Critical Policy Brief, Number 1/2024

May 2024
The Prospect for the Gaza War Expansion into a Regional War and What that Means to the PA and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Khalil Shikaki

It is no exaggeration to say that the reverberations of October 7 have impacted the Middle East region and beyond in ways that no other past Palestinian-Israeli confrontation did in the past two decades. It is almost certain that it will define the manner in which the history of the conflict will be written in this and perhaps future decades. On top of that, it might be a defining moment for our understanding of the meaning of the principles of human rights, international law, and free speech. We can already see some of the current aftershocks impacting not only the domestic Palestinian and Israeli environments, but also the manner in which the international community and global public opinion interacts with the conflict, as well the regional dynamics and balance of power.

It is the regional dynamics that this Policy Brief seeks to address. The unprecedented direct Iran-Israel armed confrontation in April 2024 represents the highest level of risk-taking that the Gaza war might have generated in the two countries since the eruption of the conflict between the two counties. Despite the apparent calm in the open conflict between Iran and Israel, the developments of the war in Gaza and on the Lebanese front between Israel and Hezbollah might increase the prospects of a return to a similar escalation that may continue to rise, threatening to destabilize the entire region, and might threaten a large-scale regional war. The prospects for such expansion and the potential repercussions on the future of the Palestinian-Authority (PA) and Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the subject of this Brief. Some of the questions addressed in the Brief include the following: did the Iran-Israel rules of the game change? If so, how will this impact the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli dynamics, the normalization process, the peace process, security and civil coordination, the future of the PA and Palestinian access to basic needs and utilities, and how should the PA respond to this development.

Background:

The attack carried out by Hamas on October 7 is unprecedented in the entire bilateral Palestinian-Jewish and Palestinian-Israeli conflict of the past 120 years. It is unique in many ways. The attack demonstrated the ability of an armed Palestinian group to execute a large scale and lethal military maneuver on fortified Israeli military bases; to easily occupy, at least for a day, all Israeli towns adjacent to the entire border with the Gaza Strip; and to take about 250 soldiers and civilian hostages and war prisoners while killing 1200 Israeli soldiers and civilians. It goes without saying, that the magnitude of civilian death and destruction is unprecedented, with hundreds of Israelis and tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians killed and close to 70% of Gazan homes, factories, farms, public buildings and civilian infrastructure destroyed. The scale and magnitude of atrocities that have been committed in violation of international law have never been seen before.

The domestic, regional and interactional ramifications for Palestinians and Israelis are also unprecedented. Domestically, the Palestinian Authority has lost almost all support and credibility in the eyes of its own public.[1] Public support for the resumption of PA control over the Gaza Strip after the war does not exceed 11% while 59% support a return to Hamas’ control.[2] In other words, if the choice is between the PA and Hamas, the majority of the public, including a large number of people opposed to Hamas, would prefer it over the PA. In Israel, the political future of the longest serving prime minister, the one most responsible for the deadlock in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, is threatened, if not completely ruined. Resignation of senior Israeli army officials, while the war is ongoing, is an indication of a deep rift within the Israeli political and security establishments and a great Israeli public eagerness for accountability.

While the Palestinian and Israeli publics continue to show significant distrust, reaching high levels of dehumanization, the findings from the Gaza Strip are extremely helpful in illustrating the dynamics of conflict resolution. While West Bankers and Israeli Jews express strong opposition to the two-state solution, standing, at least, at a two-third majority,[3] PSR’s March 2024 findings show that Gazan support for that solution has increased from 35% to 62% in six months, a dramatic 27-point increase.[4] When faced with a real existential threat of expulsion or genocide, Gazans turned to the two-state solution as a savior. Nothing shows the vitality and the contribution of that solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict better than this finding from the Gaza Strip.

Regionally, the Iranian role and influence have expanded significantly and the threat of a regional war has become real more than any time before, at least since the end of the US 2003 invasion of Iraq. Actors loyal to Iran, in three Arab countries, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon, are taking part in the armed conflict with Israel in solidarity with Hamas and the Palestinians. Yemen has blocked normal shipping access in the Red Sea and in doing so brought about direct military intervention by the US and UK against targets inside that Arab country.

The Palestinian issue is now seen as central to regional stability and the search for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has become more pressing than it has been since 2014. The international community embrace of the two-state solution is perhaps more meaningful today than in the past. The US has presented the relevant parties with its own vision for ending the entire Palestinian-Israeli conflict that combines plans for an end to the war, a “revitalization” of the PA, and a design for the day after the war in a context of a two-state solution and an Arab-Israeli normalization of relations with Israel.[5] Countries in Europe, such as Spain, Irland, and others are discussing possible recognition of the Palestinian state. The International Court of Justice finds it appropriate and urgent to examine charges that Israel is committing genocide against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The ICC is considering issuing arrest warrants against Israeli leaders and military commanders.[6] The United States and the EU are imposing sanctions on violent settlers and entities that support them financially. Moreover, international public opinion is shifting against Israel in a decisive manner. Public opinion polls show Israel losing support, particularly among the youth, in almost all counties of the world, including in the US, Germany, and the UK, with significant domestic implications in many of these countries.[7] The most recent manifestation of this development can be seen in American universities where students are testing the meaning and limits of free speech in American colleges and in the entire country.

Changing the rules of the game: direct Israel-Iran armed conflict

One of the latest, but potentially the most consequential, reverberations that has impacted the region has been the expansion of the Gaza war to directly include Iran. The Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate building and the killing of a top Iranian military commander on April 1 might have triggered a new phase in an expanded regional conflict. In one blow, perhaps inadvertently, Israel helped transform the Iran-Israel confrontation from one fought by proxies to direct state-to-state conflict. Nothing demonstrates better the severity of this development than the specter of hundreds of Iranian drones and cruise and ballistic missiles crossing Iran, Iraq, and Jordan on their way to targets inside Israel on April 13. While the vast majority were successfully intercepted by the US and Israel, with help from one or more Arab countries, the Iranian message to Israel, the US, and many Gulf and Arab countries was heard loud and clear. The potential threat to more vulnerable American bases and the Arab countries that hosts them, being much more adjacent to Iran, is much more lethal than the threat to Israel. The success of the US administration and its allies in intercepting the Iranian attack, and in containing Israeli response to that attack, was critical in preventing this episode from escalating into a larger and more devastating armed conflict. Nonetheless, this incidence does raise many questions about the Israeli and Iranian calculus and the potential for miscalculation.

Why did the regional escalation happen in the first place? Why did Israel attack the Iranian consulate in Damascus thereby escalating the low-level warfare it has been waging against Iran. In other words, why did Israel change the rules of the game? Netanyahu might have an interest in diverting the attention away from the atrocities committed in the Gaza Strip. Bringing Iran into the picture also provides a way to deflect attention away from the humanitarian catastrophe that was unfolding because Israel was restricting humanitarian service delivery, using starvation as a tool of war, particularly in the aftermath of the killing of 7 staff members of the World Central Kitchen who were delivering humanitarian aid to people in northern Gaza.

However, the reports that the attack was a serious miscalculation by the Israeli Military Intelligence, rather than a deliberate provocation by Israeli leaders, should also be taken seriously.[8] In this analysis, the Israeli intelligence did not anticipate the Iranian response and assumed that Iran will continue its previous policy of indirect retaliation. Had it been known that Iran would act differently, Israel would not have attacked. After six months of war, Israel has not yet managed to defeat Hamas or prevent it from governing the Gaza Strip. It has not secured the release of all Israeli hostages and prisoners of war. It has not succeeded in restoring deterrence with Hezbollah or preventing it from attacking northern Israel. The threat to Red Sea shipping has not yet been contained. The West Bank has been boiling, indeed threatening to explode at any moment. In other words, given all that, Israel probably had no reason to seek further escalation by provoking a direct Iranian attack.

Regardless of the Israeli motivation, the question about the Iranian behavior on April 13 is even more important. Why did Iran respond by direct retaliation this time when it did not in the past? After more than a decade of Israeli attacks against Iran in Syria and some inside Iran itself, a traditionally cautious and calculating Iran acted in an unprecedented manner, even historic, by directly attacking Israel from its own territories rather than by using its own proxies. One might argue that as Israel changed the rules of the game, and so did Iran. The Israeli April 1 attack, in this analysis, served as a tipping point. The problem with this analysis is that it ignores the fact that Israel attacked Iran, directly on its own territories, many times in the past by assassinating its nuclear scientists and military commanders and stealing documents related to its nuclear program.

A more likely explanation links the change in the Iranian behavior to dynamics unleashed by the Gaza war. October the 7^th might have empowered Iran, just as it empowered its allies in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq. If the Israeli army is unable to defeat its weakest enemy, Hamas, in six months, why would Israel possess the will to enter a direct war with Iran or risk opening yet another front, this time with the strongest of all adversaries. One might add that Iran, perhaps wishing to maintain its standing among its own allies and in the region, found it difficult to stay out when its proxies are all engaged in the fight with its full encouragement and support.

Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that the Iranian retaliation, while apparently massive, was in fact greatly constrained and calculated, indicating its wish to avoid further escalation. Israel and its allies had plenty of time to prepare and intercept incoming drones and missiles that needed to travel more than 1000 kilometer. Perhaps the Iranian message was not just for the Israelis, but also for the US and its Arab allies: geographic proximity leaves the American bases and other targets close to Iran much more vulnerable to these Iranian military assets. For Israel, the Iranian message is perhaps one of political resolve rather than military capacity. Hours before the Israeli response to its direct attack, Iran spelled out what seemed like a new policy: “In case the Israeli regime embarks on adventurism again and takes action against the interests of Iran, the next response from us will be immediate and at a maximum level.”[9] Iran, it seems, wants to tell Israel that the rules of the game have changed in yet another way: any future attacks against Iranian assets, regardless of the location, will be met by a direct Iranian retaliation.

On April 19, Israel did retaliate by carrying out a single limited strike near the city of Isfahan, deep inside Iranian territory. The limited nature of the Israeli response, while strongly encouraged by the US, does reflect an Israeli understanding of the Iranian message. But unlike Iran, Israel did not need to send a message of political resolve; it has already attacked on Iranian soil in the past. Rather, Israel wanted to send a message of military capacity; that it can penetrate and attack targets deep inside Iran without Iran’s ability to intercept them; simply put, Iran cannot win. Israel perhaps hopes Iran will get the message and will not seek to retaliate, in a similar manner to that of April 13, in the future. In this regard, Israel perhaps wants to signal to Iran its intention to continue its shadow war when necessary and that the Iranian direct attack does not deter it from doing so. The muted Iranian response to this Israel retaliatory attack near Isfahan, one in which Iran did not point the finger at Israel, might encourage Israel to think that the rules of the game are now restored to their status quo ante. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Israel has refrained, since April 1, from further targeting Iranian assets in the region.

Implications for the PA and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

It is in this exchange of messages that the greatest immediate risks to the region lies. If Iran has indeed embarked on a new policy (of direct retaliation) while Israel thinks the rules have not changed (war by proxies), the threat of escalatory dynamics remains in place, just as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus. Will Israel now stop or continue its attacks on Iranian targets in Syria and elsewhere? Would Iran retaliate directly against Israel if Israel does make such attacks? The answers to these questions are currently unknown. Because of that, the prospect for a dramatic escalation cannot be ruled out, particularly given the uncertainty about the future of the war in the Gaza Strip and its “day after” and the current limited military exchange between Israel and Hezbollah; regional war must not therefore be ruled out. If so, what are the implications for the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel?

One can think of three possible scenarios for a regional armed escalation. A low-level direct Iranian-Israeli armed confrontation restricted to exchange of missiles without escalation to a full-blown war is a first scenario. The US and Arab allies might restrict their role to one similar to what they did in April. The behavior of Iran and Israel in April, influenced greatly by US pressure, shows that the two states are unlikely to deliberately seek escalation.

In this scenario, the impact on the PA and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict might be small. The PA is likely to stay on the sideline but the Israeli-Palestinian relations are likely to continue to deteriorate. Arab-Israeli efforts to normalize relations might be postponed but regional US-sponsored security coordination is likely to increase. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process might appear to gain some momentum behind the scenes in order to justify Arab cooperation with the US and Israel. Palestinian civil and security coordination is not likely to be affected and Palestinian access to basic needs, utilities, and other necessities is not likely be interrupted. But Palestinian public dissatisfaction and perhaps anger at the PA is likely to increase. Nonetheless, the PA will most likely be able to manage its growing domestic challenges without provoking a violent Palestinian public reaction.

In a second scenario, a more comprehensive armed confrontation is likely to involve attacks on a wide range of military and infrastructural targets and might cause great civilian deaths. Israel’s ability to inflict huge damage on Iran and the inability of Iran’s retaliatory attacks to inflict large scale damage on Israel, due to US and allies’ interception of Iranian drones and missiles, might lead Iran to expand the theatre of war to include US bases and Arab military targets and well as oil and gas fields and related infrastructure. This could immediately change the US posture from defense to offence. Iran might respond by encouraging domestic allies in the Arab countries to join the war in the hope of destabilizing the Arab regimes in the entire Gulf area as well as Jordan. Public opinion in some of these countries might turn against their own rulers and contribute to greater destabilization.

In this second scenario, Arab normalization with Israel is likely to stop. Similarly, no attention is likely to be paid to the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Security and civil coordination between the PA and Israel is likely to be constrained but unlikely to stop completely. Palestinian access to basic needs and utilities will probably witness major disruptions but unlikely to stop completely. The domestic Palestinian scene is likely to see significant economic, political and security destabilization leading to further weakening of the PA, the expansion of the current armed groups into new areas, and greater armed confrontations between these armed groups and the Israeli settlers and army. Occasional unplanned confrontations between the Palestinian security services and local armed groups might increase. The ability to the PA leadership to survive under these dramatic developments is uncertain. Yet even in this scenario, the likelihood of the eruption of a third Palestinian intifada is not very high as long as the PA security services remain intact. Nonetheless, the West Bank will continue to boil, settlers’ violence is likely to expand significantly, Hamas will continue its efforts to reestablish its armed wing, and in the Gaza Strip, it will find it easier to rebuild its armed wing and reestablish its governing administration.

In a third scenario, a worst-case scenario, Iranian forces might infiltrate into neighboring countries, like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, to support Shi’ite groups (against a likely crackdown by their governments) and might encourage local armed groups to infiltrate into Jordan, who might be perceived as an ally of the US and Israel. Armed groups from Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq might seek to infiltrate into Israel and Jordan in the hope of bringing a ground offensive dimension to the conflict and bring the fight directly to the West Bank and Israeli territories. In this case, Israeli ground forces will most likely invade Lebanese and Syrian territories and might attack targets in Jordan and Iraq. The US will most likely find itself fighting alongside Israel in both offensive and defensive capacities.

In this third scenario, the expansion of the regional war is likely to end Arab normalization with Israel and all talk of Palestinian-Israeli peace. Security and civil coordination is likely to cease and Palestinian access to basic needs, utilities, and other necessities normally supplied by Israel will probably be almost completely cut off. The expansion of the war in this scenario will also most likely bring about a certain collapse of the PA and the departure of the current leadership of Abbas and the ruling elite, who are currently rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public. A third intifada is likely to erupt as members of the PA security services might join the armed groups. Fatah might revive its own armed group, al Aqsa Brigade, while Hamas might finally succeed in rebuilding its armed wing in the West Bank. Taking advantage of the thin presence of the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip, Hamas might rebuild its armed forces in that area thereby weakening the ability of the Israeli army to fight effectively on multiple fronts.

Confronting its vulnerabilities? Three steps the PA must immediately take:

Despite the numerous after-shocks triggered by the Gaza war, the PA remained relatively unmoved, essentially sitting on the sideline, awaiting the outcome of that war. This paralysis testifies to the extent of PA irrelevance and lack of leadership and initiative at a time when the Palestinians are faced with the most serious existential threat since 1967. This state of affairs adds to the challenges the Palestinians face as they confront the challenge of the “day after” and the potential of a regional war.

The PA operates today under three tremendous vulnerabilities that reduce its capacity to cope with the current and likely future challenges: the lack of legitimacy, disunity, and incompetence. To meet current and “day after” challenges and to be in a position to mitigate some of the consequences of a regional war, the PA must immediately confront these vulnerabilities and address them.

Holding national elections as soon as possible: Perhaps the most damaging vulnerability lies in its lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the vast majority of its public and the lack of credibility of its leadership not only among Palestinians but also among many, if not all, others. This lack of legitimacy is the direct outcome of the lack of periodic national elections. Lack of legitimacy affects the standing of the various political forces in the Palestinian political life. If the choice is between Hamas and the PA, the public does not hesitate to prefer Hamas over Fatah and the PA for the future control over the Gaza Strip. Asked in March 2024 about the group most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people, Fatah under the leadership of Abbas or Hamas, about half of the public selected Hamas and only 17% selected Fatah. Only by putting itself immediately on the road to parliamentary and presidential elections can the PA manage to survive the current and impending challenges. At the moment, only the ongoing war represents a valid impediment to postpone the elections. The PA should therefore plan to hold elections in 6 to 12 months from today. It should do so without reservations or preconditions. Alternatively, if it finds it cannot hold such elections, the PA leadership should immediately step down. Without elections, the PA has no future and history will deal very harshly with its current leadership and ruling elite.

Reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip requires domestic reconciliation: Palestinian division is the second PA vulnerability. Its failure to reconcile with Hamas and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the past 17 years intensified Palestinian political polarization and has now come back to haunt us at a moment of great Palestinian peril. The reunification process must proceed now without hesitation. It must not wait for the end of the war in the Gaza Strip. It should be plainly clear to the PA leadership that Israel will treat it with utmost contempt and rejection regardless of whether it reconciles or does not reconcile with Hamas. But reunification will not be possible without the formation of a transitional government, one that meets public expectations. In March 2024, the public demanded the formation of such transitional government but insisted on imposing three conditions on it: (1) it must be made up of competent professionals, (2) representing national unity or consensus, and (3) it must be independent of political parties or president Abbas. The current PA government does not meet most of these conditions. The current government lacks legitimacy and public acceptance. It cannot be expected to deal successfully with any of the major challenges facing Palestinians today, those that it will face in the “day after,” or manage the consequences of a regional war.

Addressing PA incompetence: The PA’s failure to meet the basic needs of the public in delivering good or competent governance, fight corruption, build strong and accountable public institutions, ensure financial stability, or build an independent capacity to deliver water, electricity, and fuel after 30 years of its existence, testifies to its utter incompetence in ensuring the wellbeing of the Palestinian people. While the continued Israeli occupation and the interests of some of the donor counties have certainly played a role in this dismal outcome, the fact that the PA did not prioritize these national goals in its negotiations and interactions with Israel and the international community testifies to its own failure in prioritizing the national interest. A transitional government made up of the best and brightest minds. from Palestinians residing in the occupied Palestinian territories and Palestinians from the diaspora, representing the national consensus, working closely with the PLO, must outline a workplan and a timetable to restore the constitutional functioning of the political system and remove from the PA legal system all those presidential decrees and administrative decisions that have over the past decade corrupted the entire political system and destroyed its accountability and oversight. The plan must demonstrate convincing commitment to combating corruption and strengthening of the independence of the anti-corruption institutions. It must gradually reduce dependence on Israel for transfer of clearance funds and basic needs and utilities and ensure greater Palestinian self-reliance.

It is prudent, and certainly imperative, for the PA to take measures today rather than wait for the “day after” or the onset of regional war. Immediate steps are required in order to help alleviate some of the great difficulties that the Palestinian population will definitely face once the “day after” arrives or if the Gaza war escalates to a regional one. It goes without saying that once the “day after” arrives, facts on the ground in the Gaza Strip will dictate the future and the PA will continue to be irrelevant. Hamas will resume control over that Palestinian territories and Palestinian division will become more consolidated. Furthermore, if the third scenario of the regional war, as described above, begins to unfold, the PA’s ability to prevent its own collapse, no matter what it does, if it has not already taken strong measures, will be negligeable. Even under the second scenario, the ability of the PA to act, will be significantly constrained. Only today, and under conditions of the first scenario, can the PA take measures to ensure its ability to continue to provide services to the public under conditions similar to those entailed in the second scenario.

