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This PSR Poll has been conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah. 

26-30 August 2014

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 26-30 August 2014. The period before the poll witnessed the eruption of the Gaza War which was preceded by the kidnapping and killing of three Israelis. More than 2000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, were killed during the war. About 70 Israelis, mostly from the military, were killed during the war. Our fieldwork started on the last day of the war and continued during the first four days of the ceasefire.  This press release covers public perception of the war, who came out a winner, the ceasefire agreement, targeting of civilians, evaluation of the performance of various Palestinian actors during the war, and war impact on reconciliation. It also covers Palestinian elections, the internal balance of power, the June kidnapping and killing of the three Israelis, and others. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of this special Gaza War poll highlight dramatic changes in public attitudes regarding major issues. It goes without saying that the war was the major driver behind these changes. As expected, and as we saw in previous instances during and immediately after Israeli wars with Hamas, findings show a spike in the popularity of Hamas and its leaders and a major decline in the popularity of Fatah and president Abbas.  But, as in previous cases, these changes might be temporary and things might revert in the next several months to where they were before the war.

It is worth noting that the size of the change in favor of Hamas is unprecedented since 2006. Indeed, if presidential elections were to take place today, Ismail Haniyeh would easily win over Abbas and Hamas would win the largest percentage of the popular vote in parliamentary elections. The overwhelming majority of the public views Hamas as the winner and Israel as the loser in this war. Furthermore, a similar majority views Hamas’ approach of armed confrontation with Israel as the most effective means of ending Israeli occupation. Indeed, an overwhelming majority of West Bankers wants to transfer “Hamas’ way” to the West Bank and rejects the demand to disarm the Islamist group or to disband the other Gazan armed groups. Findings also indicate that the public see Iran, Turkey, and Qatar as the most instrumental in supporting Hamas and helping Gazans remain steadfast against the Israeli attacks. By contrast, Egypt’s role is seen as week and unhelpful. Indeed, a majority believes that Egypt played a negative role in the ceasefire negotiations.

Finally, despite the fact that the Palestinian Authority, Abbas, and prime minister Rami al Hamdallah received little positive evaluation for their role during the war, a majority tends to give the reconciliation government a big role in the affairs of the Gaza Strip in the post war period. For example, a majority wants it to control border crossings and to supervise police and security sector employees; the largest percentage wants it to control borders with Israel and Egypt and to lead the reconstruction process in the Strip

(1) Gaza War:

• 79% believe that Hamas has won the Gaza War; 79% believe Israel was responsible for the eruption of the Gaza war, and 94% are satisfied with Hamas’ military performance in confronting Israeli forces.
• 63% believe that the ceasefire agreement satisfies Palestinian interests, but 34% disagree with that. Moreover, 59% are satisfied and 39% are dissatisfied with war accomplishments
• An overwhelming majority of 86% support the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.
• 49% think it is justified for Hamas to launch rockets from populated areas and 46% disagree with that.
• 57% oppose disarming armed groups in the Gaza Strip while 25% support such a measure after the ending of the siege and the conduct of elections.
• Yet, a majority of 54% support and 40% oppose Abbas’ position that argues that the reconciliation government must be committed to existing agreements reached between the PLO and Israel.
• But only 43%, compared to 53% last June, agrees with the statement that the inclusion of Hamas into the PLO means an implicit acceptance by Hamas of the PLO peace program and the existing agreements with Israel.
• About two thirds (64%) believe that Iran, Turkey and Qatar combined have given the Gaza Strip the ability to remain steadfast against Israeli attacks and to be able to continue to launch rockets during the war; only 9% believe Egypt too has contributed to that.
• Moreover, only 25% describe Egypt’s role in the ceasefire negotiations as positive while a majority of 52% describe it as negative.
• In an evaluation of the performance of the various Palestinian actors during the war, Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah comes at the bottom, with 35% giving him a positive rating. The PA comes next with 36%, Abbas with 39%, the reconciliation government with 43%, and the PLO with 44%. On top comes Khalid Mish’al with 78% approval and Hamas with 88% approval.

79% believe that Hamas has won the Gaza War; 3% believe Israel came out the winner; and 17% believe the two sides were losers. Moreover, 79% believe Israel was responsible for the eruption of the Gaza war; 5% believe Hamas was responsible; and 12% believe the responsibility lies with the two sides. 63% believe that the ceasefire agreement satisfies Palestinian interests, but 34% disagree with that. Moreover, 59% are satisfied with the accomplishment gained in the agreement compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip; 39% are dissatisfied with the accomplishment. Satisfaction with war accomplishments is higher in the West Bank (61%) compared to the Gaza Strip (56%), among those who oppose the peace process (69%) compared to those who support the peace process (55%), among Hamas supporters (69%) compared to supporters of Fatah (53%), among those who hold a BA degree (60%) compared to those who are illiterates (47%), and among students (62%) compared to housewives (58%).

An overwhelming majority of 86% support the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended. Support for launching the rockets is higher in the West Bank (88%) compared to the Gaza Strip (82%). 60% say that Hamas does not launch rockets from populated areas, but 30% say it does. 49% think it is justified for Hamas to launch rockets from populated areas and 46% disagree with that. Percentage of those who believe that launching rockets from populated areas is unjustified increases to 59% among Gazans while standing at 38% among West Bankers. The percentage of those who believe that it is unjustified to launch rockets from populated areas increases among supporters of the peace process (48%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (42%), among supporters of Fatah (62%) compared to supporters of Hamas (38%), and among illiterates (57%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (46%). Only 30% believe that Hamas should warn Israeli civilians in the specific targeted areas before launching its rockets; 68% believe it should not do so.

57% oppose disarming armed groups in the Gaza Strip while 25% support such a measure after the ending of the siege and the conduct of elections; 13% support this measure but only after reaching a peace agreement with Israel. In our June 2014 poll, only 33% said it opposed disarming and dissolving armed groups in the Gaza Strip. Despite the current opposition to disarming Gaza groups, a majority of 54% support and 40% oppose Abbas’ position that argues that the reconciliation government must be committed to existing agreements reached between the PLO and Israel and rejects Hamas position that opposes Abbas’ argument.  In our previous poll in June, support for Abbas’ position stood at 59%. Yet, only 43%, compared to 53% last June, agrees with the statement that the inclusion of Hamas into the PLO means an implicit acceptance by Hamas of the PLO peace program and the existing agreements with Israel.

About two thirds (64%) believe that Iran, Turkey and Qatar combined have given the Gaza Strip the ability to remain steadfast against Israeli attacks and to be able to continue to launch rockets during the war; only 9% believe Egypt too has contributed to that. Iran comes on top with 28%, followed by Turkey (21%) and Qatar (15%); 25% select other countries or actors.  Moreover, only 25% describe Egypt’s role in the ceasefire negotiations as positive while a majority of 52% describe it as negative and 22% as neutral. Positive evaluation of Egypt’s role is higher in the Gaza Strip (29%) compared to the West Bank (22%), among supporters of the peace process (32%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (13%), among supporters of Fatah (40%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (15% and 21% respectively), among illiterates (42%) compared to holders of BA degree (22%), and among housewives (28%) compared to students (21%).

In an evaluation of the performance of the various Palestinian actors during the war, Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah comes at the bottom, with 35% giving him a positive rating. The PA comes next with 36%, Abbas with 39%, the reconciliation government with 43%, and the PLO with 44%. On top comes Khalid Mish’al with 78% approval and Hamas with 88% approval. The approval rating for Abbas rises to 49% in the Gaza Strip and drops to 33% in the West Bank. By contrast, Khalid Mish’al’s approval rating drops in the Gaza Strip to 70% and rises to 83% in the West Bank.

(2) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza after the war:

• Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split rises to 69%; 28% remain pessimistic.
• Three months after its establishment, 46% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government and 46% are dissatisfied.
• A majority of 51% wants to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 38% prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control.
• 48% want the reconciliation government to control the border with Egypt and 39% want it under Hamas’ control.
• 44% believe the responsibility for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip should be placed in the hands of the reconciliation government while 39% prefer to place it in Hamas’ hands.
• 83% want the reconciliation government to pay the salary of the Gaza public sector that served the previous Hamas government; 13% are opposed to that.
• 65% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of supervising the work of the employees of Gaza security sector who worked in the past under Hamas government; 29% disagree with that.

Findings show that optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split rises to 69%; 28% remain pessimistic. In our last poll in June 62% were optimistic. Three months after its establishment, 46% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government and 46% are dissatisfied. Indeed, 60% prefer to get rid of the reconciliation government and form a unity government in which leaders and politicians from all major factions would participate; 34% oppose such a step and prefer to keep the reconciliation government. The preference for a unity government drops significantly to 49% in the Gaza Strip and increases to 66% in the West Bank.

A majority of 51% wants to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 38% prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. In the Gaza Strip, 64% want to place the Rafah crossing under the control of the reconciliation government and only 25% want it under Hamas’ control. The same, with minor variation, applies to control over the crossings with Israel. 48% want the reconciliation government to control the border with Egypt and 39% want it under Hamas’ control. The same, with minor variation, applies to the border with Israel; with 45% in favor of keeping the border under the control of the reconciliation government and 41% say they should stay under Hamas’ control. In the Gaza Strip, 56% say borders with Egypt should come under the control of the reconciliation government and 49% say the border with Israel too should come under the control of the reconciliation government. In the West Bank, 42% say that the Rafah crossing should come under the control of the reconciliation government and 45% say it should remain under Hamas control. The demand to place the control of the Rafah crossing under the reconciliation government increases among men (56%) compared to women (45%), among the somewhat religious (53%) compared to the religious (47%), among supporters of the peace process (58%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (39%), among supporters of Fatah (85%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (31% and 49% respectively), and among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (47%).

44% believe the responsibility for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip should be placed in the hands of the reconciliation government while 39% prefer to place it in Hamas’ hands. But 83% want the reconciliation government to pay the salary of the Gaza public sector that served the previous Hamas government; 13% are opposed to that. In this regard, 65% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of supervising the work of the employees of Gaza security sector who worked in the past under Hamas government; 29% disagree with that, wanting instead to keep these employees under Hamas’ control. In the Gaza Strip, the demand for placing the security sector employees under the control of the reconciliation government rises to 72% and only 24% want them under Hamas’ control. In the West Bank, demand to place supervision over those employees under the reconciliation government stands at 61% while 32% want them to come under the supervision of Hamas. Demand to place the security sector employees under the supervision of the reconciliation government among men (68%) compared to women (62%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (79% and 75% respectively) compared to supports of Hamas (54%). Nonetheless, 72% agree with Hamas’ demand that security and police should remain under its control during the next 6 months, up until the elections; 24% disagree with that. Two months ago 66% agreed with that.

(3) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Haniyeh would receive a majority of 61% and Abbas would receive 32%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas decreases from 50% two months ago to 39% in this poll.
• If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 45% and the latter would receive 49% of the participants’ votes.
• If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Haniyeh would receive 48% of the vote, Barghouti 29%, and Abbas 19%.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 46% say they would vote for Hamas and 31% say they would vote for Fatah, 7% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided.

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Haniyeh, for the first time since we have started asking about his popularity about 8 years ago, would receive a majority of 61% and Abbas would receive 32%. Vote for Haniyeh stands at 53% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank. Abbas receives 43% in the Gaza Strip and 25% in the West Bank. Two months ago, Abbas received the support of 53% in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Haniyeh 41%. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 71%.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas decreases from 50% two months ago to 39% in this poll. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas rises among supporters of the peace process (52%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (16%), among supporters of Fatah (86%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (15% and 32% respectively), among those who are over 50 years of age (44%) compared to youth between the ages of 18 ad 28 (37%), and among the illiterates (63%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (33%). With regard to Abbas’ vote in the presidential elections, the vote increases among non-religious (66%) compared to the religious and the somewhat religious (25% and 36% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (46%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (8%), and among supporters of Fatah (89%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (3% and 29% respectively).

If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 45% and the latter would receive 49% of the participants’ votes. This is the first time in 8 years in which Haniyeh receives more votes than Barghouti. In our previous poll, Barghouti received the support of 58% and Haniyeh 38%. The rate of participation in this case would reach 77%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Haniyeh would receive 48% of the vote, Barghouti 29%, and Abbas 19%. The rate of participation in this case would reach 80%. In our previous poll in June 2014, Barghouti received 36% of the vote, Haniyeh 33%, and Abbas 28%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 78% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 46% say they would vote for Hamas and 31% say they would vote for Fatah, 7% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Two months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and for Fatah at 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 44% and in the West Bank at 47%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 36% and in the West Bank at 27%.

A majority of 69% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 14% want them to take place after a year or more, and 12% do not want elections.

(4) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 24% two months ago to 20% today, and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged at 32%.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip drops dramatically from 64% two months ago to 22% in this poll. In the West Bank perception of safety and security drops from 51% to 47% during the same period.
• Hamas’ official TV station, Al Aqsa, is the one with the most viewership (37%) in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip followed by al Jazeera (21%), Palestine TV (16%), Ma’an-Mix (11%), and al Arabiya (5%).
• In the West Bank, 35% of the respondents expected economic conditions in their area to improve in the next few years. But in the Gaza Strip 56% expected economic conditions to improve.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 24% two months ago to 20% today, and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged at 32%. Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip drops dramatically from 64% two months ago to 22% in this poll. In the West Bank perception of safety and security drops from 51% to 47% during the same period. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 43%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 20%. For the first time ever, Hamas’ official TV station, Al Aqsa, is the one with the most viewership (37%) in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip followed by al Jazeera (21%), Palestine TV (16%), Ma’an-Mix (11%), and al Arabiya (5%).

In the West Bank, 35% of the respondents expected economic conditions in their area to improve and a similar percentage (33%) expected them to worsen. But in the Gaza Strip 56% expected economic conditions to improve and only 20% expected them to worsen.

(5) Peace Process:

• Only 47% believe the chances for the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are medium or high; 51% believe the chances are low or non-existent.
• The public is divided over the two-state solution: 49% support it and 50% oppose it.
• A majority of 53% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means to establish a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Only 22% believe negotiation is the best means to establish a Palestinian state.
• 62% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion and 35% think it is still practical.
• 81% are worried that they could be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their homes would be demolished and land confiscated.
• An overwhelming majority of 81% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the land occupied in 1967 and expel its population or deny them their political rights.
• 57% of the public supported the June 2014 kidnapping of the three Israelis in the West Bank. Similarly, a majority of 54% supported the killing of the three kidnapped Israelis and 42% opposed it.
• An overwhelming majority of 88% supports Hamas’ way of confronting the Israeli occupation as it did in the Gaza Strip; only 11% is opposed to that. A majority of 72% favors the transfer of Hamas’ approach to the West Bank.

