Introduction:

The results of the student council elections at Birzeit University that took place in May 2022 came as a shock to supporters of Fatah after the heavy loss suffered by its student youth movement, al Shabiba, winning only 18 seats out of 51, compared to 28 seats for the Islamic Bloc, Al Kutlah al Islamiyyah, and 5 seats for the Student Pole, al Qutb al Tollabi, that represents leftist forces at the university. These results were shocking to Fatah because of the importance of the student elections, especially at Birzeit University, for what they represent for the future of the national movement. It was shocking because the students of this university, more than other university in the West Bank, represent many of the various regions of the West Bank as well as the various socio-economic classes and political currents thereby making the Birzeit elections a barometer of the attitudes and behavior of the educated Palestinian youth. Birzeit University has a special importance in the democratic process because this university has been a beacon of democratic practices preserving democratic traditions throughout the previous years in which Palestinians were deprived of national elections, while student elections were held annually at that university except in the most difficult conditions, such as the Covid pandemic in 2020 and 2021.

These elections came amid the near-total absence of democratic life in the Palestinian territories as no national elections have been held since 2005 and 2006, when presidential and legislative elections were held respectively. Back in December 2021 and earlier this year, in March 2022, local council elections were held in the West Bank, but they were not held in the Gaza Strip because of Hamas' objection to holding them in that part of the Palestinian territories

Background:

The past five years have witnessed a strong showing by Hamas’ Islamic Bloc at the expense of its main rival, al Shabiba, but without gaining a majority of Birzeit student vote. In the elections that preceded the closure of the university due to the Corona pandemic, in 2019-2020, al Shabiba was in fact able to win the same number of seats as the Islamic Bloc. The following figure shows the seat distribution at Birzeit University during the period between 2016-2022.

Figure (1): Distribution of Student Council Seats at Birzeit Student elections between 2016-2022

It should be noted that al Shabiba won all Birzeit University student elections that took place between 2007 and 2015, i.e., after Hamas violently took control of the Gaza Strip.  For example, in 2008 it won 25 seats compared to 19 seats for the Islamic Bloc; in 2009 it won 24 seats compared to 22 for the Islamic Bloc; in 2010 and 2011 it won 31 seats and 29 seats respectively while the Islamic Bloc boycotted the student elections; in 2012 it won 26 seats compared to 19 seats for the Islamic Bloc; in 2013 and 2014 it won 23 seats compared to 20 seats for the Islamic Bloc.[1]  During the two years that the Islamic Bloc boycotted the elections, the student turnout fell from 85% in 2009 to 58% and 50% respectively before rising again to 75% in 2012. Most of the votes that used to go to the Islamic Bloc abstained, resulting in lowering the number of votes required per seat from 117 in 2009 to 71 in the 2010 elections.[2]

The results of the Birzeit University student elections have opened the debate about the reasons behind Fatah's loss despite the group's greater popularity in the West Bank compared to that of Hamas as indicated by the most recent public opinion polls.[3] How can Fatah's loss by such a large margin be explained despite having such a great electoral base?

Explaining Fatah’s loss and Hamas’ victory

The loss of al Shabiba and the victory of the Islamic Bloc can be attributed to a number of reasons, the most prominent of which are the following five:

1. Mistakes and blunders made by the Palestinian Authority (PA) during 2021
2. Mistakes made by Fatah
3. Internal problems within al Shabiba
4. Hamas remains attractive to the youth
5. Israel unintentionally helped Hamas

1. PA blunders and poor performance:

Over the past few years, the PA has taken a series of measures that have harmed the nature of the system of government that the Basic Law and another set of key laws had established in Palestine. Accountability and oversight over the work of the president and government have been abolished and the judiciary has been weakened and its independence threatened.[4] The year before the Birzeit University elections witnessed several events that contributed to al Shabiba’s loss including the postponement of the general elections (legislative and presidential) that were scheduled to be held in May and July 2021, the perceived PA mismanagement of the import of the coronavirus vaccines, and the killing of activist Nizar Banat during his arrest by the Palestinian security services. Public concern about corruption within the PA has been aggravated by the release of various reports including that of the Office of Financial and Administrative Control on the Ezz Waqf Fund and on Khalid Al-Hassan Hospital for Cancer Diseases.

There is considerable agreement among those interviewed for this Brief, among students, university professors, the public at large, or experts on the Palestinian political scene, that the PA's blunders and unpopular behavior were the main reasons for Fatah's loss. In-depth interviews with 14 Birzeit university students from different student political currents show that all of them agree that this has been the top most important factor shaping the outcome of the student elections: the students punished al Shabiba for the “crimes” of the PA.[5] One Birzeit University student who voted for the Islamic bloc says that the main reason for the Bloc's popularity is the link made by the students between the PA’s recent actions, such as the killing of Nizar Banat, and al Shabiba. Another student says that this shift in student attitudes did not occur in previous years because the magnitude of PA plunders in recent years has been unprecedented and the student awareness of these plunders has become much greater thanks to social media and the emergence of organized student groups, on WhatsApp and other platforms, that became much more active and effective compared to previous years.  A new student at the university says that new students do not mainly look at the activities of the student blocs inside the university but rather look at the political situation in the country, and since the PA’s behavior has worsened in recent years, student perception of the PA is becoming overwhelmingly negative.  Another student says that the main reason for the victory of the Islamic bloc is the great urge among the students to send a message to the PA and Fatah by voting against al Shabiba despite the fact that many of those students come in fact from Fatah affiliated families.

These findings are confirmed by university professors who witnessed various election rounds during past years. Reflecting the views of many, one lecturer at Birzeit University, who studied her bachelor's and master's degrees at the same university, asserted that Hamas’ victory was essentially a punishment for the PA and Fatah.

It is also the sentiment of the Palestinian public. The results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research right after the Birzeit University elections showed that 59% believe that the reason for the victory of the Islamic Bloc is a protest by students against the performance of the PA, while 32% of the Palestinian public believe that the reason for the Islamic Bloc victory is a shift among the Palestinian people towards greater support for Hamas.[6] But as can be seen in the following figure, while 70% of the likely Fatah voters think the vote for the Islamic Bloc was a punishment for the PA rather than a reward for Hamas, only 22% of likely Hamas voters think agree with that statement.

Figure (2): Reasons for the Islamic Bloc victory in Birzeit University student elections as expressed by the Palestinian public (PCPSR’s poll # 84, June 2022 )

In this context, it is useful to consider the attitudes of Palestinian youth in general towards the PA. The results of the latest polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted before the Birzeit elections indicate that the youths’ perception of the PA performance is highly negative. This negative perception leaves its impact on Fatah as well thereby reducing public support for it. As Figure (3) below indicates, the majority of 86% of the youth believes in the existence of corruption in PA institution, 73% think people cannot criticize the PA without fear, 64% are dissatisfied with the performance of president Abbas, and 57% want the president to resign.

Figure (3): Attitudes of youth between the ages of 18-22 regarding selected issues related to the PA (PCPSR’s poll # 83, June 2022)

2. Mistakes made by Fatah:

Fatah seems to lack a vision and strategy for how to deal with al Shabiba as a youth sector that represents its future. The movement seems to want to make its youth group a subordinate rather than a partner. It provides no guidelines for how the youth should relate to the Israeli occupation, a topic of the utmost importance to students and young people in general. To make things worse, Fatah lacks a clear vision on how to organize Palestinian society and deal with the day to day living conditions. Fatah’s failure in allowing its youth movement to develop its own national vision denies al Shabiba the ability to take the initiative and press the national leadership in the direction most favored by Palestinian youth.[7]

On top of that Fatah finds itself unable to distinguish itself from the PA, to the contrary, it provides full support to PA policies including those rejected by the overwhelming majority of the public. The example most cited by students and others is the manner in which Fatah dealt with the killing of Nizar Banat. Instead of distancing itself from the incident, Fatah mobilized its base and brought it to the streets to defend the PA in the face of public anger. This episode served as a dangerous precedent portraying Fatah as a party that assaults liberties and freedoms, rather than defending them, in total contradiction with Fatah’s values enshrined in its literature. Worse yet, Fatah dismissed its own Shabiba coordinator at Birzeit University and the organizing body working with him because the group issued a statement condemning the killing of Banat and rejecting repression and restrictions of freedoms. One student said that shortly before the elections, the Islamic Bloc focused its campaign on this and similar incidents to demonstrate how al Shabiba was no longer representing the aspiration of the youth and that, to the contrary, it was being used by the PA as a local militia to crack down on non-violent protests by the Palestinian civilians. Hamas distributed photos showing how Birzeit students from al Shabiba were taking part in counter demonstrations defending with the PA and its security officers. Reaction by the students to these images were decidedly negative generating a great deal of resentment against their own colleagues at the university.

Above all, Fatah has over the past years lacked the "revolutionary" discourse adopted by the movement's political rival, Hamas. Given the fact that Fatah has gained most of its popular base in the sixties and seventies of the last century as a result of its "revolutionary" discourse and action adopted and practiced by the movement in that past period. University students are considered to be among the most radical age groups in Palestinian society, one that most likely finds itself highly attracted to the "revolutionary" discourse that Fatah has now abandoned. PCPSR public opinion polls have shown, as indicated in the Figure (4) below, that a majority of 55% of the youth believe that armed struggle is the best means to achieve Palestinian goals of ending the occupation and establishing an independent state compared to only 14% of the youth who believe that negotiations are the best means. This of course is not the position adopted by the PA or the Fatah movement. 

Figure (4): The most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation according to Palestinian youth between the ages of 18-22 vs. older Palestinians (PCPSR’s poll # 84, June 2022)

3. Al Shabiba’s internal problems:

Al Shabiba made its own significant contributions to its defeat. The following problems characterized the group’s behavior at Birzeit University in the months and years before the latest elections and doomed its chances of winning:

• Al Shabiba accepted to subordinate itself to the Fatah movement without any attempt to differentiate its position from that of the larger political movement: Al Shabiba at Birzeit University lost the leadership role when it acceded to interferences from Fatah in its internal affairs, for example by allowing it to appoint, rather than elect, the group’s coordinator and organizational body, thus subordinating itself to that of the larger movement.[8] One Birzeit University student, who voted for the Islamic Bloc, says that on top of existing links between al Shabiba and the PA, the group was in no position to declare any dissenting views because it was fully controlled by its mother organization, Fatah. In toeing the line, al Shabiba, therefore, had no choice but to threw its full weight behind the PA plunders, regardless of how distasteful and unpopular they were. With this in mind, students had no choice but to vote for its rival, the Islamic Bloc.[9]
• The absence of Al Shabiba organized activities and mobilization campaigns among the students compared to that of Hamas: One student says in her explanation of the advantage the Islamic Bloc had that while al Shabiba’s student activities were ad hoc and lacked consistency, the Islamic Bloc was much more organized and active in organizing student activities.
• Visible internal disagreements existed within al Shabiba’s own ranks and were based on geographical and regional bases: Conflicts within the ranks of al Shabiba were perceived by other students are evidence of discrimination practiced by the group against certain groups and geographic areas rather than disagreements based on an open exchange of ideas and genuine disagreements over policies. These perceptions turned students off and led them to stay away from the group.[10]

 The failure of al Shabiba to act as a professional student union: Students expect their syndicate or union to aggregate their interests and protect them in negotiations with the university administration. Some students felt that, on occasions, al Shabiba failed to do that. They stressed that to be successful al Shabiba needed to pay greater attention to the needs of the students, as students, by helping to create an environment conducive to learning and scholarship.  Indeed, many say the Student Pole, a rival, was the most successful in promoting pro student programs.[11]

• The absence of democratic practices within al Shabiba at Birzeit University: As indicated earlier, the leadership of al Shabiba before the latest student elections was appointed by the Fatah leadership. While some limited forms of mini elections continued to be seen in its activities, the group has stopped its previous practice in which its entire leadership was elected by a general conference of all members.[12] This lack of democratic practices has generated disappointment among the students, including among its own ranks, leading to indifference regarding the outcome of the student elections. Al Shabiba could not sell itself to the students as a democratic movement when it shunned democratic practices within its own ranks. It is worth noting that the election defeat forced Fatah to reevaluate its policy and to allow al Shabiba to hold its own elections; indeed, a new coordinator was elected but was soon arrested by the Israelis.

