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 82% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 56% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 34% and Haniyeh 56% of the votes (compared to 59% for Haniyeh and 27% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 34% of the votes (compared to 30% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 60% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 33% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 59% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 49% and from among those the former receives 31% and the latter 60%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 26% and Haniyyeh 63%. 

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 33% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 22% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and another 6% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 22% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas six months ago stood at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Moreover, 78% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 19% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 68% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 78% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 37% say they will vote for Hamas and 32% say they will vote for Fatah, 13% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 41% and Fatah at 30%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 27% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 38% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 32% three months ago).

(5) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• 27% want to emigrate; 36% in the Gaza Strip and 21% in the West Bank
• 83% believe there is corruption in the PA institutions
• 59% view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people; 34% view it as an asset
• Public expectations from the Shtayyeh government remains negative in three areas: reconciliation, the holding of elections, and improvement of economic conditions
• 54% favors the formation of a new government under a new prime minister
• 57% view societal violence that erupts from time to time as an indication of public distrust in the justice and law enforcement system

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 23%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 67% and in the West Bank at 59%. When asked about interest in emigrating from Palestine, 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 36% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 15% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 42% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 83%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 61% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 57% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

On free speech, 38% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 18% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 58% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 37% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 43% of Gazans said it was good or very good.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 34% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 35% viewed it as an asset.

After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 70% expect failure; only 22% expect success. When asked about the prospects for reconciliation, 32% expressed optimism and 63% expressed pessimism. Three months ago, optimism stood at 41%. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29%  of the public expect success and 63% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 64% expects failure and 30% expects success.

We asked the public about its view regarding the demands for a change in the current PA government. A majority of 54% expresses support for comprehensive change leading to the appointment of a new government and a new prime minister, while 26% want only to change some of the ministers, and 14% do not want to make any change and want the government to stay as it is. Support for a comprehensive change in which the government and the prime minister are replaced is higher in refugee camps and cities (59% and 54% respectively) compared to villages/towns (48%), among men (60%) compared to women (47%), among those whose age is 30 years or higher (55%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (50%), among holders of BA degree (62%) compared to the illiterates (27%), among those who work in the private sector (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (49%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (74% and 52% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (34%).

We also asked the public about its views on the recuring internal violence similar to the one witnessed recently in which an incident between two individuals led to widespread family and tribal violence. A majority of 57% expressed the view that such incidents indicate a weak pubic trust in the justice system including law enforcement agencies; but 35% expressed the view that such incidents reflect the traditional nature of Palestinian society that is difficult or impossible to change. When asked how should the PA deal with such incidents, 66% expressed the view that first and foremost, the PA should strengthen the law enforcement authorities while 27% expressed the view that the PA should strengthen the tribal reform committees and cooperate with them. Findings show that the percentage of those who think the PA should strengthen the law enforcement agencies in order to address societal violence is higher in the West Bank (69%) compared to the Gaza Strip (63%), among men (69%) compared to women (64%), among holders of BA degree (75%) compared to the illiterates (58%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (72% and 70% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (64%), and among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (71% and 67% respectively) compared to the religious (61%).

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 23%, followed by Palestine TV (14%), al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine Today (11%), Maan (10%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (2%).

(6) The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• A majority of 63% support making the Covid-19 vaccination mandatory
• 74% are satisfied with the PA efforts to ensure the availability of the Covid-19 vaccine
• But only 45% are satisfied with the PA efforts to contain the spread of the virus

With the big rise in the number of Covid infections, we asked the public about the steps it thinks the PA government should take in order to protect people from the pandemic: 39% said it should follow the normal procedures of enforcing social distance, face masks, and payment of fines for violators; a similar percentage (37%) said it should make vaccination mandatory to all those who are allowed to take it; 5% said it should impose a full closure; and 15% said they are in favor of all of the above. When then asked specifically about mandatory vaccination, a majority of 63% expressed support while 35% expressed opposition. Support for mandatory vaccination is higher in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (62%), in refugee camps and villages (70% and 67% respectively) compared to cities (62%), among men (65%) compared to women (62%), among students and laborers (72% and 66% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, and housewives (57%, 61%, and 62% respectively), among supporters of Fatah (74%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (64% and 55% respectively), and among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (72% and 65% respectively) compared to the religious (61%). Among those who reject mandatory vaccination, 29% are in favor, and 69% are not in favor, of making it mandatory to those who work in the public sector such as those working in schools and ministries.

48% (55% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 27% (19% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24 say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.

Almost three quarters (74%, 84% in the Gaza Strip and 68% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 24% are dissatisfied. But only 45% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 53% are dissatisfied. The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 59% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at only 39%. 

(7) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the two-state solution drops to 36% and opposition rises to 62%
• 73% do not believe that a Palestinian state will be created alongside Israel during the next five years
• About half of the public believe that armed struggle is the most effective means for ending the occupation; only 28% think negotiations are the most effective means
• 44% attribute the low levels of popular participation in none violent confrontations to the absence of public trust in the PA leadership and the political parties
• 54% are in favor of a return to an armed intifada, 27% are in favor of abandoning the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution
• 39% are in favor of resuming negotiations with Israel under the sponsorship of the Quartet
• A majority of 56% looks positively at confidence building measures that aim at improving living conditions

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 36% and opposition stands at 62%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 73% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle. When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 48% chose armed struggle, 28% negotiations, and 19% popular resistance. Three months ago, 49% chose armed struggle and 27% chose negotiations.

We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 39% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 16% selected the loss of the will to fight.

When asked about support for specific policy choices, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 54% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 54% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 60% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 47% supported dissolving the PA, and 20% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

Under current conditions, a majority of 61% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. 58% are opposed, and 36% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet stands at 39% and 52% are opposed. Moreover, 49% do not believe, and 41% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 56% said it looks positively, while 35% said it looks negatively, at such measures. The percentage of those who view positively such confidence building measures is higher in the West Bank (57%) compared to the Gaza Strip (53%), in villages and cities (58% and 56% respectively) compared to refugee camps (46%), among supporters of Fatah (73%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (42% and 51% respectively), and among the non-religious (62%) compared to the religious and the somewhat religious (54% and 56% respectively).

(8) American withdrawal from Afghanistan:

• 43% do not expect, and 36% think expect, the Afghanistan scenario to happen in Palestine in the event of an Israeli withdrawal
• 46% believe the main lesson for the Palestinians in the Afghanistan example is the need to strengthen Palestinian armed groups while 28% think it is the need to strengthen the PA and its legitimacy

We asked the public about the meaning of the developments leading to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan: 40% viewed the events as a victory for Taliban against the US and its Afghani allies. But a third (33%) thought that the events leading to the US withdrawal were orchestrated ahead of time between the US and Taliban; 27% say they not know.

The largest percentage of the public (43%) does not expect what happened in Afghanistan to happen in Palestine in case of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, a scenario in which such withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the PA and its government and the takeover of armed Islamist groups, such as Hamas; but 36% believe this scenario could indeed happen and 21% do not know.  The belief that what happened in Afghanistan could happen in Palestine in the event of an Israeli withdrawal, leading to PA collapse, is higher in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (25%), in refugee camps and cities (40% and 38% respectively) compared to villages/towns (28%), among refugees (47%) compared to non-refugees (28%), among holders of PA degree (39%) compared to illiterates (17%), among students, employees, and professionals (43%, 41%, and 40% respectively) compared to farmers and laborers (15% and 30% respectively), among laborers in the public sector (40%) compared to laborers in the private sector (35%), among supporters of Hamas (66%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (21% and 36% respectively), and among the religious (40%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (29% and 34% respectively).

Moreover, 46% believe the Palestinians should learn a lesson from what happened in Afghanistan by strengthening the forces of armed resistance, but not the PA and its government, while 28% think the lesson should lead us to strengthen the PA and its legitimacy so that it would not collapse as the Afghani government did. The belief that the lesson should be to strengthen the armed groups is higher in  the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in refugee camps (55%) compared to villages and cities (42% and 46% respectively), among men (51%) compared to women (40%), among those whose age is 30 years or higher (47%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (40%), among refugees (50%) compared to non-refugees (42%), among the holders of BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (17%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (80% and 49% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (23%), and among the religious (50%) compare to the somewhat religious and the non-religions (43% each).

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% view the ending of occupation and building of the state as the most vital goal for the Palestinians
• Continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip and unemployment and poverty as the two most important problems confronting Palestinian society today

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 10% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (36%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 40% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip, 23% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 13% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 10%  said it is the spread of corruption, and 6% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

This PSR Poll has been conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah. 
25-27 September 2014

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 25-27 September 2014. The period before the poll witnessed successful implementation of the cease fire reached a month earlier after more than 50 days of armed confrontations in the Gaza Strip. But the reconciliation government failed to operate in the Gaza Strip during the period of war or ceasefire, and Fatah and Hamas exchanged accusations over who was responsible for that failure. The period of the fieldwork witnessed improvement in the Fatah-Hamas relations due to progress in reconciliation follow up talks in Cairo. It also witnessed Palestinian renewed activities at the UN with President Abbas delivering a speech at the UN General Assembly. This press release covers public perception of the war outcome, domestic Palestinian developments, elections, internal balance of power, and others. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.  