Findings show that only 47% believe the chances for the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are medium or high; 51% believe the chances are low or non-existent. Similarly, the public is divided over the two-state solution: 49% support it and 50% oppose it. In our last poll two months ago, 54% supported this solution and 46% opposed it. A majority of 53% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means to establish a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Only 22% believe negotiation is the best means to establish a Palestinian state and 20% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most effective route to statehood.  62% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion and 35% think it is still practical. Yet, only 24% support the alternative one-state solution; 75% reject the one-state solution. These findings indicate a drop in the support for the one-state solution which two months ago stood at 31%. The belief that armed confrontations are the most effective means to establish a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel increases in the Gaza Strip (56%) compared to the West Bank (51%), among men (56%) compared to women (50%), among the religious (56%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (52% and 36% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (78%) compared to those who support the peace process (39%), among supporters of Hamas (72%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (34% and 48% respectively), among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (51%), among holders of BA degree (58%) compared to illiterates (49%), and among students (58%) compared to housewives (49%).

81% are worried that they could be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their homes would be demolished and land confiscated. Only 19% are not worried. Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 81% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the land occupied in 1967 and expel its population or deny them their political rights. By contrast, 63% believe that the long term aspiration of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO is to recover part or all of the land occupied in 1967.

57% of the public say that they supported the June 2014 kidnapping of the three Israelis in the West Bank when that incident took place. Support for the kidnapping reached 76% in the Gaza Strip and only 45% in the West Bank. Similarly, a majority of 54% supported the killing of the three kidnapped Israelis and 42% opposed it. Support for the killing reached 69% in the Gaza Strip and only 42% in the West Bank. 52% of the West Bankers opposed the killing of the three kidnapped Israelis. But the public is divided over the identity of those who carried out the kidnapping and the killing of the three Israelis: 32% accuse Israel, 30% accuse Hamas, 21% believe a Palestinian acted on his own, and 2% accuse Fatah. Support for killing the kidnapped Israelis among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (50% and 29% respectively), among those who oppose the peace the peace process (73%) compared to those who support the peace process (43%), among supporters of Hamas (72%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (40% and 50% respectively), among refugees (62%) compared to non-refugees (46%), and among illiterates (72%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (56%).

In the absence of viable negotiations, 85% support joining more international organizations; 84% support joining the International Criminal Court; 62% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance; 60% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support a dissolution of the PA; and 24% support abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution. It is worth mentioning that two months ago only 41% indicated support for a return to an armed intifada.  61% believe that massive popular demonstrations could contribute to ending the Israeli occupation. But a larger majority of 72% favors the transfer of Hamas’ armed approach to the West Bank. Support for emulating Hamas in the West Bank stands at 70% among West Bankers and 74% among Gazans. Support for emulating Hamas in the West Bank is higher among those who oppose the peace process (86%) compared to those who support the peace process (63%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (86% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (50%), and among refugees (75%) compared to non-refugees (68%).

82% say they participate in boycotting Israeli goods that have local alternatives and 18% say they do not participate in the boycott. An overwhelming majority (87%) believes that the boycott movement is effective and 11% believe it to be ineffective. ...More

This PSR Poll has been conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah. 
25-27 September 2014

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 25-27 September 2014. The period before the poll witnessed successful implementation of the cease fire reached a month earlier after more than 50 days of armed confrontations in the Gaza Strip. But the reconciliation government failed to operate in the Gaza Strip during the period of war or ceasefire, and Fatah and Hamas exchanged accusations over who was responsible for that failure. The period of the fieldwork witnessed improvement in the Fatah-Hamas relations due to progress in reconciliation follow up talks in Cairo. It also witnessed Palestinian renewed activities at the UN with President Abbas delivering a speech at the UN General Assembly. This press release covers public perception of the war outcome, domestic Palestinian developments, elections, internal balance of power, and others. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.  

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

MAIN RESULTS:

This post-war poll was conducted one month after the end of the war in the Gaza Strip. This report highlights important changes in public perception compared to the findings we obtained in our previous poll which was conducted a month ago, immediately after the war end. Findings show a drop in satisfaction with the achievements of the war, probably due to the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip.  A drop was also found in the percentage of those who believed Hamas won the war, in the percentage of opposition to dissolving armed groups in the Gaza Strip, and in the popularity of Hamas and Ismail Haniyeh. Findings also show a rise in the popularity of Abbas and Fatah. Support for a third armed intifada went down in this poll as support for negotiations increased and a majority supported the two-state solution.

Despite the drop in support for the Islamists, Hamas and Haniyeh remain more popular than Fatah and Abbas.  Moreover, a majority still supports launching rockets against Israel if the siege and the blockade are not ended and two thirds of the public oppose merging Hamas’ al Qassam Brigades into the Palestinian National Security Forces. Furthermore, satisfaction with Abbas remains low.

Findings also show significant drop in the level of optimism regarding the chances for a successful implementation of the reconciliation agreement and indicate continued drop in the level of satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government. Indeed, a majority supports replacing the reconciliation government with a national unity government made up of factional leaders and politicians. Despite all that, a majority wants the reconciliation government to control crossings with Egypt and Israel and wants it to have control over Gaza’s public sector including those in the security services.

Finally, findings show that a majority of the public has not heard about Abbas’ plan to seek a deadline for ending Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. A majority of those who have heard about it do support it despite the fact that a majority expects the plan to fail.

Main Findings:

This post-war poll was conducted one month after the end of the war in the Gaza Strip. This report highlights important changes in public perception compared to the findings we obtained in our previous poll which was conducted a month ago, immediately after the war end. Findings show a drop in satisfaction with the achievements of the war, probably due to the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip.  A drop was also found in the percentage of those who believed Hamas won the war, in the percentage of opposition to dissolving armed groups in the Gaza Strip, and in the popularity of Hamas and Ismail Haniyeh. Findings also show a rise in the popularity of Abbas and Fatah. Support for a third armed intifada went down in this poll as support for negotiations increased and a majority supported the two-state solution.

Despite the drop in support for the Islamists, Hamas and Haniyeh remain more popular than Fatah and Abbas.  Moreover, a majority still supports launching rockets against Israel if the siege and the blockade are not ended and two thirds of the public oppose merging Hamas’ al Qassam Brigades into the Palestinian National Security Forces. Furthermore, satisfaction with Abbas remains low.

Findings also show significant drop in the level of optimism regarding the chances for a successful implementation of the reconciliation agreement and indicate continued drop in the level of satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government. Indeed, a majority supports replacing the reconciliation government with a national unity government made up of factional leaders and politicians. Despite all that, a majority wants the reconciliation government to control crossings with Egypt and Israel and wants it to have control over Gaza’s public sector including those in the security services.

Finally, findings show that a majority of the public has not heard about Abbas’ plan to seek a deadline for ending Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. A majority of those who have heard about it do support it despite the fact that a majority expects the plan to fail.

(1) Gaza War:

• Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War drops from 79% a month ago to 69% in this poll.
• Percentage of satisfaction with war achievements compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip drops from 59% a month ago to 49% in this poll.  
• Despite that, an overwhelming majority of 80% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.
• Moreover, a majority of 57% believes that launching rockets from populated areas in the Gaza Strip is justified and 39% say it is unjustified.
• Opposition to disarming armed groups in the Gaza Strip drops from 57% a month ago to 50% in this poll.
• About two thirds (65%) believe that Iran, Turkey and Qatar combined have given the Gaza Strip the ability to remain steadfast against Israeli attacks and to be able to continue to launch rockets during the war; only 7% believe Egypt too has contributed to that.

Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War drops from 79% a month ago to 69% in this poll; 22% believe the two sides were losers. In the Gaza Strip, only 58% say Hamas came out a winner. Furthermore, the percentage of satisfaction with war achievements compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip drops from 59% a month ago to 49% in this poll. 50% are currently dissatisfied with the achievements. Satisfaction with the war outcome increases in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), among women (51%) compared to men (47%), among the religious (54%) compared to somewhat religious and the non-religious (46% and 31% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (57%) compared to those who support the peace process (46%), among non-refugees (51%) compared to refugees (45%), among the illiterates (66%) compared to holders of BA degree (37%), among merchants, housewives, and professionals (53%, 54%, and 56% respectively) compared to students and employees (44% and 36% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (51%) compared to those who work in the public sector (33%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (67% and 59% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah and those who have not decided to whom they would vote if new elections are held today (32% and 44% respectively).

Despite that, an overwhelming majority of 80% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended. Support for launching rockets drops in the Gaza Strip to 72%. Moreover, a majority of 57% believes that launching rockets from populated areas in the Gaza Strip is justified and 39% say it is unjustified. Among Gazans, belief that it is justified to launch rockets from populated areas drops to 48% while increasing in the West Bank to 62%.

Furthermore, opposition to disarming armed groups in the Gaza Strip drops from 57% a month ago to 50% in this poll. Opposition to disarming Gazan armed groups increases in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (42%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (53% and 49% respectively) compared to the non-religious (29%), among those who oppose the peace process (70%) compared to those who support the peace process (41%), among merchants and housewives (62% and 49% respectively) compared to students and employees (42% each), and among supporters of Hamas and the undecided (68% and 49% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (34% and 42% respectively).

About two thirds (65%) believe that Iran, Turkey and Qatar combined have given the Gaza Strip the ability to remain steadfast against Israeli attacks and to be able to continue to launch rockets during the war; only 7% believe Egypt too has contributed to that. Moreover, only 21% describe Egypt’s role in the ceasefire negotiations as positive while a majority of 57% describe it as negative. When asked about the party that should finance the Gaza reconstruction with five options provided to respondents, 30% said it should be Israel, 24% said donor countries, 23% said Arab countries, 10% said Palestinian taxpayers, and 10% said Hamas. When only two options were provided, 50% said Palestinian taxpayers should finance the reconstruction and 19% selected Hamas.

(2) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would win a majority of 55% (compared to 61% a month ago) and the latter 38% (compared to 32% a month ago).
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas stays as it was a month ago at 39%.  
• If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter would receive 46% of the participants’ votes.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 39% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah.
• A majority of 69% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 11% want them to take place after a year or more, and 15% do not want elections.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas stays as it was a month ago at 39%. Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 50% before the Gaza war.  The low level of satisfaction with Abbas reflects itself in the outcome of presidential elections if held today: Ismail Haniyeh would win a majority of 55% (compared to 61% a month ago) and Abbas 38% (compared to 32% a month ago). Votes for Abbas and Haniyeh are close in the Gaza Strip with the former receiving 47% and the latter 50%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 33% and Haniyeh 57%. Vote for Haniyeh is higher in cities and refugee camps (57% each) compared to villages and towns (41%), among women (56%) compared to men (53%), among those whose age is between 18 and 29 years and 40 and 49 years (58% and 60% respectively) compared to those whose age is between 30 and 39 and those whose age is 50 or over (47% and 52% respectively), among the religious (64%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (51% and 18% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (82%) compared to supporters of the peace process (43%), among those who hold a BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (41%), among housewives, professionals, and merchants (58%, 59% and 76% respectively) compared to students and employees (45% each), among those who work in the private sector (60%) compared to those who work in the public sector (41%), and among supporters of Hamas (97%) compared to supporters of Fatah, third parties and the undecided (7%, 39%, and 46% respectively).

If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter would receive 46% of the participants’ votes. A month ago, Barghouti received 45% and Haniyeh 49%. Before the Gaza War Barghouti received the support of 58% and Haniyeh 38%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 30%, and Haniyeh 43%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 39% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 5% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. A month ago, vote for Hamas stood at 46% and Fatah at 31%. Before the Gaza war vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 40% and for Fatah at 39%. In the West Bank vote for Hamas stands at 38% and Fatah at 33%. These findings indicate a significant drop in Hamas’ popularity in the West Bank compared to the findings a month ago when it stood at 47%. They also indicate a significant rise in Fatah’s popularity in the West Bank from 27% to 33% during the same period. A majority of 69% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 11% want them to take place after a year or more, and 15% do not want elections.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip continues to drop to 9% in this poll  and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank continues to drop as well standing at 24% in this poll.
•  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip increase from 22% a month ago to 31% in this poll.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security remains unchanged compared to a month ago, standing today at 47%.
• Percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 44%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 78% compared to 81% three months ago. 
• 29% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, a larger percentage of 35% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip continues to drop to 9% in this poll compared to 20% a month ago and 24% three months ago. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank continues to drop as well standing at 24% in this poll compared to 32% a month ago and 33% three months ago.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip increase from 22% a month ago to 31% in this poll. Three months ago, before the Gaza war, the percentage of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 64%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security remains unchanged compared to a month ago, standing today at 47%; three months ago, it stood at 51%.  These findings are reflected in the percentages of those who wish to immigrate from the Gaza Strip, reaching 44%. Among residents of the West Bank, only 22% say economic and security conditions force them to seek to immigrate.

Findings also show that viewership of Hamas TV, al Aqsa, drops from 37% a month ago to 24% in this poll. Other major TV channels witnessed an increase in viewership; for example, Al Jazeera viewership rises from 21% to 24%, Palestine TV from 16% to 20%, Maan-Mix from 11% to 12%, and al Arabiyya from 5% to 7%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 78% compared to 81% three months ago.  23% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and an identical percentage say there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  29% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, a larger percentage of 35% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. It seems that the vacuum of authority in the Gaza Strip has given the public a sense of freedom.

(4) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza after the war:

• Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split drops from 69% a month ago to 53% in this poll.
• Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government drops from 46% a month ago to 36% in this poll.
• 57% prefer to get rid of the reconciliation government and form a unity government in which leaders and politicians from all major factions would participate; 35% oppose such a step and prefer to keep the reconciliation government.
• A majority of 50% (64% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank) wants to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 37% prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control.
• Satisfaction with the implementation of the reconciliation agreement drops from 61% three months ago to 48% in this poll.
• 45% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip and 40% reject this claim.
• In light of the dissatisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government, 52% believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 41% believe it is an accomplishment.

Findings indicate a significant drop in the level of optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split from 69% a month ago to 53% in this poll; pessimism rises from 28% to 43%. Optimism remains high in the Gaza Strip (64%) compared to the West Bank (48%). Furthermore, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government drops from 46% a month ago to 36% in this poll. Dissatisfaction rises from 46% to 54%. It is worth mentioning that three months ago, right after its establishment, 61% had confidence in the reconciliation government. Lack of confidence in the reconciliation government is higher in the Gaza Strip (61%) compared to the West Bank (51%), among men (61%) compared to women (48%), among the religious (57%) compared to the somewhat religious (51%), among those who oppose the peace process (77%) compared to those who support the peace process (46%), among holders of BA degree (64%) compared to the illiterates (39%), among merchants and employees (76% and 66% respectively) compared to students (50%) and among supporters of Hamas and the undecided (75% and 56%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (36% and 48% respectively). Lack of trust in the reconciliation government drives 57% of the public to seek replacing it with a unity government, on in which leaders and politicians from all major factions would participate; 35% oppose such a step and prefer to keep the reconciliation government.

