Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (95)

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 1-4 May 2025. The period prior to the poll witnessed the continuation of the war on the Gaza Strip and the failure of all attempts to reach a new ceasefire after the collapse of the three-phase agreement reached on January 15, 2025, which lasted for a little more than two months after Israel refused to enter into negotiations to implement its second phase. During that period, the US president proposed the idea of displacing the residents of the Gaza Strip to Egypt and Jordan under the pretext of facilitating the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, a proposal that was rejected by all concerned parties except Israel, which began to develop plans to carry out such displacement. Israel has also demanded the disarmament of Hamas as one of the conditions for stopping the war on the Gaza Strip. In a speech to the PLO's Central Council, the PA president called on Hamas to release the Israeli hostages and give up arms in order to deny Israel the pretext of continuing the war on Gaza. Meanwhile, the Israeli military incursion into the Jenin and Tulkarm areas in the West Bank continued, interrupted by clashes between the Israeli army and Palestinian armed groups in the northern West Bank. The Israeli army evacuated tens of thousands of people from the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps and demolished dozens of buildings in those camps. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank also continued and entrances to most towns and villages were closed by the Israeli army in order to prevent residents from accessing main roads. Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages in unprotected areas in areas B and C also continued.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted with residents in areas that did not witness armed clashes and whose residents have not been displaced or returned after being displaced, especially after the recent ceasefire during the first three months of this year. This poll covers all of the above issues as well as other issues such as domestic condition and the internal balance of power, the peace process and the alternatives available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

This survey was conducted face-to-face in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip using tablets or phones. When each interview is completed, it is automatically sent directly to our server where only our researchers can access. There is no way for anyone to intercept or manipulate the collected data.

The sample size of this survey was 1270 people, of whom 830 were interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank (in 83 residential locations) and 440 in the Gaza Strip (in 44 locations).  The margin of error stands at +/-3.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Methodology of data collection in the Gaza Strip:

The interviews for this poll included 44 census “counting areas” in all areas of the Gaza Strip, with the exception of some areas whose residents were displaced in the Rafah governorate and some other specific areas of Gaza City, Khan Younis, and the northern Gaza Strip, so that the number of areas that were not accessible stood at 13 counting areas (five in the Rafah governorate, five in Gaza Governorate, two in Khan the Yunis governorate, and one in the northern Gaza Strip). Residents of these 13 displaced counting areas were interviewed in shelters and refugee camps in the same governorate from which they were displaced. These were randomly selected from an updated list of shelters and refugee camps located in their governorates, with the exception of the Rafah governorate, whose residents were displaced to areas in the Khan Younis governorate.

As in our previous four polls since October 7, most of the questions in this poll, covering the first four months of 2025, revolve around the events of that day and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war and the Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, the unprecedented human suffering of the Gaza Strip's residents, the debate regarding the future of the Gaza Strip after the war, public satisfaction with the performance of the various parties during the war, and West Bankers’ fears of the probability of the war spilling over from Gaza to the West Bank. The current poll, as in the previous three polls, covers the consequences of the war on the internal balance of power, support for the Palestinian leadership, Palestinian-Israeli relations, and the political process.

Only half of the Palestinians in the current poll view Hamas’ decision to carry out the October 7 attack as “correct.” In the Gaza Strip, is less than that. The fears of the war finally reaching the West Bank, the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip, with declining hopes for a quick ceasefire might have contributed to this and similar findings in this poll, many of which were evident in our previous poll seven months ago.

Despite the declining favorability of October 7, most of the public continue to believe the attack and the following war have placed the Palestinian issue at the center of global attention. Unlike previous polls, today’s findings show that the majority of the public does not believe Hamas will win the current war. Still, a plurality of the public believes that Hamas will continue to control the Gaza Strip after the war. Gazans are split in the middle regarding the anti-Hamas demonstrations in the Gaza Strip even though most Gazans think these demonstrations are driven by outsiders. Gazans are also split regarding emigrating from the Gaza Strip after the war ends. On the domestic balance of power, Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular Palestinian leader. Demand for Abbas' resignation remains overwhelming even as it drops slightly. Hamas’ popularity drops a little while Fatah’s remain unchanged. Findings show support for the two-state solution remaining unchanged. Support for armed struggle declines and support for negotiations rises.

Humanitarian conditions: We start with the humanitarian and living conditions in the Gaza Strip. There has been a significant decline in the percentage of Gazans who have access to food and more than half say they have lost a family member during the war. The majority of Gazans blame Israel and the US first for their suffering and only a small minority blames Hamas first.