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

MAIN RESULTS:

This post-war poll was conducted one month after the end of the war in the Gaza Strip. This report highlights important changes in public perception compared to the findings we obtained in our previous poll which was conducted a month ago, immediately after the war end. Findings show a drop in satisfaction with the achievements of the war, probably due to the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip.  A drop was also found in the percentage of those who believed Hamas won the war, in the percentage of opposition to dissolving armed groups in the Gaza Strip, and in the popularity of Hamas and Ismail Haniyeh. Findings also show a rise in the popularity of Abbas and Fatah. Support for a third armed intifada went down in this poll as support for negotiations increased and a majority supported the two-state solution.

Despite the drop in support for the Islamists, Hamas and Haniyeh remain more popular than Fatah and Abbas.  Moreover, a majority still supports launching rockets against Israel if the siege and the blockade are not ended and two thirds of the public oppose merging Hamas’ al Qassam Brigades into the Palestinian National Security Forces. Furthermore, satisfaction with Abbas remains low.

Findings also show significant drop in the level of optimism regarding the chances for a successful implementation of the reconciliation agreement and indicate continued drop in the level of satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government. Indeed, a majority supports replacing the reconciliation government with a national unity government made up of factional leaders and politicians. Despite all that, a majority wants the reconciliation government to control crossings with Egypt and Israel and wants it to have control over Gaza’s public sector including those in the security services.

Finally, findings show that a majority of the public has not heard about Abbas’ plan to seek a deadline for ending Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. A majority of those who have heard about it do support it despite the fact that a majority expects the plan to fail.

Main Findings:

This post-war poll was conducted one month after the end of the war in the Gaza Strip. This report highlights important changes in public perception compared to the findings we obtained in our previous poll which was conducted a month ago, immediately after the war end. Findings show a drop in satisfaction with the achievements of the war, probably due to the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip.  A drop was also found in the percentage of those who believed Hamas won the war, in the percentage of opposition to dissolving armed groups in the Gaza Strip, and in the popularity of Hamas and Ismail Haniyeh. Findings also show a rise in the popularity of Abbas and Fatah. Support for a third armed intifada went down in this poll as support for negotiations increased and a majority supported the two-state solution.

Despite the drop in support for the Islamists, Hamas and Haniyeh remain more popular than Fatah and Abbas.  Moreover, a majority still supports launching rockets against Israel if the siege and the blockade are not ended and two thirds of the public oppose merging Hamas’ al Qassam Brigades into the Palestinian National Security Forces. Furthermore, satisfaction with Abbas remains low.

Findings also show significant drop in the level of optimism regarding the chances for a successful implementation of the reconciliation agreement and indicate continued drop in the level of satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government. Indeed, a majority supports replacing the reconciliation government with a national unity government made up of factional leaders and politicians. Despite all that, a majority wants the reconciliation government to control crossings with Egypt and Israel and wants it to have control over Gaza’s public sector including those in the security services.

Finally, findings show that a majority of the public has not heard about Abbas’ plan to seek a deadline for ending Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. A majority of those who have heard about it do support it despite the fact that a majority expects the plan to fail.

(1) Gaza War:

• Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War drops from 79% a month ago to 69% in this poll.
• Percentage of satisfaction with war achievements compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip drops from 59% a month ago to 49% in this poll.  
• Despite that, an overwhelming majority of 80% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.
• Moreover, a majority of 57% believes that launching rockets from populated areas in the Gaza Strip is justified and 39% say it is unjustified.
• Opposition to disarming armed groups in the Gaza Strip drops from 57% a month ago to 50% in this poll.
• About two thirds (65%) believe that Iran, Turkey and Qatar combined have given the Gaza Strip the ability to remain steadfast against Israeli attacks and to be able to continue to launch rockets during the war; only 7% believe Egypt too has contributed to that.

Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War drops from 79% a month ago to 69% in this poll; 22% believe the two sides were losers. In the Gaza Strip, only 58% say Hamas came out a winner. Furthermore, the percentage of satisfaction with war achievements compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip drops from 59% a month ago to 49% in this poll. 50% are currently dissatisfied with the achievements. Satisfaction with the war outcome increases in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), among women (51%) compared to men (47%), among the religious (54%) compared to somewhat religious and the non-religious (46% and 31% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (57%) compared to those who support the peace process (46%), among non-refugees (51%) compared to refugees (45%), among the illiterates (66%) compared to holders of BA degree (37%), among merchants, housewives, and professionals (53%, 54%, and 56% respectively) compared to students and employees (44% and 36% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (51%) compared to those who work in the public sector (33%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (67% and 59% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah and those who have not decided to whom they would vote if new elections are held today (32% and 44% respectively).

Despite that, an overwhelming majority of 80% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended. Support for launching rockets drops in the Gaza Strip to 72%. Moreover, a majority of 57% believes that launching rockets from populated areas in the Gaza Strip is justified and 39% say it is unjustified. Among Gazans, belief that it is justified to launch rockets from populated areas drops to 48% while increasing in the West Bank to 62%.

Furthermore, opposition to disarming armed groups in the Gaza Strip drops from 57% a month ago to 50% in this poll. Opposition to disarming Gazan armed groups increases in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (42%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (53% and 49% respectively) compared to the non-religious (29%), among those who oppose the peace process (70%) compared to those who support the peace process (41%), among merchants and housewives (62% and 49% respectively) compared to students and employees (42% each), and among supporters of Hamas and the undecided (68% and 49% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (34% and 42% respectively).

About two thirds (65%) believe that Iran, Turkey and Qatar combined have given the Gaza Strip the ability to remain steadfast against Israeli attacks and to be able to continue to launch rockets during the war; only 7% believe Egypt too has contributed to that. Moreover, only 21% describe Egypt’s role in the ceasefire negotiations as positive while a majority of 57% describe it as negative. When asked about the party that should finance the Gaza reconstruction with five options provided to respondents, 30% said it should be Israel, 24% said donor countries, 23% said Arab countries, 10% said Palestinian taxpayers, and 10% said Hamas. When only two options were provided, 50% said Palestinian taxpayers should finance the reconstruction and 19% selected Hamas.

(2) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would win a majority of 55% (compared to 61% a month ago) and the latter 38% (compared to 32% a month ago).
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas stays as it was a month ago at 39%.  
• If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter would receive 46% of the participants’ votes.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 39% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah.
• A majority of 69% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 11% want them to take place after a year or more, and 15% do not want elections.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas stays as it was a month ago at 39%. Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 50% before the Gaza war.  The low level of satisfaction with Abbas reflects itself in the outcome of presidential elections if held today: Ismail Haniyeh would win a majority of 55% (compared to 61% a month ago) and Abbas 38% (compared to 32% a month ago). Votes for Abbas and Haniyeh are close in the Gaza Strip with the former receiving 47% and the latter 50%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 33% and Haniyeh 57%. Vote for Haniyeh is higher in cities and refugee camps (57% each) compared to villages and towns (41%), among women (56%) compared to men (53%), among those whose age is between 18 and 29 years and 40 and 49 years (58% and 60% respectively) compared to those whose age is between 30 and 39 and those whose age is 50 or over (47% and 52% respectively), among the religious (64%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (51% and 18% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (82%) compared to supporters of the peace process (43%), among those who hold a BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (41%), among housewives, professionals, and merchants (58%, 59% and 76% respectively) compared to students and employees (45% each), among those who work in the private sector (60%) compared to those who work in the public sector (41%), and among supporters of Hamas (97%) compared to supporters of Fatah, third parties and the undecided (7%, 39%, and 46% respectively).

If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter would receive 46% of the participants’ votes. A month ago, Barghouti received 45% and Haniyeh 49%. Before the Gaza War Barghouti received the support of 58% and Haniyeh 38%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 30%, and Haniyeh 43%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 39% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 5% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. A month ago, vote for Hamas stood at 46% and Fatah at 31%. Before the Gaza war vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 40% and for Fatah at 39%. In the West Bank vote for Hamas stands at 38% and Fatah at 33%. These findings indicate a significant drop in Hamas’ popularity in the West Bank compared to the findings a month ago when it stood at 47%. They also indicate a significant rise in Fatah’s popularity in the West Bank from 27% to 33% during the same period. A majority of 69% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 11% want them to take place after a year or more, and 15% do not want elections.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip continues to drop to 9% in this poll  and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank continues to drop as well standing at 24% in this poll.
•  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip increase from 22% a month ago to 31% in this poll.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security remains unchanged compared to a month ago, standing today at 47%.
• Percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 44%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 78% compared to 81% three months ago. 
• 29% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, a larger percentage of 35% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip continues to drop to 9% in this poll compared to 20% a month ago and 24% three months ago. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank continues to drop as well standing at 24% in this poll compared to 32% a month ago and 33% three months ago.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip increase from 22% a month ago to 31% in this poll. Three months ago, before the Gaza war, the percentage of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 64%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security remains unchanged compared to a month ago, standing today at 47%; three months ago, it stood at 51%.  These findings are reflected in the percentages of those who wish to immigrate from the Gaza Strip, reaching 44%. Among residents of the West Bank, only 22% say economic and security conditions force them to seek to immigrate.

Findings also show that viewership of Hamas TV, al Aqsa, drops from 37% a month ago to 24% in this poll. Other major TV channels witnessed an increase in viewership; for example, Al Jazeera viewership rises from 21% to 24%, Palestine TV from 16% to 20%, Maan-Mix from 11% to 12%, and al Arabiyya from 5% to 7%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 78% compared to 81% three months ago.  23% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and an identical percentage say there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  29% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, a larger percentage of 35% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. It seems that the vacuum of authority in the Gaza Strip has given the public a sense of freedom.