4. Hamas remains attractive:

Hamas has controlled the Gaza Strip since June 2007, and its control has contributed to a decline in its popularity for the following 8 years, until 2015, except for short periods during its armed confrontations with Israel. Despite the fact that Hamas does not offer a better model of governance than Fatah, it did manage to regain popularity as a result of a series of measures adopted by the PA and referred to earlier. Hamas prevents any democratic life in the Gaza Strip, where no local elections have been held, as has been done more than once in the West Bank. It does not allow student elections to be held in Palestinian universities located in the Gaza Strip. It interferes in trade union elections, allowing some and preventing others. The repression by the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip of the Bedna Neish (We Want to Live) movement back in 2019 contributed to the loss of the Islamic Bloc's popularity at Birzeit University. In that year, al Shabiba won more student votes than the Islamic Bloc.[13]

However, Hamas has been able to capitalize on its rhetoric regarding the resistance to occupation and the fact that it did engage in repeated armed confrontations with the Israeli army at a time when the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, championed by the PA, was dead and buried. The May 2021 war between Israel and Hamas led to a major spike in that movement’s popularity that benefited its student group, the Islamic Bloc. Within three months, Hamas managed to increase its popularity by one third as can be seen in the following figure.[14]

Figure (5): Voting intentions before and after the May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel (PCPSR’s polls # 79, March 2021 and # 80, June 2021)

5. How Israel, inadvertently, helps Hamas:

Days before the elections, the Israeli occupation forces carried out a series of arrests against a number of activists and candidates of the Islamic Bloc at the university. Hassan Farraj, a member of Fatah's Revolutionary Council and the person in charge of al Shabiba in the movement, believes that this interference by the occupation helps to increase the level of sympathy for the students of the Islamic Bloc and thus impacts the electoral preferences of the students. Farraj adds that these arrests create sympathy for those arrested by the occupation.[15] This was supported by a number of students, those who voted for al Shabiba and those who voted for the Islamic Bloc, who asserted that the arrests by the Israeli army contributes to increasing the popularity of the detainees and their student faction.

Recommendations:

The loss of al Shabiba and the victory of the Islamic Bloc can be attributed to a number of reasons, the most prominent of which is the mistakes and blunders made by the PA during 2021. Fatah and al Shabiba made their own mistakes as well; and Hamas was able to capitalize on its increased popularity in the aftermath of its May 2021 war with Israel.

The study concludes with a set of recommendations for the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, Hamas, and al Shabibah at Birzeit University.

To the PA:

• A policy of no-interference in student elections, as well as other student matters, especially by the Palestinian security services, is recommended. Such interference, when it occurs, reflects negatively on the results in light of the students' rejection of this PA behavior.
• It is recommended that the PA maintain the democratic process in the rest of the universities and unions and encourage the holding of elections in locations where they are not held.

To Fatah:

• The most important recommendation to Fatah is similar to the one made to the PA: stop the interference in the affairs of al Shabiba; give your youth the necessary space to make their own decisions and to act as a trade union serving the interests of its student base.
• Fatah should also reformulate its national program to be in sync with the national sentiments. For Fatah youth to win, they need to be seen as part of a leading movement engaged in the national struggle for liberty and freedom.
• Similarly, Fatah needs to be seen by the students as a movement in tune with the pulse of the public on local matters even if that means having distinctly different views than those of the PA.
• In particular, Fatah needs to reestablish its democratic credentials by holding its General Congress and electing its leadership in elections that are free of fear and intimidation with full representation to all sectors of its base.

To Hamas:

• The single most important recommendation to Hamas is to allow elections to be held regularly in local bodies, universities, trade unions, civil associations, etc., and allow more freedoms to dissenting activities and protests, and enable people to elect their representatives in their local councils. It is inconceivable that Hamas would pay tribute to its victories in West Bank universities while preventing elections and restricting freedoms in the Gaza Strip.

To the Shabiba:

• The single most important recommendation to al Shabiba is to move forward with strengthening its internal democratic practices and to hold internal elections for its bodies, as happened recently after the Birzeit University loss where its youth leadership was elected by the students.
• It should combat all negative phenomena within its ranks, such as regionalism and factionalism that lead to apathy, the dispersal of efforts, and the dispersal of votes.
• It should not embrace or defend unpopular PA policies as its own; as a youth movement it should strive to encourage critical thinking and open discussion of unpopular PA measures.

 Palestinians and Israelis distrust and fear each other. Evidence from joint Palestinian-Israeli survey research indicates that distrust and fear are detrimental to peace-making. It is suspected that school education, daily life experiences-- including economic costs related to the continuation of the status quo-- and exposure to mutual violence are critical sources that contribute to the very high levels of distrust and fear. 

The overall objective of this research is to map out, identify, and explain how and why each of these sources impede the efforts toward a successful peace process and what must be done, by both sides, to dry up or neutralize them. 

Specifically, we seek to:

(1) identify and map out the top three critical socio-political and economic elements the feed existing distrust thereby contributing to widespread misperception, unwillingness to compromise, and a stagnation in the peace process;

(2) empirically demonstrate a direct or indirect relationship between these sources and the high levels of mutual distrust and fear; and,

(3) building on our research findings, as well as experiences of other conflict areas in Europe and other places-- in which critical policy decisions related to school education, daily life experiences, such as movement, access, and economic opportunity, and modes of resistance were made—outline evidence-based policy recommendations that can potentially reduce mutual distrust/fear.

Palestinian-Israeli Joint Poll on Sources of Mutual Distrust: Mutual Palestinian-Israeli distrust, found at the core of peace failure, is generated by socio-psychological forces heightened by daily life hardships, exposure to violence, and widespread negative perceptions about the other side’s educational system

September 15, 2021 --------- Palestinian and Israeli public support for peace stands at the lowest point since the beginning of the peace process 28 years ago.  Just completed joint Palestinian-Israeli research reveals an unequivocal finding: extremely low level of mutual trust among the two publics is the most important explanation for the declining support of the peace process. The joint research sought to map out the sources of distrust and recommend policy measures to address the problem of the continually declining mutual trust.

The research was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) and the Macro Center for Political Economics during the past three years with funding from the European Union (EU). One of the surveys conducted for the project was funded by the Netherland Representative Office in Ramallah and the Japan Representative Office to Palestine through the UNDP/PAPP.

The joint research relied on surveys conducted in the second half of 2020 among representative samples of the two publics, survey experiments among those hardest-hit by the prolonged conflict and military occupation, educational and classroom experiments among students, all complemented with more than a dozen focus groups with students and those paying the highest cost of the conflict. The research was supplemented by case studies, review of textbook, the development of “objective” textbook passages, and a review of the recent history of peace education in Europe and elsewhere. The report on the historical review focused on the lessons learned from previous international examples and was discussed in a workshop for Palestinian, Israeli, and international professionals who spent years exploring this sensitive topic.

The Joint polls were conducted between August and November 2020 among representative samples of the two publics. Survey research experiments were conducted in January and February 2021 with focus groups soon after. A poll in the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse series, was conducted in August 2020 among a Palestinian sample of 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations and the margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample included 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Midgam in Hebrew and Arabic The margin of error is +/-3.34%. 

The joint poll on trust and the peace process was conducted among a Palestinian sample size of 1560 adults, including 592 youth, interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample included 1201 adults, of which 272 were youth, interviewed through the internet by Rafi Smith in Hebrew and Arabic. The combined Israeli and Palestinian data files have been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of the various groups and ages in the Palestinian and Israeli societies, and to reflect, for Israeli Jews, current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error for the Israeli poll is +/-3.34%. 

Our survey research and experiments among the general public, residents of hard-hit areas, and students indicate the following (for project reports and documents, visit PSR and Macro’s websites):

• The contexts of the two societies, the Israeli and the Palestinian, are very different, leading to different results. The findings of the Israeli surveys show that trust is mostly determined by the psychological repertoire of beliefs, attitudes and emotions that are imparted and shaped in the political, educational and social culture that can be viewed as a culture of conflict. Israelis are less affected by the difficulties of daily life and violent events because their lives take place in a very different context and they lead routinized life – a normal life in the conflict
• Findings among the Palestinians show a correlation between the widespread mutual distrust on the one hand and the daily life hardships, exposure to violence, and negative perceptions of the educational system on the other side on the other hand.
• The research unveils other roots of distrust: socio-psychological variables representing the repertoire that both side are carrying,  such as ethos of conflict and negative stereotyping relating to historic experiences and narratives. These variables indicate that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative stereotypes he or she holds regarding Palestinians or Israeli Jews, the more he/she finds the other side worthy of trust and therefore supports the peace process.
• The youth are more likely to hold hardline views, to indicate less trust, and to adhere to beliefs of ethos of conflict and hold stronger negative stereotype of the other.
• When linking support for peace with trust level, strong positive correlation emerges: the higher the trust, the higher the support for peace and the lower the trust, the lower the support for peace. Here is an example from our August 2020 joint poll: Palestinian support for the two-state solution stood at 60% among those who trust Israeli Jews and only 41% among those who distrust them; Israeli equivalent stood at 81% among those who trust Palestinians and only 34% among those who distrust them.  
• A dozen Educational and classroom experiments indicated that students are more likely to trust the other side and to have a more positive attitude toward peace when the classroom text presented by the teachers were “objective” or presented the other side in a positive light.
• Six survey research experiments found residents in areas of great hardships are more likely to distrust the other and to oppose the peace process.
• A dozen focus groups among students and residents of areas of great hardships confirmed the project findings and helped to articulate the link between trust and peace and the role played by the sources of distrust.

Recommendations: It goes without saying that only the ending of occupation and the building of permanent peace can bring about a real restoration of trust and begin the process of reconciliation. Yet as our research demonstrates, progress toward peace is linked to the restoration of trust and hope. A major societal change is needed to change the state of mind that is supporting distrust. It should be accompanied by change in the information provided by leaders, mass-media, schools, ceremonies, memorial days, the imparted collective memory and existing dominant political ideologies.  Additional interim measures are needed: change the reality on the ground, stop incitements and minimize negative language and phrasing, increase contact between People, deliberately use mass media to inform and enlighten, use the school system with the goal of changing the collective psychological repertoire of society; and encourage joint projects in less sensitive areas such as health, science, and agriculture.  