[1] PSR December 2023 poll showed that satisfaction with the role of the PA standing at 14% only (10% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip) and with Mahmoud Abbas at 11% (7% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip), and with Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh at 10% (6% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). See: http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963. In March 2024, support for Hamas stood at 34%, Fatah at 17% and the demand for the resignation of president Abbas at 84% (93% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip. See, http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/973.

[2] Another 13% support control by the PA but only if it is not under the control of president Abbas. See PSR’s March 2024 poll: http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/973. .

[3] For the Palestinian findings, see ibid. For the Israeli findings see IDI poll, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/52976. The poll also shows that 68% of Israeli Jews are opposed to the transfer of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. On the same topic, see also, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-788114 and https://mondoweiss.net/2024/02/over-2-3-of-jewish-israelis-oppose-humanitarian-aid-to-palestinians-starving-in-gaza/.

[4] Ibid.

[5] In early February 2024, Blinken reported that he spoke with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about a clear path for a Palestinian State and permanent peace that means “an Israel that’s fully integrated into the region, with normal relations with key countries including Saudi Arabia…Alongside a concrete, time-bound and irreversible path to a Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel, with the necessary security assurances.” See Ynet, 8 February 2024, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/h1ruhu11ip#autoplay

icc-may-issue-arrest-warrants-....

[7] See, “How public opinion on the Israel-Hamas war has shifted,” Financial Times, 21 November 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/6bf4f6ed-b705-4e66-ac6f-59b5ef6c0c77. See also Gallup’s March 2024 poll “Majority in U.S. Now Disapprove of Israeli Action in Gaza: Approval has dropped from 50% to 36% since November,” 27 March 2024, https://news.gallup.com/poll/642695/majority-disapprove-israeli-action-gaza.aspx. Time Magazine reported that “Net favorability—the percentage of people viewing Israel positively after subtracting the percentage viewing it negatively—dropped globally by an average of 18.5 percentage points between September and December, decreasing in 42 out of the 43 countries polled.” https://time.com/6559293/morning-consult-israel-global-opinion/.

[8] See, “Miscalculation Led to Escalation in Clash Between Israel and Iran,” The New York Times, April 17, 2024,

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/17/world/middleeast/iran-israel-attack.html.

[9] See statement by the Iranian Foreign Minister to CNN: “Iran’s military response will be ‘immediate and at a maximum level’ if Israel attacks, foreign minister says,” https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/18/middleeast/iran-foreign-minister-isra...

العربية

Public Opinion Poll No -67

1 April 2018.

While an overwhelming majority of Palestinians expresses rejection of the American role in the peace process and rejects ideas attributed to the “Deal of the Century,” the failure of reconciliation, the recent Gaza explosion, the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip, concerns about PA eavesdropping on citizens’ phone calls, diminished chances for democracy, and other concerns cast a shadow of pessimism, frustration, and despair over the public leaving it with no trust in its leadership and very little optimism about the medium or even the long term future

14-17 March 2018

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-17 March 2018. The poll was conducted after the explosion of a roadside bomb that targeted the convoy of Palestinian Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah during his visit to the Gaza Strip and amid mutual accusations between Fatah and Hamas regarding the responsibility for the stalemate in reconciliation and the Gaza explosion. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed also the publication of leaks concerning alleged substance of the American “Deal of the Century.” Several other developments may have influenced the findings of the poll: reports were published regarding an eavesdropping by PA security services on citizens’ phone calls; public participation in non-violent protests diminished considerably; talks emerged around possible participation of East Jerusalemites in Jerusalem’s municipal elections; and warnings were issued by international agencies concerning the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as general conditions in the Palestinian territories and various aspects of the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In the first quarter of 2018, PSR’s poll explored various issues and public concerns: (1) the American role in the peace process and reports concerning the “deal of the century,” (2) the Gaza explosion which targeted the Prime Minister’s convey, (3) the great decline in popular participation in non-violent confrontations, (4) the possible participation of East Jerusalemites in Jerusalem’s municipal elections, and (5) other internal matters such as the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip, eavesdropping on phone calls of Palestinian citizens, the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights, reconciliation, and the internal balance of power.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians views the American role in the peace process as biased in favor of Israel and refuses the purported American ideas that have been reportedly included in the American “deal of the century,” such as making Abu Dis a capital of the Palestinian state or expanding the southern borders of the Gaza Strip into Sinai. The majority views the American suspension of support for UNRWA as aiming at closing the refugees’ file and deny them their right of return. A large percentage worries that this American position might weaken the ability of the Palestinian side to defend the rights of the refugees. For all of this, about two-thirds are opposed to the renewal of contacts between the PA and the US or the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Despite the fact that a large percentage supports the peace process, more than 90% expect to see no peace between Palestine and Israel in the next five, ten, or even 100 years. The largest percentage views the medium and long term future with a great deal of trepidation, pessimism and frustration.

Findings show that about half of the public believes that Israel stands behind the explosion that targeted the convoy of the Palestinian Prime Minister during his visit to the Gaza Strip. About three quarters of the public think that the aim of the explosion was to foil reconciliation efforts. About a quarter of Gazans however believe that the explosion represented a protest against the policies of the PA government toward the Gaza Strip.

Despite great public support for non-violent protests and the great admiration the public has for the Palestinian youth, Ahd Tamimi, viewing her as a role model and a symbol of popular resistance, the largest percentage attributes the significant decrease in public participation in non-violent protests to a weak public confidence in the Palestinian leadership and factions. Many also believe that the public thinks that such protests are ineffective in the confrontation with Israel. Indeed, findings of the poll show that about half of the public is in favor of a return to an armed intifada.

Findings also show that despite concerns about being seen as an acceptance of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, a majority of the public favors the participation of East Jerusalemites in the next Jerusalem municipal elections. Participation in the vote is seen as giving East Jerusalemites the ability to influence the municipal policies that affect them. Among all Palestinians, but more significantly among East Jerusalemites, less than a third are opposed to such participation.

Finally, when looking at internal conditions, findings show that:

Almost all Palestinians view conditions in the Gaza Strip as dire, bad or very bad. Responsibility for this situation is placed first on Israel, then the PA, and finally Hamas. But for Gazans, the blame is placed first on the PA, with Israel and Hamas second and third respectively.

About two-thirds think that the PA security services do indeed eavesdrop on phone calls of citizens and officials and more than 60% believe that such eavesdropping is done illegally and without any just cause. A majority believes that such behavior benefits the occupation first and foremost and that the Palestinian judiciary is incapable of putting an end to it.

Those who positively view Palestinian democracy, seeing it as good or very good, are less than a quarter while about two-thirds believe that Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cannot criticize the PA without fear.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation plummets to less than a third; satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government does not exceed one third; and about half of the public puts the blame for the poor showing of the reconciliation government on the PA and the PA leadership while a small minority puts the blame on Hamas.

Finally, the domestic balance of power remains relatively unchanged compared to three months ago: more than two-thirds demand the resignation of president Abbas; a Hamas candidate wins against Abbas in presidential elections; but Fatah enjoys more popular support than Hamas, with a five point difference in its favor.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

· Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 33%; 68% of the public demand the resignation of the president; demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 81% in the Gaza Strip and 62% in the West Bank

In presidential elections between Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh and Abbas, the former receives 52% and the latter 41% of the popular vote
In presidential elections between Haniyeh and Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti, the former receives 39% and the latter 55% of the popular vote
In parliamentary elections, Fatah wins 36% of the popular vote, Hamas 31%, and the third parties combined 9%
Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 40% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (36% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip). 68% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 27% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 70% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 62% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 64% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 29% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 8% (2% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip), Rami al Hamdallah (7%), Mustafa Barghouti (4%); Khalid Mishal (3%), and Salam Fayyad (2%).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 52% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 53% for Haniyeh and 41% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the vote (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 66% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh 45% (compared to 43% three months ago). If the competition was between President Abbas from Fatah and Mustafa Barghouti from al Mubadara (Initiative), Abbas receives 48% and Mustafa Barghouti receives 43% of the vote. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 38% and Haniyeh 37%. If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 25% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 32% (compared to 36% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 41% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions, status of democracy, eavesdropping on phone calls, and 3G:

Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy does not exceed 23%
Only 5% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good while 20% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good
Perception of safety and security stands at 54% in the Gaza Strip and at 53% in the West Bank
But 45% of Gazans compared to 19% in the West Bank indicate that they want to emigrate
A majority believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people
62% believe that the PA security services eavesdrop on Palestinian citizens and 62% believe that this eavesdropping is done for illegitimate purposes
Only 33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 63% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear. In a question about the status of democracy in Palestine and other countries, only 23% say Palestinian democracy is good or very good while only 10% say democracy in Egypt is good or very good. By contrast, 64% say democracy in Turkey is good or very good; 57% say democracy in Israel is good or very good, and 55% say democracy in France is good or very good.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%. In an open-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening of conditions in the Gaza Strip: the largest percentage (39%) blames Israel; 25% blame the PA, president Abbas, the reconciliation government, or Fatah; and 18% blame Hamas. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 43% of West Bankers compared to only 30% of Gazans blame Israel; and 16% of West Bankers compared to 43% of Gazans blame the PA, Abbas, the reconciliation government, and Fatah. However, responses of West Bankers and Gazans are almost identical regarding Hamas’ responsibility: 19% of West Bankers and 18% of Gazans blame Hamas. The belief that the PA and its various constituents are responsible is higher in refugee camps and cities (30% and 27% respectively) compared to villages/towns (18%), among the religious (33%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (19% and 23% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (41%) compared to those who support the peace process (18%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (51% and 34% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (7%), among those with the lowest income (36%) compared to those with the highest income (18%), in the governorates of Khanyounis and Rafah (50% each) compared to the governorates of Jenin, Tulkarm, and Jericho (4%, 8%, and 8% respectively), and among the holders of BA degree (29%) compared to illiterates (21%).

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 54%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 53%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 53% and in the West Bank at 45%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 19%. Three months ago, 41% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers indicated that they seek to immigrate.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 78% and a majority of 52% views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

We asked the public about the media reports regarding a possible eavesdropping by the Palestinian security services on phone calls of Palestinian officials and citizens:

62% say they believe that the reports are accurate and 29% believe they are inaccurate.

62% do not think, and 26% think, that the eavesdropping on phones was legal or for legitimate purposes.

56% think the primary beneficiary of eavesdropping conducted by the Palestinian security services is the Israel occupation while 25% think it is the PA administration and leadership, and only 12% think it is the Palestinian citizen and his or her security. The percentage of those who believe that occupation is the primary beneficiary increases in the West Bank (58%) compared to the Gaza Strip (51%), among the religious (57%) compared to the non-religious (49%), among those opposed to the peace process (61%) compared to supporters of the peace process (54%), among the youngest, 18-22 years (60%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 49 years (52%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (60% and 58% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (46%), among farmers, retirees, and students (81%, 66%, and 59% respectively) compared to laborers (49%), among private sector workers (55%) compared to those who work in the public sector (43%), and among the illiterates (60%) compared to holders of BA degree (54%).

Moreover, a majority of 53% think that if a Palestinian citizen (or even a former head of a Palestinian security service) submits a complaint to the Palestinian judiciary, it would be incapable of putting an end to this eavesdropping. Only 37% believe that the judiciary is capable of ending the eavesdropping.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Maan TV (15%), Palestine TV and Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (13% each), al Aqsa TV (12%), Al Arabiya, al Mayadeen, and al Quds TV (5% each).

We asked the public about the rates for 3G service, a newly introduced service by Palestinian providers in the West Bank that allows for faster access to the internet on mobile phones: a majority of West Bankers (57%) describes the rates as high or very high and only 3% describe them as low. 11% think the rates are reasonable or medium. 30% did not know much about the service or the rates.

We asked respondents about giving or donating money to the poor and charities:

Two-thirds believe that the primary motivation behind giving to the poor is to win God’s satisfaction while less than a quarter (23%) think that people give to the poor in order to win the satisfaction of other people.

Three quarters of the respondents say that they give to the poor and 23% say they do not. When asked in an open-ended question about its own motivation for giving, an overwhelming majority (80%) says that it is driven by religious incentive (such winning God’s satisfaction) while 20% say that it is driven by humanistic or social incentives (such as to ease the burden on or help the poor).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

Only 26% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government; optimism regarding the success of reconciliation drops from 50% to 30%
45% hold the PA, PA president, and the reconciliation government responsible for the failure of the reconciliation government to carry out its duties; only 15% put the blame on Hamas
60% of Gazans, compared to 26% of West Bankers, support contacts between Hamas and Dahlan to establish a joint administration for the Gaza Strip
45% believe that Israel stands behind the explosion that targeted the PA Prime Minister in the Gaza Strip and three quarters believe that the aim of the explosion is to insure the failure of reconciliation
Now that it has taken control of the border crossings and the headquarters of the ministries and other public agencies, 26% are satisfied and 65% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 38%. Similarly, only 30%, compared to 50% three months ago, are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation.

The largest percentage (45%) believes that the PA, president Abbas, and the prime minister are responsible for the poor showing of the reconciliation government. By contrast, only 15% believe that Hamas is responsible for that poor showing; 13% say the government is doing a good job; and 27% do not who is to blame. It is worth noting that the responses of West Bankers are greatly different from those of Gazans: while about one third (32%) of West Bankers blames the PA, Abbas and the prime minister, 69% of Gazans puts the blame on these three. By contrast, only 12% of West Bankers, compared to 21% of Gazans, blame Hamas. We also asked the public about two claims: the one made by the reconciliation government that Hamas is preventing it from assuming control over the Gaza Strip, particularly in financial and security matters, and the claim made by Hamas that the reconciliation government is failing to carry out its responsibilities and duties in the Strip and that it continues to impose sanction on Gazans. About a third (32%) believes the two claims are baseless while 14% think the two claims are accurate. By contrast, 23% believe Hamas’ claim to be accurate and only 14% believe that the claim of the reconciliation government is accurate. In this context, 37% (60% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) support the Dahlan-Hamas efforts to reach an agreement on creating a joint administration for the Gaza Strip while 45% (36% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank) are opposed to such efforts.

We asked respondents about the Gaza explosion that targeted the convey of the prime minister:

In an open question, we asked the public about its estimate of the party behind the explosion: the largest percentage (45%) believes it is the occupation; 14% believe it is Hamas and an identical percentage believes it is the PA or one of its agencies; 2% think it is Fatah, 1% think it is Dahlan, and 3% think it is one of the extremist groups.

About three quarters (74%) believe that the aim of the perpetrators is to foil the reconciliation efforts while 17% (23% in the Gaza Strip and 14% in the West Bank) believe that the aim is to protest against the policies of the reconciliation government toward the Gaza Strip.

(4) The peace process:

48% support and 50% oppose the two-state solution and 57% say that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion
28% support the one-state solution
48% support a return to an armed intifada
39% say that the decline in popular participation in non-violent resistance is caused by the absence of trust between the public and the PA leadership and factions
The majority supports the decisions adopted by the PLO Central Council but about two-thirds believe that President Abbas will not implement those decisions
The majority supports the participation of East Jerusalemites in the Jerusalem municipal elections by nomination and voting or just by voting
Optimism about reaching a peace agreement with Israel in 10 years, and in 100 years, is the same: a dismal 9%
48% support the two-state solution and 50% oppose it. Moreover, 46% believe that a Palestinian majority supports the two-state solution and 47% say a majority is opposed to it. Similarly, 50% believe that a majority of Israelis are opposed to the two-state solution and 41% think an Israeli majority supports that solution. 57% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to settlement expansion while only 40% think that it remains feasible because settlements can be evacuated. Similarly, 73% believe that the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or nonexistent while 25% think the chances are high or medium. Despite the above, only 28% support a one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israelis have equal rights and 69% are opposed.

When given three options to choose from, the largest percentage (35%) chose armed resistance as the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 31% chose negotiation and 25% chose non-violent resistance effective. Three months ago, 44% indicated that armed resistance is the answer and 27% sided with negotiation. When the public is asked if it supports each of the following the responses were different: 74% support joining more international organizations; 63% support popular non-violence; 48% support a return to an armed intifada; and 49% support dissolving the PA. Support for a return to an armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (39%), in cities and refugee camps (51% and 49% respectively) compared to villages/towns (34%), among the religious (55%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (43% each), among those who are opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (34%), among men (52%) compared to women (45%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 (58%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or above (48%), among Hamas supporters (74%) compared to supports of Fatah and third parties (36% and 42% respectively), among students (70%) compared to housewives and laborers (43% and 45% respectively), and among holders of BA degree (54%) compared to holder of elementary education and the illiterates (35% and 48% respectively).

We asked the public about its view on why popular participation in non-violent protests, particularly those related to the American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, has been waning: 39% say it is due to lack of trust between the public on the one hand and the PA leadership and factions on the other; 27% say it is due to the fact that non-violence is ineffective; and 25% say that it is due to the fact that many people think that the responsibility for confronting Israel and the US falls on the shoulders of the PA. 92% indicate that they have heard, and 8% have not heard, of Ahd Tamimi, a Palestinian youth activist being tried by the Israeli occupation on charges that she slapped an Israeli soldier. Among those who have heard about her, 64% say that they want her to be a role model for them and their relatives. The percentage of those who consider Tamimi a role model is higher in the Gaza Strip (80%) and lower in the West Bank (56%). It is also higher in refugee camps and cities (68% and 65% respectively) compared to villages/towns (56%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (66% and 62% respectively) compared to non-religious (54%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to those who support the peace process (60%), among supporters of Fatah and Hamas (71% each) compared to supporters of third parties (48%), and among the refugees (71%) compared to the non-refugees (58%).

60% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 16% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories. Similarly, 77% say that they are worried that they would be hurt on their daily life by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 22% are not worried.

A majority of 52% indicates that it supports the resolutions made by the recent meeting of the PLO’s Central Council, such as the cancellation of the recognition of Israel, the suspension of the Oslo Agreement, and others, while 18% indicate that they agree with some but not all of them, and 24% oppose them. Nonetheless, about two-thirds (65%) believe that president Abbas will not implement these decisions and only 24% believe he will implement them. The belief that president Abbas will not implement the Council’s decisions is higher in the Gaza Strip (70%) compared to the West Bank (62%), in cities (66%) compared to refugee camps and villages/towns (60% and 62% respectively), among the religious (66%) compared to the non-religious (47%), among those opposed to the peace process (82%) compared to supporters of the peace process (54%), among men (67%) compared to women (62%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (80% and 65% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (43%), and among those who work in the private sector (70%) compared to those who work in the public sector (59%).

Moreover, 74% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 24% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. In fact, 70% believe that there is already an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 20% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

46% of all the Palestinian public support the participation of East Jerusalemites in the next Israeli municipal elections by nomination and voting while 15% support only voting, and 29% say that they are opposed to all kinds of participation. Support for participation, either by nomination or voting, declines to 42% among East Jerusalemites but the opposition to participation among them remains almost identical (30%) to that of the general population. It is worth noting however that a large percentage (28%) did not express any views on the matter, probably out of concern that it might be risky to state its views on the subject or that its answer might not be a popular one.

We asked the public about its expectations regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations after 10 years and after 100 years:

25% believe that after 10 years conditions, or the status quo, will be as they are now with occupation and settlement expansion continuing with little change; 34% say settlements will expand and there will be one political entity characterized by a system of apartheid that discriminates against the Palestinians; 24% believe that there will be a war or an armed intifada that will end the occupation. Only 9% believe that there will be peace between Israel and the Palestinians and a Palestinian state will be established.