(4) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza after the war:

• Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split drops from 69% a month ago to 53% in this poll.
• Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government drops from 46% a month ago to 36% in this poll.
• 57% prefer to get rid of the reconciliation government and form a unity government in which leaders and politicians from all major factions would participate; 35% oppose such a step and prefer to keep the reconciliation government.
• A majority of 50% (64% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank) wants to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 37% prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control.
• Satisfaction with the implementation of the reconciliation agreement drops from 61% three months ago to 48% in this poll.
• 45% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip and 40% reject this claim.
• In light of the dissatisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government, 52% believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 41% believe it is an accomplishment.

Findings indicate a significant drop in the level of optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split from 69% a month ago to 53% in this poll; pessimism rises from 28% to 43%. Optimism remains high in the Gaza Strip (64%) compared to the West Bank (48%). Furthermore, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government drops from 46% a month ago to 36% in this poll. Dissatisfaction rises from 46% to 54%. It is worth mentioning that three months ago, right after its establishment, 61% had confidence in the reconciliation government. Lack of confidence in the reconciliation government is higher in the Gaza Strip (61%) compared to the West Bank (51%), among men (61%) compared to women (48%), among the religious (57%) compared to the somewhat religious (51%), among those who oppose the peace process (77%) compared to those who support the peace process (46%), among holders of BA degree (64%) compared to the illiterates (39%), among merchants and employees (76% and 66% respectively) compared to students (50%) and among supporters of Hamas and the undecided (75% and 56%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (36% and 48% respectively). Lack of trust in the reconciliation government drives 57% of the public to seek replacing it with a unity government, on in which leaders and politicians from all major factions would participate; 35% oppose such a step and prefer to keep the reconciliation government.

Despite the lack of trust in the reconciliation government, a majority of 50% (64% in the Gaza Strip and 43%) wants to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 37% prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. The same applies to the crossings with Israel with 52% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 47% in the West Bank) wishing to place them under the control of the reconciliation government. 46% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and 34% want it placed in the hands of Hamas.

Furthermore, satisfaction with the implementation of the reconciliation agreement drops from 61% three months ago to 48% in this poll. Indeed, 45% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip but 40% reject this claim. The belief that Hamas has established a shadow government increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (43%), among men (47%) compared to women (42%), among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (48% and 64% respectively) compared to the religious (38%), among supporters of the peace process (52%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (27%), among the illiterates (48%) compared to holders of BA degree (42%), among those who work in the public sector (50%) compared to those who work in the private sector (43%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (68% and 59% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas and the undecided (22% and 41% respectively).

But the belief that Hamas is responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 25% while 36% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 18% blame the head of the reconciliation government. The percentage of those who accuse Hamas of hindering the work of the reconciliation government increases in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to the West Bank (18%), among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (26% and 52% respectively) compared the religious (18%), among supporters of the peace process (31%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (12%), among holders of BA degree (27%) compared to the illiterates (14%), among employees and students (36% and 31% respectively) compared to merchants and housewives (12% and 22% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (36%) compared to those who work in the private sector (21%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (58% and 32% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas and the undecided (5% and 15% respectively).

In light of the dissatisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government, 52% believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 41% believe it is an accomplishment. Three months ago, right after the formation of the reconciliation government, 50% said the PA was an accomplishment and 45% said it was a burden. Findings also show that 80% of the public want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the public sector in the Gaza Strip and 17% oppose that. In this regard, 68% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of supervising the work of the employees of Gaza security sector who worked in the past under Hamas government; 29% disagree with that, wanting instead to keep these employees under Hamas’ control. Nonetheless, 68% agree with Hamas’ demand that security and police should remain under its control during the next 6 months, up until the elections; 28% disagree with that.

 (5) Peace Process:

• Only 40% of the public has heard and 58% have not heard about President Abbas’ plan to set a deadline for ending occupation and building a state. Among those who have heard about the plan 72% support it and 25% oppose it.
• A majority of 53% supports the two-state solution and 46% oppose it.
• The public is divided over the most effective means of ending occupation and building a Palestinian state: 44% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means; 29% believe negotiation is the best means, and 23% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most effective route to statehood.
• 60% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion.
• A majority of 59% support and 35% oppose committing the reconciliation government to accept existing agreements with Israel.
• The public is divided equally over the Arab Peace Initiative with 47% supporting it and an identical number opposing it.
• In the absence of viable negotiations, 83% support joining more international organizations; 79% support joining the International Criminal Court; and 63% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance.
• Only 30% support the merging of Hamas’ al Qassam Brigades into the PA’s National Security Forces as a way of meeting the demand for disarming Hamas and 67% oppose that.

Findings show that only 40% of the public has heard and 58% have not heard about President Abbas’ plan to set a deadline for ending occupation and building a state. Among those who have heard about the plan 72% support it and 25% oppose it. Only 42% of those who have heard about the plan believe the chances for its success were medium or high and 58% believe its chances for success were low or non-existent. These findings might mean that public interest in the plan is not high and that the public does not trust the process that the president has embarked on. It could also mean that the president has not yet explained his plan to the public and has not sought support for it.

Findings show A majority of 53% supports the two-state solution and 46% oppose it. A month ago, 49% supported it and 50% opposed it. But the public is divided over the most effective means of ending occupation and building a Palestinian state: 44% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means; 29% believe negotiation is the best means, and 23% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most effective route to statehood. A month ago, 53% said armed confrontations were the most effective means while 22% selected negotiations, and 20% selected popular non-violent resistance. Support for armed action as the most effective means of building a state is higher among residents of cities and refugee camps (45% each) compared to residents of villages and towns (35%), among men (48%) compared to women (39%), among the religious (48%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (41% and 30% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (67%) compared to supporters of the peace process (33%), among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (41%) among merchants and professionals (52% and 51% respectively) compared to students, housewives, and employees (37%, 40% and 41% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (47%) compared to those who work in the public sector (42%), and among supporters of Hamas (67%) compared to supporters of Fatah, the undecided, and supporters of third parties (22%, 35%, and 41% respectively).

Despite the majority support for the two-state solution, 60% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion and 36% think it is still practical. Similarly, 72% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent.  Despite that, only 27% support and 71% oppose the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution.

A majority of 59% support and 35% oppose committing the reconciliation government to accept existing agreements with Israel. A month ago, 54% supported this position and 40% opposed it. But the public is divided equally over the Arab Peace Initiative with 47% supporting it and an identical number opposed to it. A majority of 56% nonetheless is opposed to recognition of Israel as a Jewish state while 41% support this recognition.

In the absence of viable negotiations, 83% support joining more international organizations; 79% support joining the International Criminal Court; and 63% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance. The public is divided equally over a return to armed intifada; a month ago 60% supported this alternative, but three months ago support did not exceed 41%. Findings show also that a majority of 53% is opposed to the dissolution of the PA while 44% support it.  57% believe that massive popular demonstrations could contribute to ending the Israeli occupation but 42% disagree with that.  By contrast, a larger majority of 81% favors Hamas way of resisting occupation. Support for Hamas’ way stood at 88% one month ago. Furthermore, 63% favor the transfer of Hamas’ armed approach to the West Bank and 34% oppose that. One month ago, support for this transfer stood at 72%. In this regard, only 30% support the merging of Hamas’ al Qassam Brigades into the PA’s National Security Forces as a way of meeting the demand for disarming Hamas and 67% oppose that. Support for the merge is higher in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (27%), among residents of cities (32%) compared to residents of villages/town and refugee camps (25% and 21% respectively), among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (33% and 40% respectively) compared to religious (24%), among supporters of the peace process (37%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (13%), among holders of BA degree (31%) compared to illiterates (19%), among those who work in the public sector (34%) compared to those who work in the private sector (28%), and among supporters of Fatah, third parties, and the undecided (51%, 39%, and 35% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (11%).

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 50% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 30% of the public.

Findings show that 50% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 28% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 30% of the public, while 26% say it is the spread of poverty and unemployment; 22% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 18% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.....Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 12-16 December 2018. The period before the conduct of the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the intensification of popular opposition to the Social Security Law, the failure of reconciliation efforts, the release of a report indicating that President Abbas intends to dissolve the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the transfer of the Qatari funds to Israel to cover the cost of fuel for the Gaza power station, and the direct Qatari payment to Gazan employees of the former Hamas government. Also, it was revealed during this period that some Palestinians have sold property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other places in the West Bank. Despite the efforts to calm conditions in the Gaza Strip, this period witnessed a serious escalation in violence between Hamas and Israel. The US Administration announced its intention to make public its own plan for Palestinian-Israeli peace. The Israeli prime minister visited Oman and Israeli ministers visited the United Arab Emirates. Finally, a major violent escalation took place in the West Bank during the period of the fieldwork for this poll. This press release addresses all these issues and covers other matters such as parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2018 indicate a significant increase in Hamas’ popularity in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The violent confrontations in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were probably responsible for this change. Moreover, Hamas’ success in insuring Gazan access to fuel and money to pay the salaries of its former government employees probably contributed to this outcome. Support for Fatah remains relatively unchanged. Moreover, support for Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh rises in the Gaza Strip while support for President Mahmoud 

Abbas declines in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections are held today, findings show that Haniyeh would most likely be the winner. If parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah and Hamas are likely to receive the same levels of support.