Support for the attack on October 7: Once again, findings show decline in the overall support for the October 7 Hamas offensive. The decline is seen in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is important to note that support for this attack does not necessarily mean support for Hamas and does not mean support for any killings or atrocities committed against civilians. Indeed, almost 90% of the public believes Hamas men did not commit the atrocities depicted in videos taken on that day.

Ceasefire and who comes out the winner: A little over half of the Palestinians expect Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement soon. As we did in the previous two polls, we asked in the current one about the side that would emerge victorious in this war. A plurality thinks it will be Hamas but the percentage is much smaller in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.

Who will control Gaza after the war: A plurality expects Hamas to remain in control over the Gaza Strip after the war. That percentage is smaller in Gaza standing at a little over one quarter. When we asked about support for the return of the PA to control the Gaza Strip after a ceasefire, 40% expressed support. Support for the PA return is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. The idea of an Arab security deployment in Gaza to assist the PA security forces is opposed by almost two-thirds of the public.

Anti-Hamas demonstrations in the Gaza Strip: Gazans are split almost in the middle for and against the recent anti-Hamas demonstrations in the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, most Gazans think the demonstrations are driven and motivated by outside hands.

Demands for the release of the hostages and the disarmament of Hamas:  The overwhelming majority of Palestinians believes that the war will not end and Israel will not withdraw from the Gaza Strip if Hamas agrees to disarm. Similarly, the overwhelming majority disagree with the view that if Hamas releases the hostages, Israel will end the war and withdraw from the Gaza Strip. Perhaps this is why the overwhelming majority is opposed to a Hamas disarmament or the departure of its military leadership from the Gaza Strip.

Trump’s and Israeli calls for displacing Gazans: While the majority says it does not want to leave the Gaza Strip after the war ends, a large minority wants to do that. Similarly, about half of Gazans are willing to apply to Israel to help them emigrate to other countries via Israeli ports and airports.

Satisfaction with the performance of various parties during the war:  As we did in our previous polls, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with Hamas' performance continues to drop but it is higher than satisfaction with the PA, Fatah, and President Abbas. As for satisfaction with Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate continues to go to the Houthis in Yemen. followed by Qatar and Hezbollah. Satisfaction with Iran comes last as the majority views negatively Iran’s role since October 7. For the international actors, China received the highest satisfaction followed by Russia and the US receives the lowest level of satisfaction.

What should the PA do now? When asked about the measures the PA leadership should take today to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip, "the formation of a national unity government to negotiate with Israel and the international community to end the war and rebuild the Gaza Strip in the future," came first.

Fear in the West Bank of the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank: Three quarters of West Bankers say they fear the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank. If the Gaza war comes to the West Bank, the overwhelming majority says it will not leave home to go to Jordan.

Support for Palestinian factions: support for Hamas declines by 4-points while support for Fatah remains unchanged. The decline in support for Hamas came from the West Bank. Support for Fatah is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and support for Hamas is also higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. In both areas, support for Hamas is higher than the support for Fatah.

Support for Palestinian leaders: If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, Barghouti would receive 50% of the vote, followed by Khalid Mishal and Abbas.

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas: About 1 in 5 Palestinians are satisfied with the performance of President Abbas and 81% want him to resign.

The new government of Mohammad Mustafa: An overwhelming majority (69%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to carryout. In all of the reform items we asked about, we found that Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but a majority there too does not believe that the government will succeed in any of the reforms agenda items.

Support for the two-state solution:  Support for the concept of the two-state solution remains stable, with 4 out of 10 Palestinians supporting it. Support for a Palestinian state rises to more than 60% when it is not linked to the “two-state solution” and when the borders of the state are identified as those of 1967. We asked about the public support for three possible solutions to the conflict: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the solution of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel, and a one-state solution in which the Jews and Palestinians live with equality, The biggest support went to the two-state solution, slightly less than half, followed by the confederation and the one-state solution.

Support for Armed struggle: We presented the public with three ways to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective one: 4 out of 10 supported armed struggle, one third supported negotiations; and one fifth supported popular peaceful resistance. The findings indicate a significant decrease in support for armed struggle.

• For the fifth time since October 7, we asked respondents from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip what they thought of Hamas' decision to launch the October 7 attack, whether it was correct or incorrect: 50%, compared to 54% seven months ago, in September 2024, and 71% 14 months ago, in March 2024, said it was the right decision. The decrease in this percentage came from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where it stands today at 59% in the West Bank, a decrease of 5 percentage points, and 38% in the Gaza Strip, compared to 39% seven months ago.