After 100 years, only 12% believe that things will be as they are now with occupation and settlement expansion continuing; 30% think settlements will expand and there will be one apartheid state that discriminates against the Palestinians; 29% think there will be a war or an intifada that will end the occupation. The belief that there will be peace between Israel and a Palestinian state remains unchanged at 9%.

(5) Palestinian-American relations and “the deal of the century”:

Two thirds oppose the resumption of contacts with the US administration and a majority of 51% rejects the “deal of the century” regardless of its content

88% view the US as biased in favor of Israel
94% reject the idea of making Abu Dis the capital of the Palestinian state
86% reject the idea of expanding the Gaza Strip into Sinai
63% reject the idea of allowing Israeli Jews to live in the state of Palestine as citizens or residents
65% are opposed to the resumption of contacts with the American administration that have been suspended last December after the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel; 21% favor a resumption of contacts. Similarly, 68% say that the PA leadership should not return to negotiations with Israel if the US administration asks it to do so while 27% say it should comply with the US request. If negotiations with Israel resume under US sponsorship, the US will be biased in favor of Israel in the eyes of 88% of the Palestinians while only 7% think the US will be an honest broker and 2% think it will be biased in favor of the Palestinians.

A slim majority of 51% says that if the US submits its peace plan, the so-called “deal of the century,” the PA leadership should reject it regardless of its content because it must be bad for Palestinians while 29% say that the leadership should accept or reject the plan only after reviewing and discussing its content. Only 11% say that the Palestinian leadership should accept the “deal of the century.” The percentage of those who want the PA to reject the US plan regardless of its content is higher in cities (53%) compared to villages/towns (41%), among the religious (55%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (36% and 49% respectively), among those opposed to the peace process (62%) compared to supporters of the peace process (46%), among men (55%) compared to women (48%), among Hamas supporters (62%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (44% and 47% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (52%) compared to those who work in the public sector (41%), and among the illiterates (58%) compared to holders of BA degree (49%).

A majority of 52% believes that the US administration has suspended its support for UNRWA because it seeks to close the file of the refugees and deny them their right of return while 43% think the US did that in order to pressure President Abbas to force him to return to negotiations with the US over the “deal of the century.” Moreover, 49% think that the suspension of US support for UNRWA will not weaken the Palestinian negotiating position regarding the rights of the refugees but 45% think it will indeed weaken it.

We asked the public about its views regarding some of the leaked ideas that are allegedly linked to the “deal of the century:”

On Jerusalem, 94% say they are opposed to making Abu Dis a capital of the Palestinian state; 4% support the idea.

86% are opposed and 10% support the idea of expanding the Gaza Strip to include parts of Sinai in return for an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank.

63% oppose and 31% support the idea of allowing Israeli Jews to live in the Palestinian state as citizens or residents while respecting the Palestinian law and enjoying the same rights and duties as the Palestinians. Support for the idea is higher in the West Bank (32%) compared to the Gaz Strip (28%), in refugee camps (39%) compared to cities and villages/towns (29% and 33% respectively), among the non-religious (46%) compared to the religious (26%), among supporters of the peace process (37%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (21%), among men (36%) compared to women (26%), among Fatah supporters (44%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (16% and 17% respectively), and among those who work in the public sector (38%) compared to those who work in the private sector (32%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

45% say that the most vital Palestinian goal should be ending occupation and building a Palestinian state; 30% say it is the obtaining of the right of return
28% say that the most serious problem facing Palestinians today is occupation and settlements and 25% say it is poverty and unemployment

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; 20% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

العربية

Public Opinion Poll No (71)

As about 80% reject the Trump peace plan expecting it to deny the Palestinians their most vital needs, the popularity of Fatah and Abbas rises as a result of the recent PA confrontation with Israel and the popularity of Hamas and Haniyyeh drops as a result of the forceful suppression of recent popular protests in the Gaza Strip, and as less than 30% of West Bankers indicate willingness to participate in the vote if restricted to parliamentary elections in the West Bank, three quarters demand the simultaneous holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

13-16 March 2019

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

hese are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-16 March 2019. The period before the conduct of the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) by the PA president, the announcement that a new PLC, but not presidential, elections will take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within six months, the selection of Mohammad Shtayyeh to be the next prime minister following the resignation of the Hamdallah government, and the eruption of demonstrations in the Gaza Strip against high cost of living conditions and their violent suppression by Hamas’ police and armed wing . The period also witnessed the implementation of Israel’s decision to deduct a small amount of the Palestinian custom revenues it transfers every month to the PA and the PA response refusing to accept any of these funds, a Palestinian-Israeli escalation in al-Aqsa Mosque in the aftermath of a Waqf decision to re-open Bab al Rahma (Gate of Mercy) area for Muslim prayer and an Israeli ban on prayer in that area, and the formation of a new Israeli electoral list representing the center in preparation for Israeli parliamentary elections which are scheduled to take place next month. Finally, the US Administration announced during this period its intentions to release its peace plan, known as the “Deal of the Century,” after the holding of the Israeli elections. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2019 indicate a rise in support for the two-state solution, but the largest percentage remains opposed to this solution. Support for negotiations, as the most effective means of establishing a

Palestinian state rises while the belief that armed struggle is the most effective means drops. But distrust in the seriousness of the Trump Administration increases. Similarly, findings show a significant rise in the belief that the Trump plan will not include a Palestinian state, nor will it include a reference to East Jerusalem as a capital for the state, or an emphasis on the 1967 borders, or a call to a just solution to the refugee problem, or a call to end the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army. Given all these doubts about the plan, about 80% demand that the PA leadership reject the American plan when made public.

Findings also show that about three quarters of the public demand the simultaneous holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A similar percentage indicates its rejection of holding parliamentary elections if no presidential elections were held at the same time and if restricted to the West Bank. 60% would oppose elections, even if held in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, if restricted to a parliamentary vote. If the PA manages to hold parliamentary elections only and only in the West Bank, less than 30% of West Bankers say they will participate in that vote.

Findings also show that if presidential elections are held today, Abbas would win against Hamas’ Haniyyeh. Three months ago, Haniyyeh was able to win against Abbas. Abbas’ recent confrontation with the Israeli government over payment to the families of prisoners and martyrs and the deduction from the Palestinian custom revenues might have contributed to the rise in his popularity. By contrast, Hamas’ violent suppression of the recent popular demonstrations in the Gaza Strip might have contributed to the decline in support for Haniyyeh. If parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah would win the largest share of the vote indicating a significant rise in its popularity compared to our findings three months ago. Support for Hamas on the other hand drops slightly compared to our findings three months ago. Vote for the two factions has probably been affected by the same factors that affected support for Abbas and Haniyyeh.

Findings indicate that the public is evenly divided over the selection of Shtayyeh as the next prime minister, one satisfied and the other dissatisfied with the selection. But the largest percentage believe a government led by Shtayyeh will not succeed in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or in organizing elections, or in improving Palestinian economic conditions. Given the Israeli decision to deduct part of the custom revenues Israel transfers to the PA on monthly basis and the PA response by refusing to accept any of those funds, a large majority expresses pessimism about the ability of the PA to pay salaries to its public sector and a majority says that this development could lead to PA collapse.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

72% want simultaneous legislative and presidential elections and 74% are opposed to holding legislative elections in the West Bank only
54% say they will not participate in legislative election even if it is held in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and 62% of the West Bankers say they will not participate in legislative elections if restricted to the West Bank
64% are worried that domestic conditions could deteriorate toward conflict if the office of the presidency becomes vacant
60% want the president to resign and 35% want him to remain in office; but if new elections take place, in which Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh participate, the former wins 51% of the vote and the latter wins 41%
If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, Fatah would win 39% of the vote and Hamas 32%
54% view, and 42% do not view, the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people

Only 43% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 46% believe no elections will take place. An overwhelming majority (72%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 10% want parliamentary elections only. 13% do not want any elections. The belief that presidential and parliamentary elections will take place soon is stronger among those whose age is 50 years or higher (44%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (39%), among women (45%) compared to men (41%), among residents of villages/towns (46%) compared to residents of refugee camps (41%), among those who ended elementary school only (56%) compared to those who finished their BA (37%), among those who work in the public sector (46%) compared to those who work in the private sector (41%), among the married (45%) compared to the unmarried (39%), among the religious (47%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (42% and 29% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (49%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (35%), and among supporters of Fatah (55%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (44% and 36% respectively).

An overwhelming majority (72%) expects Israel to refuse to allow election to take place in East Jerusalem and 15% expect Israel to allow it. Similarly, 53% believe that Hamas will not allow election to take place in the Gaza Strip if such vote was restricted to parliamentary elections and 33% believe it will allow such election. If elections were for a parliament and a president, 66% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 26% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip. But if elections were for a parliament only, 59% say they want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 32% would oppose that.

About three quarters (74%) oppose and 19% support the holding of parliamentary elections only and only in the West Bank. Similarly, 61% oppose and 31% support the holding of parliamentary elections only even if they are to take place in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 54% say they will not participate in West Bank-Gaza Strip elections if they were restricted to a parliamentary vote and 41% say they will participate in such elections. Willingness to participate in the elections, if restricted to the PLC but were held in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is higher among those whose age is 50 years of higher (44%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (37%), among men (47%) compared to women (35%), among residents of villages/towns (46%) compared to cities (40%), among holders of BA degree (41%) compared to those who finished elementary school (33%), among the religious (45%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (39% and 35% respectively), and among supporters of Fatah and supporters of Hamas (61% and 51% respectively) compared to supporters of third parties (41%).

Similarly, 62% say they will not participate in elections if they were parliamentary only and if they were to take place in the West Bank only; 29% say they will participate in such elections. Willingness among West Bankers to participate in the elections, if restricted to the PLC and were held in the West Bank only, is higher among men (30%) compared to women (27%), in refugee camps and villages/towns (38% and 36% respectively) compared to cities (25%), among those whose age is 50 years or higher (32%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (24%), among the religious (32%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (28% and 18% respectively), among supporters of Fatah (50%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (29% and 24% respectively).

If elections were parliamentary only and took place only in the West Bank but some of the members of the new parliament were from the Gaza Strip, only 50% say such a parliament would represent both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 34% say it would represent the West Bank only. In the Gaza Strip, the largest percentage (48%) say such a parliament would represent the West Bank only and 45% say it would represent both areas.

54% are dissatisfied with the dissolution of the PLC while 37% say they are satisfied. It is worth noting that three months ago, before the actual dissolution of the PLC, 47% said they would support its dissolution and 43% said they would oppose such a step. Today, 53% view the dissolution of the PLC as illegal and unconstitutional while 33% view it as legal and constitutional.

64% are worried and 34% are not worried that domestic conditions would deteriorate in case the position of the president become vacant. But 47% believe that when the position of the president is vacant, Palestinian factions will be able to reach an agreement on conducting presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to elect a successor; 45% believe that the factions will not reach such an agreement. Despite this, 60% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 68% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 55% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 62%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 40% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 32% (38% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip). If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 51% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 47% of the vote (compared to 36% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 51% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 55% (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh 33% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 64% and Haniyeh 33%. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (2% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 4%; Khalid Mishal, Saeb Erikat, and Mustafa Barghouti by 3% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 8% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 31% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 39% three months ago).

A majority of 54% view and 42% do not view the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It is worth noting that the belief that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people stood at 58% nine months ago and at 69% thirteen years ago. The belief that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people is higher in the West Bank (56%) compared to the Gaza Strip (51%), among residents of villages/towns (60%) compared residents of cities and refugee camps (55% and 42% respectively), among non-refugees (58%) compared to refugees (49%), among those whose age is 50 years or higher (58%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (50%), among the illiterates (67%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (58%), among those who work in the public sector (58%) compared to those who work in the private sector (53%), among the married (56%) compared o the unmarried (49%), among the somewhat religious (57%) compared to the religious (51%), among the supporters of the peace process (66%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (33%), and among supporters of Fatah (85%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (30% and 49% respectively).

(2) Mohammad Shtayyeh, a new prime minister:

38% are satisfied and 40% are dissatisfied with the selection of Mohammad Shtayyeh as the designated prime minister
The largest percentage believes that a government headed by Shtayyeh will not succeed in reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or holding elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or improving the economic conditions

38% are satisfied and 40% are dissatisfied with the selection of Mohammad Shtayyeh as the next prime minister. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction reaches 52%. The largest percentage (48%) believes that a government led by Shtayyeh will not succeed in achieving reconciliation and unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 35% believe it will succeed. Similarly, the largest percentage (44%) believes that a government led by Shtayyeh will not be able to organize legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% think it will succeed. Half of the public believes that a Shtayyeh government will not be able to improve economic conditions in the PA while 36% believe it will be able to do that. Satisfaction with the selection of Shtayyeh is higher in the West Bank (41%) compared to the Gaza Strip (34%), among men (41%) compared to women (36%), in villages/towns (44%) compared to cities and refugee camps (37% and 36% respectively), among non-refugees (41%) compared to refugees (34%), among those whose age is 50 or above (40%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (33%), among those who work in the public sector (49%) compared to those who work in the private sector (38%), among the somewhat religious (40%) compared to the religious and the non-religious (36% and 35% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (46%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (24%), and among supporters of Fatah (65%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (18% and 34% respectively).

(3) Domestic conditions:

69% are worried that the PA will not be able to pay salaries and 54% are worried that it will collapse
The largest percentage (37%) believes that Israel is responsible for the deteriorating conditions in the Gaza Strip, 25% blame the PA and the president, and 21% blame Hamas
Perception of safety and security stands at 64% in the Gaza Strip and 57% in the West Bank; despite this, 43% of Gazans, compare to only 20% of West Bankers, say they want to emigrate
82% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions
47% view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people and 47% view it as an asset

Now after Israel deducted part of the custom revenues it transfers to the PA and after the PA has refused to accept the incomplete transfer, an overwhelming majority (69%) is worried and 25% are not worried that the PA will not be able to pay salaries to its public sector. Moreover 54% are worried and 40% are not worried that the PA’s inability to pay salaries to its public sector will lead to PA collapse. The percentage of those who are worried is higher in the Gaza Strip (58%) compared to the West Bank (51%), among women (57%) compared to men (50%), in refugee camps and cities (55% and 54% respectively) compared to villages/towns (49%), among non-refugees (55%) compared to refugees (51%), among the illiterates (68%) compared to holders of BA degree (51%), among housewives and laborers (60% and 57% respectively) compared to professionals and students (39% and 48% respectively), and among supporters of third parties and supporters of Fatah (61% and 55% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (47%).

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%. In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Israel, Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (37%) blames Israel while 25% blame Abbas and the PA, 21% blame Hamas, 4% blame Egypt, and 9% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 41% of Gazans, compared to 16% of West Bankers, blame Abbas and the PA and 27% of Gazans, compared to 17% of West Bankers, blame Hamas.

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 64%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 57%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 55% and in the West Bank at 47%. Despite that, 29% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 43% and declines in the West Bank to 20%.

Only 32% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 65% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 41% say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 53% believe that they cannot. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82%. The public is divided over the assessment of the PA: 47% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 47% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. The belief that the PA is an asset is higher in the West Bank (51%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in cities and villages/towns (49% each) compared to refugee camps (37%), among those whose age is 50 years or higher (49%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (43%), among laborers, housewives, and employees (53%, 49%, and 45% respectively) compared to students and professionals (38% and 41% respectively), among those who are married (49%) compared to the unmarried (42%), among the somewhat religious (50%) compared to the religious (43%) among supporters of the peace process (61%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (23%), and among supporters of Fatah (84%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (21% and 42% respectively).

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Palestine and Al Aqsa TV (14% each), Maan TV and Palestine Today (at 12% each), Al Arabiya (at 6%) and al Mayadeen (at 5%).

(4) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

67% are not optimistic and 30% are optimistic about the prospects of reconciliation
82% demand the ending of the sanctions imposed by the PA on the Gaza Strip

30% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 29%. The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 38% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 58% disagrees. Three months ago, 34% said they agreed with Abbas. When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, 71% said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 24% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no major differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans. Moreover, an overwhelming majority (82%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 14% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government.

5) The peace process

48% support and 50% oppose the two-state solution; but 58% believe that the two-state solution is not practical or feasible due to settlement expansion
The best means of establishing a Palestinian state is negotiation in the eyes of 37%, while 36% think it is armed struggle, and 22% think it is non-violent resistance
47% support a return to an armed intifada
64% believe that visits by Israeli officials to Arab countries are harmful to the efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict while 8% think they are helpful
51% expect the right wing and Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 22% expect the center to win

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 48% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 43%. Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 49% said they prefer the two-state solution, 17% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 23% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.” Three months ago, support for the two-state solution stood at 45%, for the one state solution at 22%, and 23% preferred a third undefined alternative.

The preference for the one-state solution over the others is higher in the West Bank (21%) compared to the Gaza Strip (12%), among non-refugees (20%) compared to refugees (13%), among the illiterates (29%) compared to holders of BA degree (13%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (27% and 20% respectively) compared to the religious (12%), among supporters of the peace process (21%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (13%), and among Fatah supporters (19%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (9% and 14% respectively).

A majority of 58% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high. The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 39% of the public while 30% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 17% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 34% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 34% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.

Support for waging an armed struggle is higher in the Gaza Strip (38%) compared to the West Bank (25%), among residents of refugee camps (40%) compared to residents of cities and villages/towns (30% and 25% respectively), among refugees (33%) compared to non-refugees (28%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (38%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (26%), among those who hold a BA degree (29%) compared to the illiterates (13%), among students (46%) compared to farmers, housewives, laborers, and employees (8%, 26%, 31% and 31% respectively), among the non-married (37%) compared to the married (28%), among the religious (34%) compared to the somewhat religious (27%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (51%) compared to supporters of the peace process (19%), and among supporters of Hamas (52%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (18% and 23%).

The public is divided over the role of negotiations and armed struggle in the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 37% think that negotiation is the most effective means while 36% think armed struggle is the most effective means, while 22% believe that non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 28% said negotiation is the most effective means and 44% said armed struggle is the most effective means. In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 55% support popular non-violent resistance; 47% support a return to an armed intifada; 41% support dissolving the PA; and 31% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 47% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.

65% support and 31% oppose the PLO Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel. But 78% believe that the PA leadership and security services will not stop security coordination with Israel. More than three quarters (76%) believe that if Israel ban Muslim prayer at al Rahma Gate (Gate of Mercy) area, Palestinian protests will succeed, as the case was with the metal detector gates, in forcing Israel to allow such prayer; 21% believe Palestinian protests will not succeed this time. A majority 64% believe that visits of Israeli officials to Arab countries damage the chances for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; 8% believe the visits help to promote peace and 26% believe they neither help nor hurt conflict resolution.

A slim majority of 51% expect the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 22% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections. But three quarters believe that even if the center-left win the elections, conditions will stay as they are today or become worse; only 10% expect Palestinian-Israeli conditions to improve in that case.

6) Trump’s Peace Plan:

Between 78% and 84% believe that the Trump peace plan will not call for the creation of a Palestinian state, or for East Jerusalem to be its capital, or for borders to be based on the 1967 lines, or for a just solution to the refugees’ problem, or for the ending of occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army
79% believe that the PA leadership should reject the Trump plan and 14% believe it should accept it
64% oppose and 23% support the resumption of PA contacts with the US Administration

An overwhelming majority (83%) believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about launching a new peace plan and 12% believe it is serious. We asked the public about its expectations from the plan, if and when it is submitted to the parties. A large majority of 79% believes that if the US does indeed offer a peace plan, it will not call for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel; 15% believe it will. A similar percentage (81%) believes that the plan will not call for a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem; 14% believe it will. 78% believe the Trump plan will not call for the borders of the Palestinian state to be based on the lines of June 1967 with minor mutual land swaps; 17% believe it will. An overwhelming majority of 84% believes the plan will not call for a just solution to the refugee problem; 10% believe it will. Similarly, 84% believe the plan will not call for the ending of the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the areas occupied in 1967; 11% believe it will. For all of the above, 79% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan, if offered, and 14% believe it should accept it.