Despite the lack of trust in the reconciliation government, a majority of 50% (64% in the Gaza Strip and 43%) wants to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 37% prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. The same applies to the crossings with Israel with 52% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 47% in the West Bank) wishing to place them under the control of the reconciliation government. 46% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and 34% want it placed in the hands of Hamas.

Furthermore, satisfaction with the implementation of the reconciliation agreement drops from 61% three months ago to 48% in this poll. Indeed, 45% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip but 40% reject this claim. The belief that Hamas has established a shadow government increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (43%), among men (47%) compared to women (42%), among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (48% and 64% respectively) compared to the religious (38%), among supporters of the peace process (52%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (27%), among the illiterates (48%) compared to holders of BA degree (42%), among those who work in the public sector (50%) compared to those who work in the private sector (43%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (68% and 59% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas and the undecided (22% and 41% respectively).

But the belief that Hamas is responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 25% while 36% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 18% blame the head of the reconciliation government. The percentage of those who accuse Hamas of hindering the work of the reconciliation government increases in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to the West Bank (18%), among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (26% and 52% respectively) compared the religious (18%), among supporters of the peace process (31%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (12%), among holders of BA degree (27%) compared to the illiterates (14%), among employees and students (36% and 31% respectively) compared to merchants and housewives (12% and 22% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (36%) compared to those who work in the private sector (21%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (58% and 32% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas and the undecided (5% and 15% respectively).

In light of the dissatisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government, 52% believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 41% believe it is an accomplishment. Three months ago, right after the formation of the reconciliation government, 50% said the PA was an accomplishment and 45% said it was a burden. Findings also show that 80% of the public want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the public sector in the Gaza Strip and 17% oppose that. In this regard, 68% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of supervising the work of the employees of Gaza security sector who worked in the past under Hamas government; 29% disagree with that, wanting instead to keep these employees under Hamas’ control. Nonetheless, 68% agree with Hamas’ demand that security and police should remain under its control during the next 6 months, up until the elections; 28% disagree with that.

 (5) Peace Process:

• Only 40% of the public has heard and 58% have not heard about President Abbas’ plan to set a deadline for ending occupation and building a state. Among those who have heard about the plan 72% support it and 25% oppose it.
• A majority of 53% supports the two-state solution and 46% oppose it.
• The public is divided over the most effective means of ending occupation and building a Palestinian state: 44% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means; 29% believe negotiation is the best means, and 23% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most effective route to statehood.
• 60% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion.
• A majority of 59% support and 35% oppose committing the reconciliation government to accept existing agreements with Israel.
• The public is divided equally over the Arab Peace Initiative with 47% supporting it and an identical number opposing it.
• In the absence of viable negotiations, 83% support joining more international organizations; 79% support joining the International Criminal Court; and 63% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance.
• Only 30% support the merging of Hamas’ al Qassam Brigades into the PA’s National Security Forces as a way of meeting the demand for disarming Hamas and 67% oppose that.

Findings show that only 40% of the public has heard and 58% have not heard about President Abbas’ plan to set a deadline for ending occupation and building a state. Among those who have heard about the plan 72% support it and 25% oppose it. Only 42% of those who have heard about the plan believe the chances for its success were medium or high and 58% believe its chances for success were low or non-existent. These findings might mean that public interest in the plan is not high and that the public does not trust the process that the president has embarked on. It could also mean that the president has not yet explained his plan to the public and has not sought support for it.

Findings show A majority of 53% supports the two-state solution and 46% oppose it. A month ago, 49% supported it and 50% opposed it. But the public is divided over the most effective means of ending occupation and building a Palestinian state: 44% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means; 29% believe negotiation is the best means, and 23% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most effective route to statehood. A month ago, 53% said armed confrontations were the most effective means while 22% selected negotiations, and 20% selected popular non-violent resistance. Support for armed action as the most effective means of building a state is higher among residents of cities and refugee camps (45% each) compared to residents of villages and towns (35%), among men (48%) compared to women (39%), among the religious (48%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (41% and 30% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (67%) compared to supporters of the peace process (33%), among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (41%) among merchants and professionals (52% and 51% respectively) compared to students, housewives, and employees (37%, 40% and 41% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (47%) compared to those who work in the public sector (42%), and among supporters of Hamas (67%) compared to supporters of Fatah, the undecided, and supporters of third parties (22%, 35%, and 41% respectively).

Despite the majority support for the two-state solution, 60% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion and 36% think it is still practical. Similarly, 72% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent.  Despite that, only 27% support and 71% oppose the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution.

A majority of 59% support and 35% oppose committing the reconciliation government to accept existing agreements with Israel. A month ago, 54% supported this position and 40% opposed it. But the public is divided equally over the Arab Peace Initiative with 47% supporting it and an identical number opposed to it. A majority of 56% nonetheless is opposed to recognition of Israel as a Jewish state while 41% support this recognition.

In the absence of viable negotiations, 83% support joining more international organizations; 79% support joining the International Criminal Court; and 63% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance. The public is divided equally over a return to armed intifada; a month ago 60% supported this alternative, but three months ago support did not exceed 41%. Findings show also that a majority of 53% is opposed to the dissolution of the PA while 44% support it.  57% believe that massive popular demonstrations could contribute to ending the Israeli occupation but 42% disagree with that.  By contrast, a larger majority of 81% favors Hamas way of resisting occupation. Support for Hamas’ way stood at 88% one month ago. Furthermore, 63% favor the transfer of Hamas’ armed approach to the West Bank and 34% oppose that. One month ago, support for this transfer stood at 72%. In this regard, only 30% support the merging of Hamas’ al Qassam Brigades into the PA’s National Security Forces as a way of meeting the demand for disarming Hamas and 67% oppose that. Support for the merge is higher in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (27%), among residents of cities (32%) compared to residents of villages/town and refugee camps (25% and 21% respectively), among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (33% and 40% respectively) compared to religious (24%), among supporters of the peace process (37%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (13%), among holders of BA degree (31%) compared to illiterates (19%), among those who work in the public sector (34%) compared to those who work in the private sector (28%), and among supporters of Fatah, third parties, and the undecided (51%, 39%, and 35% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (11%).

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 50% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 30% of the public.

Findings show that 50% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 28% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 30% of the public, while 26% say it is the spread of poverty and unemployment; 22% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 18% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.....Full Report

_{^{This PSR Poll has been conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah.}} 
 

19-21 March 2015

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 19-21 March 2015. The period before the poll witnessed the conduct of the Israeli elections and the victory of Netanyahu. Earlier, the PA joined the International Criminal Court (ICC), a step that led to an Israeli decision to suspend the transfer of PA custom funds. As a result, the PA was unable to pay the full salaries of the public sector. Palestinians responded by taking a decision to stop security coordination with Israel and to wage a boycott campaign against selected Israeli products. The period also witnessed a failure in implementing the reconciliation agreement due to the inability of the reconciliation government to take control over Gaza from Hamas. This failure greatly slowed down reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip as donors were unwilling to provide the necessary funds due to the absence of the PA.  This press release covers attitudes regarding the Israeli elections, Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the salary crisis, reconciliation, the peace process, ICC, security coordination and the boycott of Israeli products. Total size of the sample is 1262 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the public views negatively the outcome of the Israeli elections, believing it will increase the number and intensity of Palestinian-Israeli confrontations and will diminish the opportunity to resume negotiations. Despite this, and despite public concerns about the Israeli suspension of the transfer of PA custom funds, which constrained the ability of the PA to pay the salaries of its public sector, half of the public is optimistic about the chances for ending the suspension, now that the election in Israel is over.

Findings also show a reversal in some of the effects generated by the Gaza war nine months ago. This is particularly true regarding the internal balance of power as well as attitudes regarding the war outcome. The popularity of Abbas has improved considerably allowing him to run neck and neck with Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh. This change might have been generated by public satisfaction with Abbas’ decision to join the ICC. Similarly, Fatah’s popularity improved, particularly in the West Bank where it gains greater support than Hamas for the first time since June 2014, before the Gaza war.

Findings show a significant decline in the belief that Hamas had won the 2014 Gaza war and the level of satisfaction with the outcome of the war drops considerably. Despite this, support for launching rockets against Israel if the siege and blockade over Gaza do not end remains very high. Similarly, support for an armed intifada—which witnessed some decline—remains high. Hamas’ armed approach remains preferable to the public and the majority supports implementing it in the West Bank.

The public shows considerable satisfaction for joining the ICC despite the Israeli retaliation by suspending PA custom funds. Indeed, an overwhelming majority wants the PA to submit a complaint to the ICC against Israeli settlement policy. The public supports the PLO decision to stop security coordination but a majority believes that the PA will not implement this decision. Similarly, an overwhelming majority supports the boycott of selected Israeli products but one third say that they have not stopped buying such products. The public is opposed to the confiscation or destruction of boycotted products found in Palestinian shops; instead, it supports enacting a law banning displaying them in shops or alternatively waging a popular campaign to convince the public to stop buying these products.

Finally, a large majority remains dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. The public wants the government to assume control over crossings of the Gaza Strip and to supervise the reconstruction efforts. It also wants it to take full control over all civil and security institutions in the Gaza Strip. A clear majority wants the reconciliation government to have full control over the police force in the Gaza Strip and rejects the current status quo whereby Hamas remains in charge. The public wants the government to pay the salaries of the public sector that worked before reconciliation for the Hamas government. Finally, the public wants the reconciliation government to organize presidential and parliamentary elections within six months.

(1) Israeli Elections:

• Israeli right-wing electoral victory heightens concerns about security conditions
• An overwhelming majority expect chances for renewal of negotiations to worsen.
• But the public is optimistic about Israeli release of PA custom funds
• A majority supports return to negotiations if construction in settlements in frozen.

After the Israeli right-wing electoral victory, 47% expect increased confrontations and worsening security conditions while 18% expect the opposite: less confrontations and better security conditions. 32% expect conditions to remain as they are today.  Furthermore, 36% expect fewer chances to renew negotiations and 23% expect greater chances. 38% expect chances to remain as they are today. Half of the public expects Israel, now with the elections behind it, to resume the transfers of PA custom funds and 43% expect it will not do so.

Given the outcome of the Israeli elections, only 16% support an unconditional return to negotiations with Israel. By contrast, 42% support return to negotiations only if Israel agreed to freeze settlement construction. Still, 36% oppose return to negotiations even if Israel agreed to freeze settlement construction. Opposition to return to negotiations with the Netanyahu government even if it agreed to freeze settlement construction is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (34%), among men (41%) compared to women (31%),  among those who hold a BA degree (38%) compared to those who completed elementary education only (28%), among students (39%) compared to farmers and housewives (19% and 30% respectively), among the religious (43%) compared to the somewhat religious (31%), among those who oppose the peace process (60%) compared to those who support the peace process (20%), and among Hamas supporters (58%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (18% and 27% respectively).

(2) Palestinian Elections:

• In a presidential election, Abbas would receive 48% of the vote and Haniyeh 47%
• Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas rises from 35% to 40%
• In a parliamentary elections, Fatah would receive 39% of the vote, Hamas 32%, all other lists combined 9%, and 21% remain undecided
• 69% want general elections within six months

If new presidential elections were held today and only Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh were nominated, , the former would win 48% (compared to 42% three months ago) and the latter 47% (compared to 53% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 46% and Haniyeh 52%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 50% and Haniyeh 42%.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas rises to 40% (compared to 35% three months ago). Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 50% in June 2014 in the aftermath of the Shati reconciliation declaration but before the Gaza war.  If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 58% and the latter would receive 38% of the participants’ votes. Three months ago, Barghouti received 52% and Haniyeh 43%. But if the presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 25%, Barghouti 37%, and Haniyeh 35%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 34%. In June 2014, just before the Gaza war, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% (compared to 42% three months ago) and for Fatah at 36% (compared to 34% three months ago). In the West Bank vote for Hamas stands at 27% (compared to 32% three months ago) and Fatah at 41% (compared to 33% three months ago). A majority of 69% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 9% want them to take place after a year or more, and 16% do not want elections.

(3) Domestic Conditions, salary payment crisis, and ISIS:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 30% and in the Gaza Strip at 8%; perception of safety and security stands at 45% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank.
• Belief that corruption exists in the PA stands at 77%
• 33% say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear
• 56% are worried that the PA might collapse if Israel continues to suspend transfer of PA customs funds
• 8% believe ISIS (Daesh) represents true Islam

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 30%.  On the other hand, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 45%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 51%.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 25%.

Al Jazeera viewership is the highest, standing at 24%; Al Arabiyya stands at 7%. Viewership of PA’s Palestine TV stands at 20% and Hamas’ al Aqsa TV at 16%.  Maan-Mix viewership stands at 19%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77% compared to 81% three months ago.  23% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 18% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. An identical percentage say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

If Israel continues to suspend transfers of PA custom funds, 38% say the PA should borrow from banks to pay the public sector, 44% say the PA should either reduce salaries (29%) or reduce the size of the public sector (15%). A majority of 56% believes that continued withholding of PA custom funds, and the subsequent inability to pay the public sector salaries, will lead, if it lasts long, to the collapse of the PA; 40% do not believe that. Support for borrowing from the banks to pay the public sector is higher in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (36%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (40%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (35%), among women (40%) compared to men (35%), among those who work in the public sector (42%) compared to those who work in the private sector (35%), among supporters of Fatah (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%), and among those who support the peace process (44%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (28%).

An overwhelming majority of 86% believes that ISIS (Daesh) is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 8% believe it does represent true Islam. 6% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 13% (compared to 5% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. Belief that ISIS represents true Islam increases among the youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (10%) compared to those whose age is over 50 (7%), among residents of cities (10%) compared to residents of villages and towns (4%), among men (9%) compared to women (7%), among those who hold a BA degree (12%) compared to those who completed elementary education (7%), among students (15%) compared to farmers and retirees (0% and 2% respectively), among the religious (12%) compared to the somewhat religious (5%), and among supporters of Hamas (18% compared to supporters of Fatah (3%). Findings show that only 12% of the public support while 84% oppose allowing ISIS supporters to demonstrate publicly in the Palestinian areas (as they did in the Gaza Strip few months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for allowing ISIS supporters to demonstrate stands at 20% compared to only 8% in the West Bank.