• Parallel to 4-point drop in the perception that the October 7 attack was correct, the belief that the war on Gaza since October 7 has "revived international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that it may lead to increased recognition of the Palestinian state" drops by 4-points standing today at 64%, and only 34 said they did not believe so.

• 53% of Gazans say they have enough food for a day or two; 48% say they don't have enough food for a day or two. These results show a deterioration over the results we obtained seven months ago when 69% said they had enough food for a day or two.
• 52% of Gazans say that one or more members of their family were killed during the current war, and in a separate question, 66% say that one or more members of their family were injured during this war. When combining the answers to the two questions and omitting the overlap, the results show that 75% report that one or more of their family members have been killed or injured.

• We asked residents of the Gaza Strip how often they had to move from one shelter to another since the war began on October 7, 2023: 47% said it ranged from two to three times, 34% said it ranged from four to six times, 4% said it ranged between 7 and 10 times, and 6% said it was once.
• A majority of 51% (compared to 56% seven months ago) blames Israel for the current suffering of Gazans while 28% (compared to 22% seven months ago) blame the US; only 12% (compared to 12% seven months ago) blame Hamas; and only 7% (compared to 8% seven months ago) blame the PA. It is worth noting that the percentage of Gazans blaming Hamas stood at 18% in the current poll compared to 23% seven months ago.

• When asked if Hamas had committed the atrocities seen in the videos shown by international media displaying acts or atrocities committed by Hamas members against Israeli civilians, such as killing women and children in their homes. The overwhelming majority (87%) said it did not commit such atrocities, and only 9% said it did.

• A majority of 56% (65% in the West Bank 42% in the Gaza Strip expect Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement in a few days while 41% do not expect that.
• As we did in our previous four polls since the war, we asked in the current poll about the party that will emerge victorious in this war: 43% of the public expects Hamas to win, compared to 50% seven months ago and 67% 10 months ago. It is worth noting, as the figure below shows, that fewer Gazans, at just 23% today, expect Hamas to win compared to the results 7 and 10 months ago, when those percentages stood at 28%, 48%, and 56%, respectively. Hamas's expectation of victory has also dropped in the West Bank, where today it stands at only 56% compared to 65% seven months ago and 79% ten months ago. It is also worth noting that while 6% in the West Bank expect Israel to win the current war, 29% of Gazans expect Israel to win.

• We asked respondents to speculate about the future of the Gaza Strip the day after the end of the current war. The largest percentage (42%) says it will come under Hamas’ control. As we found in the previous poll, there are significant differences between West Bankers and Gazans, with only 28% of Gazans saying Hamas will actually control that area, compared to a much higher percentage (51%) in the West Bank. Seven months ago, 37% of Gazans said Hamas will control the Gaza Strip after the war. In the Gaza Strip, 21% expect the Israeli army to control the Gaza Strip; 19% believe that the PA will return to control the Gaza Strip; and 24% believe it will come under international control.
• If an agreement is reached to end the war on the Gaza Strip, 40% (46% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) support the return of the PA to managing the affairs of the Gaza Strip and providing for the requirements of daily life and responsibility for reconstruction and 56% do not support it. Last September, 70% said they oppose the return of President Abbas and the PA to the Gaza Strip and control of the Rafah crossing after a ceasefire is reached, and 27% supported it at the time, with support in the Gaza Strip at that time standing at 42% compared to only 17% in the West Bank.
• If the PA resumes its administration of the affairs of the Gaza Strip, only 31% (38% in the Gaza Strip and 25% in the West Bank) support asking for Arab forces from Jordan and Egypt to enable it to maintain security and 65% oppose that. In September 2024, support for the deployment of an Arab security force from Egypt and Jordan in the Gaza Strip to assist the Palestinian security forces stood at 32% and opposition at 66%.  In June 2024, support stood at 23% and opposition at 75%.

• 48% of Gazans compared to only 14% in the West Bank say they support the demonstrations that took place over the past two months in the Gaza Strip demanding that Hamas abandon control over that Strip while some demanded the departure of some of its military leaders out of Gaza. Support for these demonstrations stands at 28% in the combined West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 67% say they oppose them. Opposition to demonstrations stands at 77% in the West Bank but only 50% in the Gaza Strip.
• However, when asked about their opinion on the nature of these anti-Hamas demonstrations, whether they express a genuine opinion of a segment of the population or artificial and driven by external hands, a majority of 59% said they were artificial and driven by external hands while only 20% said they express the real opinion of the population. Even though almost half of the residents of the Gaza Strip support these demonstrations, 54% of them believe that these demonstrations are motivated by external hands and 20% believe that they are both, i.e. that they express a genuine opinion of the residents and are at the same time motivated by external forces.
• A majority of 57% (70% in the West Bank and only 38% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the steadfastness of the residents of the Gaza Strip despite heavy human losses and massive destruction is due to their deep belief in God, fate and destiny while 25% (40% in the Gaza Strip and 15% in the West Bank) believe they have no other option, and 15% (22% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) believe it is due to their belief in their Palestinian national identity.