But if the Trump plan does indeed include all such items, such as a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, with borders based on the 1967 lines, a just solution to the refugees’ problem, and an Israeli army withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, a majority of 52% calls for rejecting it and 43% call for accepting it. Call for accepting the plan is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 55% while the call for rejecting it is higher in the West Bank, standing at 59%. Support for accepting the American plan if it contains all these Palestinian needs is also higher among men (46%) compared to women (40%), in refugee camps (48%) compared to villages/towns and cities (41% and 43% respectively), among refugees (47%) compared to non-refugees (41%), among holders of PA degree (49%) compared to the illiterates (35%), among those who work in the public sector (55%) compared to those who work in the private sector (41%), among supporters of the peace process (50%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (33%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (54% and 49% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (34%).

A majority of 64% is opposed and 23% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Opposition to the resumption of dialogue with the US is higher in the West Bank (70%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), in villages/towns (71%) compared to cities and refugee camps (64% and 57% respectively), among non-refugees (66%) compared to refugees (62%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (75%) compared to supporters of the peace process (61%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (69% and 68% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (59%).

العربية

Joint Israeli-Palestinian Public Opinion Poll 17, September 2005

PRESS RELEASE

TWO THIRDS AMONG PALESTINIANS, ISRAELI JEWS AND ISRAELI ARABS SUPPORT THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS THE STATE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND PALESTINE AS THE STATE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between September 7 and 21 , 2005.*

The poll was designed to explore one of the most difficult issues in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute: the recognition of the Jewish identity of Israel by Palestinians and Israeli Arabs and the recognition of the Palestinian identity in a Palestinian state by Israelis. In addition the poll examined changes in Israelis and Palestinians’ attitudes on a range of issues related to the conflict following the disengagement, both publics’ assessments of future developments and Palestinians’ attitudes on the forthcoming legislative council elections.

This is the 13th joint poll in an ongoing research project on the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 in the wake of the Camp David summit.

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1369 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted September 7-9. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of 499 Israeli Jews and a representative sample of 451 Israeli Arabs. The Israeli sample was properly weighted according to the proportion of the respective sectors in the population to produce the overall Israeli estimates (overall sampling error of 3.9%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between September 11 and 19.

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-2964933 or email kshikaki@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il

*This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah.

Summary of Results

(1) Mutual recognition of identity: Consistent majority support for a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people
66% of the Israelis and 63% of the Palestinians support a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute. 29% of the Israelis and 35% of the Palestinians oppose such a step. Among Israeli Jews 67% support and 29% oppose this mutual recognition of identity. Even more remarkable is the majority support for this step among Israeli Arabs: 63% support and 34% oppose it. This result indicates that despite their frustration and marginalization as citizens, they are willing to accept the definition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, concurrently with the recognition of a Palestinian identity and a Palestinian state. Similar levels of support among Israelis and Palestinians were obtained in December 2004, suggesting that support for this sensitive and disputed issue of national identity has made inroads in both societies. 55% of the Israelis and 53% of the Palestinians know that a majority in their society supports a mutual recognition of identity. These levels of awareness indicate that this step has acquired normative legitimacy in both societies. However the two publics seem to be less aware of the support for such a mutual recognition in the other public: 50% of the Israelis believe there is majority support for such recognition among Palestinians; and only 43% among Palestinians believe that most Israelis support it. (2) Framing the disengagement Following the completion of the disengagement, 59% of Israelis report that they have supported it compared to 34% who state they opposed it. An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (84%) but also a slim majority among Israelis (51%) see Sharon's plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel. 47% among Israelis and 15% among Palestinians don’t see it as such. In addition, 60% of the Israelis and 73% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Intifada and armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve. Yet, surprisingly, this Palestinian assessment of the role of armed struggle in the context of disengagement and the intifada does not lead to increased support for violence against Israelis. To the contrary, 77% indicate support and 22% indicate opposition for maintaining the current ceasefire; support for the suicide attack that took place in Beer Sheva around the end of August did not exceed 37% while a majority of 56% opposed it. Moreover, 62% oppose and 35% support continued attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip and 60% support and 37% oppose collection of arms from armed factions in Gaza after a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip. Similarly, while 40% of the Palestinians give Hamas most credit for evacuating the Gaza Strip (compared to 32% to Fateh and the PA), it is Fateh, not Hamas that benefits from the greater optimism that prevailed with the Israeli withdrawal: if elections are held today, 47% would vote for Fateh while only 30% would vote for Hamas. Three months ago, 44% said they would vote for Fateh and 33% for Hamas. With the Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian priorities are shifting towards economic conditions, fighting corruption, and enforcing law and order. Here too, Fateh seems to gain indirectly from disengagement. Most Palestinians believe Fateh is more able than Hamas to deliver improved economic conditions (priority # 1 for Palestinians today), reach a peace agreement with Israel, and enforce law and order. Hamas, however is perceived as the most able to fight corruption (priority # 2 for Palestinians today). Palestinian focus on state building, rather than violence, is also seen in the strong support (73%) for the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 lines as its borders that would start first in the Gaza Strip and gradually extend to the West Bank. 25% oppose such a state. (3) Conditions in the Gaza strip following the disengagement Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza strip created mixed expectations for the future among Palestinians. On the optimistic side, 64% of the Palestinians expect economic conditions in the Gaza strip to improve and 57% believe that the peace process with Israel will be enhanced. On the pessimistic side, 57% of the Palestinians fear that the Gaza strip will become a “big prison”. Indeed Israelis are quite reluctant to relax the closure on the strip. 58% of the Israelis oppose the crossing of Palestinian laborers from the Gaza into Israel compared to 40% who support it. 45% oppose the construction of a railroad to connect the Gaza strip and the West Bank while protecting Israel’s security needs, while 49% support it. However, 53% of the Israelis support the opening of the Gaza port for fishing and sailing under the supervision of the Israeli navy while 41% oppose it. Only 5% of Israelis think that Israel should bear responsibility for maintaining orderly living conditions in the Gaza strip following the disengagement. 56% think this is the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority, and 38% think it is the responsibility of both. (4) Impact of the disengagement on attitudes towards settlers and assessments of the future of the settlement project The decisive manner in which the disengagement has been carried out seems to have bolstered somewhat Israeli beliefs that Sharon is planning and capable of carrying out further unilateral disengagements in the West Bank. While 52% of the Israelis thought so in June - two months before the disengagement, 56% of the Israeli public believe so now following the completion of the disengagement. As to the future of the settlements in the longer run, 50% of the Israeli public (compared to 58% in June), believe that in the coming years the number of settlements in the West Bank will decrease. 19% expect the number of settlements to increase (18% in June). In contrast, a majority of the Palestinians (52%) fear that the number of settlements will increase in the future and 39% think it will decline compared to 52% and 33% respectively who thought so in June. The percent of Israelis supporting the dismantling of most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians decreased considerably following the disengagement. While 67% supported such a step in March and 62% supported it in June just before the disengagement, 54% support it now. However Israelis’ assessments of the settlements’ contribution to Israel’s national security did not change following the disengagement. 38% of the Israelis believe that the settlements contribute to Israel’s national security (37% in June), while 36% believe they hurt it (39% in June). 21% think that settlements neither contribute nor hurt (19% in June). If future evacuation of settlements will take place as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, 44% of Israelis believe that Jewish inhabitants of the settlements should be allowed to continue living there under Palestinian rule if they wish to do so, while 53% oppose it. As to the Palestinians, only 26% support allowing settlers wishing to live in the West Bank under Palestinian rule to do so, while 72% oppose it. (5) Focus on Jerusalem: The barrier and the E-1 plan
In our survey we examined two of the most critical and sensitive areas of contention between Israel and the Palestinians in recent months and in the future: the barrier built by Israel around Jerusalem (“Otef Yerushalaim”) and the E-1 development plan in the corridor between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Edumim. On the first issue, Israelis were told that The security fence surrounding Jerusalem, will eventually bring about 200,000 Palestinians under Israeli rule and will separate other 55,000 Palestinians from the city. They were then asked whether the construction of the fence will strengthen or weaken Israel’s grip over Jerusalem, whether it increases or decreases the level of security in the Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem and whether they support or oppose the construction of the barrier around Jerusalem. 51% believe it will strengthen Israel’s hold on Jerusalem while 39% believe it will weaken it and 3% think it will have no impact. 73% believe the barrier will increase the level of security in the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem compared to 17% who believe security will decrease and 6% feel it will have no impact on the level of security. 62% of the Israelis support and only 30% oppose the construction of the barrier surrounding Jerusalem. On the second issue Israelis were informed that the government has begun infrastructure work in the area located between Ma’ale Edumim and Jerusalem with the intention to join together the two municipalities. If this plan comes through it will substantially impair the territorial contiguity between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank. They were then asked if this plan increases or decreases the likelihood for a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, whether it strengthens or weakens Israel’s grip over Jerusalem and the extent to which they support or oppose the plan. 22% of the Israelis believe the plan will increase the likelihood of a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, 57% believe it will decrease the likelihood for a settlement, and 8% think it will have no impact. 66% believe the plan will strengthen the grip over Jerusalem in the future, compared to 19% who believe it will weaken Israel’s hold on Jerusalem, and 7% who believe it will have no impact. 57% of the Israelis support and 28% oppose the plan. (6) Expectations for future developments and how to proceed from here.
Both publics were asked to assess the coming developments following the successful implementation of the disengagement and the new date set for the parliamentary elections in the Palestinian Authority in January

5% of the Israelis and 25% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations between the parties will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop. 58% of the Israelis and 60% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue; and 32% of the Israelis and 11% of the Palestinians believe that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations.
The poll examined Israeli and Palestinian preferences concerning the next steps that should be taken in the course of the peace process. Both publics seem to differ greatly on the specific route they prefer for that purpose. 69% of the Palestinians prefer immediate return to final status negotiations on all issues in dispute at once and 25% prefer a gradual step by step approach. Among Israelis, 59% prefer a gradual a step by step approach and 33% prefer a final status solution of all issues at once.
If talks on a comprehensive solution begin, only 37% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians believe it is possible to reach these days a compromise settlement with the current leadership of the other side. 59% among Israelis and 68% among Palestinians believe such a settlement is currently impossible.
When asked to assess how soon will a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians be achieved, 36% of the Palestinians and 22% of the Israelis believe a political settlement is not possible ever, 30% of the Israelis and 38% of the Palestinians believe it will be achieved in the next generation or many generation to come, 39% of the Israelis and 20% of the Palestinians think it will be reached in the next decade or the next few years.
If a compromise settlement is nevertheless reached, 49% of the Palestinians but only 18% of the Israelis believe Abu Mazin is strong enough to convince his people to accept such as settlement. As to Sharon’s ability to deliver a comprehensive settlement, 59% of the Israelis and 53% of the Palestinians believe he is strong enough to do that.
In the same context, 57% of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis support the Quartet’s Roadmap plan, compared to 40% among Palestinians and 34% among Israelis who oppose it.
47% of the Israelis believe that Israel should negotiate also with the Hamas if it is necessary in order to reach a compromise agreement; 50% oppose it.

العربية

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Poll 24 - June, 2007.

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll

In the Backdrop of the Gaza Takeover by Hamas, Israelis and Palestinians Share Grim Expectations of the other Side’s Leadership and the Chances for the Resumption of Negotiations

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between June 12 and 20, 2007. The data for these surveys were collected while the Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip took place. The evaluation of the reported figures must take into consideration this context.

The joint poll examined the two publics’ support of a renewed cease fire agreement between Israel and the Palestinian factions and several ideas to promote it including the deployment of international forces on the borders of the Gaza strip, and the security plan proposed by US Secretary of State Rice. In addition we examined assessments of the Arab League (Saudi) plan, the Israeli leadership's degrees of freedom to negotiate with various configurations of a Palestinian government, and an Israeli-Syrian settlement.

· 89% of Israelis and 76% of Palestinians believed at the time of the survey that armed confrontations between the two sides will continue. 47% of Israelis and 51% of Palestinians believed that negotiations will resume. However only 31% of Palestinians believed it is possible to reach a compromise settlement with the current Israeli leadership. Among Israelis, 42% believed that it is possible to reach such a settlement with Abu Mazin, and 25% - with a Palestinian national unity government.
· 63% of the Palestinians support the security plan proposed by the American Secretary of State last month, compared to 45% among Israelis who support it. The plan requests from the Palestinians the enforcement of law and order, fighting terrorism, preventing rocket attacks on Israel, and preventing smuggling through tunnels. It requests the Israelis to open the crossings of Rafah, Kerem Shalom, and Karni on a regular and permanent basis, to allow passage of people and goods between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and remove checkpoints in the West Bank. Presumably Israelis’ lukewarm support of the plan has been driven by fears of renewed violent attacks by Hamas following its takeover of Gaza if checkpoints are removed and Gazacrossings are open, echoing Israeli security authorities’ concerns.
· Regarding another closely related issue, the deployment of international forces along the borders of Gaza, Egypt and Israel, in order to prevent arm smuggling and rocket launching on Israel, a considerable majority among Israelis (65%) support this step, while 35% of the Palestinians support it. Three years ago in June 2004, 53% of the Israelis and 60% among Palestinians supported the deployment of such an armed force.

Given the blowing of war winds in the region and speculations about a new war in the summer we attempted to asses the impact of these speculations on Israelis’ expectations and attitudes toward the use of force versus peaceful means to cope with threats that Israel faces.

· 46% of the Israelis believe that another war can be expected this summer while 42% do not expect such a war.
· 15% of the Israelis also believe that a ground operation in the Gaza strip can prevent a coming war in the summer while 49% believe that such an operation will rather promote war.

And Given the difficulties the Palestinians confront in their domestic scene, we attempted to assess how the Palestinian public views its options regarding the future of the PA, possible confederation with Jordan, and the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years.

· 41% of the Palestinians want to dissolve the PA and replace it with an international trusteeship (26%) or return to full Israeli occupation (16%). 49% oppose the dissolution of the PA.
· 42% support the establishment of a confederation with Jordan and 52% oppose that.
· 70% believe the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are low or nonexistent and 26% believe the chances are medium or high.

The joint poll further examined Israeli and Palestinian assessments of the capability of both leaderships to reach a political settlement these days.

Total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 14 and 20, 2007. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 598 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic, or Russian between June 12 and 19, 2007. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

Main Findings

(A) Cease Fire Agreement and the renewal of the political process

· At the time of the joint poll, Israelis and Palestinians do not hold high hopes regarding the resumption of negotiations. Only 17% of Palestinians and 9% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop. 34% of the Palestinians and 38% of the Israelis think that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue. 41% of the Palestinians and 51% of the Israelis believe that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations
· 70% of the Israelis believe that neither side came out a winner in the current round of the conflict, 12% believe that the Palestinians won, 10% believe that Israel won and 5% believe that both won.
· 9% of the Israelis also believe that Israel will gain more from the recent cease fire while 33% believe Palestinians will gain more, 40% believe both will gain and 16% think neither side will gain.
· As to steps which can help to sustain a cease fire, 35% of the Palestinians and 65% of the Israelis support a proposal to deploy international armed forces in the Gaza Strip, especially on the border with Israel andEgypt to prevent arm smuggling and rocket launching on Israel. 61% and 29% oppose this proposal respectively.
· Similarly, 63% of the Palestinians and 45% of the Israelis support the American security plan, which was presented to the Palestinians and Israelis last month. The plan requests from the Palestinians the enforcement of law and order, fighting terrorism, preventing rocket attacks on Israel, and preventing smuggling through tunnels. It requests from the Israelis to open the Rafah, Kerem Shalom, and Karni crossings on a regular and permanent basis, allow passage of people and goods between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and remove checkpoints in the West Bank. 36% of the Palestinians and 52% of the Israelis oppose this plan.
· 40% of the Israelis support and 57% oppose the release of Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiations with him in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians.
· 60% of the Israelis support negotiations between Israel and Abu Mazin over a final status settlement.
· Despite these levels of support only 42% of the Israelis believe that it is possible to reach nowadays a compromise settlement between Olmert and Abu Mazin. In December 2006, 46% believed so.
· Similarly, 50% of the Israelis support and 46% oppose negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which includes Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement. However only 25% of Israelis believe that it is possible, and 70% think it is impossible to reach a compromise settlement with the Palestinian national unity government. In March 2007, 33% believed this is possible. This drop in Israelis’ optimism regarding the chances to reach an agreement between the two leaderships is likely a reaction of Israelis to the leadership crisis in the PA, following the recent events in Gaza.
· As to Palestinians, 31% believe it is possible and 65% think it is impossible to reach a compromise settlement with the current Israeli leadership.
· A majority of 60% among Palestinians and 64% of the Israelis agrees with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict, there would be mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. 38% and 30% respectively disagree. 51% of the Palestinians and 48% of the Israelis believe that a majority in their public supports such a proposal, and 37% and 36% respectively think the majority opposes it. However both publics are only partly aware of the majority support for such a step in the other side. Only 43% of the Palestinians and 35% of the Israelis think the other side public supports this step.
· Despite the ongoing internal strife in the PA, these levels of support in a mutual recognition of identity did not change much. In December 2006, 63% of the Israelis and 58% of the Palestinians supported such a step.
· Given the ongoing events, both publics are quite pessimistic regarding the chances for such a mutual recognition (marking support in a two state solution) to materialize. Only 26% of the Palestinians and 39% of the Israelis believe that there are medium or high chances that a Palestinian State will be established in the next 5 years. 70% of the Palestinians and 59% among Israelis believe that these chances are nil or low.
· 66% of the Palestinians and 43% among Israelis believe that a political settlement will never be reached or only in many generations to come, 13% and 33% respectively think it will come in the next generation or next decade, and only 13% Palestinians and 18% Israelis think it will come in the next few years.

(B) The Arab league plan and negotiations with Syria

· In addition to the Palestinian arena, we examined in the poll both publics’ attitudes regarding the Arab League (Saudi) plan, and Israelis’ attitudes toward a settlement with Syria over the Golan Heights.
· As to the Arab League (Saudi) plan, and after briefing our respondents on its essential elements, 36% of the Israelis and 66% of the Palestinians support the plan compared to 59% and 31% respectively who oppose it.
· When we framed the reference to the refugees issue in terms of President Clinton’s approach to the issue, support for the Saudi plan decreased among Palestinians and slightly increased among Israelis. Under this framing 46% of the Palestinians and 39% of the Israelis support the Saudi plan while 49% and 52% respectively oppose it.
· 47% among Israelis believe that Israel should and 50% think that Israel should not enter negotiations with Syria's President Assad on full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement
· 25% of the Israelis support and 60% oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria.
· Israelis’ support for the return of the Golan Heights increases noticeably when presented with the proposal to demilitarize the Golan Heights and to turn it into a recreational park under Syria's sovereignty, but administered jointly with Israel. Israeli citizens would be allowed to enter the park freely for vacation and recreational purposes. Under these terms, 31% support and 56% oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement.