Findings also show that the public has lost hope for a successful reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and that a large majority is dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. They also show that the public is highly opposed to the policies of president Abbas toward the Gaza Strip including his demand for the full transfer of control over the Strip by Hamas to the reconciliation government and his demand for one gun. Indeed, the public supports the continued presence of armed battalions of the various factions alongside the official PA security services in the Gaza Strip. An overwhelming majority demands the ending of sanctions imposed by President Abbas on the Gaza Strip such as the decrease in salaries and in the amount of electricity provided to Gazans. But it is worth noting that a large percentage supports the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) despite the fact that more than one third believes that such a step is harmful to the reconciliation efforts.

Findings also show a widespread opposition to the Social Security Law reaching almost a consensus among West Bankers who believe that the law applies to them or will have an impact on them or their families. It is evident that the distrust in the government and the belief that the law is unjust are the most important drivers of the opposition to the law.

The majority views the results of the last confrontation between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip as a victory for Hamas. Indeed, an even larger majority than before continues to support Hamas-Israel indirect negotiations for a long term tahdia or truce. The majority also supports the current agreement between Hamas and Israel that allows Qatari-funded Israeli fuel as well as Qatar money to reach the Gaza Strip despite opposition by the PA to this Qatari role. In fact, findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians welcome the Qatari role in the Gaza Strip, both in terms of paying for the fuel needed for the generation of electricity and for the payment of the salaries of the employees of the former Hamas government. Despite all of this, the public tends to believe that the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip will collapse shortly and that such a collapse will lead to a widescale war against the Gaza Strip.

Findings regarding the peace process indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution and a considerable rise in support for an armed intifada. They also show a significant rise in the perception that the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion in the West Bank. Moreover, an overwhelming majority believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about promoting peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians believe that the Trump peace plan, when and if one is ever presented, will not call for any of the following: the establishment of a Palestinian state, East Jerusalem as a capital of the state of Palestine, the June 1967 lines as a basis for setting borders of Palestine, a just solution to the refugee problem, or ending the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. For this reason, three quarters of the Palestinians demand a rejection of the Trump plan. But findings also indicate that a large minority believes that the US mediation is indispensable for any peace negotiations with Israel. Moreover, the public is split in its attitude toward the Trump plan if it does indeed contain all these vital elements that the public currently thinks will be absent.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 64% want Abbas to resign and 32% want him to remain in office
• In new presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 42% and the latter 49% of the public vote; if the elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 55% of the vote and the latter 40%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 35% and Hamas 34% of the popular vote.

A majority of 64% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while 32% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 35% (42% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 47% for Abbas and 45% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the vote (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 56% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 40%.  If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 29% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 24% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 5%; Khalid Mishal by 4%; Mustafa Barghouti and Saeb Erikat by 2%; and Salam Fayyad by 1% each.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they would vote for Hamas and 35% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 27% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 34% three months ago) and for Fatah at 31% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 21% three months ago) and Fatah at 39% (compared to 38% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• 4% think conditions in Gaza are good and 14% think conditions in the West Bank are good
• 43% blame Abbas and the PA and 21% blame Hamas for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip
• 55% of Gazans and 47% of West Bankers feel safe and secure
• 48% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers want to emigrate
• Belief that PA institutions are corrupt stands at 80%
• 53% believe that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 14%. In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (43%) blames the PA, president Abbas, and the reconciliation government; 21% blame Hamas, 9% blame Egypt, and 20% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 58% of Gazans, compared to 34% of West Bankers, blame the PA, Abbas and the reconciliation government; and 28% of Gazans, compared to 17% of West Bankers, blame Hamas.

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 55%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 47%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 45% and in the West Bank at 48%.  One third )32%) of the public says it wants to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 48% and declines in the West Bank to 22%.  Only 35% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 61% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 50% believe that they cannot.  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%.  A majority of the public (53%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 42% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Al Aqsa TV (14%), Ma’an TV, Palestine TV, and Palestine Today (at 12% each), al Mayadeen and al Quds TV (5% each), and Al Arabiya (at 4%).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government: 

• 66% are dissatisfied and 23% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government
• Optimism about the success of reconciliation stands at 29% and pessimism at 66%
• Large majorities are opposed to Abbas policies toward the Gaza Strip and Hamas and 77% demand the removal of the sanctions imposed against the Gaza Strip and Hamas
• 47% support and 43% oppose the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council

Less than a quarter (23%) is satisfied and 66% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 22%.  29% are optimistic and 66% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%.

The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 34% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 61% disagrees. Three months ago, 31% said they agreed with Abbas.  When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, more than two-thirds (68%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 25% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans.  Moreover, an overwhelming majority (77%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 18% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 80% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip.

The largest percentage (47%) supports the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council and 43% are opposed to that. Nonetheless, 37% believe that such a dissolution will harm the prospects of reconciliation while 21% believe it will improve the chances for reconciliation, and 34% believe it will have no impact on the reconciliation.  Support for dissolving the PLC is higher in the West Bank (52%) than in the Gaza Strip (38%), among men (51%) compared to women (42%), among holders of BA degree (45%) compared to the illiterates (38%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (62% and 50% respectively) compared to the religious (39%), and among supporters of Fatah (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas (38%).

4) Israel-Hamas confrontations in the Gaza Strip and the long-term tahdia, or truce:   

• 61% support and 33% oppose a long term tahdia agreement between Hamas and Israel even if it was arrived at in the absence of reconciliation
• Two thirds of the public support the current arrangement between Hamas and Israel that allows the entry of Qatari fuel and money into the Gaza Strip
• But the majority expects the current ceasefire to collapse soon and worries that it would lead to widescale war

A majority of 61% (compared to 55% three months ago) supports and 33% oppose a Hamas-Israel long-term tahdia, or cessation of violence, even in the absence of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. The agreement would entail the opening of the border crossing with Egypt and access to a seaport and an airport in a neighboring area in return for a Hamas enforcement of a long-term ceasefire as well as ending the Return Marches and the incendiary kites. Support for this long-term cessation of violence is higher in the Gaza Strip (64%) than in the West Bank (59%).  Two-thirds (67%) support a limited tahdia (quiet) that would allow the entry into the Gaza Strip of Qatari fuel and money in return for stopping the confrontations along the Gaza-Israel border area including the incendiary balloons. Opposition to this tahdia stands at 28%. Support for this tahdia stands at 72% in the Gaza Strip and 64% in the West Bank.

But a majority of 62% believes the current ceasefire between Hamas and Israel will not last for long and that it will collapse soon while 32% believe it will last for a long or a medium period.  If the current ceasefire collapses, a majority of 62% believes it will lead to a widescale war between Hamas and Israel while 31% believe that a collapse of the ceasefire will not lead to a widescale war. But the public is split over the chances for reaching a long term Tahdia that would ease the siege and stop the confrontation: 50% believe the chances are high or medium and 48% think the chances are non-existent.

A majority of 62% thinks that Hamas has come out victorious from the most recent confrontation with Israel while 31% think it has not come out victorious.  By contrast, about two-thirds (66%) are dissatisfied and 25% are satisfied with the position taken by the PA and the PA leadership during the most recent confrontation in the Gaza Strip.

5) Social Security Law

• 51% are opposed to the implementation of the Social Security Law, 13% support implementing it, and 9% want it revised
• The main reasons for opposing the law are the belief that it is unjust (49%) and the distrust in the government (32%)

Only 44% of the public believe that the Social Security Law applies to them or that they will be impacted by its implementation while 46% believe it does not apply to them or will not affect them.  In its position toward the Social Security Law, the public is divided into three groups: (1) the largest one (51%) is opposed to the implementation of the law now or in the future; (2) only 13% support the implementation of the law now; and (3) 9% support the implementation of the law but only after it is revised. It is noticeable that opposition to the law in the West Bank is higher than it is in the Gaza Strip (65% and 28% respectively). Moreover, Opposition to the implementation of the law now or in the future is higher among those who say that the law applies to them or will affect them, reaching two-thirds (67%); and this is particularly true among West Bankers as opposition to the law stands among them at 84%. Opposition to the law is also higher among the illiterates (55%) compared to the holders of BA degree (51%), among those whose age is 50 years or above (56%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (44%), and among laborers and employees (62% and 54% respectively) compared to students and the retirees (36% and 35% respectively).

In an open question, addressed to those who said that they oppose the implementation of the law, we asked about the reasons for the opposition. Three answers were provided: 49% said the law is unjust, 32% said they do not trust the government and fear its corruption, and 14% said that their salaries are already too small and they cannot afford further cuts. Even if the law was revised as some demand, only 31% believe that the Social Security Fund or the government will actually make the payment to the retirees; a majority of 56% believes that the Fund and the government will not honor their commitment to pay the retirement wages.

6) Sale of Palestinian property to Israeli Jews

• 88% call Palestinians who sell property to Israeli Jews as traitors
• 64% believe that the deterrent punishment for sale of property to Israeli Jews is the death penalty

An overwhelming majority of the public (88%) designates other Palestinians who sell property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other occupied territories as traitors while 9% call them corrupt and unpatriotic. Three quarters believe that the current penalties for sale of property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other places do not provide a deterrence against such sales while 14% believe the current penalties provide a sufficient deterrent. When, in an open question, we asked the public to identify a deterrent punishment, about two-thirds (64%) said it is the death penalty while 22% said imprisonment. Findings show that more than three quarters (78%) are dissatisfied and 17% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to deter sale of properties by Palestinians to Israeli Jews.