• An overwhelming majority of residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (88% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the war on the Gaza Strip will not end and Israel will not withdraw from the Gaza Strip if Hamas agrees to disarm as demanded by Israel and regional and Palestinian parties; only 17% believe that the war will indeed end and Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip in that case.
• 73% (82% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip) disagree with the statement that if Hamas releases Israeli detainees, the war will end and Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and 24% (39% in the Gaza Strip and 14% in the West Bank) agree with this view.

• When asked whether it supports or opposes the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to stop the war on the Gaza Strip, an overwhelming majority (85% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip) said it is opposed to that; only 18% support it.
• When asked whether it supports or opposed the eviction of some Hamas military leaders from the Gaza Strip if that was a condition for stopping the war, 65% said they oppose it and 31% support it. Support for this step stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and only 20% in the West Bank.

• When asked whether it supports or opposes the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to stop the war on the Gaza Strip, an overwhelming majority (85% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip) said it is opposed to that; only 18% support it.
• When asked whether it supports or opposed the eviction of some Hamas military leaders from the Gaza Strip if that was a condition for stopping the war, 65% said they oppose it and 31% support it. Support for this step stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and only 20% in the West Bank.

• We asked the residents of the Gaza Strip about US President Trump's statements about the need to displace them in order to rebuild it and whether they are ready to emigrate from the Strip after the end of the war. A majority of 56% said they are not willing to emigrate but a large minority of 43% say they are willing to emigrate from the Gaza Strip after the end of the war.
• When asked whether they would be willing to apply to Israel to help them emigrate to other countries through its airports and seaports, 49% said they would do so and 50% said they would not do so.
• Despite Egypt and Jordan's rejection of the US president's request to accept the expusion of Gazans, a large minority of 43% believes that these two countries would bow to US pressure and accept the emigration of residents of the Gaza Strip while a majority of 53% believes they will not succumb to US pressure.
• If Israel were to occupy the Gaza Strip, 47% of the public believe that it would force Gazans to emigrate through its ports and airports to other countries in the world, but 49% (51% in the Gaza Strip and 47% in the West Bank) do not believe Israel will do so.

• As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:

1. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with Hamas' performance drops to 57% (67% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Fateh (24%; 19% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip), the PA (23%; 28% in the Gaza Strip and 19% in the West Bank), president Abbas (15%; 13% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip).

• We asked the public for the second time what political measures the PA leadership should take today to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip. We presented the public with three options: reconciliation, the formation of a national unity government, and the provision of humanitarian services. First came "the formation of a national unity government to negotiate with Israel and the international community to end the war and rebuild the Gaza Strip in the future," with 46% opting for it, compared to 42% seven months ago. Second was "achieving immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" with 34% selecting it.  The third option, chosen by only 16%, was for the PA to "lead a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the residents of Gaza in cooperation with Egypt and the international community." It is worth noting that support for the formation of a national unity government stands at 52% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank.

2. As for satisfaction with Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate went to Houthis in Yemen, as we found in our previous polls, today at 74% (84% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Qatar (45%), Hezbollah (43%), and Iran (31%).  The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction in the current and previous polls in the West Bank and Gaza. The findings show that a rise in satisfaction with Yemen and Qatar.

We asked the public about its assessment of Iran's role in Palestine in light of what has been happening since October the 7th, is it a useful role or harmful to the Palestinian cause? A majority of 54% believes Iran's role is harmful while only 32% believe it is beneficial.

3. For the international actors, China received the highest satisfaction (26%), followed by Russia (21%), and the United States (3%).

• 75% of West Bankers say they fear the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank while 23% do not fear such a war. 65% of West Bankers believe that if the war spreads to the West Bank, Israel will succeed in destroying most of its cities, as it did in the Gaza Strip.
• Despite this, 55% believe that Israel will not win a war in the West Bank if it moves there from the Gaza Strip, but 40% believe it will win it. When West Bankers are asked what they would do if the war moved to the West Bank, would they move with their families to Jordan or stay in the West Bank, 88% of West Bankers say they will remain in the West Bank while 9% say they will go to Jordan.