(C) Other Conflict Related and Conflict Resolution Issues

Given the current difficulties confronting the Palestinians, we examined Palestinian public perceptions of various threats and options:
· A majority of Palestinians (56%) believe that the most serious threat confronting the Palestinians today is infighting and lawlessness, followed by poverty (21%), Israeli occupation and settlements (12%) and finally international boycott and sanctions (10%).
· A large percentage (41%) of the Palestinians wants the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority but a larger percentage (49%) opposes that. The percentage of those in favor of dissolving the PA is divided among those who want it replaced with international trusteeship (26%) and those who want it replaced with a return to full Israeli occupation (16%).
· Similarly, 42% of the Palestinians support the establishment of a confederation with Jordan while 52% oppose that. The percentage of those in favor the confederation solution is divided among those who want it now (25%) and those who want it only later after the establishment of a Palestinian state (17%).
· Overwhelming majority of 82% of the Palestinians view acts such as the kidnapping of foreigners, the burning of internet cafe’s, and the bombing of foreign schools as criminal deserving condemnation while only 3% view them as nationalistic and deserving support. In the Gaza Strip, 85% view these acts as criminal and 2% as nationalistic.
· Given the blowing of war winds in the region and speculations about a new war in the summer 46% of the Israelis believe that another war can be expected this summer while 42% do not expect such a war. We attempted to asses Israelis’ attitudes toward the use of force versus peaceful means to cope with threats that Israel faces. Israelis were presented with a list of possible steps Israel could take and were asked to assess the potential of each step to promote or rather prevent a war in the summer. The table below presents Israelis’ assessments of the possible outcomes of these steps.

	Percent believing it can prevent war	Percent believing it can neither prevent nor promote	Percent believing it can promote war
Negotiations with Syria	46%	41%	10%
Negotiations with Abu Mazin	26%	61%	10%
Negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government	24%	47%	14%
Negotiations on the Saudi plan	35%	49%	10%
Preventative attack on Hizballa	16%	24%	55%
A ground operation in the Gaza Strip	15%	31%	49%
Bombing Iran's nuclear reactor	15%	15%	65%
Threatening Syria with harsh measures if it will start a war	22%	27%	44%

Of all the negotiation options facing Israel these days, the most preferred one is negotiations over the Saudi plan, with 31% of the Israelis chose preferring it most. Second stands negotiations with the Palestinians on a compromise agreement, with 25% preferring it most. Only 17% prefer most negotiations with Assad and Syria over the Golan Heights in return for full peace.17% do not prefer any of these options.

(D) Palestinian Domestic Balance of Power

· If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fateh would receive 43% of the vote, the same percentage it received three months ago in our March survey. But support for Change and Reform (Hamas) drops from 37% three months ago to 33% in this survey. Support for all other third parties combined stands at 12% and 13% remain undecided.
· If new presidential elections are held today and the only two candidates were Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, 40% would not participate in these elections. Among those who would participate, 49% would vote for Abbas and 42% for Haniyeh. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, non participation would drop to 31%. Among those who would participate, 59% would vote for Marwan Barghouti and 35% for Haniyeh. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti wins against Haniyeh by 55% to 41%.

(E) General mood and attitudes toward democracy

· 90% of the Palestinians describe current Palestinian conditions as very bad or bad while only 6% describe them as good or very good. 28% of the Palestinians say they want to immigrate to other countries and 23% say they are not proud of being Palestinians. As to Israelis, 44% think Israel’s general condition these days is bad or very bad, 38% believe it to be so-so and 17% describe Israel’s condition these days as good or very good.
· In the backdrop of the internal strife in the Gaza strip 54% of the Palestinians and 85% of the Israelis see democracy in the Palestinian Authority as a failed system that cannot be implemented in Palestine. 41% of the Palestinians and 10% of the Israelis see democracy rather as a successful system that is suited for Palestine.
· Nonetheless, 42% of the Palestinians who believe that democracy is a failed system believe that the Palestinian Authority should maintain that democratic system despite its problems, while 45% think that it should abandon it and adopt a non democratic system. 2% of the Israelis think that the current status of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority is very good or good, 12% believe it is so-so, and 84% think it is bad or very bad.

العربية

Critical Policy Brief, Number 4/2019

2 July 2019

The Power Struggle Between Fatah and Hamas Prevents Palestinian Reconciliation and Reunification

Khalil Shikaki

To change the status quo, the Gaza Strip confronts four alternatives: (1) a unifying reconciliation that allows the Strip to return to the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA); (2) a long-term agreement with Israel that would ease the current siege and blockade and allow greater Hamas control; (3) a war with Israel; or (4) the imposition of further PA sanctions on Hamas. Given the developments since Hamas’s violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the prospects for reconciliation seem low while medium for a long-term deal with Israel and high for a war or further sanctions.

A fourth war between Israel and Gaza or the imposition of further sanctions will probably fail to significantly alter the current political landscape but might help postpone the moment of truth or might facilitate a long-term deal between Hamas and Israel. Such a deal will most likely generate further long-term fragmentation in the Palestinian national movement and, in the long run, enforce a more permanent separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while in the meanwhile trigger immediate PA administrative and financial sanctions on the Gaza Strip. A Hamas-Israel long term deal will also widen the internal socio-political rift and will probably be detrimental to any chance for a future transition to democracy in the two entities.

It seems logical that the realization of this dynamic, not to mention other mutual threats, is sufficient to force Hamas and Fatah to look for new ways to give reconciliation a chance. But it does not. Why? This Brief provides an analysis of the positions of the two sides, as well as the positions of other relevant players. It describes the price that must be paid by both sides to give reconciliation a chance and why the two sides have so far refused to pay that price.

(1) The future of the Gaza Strip: the status quo and its alternatives:

The future of the Gaza Strip is characterized by dangers and risks; its current political and economic conditions leave no room for optimism. No state recognizes Hamas’s rule over the Gaza Strip despite the fact that its two neighbors deal with it as the de facto authority. Others, such as the PA, Qatar, the UN and other international actors do the same. All agree that living conditions are continuously worsening. Less than a year ago, a UN report, issued by UNCTAD, indicated that by 2020, the Strip will become uninhabitable, confirming a report issued by the UN back in 2012. Since 2006, Israel has imposed a see, air, and land blockade and a siege over the Gaza Strip. The siege and blockade have worsened since 2007 after Hamas assumed full control over the Strip. After three wars between Hamas and Israel since 2008, unemployment has increased to more than 50%, rising to more than 60% among the youth, and more than 80% of the population rely on some sort of aid. All economic sectors, along with health, education, power, food, and water, suffer from a deep crisis and a crumpling infrastructure. Last March, various popular demonstrations erupted against Hamas’s rule protesting harsh living conditions. They were confronted by Hamas’s use of severe force. For all of that, it is not surprising that about half of the Gazan residents wish to emigrate in search for survival and better life.[1]

Palestinian and regional actors have explored various ways of addressing the crisis in Gaza. The following paragraphs describe the four ideas that have received the greatest attention:

A) Reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas: Fatah’s and Hamas’s policies toward Gaza have become clearer over the past couple of years. Abbas’ policy is based on three pillars: (1) a determination to restore full PA control over the Strip; (2) a reliance on sanctions and political pressure as the means to force Hamas to surrender full control to his government; and in the meanwhile (3) insure that Hamas fails to acquire legitimacy or a capacity to transform the Strip into a functioning entity or a mini-state. Hamas confronts Abbas’s policy with a position reflecting various levels of flexibility and rigidness with the aim of achieving the following three goals: (1) getting rid of the financial and political burden of its rule over the Gaza Strip in a manner that allows it to regain legitimacy and a reintegration into the PA political system; (2) insure its continued military control over the Strip in a manner that guarantees its survival and gives it the last word over all Gazan affairs; and (3) use its military capacity to acquire greater internal legitimacy, as the symbol of resistance, and force Israel to make concessions to improve Gazan conditions.

In other words, the PA, which spends about 100 million US dollars per month in the Gaza Strip, says that a reconciliation that allows its government a full control over the Gaza Strip is the only way out. The PA rests its position on its own interpretation of the terms of the October 2017 Cairo reconciliation deal facilitated by Egypt. That agreement however does not it provide the PA a full security control over the Strip; indeed, it does not address the issue. But president Abbas made it clear at that time that the success of reconciliation is dependent on Hamas’s readiness, along with other factions, to disarm and disband its armed wing. He made it clear that any empowerment of the government must mean “one authority, one law, one administration, one arm, and certainly one political program, that of the PLO.”[2]

By contrast, Hamas’s new leadership in the Gaza Strip, led by Yahya Sinwar, showed significant flexibility in its readiness to surrender almost full civil control to the PA government. It was this flexibility that allowed the 2017 deal to be made. But Hamas rejects Abbas’ interpretation of the terms of that deal insisting that its guns are “resistance arms” that are as legitimate as the PA, if not more. Hamas leaders made it clear that the subject is not open for discussion; that it is a red line. Sinwar declared that “no one in the world can disarm us, to the contrary, we intend to amass more arms in order to protect our people.”[3] Despite the fact that the other relevant actors, such as Egypt, Qatar, the UN, Israel, the EU, the US, and others appreciate the PA position and welcome it, all of them assume that it cannot be implemented at this time. Instead, they are willing to support a gradual PA return to the Gaza Strip even if Hamas is not disarmed in the short term.

B) Long term agreement between Hamas and Israel: In the absence of reconciliation, Hamas will find itself searching for alternative means to improve living conditions and consolidate its control over the Gaza Strip. One such alternative is to reach a long term cessation of violence, a hudna, with Israel that allows for the easing of the siege while providing Hamas with the financial capacity to deliver services, through foreign aid such as that of Qatar, or through custom and tax revenues that can be generated by directly collecting custom duties and other taxes on goods that enter the Gaza Strip. This solution to the crisis in the Gaza Strip finds some support among Israeli right-wing circles viewing it as the means to sustain and consolidate Palestinian divisions thereby reducing the prospects for Palestinian statehood.[4] The idea gained serious attention in mid-2018 after most relevant players came to the conclusion that reconciliation was no longer a viable option, at least in the short run.

This alternative does not require disarming Hamas but it seeks to bring about a significant improvement in economic and living conditions of Gazans, greater freedom of movement for individuals, entry of some banned goods, such as cement, and the opening of the Strip’s border crossings. It also seeks to solve some of Gaza’s long-term problems, such as electricity and water, and perhaps explor ways to gain access to seaport and airport services. Hamas also hopes to convince Egypt to permanently open the Rafah crossing for the movement of passengers and goods on both directions so that the Strip would be able to import and export through Egypt, not just Israel, which in turn would allow Hamas to directly impose its own customs and thereby improve its administration and service delivery. For this solution to succeed, Hamas would have to agree not only to a ceasefire, but also to a resolution to the issue of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas, stop building offensive tunnels under Israeli territories, and stop those border activities that started with the March of Return, such as incendiary balloons and others. For Israel, such an arrangement would insure quite along its southern borders allowing it to devote its attention to Iran and deal more effectively with the US regional plans as well as the so-called “Deal of the Century” and the possibility of annexing parts of the West Bank.[5]

C) The military solution: Hamas does not have an effective military solution to the crisis in the Gaza Strip. But things are different for Israel. Some Israelis, such as former minister of defense Avigdor Lieberman and the Likud Knesset member, Avi Dichter, think that Israel can and should destroy Hamas’s military infrastructure and reoccupy the Gaza Strip for an extended period during which preparation can be made for the possible return of the PA or the imposition of some other arrangement.

Israel, however, does not have a Palestinian, Arab, or international partner for such war. Moreover, it seems that the Israeli army estimates that the cost of a military action along these lines would be very high and would outweigh the potential benefits and that a full control over the Gaza Strip would require the re-occupation of the Strip for years, not months, and that the elimination of Hamas’s power would leave the Strip in chaos and ruin creating fertile ground for groups and ideas more extremist than those of Hamas. Moreover, this solution finds resistance from some of the right wing figures who hope to keep Hamas as a potential threat to the PA thereby keeping the Palestinians divided.

D) Palestinian financial and administrative pressure: As long as Hamas rejects PA demands for “one gun,” the belief that more pressure might work is likely to gain momentum within circles close to Abbas. The PA might impose further punishment similar to what it inflicted in the past and might expand the previous measures by considerably reducing the monthly funds it transfers to Gaza and by stopping many of the services, in the social and communication sectors, it currently provides. It might also deny Hamas’s legitimacy in the West Bank and hold elections restricted to that area.

It is likely that such steps would meet strong opposition from Israel, Egypt, Qatar, and the UN due to concerns regarding the implications of such measures on the humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip and the increased prospects for another war between Hamas and Israel. Most of the Palestinian public will most likely oppose such measures. Indeed, current polls indicate that more than 80% of the public demand that the PA remove all sanctions currently imposed on the Gaza Strip.[6]

(2) Why Fatah and Hamas prevent reunification

Assigning blame for the continuation of the split is no mystery. Both Fatah and Hamas are equally responsible. Both parties impose preconditions; placing their partisan interests over those of the public: Hamas refuses to abandon the “resistance arms” and Fatah refuses to abandon the demand for “one gun.” The truth is the “resistance arms” is nothing but a military infrastructure that provides Hamas with power and immunity allowing it to control the Gaza Strip and acquire a regional standing. Similarly, “one gun” gives Fatah the exclusive control over the formal Palestinian security sector, as most of its personnel comes from its own ranks, which in turn allows it to easily gain hegemony over the Palestinian political system.

It is true that Hamas’s military capacity plays a central role in resisting any Israeli incursions in or attacks on the Gaza Strip. Yet, this fact does not negate the role it plays in bolstering the power of a political party and that Hamas has actually used this capacity in 2007 to settle scores with Fatah and militarily defeat forces loyal to the elected president in an internal strife thereby giving it a domestic advantage and consequently splitting the Palestinian authority politically and territorially. It also goes without saying that the PA needs to have full control and monopoly over coercive force in order to be able to enforce law and order, insure internal security, help deliver justice and other public services, and empower the private sector. But here too, there is no doubt that “one guan” guarantees continued control over the entire political system by a political party that in fact lost the parliamentary elections and has no legal claim to “one gun” without winning new parliamentary and presidential elections.

Moreover, it is not clear that Hamas’s military capacity is essential for protecting the Gaza Strip. Israel has unilaterally withdrawn from that area and, given the economic, demographic, and political costs, is not indicating serious interest in reoccupying it. Similarly, Fatah’s insistence for “one gun” is belied by the constant presence of Israeli troops in PA-controlled areas in the West Bank, a presence that undoubtedly harms PA standing among the Palestinians but does not prevent it from dominating the domestic scene.

(3) The public as a spectator:

True, the Palestinian public, or most of it, is a spectator watching a losing political game played by Fatah and Hamas. It expects those who benefit from disunity to put an end to it. This however does not mean that the public has not given its own view regarding the positions of the two sides. Public opinion surveys show clearly that a majority of the Palestinians rejects the imposition of preconditions on reconciliation, as those stated by Fatah and Hamas. True, the overwhelming majority of the public (78%) wants the entire unified security sector to come under the control of the PA government. Yet, the public sees no contradiction between siding with a unified chain of PA security command and the continued existence of the various Gazan armed groups. Indeed, responding to Abbas’s demand for “one gun,” 72% of the public indicated opposition to disarming these groups as a condition for reunification.[7] In other words, the public, notwithstanding the fact that it was Hamas who initiated the process that led to disunity and used arms, the “resistance arms,” no less, to defeat its domestic opposition, rejects the views of Fatah and the PA and sides with Hamas. Why is the public so forgiving?

It is obvious that the public is strongly in favor of a single unified authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that it supports a PA monopoly over coercive force as the means to enforce law and order and maintain internal security. But the public, which is also strongly in favor of national unity as a top priority, realizes that it is impossible to disarm Hamas without triggering a civil war. Therefore, it is willing to temporarily turn a blind eye to Hamas arms, pending the restoration of unity and the establishment of a new legitimate political system. More importantly, part of the Palestinian public, even if not the majority, believes that ending Israeli occupation cannot be achieved except by resort to arms and that the continued existence of armed groups in the Gaza Strip, despite its risks to societal peace and PA capacity, remains a national necessity more important than the “one gun.”

(4) Conclusion: the price of unity:

The main Palestinian beneficiaries from the current split are Fatah and Hamas; both are willing to sacrifice the public interest in order to maintain their own party interests. In doing so, they, knowingly or unknowingly, weaken the Palestinian position at a critical moment in their history, a moment in which they have lost most of their Arab allies and have become victims to a regional conflict that threatens their interests. In tolerating a situation in which two million Palestinians are deprived of participation in their country’s economic, social, and technological development and in which two authoritarian political systems, devoid of accountability and oversight, are created, the two parties show a lack of responsibility and an abandonment of the initiative. All Palestinians pay for this outcome, as regaining the initiative is unlikely without regaining unity.

But unity can only be regained incrementally. Indeed, only an electoral legitimacy is stronger than the legitimacy of the “resistance arms,” thereby making it possible to enforce a “one gun” policy. Thus, the price that must be asked of Fatah in order to achieve unity is to agree to postpone the demand for “one gun” until after the holding of elections. Similarly, the price that must be asked of Hamas is to commit itself to accept the verdict of the voters. To make the “resistance arms” or the “one gun” sacred is to sacrifice national unity in order to preserve the selfish interests of a political party. Both sides should use the election campaign as an opportunity to lobby for their positions and both should accept the judgement of the public. One should not expect success from any other alternative.

[1] Wish to emigrate stood in March 2019 t 43% in the Gaza Strip compared to 20% in the West Bank. The Gazan percentage stood at 48% in December 2018. See polls by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research; see: http://pcpsr.org/en/node/752 and also: http://pcpsr.org/en/node/740

[2] The PA president made his position clear in a speech in front of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council in October 2017, see: https://alqabas.com/444569/. Earlier in that month, Abbas told an Egyptian TV station, CBC, that: “If someone from Fatah in the West Bank carries a gone other than the legitimate gun, I would arrest him, and this is what I intend to do in the Gaza Strip. There must be one legitimate gun …. I will not allow the replication of the Hezbollah model.” See, https://www.annahar.com/article/675427-عباس-يرفض-استنساخ-تجربة-حزب-الله-في-لبنان-سنتسلم-كل-شيء-في-غزة

Abbas went back to the same theme less than a year later when he said in front of the PLO Central Council in August 15, 2018: “We do not want militias in the Gaza Strip; only one legitimate gun is allowed, we want one gun in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” See: https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2018/08/15/1166660.html

[3] Hamas leaders issued several statements in October 2017, right after the signing of the agreement. Sinwar’s statement, issued on 24 October, confirmed that Hamas has indeed made big concessions for the sake of reconciliation, but made it clear that “our arms are indispensable,” adding: “as a nation, we are still in a national liberation phase.” See, https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/content/print/1092903.html. See also, hadfnews.ps/post/34030/السنوار-لا-أحد-يمكنه-نزع-سلاح-المقاومة-ويدعو-عباس-لزيارة-غزة

Husam Badran, one of Hamas’s senior leaders, was emphatic: “We refuse any discussion of the future of the arms of the resistance, not now nor in the future.” See, https://alqabas.com/444569/

Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyyeh, showed some flexibility in an interview in an Egyptian TV station: “We are ready to institute a mechanism and a strategy with Fatah and other factions on how to operate the resistance arms and decision. See, https://www.alhadath.ps/article/65739/هنية-مستعدون-لوضع-استراتيجية-مع-الفصائل-ل%d8

Haniyyeh added: “the arms of the [civil] security sector should be unified and should come under the control of the state.”