For more information or interviews: contact Khalil Shikaki, PSR director, at kshikaki@pcpsr.org or 02-296 4933, and.Roby Nathanson, General Director, MACRO at roby@macro.org.il or 03-5251057

(1) Review selections of textbook material to be used in classroom experiments, the organization of at least a dozen classroom experiments on each side, the Palestinian and the Israeli, involving selected material and students, and the organization of at least a dozen focus groups with each side with teachers and students in various school types, religious, governmental, private, etc.;

(2) two major surveys on each side among representative samples, with added samples for youth, to measure overall public and youth exposure to violence, hardships, as well as personal tragedies and examine the ramifications of the findings with focus groups, particularly the youth;

(3) specially designed survey research experiments and case studies in which respondents under different levels of stress and hardship are observed and interviewed and compared to similar respondents who are exposed to no or less suffering and hardships;

(4) evaluate experiences and review lessons learned from other conflict areas, particularly in Europe through background research and meetings and workshops with experts and historians; 

(5) prepare, publish and disseminate reports of findings of research and recommendations to the public and various beneficiaries, including the publication of proposed textbook material that can be used by both sides to supplement existing textbooks; and

(6) workshops with and briefings for various local and international policy making bodies, particularly among the final beneficiaries.

1) Educational Experiments and Textbook Passages for Sustainable Peace Education: 

Two rounds of educational experiments were conducted during the period of the project. Each round included three experiments with students from the three selected classes in the three types of schools. The goal of the experiments was to explore the impact of school curriculum, in three varieties, “nonpositive,” meaning one that focused on pain, suffering, and costs of conflict to one’s own side, “positive,” meaning one that focused on the benefits of peace and diplomacy and the need to reach out to the other side and understand its fears, and “objective” passages, meaning one that focused on the two sides of the coin, the positive and the negative in a balanced manner. The project sought to document the impact of these types of texts on the students’ perception of the other side and on the attitudes regarding the question of peace and the two-state solution.

Each experiment involved the following:

1) Student participation: between 12 and 24 students, males and females, participated in each experiment in the three levels or grades. The consent of the students and their parents was secured before the sessions were held.

2) A selected text was presented by a teacher in a classroom setting. In the first round, three experiments are conducted, with students from the three types of schools. the passages used, (positive and nonpositive) are those selected from the existing textbooks. In the second round, three experiments are conducted with the same students from the three types of schools. The passages used by the teachers in the second round were those designed by PSR’s team and labelled “objective.” Each experiment of the first round was divided into two sessions. The nonpositive text was used in the first session and the positive text was used and in the second session. In the second round of experiments, the teachers used the “objective” texts drafted by PSR’s team. Only one session was conducted in the second round.

3) Teachers and locations: for the two rounds, PSR asked the teacher of each subject to teach the chapter to his or her class in the same way it is normally thought. However, while some of the sessions were held at the schools (government, private, and Islamic), others were held at PSR. The purpose of each session was explained to the teacher of each subject.

4) Questionnaire: students participating in all the sessions in the two rounds were asked to fill out a questionnaire that aimed at measuring student perception of the other (the Israelis), level of trust, and attitudes regarding the peace process and the two-state solution.  The data was entered and analyzed in order to compare findings in the two rounds and in the two sessions in the first round.

Description of the experiments:

Each educational experiment has 18-24 student. Each educational experiment started with an introduction by the teacher. Then, each teacher presented and explained two lessons of the selected (one positive/one nonpositive) text book to his/her students. After each lesson, the students filled a questionnaire. 

Three experiments were conducted in the first round: :

1. The first experiment involved 22 students (males and females) from a government school and was held in two sessions. The first session was held on 17 September 2020 at PSR. The positive text used was on fulfilling commitments from a religion textbook for the 9^th grade. The nonpositive text used in the second session of the first experiment was on the grandfather’s memory from an Arabic textbook for the 9^th graders.

2. The second experiment was conducted inside the classroom with 18 female students from an Islamic school, the Islamic Society School in Ramallah. The students came from two grades, the 10^th and the 11^th and the session was held on 4 October 2020. The positive text addressed the issue of traditional life in Palestine from the Arabic subject for the 9^th grade. The nonpositive text address the killing of Palestinians by an Israeli sniper; the subject is also Arabic.

3. The third experiment was conducted with students from a private school, the American School, with a total of 24 male and female students. The positive text dealt with personal hygiene from the Arabic subject for the 9^th grade. The nonpositive text addressed the issue of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, also from the Arabic subject for the 9^th grade. 

Three additional educational experiments and three new focus groups were conducted in the second round of the educational experiments.

1. In the first experiment, 15 students from a governmental school participated in a session at PSR on 18 January 2021. The objective passage addressed in this session reviewed the recent history of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

2. In the second experiment, 14 female students form an Islamic school participated in a session at the school for students from the 10^th and 11^th grades. The session was held on 27 January 2021. The topic from the subject of religion addressed the common elements in the three Abrahamic religions.

3. In the third experiment, 12 students from a private school, the same American school used in the first round, participated in a session held on 9 February 2021. The objective text in civics address the issue of historic narratives of Palestinians and Israelis.

Findings:

Findings of the first round showed clearly that students attitudes and perceptions regarding trusting the other side changed based on the text presented to them. The positive text produced greater trust in the other side compared to the level trust when the nonpositive text was produced.  Findings showed that 78% of the students had a low trust level and 19% had a medium trust level and only 3% had a high trust level when discussing the nonpositive text. The distrust level went down considerably from 78% to 23%, the medium trust went up from 19% to 56% and the high trust went up from 3% to 20% when discussing the positive text. Other findings confirmed this trend: the belief that the best means of ending the Israeli occupation is reaching a peace agreement stood at 53% among those who have a high level of trust on the other side declining to 17% among those with low level of trust. 

Finding of round 2 reflected the fact that the only texts that were presented to the students were “objective” and were designed by the project team based on the lessons learned from the findings of round 1 and the other work that was generated by that time from other project activities, such as the work on lessons learned from the previous experiences in Europe and elsewhere in peace education.  These texts focused on what the research team labeled “facts” and reflected views that are shared by many Palestinians and Israelis. The findings of the survey that was conducted among the students in this round showed that 54% of the students continued to have a low level of trust in the other side while 21% showed high level of trust; a little over a quarter (26%) expressed a medium level of trust.  As we found in the first round, the increase in the level of trust led to a parallel increase in the acceptance of peace agreements as the best means of ending the conflict. For example, half of those with a high trust level endorsed peace agreements while the equivalent percentage stood at 11% among those with a low level of trust. The following table show the impact of text on the level of trust in the two rounds.

 In the second round of the educational experiments, three experiments were conducted with the same schools and classes of the first round between December 2020 – February 2021, 10-15 students each, at PSR in Ramallah except the Islamic school that took place at the school premises in Ramallah. In this round the teachers presented and explained a short (alternative) passages of textbooks material that were designed by PSR’s researchers. And as in the first round, one questionnaire was filled out by the students after presenting the designed textbooks material.

In the first year, after reviewing existing textbook material for the various grades between the 6^th and the 12^th, PSR’s team identified areas where vacuum exists. Initial draft covering three subjects, history, religion, and civics, were prepared. During the second year of the project, the team revised the initial drafts in consultation with students, school teachers, and administrators. Along with other beneficiaries, the team  came to the conclusion that these passages must be perceived at “objective,” reflecting the reality of conflict while aspiring to serve as texts useful for peace education. Emphasis was therefore placed on ensuring that the students are exposed to perspectives of the two sides, the costs of war and the benefits of peace, the cup half full and the cup half empty. Various drafts were tested on small groups of students. Semi-final draft were prepared by the end of the second year.

During the third year, further adjustments were made based on the findings of the first round of the educational experiments and the report on lessons learned from the European and other experiences. Three passages were finalized and used in the second round of the educational experiments.  Copies were exchanged with the body in the Palestinian Authorities responsible for the development of curriculum. Copies were also shared with the UNRWA leadership.

These are the titles of the three passages:

   Looking at the Other’s Viewpoint: Historical Narratives of Palestinians and Israelis Sustainable Peace Education 

Palestinians and Israelis use their different historical narratives to prove their rights or the basis of their presence in this country. Each party claims that it has proven the truth concerning its connection to this land, the land of historical Palestine. At the same time, this raises controversy and clashes between successive generations on both sides.

  The Oslo Agreement: The Difficult Road to Palestinian-Israeli Peace  Sustainable Peace Education

The peace process faced many obstacles on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. The Israeli government did not commit to transferring powers in accordance with the deadlines stipulated in the agreement, and continued to sponsor settlement activity in the Palestinian territories. The process also faced strong opposition from internal Palestinian parties, where some expressed their opposition by boycotting elections or refusing to participate in the PA authority. Others carried out bombing attacks against Israeli targets.

  Guidance and Light: The Doctrine of Monotheism in Revealed Religions Brings People Together and does not Divide Them Sustainable Peace Education

The basic idea in the three religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is centered on the doctrine of monotheism. This doctrine is derived from our prophet Ibrahim Al–Khalil, father of the prophets. The doctrine of monotheism is based on an established religious belief in one God with no second god and no partner. 

Focus groups:

Focus groups were used extensively in this project, particularly in our efforts to understand the impact of various educational texts on students’ perceptions of the other side. In addition to educational experiments, focus groups were used in our research into the impact of daily living conditions on perception of the other.

Focus groups for Educational Experiments, Round 1: The focus group for the first educational experiment in round (1) was conducted with the same students who participated in that experiment. It was held on 18 September. The purpose of the focus group session, which was held at PSR, was to discuss the findings of the questionnaire that the students had filled out during the experiment. The focus group of the second experiment was held with the same students who took part in that experiment. It took place on 5 October 2020. The focus group of the third experiment was held with the same students who took part in that experiment. It was held on 13 October 2020.

Round 2 of the educational focus groups: For round two, the focus group for the first experiment was held at PSR on 19 January 2021. The focus group of the second experiment was held on 28 January with the same students who took part in that experiment. The focus group of the third experiment was held with the same students who took part in that experiment. It was held on 10 February 2021.

Findings:

As indicated earlier, three types of schools participated in the focus groups. The finding of the focus group sessions in all of them were similar. When discussing the nonpositive text and the findings based on the answers of the students after that session, it was clear that the ideological tendencies among the students were compounded by the emotional responses generated by  the text contributed to the greater tendency to distrust the other: “they do not want peace; they want to demolish our homes, take away our land, expel us from our homeland, wage wars against us, and imprison and torture us.”

However, when reviewing the findings after the positive text, the emotional outbursts of the students were rare and the students were much more willing to engage in a more reasoned debate. In this environment, it was possible for the students to accept the concept of peace with the other. Students emphasized the importance of peace as the means to ensure security. Their demands now focused on the need for an honest implementation of agreements. When offered various scenarios to test willingness of the students to treat the other as a fellow human being the students showed remarkable openness and willingness to empathize and to emphasize the universal nature of human rights. 

Following the second round of the educational experiments, three focus groups were conducted with the the same schools and classes between January-February 2021. Each focus group has 10-15 student.