(4) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza:

• Pessimism regarding success of reconciliation stands at 54% and optimism at 42%
• Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 28%
• 45% say Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip but only 24% blame Hamas for the poor performance of the reconciliation government
• 73% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the employees of the former Hamas government and 64% believe the reconciliation government should be in charge of the Gaza police
• 72% want the unification of the police force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the control of the reconciliation government

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 42% and pessimism at 54%. Satisfaction with the implementation of the reconciliation agreement stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 62%. Similarly, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 28%; dissatisfaction stands at 62%.  It is worth mentioning that nine months ago, right after its establishment, 61% had confidence in the reconciliation government.

51% (59% in the Gaza Strip) want to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 30% (26% in the Gaza Strip) prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. The same applies to the crossings with Israel with 51% (55% in the Gaza Strip) wishing to place them under the control of the reconciliation government.  44% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and 30% want it placed in the hands of Hamas.

45% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip and 39% reject this claim. But the belief that Hamas is responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 24% while 30% believe that the PA and president Abbas are to blame and 17% blame the head of the reconciliation government.

73% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salaries of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (72%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salaries of the Gazan police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government. 64% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; 30% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  Similarly, 72% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the previous Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 23% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip. Support for the unification of the police force under the control of the reconciliation government is higher among Fatah supporters (79%) compared to supporters of Hamas (56%), among the somewhat religious (76%) compared to the religious (67%), and among supporters of the peace process (77%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (65%). Support for the unification in the West Bank is similar to that in the Gaza Strip (73% and 71% respectively).

If money to pay the Gazan public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government is not readily available, 47% support reducing the salary of the current PA public sector by 15% thus allowing the reconciliation government to have the resources to pay the Gazan public sector. A slim majority of 51% is opposed to the reduction of the salary of the current PA public sector.

49% believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 42% believe it is an accomplishment. Nine months ago, right after the formation of the reconciliation government, 50% said the PA was an accomplishment and 45% said it was a burden.

(5) Gaza War and the peace process:

• A drop in the percentage of those who believe Hamas won the last Gaza war with Israel
• Satisfaction with the achievement of the last Gaza war drops to 37%
• More than two thirds support launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip if the siege and blockade continue
• 51% support the two-state solution but only 29% believe negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state
• Wide spread support (82%) for joining international organizations and 48% support an armed intifada
• 47% believe that Israel plans to destroy the two mosques, al Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock, and replace them with a Jewish temple

Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War drops from 66% three months ago to 60% in this poll; 24% believe the two sides were losers. In the Gaza Strip, only 51% say Hamas came out a winner. Six months ago, 69% said Hamas came out a winner. Percentage of satisfaction with war achievements compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip drops from 42% threes month ago to 37% in this poll. 62% are currently dissatisfied with the achievements. In the Gaza Strip, 60% are dissatisfied with war achievements.  Despite that, a majority of 68% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended. Satisfaction with the war achievements is higher in the Gaza Strip (39%) compared to the West Bank (35%), among those who hold a BA degree (37%) compared to the illiterate (26%), among students (47%) compared to farmers (29%), among refugees (40%) compared to non-refugees (34%), among the religious (45%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (32% and 29% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (50%) compared to supporters of the peace process (30%), and among Hamas supporters (64%) compared to Supporters of Fatah (22%).

A majority of 51% supports the two-state solution and 48% oppose it. But the public is more divided over the most effective means of ending occupation and building a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel: 37% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means; 29% believe negotiation is the best means, and 30% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most effective route to statehood. Three months ago, 42% said armed confrontations were the most effective means while 26% selected negotiations, and 28% selected popular non-violent resistance. Percentage of those who believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means increases in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (34%), among residents of cities (39%) compared to residents of refugee camps and villages (31% each), among men (42%) compared to women (32%), among the religious (42%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (33% and 25% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (66%) compared to supporters of the peace process (22%), and among Hamas supporters (66%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (15% and 26% respectively).

60% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion and 38% think it is still practical. Similarly, 71% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent.  Despite that, only 31% support and 68% oppose the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution. Support for the one-state solution increases in the West Bank (33%) compared to the Gaza Strip (27%), among women (32%) compared to men (29%), among the illiterate (34%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (26%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (51% and 33% respectively) compared to the religious (25%), among supporters of the peace process (39%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (17%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (42% and 40% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%). 

46% support and 51% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative; but only 39% support recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people in return for an Israeli recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.

In the absence of viable negotiations, 82% support joining more international organizations; 68% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance; 48% support return to an armed intifada, and 43% support dissolving the PA. Three months ago, support for a return to armed intifada stood at 56% and nine months ago, i.e., before the Gaza war, at 41%.  A majority of 74% favors Hamas way of resisting occupation; this percentage stood at 79% three months ago. Furthermore, 56% favor the transfer of Hamas’ armed approach to the West Bank and 40% oppose that. Three months ago support for this transfer stood at 62%. Support for an armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (44%), in cities (50%) compared to refugee camps and villages (41% and 45% respectively), among men (52%) compared to women (45%), among students (53%) compared to housewives (45%), among the religious (52%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (35% and 46% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (72%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (38%), and among Hamas supporters (78%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (30% and 44% respectively).

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 77%. 23% are not worried. An overwhelming majority of 82% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population or deny them their rights. When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 63% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967 while 28% said it was to conquer the state of Israel or conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.

An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 47% believe that Israel intends to destroy al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 20% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 10% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 14% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.  More than half of the public (52%) believes that Israel will indeed succeed in implementing its plans for al Haram al Sharif and 43% believe it will not succeed.

(6) ICC, security coordination, and the boycott campaign

• 86% want the PA to submit a complaint against Israel to the ICC
• 60% support stopping security coordination with Israel
• 85% support the campaign to boycott Israeli products  

Despite the fact that the PA decision to become a member in the ICC has led Israel to suspend transfers of PA custom funds, 69% believe that the PA decision was a correct one and 26% believe it was the incorrect decision. Now, after joining ICC, 86% want the PA to submit a complaint against Israel for building settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. Despite that, public confidence in the effectiveness of the court is not high: only 42% believe it will be effective in reducing or stopping settlement construction and 54% believe it will not be effective. Confidence in ICC effectiveness is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (39%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (47%) compared to those who are over 50 years of age (41%), among women (46%) compared to men (37%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (51% and 45%) compared to the religious (38%), among supporters of the peace process (49%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (28%), and among supporters of Fatah (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas and the third parties (32% and 37%).

A majority of 60% favors and 35% do not favor stopping security coordination with Israel. But a majority of 57% believes that the PA will not implement the decision of the PLO Central Council to stop security coordination with Israel; only 34% believe the PA will implement it. Support for stopping security coordination is higher in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (55%), among those who hold a BA degree (67%) compared to the illiterate (55%), among refugees (65%) compared to non-refugees (57%), among the religious (64%) compared to the somewhat religious (56%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (71%) compared to supporters of the peace process (56%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (74% and 64% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (56%).

85% support the local and international campaign to boycott Israel and impose sanctions against it; 13% oppose it. 54% say that they have stopped buying boycotted Israeli products from Tnova and Strauss; 14% say they did not buy these products in the past; and 31% say they have not stopped buying them.  Two thirds (65%) believe that the boycott of Israeli products will be effective in contributing to ending occupation and 34% do not believe that.  The public is divided over the question of what to do to convince shops from selling boycotted Israeli products: one third (32%) supports confiscating or destroying these products; a second third (31%) wants the PA to enact a law banning selling them; and finally 34% want the PA to encourage people not to buy these boycotted products. In the West Bank, only 23% are in favor of confiscating or destroying these products (11% favor confiscation and 12% favor destruction). Opposition to destroying or confiscating boycotted products is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (23%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (37%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (29%), among refugees (37%) compared to non-refugees (28%), among holders of BA degree (36%) compared to the illiterate (28%), among students (36%) compared to merchants and housewives (25% and 31% respectively), among the religious (34%) compared to the somewhat religious (28%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (36%) compared to supporters of the peace process (31%), and among Hamas supporters (40%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (30% and 31% respectively).

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 39% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state is the top most important goal for the Palestinian people and 36% believe it is obtaining the right of return for refugees
• 28% say that the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment and 26% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlements.

39% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 36% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% while 26% of the public say that it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 22% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; and 19% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.  

This PSR Poll has been conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah. 
 

3-6 December 2014

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 3-6 December 2014. The period before the poll witnessed increased tension in al Haram al Sharif (Noble Sanctuary, known to Israeli Jews as the Temple Mount) and the Jerusalem area leading to repeated clashes and various knife and other attacks. The period also witnessed continued stalemate in the implementation of the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement. But the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel remained in effect with both sides observing it. Palestinian efforts to secure international support for statehood recognition gained an added momentum while Israeli-Palestinian violence continued to rise. Domestically, the PA arrested and then released the head of the union of public sector employees while declaring the union illegal.  This press release covers public perception of domestic developments such as reconciliation, elections, and balance of power. It also covers aspects of the Gaza War, the peace process, and a permanent peace agreement. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Four months after the end of the latest Gaza war, the initial findings are still strongly felt. Despite a relative improvement in the balance of power in favor of Abbas and Fatah, the popularity of Hamas and Ismail Haniyeh remains higher.  Indeed, Hamas can easily win a new presidential election if one is held today. Hamas can also do better than Fatah in a new parliamentary election. Optimism regarding the chances for a successful implementation of the reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas continues to diminish. Similarly, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government and the performance of President Abbas continues to drop. Despite the fact that most of the public does have much confidence in the union of the public sector employees, about two thirds view as unacceptable the steps taken by the PA government against the union and its head. 

Most Palestinians continue to believe that Hamas won the war. Morevoer, an overwhelming majority of Palestinians continues to support launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip if the blockade is not lifted. Findings also show that the level of support for a return to an armed intifada remains high; indeed support for armed struggle has increased compared to our previous findings three months ago particularly in light of the dangerous tension in Jerusalem and the holy places. The Palestinian public believes the worst regarding Israeli intentions and goals for al Haram al Sharif, the Nobel Sanctuary, and half of the public fears that Israel will succeed in achieving those goals. Perhaps driven by this fear, the overwhelming majority tends to support those acts of violence, such as knifing and run-over, that have become lately more frequent in Jerusalem. Along with this development, findings show a significant decline in the percentage of support for a permanent peace settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. A decline has also been registered in the level of support for the two-state solution.

Finally, we asked the public about its views on the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Findings show that the overwhelming majority believes that the group does not represent true Islam. But the belief that it does represent true Islam was found twice as much in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank. Findings also show that the majority of the public, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, supports the current war against ISIS.

(1) Al Haram al Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary):

• The overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger
• Half of the public believes that Israel will succeed in implementing its designs for al Haram.

An overwhelming majority (87%) believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 56% believe that Israel intends to destroy al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 21% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 9% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 6% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.  Moreover, half of the public believes that Israel will indeed succeed in implementing its plans for al Haram al Sharif.

(2) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• Haniyeh wins against Abbas in a presidential election
• Satisfaction with Abbas continues to decline
• Marwan Barghouti wins against Haniyeh in a presidential election
• Hamas wins the largest percentage of the public vote in a new legislative election
• More than 70% want presidential and legislative elections within a period that does not exceed six months

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would win a majority of 53% (compared to 55% three months ago) and the latter 42% (compared to 38% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 44% and Haniyeh 54%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 41% and Haniyeh 53%. In this regard, the evel of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas drops to 35% (compared to 39% three months ago). Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 50% before the Gaza war.  Satisfaction with Abbas is higher in the West Bank (37%) compared to the Gaza Strip (32%), among those whose age is over 50 years (40%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (30%), among Fatah supporters (84%) compared to supporters of Hamas , the undecided, those who do not intend to participate in elections, and supporters of third parties (9%, 25%, 25%, and 29% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (48%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (15%), among the illiterates (51%) compared to those with a BA degree (33%), among employees (38%) compared to students (29%), and among those who work in the public sector (40%) compared to those who work in the private sector (35%).

If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 52% and the latter would receive 43% of the participants’ votes. Three months ago, Barghouti received 48% and Haniyeh 46%. Before the Gaza War Barghouti received the support of 58% and Haniyeh 38%.  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 24%, Barghouti 33%, and Haniyeh 40%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 36% say they would vote for Hamas and 34% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 39% and Fatah at 36%. Before the Gaza war vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 42% and for Fatah at 34%. In the West Bank vote for Hamas stands at 32% and Fatah at 33%. These findings indicate a drop in Hamas’ popularity in the West Bank compared to the findings three months ago when it stood at 38%. They also indicate a drop in support for Fatah in the Gaza Strip from 39% to 34% during the same period. In this context, a majority of 71% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 8% want them to take place after a year or more, and 16% do not want elections.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 10% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 23%.
• Perception of safety and security rises in the Gaza Strip to 46% and drops in the West Bank to 38%.
• Viewership of al Aqsa TV station drops to 18%.
• Only 30% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize PA authorities without fear.
• About two thirds of West Bankers believe that the arrest of the head of the public sector employee union is unacceptable or illegitimate.
• 18% borrowed loans from banks in Palestine 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 10% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 23%.  Yet, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip increase from 31% three months ago to 46% in this poll. Six months ago, before the Gaza war, the percentage of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 64%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security drops from 47% three months ago to 38% in this poll; three months ago, it stood at 51%.  But despite the improved security in the Gaza Strip, findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 43%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 23%.

Viewership of Hamas TV, al Aqsa, drops from 24% three months ago to 18% in this poll. Al Jazeera viewership rises from 24% to 26%, Palestine TV from 20% to 22%, Maan-Mix from 12% to 13%, and al Arabiyya from 7% to 8%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81% compared to 78% three months ago.  Moreover, only 21% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 20% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  Similarly, 30% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, a larger percentage of 34% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

In the West Bank, 33% say they believe the union of the West Bank public sector employees works first and foremost for the benefit of the employees while 51% believe it only serves political and partisan agenda.  Despite this lack of trust in the union, 65% of West Bankers consider the arrest of the head of the union, Bassam Zakarnah, and his deputy unacceptable or illegal while only 16% consider it acceptable or legal.  In the Gaza Strip, 49% believe the union of the Gazan public sector employees works first and foremost for the benefit of the employees while 47% believe it serves political and partisan agenda. Nonetheless, 70% of Gazans consider the arrest of Zakarnah and his deputy to be unacceptable or illegal.  The belief that the arrest is unacceptable or illegal increases also among men (69%) compared to women (65%), among those whose age is over 50 years (71%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (66%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (81% and 76% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters, those who do not intend to participate in elections and the undecided (58%, 61% and 64% respectively), among the religious (70%) compared to the somewhat religious (65%), among those who oppose the peace process (80%) compared to those who support the peace process (62%), among the holders of BA degree (71%) compared to the illiterates (65%), and among merchants, farmers, and employees (75%, 73%, and 70% respectively) compared to students and laborers (63% each).