[4] See for example the plan proposed by Israeli minister of intelligence and transportation, Israel Katz, in June 2016 to build an artificial island off the coast of the Gaza Strip. The island would contain facilities for a port, an airport, and an infrastructure for water desalination and power generation and would be supervised by the Palestinians and international actors. Israeli defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman opposed the idea when it was proposed. Despite that opposition, the plan was submitted to the Israeli cabinet for discussion in more than one occasion between 2016-2018. The idea was first proposed in 2000 by a joint Dutch-Israeli team. See: https://www.albawaba.com/news/israel-revisits-plan-build-artificial-islands-coast-gaza-1070762 and,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-wants-someone-to-build-a-5-billion-island-off-gaza--for-a-seaport-hotels-airport/2016/06/20/e45ce6fc-7948-4a10-bef3-0f782b030739_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4763c7b516f0

[5] After a recent security cabinet meeting in June, a Palestinian website reported that Yuval Steinitz, Israel's Minister of Energy, has indicated that a long term deal with Hamas is feasible, see: https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2019/06/20/1252753.html#ixzz5rVAPwxhw

[6] PSR’s March 2019 poll indicated that 82% of the public demand removal of all sanctions, see: http://pcpsr.org/en/node/752

[7] See PSR’s December 2018 poll: http://pcpsr.org/en/node/740

العربية |

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Public Opinion Poll No (70) Press-Release

18 December 2018

A large majority rejects the Social Security Law, two-thirds are dissatisfied with the reconciliation government, and almost two-thirds demand the resignation of president Abbas. In the meanwhile, three quarters of the Palestinians welcome the role played by Qatar in the Gaza Strip and the last Palestinian-Israeli armed confrontations in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank significantly increase the popularity of Hamas and the support for an armed intifada and decrease the support for diplomacy and negotiations. Indeed, three quarters demand Palestinian rejection of the Trump peace plan viewing it as failing to meet any of the basic needs of the Palestinians

12-16 December 2018

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 12-16 December 2018. The period before the conduct of the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the intensification of popular opposition to the Social Security Law, the failure of reconciliation efforts, the release of a report indicating that President Abbas intends to dissolve the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the transfer of the Qatari funds to Israel to cover the cost of fuel for the Gaza power station, and the direct Qatari payment to Gazan employees of the former Hamas government. Also, it was revealed during this period that some Palestinians have sold property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other places in the West Bank. Despite the efforts to calm conditions in the Gaza Strip, this period witnessed a serious escalation in violence between Hamas and Israel. The US Administration announced its intention to make public its own plan for Palestinian-Israeli peace. The Israeli prime minister visited Oman and Israeli ministers visited the United Arab Emirates. Finally, a major violent escalation took place in the West Bank during the period of the fieldwork for this poll. This press release addresses all these issues and covers other matters such as parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2018 indicate a significant increase in Hamas’ popularity in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The violent confrontations in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were probably responsible for this change. Moreover, Hamas’ success in insuring Gazan access to fuel and money to pay the salaries of its former government employees probably contributed to this outcome. Support for Fatah remains relatively unchanged. Moreover, support for Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh rises in the Gaza Strip while support for President Mahmoud

Abbas declines in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections are held today, findings show that Haniyeh would most likely be the winner. If parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah and Hamas are likely to receive the same levels of support.

Findings also show that the public has lost hope for a successful reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and that a large majority is dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. They also show that the public is highly opposed to the policies of president Abbas toward the Gaza Strip including his demand for the full transfer of control over the Strip by Hamas to the reconciliation government and his demand for one gun. Indeed, the public supports the continued presence of armed battalions of the various factions alongside the official PA security services in the Gaza Strip. An overwhelming majority demands the ending of sanctions imposed by President Abbas on the Gaza Strip such as the decrease in salaries and in the amount of electricity provided to Gazans. But it is worth noting that a large percentage supports the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) despite the fact that more than one third believes that such a step is harmful to the reconciliation efforts.

Findings also show a widespread opposition to the Social Security Law reaching almost a consensus among West Bankers who believe that the law applies to them or will have an impact on them or their families. It is evident that the distrust in the government and the belief that the law is unjust are the most important drivers of the opposition to the law.

The majority views the results of the last confrontation between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip as a victory for Hamas. Indeed, an even larger majority than before continues to support Hamas-Israel indirect negotiations for a long term tahdia or truce. The majority also supports the current agreement between Hamas and Israel that allows Qatari-funded Israeli fuel as well as Qatar money to reach the Gaza Strip despite opposition by the PA to this Qatari role. In fact, findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians welcome the Qatari role in the Gaza Strip, both in terms of paying for the fuel needed for the generation of electricity and for the payment of the salaries of the employees of the former Hamas government. Despite all of this, the public tends to believe that the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip will collapse shortly and that such a collapse will lead to a widescale war against the Gaza Strip.

Findings regarding the peace process indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution and a considerable rise in support for an armed intifada. They also show a significant rise in the perception that the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion in the West Bank. Moreover, an overwhelming majority believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about promoting peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians believe that the Trump peace plan, when and if one is ever presented, will not call for any of the following: the establishment of a Palestinian state, East Jerusalem as a capital of the state of Palestine, the June 1967 lines as a basis for setting borders of Palestine, a just solution to the refugee problem, or ending the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. For this reason, three quarters of the Palestinians demand a rejection of the Trump plan. But findings also indicate that a large minority believes that the US mediation is indispensable for any peace negotiations with Israel. Moreover, the public is split in its attitude toward the Trump plan if it does indeed contain all these vital elements that the public currently thinks will be absent.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 32% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip.
Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 35% (42% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip).
If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 47% for Abbas and 45% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the vote (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 56% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 40%.
If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 29% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 24% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 5%; Khalid Mishal by 4%; Mustafa Barghouti and Saeb Erikat by 2%; and Salam Fayyad by 1% each.
If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they would vote for Hamas and 35% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 27% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 34% three months ago) and for Fatah at 31% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 21% three months ago) and Fatah at 39% (compared to 38% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 14%.
In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (43%) blames the PA, president Abbas, and the reconciliation government; 21% blame Hamas, 9% blame Egypt, and 20% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 58% of Gazans, compared to 34% of West Bankers, blame the PA, Abbas and the reconciliation government; and 28% of Gazans, compared to 17% of West Bankers, blame Hamas.
Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 55%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 47%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 45% and in the West Bank at 48%.
One third )32%) of the public says it wants to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 48% and declines in the West Bank to 22%.
Only 35% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 61% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 50% believe that they cannot.
Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%.
A majority of the public (53%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 42% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Al Aqsa TV (14%), Maan TV, Palestine TV, and Palestine Today (at 12% each), al Mayadeen and al Quds TV (5% each), and Al Arabiya (at 4%).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

23% are satisfied and 66% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 22%.
29% are optimistic and 66% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%.
The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 34% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 61% disagrees. Three months ago, 31% said they agreed with Abbas.
When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, more than two-thirds (68%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 25% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans.
Moreover, an overwhelming majority (77%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 18% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 80% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip.
The largest percentage (47%) supports the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council and 43% are opposed to that. Nonetheless, 37% believe that such a dissolution will harm the prospects of reconciliation while 21% believe it will improve the chances for reconciliation, and 34% believe it will have no impact on the reconciliation.

4) Israel-Hamas confrontations in the Gaza Strip and the long-term tahdia, or truce:

A majority of 61% (compared to 55% three months ago) supports and 33% oppose a Hamas-Israel long-term tahdia, or cessation of violence, even in the absence of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. The agreement would entail the opening of the border crossing with Egypt and access to a seaport and an airport in a neighboring area in return for a Hamas enforcement of a long-term ceasefire as well as ending the Return Marches and the incendiary kites. Support for this long-term cessation of violence is higher in the Gaza Strip (64%) than in the West Bank (59%).
Two-thirds (67%) support a limited tahdia (quiet) that would allow the entry into the Gaza Strip of Qatari fuel and money in return for stopping the confrontations along the Gaza-Israel border area including the incendiary balloons. Opposition to this tahdia stands at 28%. Support for this tahdia stands at 72% in the Gaza Strip and 64% in the West Bank.
But a majority of 62% believes the current ceasefire between Hamas and Israel will not last for long and that it will collapse soon while 32% believe it will last for a long or a medium period.
If the current ceasefire collapses, a majority of 62% believes it will lead to a widescale war between Hamas and Israel while 31% believe that a collapse of the ceasefire will not lead to a widescale war.
But the public is split over the chances for reaching a long term Tahdia that would ease the siege and stop the confrontation: 50% believe the chances are high or medium and 48% think the chances are non-existent.
62% think that Hamas has come out victorious from the most recent confrontation with Israel while 31% think it has not come out victorious. By contrast, about two-thirds (66%) are dissatisfied and 25% are satisfied with the position taken by the PA and the PA leadership during the most recent confrontation in the Gaza Strip.

5) Social Security Law

44% of the public believe that the Social Security Law applies to them or that they will be impacted by its implementation while 46% believe it does not apply to them or will not affect them.
In its position toward the Social Security Law, the public is divided into three groups: (1) the largest one (51%) is opposed to the implementation of the law now or in the future; (2) only 13% support the implementation of the law now; and (3) 9% support the implementation of the law but only after it is revised. It is noticeable that opposition to the law in the West Bank is higher than it is in the Gaza Strip (65% and 28% respectively). Moreover, Opposition to the implementation of the law now or in the future is higher among those who say that the law applies to them or will affect them, reaching two-thirds (67%); and this is particularly true among West Bankers as opposition to the law stands among them at 84%.
In an open question, addressed to those who said that they oppose the implementation of the law, we asked about the reasons for the opposition. Three answers were provided: 49% said the law is unjust, 32% said they do not trust the government and fear its corruption, and 14% said that their salaries are already too small and they cannot afford further cuts.
Even if the law was revised as some demand, only 31% believe that the Social Security Fund or the government will actually make the payment to the retirees; a majority of 56% believes that the Fund and the government will not honor their commitment to pay the retirement wages.

6) Sale of Palestinian property to Israeli Jews

An overwhelming majority of the public (88%) designate other Palestinians who sell property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other occupied territories as traitors while 9% call them corrupt and unpatriotic.
Three quarters believe that the current penalties for sale of property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other places do not provide a deterrence against such sales while 14% believe the current penalties provide a sufficient deterrent. When, in an open question, we asked the public to identify a deterrent punishment, about two-thirds (64%) said it is the death penalty while 22% said imprisonment.
Findings show that more than three quarters (78%) are dissatisfied and 17% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to deter sale of properties by Palestinians to Israeli Jews.

7) Role of Qatar in the Gaza Strip

More than three quarters (78%) support the Qatari efforts to support the electricity sector in the Gaza Strip despite the fact that the PA is opposed to this Qatari effort; opposition to Qatari efforts does not exceed 19%.
More significantly, an overwhelming majority of 79% supports the Qatari payment of salaries to the employees of the former Hamas government in the Gaza Strip despite the fact that the PA is opposed to this payment; opposition to the payment does not exceed 19%.
Generally speaking, a large majority of 73% looks positively, and only 25% looks negatively, at the role played by Qatar on the Palestinian issue, particularly in the Gaza Strip. It is noticeable that there are no differences between the views of Gazans and West Bankers regarding the Qatari role.

8) Decisions of the Palestinian Central Council of the PLO

Two thirds (67%) support and 29% oppose the Central Council’s decision to suspend Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel until Israel recognizes the state of Palestine.
Similarly, 72% support and 23% oppose the Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel; but more than two-thirds (70%) believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 23% believe it will.

9) The peace process

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 43% and opposition at 55%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 47%. But support for the two-state solution rises to 52% when the borders of the Palestinian state are described as those of the 4^th of June 1967.
Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 45% said they prefer the two-state solution, 22% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 23% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.” Three months ago, support for the two-state solution stood at 53%, for the one state solution at 24%, and 14% preferred a third undefined alternative.
A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 35% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 73% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.
The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel;” according to 34% of the public while an identical percentage prefers waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 16% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 40% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel.
But a large minority of 44% thinks that armed struggle is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 28% believe that negotiation is the most effective means and 23% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 39% said negotiation is the most effective means and 33% said armed struggle is the most effective means.
An overwhelming majority of 77% say they are worried that in their daily life they would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 23% say they are worried.
59% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 18% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.
In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 71% support joining more international organizations; 61% support popular non-violence resistance; 54% support a return to an armed intifada; 47% support dissolving the PA; and 32% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, only 46% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 42% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
Half of the public (50%) opposes and 47% support in principle the holding of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in order to resolve the conflict.
If a Palestinian state is established, about two-thirds (68%) want it to be armed with heavy weapons, such as tanks and air force, while 27% want it to have a strong security force but without heavy arms.
After the establishment of a Palestinian state, a majority of 54% is opposed to the idea of a confederation between that state and Jordan while 40% support the idea.

10) Trump’s Peace Plan:

An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about launching a new peace plan and 16% believe it is serious.
If the Trump Administration does nonetheless offer such a peace plan, 73% believe the chances for its success are slim or non-existent and 24% believe the chances are high or medium.
A large majority of 72% believes that if the US does indeed offer a peace plan, it will not call for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel; 22% believe it will.
A similar percentage (75%) believes that the plan will not call for a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem; 21% believe it will.
67% believe the Trump plan will not call for the borders of the Palestinian state to be based on the lines of June 1967 with minor mutual land swaps; 26% believe it will.
An overwhelming majority of 80% believes the plan will not call for a just solution to the refugee problem; 16% believe it will.
Similarly, 77% believe the plan will not call for the ending of the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the areas occupied in 1967; 19% believe it will.
74% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan, if offered, and 21% believe it should accept it.
But if the Trump plan does indeed include all such items, such as a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, with borders based on the 1967 lines, a just solution to the refugees’ problem, and an Israeli army withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, the largest percentage (49%) calls for rejecting it and 44% call for accepting it.
A majority of 59% is opposed and 28% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
We asked the public if Palestinian-Israeli negotiations can be sustained without the US role as a mediator: A majority of 52% believes that it can while 43% view the US role as indispensable.

11) Israeli relations with Arab countries:

78% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its problems and internal conflicts and that Palestine is not its primary cause; 21% believe that Palestine remains the primary cause of the Arab World. Moreover, 72% believe that an alliance already exists between Sunni Arabs and Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation; 21% disagrees with this assessment.
A majority of 60% believes that the visits by Israeli leaders to Arab countries are harming the prospects for peace while 10% believe they contribute to peace making; 27% believe they neither help nor hinder peace making.
We asked the public to speculate about the motivation of some of the Arab countries in allowing such Israeli visits to their capitals. A majority of 60% said that they want to win the support of the Trump Administration, 17% said they are seeking to fight Iran, and 12% said they are interested in promoting Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

(12) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 29% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 26% say it is poverty and unemployment; 25% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.

(13) The murder of Jamal Khashoggi:

A majority of 51% believes that Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman is the person responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, while 26% put the blame for the murder on King Salman, and 9% put it on those employees reporting to the two leaders.

العربية

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No 59

A Majority backs a two-state solution and support for knifing attacks drops, but majorities in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip continue to support a return to an armed intifada and 60% of West Bankers and three quarters of Gazans believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it would help achieve national rights in ways negotiations could not

17-19 March 2016

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17 and 19 March 2016. The period before the poll witnessed continued limited Palestinian-Israeli confrontations with a number of stabbings by young Palestinians in the West Bank and in Israel and stone throwing at checkpoints and other areas of friction. It also witnessed efforts to move forward Hamas-Fatah reconciliation efforts with a meeting held in Doha. The fieldwork started few days after the government and the teachers reached an agreement that ended a strike that was declared by the teachers in order to increase their wages and improve their work conditions. This press release addresses many of those issues and covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, teachers’ strike, reconciliation, Palestinian-Israeli confrontations, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2016 indicate significant changes in some of the findings obtained in the second half of 2015. A majority now backs a two-state solution and support for stabbing attacks against Israelis has dropped, particularly among West Bankers. Nonetheless, a majority in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continues to support an armed intifada and continues to believe that such an intifada would help Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Demand for Abbas’ resignation remains unchanged with about two thirds supporting it. As we found in our previous two polls, in September and December 2015, the “Oslo generation” of youth between the ages of 18 and 22 are the least supportive of the two-state solution, the most supportive of stabbing attacks, and the most likely to think that an armed intifada would help Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not.

Findings show a significant drop in the support for stabbing attacks compared to our December 2015 poll. This is particularly true in the West Bank where a majority is opposed to such attacks. Indeed, only a little over one third believes that if the current confrontations continue as they are now they would help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not; the majority does not believe that. By contrast, a majority in the West Bank, reaching about 60% (and 75% in the Gaza Strip), believes that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada it would help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Nonetheless, this West Bank percentage is four percentage points fewer than what we found in the West Bank three months ago. In other words, there is a notable drop in the West Bank in the support for knifing attacks due, it seems, to a rising perception in its inefficacy, and a large majority continues to view an armed intifada as more effective than these attacks. We also see a drop in the level of support for abandoning the Oslo agreement, but a large majority continues nonetheless to support such an abandonment.

Support for the two-state solution is on the rise in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but it remains higher in the former than in the latter. Findings also show that the public rejects the proposed idea of separation advanced recently by the head of the Israeli opposition Labor party which calls for separation between Palestinians and Israelis in East Jerusalem and the West Bank within a context of temporary unilateral interim arrangements.

If new presidential elections are held today in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh would win against Mahmud Abbas with a margin of 11 percentage points. But if the competition is between Marwan Barghouti, for Fatah, and Haniyeh, the former would win by a margin of 18 percentage points. If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah and Hamas are likely to obtain almost identical results. Nonetheless, findings show a small increase in support for Fatah and a small decrease in support for Hamas in the West Bank; in the Gaza Strip we see the reverse: a small decrease for Fatah and a small increase for Hamas. It is possible that reaching an agreement with the striking teachers have contributed to the slight improvement of Fatah standing in the West Bank. Yet, it is clear that this development did not have an impact on Abbas’ standing (despite a minor improvement in the West Bank) as a majority in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continues to demand his resignation. It should be noted that an overwhelming majority of the public sympathizes with the teachers and their demands and rejects the government policy regarding the teachers’ strike. If the poll was conducted before reaching an agreement to end the strike, it is likely that support for Fatah and Abbas would have been less than what today’s findings show. It is also possible that the talk about negotiations to build a seaport in the Gaza Strip and the recent reconciliation talks between Hamas and Egypt have contributed to the improvement of Hamas’ standing in the Gaza Strip. It should be noted that an overwhelming majority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip looks positively at the idea of Hamas-Israeli negotiations under Turkish sponsorship to establish a seaport for Gaza.

(1) Popular Palestinian-Israeli confrontations:

Support for stabbing attacks declines from 67% to 58%.
56% support return to an armed intifada and 65% think that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it would serve Palestinian national interests.
65% oppose and 30% support measures taken by PA security services to prevent attacks on Israel.
70% believe Hamas supports the current confrontations, 55% believe Fatah supports them, and 29% believe Abbas supports them.

Findings show that support for use of knives in the current confrontations with Israel drops from 67% three months ago to 58% in this poll. Support for knifing attacks in the Gaza Strip stands at 82% and in the West Bank at 44%. Three months ago, support among West Bankers for knifing attacks stood at 57% and among Gazans at 85%. Support for knifing attacks is also higher among men (60%) compared to women (57%), in cities and refugee camps (62% and 58% respectively) compared to villages (40%), among those whose is age is between 18 and 22 (62%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (55%), among refugees (66%) compared to non-refugees (52%), among those who work in the public sector (63%) compared to those who work in the private sector (53%), among those who hold a BA degree (59%) compared to illiterates (53%), among the religious (65%) compared to the somewhat religious (51%), among supporters of Hamas and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in new elections (82% and 64% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah, third parties, and those who will not participate in new elections (49%, 48%, and 45% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (47%), and among those who use social media on daily basis (61%) compared to those who do not use social media (53%).

Findings also show that 29% believe that the current confrontations will develop into a new armed intifada, 15% believe they will develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, and 17% believe they will develop in both directions. By contrast, 22% believe the confrontation will stay as they are now and 14% believe they will gradually dissipate. Three months ago, 37% said that the current confrontations will develop into an armed intifada.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 56% support a return to an armed intifada; 77% support joining more international organizations; 64% support a popular non-violent resistance; 46% support the dissolution of the PA. Three months ago, 60% supported return to armed intifada. In the West Bank, current level of support for an armed intifada stands at 52% (compared to 60% three months ago).