The focus groups in the second round discussed the significance of “objective” texts and the findings of the surveys that were conducted after each experiment. The findings confirmed what we saw when reviewing the impact of the positive texts> students were more considerate of other views and more open to new ideas. Students were more willing to emphasize the benefits of peace: “leads to restoration of rights and provides security to both sides.” But some were also interested in exploring the impact of peace failure: “what if it gave us a failed state? Will the settlers be removed? Will the state be truly sovereign and independent?” When discussing the importance of understanding the narrative of the other side, students distinguished between knowing and accepting  the other’s view of history: “while knowing the narrative of the other helps to reduce distrust, accepting the narrative of the other side is unacceptable because it means rejecting our own right to our land or accepting to be the scapegoats that pay the price for the oppression of the Jews throughout history.”

Survey Research Experiments and Case Studies The survey research experiments aimed at exploring the impact of daily living conditions, the hardships and suffering and exposure to violence, under a prolonged conflict. In order to select the areas, groups, and topis that would be the focus of the experiments, the Palestinian research team examined existing literature on life under occupation. Moreover, the team gained additional insights from the findings of the optional survey. Three areas/topics were selected: the H2 area in Hebron for their suffering from settlers’ attacks; the areas directly impacted by the location of the separation barrier; and those Palestinians residing in area C and denied building permits or see their homes and properties destroyed.

PSR has selected 243 participants for its three survey experiments in the following manner:

1)  80 people were selected for each area or experiment. Before the interviews were conducted, the respondents gave an oral consent. Respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their responses and were assured that they could stop the interview at any time and could refuse to answer any of the questions. The interviews were conducted between 25 January – 3 February 2021.

2) In the selected areas/topics, three localities were selected in which two were areas in which our optional and comprehensive surveys have shown significant hardships and one in which it indicated little or no significant hardships.  3) 27 individuals were selected in each locality.

3) Half of the sample comprised young respondents between the ages of 18- and 29-year-olds.

4) In areas of hardships, the coordinators have surveyed the area and asked local people before determining the plan for the selection of the respondents. After setting the plan, interviewers selected the homes, explained the purpose of the research to the selected adult respondents, asked if the criteria of hardships apply to the selected respondents. Once criteria confirmed, the interview was conducted with that person after obtaining his or her consent.  Once completed, the interviewers proceeded to the next home determined randomly by the plan. All respondents were asked to identify other areas in their neighbourhoods with similar level of hardships.

5) In areas where people were not expected to suffer from significant hardships, respondents were not asked to identify other potential areas with a similar low level of hardships. The selection of the homes was done randomly based on existing maps

6) Respondents were asked to identify themselves for two reasons: they compensated in the amount of NIS 50 per respondent (respondents have had to sign a receipt for that amount) and because they might be potentially selected for the focus group discussion and therefore, they needed to provide a phone number so that they can be called later to arrange for the focus group.  

Findings:

The survey experiments demonstrate the validity of our hypothesis on the Palestinian side: the greater the hardships, the greater the level of distrust and the opposition to the peace process.  The areas selected did indeed show greater hardships with 78% to 100% of the respondents in those areas indicating extreme hardships and or exposure to violence, particularly when compared to those living in area A, where the level of hardships diminished to only 40%. 

Findings show that the level of distrust in Israelis stood at 86% in areas of high hardships declining  to  77% in areas of low hardships. And 82% in areas of medium hardships. High support for the peace process among those with low level of trust stood at 3% and medium support at 21%. By contrast the equivalent percentages were 35% and 29% respectively among those with a medium level of trust. For those expressing a high level of trust, support for the peace process stood at 100%.  Findings have also shown that high support for the peace process stood at 13% among those with the highest level of hardships, 21% among those with the medium level of hardships, and only 7% among those with the highest level of hardships. 

Two focus groups were conducted   at PSR, both on 1 March 2021 with 12 participants in each group from among those who participated in the survey research experiments. Participants’ difficulties were the result of the building of settlement, the building of the separation barrier in the West Bank, and those residing in the H2 area of Hebron or area C. We also invited people with much less exposure to such difficulties and violence, such as those living in area A of the West Bank.

Findings of these focus groups showed significant lack of trust in Israelis among those with the highest level of difficulties. Similarly, those with the highest level of distrust showed little confidence in and support for the peace process. While some of the attitudes expressed by participants reflected ideological predispositions, others reflected the experiences of living through daily hardships or being witnesses to violence and hardships.

One participant expressed anger and hate: “My own land was confiscated to allow for the building of the separation barrier; I saw my own land, the one that has been in my family for generations, being taken away from me and my children without justification. On top of that, I was then arrested and thrown in jail. How can I not distrust and hate?” One participant from area A expressed the view that such Israeli practices must stop if peace is to prevail. One participant from expressed the view that “settlers’ violence, checkpoints, and army attacks make life a living hell, ensures there will never be peace. This comes from our own daily life experiences; we see violence every day. We therefore do not trust the state of Israel.” One of the participants whose land is located behind the separation barrier described daily life in the following terms: “Every day, I spend at least one hour of my time waiting at the gate each way. How can I trust Israelis and be convinced they want peace?”   

Three case studies were written based on the findings of the survery experiments, focus groups, and other projects surveys. The purpose of the case studies is to use specific examples and dynamics generated by the prolonged conflict that can illustrate and demonstrate the correlation between exposure to hardships and violence on one hand and diminished trust in the other on the other hand. The case studies are selected with that goal in mind. The evidence they rely on are based on various tools utilized in the project: surveys, survey research experiments, focus groups, and interviews with victims, activists, and policy makers. In describing the hardships, these case studies rely not only on the findings demonstrated by these tools, but also on existing evidence gathered by local and international agencies. Here below is a description of the six Palestinian and Israeli case studies.

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Life in areas adjacent to the separation wall as a case study 

This case study focused on studying one of the areas where suffering is high, those directly impacted by the construction of the Israeli separation wall, with the consequent barriers and restrictions on the residents, and how this affected the attitudes and perceptions of the people residing in the area towards the Israelis and the peace process.

The paper is intended to be a policy paper, discussing ways to alleviate the difficulties of life experienced by citizens in the areas adjacent to the wall, in an attempt to present a set of recommendations to the Palestinian government, Palestinian civil society, the international community, and the Israeli government that can be built upon in an attempt to enhance trust between the two parties if they want to move forward, in a serious peace process that ends all outstanding issues.

The paper utilized the findings of two public opinion polls conducted in the second half of 2020 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) on trust in the other side as well as  three survey experiments conducted in January 2021 among a sample of 243 individuals, including 162 who live in areas of severe hardships due to the wall and other hardships of daily life under occupation, and 81 individuals from areas of less suffering that are more remote from areas of friction. One of the three survey experiments was conducted om the residents directly affected by the separation wall or barrier. We also held two focus groups to discuss the results of the two surveys and the survey experiments to explore perceptions of individuals directly affected by daily life difficulties in the selected hardships areas. The paper also relied on many interviews with decision-makers, specialists, and citizens, and on several press reports that dealt with the subject, in addition to reports issued by Palestinian and international institutions.

The findings of this case studies provide evidence confirming the basic hypothesis of the project. Here is one example from the case under investigation. The results of the surveys and experiments conducted among the residents of those areas adjacent to the wall indicate that the greater the difficulties, the less the trust in the Israelis and the less support for the peace process. For example, 86% of those who suffer from high difficulties say they have low trust in Israeli Jews, only 1% of them have high trust, and 13% have medium trust. Trust increases slightly among those who suffer from fewer difficulties, as 23% of them have medium trust and 77% have low trust. This is also reflected in support for the peace process. While 73% of those who suffer from high difficulties have low support for the peace process, 58% and 61%, respectively, of those who have moderate or little difficulties have low support for the peace process. 

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Settlers’ attacks in H-2 areas of Hebron as a case study  

This case study aimed at studying the difficulties caused by the settlers’ attacks on Palestinian residents of H2 area in the city of Hebron, which is one of the areas in which daily suffering and life difficulties increases dramatically as a result of the prolonged occupation and the settlers’ attacks in particular, and how this affects the attitudes and perceptions of the people of the area towards the Israelis and the peace process. As in the other two cases, this one too shows that the difficulties of daily life and the exposure to violence resulting from the conflict play an important role in reducing trust and increasing opposition to the peace process.

Also, like the other two, this case study relied on the findings of the surveys and experiments conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) on trust in the other party. The survey experiment specific to this paper was conducted in January 2021. The paper also relied on the findings of two focus groups that were organized by PSR to discuss the results of the attitudinal surveys and the survey experiments. Moreover, interviews with decision - makers, specialists, and citizens were conducted for a better understanding of the underlying forces at play in areas of increased suffering and hardships. We also relied on a set of press and documentary reports that dealt with the subject in addition to reports issued by Palestinian and international institutions.

Most of the residents of H2 are more likely than others to be subjected to violence by settlers and the occupation. The results obtained from a survey conducted for the residents of those areas indicate that the greater the difficulties, the less trust in the Israelis and the less support for a peace process between the two sides. The results of surveys among young people (18-29) also showed that there is a close relationship between difficulties and trust. The greater the difficulty, the lower the trust. The same applies to the elderly (30 and over), but to a lesser degree. Findings also show higher levels of distrust among those who have been exposed to more violence at the hands of the Israelis, reaching 87% among those who have been exposed to the highest levels and declining to 82% among those who have been subjected to a lower degree of violence.

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Home demolition and denial of building permits as a case study  

This case study examined the impact of the Israeli policies in denying Palestinian’s housing improvement. It aims to examine the impact of the difficulties in obtaining building permits and the policy of house demolition in Area C on the level of Palestinians’ trust in the Israeli side, and the extent of its impact on the level of support for the peace process with the Israelis.  The paper relied on the same data as the other two case studies. One of the survey experiments was carried out among residents living in areas suffering the most from house demolitions and denial of building permits. Focus groups and interviews helped to shed greater light on the relationship between hardships and distrust.

It is worth pointing out that the results of the survey experiment conducted by PSR, unlike the findings in the other case studies, indicate that there are no significant differences in the levels of trust in the Israelis among Palestinians who were refused a building permit or had their homes demolished compared to Palestinians who were not. However, about 78% of those who were refused building permits or had their homes demolished say that they have experienced high difficulties, compared to 40% of those who live in areas that do not experience difficulties in obtaining building permits from the Israeli authorities or demolishing homes. 

Joint Palestinian-Israeli public opinion polls on trust

Two surveys were conducted for this project: 

After finalizing the questionnaire, PSR conducted four training sessions for its fieldworkers: three trainings sessions in the west bank (north, middle and south), and one training session in Gaza. The Palestinian sample size was 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 12-26 August, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Midgam in Hebrew and Arabic 12 August and 3 September 2020. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3.34%.  The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, Dr. Nimrod Rosler from Tel Aviv University and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin.