7) Role of Qatar in the Gaza Strip

• Three quarters back the Qatari efforts to support the Gazan electricity sector
• 79% support the Qatari payment of salaries of the former Hamas government employees

More than three quarters (78%) support the Qatari efforts to support the electricity sector in the Gaza Strip despite the fact that the PA is opposed to this Qatari effort; opposition to Qatari efforts does not exceed 19%.  More significantly, an overwhelming majority of 79% supports the Qatari payment of salaries to the employees of the former Hamas government in the Gaza Strip despite the fact that the PA is opposed to this payment; opposition to the payment does not exceed 19%.  Generally speaking, a large majority of 73% looks positively, and only 25% looks negatively, at the role played by Qatar on the Palestinian issue, particularly in the Gaza Strip. It is noticeable that there are no differences between the views of Gazans and West Bankers (73% and 72% respectively) regarding the Qatari role. But support is higher among the youth whose age is between 18 and 22 years (77%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (69%), among the illiterates (73%) compared to the holders of BA degree (66%), among women (76%) compared to men (69%), among the religious (82%) compared to the somewhat religious and the unreligious (68% and 50% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (88%) compared to supporters of Fatah (53%).

8) Decisions of the Palestinian Central Council of the PLO

• 67% support the Central Council’s decision to suspend recognition of Israel
• 72% support the Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel

Two thirds (67%) support and 29% oppose the Central Council’s decision to suspend Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel until Israel recognizes the state of Palestine. Similarly, 72% support and 23% oppose the Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel; but more than two-thirds (70%) believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 23% believe it will.

9) The peace process

• 43% support the two-state solution; 52% support it when borders are identified as 1967 lines
• In choosing between a two-state solution and a one-state solution, 45% support the former and 22% the latter
• 63% believe the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion
• 44% believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state
• 59% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to annex Palestinian land and expel its population
• 54% oppose and 40% support a confederation between Jordan and the state of Palestine

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 43% and opposition at 55%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 47%. But support for the two-state solution rises to 52% when the borders of the Palestinian state are described as those of the 4th of June 1967.  Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 45% said they prefer the two-state solution, 22% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 23% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.” Three months ago, support for the two-state solution stood at 53%, for the one state solution at 24%, and 14% preferred a third undefined alternative.

A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 35% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 73% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel;” according to 34% of the public while an identical percentage prefers waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 16% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 40% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel.  But a large minority of 44% thinks that armed struggle is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 28% believe that negotiation is the most effective means and 23% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 39% said negotiation is the most effective means and 33% said armed struggle is the most effective means.

An overwhelming majority of 77% says they are worried that in their daily life they would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 23% say they are not worried.  59% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 18% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 71% support joining more international organizations; 61% support popular non-violence resistance; 54% support a return to an armed intifada; 47% support dissolving the PA; and 32% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, only 46% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 42% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.

Support for an armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (60%) than in the West Bank (51%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (65%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (55%), among holders of BA degree (55%) compared to the illiterates (44%), among men (57%) compared to women (52%), among students (63%) compared to laborers (47%), among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious (49%), among those who oppose the peace process (81%) compared to those who support the peace process (41%), and among supporters of Hamas (76%) compared to supporters of Fatah (36%).

Support for abandoning the two-state solution and adopting the one-state solution is higher in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (29%), among men (35%) compared to women (28%), among students (34%) compared to housewives (28%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (44% and 33% respectively) compared to the religious (29%), among supporters of the peace process (35%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (24%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (42% and 32% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (25%).

Half of the public (50%) opposes and 47% support in principle the holding of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in order to resolve the conflict. If a Palestinian state is established, about two-thirds (68%) want it to be armed with heavy weapons, such as tanks and air force, while 27% want it to have a strong security force but without heavy arms.  After the establishment of a Palestinian state, a majority of 54% is opposed to the idea of a confederation between that state and Jordan while 40% support the idea. Support for the confederation with Jordan is higher in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (34%), among students (47%) compared to merchants (29%), among the religious (43%) compared to the somewhat religious (38%), among supporters of the peace process (46%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (31%), and among Fatah suppoers (54%) compared to supporters of Hamas (41%).

10) Trump’s Peace Plan:

• 73% believe that the chances for the success of Trump’s peace plan are slim or non-existent
• 72% believe the Trump plan will not call for the establishment of a Palestinian state
• 74% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the Trump peace plan
• 59% are opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the Trump Administration
• But 43% believe that the US role is indispensable in any Palestinian-Israeli negotiations

An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about launching a new peace plan and 16% believe it is serious.  If the Trump Administration does nonetheless offer such a peace plan, 73% believe the chances for its success are slim or non-existent and 24% believe the chances are high or medium.  A large majority of 72% believes that if the US does indeed offer a peace plan, it will not call for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel; 22% believe it will.  A similar percentage (75%) believes that the plan will not call for a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem; 21% believe it will.  67% believe the Trump plan will not call for the borders of the Palestinian state to be based on the lines of June 1967 with minor mutual land swaps; 26% believe it will.  An overwhelming majority of 80% believes the plan will not call for a just solution to the refugee problem; 16% believe it will.  Similarly, 77% believe the plan will not call for the ending of the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the areas occupied in 1967; 19% believe it will.

An overwhelming majority of 74% believes that the Palestinian leadership should reject the Trump peace plan, if offered, and 21% believe it should accept it. The demand for rejecting the US plan is higher in the West Bank (83%) compared to the Gaza Strip (59%), among holders of BA degree (76%) compared to the illiterates (71%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (82%) compared to supporters of the peace process (68%), and among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fatah (60%).

But if the Trump plan does indeed include all such items, a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, with borders based on the 1967 lines, a just solution to the refugees’ problem, and an Israeli army withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, the largest percentage (49%) calls for rejecting it and 44% call for accepting it. Support for such a plan that includes all these items is higher in the Gaza Strip (57%) compared to the West Bank (36%), among men (48%) compared to women (41%), among holders of BA degree (44%) compared to the illiterates (39%), among the somewhat religious (46%) compared to the religious (41%), among supporters of the peace process (49%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (33%), and among supporters of Fatah (62%) compared to supporters of Hamas (34%).

A majority of 59% is opposed and 28% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. We asked the public if Palestinian-Israeli negotiations can be sustained without the US role as a mediator: A majority of 52% believes that it can while 43% view the US role as indispensable. The belief that the US role is dispensable is higher among the youth between 18 and 22 years (55%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (47%), among the religious (57%) compared to the somewhat religious (48%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (58%) compared to supporters of the peace process (51%), among holders of BA degree (55%) compared to the illiterates (50%), and among supporters of Hamas (56%) compared to supporters of Fatah (47%).

11) Israeli relations with Arab countries:

• 78% think Palestine in no longer the Arab’s primary cause
• 60% view Israeli leaders’ visits to Arab countries as harming to the efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and 60% believe that Arab countries that invite Israeli leaders do so in order to win the support of the Trump Administration

An overwhelming majority (78%) believes that the Arab World is preoccupied with its problems and internal conflicts and that Palestine is not its primary cause; 21% believe that Palestine remains the primary cause of the Arab World. Moreover, 72% believe that an alliance already exists between Sunni Arabs and Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation; 21% disagrees with this assessment. A majority of 60% believes that the visits by Israeli leaders to Arab countries are harming the prospects for peace while 10% believe they contribute to peace making; 27% believe they neither help nor hinder peace making. We asked the public to speculate about the motivation of some of the Arab countries in allowing such Israeli visits to their capitals. A majority of 60% said that they want to win the support of the Trump Administration, 17% said they are seeking to fight Iran, and 12% said they are interested in promoting Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

(12) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% say that ending occupation and building a state should be the most vital Palestinian national goal
• 29% view continued occupation and settlement construction as the most serious problem confronting Palestinians

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 29% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 26% say it is poverty and unemployment; 25% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.

(13) The murder of Jamal Khashoggi:

• 51% believe that the Saudi Crown Prince is responsible for the murder of Khashoggi 

A majority of 51% believes that Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman is the person responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, while 26% put the blame for the murder on King Salman, and 9% put it on those employees reporting to the two leaders. 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by PCPSR-Polling and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22-25 October 2025. The immediate period prior to the poll witnessed the announcement of the Trump Plan at the end of September followed by a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel based on that plan. Few days before the conduct of the poll interviews, Israeli hostages were and Palestinian hostages were released by Hamas and Israel respectively. Israel allowed humanitarian aid to enter the Gaza Strip and president Trump announced the end of the two-year Gaza War. Meanwhile, conditions in the West Bank continued to deteriorate due to increased settler violence. Settler attacks wreaked havoc on Palestinians during olive harvest which normally take place in October. The Israeli army evacuated tens of thousands of people from the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps and demolished dozens of buildings in those camps. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank also continued and entrances to most towns and villages were closed by the Israeli army in order to prevent residents from accessing main roads.

This poll covers all of the above issues as well as other issues such as domestic condition and the internal balance of power, the peace process and the alternatives available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted with residents in areas to the west, south and north of what came to be known as the “yellow line,” areas that were free of Israeli army presence. Residents of the areas that were under Israeli military occupation, such as Rafah, and parts of Northern Gaza, and Khanyounis, were interviewed in shelters.

This survey was conducted face-to-face in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip using tablets or phones. When each interview is completed, it is automatically sent directly to our server where only our researchers can access. There is no way for anyone to intercept or manipulate the collected data.

The sample size of this survey was 1200 people, of whom 760 were interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank (in 76 residential locations) and 440 in the Gaza Strip (in 44 locations).  Interviews in the Gaza Strip were conducted in 23 “counting areas,” or areas that existed before the war but were mostly destroyed. Residents of these “counting areas,” including those whose homes were completely or partially destroyed were interviewed either in their original homes or in tents erected between the rubbles of their homes. Residents of inaccessible areas, such as those of Rafah and most of Northern Gaza, were interviewed in 6 built-up shelters and 15 tent shelters.