18% of the public (11% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip) say that they have received loans from the local banks. Among those who have received loans, 88% say they are currently repaying them. Loans have been received mostly to buy or build homes, followed by investments in projects, buying cars, or marriage. Half of the public is satisfied with the facilities received from the banks and the other half is dissatisfied

(4) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza after the war:

• Pessimism about reconciliation rises to 58%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government drops to 26%.
• 44% believe that Hamas has a shadow government in the Gaza Strip, but only 21% blame Hamas for the bad performance of the reconciliation government.
• A majority of 55% believes that the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people.
• 40% blame extremist groups outside Fatah and Hamas for the responsibility for the explosions that took place in the Gaza Strip in November 2014

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split drops from 53% three months ago to 40% in this poll. Pessimism rises from 43% to 58%. Moreover, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government drops from 36% three months ago to 26% in this poll. Dissatisfaction rises from 54% to 67%. It is worth mentioning thatsix months ago, right after its establishment, 61% had confidence in the reconciliation government.

49% (61% in the Gaza Strip) want to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 36% (26% in the Gaza Strip) prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. The same applies to the crossings with Israel with 50% (58% in the Gaza Strip) wishing to place them under the control of the reconciliation government.  46% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and 35% want it placed in the hands of Hamas.

Satisfaction with the implementation of the reconciliation agreement drops from 48% three months ago to 36% in this poll. 44% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip and 41% reject this claim. But the belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 21% while 32% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 15% blame the head of the reconciliation government. Belief that Hamas is responsible for the poor performance of the reconciliation government is higher in the Gaza Strip (31% compared to the West Bank (14%), among men (24%) compared to women (18%), among Fatah supporters (46%) compared to supporters of Hamas (5%), among supporters of the peace process (26%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (11%), among employees (31%) compared to housewives (16%), among those working in the public sector (33%) compared to those working in the private sector (23%).

In light of the dissatisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government, 55% believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 40% believe it is an accomplishment. Six months ago, right after the formation of the reconciliation government, 50% said the PA was an accomplishment and 45% said it was a burden.

The largest percentage (40%) believes that radical groups, not from Fatah or Hamas, were behind the explosions that targeted cars and homes of Fatah leaders in the Gaza Strip while 18% blame Fatah or groups within Fatah and 17% blame Hamas or groups within Hamas for these explosions. 10% blame others, most prominently Israel.

 (5) Gaza War and the peace process:

• Two thirds believe that Hamas won the Gaza war, but satisfaction with the accomplishment of the war drops to 42%.
• Majority continues to support launching rockets from Gaza if the siege and blockade are not lifted.
• Less than half of the respondents have heard about Abbas plan which seeks to set a deadline for ending occupation and 43% of those who have heard about it believes its chances of success are high or medium.
• 48% support the two-state solution but 58% believe that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion; yet, 71% oppose the one-state solution.
• The largest percentage (42%) believes that armed action is the most effective means for establishing  Palestinian state while 26% believe in negotiations and 28% believe in popular non violent action.
• 80% favor joining additional international organizations.
• 79% support Hamas’ way of confronting Israeli occupation and only 28% support merging al Qassam Brigades in the Palestinian National Forces.
• 80% support attempts by individuals to stab or run over Israelis.
• 38% support and 60% oppose a package containing a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative, but 23% of those who oppose the package accept it if Israel accepted the Arab Peace Initiative.
• An overwhelming majority (82%) is worried that it will be hurt at the hands of the Israelis and a similar percentage (83%) thinks Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex Palestinian territories and expel its population or deny them their political rights.

Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War drops from 69% three months ago to 66% in this poll; 22% believe the two sides were losers. In the Gaza Strip, only 58% say Hamas came out a winner.  Similarly, percentage of satisfaction with war achievements compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip drops from 49% a month ago to 42% in this poll. 56% are currently dissatisfied with the achievements. In the Gaza Strip, 66% are dissatisfied with war achievements.   Despite that, an overwhelming majority of 77% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended. Similarly, a majority of 79% favors Hamas way of resisting occupation; this percentage stood at 81% three months ago. Support in the West Bank for Hamas’ way stands at 80% and in the Gaza Strip at 78%. Support for Hamas’ way rises to 98% among Hamas supporters compared to 62% among Fatah’s. Similarly, support increases among the religious (86%) compared to the somewhat religious (76%), among those who oppose the peace process (92%) compared to those who support the peace process (73%), and among holders of BA degree (79%) compared to the illiterates (56%).

Furthermore, 62% favor the transfer of Hamas’ armed approach to the West Bank and 36% oppose that. Three months ago support for this transfer stood at 63%.  Moreover, only 28% support the merging of Hamas’ al Qassam Brigades into the PA’s National Security Forces as a way of meeting the demand for disarming Hamas and 68% oppose that. Additionally, support for the proposal to dissolve Gazan armed groups stands at 47%. But the support is conditional: 19% support it only after reaching a peace agreement, 15% support it only after the removal of the siege and blockade, and 6% support it after the holding of elections. 8% support dissolving armed groups now without any conditions.  Opposition to disarming Gazan armed groups stands at 49%. In the Gaza Strip opposition to disarming these groups stands at 45%.

48% support and 51% oppose the two-state solution. But 58% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion and 38% think it is still practical. Similarly, 70% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent.  Despite that, only 28% support and 71% oppose the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution. The public is divided over the most effective means of ending occupation and building a Palestinian state: 42% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means; 26% believe negotiation is the best means, and 28% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most effective route to statehood. Three months ago, 44% said armed confrontations were the most effective means while 29% selected negotiations, and 23% selected popular non-violent resistance. Percentage of those who believe that armed action is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel increases in the Gaza Strip (45%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among men (45%) compared to women (39%), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (45%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (42%), among Hamas supporters and the undecided (66% and 48% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (21% and 34% respectively), among the religious (45%) compared to the somewhat religious (39%), among those who oppose the peace process (71%) compared to those who support the peace process (30%), among holders of BA degree (51%) compared to the illiterates (21%), and among students (50%) compared to housewives (37%).

In the absence of viable negotiations, 80% support joining more international organizations; 73% support joining the International Criminal Court; and 60% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance; 56% support return to an armed intifada, and 49% support dissolving the PA. Three months ago, support for a return to armed intifada stood at 50% and six months ago at 41%. Findings also show that only 46% of the public has heard about President Abbas’ plan to set a deadline for ending occupation and building a state. Among those who have heard about the plan 69% support it and 28% oppose it. Only 43% of those who have heard about the plan believe the chances for its success were medium or high and 56% believe its chances for success were low or non-existent. Findings also show that in light of the tension in East Jerusalem and the increase in the level of mutual violence, 79% support and 20% oppose attempts by individual Palestinians to stab or run over Israelis in Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank.

Findings show that 38% support and 60% oppose a package of a permanent status agreement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for this package stood at 46% in December 2013. The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) final borders and territorial exchange; (2) refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) a demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) security arrangements; and (6) end of conflict. We have been addressing these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the most recent Gaza War. 

Findings, as the summary table below shows, indicate that the public rejects five out of six items in the package and accept two. The following is a summary of the items and the attitudes to each:

 (1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 45% support or strongly support and 54% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2013, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 52% and opposition at 48%.

(2) Refugees: 40% support and 58% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2013, 46% agreed with an identical compromise while 52% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem: 29% support and 71% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2013, an identical compromise obtained 32% support and 68% opposition.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State: 28% support and 71% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2013, 28% support, and opposition reached 71%.

(5) Security Arrangements: 46% support and 53% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2013, 52% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 48% opposed it.

(6) End of Conflict: 61% support and 37% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in December 2013 were 63% support and 36% opposition.

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2014

If president Abbas presented this package to the public in a referendum, 38% say they would vote in favor and 58% say they would vote against it. If the package contained an Israeli acceptable of the Arab Peace Initiative, 23% of those who oppose the package would change their mind and vote in favor. Support for the package increases in the Gaza Strip (43%) compared to the West Bank (35%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (62% and 49% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas and the undecided (19% and 30% respectively), among the somewhat religious (41%) compared to the religious (33%), among supporters of the peace process (47%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (20%), among the illiterates (49%) compared to holders of BA degree (34%), among employees, laborers and housewives (44%, 41%, and 40% respectively) compared to students (27%), and among those working in the public sector (46%) compared to those working in the private sector (37%).

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public (82%) are worried and 19% are not worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis or their land confiscated or homes demolished. Moreover, 83% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to expand its borders to include all territories between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel their Palestinian population or deny them their political rights. When asked about the long term goal of the PLO and the PA, 69% said that it is to recover all or some of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and 25% said it is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 territories or defeat Israel and destroy its Jewish population.  

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 43% believe that that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be end of Israeli occupation and building a Palestinian state.
• 29% believe that the continuation of occupation and settlements is the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 25% believe it is the spread of corruption.

43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 16% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 29% of the public, while 25% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; 23% say it is poverty and unemployment; and 18% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

(7) The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 

• Three quarters views ISIS as a radical fringe that does not represent true Islam and 12% view it as representing true Islam.
• Among those who view ISIS as not representing true Islam, 74% support the current war against it.
• Among those who view ISIS as representing true Islam, 61% believes that a group loyal to it should be established in Palestine.

Three quarters of the public believe that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 12% believe it does represent true Islam. 14% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 19% (compared to 8% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 74% of those who say ISIS does not represent true Islam support, and 20% oppose, the war currently waged by Arab and West countries against the group. 61% of those who say ISIS represents true Islam believe that an Islamist movement loyal to the group should be established in the Palestinian territories; 36% of them oppose that. Belief that ISIS represents true Islam is higher among men (14%) compared to women (10%), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (15%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (8%), among Hamas supporters (19%) compared to supporters of Fatah, the undecided and supporters of third parties (7%, 7%, and 10% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (18%) compared to supporters of the peace process (7%), among refugees (15%) compared to non-refugees (9%), among holders of BA degree (15%) compared to illiterates (6%), among students and employees (20% and 17% respectively) compared to professionals and retirees (7% each). 

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (46)

In the aftermath of the Gaza War: Hamas’ way is preferred by the majority over Abbas’ way as the most effective in ending occupation and building a Palestinian state and Haniyeh defeats Abbas in a presidential election 

13-15 December 2012

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-15 December 2012. Two major developments preceded the conduct of the poll: (1) the Gaza war between Hamas and Israel followed by a ceasefire, a visit by Khalid Mish’al to the Gaza Strip, and Hamas’ celebration of victory in the war on the occasion of the movement’s launch, (2) the submission of a Palestinian request for the upgrading of the status of Palestine to a non-member state at the UN, the vote at the General Assembly on the request with 138 countries voting in favor, and the return of president Mahmoud Abbas to the West Bank amid public celebrations in support of his UN bid. This press release covers public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today, the Gaza war, the UN vote, and others. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The events of the past several weeks have given Hamas a significant boost similar to the one it enjoyed in the aftermath of the breaching of the Rafah border with Egypt in early 2008. The fourth quarter of 2012 shows a dramatic change in public attitude favoring Hamas. Haniyeh’s popularity increases significantly allowing him to defeat Abbas if new presidential elections are held today. A parliamentary election, if held today, would give Hamas and Fateh an almost equal number of votes. Moreover, positive public evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip increases dramatically and the gap in public perception of conditions in the West Bank compared to conditions in the Gaza Strip widens in favor of the latter; this gap was first registered in our previous poll last September. Needless to say, the outcome of the latest Gaza war between Hamas and Israel is responsible for this change.

Findings are also somewhat positive for Abbas. Evaluation of conditions in the West Bank is more positive today than it was three months ago. Similarly, positive evaluation of Abbas’ performance increases in this poll. These results might have been generated by the outcome of the diplomatic warfare at the UN between the PA and Israel. The cessation of demonstrations and internal confrontations that erupted in the West Bank more than three months ago in protest against price rises and the deteriorating economic conditions might have also contributed to the general public perception of improvement in the general conditions in the West Bank. Finally, findings show a dramatic increase in the level of optimism regarding the chances for reconciliation and the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip compared to the situation not only three months ago but most importantly since the separation in June 2007.

But most significantly the poll shows that Hamas’s way, as represented by the Gaza war and its outcome, receives the support and confidence of the majority of the public while Abbas’ way, represented by the UN bid and the international recognition of the Palestinian state, receives the support and confidence of a little over one quarter. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians believe that Hamas has come out victorious in its war with Israel. A majority also believe that conditions in the Gaza Strip will now improve while a majority believes that conditions in the West Bank will now become worse or stay as it was before the UN vote.

(1) Presidential, Legislative, and Local Elections:

• Haniyeh defeats Abbas in a presidential election by 48% to 45%, but Barghouti wins against Haniyeh, 51% to 42%.
• In a three way presidential elections, Haniyeh receives 39%, Marwan Barghouti 29%, and Abbas 27%.
• In a parliamentary election, Fateh wins 36% and Hamas 35% of the voters.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 45% and Haniyeh 48% of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 69%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 51% and Haniyeh 40%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 44% and Haniyeh 52% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 45% and Haniyeh 45%. The percentage of vote for Haniyeh is the highest since Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006. The previous highest percentage of vote for Haniyeh stood at 47% in March 2008 immediately after the breaching of the Rafah borders with Egypt. Percentage of support for Abbas at that time stood at 46%.

The vote for Haniyeh increases among those who do not use the internet (52%) compared to those who use it on daily basis (44%), among the religious (57%) compared to the somewhat religious (40%), among those who oppose the peace process (74%) compared to those who support the peace process (39%), among non-refugees (50%) compared to refugees (45%), among the illiterates (52%) compared to those holding a BA degree (38%), among the professionals (65%) compared to employees, laborers, and students (37%, 48%, and 48% respectively), and among those who work in the private sector (47%) compared to those who work in the public sector (40%).

If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 51% and the latter 42% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 73%. In our September poll Barghouti received 61% of the vote and Haniyeh 32%.

If the presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Haniyeh would receive the largest percentage (39%) followed by Barghouti (29%), and Abbas (27%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 77%. In our previous poll last September, Barghouti received 45%, Haniyeh 29%, and Abbas 20%.  

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 78% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 35% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fateh, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% and in the West Bank at 33%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 38% and in the West Bank at 34%. These results indicate a sharp increase in Hamas’ popularity compared to our September results when it stood at 28% (31% in the Gaza Strip and 25% in the West Bank). By contrast, Fateh’s popularity remained almost unchanged during the same period.  