• If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, turnout would be 64%. Vote for Marwan Barghouti among the participants in the elections stands at 50%, followed by Khalid Mishal (35%) and Abbas (11). Seven months ago, support for Marwan Barghouti among voters stood at 46%, Hamas’ candidate at 44%, and Abbas at 9%.

• If only two candidates were in the competition for the presidency, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, turnout would drop to 47%. In this case, among the actual voters Mishal stands at 68% and Abbas at 25%. Seven months ago, only 24% among the actual voters chose Abbas and 74% chose Hamas’s candidate.

• If the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti of Fatah and Mishal of Hamas, turnout would rise to 62%. In this case, the vote for Barghouti among the participants in the elections would be 58% and for Mishal 39%. These results indicate a 6-point rise in the percentage of votes for Barghouti and an 8-point drop in the vote for the Hamas candidate.

• In a closed question, we asked the public to choose the person it deems appropriate as President Abbas's successor from a predetermined list of options. The largest percentage (39%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti, 21% said they prefer Khalid Mishal, 12% chose Mohammed Dahlan, 6% chose Mustafa Barghouti, and 19% said they do not know or chose someone other than those listed.
• Satisfaction with President Abbas' performance stands at 19% and dissatisfaction at 79%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 13% in the West Bank (compared to 11% seven months ago) and in the Gaza Strip at 29% (compared to 27% seven months ago).
• 81% want President Abbas to resign while 18% want him to remain in office. Seven months ago, 84% said they want the president to resign. Today, 85% of the demand for the president's resignation comes from the West Bank and 74% comes from the Gaza Strip.

• When asked which political party or movement they support, the largest percentage (32%) said they prefer Hamas, followed by Fatah (21%), 12% selected third parties, and 34% said they do not support any of them or do not know. Seven months ago, 36% said they support Hamas and 21% said they support Fatah. These results mean that support for Hamas over the past seven months has decreased by 4 percentage points, while support for Fatah has remained unchanged during the same period. Support for Hamas today stands at 29% in the West Bank (compared to 37% seven months ago) and for Fatah at 18% (compared to 18% seven months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas stands at 37% (compared to 35% seven months ago) and support for Fatah at 25% (compared to 26% seven months ago).

• But if new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, 62% say they will participate in them, and among the participants in the elections 43% say they will vote for Hamas, 28% for Fatah, 8% for third parties, and 19% have not yet decided. Compared to the results we obtained seven months ago, the current results among voters actually participating in the elections indicate a decrease of 2 percentage points for Hamas and a rise of one percentage point for Fatah. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Hamas among voters participating in the elections stands at 49% (compared to 42% seven months ago), and vote for Fatah among voters participating in the elections stands at 30% (compared to 33% seven months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 38% (compared to 48% seven months ago) and Fatah among voters participating in elections stands at 27% (compared to 23% seven months ago).

• 40% (compared to 43% seven months ago) believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 19% (compared to 19% seven months ago) believe that Fatah led by president Abbas is the most deserving. More than a third, (35%) compared to 32% seven months ago, believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership.

• An overwhelming majority (69%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to carry out. By contrast, 23% believe it will succeed in doing so. Seven months ago, 69% said the new government would not succeed in carrying out reforms.
• We also asked the public about its expectations for the new government, such as carrying out specific reforms announced by this government or meeting the priorities of the public:

1. 76% believe that the government will not succeed in pushing for reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip It is important to note, as the following figure shows, that in all of these measures, Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but the majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of these reforms.
2. 75% believe it will not succeed in improving economic conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
3. 73% believe it will not succeed in holding legislative and presidential elections
4. 74% say it will not succeed in providing relief for the Gaza Strip and reconstruction in the future

It is important to note, as the following figure shows, that in all of these measures, Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but the majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of these reforms.

• Al Jazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine as 60% selecting it as the one they watched the most during the past two months. Due to the current war conditions, residents of the West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to watch Aljazeera, 72% and 43% respectively. The second most popular stations is Palestine Today (3%), followed by Palestine TV and Al-Arabiya (2% each), and finally Ma'an and Al-Mayadeen TV (1% each).
• A majority of 60% (compared to 66% seven months ago) believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 35% (compared to 30% seven months ago) believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people.
• We asked the public in the West Bank about its personal and family safety and security. The findings show that only 11% feel safe and secure while 88% feel unsafe and unsecure. Seven months ago, the perception of safety stood at 9% and 19 months ago at 48%.
• 71% say they are dissatisfied and 28% say they are satisfied with the current levels of popular solidarity in the West Bank with the people of the Gaza Strip in the war Israel is waging against them.
• Moreover, 71% are dissatisfied and 27% are dissatisfied with the current levels of popular solidarity in the West Bank with the displaced residents of the northern refugee camps.