The margin of error stands at +/-3.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Palestinian opinion on the Trump Plan is widely known and split: roughly seven in ten have heard of it, and when framed in Arab/Islamic terms support is near even, with Gazans much more favorable than West Bankers. Majorities back Hamas’s response yet draw a hard red line against disarming Hamas. Most doubt the plan will end the war or produce a state within five years; many expect renewed fighting, and nearly half anticipate Arab normalization even without statehood. Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about PA reforms. Palestinian public opinion reveals a profound crisis of confidence in the current leadership. Overwhelming dissatisfaction with President Abbas and a Palestinian Authority viewed as corrupt creates a leadership vacuum, filled by Fatah’s popular Marwan Barghouti in presidential polls, while Hamas consistently outpolls Fatah as a party. Regarding the October 7th war, majority support for Hamas’s decision to attack persists, even as expectations of its victory decline. However, a core, cross-regional red line remains: overwhelming opposition to disarming Hamas, complicating any post-war arrangement.  A stark divide separates the Palestinian territories: despite immense suffering, Gazans exhibit greater pragmatism, showing more openness to negotiated settlements and practical governance. Conversely, West Bankers are more skeptical of external plans and more supportive of armed struggle. Overall, deep skepticism about the viability of external peace plans prevails, alongside a strong public demand for internal legitimacy through elections and self-reliant security, reflecting deep distrust in both the PA and the Israeli army. This complex landscape suggests that any sustainable path forward must address the dual crises of Israeli occupation and internal leadership legitimacy.

The following is a summary of the main findings:

The Trump Plan: Awareness of the Trump Plan is high: more than 70% have heard of it; but Palestinian public opinion on the Plan is deeply ambivalent, shaped by its framing and a significant divide between the West Bank and Gaza. Presented with a favorable “Arab and Islamic” framing, the plan is nearly split (47% support vs. 49% opposition), yet this masks a stark regional difference: almost 60% of Gazans support the framed plan, while the same percentage of West Bankers oppose it.  Support is also higher among those aware of the plan (50% vs about 40% among the unaware of the plan). Despite this ambivalence toward the plan itself, there is strong majority support for Hamas’s response to it, coupled with high satisfaction with the prisoner exchange list Hamas secured. This support is linked to a core red line: about 70% of Palestinians, including almost 80% in the West Bank and 55% in Gaza, staunchly oppose the disarmament of Hamas, even as a condition to prevent the war’s return.

Overwhelming skepticism clouds the plan's long-term prospects. A vast majority (70%) does not believe it will lead to a Palestinian state within five years, and most (more than 60%) doubt it will permanently end the war. This pessimism is more pronounced in the West Bank, where residents are also more likely to expect the conflict to resume soon. Furthermore, nearly half believe the plan will facilitate Arab normalization with Israel even without a Palestinian state. While Gazans express some optimism that PA reforms could create a path to statehood, West Bankers remain largely unconvinced.

The Day After arrangements in the Gaza Strip: Palestinian opinion on "day after" governance in Gaza is deeply divided, revealing significant distrust in external plans and a strong preference for autonomous Palestinian control, though with notable regional differences. A slight majority opposes a committee of unaffiliated professionals managing Gaza under an international umbrella, as envisioned in the Trump Plan. However, this opposition flips to strong support from both West Bankers and Gazans when the proposal is framed as a Palestinian-led expert committee overseeing reconstruction with international support, omitting any mention of political non-affiliation.

There is minimal appetite for a return of direct Palestinian Authority (PA) control; only one-third of the public favors a scenario where the PA has full or shared governance. The idea of an armed Arab force entering Gaza to maintain security is overwhelmingly rejected by almost 70%, especially in the West Bank. Opposition softens somewhat, particularly in Gaza, if the force's mission is framed around border security and cooperation with local police, explicitly omitting the controversial goal of disarming Hamas. This highlights a core red line: any arrangement seen as undermining Palestinian arms is widely opposed. Finally, the prospect of the PA merely "coordinating" the work of an expert committee is met with majority opposition in the West Bank but finds majority support in Gaza, underscoring Gaza’s greater willingness to engage with pragmatic governance solutions.

October 7 and the Gaza War: Public opinion following the October 7th war reveals complex and evolving attitudes. Support for Hamas’s decision to launch the offensive, while declining from its peak, remains a majority at more than 50%, with recent gains in Gaza and sustained high support in the West Bank. Humanitarian conditions in Gaza present a stark contrast: while food access has significantly improved, a staggering 72% of Gazans report a family member has been killed or injured, and the vast majority have been displaced multiple times. Most Palestinians continue to blame Israel for this suffering, and a near-unanimous do not believe Hamas committed the atrocities against civilians depicted in international media.

Politically, expectations of a Hamas victory have fallen to about 40%, revealing a major split: West Bankers remain more optimistic, while a notable portion of Gazans, 3 in 10, now anticipate an Israeli win. This has not translated into a desire for capitulation, as an overwhelming majority opposes disarming Hamas to end the war, including 85% in the West Bank and 55% in Gaza. Satisfaction ratings reflect these dynamics, with Hamas (60%) enjoying far greater approval than President Abbas (about 20%). Regionally, Yemen’s Houthis are most popular, then Qatar, Hezbollah, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Internationally, China comes first followed by Russia, Spain, France, UK, and finally the US or President Trump.

Domestic conditions: A profound sense of insecurity pervades the West Bank, where 85% of residents feel unsafe—a dramatic decline from about half two years prior. This is compounded by a widespread belief that the PA institutions are corrupt.  Recent dismissals—of the transportation minister accused of bribery and the Director General of Crossings and Borders—do not convince most; more than half say these are not serious signals of an anti‑corruption drive. Consequently, a majority views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people, compared to 40% who see it as an asset. Asked which step the PA should prioritize to address conditions in Gaza, enable West Bank–Gaza reunification, and engage Israel/international actors on statehood, the largest percentage favors holding presidential and legislative elections including Hamas, followed by forming a national unity government including Hamas, and thirdly ensure immediate reconciliation with Hamas. Media consumption is dominated by Al Jazeera, with far higher viewership than any other.

Palestinian elections: About two thirds support holding presidential and legislative elections in the West Bank and Gaza a year after the current Gaza ceasefire; support is higher in the West Bank than Gaza, suggesting some Gazans who oppose a one‑year timeline may prefer earlier elections. Yet 60% believe the PA does not genuinely intend to hold elections within a year and do not expect them to occur within a year, while only about one third think they will, with little difference between the two Palestinian areas. Furthermore, a significant majority opposes President Abbas’s precondition that all electoral candidates must accept PLO obligations, including agreements with Israel. This opposition is particularly strong in the West Bank. On the logistical challenge of voting in East Jerusalem if Israel bars East Jerusalem voting under Oslo arrangements, the largest percentage favors internet voting, followed by voting in holy places, and finally bussing voters to PA‑controlled areas.

Public opinion reveals continued profound dissatisfaction with President Mahmoud Abbas, with three quarters disapproving of his performance and 80% wanting his resignation. This unpopularity is reflected in presidential polls where Abbas secures only 13% of the vote. In sharp contrast, Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti emerges as the most popular leader, decisively winning hypothetical elections against Hamas’s Khalid Mishal in both three-way and two-way contests. On the party level, Hamas maintains a significant lead over Fatah, both in general preference and in a potential legislative election. This is reinforced by the perception that Hamas is more deserving of leadership than Fatah under Abbas. However, a substantial segment of the public is deeply disillusioned with the status quo, as nearly a third believe neither party is worthy of representing the Palestinian people. In terms of political dynamics, findings clearly indicate that public support for Hamas has grown over the past two years, a trend observed in both Palestinian areas but more pronounced in the West Bank.

Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Palestinian public opinion on a political settlement is deeply divided and conditional. A slight majority opposes the general concept of a two-state solution, a sentiment rooted in the belief that it is no longer practical due to settlement expansion. Support for the solution erodes further when linked to compromises like demilitarization or Arab normalization. This reveals a stark internal divide: Gazans are consistently far more supportive of negotiated settlements, even with significant conditions, than West Bankers. For example, support for a detailed two-state agreement is nearly twice as high in Gaza. Regarding strategies to end the occupation, there is a notable tension. While non-violent tactics like joining international organizations garner majority support, "armed struggle" is still viewed as the single most effective method, particularly in the West Bank. This is mirrored in responses to settler violence, where an overwhelming majority feels unprotected by both the complicit Israeli army and absent PA police forces, leading to significant public backing for either deploying PA police or forming local armed groups to ensure community defense.