About two thirds (65%) of the public believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 66% (71% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. The belief that if the current confrontations developed into an armed intifada it would serve Palestinian national interests in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (59%), in cities and refugee camps (69% and 65% respectively) compared to villages (51%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 (73%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (61%), among holders of BA degree (67%) compared to illiterates (59%), among the religious (71%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (61% and 58% respectively) among Hamas supporters (86%) compared to those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections, those who will not participate in the next elections, supporters of third parties, and supporters of Fatah (70%, 60%, 58%, and 51% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to those who support the peace process (57%), and among those who use social media on daily basis (67%) compared to those who do not use social media (61%).

A majority of 54% of the public (68% in the Gaza Strip and 46% in the West Bank) believes that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 50% said that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Moreover, 43% of the public (54% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, they would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 51% (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not.

We asked the public about the efforts made by the PA security services during the current confrontations to contain the violence, leading, according to a statement by PA head of intelligence Majid Faraj, to the prevention of 200 attacks against Israelis. 30% of the public indicated its support for the action taken by the PA security services while 65% indicated opposition. Support for the action in the West Bank stands at 34% and opposition at 59% and support in the Gaza Strip stands at 22% and opposition at 74%. Opposition to the action taken by the PA security services is also higher in cities (68%) compared to refugee camps and villages (62% and 52% respectively), among refugees (68%) compared to non-refugees (62%), among holders of BA degree (69%) compared to illiterates (61%), among the religious (71%) compared to the somewhat religious (59%), among Hamas supporters, supporters so third parties and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections (85%, 68%, and 68% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in the next elections and supporters of Fatah (62% and 45% respectively), and among those who are opposed to the peace process (80%) compared to supporters of the peace process (53%).

When comparing the level of support of various parties for the current confrontations, Hamas comes on top with 70% of the public believing that it supports them, followed by the PFLP, receiving 62%, Fatah (55%), and al Mubadara or the Initiative (52%). By contrast, only 29% say president Abbas supports the confrontations, 23% say Jordan supports them, and only 13% say Egypt supports them. After Iran announced that it intends to provide financial assistance to the families of martyrs and the families whose homes are destroyed by Israel in the current confrontations, 69% say that their impression of Iran is now positive and only 24% say their impression of Iran is negative.

(2) The future of the Oslo agreement:

63% support and 30% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement.
65% believe that Abbas is not serious about abandoning the Oslo agreement.

An overwhelming majority of 91% of the public believes that Israel does not abide by the Oslo agreement and 5% believe it does. Findings also show that 63% support and 30% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 68% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 25% opposed it. But 65% of the public believe that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 26% think he is serious. Three months ago, 67% expressed the view that the president is not serious. Support for abandonment of the Oslo agreement is higher in the West Bank (64%) compared to the Gaza Strip (62%), among men (68%) compared to women (58%), in cities (66%) compared to villages and refugee camps (56% and 53% respectively), among holders of BA degree (70%) compared to illiterates (39%), among those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections, supporters of Hamas, and supporters of third parties (71%, 70%, and 65% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in new elections and supporters of Fatah (59% and 56% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (53%), and among those who use the social media on daily basis (68%) compared to those who do not use social media (56%).

(3) Palestinian Elections:

Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36%, and 64% demand his resignation.
In presidential elections, Ismail Haniyeh receives 52% of the vote and Abbas 41%.
In presidential elections between Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti, the former receives 39% and the latter 57%.
In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 33% of the vote and Fatah 34%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% which is similar to the level of satisfaction we obtained three months ago. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. These results are almost identical to those obtained in our previous poll three months ago. Demand for Abbas’ resignation is higher in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (63%), among men (66%) compared to women (63%), in cities (66%) compared to refugee camps and villages (63% and 57% respectively), among the Oslo generation, those between 18 and 22, (69%) compared to those whose age is over 50 (60%), among holders of BA degree (68%) compared to the illiterates (62%), among the non-religious (57%) compared the religious (66%), among Hamas supporters, supporters of third parties, and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections, and those who will not participate in the next elections (90%, 74%, 69%, and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (28%), and among those who are opposed to the peace process (85%) compared to supporters of the peace process (51%).

If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 24% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Ramil al Hamdallah, Khalid Mishal, and Mustapha Barghouti receive 5% each; Mohammad Dahlan receives 4%; and Salam Fayyad receives 3%. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would win 52% (compared to 51% three months ago) and the latter 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 54% (compared to 48% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 41% (compared to 37% three months ago and Haniyeh 50% (compared to 53% three months ago). If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 57% and the latter would receive 39% of the participants’ votes. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 37% and Haniyeh 39%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 73% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 33% say they would vote for Hamas and 34% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 33% and Fatah at 33%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 35% three months ago) and for Fatah at 34% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 32% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 30% three months ago).

(4) Domestic Conditions:

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 47% and in the West Bank at 39%.
48% of Gazans and 21% of West Bankers say they want to emigrate.
Viewership of Hamas’ al Aqsa TV station is highest at 21% followed by PA’s Palestine TV at 20%.
Belief that there is corruption in PA institutions stands at 79% and belief that there is free press in the West Bank stands at 17%.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 14% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%. Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 47%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 39%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 50% and in the West Bank at 29%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 48%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 21%. Three months ago 41% of Gazans and 24% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate. The largest percentage (37%) of those who seek to emigrate indicates that the main motivation is search for jobs; 22% say difficult conditions imposed by Israeli occupation forces them to seek to emigrate; 15% say it is the lack of security and 10% say it is the lack of freedoms and democracy that push them out.

Hamas’ al Aqsa TV viewership is the highest, standing at 21%, followed by Palestine TV (20%), Maan-Mix at 19%, Al-Jazeera at 17%, and Al Arabiya at 6%. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%. 17% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 20% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip. 29% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear.

(5) Reconciliation, the National Reconciliation government and Gaza seaport negotiation:

Optimism about reconciliation stands at 38% and pessimism at 59%.
26% are satisfied and 65% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
Only 20% believe that Hamas is responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government; 51% believe that the PA, Abbas, and head of the reconciliation government are responsible for the bad performance.
72% believe that the reconciliation government must pay the salaries of the Gazan public sector that worked for the former Hamas government.
65% believe that the reconciliation government, not Hamas, must be in charge of the security sector in the Gaza Strip.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 38% and pessimism at 59%. Three months ago optimism stood at 30% and pessimism at 66%. 26% say they are satisfied and 65% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 62%. Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 20% (12% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) while 34% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 17% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

72% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salary of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (70%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salary of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government. In return, 65% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; only 25% believe Hamas should be the one in charge. Similarly, 75% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the pervious Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 21% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

We presented the public with the news that negotiations between Israel and Hamas, with Turkish mediation, were underway to build a Gaza seaport in return for a long term truce between Hamas and Israel and asked if respondents supported or opposed such a deal: 70% of the public indicated support and 27% indicated opposition for such a deal.

(6) Teachers’ strike:

73% believe that the teachers’ wages are not fair.
Three quarters blame government policy, not teachers’ strike, for the closure of schools and the interruption of teaching.

Almost three quarters (73%) of the public believe that the teachers’ wages are not fair and 23% think they are fair. Moreover, three quarters of the public believes that it was the government policy that was responsible for the closure of the schools and the interruption of teaching during the teachers’ strike; only 22% blame the teachers. Belief that the government policy, not the teachers, is responsible for the closure and interruption is higher in the West Bank (77%) compared to the Gaza Strip (73%), among those who work in the public sector (78%) compared to those who work in the private sector (75%), among holders of BA degree (77%) compared to the illiterates (69%), among the married (77%) compared to the unmarried (73%), among those who will not participate in the next elections, supporters of Hamas, supporters of third parties, and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections (86%, 82%, 75%, and 73% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (60%), and among those who oppose the peace process (84%) compared to supporters of the peace process (71%).

An overwhelming majority of 84% indicates that it views as unacceptable the behavior of the PA security services in establishing checkpoints to prevent striking teachers from reaching the government headquarter in Ramallah; only 14% find that behavior acceptable. Now after an agreement has been reached between the government and the teachers to end the strike, only 32% express the view that the teachers have gained most of their demands; 63% believe the teachers did not gain most of their demands.

(7) Peace Process and Israel’s long term aspirations:

51% support and 48% oppose the two-state solution.
47% support and 50% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative.
61% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement construction.
82% are worried that they would hurt by Israelis.
An overwhelming majority believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex all Palestinian territories.
An overwhelming majority believes that Israel plans to change the status quo in al Haram al Sharif.

A slim majority of 51% supports and 48% oppose the two-state solution. Three months ago, 45% supported and 54% opposed this solution. Support for the two-state solution is higher in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (49%), among men (53%) compared to women (50%), in villages (60%) compared to cities and villages (50% and 47% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (61%) compared to the Oslo generation, 18 to 22 years, (42%), among non-refugees (54%) compared to refugees (48%) among those who work in the private sector (56%) compared to those who work in the public sector (53%), among the illiterates (60%) compared to those who hold a BA degree ( 50%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (73% and 56% respectively) compared to the religious (44%), among supporters of Fatah, supporters of third parties, and those who did not decide to whom they will vote in the next elections (71%, 64%, and 53% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in the next elections and Hamas supporters (49% and 30% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (65%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (28%), and among those who do not use the social media (56%) compared to those who use social media on daily basis (51%).

Findings also show that 47% support the Arab Peace Initiative and 50% oppose it. Similarly, only 39% support a mutual recognition of national identity of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people and 60% oppose it. We also asked the public about the separation plan proposed by the head of the Israeli opposition Labor party, Isaac Herzog, which talks about a temporary interim arrangement that would lead to separation from the Palestinians along the following lines: (1) place 28 Palestinian villages and towns currently inside Jerusalem under the control of the PA; (2) cessation of settlement construction in the West Bank with the exception of building inside the large settlements; (3) removal of setters’ outposts in the West Bank; (4) transfer civil jurisdiction over most of the West Bank to the PA with the exception of the large settlement blocs which Israel wants to annex in the final status agreement; and (5) the Israeli army stays in its current deployment in the West Bank until a final status agreement is reached. Only 30% of the public said they are in favor of the plan and 66% indicated opposition.

Palestinian views on the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel vary: 42% think that armed action is the most effective, 29% think negotiation is the most effective, and 24% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 46% said armed action was the most effective and 26% said negotiation was the most effective. Findings also show that majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion while 37% say it is still practical. Moreover, 74% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 24% believe the chances are high or medium. Despite this, only 29% support, and 70% oppose, a one-state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equal rights.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 82%; 18% are not worried. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of 82% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population or deny them their rights. 17% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967. When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 61% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967 while 25% said it was to conquer the state of Israel or conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.

An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 52% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 20% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 9% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 9% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.

(8) Hezbollah, the Arab World and ISIS:

33% support and 60% oppose the resolution of Arab League labeling Hezbollah a terrorist organization.
76% believe that the Arab World no longer cares about Palestine and that Palestine is no longer its principle cause.
88% see the Islamic State (Daesh) as a radical group that does not represent true Islam.

60% disagree and 33% agree with the resolution of the Council of the Arab League labeling Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Opposition to the Arab League resolution is higher in the West Bank (68%) compared to the Gaza Strip (46%), in villages (75%) compared to cities and refugee camps (57% and 53% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (63%) compared to the Oslo generation, 18 to 22 years, (54%), among non-refugees (64%) compared to refugees (54%), among those who work in the private sector (62%) compared to those who work in the public sector (57%), among the illiterates (62%) compared to holders of BA degree (57%), among the married (62%) compared to the unmarried (56%), among supporters of third parties, those who will not participate in the next elections, and Hamas supporters (77%, 62%, and 61% respectively) compared to those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections and supporters of Fatah (56% and 54% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (62%) compared to supporters of the peace process (59%), and among those who do not use the social media (72%) compared to those who use social media on daily basis (54%).

Moreover, 76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. 23% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. In fact, 64% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 28% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

An overwhelming majority of 88% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 7% believe it does represent true Islam. 5% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 13% (compared to 4% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 80% support and 17% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

48% believe that the first Palestinian priority should be to end occupation and build a state.
Settlements and occupation is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today followed by unemployment and poverty.

48% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 30% of the pubic; 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 23% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; 17% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

العربية

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (18)

With Optimism Fading, and Three Months After the Completion of the Israeli Unilateral Disengagement from the Gaza Strip, Support for a Permanent Settlement along the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative Drops, but a Large Majority Continues to Support the Hudna and Fateh’s Popularity Increases

6-8 December 2005

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between December 6-8, 2005. The poll deals with the “tahdi’a” or calm, Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, agreement on border crossings, permanent status agreement, bombing attacks in Amman hotels, and voting intentions in the upcoming legislative elections. Total size of the sample is 1316 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (840) and the Gaza Strip (476) in 118 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings

Findings show that one year after the death of Yasir Arafat and three months after the implementation of Sharon’s unilateral plan for disengagement, optimism which prevailed a year ago is now fading. Expectations that violence will stop and negotiations will resume soon drop by more than one third while the percentage of those who believe that violence will not stop and there will be no return to negotiations increases by more than 50%. Belief that a political settlement with Israel is impossible and that reconciliation between the two peoples is not possible ever has deepened. Expectations that internal and security conditions will improve are not being met as the percentage of those who feel that they lack personal safety and security is increasing. Similarly, percentage of those who believe corruption exists in the PA remains very high.

The implications of the Israeli unilateral disengagement are being strongly felt. Belief that disengagement is victory for armed struggle increases while at the same time most people view the Gaza Strip as a big prison and that conditions inside the Strip are now the same or worse than they were before the Israeli withdrawal. The greatest impact of the unilateral withdrawal and the widespread belief that it was the outcome of Palestinian armed resistance is felt on public support for a permanent settlement along the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for the compromises of this settlement has dropped considerably in this poll compared to the situation one year ago when a majority of Palestinians supported it. Apparently, some Palestinians are no longer convinced of the need to compromise as long as Israel is intent on ending its occupation unilaterally. Despite the fact that these developments do not apparently weaken support for Fateh, they do considerably increase support for Hamas. Compared to a year ago, support for Hamas has increased by about 55%.

(1) Peace Process and Permanent Settlement

· Support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters drops from 54% in December 2004 to 46% in this poll
· Drop in support for the permanent settlement is significant in all items including borders, refugees, Jerusalem, sovereignty, security arrangements, and end of conflict

Palestinian support for a permanent settlement agreement similar to that of the December 2000 Clinton Parameters, the January 2001 Taba Talks, and the Geneva Initiative drops from 54% one year ago to 46% in this poll. Support for the item on final borders -- which would be based on the 1967 lines except for about 3% of the West Bank which would be exchanged with an Israeli territory of equal size—drops from 63% to 55%. Support for the item on refugees – which would be based on UNGA resolution 194 while giving refugees five different options for permanent residency with return to Israel being subject to Israeli decision—drops from 46% to 40%. Support for the item on Jerusalem – which would make East Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state but would put Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty – drops from 44% to 33%. Support for the item on the establishment of a Palestinian state that has no army drops from 27% to 20%. Support for the item on security arrangements – which would allow Israel to use Palestinian airspace and maintain two early warning stations in Palestinian territories – drops from 53% to 43%. Support for the item on ending the conflict once the permanent status agreement is implemented – which would allow neither side to make further claims and would require both sides to acknowledge that Palestine and Israel are the homelands of their peoples – drops from 69% to 64%.

(2) Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Agreement on Border Crossings

· 83% see the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as victory for armed struggle, but support for armed attacks from the Gaza Strip does not exceed 36%
· 52% see the Israeli withdrawal as the beginning of the end of occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state and 46% do not agree
· Only 45% evaluate the situation in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal as better, 53% say it has not changed or has become worse, and 55% sees the Gaza Strip as a big prison
· 56% oppose and 41% support the agreement made with Israel on the operation of the Rafah international crossing

The overwhelming majority of Palestinians view the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as a victory for armed struggle against the Israeli occupation and 17% do not agree with that. Moreover, more than two thirds (68%) believe that armed confrontations during the intifada have helped achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not while only 29% do not agree with that.

Despite this assessment of the role of violence, the percentage of those supporting armed attacks from the Gaza Strip does not exceed 36% while 60% oppose it. Opposition to such attacks increases to 66% in the Gaza Strip compared to 57% in the West Bank. Findings also show that support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians does not exceed 40% with opposition standing at 58%. Moreover, 62% of all Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip oppose, and 33% support bombing attacks or the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip.

The public is divided in its evaluation of the implication of the Israeli withdrawal on the national goal of ending occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state: 52% see the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as a beginning for achieving that goal and 46% do not agree with that. Moreover, only 45% evaluate the situation in the Gaza Strip after disengagement as better than before, 28% see it unchanged, and 25% see it worse. Specifically, while only 3o% say that the Gaza Strip has become free and open, 55% say it has become a big prison and 11% see no change.

This negative outlook applies also to the performance of the PA in the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal. 55% see this performance as remaining unchanged compared to PA performance under Israeli occupation or becoming worse and 40% evaluate the performance of the PA as better than before. This negative evaluation is also evident in the opposition of 56% and the support of 41% to the Rafah Crossing’s agreement. Opposition to the agreement is clear when it comes to European presence with only 40% supporting such presence and 58% opposing it. Despite this, 58% say the agreement strengthens Palestinian sovereignty; 37% disagree with that.

The public sees the future in negative terms with regard to control of border crossings and settlements in the West Bank. Only one third expects, and 62% do not expect, Israel to continue to implement the agreement on the crossings. Similarly, the majority (58%) expects and 13% do not expect, Israel to close the Rafah crossing if bombing attacks or rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip. Moreover, despite the fact that 59% expect, and 36% do not expect, Israel to carry out a further unilateral disengagement steps from other areas in the West Bank in the future, only 42% expect the evacuation of most or some settlements in the West Bank and 45% expect Israel to build more settlements.

(3) Calm, Collection of Arms, and Optimism about the Future

· 80% support and 18% oppose the extension of the current “Tahdi’a” or calm
· 47% support the collection of arms from armed factions and 51% oppose it. In the Gaza Strip, support for collection of arms reaches 54%
· But support for collection of arms from armed factions in the Gaza Strip only reaches 63%
· 82% support and 17% oppose the merging of armed militias into the PA security services
· Level of optimism continues to drop

Finding show strong support for the continuation of the calm with 80% support and 18% opposition. Moreover, a similar percentage (75%) supports, and 23% oppose, the current ceasefire. Percentages of support for extending the “calm” period and for the ceasefire are larger in the Gaza Strip (86% and 77% respectively) than in the West Bank (77% and 74% respectively). But findings show that a majority of 51% opposes the collection of arms from armed groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and 47% support it. When it comes to collection of arms from armed groups in the Gaza Strip only, overall support increases to 63% and opposition drops to 34%. Support for collection of arms from armed groups in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is greater in the Gaza Strip (54%) than in the West Bank (43%). In the Gaza Strip, support for collection of arms from Gazan armed groups reaches 68% compared to 61% in the West Bank. Support for collection of arms from the Gaza Strip increases among supporters of Fateh (78%) compared to supporters of Hamas (41%) and among those who are willing to buy lottery tickets (79%) compare to those who are not willing to do so (46%).

A large majority of 82% supports and 17% oppose the absorption of members of armed groups from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fateh into the Palestinian security services so that they would become part of the PA. Support for this measure reaches 84% in the Gaza Strip compared to 80% in the West Bank.

Findings show a significant decrease in the level of optimism regarding the possibility of a return to negotiations and cessation of violence in the near future from 25% in June to 19% in this poll. One year ago, this percentage stood at 30%.

(4) Bombing Attacks in Amman’s Hotels

· 88% oppose and 9% support the bombing attacks that took place in Amman hotels in Jordan in November 2005
· 78% view these attacks as criminal acts condemned by Islam and 10% view it as martyrdom attacks

88% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip oppose, and 9% support, the bombing attacks that took place in Amman hotels last November. 78% see these attacks as criminal acts condemned by Islam while 10% see them as martyrdom operations supported by Islam. Belief that these attacks are martyrdom acts is greater in the Gaza Strip (14%) than in the West Bank (8%), among men (12%) than women (8%), among students (20%) compared to housewives (7%) and laborers (8%), among the unmarried (17%) compared to the married (9%), among the youngest (18%) compared to the oldest (4%), and among supporters of Hamas (18%) compared to supporters of Fateh (7%).