Here are some of the relevant findings of the first survey:

• Levels of trust in the other side are very low: 90% of Palestinians and 79% of Israeli Jews think the other side is not trust worthy. When asked about the role of leadership in fostering distrust: 40% of Israeli Jews, 44% of Israeli Arabs, and 34% of the Palestinians expressed the view that their side’s leadership diminishes trust with the other side. By contrast, two thirds of Israeli Jews, 38% of Israeli Arabs, and 78% of Palestinians think the leadership on the other side diminishes trust.
• When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 34% of the Palestinians (49% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip) 41% of Israeli Jews choose “reach a peace agreement.” This represents a decrease in support for a peace agreement among Palestinians and Israeli Jews compared to only 41% and 45% respectively who chose this option in 2018.  37% of Palestinians (compared to 27% two years ago) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 19% call for “a definitive war with the Palestinians” compared to 20% in 2018.
• Support for the two-state solution remains relatively stable at 43% among Palestinians and among Israeli Jews declines just slightly from 43% in mid-2018 to 42%. Among all Israelis, Jews and Arabs, 44% in total support the two-state solution. This is the lowest level of support for this concept among Israeli Jews, and all Israelis, since the beginning of the Pulse, in June 2016. Still, fewer people on both sides support two possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights and one state without rights.
•  Palestinians and Israelis were presented with a peace package identical to the one we presented to them in mid-2018 and representing a modified version of the package we presented to both sides five times during the past four years. Findings show significant drop in support among the two publics. Only 27% of Palestinians (compared to 42% in mid-2018, a 15-point drop) and 36% of Israeli Jews (compared to 45% two years ago, a 9-point drop) support a permanent peace agreement package, along with 49% of Israeli Arabs. In total, 38% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic, the bilateral agreement will be part of a regional agreement along the lines of the Arab Peace Initiative, the US and major Arab countries will ensure full implementation of the agreement by both sides, and the end of the conflict and claims. Fifty one percent of all Israelis (56% of Israeli Jews) and 70% of Palestinians are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package.
• The survey also tested the likely impact of previously tested zero-sum incentives on the level of support for the peace package. Drawing on six such incentives, we paired measures that show reciprocal benefits but also costs for each side. This is the second time that we have conducted this experiment. In this experiment, which was conducted among half the sample, we changed the pairs that were tested as the goal has been to pair incentives that received similar levels of success in previous test. Findings in the previous experiment, in mid-2018, showed significant success among Israeli Jews but very little success among the Palestinians. The current findings show significant potential for success among both publics, but the success among Israeli Jews remains greater: six of the six pairs generated higher levels of support for the peace package among Israeli Jews while on the Palestinian side only four generated higher levels of support. As a result, three pairs caused a majority of Jewish Israelis to say they were more likely to support the package while none of the paired incentives convinced a majority of Palestinians to say they were more likely to support the detailed two-state package.
• Moreover, the current joint poll conducted a second experiment among the other half of the sample. In this one, we sought to understand the hierarchy of priorities for the two publics: what were their most important demands and what concessions were the most difficult for them to make versus those that were less difficult. Broadly, for Israelis the top priority for demands involved symbolic recognition of the Jewish connection to the land, and the demand that Palestinians imprison those involved in violence. However, a plurality did not believe Israel should have to make concessions in return for its own demands, indicating that Israeli demands should be unconditional. Similarly, on the Palestinian side, a majority declined to choose a specific concession Palestinians should make in return for its negotiators’ demands. Yet the top demand Palestinians prioritized was the release of Palestinian prisoners; the main concession they accepted – those who chose one – was removing incitement from textbooks.
• A second peace package was tested in this poll: Trump’s peace plan, or the deal of the century. Like the peace package we have tested over the years, this one was broken into its most important components. The public was asked about each one and the package as a whole. Findings are dramatic: 93% of the Palestinians opposed the plan and 5% accepted it. Among Israelis, a majority of Israeli Jews (51%) accepted it, 30% rejected it, and 19% did not know or were uncertain. A large majority of Palestinians (69%) thought that Israeli Jews would accept the plan. On the Israeli side, two thirds thought the Palestinians would reject the plan.  

Second Survey:

PSR and its new partner, MACRO, reviewed the comprehensive survey questionnaire that was prepared by PSR during the first and the second year of the project and agreed on major modifications. Before the end of the third year, the two teams agreed on a final version.  Before conducting the survey, four training sessions were conducted by PSR in October 2020 to PSR’s fieldworkers: three training sessions in the West Banks (North, Middle and South), and one training session in Gaza.

The Palestinian sample size was 1560 adults, including 592 youth, interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between 29 October to 1 November, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 1201 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Rafi Smith in Hebrew and Arabic on 00 November 2020. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli and Palestinian data files have been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of the various groups and ages in the Palestinian and Israeli societies, and to reflect, for Israeli Jews, current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error for the Israeli poll is +/-3.34%. 

Findings:

Here are some of the main findings of the joint comprehensive survey:

Israeli and Palestinian Support for Peace: Our most unequivocal finding shows that trust is the most important predictor of support in the peace process among respondents from both sides.

On the Israelis side, we found additional socio-psychological variables such as ethos and stereotyping, which indicated that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative stereotypes he holds regarding Palestinians, the more he/she supports the peace process.

Among the Palestinians, we asked about support for the concept and details of the two-state solution. But peace has also been defined in term of support and opposition to an agreement based on many associated compromises as well as expression of attitudes consistent with that solution. For example, we examined attitudes regarding related topics: violence vs. diplomacy and perceptions of the other and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does. We also probed the extent of zero-sum beliefs. These and other relevant questions informed our peace indicator building. The indicator of peace, has three levels: high, medium, and low. The peace indicators’ building exercise showed that support for peace is predominantly low in the two joint polls, but most significantly in the October poll, when an expanded set of 13 questions were used to build this peace indicator while only four were used to build the August indicator.

Israeli and Palestinian Distrust: On the Israeli side, the results indicate a low level of trust towards Palestinians, expressed by the Jewish samples. However, Israeli Arabs expressed somewhat a higher level of trust towards Palestinians. Both groups did not differentiate significantly in trust towards Palestinians in general and towards their leaders. The results of the Jewish sample in the survey study 2 show that most of the Jewish respondents (34.1%) attributed their lack of trust to the “Palestinian education system, which incites against Jews”.

Among the Palestinians, findings of our two joint surveys indicate that the levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. A solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. For trust, the building of the indicator went through three steps: the first step was to build an indicator based on measuring direct questions about willingness to trust the other side. The second step was based on a set of indirect questions about trust. In the third step, we combined the two indicators into one. Findings show mostly low levels of trust for all three trust indicators, but more so in October and in trust indicator #3 (the combined trust indicator). A large set of questions (15 direct and indirect questions) was used to build the October trust indicator while only five direct and indirect questions were used to build the August indicator.

Conclusions: The present study unveils the roots of distrust in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study shows that although exposure to violence related to the conflict, experience of violence and hardships, and negative perceptions of the educational system of the other side have some effect on trust, particularly among the Palestinians who live under the harsh reality of military occupation, the primary determinants, particularly among the Israelis, are the socio-psychological variables representing the repertoire that Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs are carrying. This repertoire includes beliefs, attitudes and emotions. Among Israeli Jews, these beliefs and attitudes of the conflict take the form of stereotypes, ethos of conflict, concerns about antisemitism and holocaust and political orientation. They lead also to cognitive closure, reflected in refusal to acquire information from a Palestinian. This socio-psychological repertoire influences what information receives attention and the way in which it is mentally coded and organized. Next, it functions as an interpretive framework, influencing evaluations, judgments, predictions and conclusions drawn by Israelis. This repertoire is the key determinant of trust. For example, Israeli Jews, who negatively stereotype Palestinians and even delegitimize them, while adhering to ethos of conflict as their ideology, show distrust towards Palestinians.

What should be of great concern is the well-established findings showing that this repertoire is acquired at the very early age. This is unavoidable, as children learn this repertoire from all agents of socialization, including parents, leaders, television, literature, teachers, social media and schoolbooks. The beliefs and attitudes regarding the conflict learned by children at an early age remain in their socio-psychological repertoire and may have latent influence later on. These contents serve as fertile ground for the later development of conflict attitudes. They may constitute a part of children’s general worldviews which remains relatively constant across time. Eventually, these will pose a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution.

Recommendations

Living under military occupation, Palestinians experience hardships and exposure to violence on daily basis. We suggest that these are some of the reasons for such strong distrust of Israeli Jews. On the Israeli Jewish side, some of these reasons also lies in the cultural-societal-political climate of the Israeli society, as reflected in the information provided by leaders, mass-media, schools, ceremonies, memorial days, the imparted collective memory and existing dominant political ideologies. On the Palestinian side, changing the reality on the ground and restoring hope for peace and the two-state solution is essential for restoring some level of trust. On the Israeli Jewish side, a major societal change is needed to change the state of mind that is supporting distrust. On both sides, conflict supporting narratives need to be addressed before any trust can be restored.

1. Change the new reality on the ground: For Palestinians, the reality on the ground worsen by the day as land is confiscated, homes demolished, movement and access restricted, and settlers’ violence increases. The siege and blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip and the frequent eruption of massive violence and destruction of civilian infrastructure make the Strip a big prison for the two million Palestinians living in it. Israelis too, but particularly those who live in the south suffer the occasional barrages of rockets from the Gaza Strip while settlers who live in the occupied West Bank, face occasional violence and rock throwing. Although Palestinian and Israeli authorities coordinate with each other on essential civil and security matters, no dialogue takes place on how to ease daily living conditions, stop the building of settlements, or eradicate violence. To be effective in reducing distrust and hate, coordination between the two sides need to cover all these additional areas of daily friction and difficulties and search for ways to deliver security to both sides. It goes without saying that only the ending of occupation and the building of permanent peace can bring about a real restoration of trust and begin the process of reconciliation.
2. Stop incitements and minimize negative language and phrasing: Various formal and informal sources in Israel, present the Palestinian school textbooks, teachers, mass media and the leaders as inciting against Israel, Zionism (Jewish Nationalism) and as being anti-Semitic. This practice can be found also on the Palestinian side. It is exaggerated and augmented serving the struggle between the two contradicting and rival narratives.
3. Contact between People:  Contact between members of the two societies is one of the most researched methods to change beliefs, attitudes, and emotions in order to improve the relations between them.
4. Use of mass media: Mass media is one of the most powerful agents that provides information and shapes public opinion. Mass media should stop presenting the other side in negative way and develop peace journalism.  It can supply major information about the other group; it can supply major information about the culture of the other- with films, theatrical plays, or entertainment programs; it can enlighten in a balance way, the eruption of the conflict, its major events and costs that have been paid for continuation of the conflict.    
5. Education: In the long run, education constitutes one of the most important methods for eradicating distrust. This method involves using the school system since this system is often the only institution of which the society can make wide scope use to change the psychological repertoire of society members. Education for building trust must begin at an early age and continue through the years of schooling. Also, it is possible to a establish joint Israeli-Palestinian committee to examine existing textbooks and curricula to eliminate any derogative expressions.  
6. Joint Projects: Joint projects of various kinds, but particularly those that are less sensitive, can serve as a method for building trust. They can be in different areas such as health, agriculture, or science. Joint projects can foster links between members of the two groups at different levels of society, such as elites, professionals, as well as grass roots. This method provides opportunities for personal encounters in which past opponents can form personal relations.

The following material represent the publications of our joint research.