• The majority of the Palestinians (71%) has heard of the Trump Plan, three quarters in the West Bank and about two-thirds (65%) in the Gaza Strip.  We presented the public with the Trump Plan, using the Arab and Islamic framing of that plan as follows: the plan ends to the war on Gaza, releases hostages and Palestinian prisoners, abandons the forced transfer of Gazans, allows the entry of humanitarian aid,  requires the gradual Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, requires the disarmament of Hamas, requires reforming the Palestinian Authority, and calls for the start of a political process toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. Given this deliberate framing of the Trump Plan, we asked the public whether it supports or oppose it: 47% supported the plan in this Arab and Islamic framing and 49% opposed it. Support is much higher in the Gaza Strip compared Satisfaction to the West Bank, 59% and 39% respectively. Support is also higher among those who have heard of the plan compared to those who have not: 50% t0 39% respectively.
• A majority of the Palestinians (62%) supports Hamas’ response to the Trump plan, with greater supported in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 65% and 56% respectively. Support is much higher among those who have heard of the plan compared to those who did not hear of it: 71% and 41% respectively.  We asked specifically about public satisfaction with the names of Palestinian prisoners whose release Hamas has secured. A vast majority  (69%) of all Palestinians indicated satisfaction, but satisfaction is much higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 76% and 59% respectively.
• The majority of Palestinians (62%) does not think the Trump Plan will succeed in ending the War in the Gaza Strip once and for all. Although Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not think the Trump Plan will indeed bring a permanent end to the war, this pessimism is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 67% and 54% respectively; only 42% of Gazans and 27% of West Bankers believe it will indeed put an end to the war once and for all. Moreover, in light of the statement by the Israeli prime minister Netanyahu that after the return of the hostages to Israel, Israel will return to the war on Gaza if Hamas does not give up its arms, a majority in the West Bank (59%) thinks the Gaza war will return soon while Gazans are divided evenly, 49%-48%. In the West Bank, only 33% think the war on Gaza will not return soon. 
• The public in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but more in the former, is highly opposed (69%) to the element in the Trump plan that demands the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza Strip even “if this is a condition for the war to not to return the Gaza Strip,” with opposition standing at 78% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip. Support for disarming Hamas stands at 18% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip.
• The vast majority of West Bankers and Gazans (70%) do not believe that the Trump Plan will lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within the next five years; only 21% of West Bankers and 34% of Gazans think it will indeed lead to that.
• We asked the public about its views regarding the role of PA reforms, “if fully implemented,” in opening “the door to the establishment of a future Palestinian state in a manner that fulfills the aspirations of the Palestinian people:” While a majority of Gazans (59%) are optimistic that such real reforms would indeed achieve that outcome, the opposite is true in the West Bank, with only 44% think it would do that. A slim majority of West Bankers (51%) do not believe that such reforms, even if fully implemented, would indeed lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
• But when asked about the possibility that the Trump Plan “will lead to Arab and Islamic normalization with Israel within a year or two from now, even if a Palestinian state has not been established before then,” a half of the Palestinians (49%) said it will indeed lead to that while 48% said it will not. Both, West Bankers and Gazans, think that, 53% and 42% respectively think the Trump Plan will lead to Arab normalization with Israel even if a Palestinian state has not been established.
• We asked the public about the Day After arrangements pertaining to governing Gaza, the role of the PA, and the role of international bodies: We started by asking the public about its support and opposition to the formation of a Palestinian committee of professionals, that is not affiliated with the PA or Hamas, to manage the affairs of the Gaza Strip under and international umbrella in the accordance to the Trump Plan. A majority of 53% said it is opposed to such committee but a large minority (45%) supported it. It is noticeable that a slim majority of 51% of Gazans supported the formation of this committee while only 41% of the West Bankers supported it.
• When the question about the nature of this committee of Palestinian professionals omits reference to the fact that the committee will not be affiliated with Hamas or the PA and when the international auspices is linked to the implementation of the reconstruction program, attitudes change and the gap between West Bankers and Gazans narrow considerably. Indeed, a large majority of Palestinians (67% in total, 67% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip) supports the “administration of the Gaza Strip by a committee of Palestinian experts and specialists, including the implementation of the reconstruction program under international auspices and support.”  Opposition stands at 31%.
• We asked the public about its support for an alternative governing arrangement for the Gaza Strip whereby the PA would resume full control over governance in the Gaza Strip including the management of reconstruction. The largest percentage (41%) expressed opposition to the two options (44% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip); about a quarter (24%) preferred the independent committee of professional; a similar percentage (23%) expressed support for the return of the PA to fully control the Gaza Strip; and a small percentage of 10% expressed preference to the committee if it came under the administration of the PA. In other words, only 33% prefer a full or shared PA control over the Gaza Strip.
• In the event in which the Palestinian committee of professional assumes responsibility over the affairs of the Gaza Strip under an international umbrella in accordance of the Trump Plan, a large majority (68%) would be opposed to the entry of an armed Arab force from Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab and Islamic countries to maintain security and disarm Hamas. It is worth noting that the opposition is much greater in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 78% and 52% respectively.
• When the question omits reference to one of the missions of the international force, disarming Hamas, public response changes, particularly in the Gaza Strip. We asked about support and opposition to the “entry into Gaza of an international force from Arab States whose mission is to secure the borders, prevent the entry of arms and ensure internal security in cooperation with the Committee of Experts and the local Palestinian police.” A majority of Gazans (53%) and a large minority of West Bankers (43%) supported this mission while 47% of Gazans and 60% of West Bankers opposed it.
• We asked about support and opposition to a specific role for the PA in which it would “coordinate” the work of the committee of experts and professionals in the administration of the Gaza Strip. A majority of West Bankers (56%) expressed opposition while only 40% expressed support, while a majority of Gazans (54%) supported and 45% opposed that “coordination.”

• For the sixth time since October 7, 2023, we asked respondents from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip what they thought of Hamas' decision to launch the October 7 attack, whether it was correct or incorrect: 53% compared to 50%, in May 2025, and 54% in September 2024, and 67% in June 2024, and 71% in March 2024, said it was the right decision. The increase in this poll came from the Gaza Strip, where it stands today at 44%, an increase of 7 percentage points, and 59% in the West Bank, compared to an identical percentage in May 2025.

• 87% of Gazans say they have enough food for a day or two; 13% say they don't have enough food for a day or two. These results show a significant improvement over the results we obtained five months ago when only 53% said they had enough food for a day or two.
• 51% of Gazans say that one or more members of their family were killed during the current war, and in a separate question, 63% say that one or more members of their family were injured during this war. When combining the answers to the two questions and omitting the overlap, the results show that 72% report that one or more of their family members have been killed or injured. These results are almost identical with those we obtained five months ago.

• We asked residents of the Gaza Strip how often they had to move from one shelter to another since the war began on October 7, 2023: 31% said it ranged from two to three times, 36% said it ranged from four to six times, 13% said it ranged between 7 and 10 times, and 7% said it was once.
• A majority of 54% (compared to 51% five months ago) blames Israel for the current suffering of Gazans while 24% (compared to 28% five months ago) blame the US; only 14% (compared to 12% five months ago) blame Hamas; and only 6% (compared to 7% five months ago) blame the PA. It is worth noting that the percentage of Gazans blaming Hamas stood at 21% in the current poll compared to 23% five months ago.

• When asked if Hamas had committed the atrocities seen in the videos shown by international media displaying acts or atrocities committed by Hamas members against Israeli civilians, such as killing women and children in their homes. The overwhelming majority (86%) said it did not commit such atrocities, and only 10% said it did.

• As we did in our previous five polls since the war, we asked in the current poll about the party that will emerge victorious in this war: 39% of the public expects Hamas to win, compared to 43% five months ago, 50% 12 months ago, and 67% 15 months ago. It is worth noting, as the figure below shows, that a larger percentage of Gazans, at 27% today, expect Hamas to win compared to the results five months ago. However, Hamas's expectation of victory has dropped in the West Bank, where today it stands at only 48% compared to 56% five months ago. It is also worth noting that while 6% in the West Bank expect Israel to win the current war, 29% of Gazans expect Israel to win.

• When asked whether it supports or opposes the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to permanently end the war on the Gaza Strip, an overwhelming majority of 69% (87% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) said it is opposed to that; only 29% support it.

• As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:
• On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with Hamas' performance rises to 60% (66% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Fateh (30%; 25% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip), the PA (29%; 23% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip), and finally, president Abbas (21%; 16% in the West Bak and 29% in the Gaza Strip).

• As for satisfaction with Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate went to Houthis in Yemen, as we found in our previous polls, today at 74% (84% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Qatar (52%), Hezbollah (50%), and Iran (44%).  The findings show a significant rise in satisfaction with Qatar, Hizballah and Iran. We also asked, in this poll, about satisfaction with Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and the findings were 42%, 34%, and 27% respectively.

• For the international actors, China received the highest satisfaction (34%), followed by Russia (25%), and the United States (6%; in this poll we asked about president Trump). We also asked, in this poll, about satisfaction with Spain, the UK, and France and the findings were 35%, 14%, and 20% respectively.

• When asked about its support and opposition to the holding of Palestinian elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after a year of the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the majority (65%) said yes and only 32% said no. The majority in the West Bank is much larger than that in the Gaza Strip, 72% and 54% respectively, which might mean that those opposed to the holding of these elections might wish to hold these elections sooner than a full year from now.
• However, we found that the majority of the Palestinians (60%), with little differences between West Bankers and Gazans, believe the PA does not really intend to hold presidential and legislative elections a year from now; only a third believe the PA will hold such elections.  Therefore, an identical majority (60%) does not think that Palestinian presidential and legislative elections will indeed be held a year from now. Only a third believe elections will indeed be held within a year from now.
• The majority of the public (63%) is opposed to the condition set by president Mahmoud Abbas on those who wish to participate in the elections, which required them to accept all the obligations of the PLO, including the agreements with Israel. The opposition is wider in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 70% and 52% respectively; and support for this condition stands at 24% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip.
• We asked the public about its view on the best arrangements that would allow East Jerusalemites to participate in future Palestinian elections if Israel does not allow them to do so according to arrangement stipulated in the Oslo agreement. Three alternative arrangements were offered to the public: the largest percentage (41%) selected “voting through the Internet,” followed by “voting in the holy places,” selected by 31%; and finally, 22% selected providing “ free transportation of voters in buses to areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority.”
• We asked the public about its perception of Hamas two years after the Gaza war: has their support for the organization increased or decreased: 18% said its support for Hamas was big and it has not changed while 19% said its support increased a lot, and 17% said its support increased a little. By contrast, 16% said it did not support Hamas before and that its opposition to Hamas has not changed; 12% said its support decreased a little, and 10% said its support for Hamas has decreased a lot. The conclusion from these numbers is that the past two years have led to greater support for Hamas rather than the opposite and that this conclusion is true in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but more so in the former.
• If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, turnout would be 68%. Vote for Marwan Barghouti among the participants in the elections stands at 49%, followed by Khalid Mishal (36%) and Abbas (13). The following figure shows the results of the vote among all participants in the poll including those who do not intend to participate in the elections.