(5) Upcoming Legislative Elections and Other Domestic Issues

· 78% say they will participate in the upcoming legislative elections, and among those, 50% say they will vote for Fateh, 32% say they will vote for Hamas, 9% for other lists, and 9% are undecided
· 37% view poverty and unemployment as the most pressing problem facing Palestinians today followed by the practices of Israeli occupation forces and the spread of corruption (25% each)
· Satisfaction with the performance of Abu Mazin stands at 62% and dissatisfaction 34%
· Popularity of Marwan Barghouti reaches 30% as vice president, followed by Dahlan (14%), Ismail Hanyieh (13%), and Mahmud Zahhar (11%)
· Popularity of Fateh stands at 45% and Islamists 35%
· 86% believe there is corruption in the PA

If elections are held today, findings show that 78% of the Palestinians would participate (compared to 74% last September). Among those intending to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections, 50% will vote for Fateh, 32% for Hamas, 9% for other factions and groups including independents, and 9% remain undecided. Last September, Fateh received 47% of the vote, while Hamas received 30%, other factions 11%, and 11% were undecided. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Fateh increases from 47% to 53% during the same period. Among the whole population (those intending and those not intending to participate in the elections), support for Fateh reaches 45% and Hamas 28%. Last September, support for Fateh stood at 39% and Hamas at 27%. Support for Fateh in the Gaza Strip increases from 40% to 49% during the same period.

Poverty/unemployment is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today in the eyes of 37% of the public, followed by corruption and Israeli occupation measures (25% each), and finally internal anarchy and chaos (12%). Last September, poverty/unemployment received 40%, occupation and corruption received 25% each, and internal anarchy received 8%. From among a list of eight vital considerations for voting in the parliamentary elections, # 1 is the ability to fight corruption receiving 30%, # 2 the name or party affiliation of the list with 15%, # 3 and 4 ability to improve economic conditions and ability to reach a peace agreement with Israel with 13% each, # 5 ability to maintain national unity with 9%, # 6 ability to enforce law and order with 8%, # 7 ability to protect refugees’ rights in negotiations with 7%, and finally # 8 ability to insure continuation of the intifada with 4%. This order is similar to the September findings with the exception of the first consideration which three months ago received 24%.

In a detailed comparison of the ability of the different groups to deliver on seven of the vital voters’ considerations, Fateh is seen as the most able in five and Hamas in two. These results are similar to those we obtained last September with Fateh widening the gap against Hamas in its favor. Fateh is perceived as the most able to improve the economy (receiving 50% vs. 30% for Hamas), to push the peace process forward (receiving 66% vs. 21% for Hamas), to protect national unity (receiving 47% vs. 36% for Hamas), to protect refugees’ rights (receiving 48% vs. 36% for Hamas), and to enforce law and order (receiving 56% vs. 31% for Hamas). Hamas is perceived as the most able to fight corruption (receiving 48% vs. 36% to Fateh) and to insure the continuation of the intifada (receiving 64% vs. 24% to Fateh).

Public satisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas stands at 62% compared to 64% last September. In this survey 34% say they are not satisfied with Abbas’ performance. In a closed question, in a contest for the office of PA president between Mahmud Abbas, Mahmud Zahhar, and Mustafa Barghouti, Abbas comes first with 41% followed by Zahhar with 21% and Barghouti with 19%. These results are similar to those obtained in our last poll in September. In another closed question with a list of 8 candidates, in a contest over the office of vice president, Marwan Barghouti receives the greatest level of support with 30% followed by Mohammad Dahlan with 14%, Ismail Haniyyah (13%), Mahmud Zahhar (11%), Mustafa Barghouti (8%), Saeb Erikat and Farouq Qaddoumi (6% each), and finally Ahmad Qurai (3%). The percentages for the September poll were as follows: 24% for Marwan Barghouti, 9% for Dahlan, 13% for Haniyyah, 14% for Zahhar, 9% for Mustafa Barghouti, 6% for Erikat, 8% for Qaddoumi, and 6% for Qurai. In a closed question with a list of five candidates, in a contest over the office of prime minister, Marwan Barghouti comes first with 36% followed by Zahhar with 20%, Mustafa Barghouti with 14%, Dahlan with 11%, and Qurai with 6%. Last September, Marwan Barghouti received 30%, Zahhar 22%, Mustafa Barghouti 17%, Dahlan 8%, and Qurai 8%.

Findings show that 86% believe corruption exists in the PA; among those, 58% expect corruption to increase or remain the same in the future. The poll also shows only 35% feel they and their families are safe and secure and 64% do not feel that. Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy reaches 35%..... Full Report

SPSS Data File:

18_ December 2005.sav

العربية

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (60)

21 June 2016

With half of the public thinking that the recent Palestinian little uprising, or habba, has come to an end and with support for stabbing attacks continuing to decline and Hamas’ popularity slipping, half of the public supports the French Initiative but only a small percentage expects it to succeed

2-4 June 2016

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 2 and 4 June 2016. The period before the poll witnessed a significant decline in the number of incidents of confrontations and stabbings directed against Israelis. But a bombing attack on an Israeli bus took place in Jerusalem in mid-April. The period also witnessed meetings in Cairo between Hamas leaders and Egyptian officials and in Doha between Fatah and Hamas representatives. Data collection took place while the Paris Peace Conference was in session with the participation of representatives from more than 20 states. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reconciliation, Palestinian-Israeli confrontations, the French Initiative, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Results of the second quarter of 2016 point out to three main findings: (1) half of the public believes that the current Palestinian confrontations, or al habba al sha’biyya, has come to an end, support for stabbing attacks continues to decline, and the public continues to reduce its expectations from the current confrontations; (2) by contrast, half of the public expresses support for the French Initiative that aims at providing an international backing for a revival of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, but public expectations of success for the initiative are much smaller than the support ; and, (3) there is a limited decline in support for Hamas and its presidential candidate, Ismail Haniyeh, despite continued demand for Abbas’ resignation from two thirds of the public.

Findings show a continued and significant drop, particularly in the West Bank, in support for stabbing attacks. The highest percentage of support for such attacks was registered six months ago before it considerably declined three months ago. Furthermore, findings show a continued decline in public expectations regarding a possible escalation of the current limited popular confrontations to an armed intifada; today, a

quarter thinks such a development is likely. Similarly, findings show a decline, dropping from more than half to less than a third, in the percentage of those who think that if the current confrontations continue as they are now, they would contribute to achieving national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Decline, particularly in the West Bank, has also been found in the percentage of those who believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it would help Palestinians achieve national rights and in the percentage of those who support ending Palestinian implementation of PA obligations under the Oslo agreement. Nonetheless, a majority continues to believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it will help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Perhaps it is for this reason that a majority continues to support a return to an armed intifada. Indeed, more than two thirds supported the Jerusalem bus bombing attack which took place in mid-April and injured 20 Israelis.

If new presidential elections are held today in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh would do better than Abbas but findings show that the gap between the two narrows from eleven to five percentage points. Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular Palestinian figure. If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah is likely to do a little better than Hamas. It seems that the declining Palestinian-Israeli confrontations and the focus on international diplomacy in recent weeks have influenced the domestic balance of power in a manner that favors Abbas while somewhat weakening Hamas. Moreover, it is possible that the optimism regarding improved relations between Egypt and Hamas, which might have improved Hamas standing in the past, has now somewhat faded as the Rafah border crossing has remained essentially closed during most of the last three months. Moreover, a majority is convinced that another Gaza war will erupt in the near future. On the other hand, Abbas, Fatah and the PA remain highly vulnerable as two thirds demand Abbas resignation, Fatah has not gained any additional support during the last three months, and a majority of Palestinians believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people.

(1) The French Initiative:

50% support and 41% oppose the French Initiative.
29% expect the French Initiative to succeed and 59% expect it to fail.

We asked the public about its support for the French Initiative. The initiative we presented to respondents as one that “calls for the formation of an international support group for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the holding of an international peace conference that would seek a settlement based on the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative in accordance with a specific time frame.” 50% of the respondents supported and 41% opposed the initiative. Support reached 46% in the West Bank compared to 56% in the Gaza Strip. Support for the French Initiative is higher also among those who intend to vote for Fatah, third parties, and those who have not yet decided to whom they will vote (68%, 56%, and 55% respectively) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas and those who do not intend to participate in the election (32% and 41% respectively), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (59% and 51% respectively) compared to the religious (47%), among supporters of the peace process (59%) compared those who are opposed to the peace process (30%), among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (46%), among farmers, the unemployed, and employees (62%, 57%, and 53% respectively) compared to students and housewives (46% and 48% respectively), among those working in the public sector (54%) compared to those who work in the private sector (49%).

We also asked respondents to indicate their expectations regarding the success or failure of the French Initiative in assisting the goal of reaching Palestinian-Israeli peace. 29% expected success and 59% expected failure. Here too there was a significant difference between residents of the West Bank compared to residents of the Gaza Strip: 39% of Gazans, compared to only 22% of West Bankers, expected success.

(2) Palestinian-Israeli confrontations:

Half of the public believes that the current popular confrontation, or Habba Sha’biyya, is over and the other half believes it is still going on.
Support for knifing attacks continue to decline, but two thirds support the Jerusalem bus bombing.
Expectations that the current confrontation will develop into an armed intifada continue to diminish.
54% support return to armed intifada.

The public is divided into two equal halves regarding the end of the current popular confrontation, or al habba al sha’biyya: 48% believe it has stopped and 48% believe it has not stopped. In the West Bank, 49% believe it has ended and 46% believe it has not. In the Gaza Strip, 46% say it has ended and 51% say it has not. The percentage of those who think it has ended increases among those between the ages of 40 and 49 years (53%) compared to those between the ages of 18 and 22 (42%), among those who intend to vote for Fatah, third party voters, and the undecided (56%, 53%, and 51% respectively) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas and those who do not intend to participate in the election (36% and 46% respectively), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (66% and 49% respectively) compared to the religious (44%), among supporters of the peace process (54%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (39%), and among merchants and the unemployed (56% and 53% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, laborers, and students (29%, 45%, 45%, and 46% respectively).

Findings also show that support for use of knives in the current confrontations with Israel continues to decline in this poll, dropping from 58% three months ago to 51%. Support for knifing attacks in the Gaza Strip stands at 75% and in the West Bank at 36%. Three months ago, support among West Bankers for knifing attacks stood at 44% and among Gazans at 82%. Nonetheless, support for the Jerusalem bus bombing attack which took place in mid-April and cause more than 20 Israeli injuries stands at 65%; only 31% say they oppose this bombing attack. Support for the bus bombing attack is higher in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (59%), among residents of refugee camps and residents of cities (72% and 67% respectively) compared to residents of villages and towns (54%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (76%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (55%), among voters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 62% respectively) compared to Fatah voters (53%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (80%) compared to supporters of the peace process (57%), among refugees (70%) compared to non-refugees (62%), among holders of BA degree (70%) compared to illiterates (49%), among merchants and students (73% and 72% respectively) compared to the retired, laborers, and farmers (34%, 57%, and 60% respectively), among the unmarried (70%) compared to the married (65%).

With regard to expectations, 25% believe that the current confrontations will develop into a new armed intifada, 17% believe they will develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, and 13% believe they will develop in both directions. By contrast, 29% believe the confrontation will stay as they are now and 13% believe they will gradually dissipate. Three months ago, 29% said that the current confrontations will develop into an armed intifada.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 54% support a return to an armed intifada; 75% support joining more international organizations; 56% support a popular non-violent resistance; 43% support the dissolution of the PA. Three months ago, 56% supported return to armed intifada. In the West Bank, current level of support for an armed intifada stands at 51% (compared to 52% three months ago). 58% of the public (68% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 65% (75% in the Gaza Strip and 59% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Moreover, 41% of the public (52% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 54% said that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Finally, findings indicate that 32% of the public (41% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, they would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 43% (54% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not.

When comparing the level of support of various parties for the current confrontations, Hamas comes on top with 66% of the public believing that it supports them, followed by Fatah (49%). By contrast, only 26% say president Abbas supports the confrontations.

(3) The future of the Oslo agreement and the future of security coordination:

56% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement.
Only 27% believe that president Abbas is serious about abandoning the Oslo agreement.
Similarly, only 27% believe that president Abbas is serious about ending security coordination with Israel.
46% say that terminating the Oslo agreement would lead to PA collapse and the return of the Israeli “civil administration.”

56% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 63% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 30% opposed it. Support for the abandonment of the Oslo agreement stands at 57% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip. Support for abandoning the Oslo agreement is higher among men (63%) compared to women (50%), among Hamas voters, the undecided, and voters of third parties (63%, 60%, and 58% respectively) compared to Fatah voters (47%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (48%), among holder of BA degree (62%) compared to the illiterates (51%), among farmers, employees, merchants, and the retired (87%, 65%, 61%, and 60% respectively) compared to students and housewives (46% and 49% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (73%) compared to those who work in the private sector (61%).

When asked about the seriousness of the PA leadership regarding abandoning the Oslo agreement, 67% of the public indicated that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 27% think he is serious. Three months ago, 65% expressed the view that the president is not serious. Similarly, we asked the public about its assessment of the seriousness of the Palestinian leadership regarding its intention to suspend security coordination with Israel in light of the Israeli announcement that the IDF will not stop its incursions into Palestinian cities. More than two-thirds (68%) indicated that the PA leadership is not serious while only 27% indicated it believes the PA leadership is serious.

We told the public that a Palestinian abandonment of the Oslo agreement might lead to one of two outcomes: the collapse of the Palestinian authority and the return of the Israeli “civil administration” or alternatively an Israeli suspension of its settlement activities and return to serious negotiations with the Palestinian side. We asked the public what it thought was the most likely outcome: 46% selected the collapse of the PA while 41% selected the Israeli suspension of its settlement activities.

(4) Palestinian Elections:

65% want president Abbas to resign and 31% want him to stay in office.
In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 43% and the latter 48%.
In presidential elections between Abbas, Haniyeh, and Marwan Barghouti, the first receives 20%, the second 35%, and the third 40%.
If parliamentary elections took place today, Fatah receives 34% of the vote, Hamas 31%, and all other electoral lists combined 9%; 26% say they have not decided yet.

65% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. These results are almost identical to those obtained in our previous poll three months ago. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 64% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 30% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Rami al Hamdallah receive 6%; Khalid Mishal, and Mustapha Barghouti and Mohammad Dahlan receive 5% each; and Saeb Erekat and Salam Fayyad receives 2% each. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% which is similar to the level of satisfaction we obtained three months ago. Level of satisfaction with Abbas are identical in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 48% (compared to 52% three months ago) and the latter 43% (compared to 41% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 44% three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 49% (compared to 54% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 41% (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh 47% (compared to 50% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 20%, Barghouti 40% and Haniyeh 35%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 75% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 34% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 26% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 33% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 33% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 35% (compared to 34% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 34% three months ago).

(5) Domestic Conditions:

Perception of security stands at 44% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank.
In the Gaza Strip, percentage of those wishing to emigrate stands at 45% and in the West Bank at 22%.
Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands today at 80%.
52% believe that the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 41% believe it is an asset.
More than three quarters of the public oppose the suspension of PLO financial payment to the PFLP and the DFLP.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 12% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%. Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 44%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands also at 44%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 47% and in the West Bank at 39%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago 48% of Gazans and 21% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate. The largest percentage (40%) of those who seek to emigrate indicates that the main motivation is search for jobs; 23% say difficult conditions imposed by Israeli occupation forces them to seek to emigrate; 12% say it is the lack of security and 9% say it is the lack of freedoms and democracy that push them out.

In an open-ended question, we asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al-Jazeera TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Hamas’ al Aqsa Palestine TV at 18%, Palestine TV and Maan-Mix at 17% each, Palestine Today (Filasteen al Youm) at 7%, Al Arabiya at 6%, al Quds TV at 4%, and al Mayadeen at 2%.

We asked the public about its impressions regarding corruption, freedom of the press, the ability to criticize government and if the PA is a burden or an asset for the Palestinian people: Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. 17% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 16% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip. 31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. Finally, a majority of 52% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while only 41% view it as an asset. Percentage of those who think the PA is a burden is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip (53%) compared to the West Bank (51%). It is also higher among residents of refugee camps (60%) compared to residents of villages and residents of cities (45% and 52% respectively), among voters of Hamas, third parties, and those who do not intend to participate in the election (79%, 60%, and 60% respectively) compared to votes of Fatah (18%), among the religious (56%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (38% and 49% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to supporters of the peace process (39%), among holders of BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (41%), among farmers, merchants, laborers, and the retired (63%, 59%, 58%, and 57% respectively) compared to professionals and employees (46% and 48% respectively), and among those who work in the private sector (57%) compared to those who work in the public sector (43%).

An overwhelming majority of 76% indicates that it does not agree with the decision apparently taken by the PA president to withhold financial support from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; only 16% agree with that decision.

(6) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government, and the possibility of another Gaza war:

Optimism regarding reconciliation stands at 36% and pessimism at 60%.
28% are satisfied and 63% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
Only 19% blame Hamas for the bad performance of the reconciliation government
71% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the Gaza public sector under the former Hamas government.
65% want the reconciliation government to supervise security and police services in the Gaza Strip.
55% believe that there is a high probability of a new war against the Gaza Strip in the near future.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 36% and pessimism at 60%. Three months ago optimism stood at 38% and pessimism at 59%. 28% say they are satisfied and 63% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 66% and in the West Bank at 62%. We asked the public who is responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government. Findings show that belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 19% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) while 35% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 15% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

71% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salaries of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (69%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salaries of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government. In return, 65% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; only 26% believe Hamas should be the one in charge. Similarly, 75% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the pervious Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 21% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

We asked the public if it believes that there might be a real chance to open the Rafah Crossing on a normal regular schedule now after the meetings in Cairo between Hamas and the Egyptian officials and in light of the Doha meetings between Fatah and Hamas officials. 55% said there is a chance for that and 39% said there was no real chance for that. In light of recent talk about a possible Gaza war, we asked the public about its expectations: 55% said the prospects for such war in the near future are high or very high and 40% said the prospects are low or very low. A majority of 57% of Gazans believe the prospects for war are high or very high.

(7) The Arab World, war in Syria, ISIS, and US elections:

78% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own problems and that Palestine is no longer the Arabs’ principle cause.
On Syrian, 40% are in favor of the Syrians Free Army, 18% favor Assad, and 5% favor radical Islamists such as ISIS.
88% see ISIS as an extreme group that does not represent Islam and 79% support the war against it.
70% believe that there is no difference between Clinton and Trump.

78% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 20% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. In fact, 59% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 30% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

In light of the escalating conflict in Syria and the emergence of three main parties to the conflict, we asked the public for its view on the party it views as the more preferable or the one it views as the least harmful. The largest percentage (40%) chose the Free Syrian army, 18% chose Bashar Asad and his army, and 5% chose the extreme religious opposition, such as ISIS. 23% said they do not like any of the three parties.

An overwhelming majority of 88% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 8% believe it does represent true Islam. 4% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 16% (compared to 3% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 79% support and 18% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

We asked the public about the US elections and which presidential candidate, Hilary Clinton or Donald Trump, it viewed best for the Palestinians. A large majority (70%) said there is no difference between the two candidates, while 12% said Clinton is better and 7% said Trump is better.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

45% view Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state as the top most important Palestinian goal and 32% think the most vital goal is the right of return.
38% view poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 31% think it is occupation and settlement construction.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 38% of the pubic; 31% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and; 10% believe it is the spread of corruption in public institutions.

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