Support for Hamas increases in cities (36%) compared to refugee camps (33%), among women (37%) compared to men (34%), among those whose age is over 50 (39%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (30%), among those who do not use the internet (39%) compared to those who use it on daily basis (32%), among the religious (45%) compared to the somewhat religious (28%), among those who oppose the peace process (55%) compared to those who support it (29%), among the illiterates (38%) compared to holders of a BA degree (25%), among the professional (50%) compared to students, laborers, and employees (33%, 30%, and 29% respectively).

(2) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip is higher than positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank: 43% to 35%.
• Percentage of belief that corruption exists in the PA institutions in the West Bank is higher than the percentage of belief that corruption exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip: 74% to 53%.
• 35% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear and 29% believe that people can criticize the authorities in the Gaza Strip without fear.
• Percentage of safety and security stands at 60% among West Bank residents and 70% among residents of the Gaza Strip.
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government is higher than the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government: 56% to 34%; satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 54%.
• Optimism regarding the chances for reconciliation rises to highest level since the split in 2007.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises sharply from 25% three months ago to 43% in this poll while 33% say conditions are bad or very bad. Similarly, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank rises sharply from 19% three months ago to 35% in this poll and 36% say conditions are bad or very bad.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank drops from 79% in our previous poll three months ago to 74% in this poll. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 53% compared to 63% three months ago.  24% say there is, and 45% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. Similarly, 23% say there is, and 40% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  35% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 29% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These results indicate a decrease in the perception of freedom to criticize authorities in the West Bank compared to results obtained three months ago when it stood at 42%.  Only 49% of the public believe that the local elections that took place in the West Bank last October were fair and 34% say they were not fair.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 60% and in the Gaza Strip at 70%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 56% and 64% respectively. Nonetheless, findings show that the percentage of Gazans who seek immigration to other countries stands at 41%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands today at 22%. Last September these percentages stood at 42% and 29% respectively. 

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government rises sharply from 35% three months ago to 56% in this poll and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government increases from 22% to 34% during the same period.  Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 54% while 44% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 46%. The percentage of positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government is higher in the West Bank (60%) compared to the Gaza Strip (49%), among men (58%) compared to women (54%), among those over 50 years of age (59%) compared to those between 18 and 28 years old (52%), among Hamas supporters (88%) compared to Fateh supporters (35%), among the religious (64%) compared to the somewhat religious (50%), among those opposed to the peace process (73%) compared to supporters of the peace process (52%), among the illiterates (63%) compared to holders of a BA degree (47%), among merchants (78%) compared to students and employees (52% and 49% respectively), and among those working in the private sector (57%) compared to those who work in the public sector (51%).

In light of the resumption of the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas, 39% say they expect unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to be restored in the near future, 40% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time, and only 18% say unity will never be restored and that two separate entities will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In our September poll, the largest percentage (42%) said that unity will never be restored and two separate entities will be established; only 14% said unity will be restored in the near future. The current percentage of optimism regarding reconciliation and restoration of unity is the highest since separation in 2007. At that time, a percentage of 29% believed that unity will be restored within months while 22% said separation will become permanent.  

(3) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that the most vital Palestinian goal should be the ending of Israeli occupation and the building of a Palestinian state and 33% say it should be to obtain the right of return.
• 27% believe that the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment and 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement construction.

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe that the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27% of the public while 25% believe the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, another 25% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 6% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

4) Gaza War and the UN Vote:

• 81% say Hamas came out the winner from its war with Israel.
• 41% believe that the truce between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip serves Palestinian interests and 39% say it serves the interests of the two sides.
• The largest percentage (39%) believes that it was Iran that gave Hamas the greatest power to stand up to Israel during the Gaza war, 29% say it was Hamas own capacity that gave it that power, and 20% say it was Egypt.
• 63% say that now after the truce agreement between Hamas and Israel that followed the last Gaza war conditions in the Gaza Strip are becoming better than before the war.
• After the UN vote, only 41% expect Palestinian conditions to change for the better.
• 64% believe that now after the UN vote the US will punish the PA by suspending financial assistance and 79% believe that Israel too will punish the PA.
• 76% believe that the PA president and government should impose Palestinian sovereignty throughout the West Bank but only 37% believe they will actually do that.
• To force Israel to withdraw from the Palestinian state, the largest percentage (41%) believes that armed attacks on Israeli army and settlers would be the best way but 24% believe the best way is to return to negotiations.
• 60% believe that Hamas’ way is the best way to end Israeli occupation while only 28% believe Abbas’ is the best way.

Findings indicate that Hamas has gained a great political victory in its war with Israel: 81% believe that it came out the winner and only 3% believe that Israel came out the winner; 13% believe neither side came out a winner. Percentage of those who believe that Hamas came out a winner stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 84% in the West Bank. Findings also show that 41% believe that the truce that followed the war serves Palestinian interests and a similar percentage (39%) believes that it serves the interests of the Palestinians and Israelis alike and 16% believe that it serves the Israeli interests only. Furthermore, a majority of 63% believes that conditions in the Gaza Strip, now after the truce, are becoming better than before the war while 27% say conditions are the same as before the war and 8% say conditions are becoming worse. Yet, in parallel with this optimism, a majority of 52% believes that Israel will launch a ground offensive against the Gaza Strip in the near future and 43% say it will not.

Findings show that the largest percentage (39%) believes that it was Iran’s support and contribution that gave Hamas the greatest power to stand up to Israel during the last war while 29% attribute Hamas’ achievement to its own capacity and 20% believe Egypt’s contribution was the most helpful. Percentage of those who attribute Hamas’ success to Iran increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (38%), in cities and villages (40% and 41% respectively) compared to refugee camps (30%), among men (47%) compared to women (31%), among those whose age is over 50 years (44%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (37%), among supporters of Fateh (47%) compared to supporters of Hamas (35%), among holders of a BA degree (46%) compared to illiterates (24%), and among those who work in the public sector (52%) compared to those who work in the private sector (44%).

With regard to conditions of occupation and settlement construction in the aftermath of the UN vote, findings show that only 41% believe they will improve while 37% believe they will remain the same as before the vote and 21% believe they will worsen. Moreover, the overwhelming majority (79%) believes that Israel will punish the Palestinians by suspending the transfer of custom duties and other taxes and 64% believe the US will suspend financial assistance to the PA.

The overwhelming majority (76%) believes that the PA president and government should impose Palestinian sovereignty over the entire West Bank, for example by deploying the Palestinian security services in area C, currently under Israeli control, even if such a deployment leads to a confrontation with the Israeli army and settlers; 21% oppose this measure. Despite this high level of support for imposing sovereignty in the West Bank, most Palestinians (56%) do not believe the PA government and president will actually take this measure while 37% believe they will. Similarly, while 71% support and 25% oppose Palestinian insistence on taking control of the border terminal with Jordan at the Allenby Bridge even if such a step leads to suspension of travel across the bridge, a majority of 56% believes the PA president and government will not do that and 36% believe they will do that.

We asked the public about its views regarding the best means of forcing Israel to end its occupation of the territories of the Palestinian state, now after the UN vote. The largest percentage (41%) believe that the answer lies in armed attacks against the army and settlers, 30% said it was return to negotiations, and 24% believed it was non-violent resistance. In our previous poll in September 2012, 32% selected armed attacks, 33% selected non-violent resistance, and 28% selected negotiations.

Belief that armed resistance is the answer is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) than in the West Bank (39%), among men (47%) than women (35%), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (44%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (38%), among those who use the internet on daily basis (46%) compared to those who use it once a month (24%), among supporters of Hamas (63%) compared to supporters of Fateh (25%), among the religious (46%) compared to the somewhat religious (38%), among those who oppose the peace process (67%) compared to those who support the peace process (33%), among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (39%), among students (47%) compared to farmers, housewives, laborers, and retirees (30%, 34%, 35%, and 37% respectively), and among those who work in the private sector (46%) compared to those who work in the public sector (38%).

Finally, we asked the public to compare Hamas’ way or approach, given the Gaza war and its outcome, to Abbas’ way, given the UN vote and its outcome, and to select the one it prefers as the most effective in ending occupation and building a Palestinian state. Findings show that 60% believe that Hamas’ way is the most preferable while only 28% selected Abbas’ way. Belief in Hamas’ way increases in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (56%), among supporters of Hamas (93%) compared to supporters of Fateh (30%), among the religious (64%) compared to the somewhat religious (57%), among those who oppose the peace process (81%) compared to those who support the peace process (53%), and among students (65%) compared to farmers and employees (43% and 52% respectively).

5) Peace Process:

• Support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative drops from 50% a year ago to 43% in this poll.
• 52% support and 48% oppose the two-state solution but 62% believe that it is impossible these days to reach a permanent settlement with Israel and 60% believe the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state are slim to non-existent.
• 58% believe the two-state solution is no longer practical and 39% believe it is still possible.
• Only 27% support a one-state solution in which Jews and Palestinians would have equal rights and 71% oppose it.
• 53% support and 45% oppose the Arab initiative for peace with Israel.
• 74% are worried that they or members of their family would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished.
• 61% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to extend its borders to include all areas between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and to expel its Arab population and 20% believe Isreal’s long term goal is to annex the occupied territories and deny the Palestinians their political rights.

Findings show that 43% support and 56% oppose a package of a permanent status agreement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for this package stood at 50% in December 2011. The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) final borders and territorial exchange; (2) refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) a demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) security arrangements; and (6) end of conflict. We have been addressing these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic stalemate throughout 2012. 

Findings, as the summary table below shows, indicate that the public rejects four items in the package and accept two. The following is a summary of the items and the attitudes to each:

 (1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 53% support or strongly support and 45% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2011, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 63% and opposition at 36%.

(2) Refugees: 41% support and 56% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2011, 45% agreed with an identical compromise while 53% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem: 29% support and 70% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2011, an identical compromise obtained 40% support and 59% opposition.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State: 28% support and 71% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2011, 32% support, and opposition reached 67%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

(5) Security Arrangements: 46% support and 53% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2011, 50% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 49% opposed it.

(6) End of Conflict: 59% support and 39% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in December 2011 were 63% support and 35% opposition.

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2012

 Support for the package is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 53%, than in the West Bank, standing at 37%, among supporters of the peace process (50%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (24%), among those who would vote for Fateh and third parties (54% and 50% respectively) compared to those who would vote for Hamas or those who are undecided regarding whom they will vote for (36% and 40% respectively), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (48%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 50 years (35%), and among those who live in cities (45%) compared to those who live in villages and towns (32%), and among those who work in the public sector (49%) compared to those who work in the private sector (41%).   

Findings also show that 42% of the public believe that a majority among Palestinians supports a settlement along these lines while 49% believe a majority opposes it and 10% say it does not know the position of the majority. Only 33% believe that a majority among Israelis supports such a package while 56% believe a majority of Israelis opposes it. Perhaps for this reason, and others, only 36% believe that it is possible these days to reach a permanent settlement with Israel while 62% believe that it is impossible to reach such a settlement. Moreover, the public is pessimistic about the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years: 60% believe the chances to be slim or non-existent and 38% believe them to be medium or high.

As in our September 2012 poll, findings show that a small majority of 52% supports the two-state solution and 48% oppose it. Similarly, 53% support and 45% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative that calls for a two-state solution and the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states. But findings show also that a majority of 58% does not believe that the two-state solution is practical due to Israeli settlement expansion while 39% believe it is still feasible. Moreover, a similar percentage (60%) believes that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel are slim or non-existent while 38% believe the chances are medium or high. It is worth mentioning in this regard that the percentage of those who believe that the chances for Palestinian statehood are medium or high have increased by 11 percentage points since our last poll in September. The increase might be due to Palestinian success in gaining UN recognition of Palestinian statehood. It is also worth mentioning that despite the belief that the two-state solution is no longer practical, a large majority of 71% opposes the alternative one-state solution in which Arabs and Jews are treated equally; only 27% support the one-state solution.

Findings show that three quarters of the public (74%) are worried and 26% are not worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis or their land confiscated or homes demolished. Moreover, 80% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to expand its borders to include all territories between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel their Palestinian population or deny them their political rights. When asked about the long term goal of the PLO and the PA, 62% said that it is to  recover all or some of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and 32% said it is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 territories or defeat Israel and destroy its Jewish population....Full Report

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (49)

Palestinian public is spilt regarding the resumption of direct negotiations with Israel and pessimistic regarding the chances for success, but if the talks do lead to a peace agreement, the public believes that a majority of the Palestinians will approve it in a referendum

19-21 September 2013

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 19-21 September 2013. The period before the poll witnessed two major developments: the return to Palestinian-Israeli direct bilateral negotiations and the removal by the Egyptian army of president Morsi, replacing him with a new president and a new government. The army also partially closed the Rafah crossing into Egypt and began to close down tunnels along the Egyptian borders with the Gaza Strip. This press release covers public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Rami al Hamdallah, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, return to negotiations, developments in Egypt, and others. Total size of the sample is 1261 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the Palestinian public is divided almost equally over President’s Abbas’ decision to resume direct bilateral negotiations with Israel. Moreover, despite the vital importance attached by the public to the issue of prisoners’ release, a larger percentage gives greater priority to the two combined issues of the 1967 borders and settlement freeze. Furthermore, the lack of enthusiasm for return to negotiations seems to be driven by the belief of a large majority that the current round of talks will fail just like previous rounds. But if negotiations do succeed and an agreement is reached, the public believes that a majority of the Palestinians will approve it in a referendum.

A majority does not expect to see any positive development during the period of negotiations; only a quarter to a third expects improvement in economic conditions, reduction in settlement activities, or decrease in the number of checkpoints and other Israeli restrictions in the West Bank. Perhaps because of all of this, a majority supports waging popular non-violent resistance, side by side with negotiations. Indeed, two thirds want to go now to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in order to stop settlement construction even if such a step leads to suspension of Israeli transfer of revenues to the PA and a halt to prisoners’ release. It is worth mentioning in this regard that on the 20^thanniversary of the Oslo Agreement, less than a third of the public views it as having served vital national interests of the Palestinian people with a majority believing that the accord has in fact damaged those interests and that the PA should stop implementing it. 

Findings also show that the latest developments in Egypt, including the change of the president and government, increase doubts about the future of reconciliation and reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Stip. Optimism about unity has in fact reached the lowest level since the split in 2007. Findings also show that two thirds of the public believe that the change in Egypt will weaken Hamas’ authority in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, perhaps due to the partial closure of the Rafah crossing, the Egyptian army’s closure of the tunnels, and Hamas’s reaction to the change in Egypt, the percentage of positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip has decreased significantly. Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Ismail Haniyeh has also dropped. But findings do not show a decrease in the likely vote for Hamas in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip if elections are held today.