 Questionnaire of the first joint poll 

Questionnaire of the second joint poll

Table of findings of the first joint poll

Table of findings of the second joint poll coming soon

Summary Report of findings of the joint polls 

Combined Report of findings of the joint polls

Palestinian Report of findings of the joint polls

Israeli Report of findings of the joint polls

Sustainable Peace Education: Report on lessons learned from Europe and elsewhere

This report studies the practice of peace education. It offers an introduction into the way peace education has developed over time and how it is addressed academically. It draws from concrete examples mainly from Europe, while considering lessons from successful experiences for Israel/Palestine. 

PSR and Macro commissioned Prof. Dr. Stephan Stetter, from the Bundeswehr University Munich, to prepare a report on lessons learned and evaluate experiences from other conflict areas, particularly in Europe. Stephan Stetter holds the Chair in International Politics and Conflict Studies at the Universität der Bundeswehr in Munich. He has studied political science, sociology and history at the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, the Hebrew University of Jersualem and the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) where he has received his MSc (with distinction). He holds a PhD from the LSE (2004) and has written his dissertation on EU Foreign and Interior Policies at the LSE and the European University Institute in Florence. From 2003 until 2006 he was a researcher at the Institute for World Society Studies at Bielefeld Universität Bielefeld. From 2007 until 2008 he was a temporary Professor for Political Science at Bielefeld University. He received his Habilitation from the Faculty of Sociology at Bielefeld University in January 2008 with a work on "World Society and the Middle East". Since October 2008 he holds the Chair in International Politics and Conflict Studies at the Universität der Bundeswehr München. Stephan Stetter's main areas of expertise are Middle East politics (with a special focus on Israel/Palestine), theories of world politics, conflicts and globalisation/world society as well as EU foreign policies, in particular Euro-Mediterranean relations. He is the author of "World Society and the Middle East: Reconstructions in Regional Politics (Palgrave, 2008) and "EU Foreign and Interior Policies : Cross-Pillar Politics and the Social Construction of Sovereignty"(Routledge, 2007). He has published widely in leading peer-reviewed academic journals such as International Organization, Review of International Studies, Mediterranean Politics and Journal of European Public Policy. He is editor of several books such as "Territorial Conflicts in World Society" (Routledge, 2007), "The European Union and Border Conflicts" (Cambridge University Press, 2008, with Thomas Diez and Mathias Albert) and "Der Nahe Osten im Umbruch" (VS-Verlag 2009, with Martin Beck, Cilja Harders and Annette Jünemann). Since 2003 Stephan Stetter is EU-coordinator of the Israeli-European Policy Network (IEPN). In that capacity he has published jointly with Roby Nathanson four books on EU-Israeli relations and is also editor of the IEPN Working Paper Series.

PSR has asked Prof. Stetter to conclude his report with specific recommendations regarding the range of issues covered in the research: 1) how to design an educational system that promotes greater reconciliation, 2) how to remove or mitigate the consequences of hardships inflicted on individuals, groups and communities by the conflict, and (3) how to reverse the consequences of exposure to violence, particularly on the youth.

After reviewing the first draft of Prof. Stetter report by PSR and MACRO, Prof. Stetter revised his report and has prepared a semi-final version of the report that was discussed with experts form Palestine, Israel and Europe in a virtual workshop (due to COVID 19) on 25 January 2021, see below.

The report studied the practice of peace education. It offered an introduction into the way peace education has developed over time and how it is addressed academically. It drew from concrete examples mainly from Europe, while considering lessons from successful experiences for Israel/Palestine. In section 2 of the report, core concepts were presented that are of key importance when dealing with peace education, namely the concepts of “peace education”, “conflict” and “peace” as well as the notions of “(local) peace-building” and “(post-) conflict societies”. Section 3 looked at peace education in detail. It is divided in three sub-sections. It, firstly, offered an overview on how peace education is defined today in key policy documents, mainly from the international level where this concept has become mainstreamed. It secondly provided for an overview on the history of the practice of peace education, a history that dates back to the 19^th century and attempts in that period for pedagogical reforms, on the one hand, and peaceful political relations between nations, on the other. Thirdly, by looking at contemporary practical experiences mainly in Europe this section discussed achievements but also pitfalls of peace education. Special attention was given here to the cases of Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the process of European integration under the umbrella of the EU. Section 4 looked at two specific intervening contexts of relevance to peace education. On the one hand, the role of everyday dynamics and concrete life experience of people in conflict-settings were addressed and how they are fostering or hampering peace education. On the other hand, the impact exposures to violence have on peace education. What was emphasized here is the central role of violence in rendering mutual distrust a fundament of social relations, but also the strategic use of violence that works against peace education. Throughout sections 3 and 4 reference to the Israel/Palestine case was made in order to highlight similarities and differences with European experiences. The paper closed with a summary of successful examples from Europe and policy recommendations for Israel and Palestine.

Here are the links to the publications in English:

1) Three Palestinian short passages of textbook material:
   Looking at the Other’s Viewpoint: Historical Narratives of Palestinians and Israelis Sustainable Peace Education 

What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

  The Oslo Agreement: The Difficult Road to Palestinian-Israeli Peace  Sustainable Peace Education

What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

  Guidance and Light: The Doctrine of Monotheism in Revealed Religions Brings People Together and does not Divide Them Sustainable Peace Education

What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

2) One report on lessons gained from other experiences:

What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

3) Three Palestinian case studies:  

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Life in areas adjacent to the separation wall as a case study:

What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Settlers’ attacks in H-2 areas of Hebron as a case study:

PSR case studies_H2 area_English.pdf (pcpsr.org)

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Home demolition and denial of building permits as a case study:

PSR case studies_building permits_English.pdf (pcpsr.org)

4) A joint Palestinian-Israeli report on the findings of the survey research and the survey research experiments on both sides.

Combined Report of findings of the joint polls:

Microsoft Word - Combined Report of Palestinian-Israeli Joint Polls.docx (pcpsr.org)

Summary Report of findings of the joint polls:

Summary Report of Joint Palestinian-Israeli Polls (pcpsr.org)

Palestinian Report of findings of the joint polls:

Microsoft Word - Palestinian Report of Joint Palestinian-Israeli Polls.docx (pcpsr.org)

Israeli Report of findings of the joint polls:

Microsoft Word - Israeli Report of Joint Palestinian-Israeli Polls.docx (pcpsr.org)

Questionnaire of the first joint poll:

Joint Poll Questionnaire English_August 2020.pdf (pcpsr.org)

Table of findings of the first joint poll:

Microsoft Word - Table of findings_english Joint Poll 6 June 2020.docx (pcpsr.org)

Questionnaire of the second joint poll:

1 (pcpsr.org)

The current difficult economic, social and psychological conditions in the Gaza Strip can only be understood when analyzed in the context of the blockade and repeated wars it has been suffering from since 2007. These conditions must also be placed in the context of internal division and a political failure in which all reconciliation efforts and factional dialogue led nowhere.  Even when a consensus emerged over holding general elections for the Legislative Council, the Presidency and the PLO National Council, success remained elusive. Nonetheless, while general elections cannot be held in the foreseeable future, the pressure of the successive crises in the Gaza Strip forces a search for a way out of the impasse. This paper proposes the holding of local elections in the Gaza Strip as a small step that might trigger a gradual wider process.  Local elections have been held three times in the northern governorates of the PA without the Gaza Strip’s participation since 2005. The paper argues that these local elections might provide a mechanism to gradually break the impasse and provide an opportunity for change that might enhance the confidence of the local community and its participation in administration and governance, enhance communication and engagement between local municipalities and the world, and might allow attracting projects to address pressing environmental crises and problems in the Gaza Strip.    The continuation of the current fait accompli will only have more negative effects on the population, regardless of how much Hamas strives to improve it.  The movement has already been hurt in appointing mayors even if it has made an effort to appoint the best in the management of the local bodies.

The Gaza Strip after 15 years of closure, wars, and the absence of elections:

The status quo in the Gaza Strip is characterized by the following:

1) Blocked political horizon and the loss of the hope for change: The political divide has led to the disruption of the democratic process and the fragmentation of the Palestinian political system. Palestinian division is likely to persist given the absence of any serious prospects for Palestinian reconciliation. Local and regional reconciliation efforts have so far been met with failure. This aspect of the status quo has proven to be the most resilient and resistant to change.

Main qualitative indicators continue to deteriorate: The Israeli blockade and repeated wars have caused a sharp deterioration in all indicators of life in the Gaza Strip, including health, education and the economy, with 1.3 million of Gaza's 2.1 million Palestinians in need of food assistance,[1] unemployment levels rising to 46.6% during the first quarter of 2022 compared to the average of 34.8% in 2006, while 81.4% of Palestinian households in the Gaza Strip live below the poverty line[2].

Unending rounds of escalation between the factions in Gaza and the occupation army: Since 2007, the Gaza Strip has been subjected to five major wars, dozens of short violent eruptions, and military and security tensions, causing thousands of victims from all segments of society and destroying tens of thousands of homes and infrastructure.

Psycho-social effects and extremism: The split and infighting have directly contributed to dividing the political system leading to the absence of the democratic process and the denial of the right of the population to choose their representatives, leading further to a state of frustration, despair and lack of horizon among Gazans. This has also led to a rise in the desire to emigrate among young people reaching 37%,[3] to unprecedented levels of attempted suicides, widespread hate speech and incitement, and to the strengthening of the political and legal divide between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

Moreover, compelling living conditions, rampant manifestations of corruption in the political and economic classes, and the prevalence of revenge tendencies have led many young people to embrace extremist ideology.[4]  Hamas leader Khalil al-Haya said in 2015 at a session at the headquarters of the Legislative Council in Gaza that "our message to the whole world, which fears terrorism and extremism, is that delaying reconstruction and maintaining the siege on the Gaza Strip produce a suitable environment for the spawning of extremism and the increase of terrorism."

Proceeding from the fact that: (1) the continuation of the economic and political situation as it is has become untenable and represents a constant threat to the unity of the people and the opportunities for economic growth and political development, (2) the absence of opportunities to achieve reconciliation adds a further threat to the future of the Gaza Strip , and (3) the rejection by both Egypt and the Palestinian Authority of the option of creating a trade zone between Egypt and the Gaza Strip (because in their view it promotes the separation of the Gaza Strip away from the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority) reduces the prospects of ecnonmic development, (4) continued Israeli imposition of severe restrictions on the quality of goods entering Gaza, under the pretext of preventing the entry of "dual-use" goods, and on trade exchange with the West Bank and Israel adds yet another economic constraint, the holding of municipal elections in Gaza's governorates may present a gateway to a gradual exit from the crisis.

Why elections?

There are four reasons that call for the holding of local elections in the Gaza Strip:

Responding to legal entitlement and a developmental requirement: Holding elections for local bodies is a fulfillment of legal obligation based on the terms of law. It also provides an opportunity for change and sustainable development.  For the youth, it represents a sign of hope for a better future of political and social participation.

The renewal of legitimacy strengthens international engagement: The renewal of the legitimacy of local bodies that rely heavily on international support contributes significantly to obtaining grants, projects and assistance, especially since there are a wide range of challenges in the field of service delivery, deterioration of infrastructure, environmental, hygiene and health problems suffered by the governorates of the Gaza Strip.