• If only two candidates were in the competition for the presidency, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, turnout would drop to 53%. In this case, among the actual voters Mishal stands at 63% and Abbas at 27%. Five months ago, only 25% among the actual voters chose Abbas and 68% chose Hamas’s candidate.  The following figure shows the results of the vote among all participants in the poll including those who do not intend to participate in the elections.

• If the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti of Fatah and Mishal of Hamas, turnout would rise to 64%. In this case, the vote for Barghouti among the participants in the elections would be 58% and for Mishal 39%. The following figure shows the results of the vote among all participants in the poll including those who do not intend to participate in the elections.

• In a closed question, we asked the public to choose the person it deems appropriate as President Abbas's successor from a predetermined list of options. The largest percentage (39%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti, 25% said they prefer Khalid Mishal, 11% chose Mohammed Dahlan, 7% chose Mustafa Barghouti, and 18% said they do not know or chose someone other than those listed.
• Satisfaction with President Abbas' performance stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 75%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 18% in the West Bank (compared to 13% five months ago) and in the Gaza Strip at 31% (compared to 29% five months ago).
• 80% want President Abbas to resign while 20% want him to remain in office. Five months ago, 81% said they want the president to resign. Today, 83% of the demand for the president's resignation comes from the West Bank and 73% comes from the Gaza Strip.

• When asked which political party or movement they support, the largest percentage (35%) said they prefer Hamas, followed by Fatah (24%), 9% selected third parties, and 32% said they do not support any of them or do not know. Five months ago, 32% said they support Hamas and 21% said they support Fatah. These results mean that support for Hamas over the past five months has increased by 3 percentage points, and the same is true for Fatah. Support for Hamas today stands at 32% in the West Bank (compared to 29% five months ago) and for Fatah at 20% (compared to 18% five months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas stands at 41% (compared to 37% five months ago) and support for Fatah at 29% (compared to 25% five months ago).

• But if new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, 65% say they will participate in them, and among the participants in the elections 44% say they will vote for Hamas, 30% for Fatah, 10% for third parties, and 16% have not yet decided. Compared to the results we obtained five months ago, the current results among voters actually participating in the elections indicate a very minor increase in the vote for both, Hamas and Fatah. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Hamas among voters participating in the elections stands at 49% (compared to 49% five months ago), and vote for Fatah among voters participating in the elections stands at 32% (compared to 30% five months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 40% (compared to 38% five months ago) and Fatah among voters participating in elections stands at 29% (compared to 27% five months ago). The following figure shows the results of the vote among all participants in the poll including those who do not intend to participate in the elections.

• 41% (compared to 40% five months ago) believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 22% (compared to 19% five months ago) believe that Fatah led by president Abbas is the most deserving. Less than a third, (31%) compared to 35% seven months ago, believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership.

• We asked the public in the West Bank about its personal and family safety and security. The findings show that only 15% feel safe and secure while 85% feel unsafe and unsecure. Five months ago, the perception of safety stood at 11% and two year ago at 48%.
• The poll found that 80% of the Palestinians (92% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip) believe that there is corruption in the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. We asked the public about its views regarding the recent steps taken by the Palestinian Authority, such as the dismissal of the current government's Minister of Transportation, who is accused of bribery, or the Director General of Crossings and Borders. A slim majority (52%) does not think such steps represent a serious indication of the PA's intention to fight corruption while 45% think that they do indicate that.
• We asked the public about its views on the most important measures that the PA leadership should take now “to address the current conditions in Gaza in a manner that would allow the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and negotiation with Israel and the international community regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state.” Three choices were offered: the largest percentage (37%) selected “the conduct presidential and legislative elections with the participation of all political factions including Hamas,” followed by the formation of “a national unity government that would include all political factions including Hamas,” selected by 31% ; and finally came bringing about “immediate reconciliation with Hamas as a first step,” selected by 27%.
• Al Jazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine as 58% selecting it as the one they watched the most during the past two months. Due to the current war conditions, residents of the West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to watch Aljazeera, 74% and 34% respectively. The second most popular stations is Palestine Today and Al-Aqsa TV (3% each), followed by Palestine TV and Al-Arabiya and Al-Mayadeen TV (2% each), and finally Ma'an (1% each).
• A majority of 56% (compared to 60% five months ago) believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 40% (compared to 35% five months ago) believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people.

• 45% support and 53% oppose the concept of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details. Last September, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 40%. As the figure below show, the rise in support in this poll came entirely from the Gaza Strip.

• Support for a two-state solution is usually linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for a Palestinian state. Today, 56% (compared to 64% five months ago) believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion, but 41% (compared to 33% five months ago) believe it remains practical. Moreover, 61% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent and 37% believe the chances are medium or high.
• In the context of the two-state solution, but with few added details, we asked about support and opposition to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the borders of June 4, 1967, one that would be demilitarized, with East Jerusalem as its capital, with limited land swaps so that it can live in peace with the State of Israel, with international guarantees. A majority of 53% expressed opposition and 44% expressed support. It is worth noting that support in the Gaza Stirp for this solution, with its various conditions, is almost twice in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank, 61% and 33% respectively. Opposition to this solution stands at 63% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip.
• In the same context, but one in which we added the issue of Arab normalization with Israel, we found a majority of Palestinians (59%) in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 63%% and 54% respectively, do not support “reaching a political and security agreement to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that includes the establishment of a Palestinian state through a regional agreement between the Arab states and Israel and the normalization of relations between them,” while 34% of West Bankers and 45% of the Gazans do support such agreement.
• We came back again to the same two-state solution issue. This time we asked the public if it agrees or disagrees with the following sentence: "I support a Palestinian political agreement that guarantees an end to the war, an end to the occupation, the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state and the normalization of relations between Israel and neighboring Arab states:” two thirds expressed opposition and only 31% expressed support. Support is higher among Gazans compared to West Bankers, 45% and 22% respectively. Opposition stands at 75% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip.
• We asked about the public support for three possible solutions to the conflict: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the solution of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel, and a one-state solution in which the Jews and Palestinians live with equality, 47% (47% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, while 18% (8% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) prefer a confederation between two states. 12% (10% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the establishment of a single state with equality between the two sides. 24% said they did not know or did not want to answer.
• When asked about the public's support or opposition to specific political measures to break the deadlock, 73% supported joining more international organizations, 54% supported resorting to unarmed popular resistance, 41% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 45% supported the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Five months ago, 46% supported a return to confrontations and an armed intifada, 50% supported unarmed popular resistance, 42% supported the dissolution of the PA, and 26% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We found that a majority of 53% thinks that the recognition of Palestine by France, Britian, Canada, Australia, and other European countries brings the Palestinians closers to ending the Israeli occupation and reaching a real Palestinian state; 45% do not think so.
• A larger majority (65%) thinks that the global popular solidarity with the Palestinian people, such as the Global Steadfastness Flotilla, the ships breaking the siege, the popular demonstrations in the capitals of the world, and the decline in support for Israel in the world, including in the United States, does bring the Palestinians closer to ending the occupation and reaching a real state; one third do not think so.
• We presented the public with three ways to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective one: 41% (49% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip) chose "armed struggle"; 36% (37% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) chose negotiations; and 19% (13% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) chose popular peaceful resistance. As shown in the figure below, these results indicate a very slight decrease in support for armed struggle, a 3-percentage point increase in support for negotiations, and a very slight decrease in support for peaceful resistance.

• We asked the public about the most effective means to confront settler terrorism: relying on the Israeli army to prevent such attacks, deploying Palestinian police forces in areas subject to attack, forming armed groups from the residents of those areas, or forming unarmed groups from those areas. The results were as follows:  

1. The option to deploy Palestinian police forces in these areas came in first place with 30% support.  Similarly, reliance on the Israeli army came also in the first place with 30%.  
2. A quarter of the public said that forming armed groups is the most effective option  
3. The option of forming unarmed groups came last with only 10% opting for it. 

• However, when asked about the role of the Israeli army in preventing or stopping settler attacks, a majority of 75% say the army supports settler attacks
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (93%) say that the Palestinian security services do not enter the areas that are attacked by settlers, whether during or after the attacks. 

• 41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages; 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; and 10% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (43%; 46% in the Gaza Strip and 40% in the West Bank) said it is the Israeli occupation; 22% said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; 12% said it is settlers’ attacks in the West Bank; 12% said it is corruption; and 8% said it is unemployment. Five months ago, 43% said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip and 30% said it is the Israeli occupation.