We asked the public about its views regarding developments in Egypt and Syria and regarding relations with Jordan. Findings show that about two thirds view change in Egypt negatively while less than a quarter sees it as good for Palestinians. Perhaps this reaction is driven by the fact that change in Egypt has led to the closure of the tunnels and the Rafah crossing leading to substantial hardships. On Syria, we found that despite the belief of the majority that the Assad regime was the one that used the chemical weapons against Syrian civilians, two-thirds oppose an American military strike against the Assad forces. The opposition to the strike might be due to the belief of many Palestinians that the strike would target Syria more than the Assad regime. Finally, with regard to relations with Jordan, findings show a reduction in support for a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation compared to the level of support obtained three months ago. It should be noted that support for the confederation increased last June in the aftermath of the signing of the holy places agreement, an agreement that was supported by a majority of the public at that time.

(1) Presidential and legislative elections:

• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 51% and Haniyeh 42%.
• If the presidential contest was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 58% and the latter 35%.
• If the contest was between Barghouti, Haniyeh, and Abbas, the first receives 35%, the second 33%, and the third 27%.
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 38%, Hamas 31%, all other electoral lists combined 10%, and 22% are undecided.

​

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 51% and Haniyeh 42% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 63%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 49% and Haniyeh 44%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 45% and Haniyeh 50% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 55% and Haniyeh 37%.  If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 58% and the latter would receive 35% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 71%. In our June poll Barghouti received 57% of the vote and Haniyeh 36%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (35%) followed by Haniyeh (33%), and Abbas (27%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 75%. In our previous poll last June, the results were identical to the current findings. 

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 38% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% and in the West Bank at 25%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 38% and in the West Bank at 39%. These results indicate a decrease in support for Fatah and stability in the vote for Hamas.    

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops to 21% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains at 29%
• 79% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank and 66% believe it exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip
• Only 31% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear and only 24% believe people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the dismissed Hamas government in the Gaza Strip without fear.
• Percentages of safety and security in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are equal, standing at 55%
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 36% and positive evaluation of the performance of Al Hamdallah government stands at 29% 
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 49%.

​

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops dramatically from 36% three months ago to 21% in this poll while 55% say conditions are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged compared to three months ago standing today at 29%. But the percentage of those who believe conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad increases from 37% to 44% during the same period.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 79% in this poll. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 66%.  Moreover, 20% say there is, and 41% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 16% say there is, and 33% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 24% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55% and in the Gaza Strip at 55%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 64% in the Gaza Strip and 56% in the West Bank.  But findings also show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 26%. Last June these percentages stood at 42% and 27% respectively. 

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 36%.Three months ago it stood at41%. Positive evaluation of the government of Rami al Hamdallah in the West Bank stands today at 29%.  Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas remains unchanged at 49%. Dissatisfaction with the president performance stands today at 48%.  

(3) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the chances for reconciliation and reunification stands today at its lowest point: 12%
• Majority believes that developments in Egypt weakens the chances for reconciliation and weakens Hamas’ authority in the Gaza Strip
• Large majorities believe that reconciliation will not succeed as long as restrictions are imposed on Hamas members in the West Bank and Fatah members in the Gaza Strip or without an agreement on the date for elections
• 77% support continued PA payment of salaries for Gaza public sector employees
• 47% support holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if separation continues for a long time

Given the developments in Egypt and the ups and downs in the Fateh-Hamas dialogue, percentage of optimism about the chances for reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip drops to the lowest level since the split in 2007, standing today at 12%. The belief that unity is impossible and that two separate entities will emerge increases from 36% three months ago to 41% in this poll. 42% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time. 57% believe that the latest development in Egypt reduces the chances for reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 14% believe it increases those chances and 25% believe it makes no difference. 67% believe that the Egyptian developments will weaken Hamas’ authority in the Gaza Strip while 10% believe they will strengthen it and 20% believe they will leave no impact on that authority.

We asked respondents about conditions under which they believe reconciliation cannot succeed. About three quarters believe that reconciliation will not succeed without first ending the restrictions on freedoms enjoyed by supporters of Hamas in the West Bank and a similar percentage (75%) believes that it will not succeed without ending restrictions on freedoms enjoyed by supporters of Fatah in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 67% say it will not succeed without first agreeing on an election date; 65% say it will not succeed if Hamas continues to reject agreements signed by the PLO with Israel; 63% say it will not succeed if security coordination with Israel in the West Bank continues; another 61% say it will not succeed if the PA continues to recognize Israel and the Oslo agreements; and 56% say it will not succeed as along as Hamas insists on keeping its al Qassam armed wing in the Gaza Strip.

The largest percentage (36%) believes that the PA, with its parts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 30% believe that it is an accomplishment for the Palestinian people. Furthermore, 15% believe that the PA in the West Bank is an accomplishment while the PA in the Gaza Strip is a burden. By contrast, a similar percentage (13%) believes that the PA in the Gaza Strip is an accomplishment while the PA in the West Bank is a burden.

56% regard the Gaza Strip as an Israeli-occupied territory, just like the West Bank. But 19% consider it a liberated area and 25% consider it semi-liberated and semi-occupied. Belief that the Strip is liberated or semi liberated increases in the Gaza Strip, reaching 58%, and decreases in the West Bank, standing at 35%.

More than three quarters of the public (77%) support the continued payment of salaries to Gaza Strip employees who used to work for the PA before the split in 2007. 20% believe that the PA should stop the payment. But the public is split over the necessity of holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if the current disunity continued for a long time: 47% believe it to be necessary to hold such separate elections and 50% believe it to be unnecessary.  

(4) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be the most vital Palestinian goal and 29% believe that obtaining of the right of return should be the most vital goal.
• 28% view the spread of poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 23% view the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split as the most serious problem. 

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (39) 

While youth revolts in the Arab World pose a threat to Hamas and its government in the Gaza Strip, al Jazeera leaks of PLO documents recording Palestinian-Israeli negotiations pose a threat to Fateh and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and the US use of its veto power against the UNSC resolution denouncing Israeli settlements destroys much of American credibility in the peace process 

17-19 March 2011    

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17-19 March 2011. The poll was conducted during a period of turmoil and revolt in the Arab World leading to regime change in Egypt and Tunisia. Moreover, the Palestinian areas witnessed demonstrations demanding end of the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Before that, al Jazeera satellite TV news station released leaked Palestinian documents pertaining to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. These documents were leaked from the PLO negotiations department. During the same period, the US used its veto power to block a UNSC resolution condemning Israeli settlements’ activities. In the settlement of Itamar, near Nablus, a family of five was killed. This press release covers issues related to the events in the Arab World, the leaks on al Jazeera, Palestinian domestic conditions, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the future of reconciliation and reunification, the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the most serious problems confronting Palestinians today, the peace process and the impact of the Arab youth demonstrations on it, and the Itamar attack. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2010 highlight a number of internal developments that came in response to external events. Three of the most significant events of the period under consideration were the publication of PLO documents related to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the eruption of youth demonstrations in the Arab World demanding regime change in their countries, and the US use of its veto power to block a settlements' related UNSC resolution.  Palestinians were affected differently by these events. For example, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leadership were negatively affected by al Jazeera leaks as findings show a decrease in support for Fateh and a similar decrease in the level of satisfaction with the performance of president Mahmud Abbas. Several factors led to this outcome: al Jazeera remains the most watched TV news station in the Palestinian areas and the most credible one. While the PA leadership in the West Bank defended itself by accusing al Jazeera of conspiring against it, a large majority of Palestinians believed that al Jazeera goal was to seek the truth and not to conspire against the PA. Moreover, in responding to the leaks, the PA’s case remained unconvincing in the eyes of a large majority of Palestinians. Above all else, and based on the leaks, half of the public concluded that the PA’s negotiating position was not committed to the vital goals and interests of the Palestinian people.

By contrast, the events in the Arab World and particularly the youth demonstrations seem to pose a threat to Hamas in the Gaza Strip rather than to Fateh in the West Bank. For example, findings show that two thirds of Gazans believe that there is a need for demonstrations in the Gaza Strip demanding regime change in the Strip. More seriously for Hamas, half of Gazans indicate that they might participate in such demonstrations. In the West Bank, the picture is different: only one third believes there is a need to demonstrate and demand West Bank regime change and only one quarter indicate willingness to participate in such demonstrations. Findings also show that if demonstrations were to erupt in the Gaza Strip, demands and slogans will focus not only on ending the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, but also on the absence of freedoms. By contrast, if demonstrations erupt in the West Bank, demands and slogans will focus on the two issues of ending the split and ending occupation.  It is worth noting that findings show that the Palestinian public expects the developments in the Arab World to have a positive impact on the prospects for opening the Rafah crossing with Egypt on permanent basis. But a large majority does not expect Palestinian demonstrations similar to those in the Arab World would lead to end of occupation or end of settlement activities.

Finally, findings show that the US use of its veto power to block UNSC resolution condemning settlement activities has dealt a severe blow to Palestinian public readiness to accept a large US role in the peace process. The poll found that the percentage of those in favor of such US role has decreased considerably to a small minority; in previous surveys, large majority favored a greater US intervention in the peace process.

(1) Youth demonstrations in the Arab World and in Palestine:

• 92% sympathize with demonstrators in the Arab World and two thirds expect this development to have a positive impact on Palestinian conditions
• 36% of West Bankers support West Bank demonstrations to change the regime and 24% are ready to participate in such demonstrations
• 67% of Gazans support demonstrations in the Gaza Strip that would seek to charge the regime and 50% are ready to participate in these demonstrations
• 51% prefer the slogan that calls for "people want to end the split" and 24% favor "people want to end the occupation"

An overwhelming majority of 92% sympathizes with the demonstrators in Arab countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen; 7% do not sympathize with Arab demonstrators. 41% believe that the first basic demand of the demonstrators in Egypt is to end the state of poverty and unemployment, 38% believe it is freedom from oppression of the ruling regime, 11% believe it is to end corruption, 5% believe it is to replace the Egyptian regime with an Islamist one, and 3% believe the demonstrators want to express opposition to Egypt’s pro Western policies.  About two thirds (64%) expect the developments in the Arab World to have a positive impact on Palestinian conditions, 17% believe they will have a negative impact, and 15% believe they will have no impact.

Two thirds (66%) expect the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt to lead to permanent opening of the Rafah international crossing with Egypt and 27% do not expect that. But a majority of 54% believes the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years will not change as a result of the developments in the Arab World, 21% believe such chances will increase and 23% believe the chances will decrease.

47% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe that there is a need for similar demonstrations in the West Bank demanding regime change and 50% believe no need exists. The percentage of the belief that there is a need for demonstrations in the West Bank similar to those in the Arab World increases in the Gaza Strip (64%) compared to only 36% in the West Bank, among the youth, 18-27 years old, (54%) compared to those over 47 years old (41%), among supporters of Hamas (72%) compared to supporters of Fateh (28%), among supporters of other parties  and those who do not wish to participate in future elections (46% each), and among the those who define themselves as religious (52%) compared to those who define themselves as "somewhat religious" (41%).

By contrast, 52% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe there is a need for similar demonstrations in the Gaza Stripdemanding regime change in that area and 40% believe no need exists. The percentage of the belief that there is a need for demonstrations in the Gaza Strip similar to those in the Arab World increases in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (43%), among the youth, 18-27 years old (62%) compared to those over 47 years old (38%), among supporters of Fateh (71%) and supporters of third parties (70%), nonaffiliated (50%), those who do not wish to participate in future elections (46%) compared to supporters of Hamas (27%), and among supporters of the peace process (57%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (37%), and among those who are "somewhat religious" (57%) compared to those who are "religious" (45%).

When asked about their possible participation in such regime-change demonstrations in their respective areas, major differences emerged between West Bankers and Gazans: while 50% of Gazans are ready to participate in demonstrations to demand regime change in the Gaza Strip, only 24% of West Bankers are ready to participate in demonstrations demanding regime change in PA in the West Bank. In the West Bank, the desire to participate in demonstrations to change the regime in the West Bank increases among the youth, 18-27 years old (34%) compared to those over 47 years old (17%). In the Gaza Strip, the desire to participate in demonstrations demanding regime change in the Gaza Strip increases among the youth, 18-27 years old (61%) compared to those over 47 years old (25%).

When asked about the most preferred slogan to raise in Palestinian demonstrations, a majority of 51% opted for “people want to end the split,” followed by “people want to end occupation” (24%), and “people want to end corruption” (14%). Four other slogans received 2% each: “people want to end negotiations,” “people want to end Oslo,” “people want an end to security coordination,” and “people want to return to the intifada.” In the West Bank, the slogan "people want to end the occupation" (29%) comes second to ending the split (46%).

(2) Al Jazeera Publishes leaked PLO negotiations’ documents:

• 79% believe all or some of what al Jazeera has leaked regarding Palestinian-Israeli negotiations; only 19% believe none of it
• 49% believe Palestinian negotiators had not been committed to the goals and interests of the Palestinian people and 44% believe they had been
• 59% are convinced that in releasing the documents, al Jazeera sought to uncover the truth and 62% are not convinced by the PA's response to al Jazeera leaks

78% say they have seen or heard, on al Jazeera or other media outlets, about leaked documents published by al Jazeera news TV channel. 79% believe in the truthfulness of all or some of what has been published by al Jazeera regarding concessions made by Palestinian negotiators and 19% do not believe any of it.  About half (49%) believes that the Palestinian negotiating position, as revealed by al Jazeera, was not committed to vital Palestinian goals and interests and 44% believe it has been committed to vital goals and interests. The belief that the PA was committed to vital Palestinian interests and goals increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (41%), among supporters of Fateh (78%) compared to supporters of Hamas (13%) as well as supporters of third parties (40%) the nonaffiliated and those who will not participate in future elections (36% and 35% ), and among the "somewhat religious" (49%) compared to the "religious" (38%), and among students (61%) compared to laborers and merchants (37% and 27% respectively), and among those working in the public sector (51%) compared to those working in the private sector (36%).

A majority of 59% believes that the goal of al Jazeera in publishing the leaked documents was to uncover the truth, but 36% believe the aim was to conspire against the Palestinian leadership. Percentage of those who believe that the goal of al Jazeera was to uncover the truth increases in the West Bank (63%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among women (63%) compared to men (57%), among supporters of Hamas (95%) compared to supporters of Fateh (27%), among the "religious" (71%) compared to the "somewhat religious" (51%), and among those who work in the private sector (65%) compared to those who work in the public sector (49%).