Local elections could serve as a first step on the road to general elections: The holding of local elections in the Gaza Strip is a real opportunity to persuade the international community to meet the Palestinians' desire for change and push it to work harder with the Israeli government to facilitate the holding of general elections.

It serves Hamas' interest: The holding of elections for local bodies shows Hamas' faith in, and support for, the democratic process. In the past, it favored these elections and it now has an opportunity to demonstrate its real intentions.  The movement's approval and the quest to complete local elections in the Gaza Strip will strengthen its position as a political movement seeking to gain leadership through the election process thereby improving its image in front of the Palestinian society and the world. It is worth mentioning that Joseph Borrell, representing the EU foreign policy establishment, indicated on April 30, 2021, that the postponement of the Palestinian general elections, the first in 15 years, was "very disappointing."[5]  The EU had consistently supported the holding of credible, inclusive and transparent elections for all Palestinians. Thus, even if the results are not satisfactory to everyone, if Hamas wins, they will be acceptable to many among the international community. It is also worth mentioning that Hamas did participate, directly or indirectly, in the elections of local and various other societal bodies in the West Bank. Therefore, it goes without saying that it is the duty of Hamas to meet Gazans’ needs to elect their own local leaders.

Completing the local election process in the Gaza Strip

The Palestinian political system has almost never respected the constitutional and legal dates for elections, whether legislative, presidential or local.  Indeed, elections were held only when serving the political needs of the various political actors. In light of the Palestinian division, an additional constraint has been added leading to the holding of elections in certain parts of the Palestinian territories while abstaining from holding them in others. This happened with the local elections in 2012 when Hamas refused to participate in these elections and prevented them from taking place in the Gaza Strip. At that time, Hamas argued that holding local elections would have "deepened the state of division and increased tension."  Fatah on the other hand said that given the fact that the holding of comprehensive general elections was difficult, the least that could be done was to go ahead with local elections. In 2016, Hamas agreed to enter the elections and allow them to be held in Gaza, but no Gazan elections took place after the filing of appeals against six Fatah lists, all accepted by the Central Election Commission (CEC), leading to a decision by the High Court in Ramallah to allow the holding of elections in the West Bank but not in the Gaza Strip. In this case, the court’s reasoning was the “absence of a legitimate judiciary, one formed according to the Basic Law and other relevant laws.”

A breakthrough occurred in 2021 after a series of successful meetings between the CEC and the various Palestinian factions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. All factions, including Hamas, agreed to hold general elections.  The Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas issued Decree No. 3 of 2021 on January 15 specifying the dates for the holding of legislative, presidential, and National Council elections in three stages.

Three months later, in April 2021, a presidential decree No. (12) of 2021 was issued, providing for the postponement of the general elections, where the first article stated "Postponement of the general legislative and presidential elections and the National Council.... until the conditions for holding them are met in all Palestinian territories, especially Jerusalem, the capital, in accordance with the provisions of the law.”

Soon after that, the PA decided to hold local elections in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, in two phases. However, it was postponed in Gaza due to Hamas’ objections. In a press release on March 13, 2022, Hamas stressed that “fragmented elections” promote the approach of authoritarianism and exclusion, and that there is no solution except through inclusive national and local elections based on consensus.[6] Additionally, Hamas set three main conditions in order for it to allow the holding of elections for local bodies in the Gaza Strip. These included: first, that local elections should be part of the general elections, including parliamentary and presidential elections, and not a substitute for them; second, that there should be a written pledge from President Mahmoud Abbas to ensure that elections will not be cancelled at the last minute; and thirdly, for the president to retract the amendments he has made to the local elections law relating to the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance.

What can be gained by completing the local elections by holding them in the Gaza Strip

The right to participate: The holding of local elections enhances the chances of participation in the electoral process, the right to compete and vote, and restores dynamism to the Gaza Strip thus triggering greater activism and restoring hope in the face of the current stagnation. It can pump a new blood creating opportunities to address pressing issues and environmental problems in local bodies, and moves citizens from talking about wars and destruction to talking about hope and the future.

Easing tension and spreading hope among young people: Young people make up about two-thirds of Gaza's population (of two million people), none of whom participated in any elections whatsoever. The last local elections were held in the Gaza Strip in 2005. Depriving young people of participation in the selection of their representatives is a violation of the constitution; marginalizing young people and signaling to them their lack of importance, leading some of them to extremism and frustration.

The completion of local elections is a confidence building measure that could serve as a small step towards reconciliation: the completion of local elections will only take place in coordination between all relevant parties, namely the Palestinian government, CEC, and Hamas.  It is a new phase, not a new round of elections, and it requires approval from all parties. It will also be completed within the laws governing the electoral process that has already been held in the West Bank without the Gaza Strip. Therefore, it must have the same specifications and procedures for any elections held in Palestine based on the laws in force. This development will enhance the dialogue between the Palestinian factions, especially Hamas, with CEC, the PA, and Fatah. Coordination for the participation of international and civil society election monitoring teams will also legitimize these elections. Although optimism about reconciliation may be far from real, the holding of these local elections in the Gaza Strip can be seen as a small confidence building measure that might improve the chances of holding general elections when time becomes ripe for that process to restart. The holding of local elections in the Gaza Strip will be the first successful sign of a joint national effort since the split in 2007 and might generate greater trust between the two sides of the split, Fatah and Hamas, and will likely reopen the door for dialogue to address the problems of holding general elections.

Local elections are a competition for service delivery and should not be politicized:  Local elections are not as politicized as general elections, but are elections to renew legitimacy at the level of local administration and inject new blood, ideas and programs to serve the local community in service delivery sectors. Its results are expected to be acceptable even if Hamas wins, as the community of donors already deals with most municipalities in the Gaza Strip, and their Hamas-appointed heads. Several trade union elections have already been held with the participation of the Gaza Strip, the most recent of which was the Bar Association elections. All factions competed in the union elections and internal and external parties accepted the legitimacy of those elections and their results. All of this enhances the chances of holding local elections and reduces concerns about the international reaction regardless of their results, as most members of the international community, which demands the holding of elections, will find it difficult to reject their results. 

The difficulties of holding local elections in the Gaza Strip

Hamas' concerns: The most important challenge to holding local elections is Hamas' position as reflected in a letter it submitted to CEC. According to the CEC, Hamas has requested "written" guarantees before it would allow local elections to take place in the Gaza Strip. These guarantees sought to ensure that the election will not be postponed in the last minute. CEC added that Hamas's letter also included issues related to the electoral law, namely: "abolishing the composition of the Election Court and restoring the jurisdiction to decide on appeals to the courts of first instance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”[7]

Administrative and technical procedures for holding elections: There are legitimate questions and concerns about the technical and logistical aspects of holding elections in accordance with the existing laws. However, it should be noted that these issues and procedures are meant to facilitate, not complicate, the election process and that policy makers must show the required flexibility in putting them in place. Thus, when elections are desired and accepted by all parties, procedural and technical challenges should be addressed and overcome by consensus.

Conclusions

This paper argues that the holding of local elections in the Gaza Strip is essentially a completion of the election process that has already taken place but has not been implemented in that part of the Palestinian territory; it is not a separate electoral process.  Moreover, it believes that success in this matter might trigger greater dynamism in the Gaza Strip turning it into a workshop on many levels, while strengthening the economy and community engagement. It might also produce greater dialogue and constructive debate instead of the state of tension, hate speech and despair prevailing today.

Based on a review of the motives and difficulties, the paper also considers that holding local elections is a viable and practical option and may even constitute a small bridge towards Palestinian reconciliation. The completion of the municipal elections strengthens the cohesion of the Gaza Strip with the northern governorates in the  West Bank and achieves a tangible interest for the Palestinian Authority and the presidency. These elections are also in Hamas' interest in terms of easing societal tensions, addressing the phenomena of extremism and frustration, and easing the burdens of local government administration. They can also serve as a signal of Hamas’ commitment to pluralism, which will greatly help it gradually return to the formal Palestinian political system.

Within a four-week period, between the end of April and the end of May 2021, Hamas exchanged its former status as the leader of the “resistance’ and the representative of the interests of the Gaza Strip to the leader of the resistance and the representative of all interests of the Palestinian people in its relations with the Israeli occupation. It did not do that through elections or control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Palestinian Authority (PA). Instead, it did it by taking advantage of a leadership vacuum left by the PA and by winning the battle over the hearts and minds of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, i.e., under the Israeli occupation. In a rare moment in the history of the Palestinian people, the majority of those living under in these occupied areas declared that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people. It is certain that the public meant to convey a mandate to Hamas to take the initiative in responding to and addressing Israeli threats to the interests of the Palestinian people living under the occupation. It is also certain that the public did that because it believed that Hamas own something that the PA did not: capacity, political will, and the readiness to take the initiative and lead. This development, if sustained and consolidated, could represent a paradigm shift in internal relations and in Palestinian-Israeli relations. But the big question arises: can Hamas do that, even in the limited sense of representation and leadership and does it really wish to do that?

The presidential decree issued in mid-January is the first practical step for holding general elections, starting with elections for the Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority on May 22. Regardless of the seriousness and possibility of holding the third Palestinian legislative elections, which were delayed or caused to be delayed for more than ten years, the forces of the left must prepare for these elections and decide what they want: is it merely survival, or working, despite their relatively small size, to be a third, effective force in the Palestinian political system? 

This paper aims to discuss the left’s current options in dealing with the issue of legislative elections. It covers three such options: for the left-wing forces to contest the upcoming elections within a joint national list entailing components of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with or without Hamas, or as a unified left list, or with individual left lists. This paper highlights some of the advantages and drawbacks of these options. It ends with a proposal for a comprehensive, unified mobilization of the forces of the Palestinian left.

Background

If new legislative elections are held next May, they will be the third elections in 27 years since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority apparatus, after the elections of 1996 and 2006. These elections will be held through a different system from the previous ones, a full proportional representation system. The results of Public Opinion Poll No. 77 of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research indicate that, if new legislative elections are held with the participation of all political forces, 61% say that they will participate in them. The Hamas Change and Reform List will gain 34%, Fatah, 38%, and all other lists that had participated in the 2006 elections will gain 8% in total, while 20% have not yet decided who they will vote for. The findings indicate that 3 blocs (including two electoral lists, representing 4 parties/factions) who have passed the electoral threshold in the 2006 legislative elections, will not be able to do so if legislative elections are held today, taking into account a margin of error of +/- 3% and the transformation of the electoral system into one of full proportional representation.

As evidenced by the results of the aforementioned poll, the parties and fronts of the so-called Palestinian left may lose half their seats that they had collectively gained in the 2006 legislative elections, which were only 9 out of 132 seats. This expected loss is the result of the failure of these parties and fronts to maintain their principles and goals and implement their programs. Despite their awareness of this and their attempt to form a body that expresses minimum unity as a third force, such as the National Democratic Union that came into existence between September 2018 and January 2019, the calculations, based on narrow interests of the leaders of these parties and fronts, have caused them to lose another opportunity to protect themselves from extinction and prevent their exit from the Palestinian political scene. The experience of the Alternative List in the 2006 elections, which consisted of the Democratic Front coalition, the People’s Party, and the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA), was not a successful experiment in terms of persuading the masses to vote for it, because it was a temporary coalition that ended with the announcement of results, winning only two seats in those elections.