• 41% (52% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip) believe Israel benefits the most from the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, 39% believe it is the Syrian people, 9% believe it is Turkey, and 5% believe it is the Palestinian cause.
• We asked the public what they thought of the United States’ war against the Houthis and whether it could succeed in defeating them and end their pro-Palestinian stand. 66% believe that the US will not succeed in its war against the Houthis while 28% believe it will. Belief that the US will succeed in defeating the Houthis rises in the Gaza Strip to 46% compared to only 15% in the West Bank.

• 40% support and 57% oppose the concept of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details. Last September, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 39%.

• But when asked about support or opposition to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied in 1967, i.e. defining the borders of the state and without linking it to the two-state solution, support rises to 61% (66% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip), while 36% do not support the establishment of such a state.
• Support for a two-state solution is usually linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for a Palestinian state. Today, 64% (compared to 57% seven months ago) believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion, but 33% (compared to 39% seven months ago) believe it remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent and 31% believe the chances are medium or high.
• When asked about the public's support or opposition to specific political measures to break the deadlock, 68% supported joining more international organizations, 50% supported resorting to unarmed popular resistance, 46% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 42% supported the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, and 26% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Seven months ago, 51% supported a return to confrontations and an armed intifada, 45% supported unarmed popular resistance, 49% supported the dissolution of the PA, and 22% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We asked about the public support for three possible solutions to the conflict: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the solution of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel, and a one-state solution in which the Jews and Palestinians live with equality, 47% (46% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, while 15% (9% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip) prefer a confederation between two states. 14% (12% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the establishment of a single state with equality between the two sides. 24% said they did not know or did not want to answer.
• Only 23% say they have heard and 72% say they have not heard about the “Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution” launched by Saudi Arabia with Arab and international cooperation.
• We presented the public with three ways to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective one: 41% (48% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) chose "armed struggle"; 33% (29% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) chose negotiations; and 20% (15% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip) chose popular peaceful resistance. As shown in the figure below, these results indicate a decrease of 9-percentage points in support for armed struggle, a 3-percentage point increase in support for negotiations, and a 5-point increase in support for peaceful resistance.

• We asked the public about their view of the Israeli intentions behind destroying homes in some refugee camps in the northern West Bank and the displacement of the residents of these camps. Respondents could choose one of three possibilities that proceeded from the least to the most extreme: The largest percentage (44%) choose the most extreme intention, that Israel's aspiration is to eliminate armed groups, destroy refugee camps, and expel their residents to Jordan; 35% believe it is to eliminate armed groups and eliminate the West Bank refugee camps as Israel does in the Gaza Strip, and 18% believe it is just to eliminate armed groups in the northern West Bank.
• A majority of 64% believes that criticism of the war in Israel and the signing of petitions demanding its cessation will not succeed in forcing Netanyahu to stop the war while only 32% believe that such protests will succeed in stopping the war.
• We asked the public about the most effective means to confront settler terrorism: relying on the Israeli army to prevent such attacks, deploying Palestinian police forces in areas subject to attack, forming armed groups from the residents of those areas, or forming unarmed groups from those areas. The results were as follows:  
• A third of the public said that forming armed groups is the most effective option  
• The option to deploy Palestinian police forces in these areas came in second place with 27% support.  
• Reliance on the Israeli army came in third place with 23%.  
• The option of forming unarmed groups came last with only 12% opting for it. 
• When asked about the role of the Israeli army in preventing or stopping settler attacks, a majority of 75% say the army supports settler attacks
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (93%) say that the Palestinian security services do not enter the areas that are attacked by settlers, whether during or after the attacks. 
• We asked respondents whether the security conditions in their area of residence and the restrictions imposed by the occupation were pushing their neighbors to leave the area: 8% believe this is true and 88% say it is not true

• 41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages; 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; and 12% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (43%; 57% in the Gaza Strip and 34% in the West Bank) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; 30% said it is the Israeli occupation; 9% said it is corruption; 6% said it is unemployment; and 9% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Seven months ago, 38% said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; and 30% said it is the Israeli occupation.