A majority of 62% believes that the PA response to al Jazeera leaks of the negotiations’ documents was not convincing and 33% believe it was convincing. Percentage of those who believe that the PA response was not convincing increases in the West Bank (67%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among those whose age is over 47 years old (74%) compared to those between the ages of 18-27 (56%), and among supporters of Hamas and those who do not wish to participate in future elections, the nonaffiliated, and supporters of third parties (89%, 70%, 65%, and 64% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (34%).

(3) Domestic Conditions

• 21% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 33% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good
• 70% believe there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank and 59% believe there is corruption in the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip
• 65% believe that there is, or there is to some extent, free press in the West Bank and the percentage regarding the Gaza Strip is 46%
• 33% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear and only 19% believe that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities there without fear
• Perception of personal safety and security stands at 54% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 31% and 39% for the Fayyad government; 23% say Haniyeh's government is the legitimate one and 25% say Fayyad's government is the legitimate one
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 46% and dissatisfaction at 51%

21% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 56% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, in December 2010, 17% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 62% said they were bad or very bad. By contrast, 33% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 33% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 35% and 31% respectively. 70% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 59% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. 65% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 31% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 46% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 42% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip.

33% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, only 19% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These findings reflect an improvement in the situation in the West Bank and lack of change in the Gaza Strip. Since the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in June 2007, these percentages have witnessed gradual and significant decrease. As the table below shows, belief that people can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear stood at 56% while 52% believed that people can criticize the authorities without fear in the Gaza Strip.

Table: Gradual decrease in belief about the ability to criticize authorities in the West Bank or Gaza Strip since the spilt between the two areas

Perception of safety and security stands at 54% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip.  Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 31% and Salam Fayyad’s at 39%. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 36% and 43% respectively.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries stands at 37%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 21%.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 46% while 51% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. These percentages reflect a decrease in the level of satisfaction with the performance of the president, which stood at 50% three months ago while the level of dissatisfaction stood at 45%. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 39% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank. 23% say the government of Haniyeh is the legitimate Palestinian government and 25% say the Fayyad government is the legitimate one. 37% say both governments are illegitimate. These results indicate a decrease in the percentage of those who view the Fayyad government as legitimate.

(4) West Bank-Gaza Strip split and how to end it:

• A majority of 52% opposes and 43% support Fayyad's proposal to end the West Bank-Gaza Strip split
• A majority of 62% blames Fateh and Hamas together for the continuation of the split
• A decrease in the percentage of the belief that the spilt is permanent show a drop from 39% three months ago to 21% in this poll
• 43% believe that ending the split requires "regime change" in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• To end the split, 33% support, and 61% oppose, Abbas' acceptance of Hamas conditions for reconciliation even if this leads to the return of international boycott and sanctions
• By contrast, to end the split, 47% support and 46% oppose Hamas' acceptance of existing agreements with Israel

A majority of 52% opposes and 43% support Salam Fayyad’s proposal to end the West Bank-Gaza Strip split by an immediate unification of the two areas, the formation of a national unity government under the premiership of a prime minister acceptable to Fateh and Hamas, and the maintenance of the status quo regarding security conditions in the Gaza Strip (under Hamas’s control) and the West Bank (under Fateh). Support for the Fayyad proposal stands at 45% in the West Bank compared to39% in the Gaza Strip.  Fateh and Hamas together are responsible for the continuation of the split as seen by 62% of the public, but 15% blame Hamas alone and 15% blame Fateh alone. But when asked about the future of the split if Hamas won new presidential and parliamentary elections, 46% said it would be consolidated, but in a scenario in which Fateh would win such elections, only 25% said the split would, as a result, be consolidated.

After the events in Egypt and the cessation of the Egyptian role in Fateh-Hamas reconciliation, 21% believe that unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will resume soon, 50% believe unity will resume but only after a long time, and 21% believe that unity will never return. These results reflect a significant decrease in the percentage of those who believe that the split is permanent (which stood at 39% three months ago), perhaps due to the increased public and youth demonstrations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip demanding an end to the split.

In order to end the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 43% believe that the regimes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should fall, while 16% believe that ending the split requires the downfall of the regime in the Gaza Strip only, and 15% believe it requires the downfall of the regime in the West Bank only. 18% believe that ending the split does not require the downfall of either regime.

In order to end the split, 33% support and 61% oppose a proposal whereby president Abbas would accept Hamas conditions for unification even if such a step would lead to the return of international sanctions and boycott. Findings show that 69% view such a step by the president as posing a threat to their own interests and those of the Palestinian people. A majority of 52% believe the chances for the president to take such a step are small or very small while 42% believe chances are high or medium. Support for Abbas' acceptance of Hamas conditions as a way to end the split increases in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to the West Bank (31%), among those over 47 years old (38%) compared to those between the ages of 18-27 (32%), among supporters of Hamas (56%) compared to supporters of Fateh (23%), among those opposed to the peace process (52%) compared to those who support the peace process (29%), and among the "religious" (43%) compared to the "somewhat religious" (25%).

By contrast, a larger percentage (47%) supports and 46% oppose a different proposal whereby Hamas would end the spilt by accepting international conditions imposed after it won the elections back in 2006, including accepting peace agreements with Israel. The lesser opposition to this proposal than to the previous one seems to be due to the fact that a much lower percentage (43%) perceive such Hamas shift as a threat to their interests or to the interests of the Palestinian people. But as in the previous proposal, 53% believe the chances Hamas would take such an initiative are small or very small and only 41% believe the chances are high or medium.  Support for a Hamas initiative to accept agreements with Israel as the means to end the split increases in the West Bank (49%) compared to the Gaza Strip (45%), among men (50%) compared to women (46%), among those between the ages of 18-27 (49%) compared to those over 47 years old (40%), among supporters of Fateh (67%) compared to supporters of Hamas (25%), among supporters of the peace process (55%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (23%), and among the "somewhat religious" (52%) compared to the "religious" (39%).

(5) Presidency and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections were to take place today, Abbas would receive 55%, Haniyeh 38%; and if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter 31%
• For vice president, Marwan Barghouti receives 30% while 18% select Ismail Haniyeh, 14% select Salam Fayyad, and 11% select Mustafa Barghouti
• If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, Fateh would receive 40%, Hamas 26%, all other lists combined 12%, and 22% are undecided
• 51% believe that Hamas is opposed to holding new parliamentary and presidential elections due to its perception that it cannot work freely and 37% believe it is fear of losing the elections

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 55% and Haniyeh 38% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 58%. These results are similar to those obtained in our pervious poll three months ago. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives in this poll 53% and Haniyeh 42% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 56% and Haniyeh 35%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter would receive 31% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 67%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36% and in the West Bank Barghouti receives 66% and Haniyeh 28%. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 30% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Salam Fayyad (14%) Mustafa Barghouti (11%) and Saeb Erekat (2%).  These percentages are similar to those obtained by PSR three months ago.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 26% say they would vote for Hamas and 40% say they would vote for Fateh, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago with the exception of the likely vote for Fateh which dropped by four percentage points. Vote for Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (21%) and among women (28%) compared to men (23%). Vote for Fateh is higher in the Gaza Strip (42%) than in the West Bank (39%), and among men (43%) compared to women (38%). Support for Hamas increases also among those over 38 years old reaching 32% and decreases among those between 18-27 years old to 20%. Fateh's popularity is higher among those between 18-27 years old (44%) compared to those over 38 years old (36%). Hamas is more popular among the "religious" (42%) compared to the "somewhat religious" (15%). Fateh is more popular among the "somewhat religious" (47%) compared to the "religious" (31%). Hamas is more popular among housewives and laborers (30% each) and less popular among students (18%). Fateh is more popular among employees and students (50% and 49% respectively) and less popular among laborers and retired persons (32% and 22% respectively).

46% believe that if presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held today, Fateh would win and only 16% believe Hamas would win while 22% believe other factions will win. 51% believe that the reason Hamas is opposed to holding parliamentary and presidential elections today is due to Hamas’ belief that it is not allowed to operate freely in the West Bank or because it believes such elections would not be fair or free, while 37% believe that the reason behind Hamas’ opposition to elections is fear of losing them.

(6) Local elections:

• 60% evaluate the performance of their local councils during the last five years as good or very good
• 51% believe that the upcoming local elections in July will be fair and 38% believe it will not be fair
• 47% believe that holding local elections in the West Bank will lead to the consolidation of the split; despite this, 61% of the West Bankers say they will participate in those elections

60% evaluate the performance of their local councils during the past five years as good or very good and 34% as bad or very bad.  51% believe that the upcoming July local elections will be fair and 38% believe they will not be fair.  47% believe the holding of local elections will consolidate the split and 20% believe it contributes positively to reconciliation while 28% believe that it will have no effect on reconciliation.  46% believe that Fateh will win the upcoming local elections, and 13% believe candidates from the left and independents will win the elections and 20% believe family candidates will be the winners.  61% of the West Bankers say they will participate in the local elections and 35% say they will not participate.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the first most vital goal for the Palestinian people should be to end the occupation and build an independent state; 27% say it should be to insure the right of return, 17% say it should be to build a pious or moral individual and society, and 10% say it should be to build a democratic political system
• 28% say the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment, another 28% say it is the absence of national unity due to the split, 22% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement expansion, 11% say it is corruption, and 8% say it is the blockade of the Gaza Strip

The largest percentage (45%) believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 27% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return for refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 17% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The largest percentage (38%) believes that the second most vital Palestinian goal should be to obtain the right of return for refuges to their 1948 towns and villages. 25% believe that the second goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, 22% believe that the second goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, and 15% believe the second most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% of the public while a similar percentage believes the most serious problem is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 22% believe the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 11% believe it to be the corruption in some public institutions, and 8% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

(8) The peace process:

• A majority of 69% prefers to have the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, rather than the Gaza border crossings with Israel, open for movement of goods on permanent basis; 27% prefer the opposite
• 32% support and 63% oppose the attack in the Itamar settlement
• After the US veto in the UNSC, 69% oppose a large American role in the peace process
• 56% support and 41% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative
• 48% support and 50% oppose a Palestinian-Israeli mutual recognition of national identity
• In the absence of negotiations, 33% prefer going to the UNSC while 25% prefer return to armed confrontations, 18% prefer non violent peaceful confrontations, and 17% prefer dissolving the PA
• Palestinian attempt to go to the UNSC for recognition of statehood will be met by a US veto according to 75% of the public
• A unilateral declaration of statehood will change conditions for the better in the eyes of only 24%
• Peaceful popular revolution against occupation and settlements will succeed in ending occupation and stopping settlement expansion in the eyes of only 31%
• Two thirds believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non existent
• 70% are worried that they or members of their families will be hurt at the hands of Israelis in their daily life or that their land will be confiscated or homes demolished
• 60% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to extend its state to the whole area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River and to expel its Palestinian population while 21% believe the goal is to annex the West Bank and to deny political rights to its population. Only 17% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to ensure its security and to withdraw from all or parts of the West Bank.

In the context of youth demonstrations in the Arab World and the possible opening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, we asked respondents whether they prefer to have the Rafah crossing opened for the movement of goods on permanent basis even if that led to the closure of Israeli-Gazan crossings for goods. Findings show that a big majority of 69% prefers and 27% do not prefer to have the Rafah crossing with Egypt open for goods on permanent basis over the opening of the Israeli goods’ crossings with the Gaza Strip on permanent basis. The percentage of those preferring to have the Rafah crossing with Egypt open for goods on permanent basis stands in the West Bank at 73% compared to 63% in the Gaza Strip. The percentage increases among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fateh (61%), and among those opposed to the peace process (78%) compared to supporters of the peace process (67%).

We also asked about attitudes regarding the attack in the settlement of Itamar which took place just before the conduct of the poll and led to the death of a family of five. The poll found that 63% opposed the attack while 32% supported it. The percentage of support for the attack increases in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (20%), among those between the ages of 18-37 years old (37%) compared to those over 37 years old (26%), among supporters of Hamas (51%) compared to supporters of Fateh (23%), among those opposed to the peace process (46%) compared to supporters of the peace process (28%), among the “religious” (37%) compared to the “somewhat religious” (28%), and among students (35%) compared to laborers (26%).

Despite the relatively large majority-opposition to the Itamar attack, 45% believe that if peace negotiations do not resume and if armed confrontation between Palestinians and Israelis erupts, it will help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not; 49% do not share this view.

Findings show that in the aftermath of the US veto against the UNSC resolution condemning settlement activities, a majority of 58% opposes a return in the future to the UNSC for a similar resolution. Furthermore, a large majority of 69% expresses opposition to a larger US role in the peace process. In our August 2009 poll, a majority of 61% indicated support for a larger US role in the peace process.

A majority of 56% support and 41% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative which calls for Israeli withdrawal to the line of 1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the resolution of the refugee problem based on UN resolution 194 in return for an Arab recognition of Israel and normalization of relations with it. Support for this initiative stood at 54% and opposition at 42% in our last poll in December 2010. Findings also show that 48% support and 50% oppose a mutual recognition of national identity with Palestinians recognizing Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis recognizing Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict have been settled and after a Palestinian state has been established. These figures are similar to those obtained in our last poll in December 2010. In light of the cessation of negotiations with Israel, the public is divided over the best means for ending occupation: 33% prefer to go to the UNSC to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state while 25% prefer return to confrontations and armed attacks against Israel, 18% prefer peaceful, non violent, confrontations, and 17% prefer the dissolution of the PA.

Yet, if the Palestinian side decides to go to the UNSC in order to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state, 75% believe that the US will veto such resolution. Moreover, if the Palestinian side is to unilaterally declare independent statehood around the end of 2011, 41% say current conditions in the Palestinian areas will not change while 24% say things will change for the better and 32% say things will change to the worst. If a peaceful popular revolution against occupation is to take place in the West Bank, emulating peaceful popular revolutions in Arab countries like Egypt and Tunisia, such a revolution will be able to end occupation and stop settlement expansion in the eyes of 31% while 66% say it will not be able to do so.  

Two thirds believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non existent while 32% believe them to be medium or high. Moreover findings show that an overwhelming majority of 70% is worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 30% say they are not worried. Percentage of worry stands at 72% in the Gaza Strip compared to 69% in the West Bank. When asked about their perception of Israel’s long term goals, the largest percentage (60%) indicated that it is to extend its state to the whole area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River and to expel its Palestinian population while 21% indicated that the goal is to annex the West Bank and to deny political rights to its population. Only 17% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to ensure its security and to withdraw from all or parts of the West Bank. We found little differences between West Bankers and Gazans in their assessment of Israel’s long term goals.....Full Report