The forces of the left must realize that the Hamas-Fatah rapprochement and agreement express the depth of the crisis that the two movements have reached in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and do not express the alleged unity required to face the challenges witnessed by the Palestinians. This may be an opportunity for third or new forces to present themselves as alternatives. The depth of the Hamas crisis can be evidenced by its approval of the Fatah movement’s project based on the solution of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, at a time when many leaders of the Fatah movement themselves believe that this solution has become impossible and long dead. Likewise, the Hamas slogan of armed resistance has retreated from being a strategy to a mere tactic. This is evident in Hamas’ support, and then control, of the Return Marches that began in March 2018, as well as the fact that the last real armed confrontation with Israel was in 2014, and the various disputes between Hamas and Islamic Jihad about controlling and timing the use of arms.

On the other hand, the Fatah movement’s crisis appears to be deeper and more complex, leading it to the verge of fragmentation after its resounding failure, for more than a quarter of a century, to achieve its program based on the two-state solution, as well as its failure to build institutions capable of forming the nucleus of the state project. The slogans of “internationalization” and “changing the PA mandate” have not merely fallen, but brought the opposite results, ushering in Arab-Israeli normalization that has placed Fatah and its leadership in a spot of limited maneuver and submission, or a revolution for which it is no longer qualified.  The call for a popular resistance strategy-- which was adopted by all PLO factions, as well as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in the meeting of the general secretaries on September 3, 2020, which was held, allegedly, to confront the Deal of the Century and the wave of Arab-Israeli normalization-- has proven to be mere lip service. It has been more than six months since the first statement of the so-called Popular Resistance leadership, without the issuance of a second statement. This is evidence of a deficiency in describing the era, the program, and the appropriate tools. As a result, the call for popular resistance did not receive any response from the public. It should be noted that, according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Palestinian support for the two-state solution has declined from 55% in 2011 to 39% in 2020 despite the support it has from all Palestinian parties and movements (including Hamas, and with no objection from Islamic Jihad). Moreover, 62% of the public believe that this solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion, Support for the one-state solution in historic Palestine, with equal rights for all its citizens, has risen from 27% in 2011 to 37% in 2020, despite the fact that no Palestinian party or movement has adopted this solution.

The Hamas-Fatah dyad, based on partisan quotas and interests, which has forgotten or ignored their roles as national liberation movements, is not a true division, one based on the beliefs of the masses that support them. But it will remain as such in the absence of a real, third force. Palestinians today are thirsty for a party or a movement capable of mobilizing their energies and hopes, one that addresses their minds and present a revolutionary and a realistic vision and program.

Options and a window of opportunity

According to the results of the aforementioned poll, and after adding the percentage of those who will not participate in the elections (39%) and those who have not yet decided whom they will vote for (20% of the 61% who said they will participate), the total comes to 51% of all Palestinians who are entitled to vote. Thus, there is a real chance for a new party, faction or movement to convince the 39% to participate. It is believed that the main reason for the unwillingness to participate, among a large proportion of these, is their lack of confidence in the existing parties and movements, and also, perhaps, because they are not convinced of their programs. There is also a chance to reach out to the 20% of those who plan to participate in the elections, but have not yet decided to whom they will vote (12% of the total number eligible to vote). There is even an opportunity to compete for the votes of those who have already decided whom they will vote for, if the new party or movement is able to present a new, different, and perhaps revolutionary program, in terms of its nature and tools. Thus, the percentage of those who can be persuaded may reach more than 50% of all Palestinians who are entitled to vote. In other words, if a new party or movement is able to convince only 25% of all Palestinians who are entitled to vote, this party will outperform Fatah and Hamas and become the largest force in the Legislative Council.

The Palestinian left has three options. The first is to maintain a symbolic presence in the political system, as in the first option below. The second is to seek to exercise an influential role, by creating a unified left. This option however is dependent on the failure of Fatah and Hamas to create a joint list of their own. Finally, there is an option in which the left risks increasing its weakness, and possibly eradicating it completely from the political scene, in the form of individual lists of left parties.

(1) Joint National List

With reference to the outcomes of the dialogue between Hamas and Fatah, in particular, and other factions, in general, the last of which was held at Cairo on February 8 and 9, it appears that the idea of running in the next legislative elections with a joint list that includes Hamas, Fatah and the remaining PLO factions is under serious consideration by the official bodies of Fatah and Hamas.

Fatah may wish, through this joint list, to protect the movement from the almost certain fragmentation in its ranks, by restricting the ability of its prominent leaders to form electoral lists outside the official list of Fatah (the President’s list). The results of a public poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research last December indicated that, if Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti forms a list outside the official list of Fatah, his list would gain 25% of the votes, compared to 19% for the official list of Fatah. Similarly, if Mohammed Dahlan forms a list outside the official list of Fatah, his list would gain 7% of the votes, compared to 27% for the official list of Fatah. In both cases, the “official” Fatah list will lose to Hamas, which will receive about 33% of the votes. As for Hamas, it may have submitted to the idea of power-sharing and quotas, as it was not faithful to the votes cast by the majority in the last legislative elections. Perhaps Hamas sees the joint list as an opportunity for the beginning of its accession to and effective representation in PLO institutions, and an opportunity to be rid of the burdens of governance in Gaza, as well as an opportunity for its recognition by the international community, which has boycotted the government formed by Hamas after it won the majority of seats in the Legislative Council in 2006.

As for the forces of the left (Popular Front, Democratic Front, National Initiative, People’s Party and the Democratic Union – FIDA), they seem to be powerless, seeing in the joint national list a lifeline for their symbolic survival on the political scene, after the accumulated failure of their performance and the dissolution of most of their cadres and popular bases. There is a risk that most of them will not be able to reach the threshold, and thus may fall out of the political scene, if they run the upcoming legislative elections individually. If the forces of the Palestinian left want to preserve their current symbolic existence and dispense with the ambition of an alternative or influential force, they must join the joint list with Fatah and Hamas if such a list is agreed upon, or enter a joint list with Fatah and all the PLO factions. One of the advantages of this option is that it is easy to market as a unification option required by the current conditions, to keep the forces of the left in the political scene and give them an opportunity to try to reform their situation. It is also expected that the Fatah and Hamas movements will contribute to the bulk of the cost of the electoral campaign for this joint list, thus relieving the left of much-needed financial costs. However, among the drawbacks of this option is that it keeps these forces ineffective and under the influence of the two major parties, as it is not expected that Hamas and Fatah will agree to give these forces a weight (number of seats) greater than what they had jointly gained in the 2006 elections.Their presence and influence in the likely national unity government after the elections will be limited, as the Hamas-Fatah collusion may eliminate Fatah’s need to appease these factions by giving them ministerial portfolios, as was the case in the past. This option also denies the left the distinction (if any) in its programs.

(2) United Left List

There is a great opportunity for existing third forces or for new powers, especially if they are based on a new, young leadership that has not been tainted by the corruption of the Authority and the factions that constitute it. This should be seen as a call to all young men and women of the Palestinian left, in particular, and to all young men and women of Palestine, in general (who, in the 18-39 years age group, account for more than 60% of those with the right to vote, and, for more than half of the voters, it will be the first time in their lives that they are entitled to vote, being in the 18-32 years age group) to trust themselves and not to hesitate to present new, emancipatory visions and programs of struggle that address the minds of the masses, not in the defeatist “pragmatism” or the destructive militarism way, but in the belief that the will and unity of the masses, which trust their leadership, is capable of working miracles. 

The forces of the left must realize that their audience no longer accepts any excuse for the continued existence of this number of ineffective left-wing parties and fronts, especially that the key reasons for failure of all attempts to unify the left forces are considered by many as due to reasons and interests of particular leaders of those parties and fronts. Further, there is no programmatic or ideological reason that hinders this unity. Thus, one of the advantages of the option of a united left list is that it may restore some lost confidence in the parties and fronts of the Palestinian left. Several attempts have been made to accomplish this outcome. One should build on these efforts in order to achieve it in a short period of time (before the end of the candidacy period on March 31). Also, this option doubles the chances for this list to gain a number of seats that enable it to build an alliance with Fatah or Hamas, if the two parties run in the elections separately and neither gains a majority in the Legislative Council. However, one of the drawbacks of this option is that, if Hamas and Fatah are allied before or after the elections, these forces will remain weak. Even if these forces double their number of seats compared to the 2006 elections, they will not be able to rise to the level of an effective force if they do not properly appraise the conditions of the country and offer programs that treat the malaise in our political system while addressing the reasons for their own previous failures, including the inability to bring forth new leaders.  The leftist forces will do better if they ally themselves with social forces and independent figures that are close to their ideology while having a a presence at the grassroot level, such as the “Wa’ad” (promise) movement for homeland, justice and democracy, which announced its formation at a press conference on February 27, 2021, in Ramallah. The movement has declared that it is not “an electoral bloc”, but will support the lists seen as close to the issues and principles that the movement upholds. It is clear that most of the initiators of this movement are members and cadres with leftist backgrounds. We should keep in mind that the left today is not engaged with the needs and concerns of citizens, and, thus, its ability to properly decipher the public scene is hampered. It should remember the popular movement to bring down the Social Security law in 2018/2019, which was one of the most important reasons leading to overthrow of the previous government. Most of the leftist forces either supported or did not oppose the aforementioned law. Rather, the leadership pushed leftist leaders to the forefront to defend that law and try to convince the masses of its value. Eventually, the movement forced the PA president to abandon the law and stop its implementation.

(3) Individual Left Lists

In the event of failure to achieve the previous options, and given the fact that there has been no change in most or all of the top decision-makers in the forces of the left since the 2006 elections, these forces may choose to run in the next elections through separate lists or in coalitions similar to Badil (alternative) that ran in the previous election. one of the advantages of this option is that it gives the forces of the left the opportunity to present their own pure programs and visions, without having to compromise. It also gives them a greater margin of freedom and maneuver for potential coalitions after the elections. One or more of these forces may gain a number of seats that would force Fatah or Hamas to seek their participation in the next government, as neither Fatah nor Hamas are likely to obtain a majority that would enable it to form a government on its own. A drawback of this option is that some forces would risk failing to meet the threshold condition, thus increasing their weakness, potentially fading out, with the exception of the “Popular Front” which probably believes that it retains its presence and base of popularity to enable it to pass the threshold. Yet, this will not suffice to make it an influential force. Likewise, individual electoral campaigns for each list will multiply the demands on and deplete the financial resources of those forces that are in dire need of them. The left’s lack of financial resources has been the price it paid for submitting to the dictates of the PLO leadership which denied it the right to its legitimate share in the National Fund, allowing Fatah and its president to monopolize these resources and blackmail them on more than one occasion. Under this option, leftist factions will be forced to compromise further on their principles after the elections.

What to do?

To be an effective third force, the factions of the left must double their efforts, today, not only to maintain a presence in the Palestinian political scene, as in the first and second options, but to contribute to determining the next Palestinian domestic direction and the future direction of the relationship with Israel. The left and other third party fronts in the PLO, along with newly emerging parties wishing to be an alternative or influential third force, must review and study the causes of the “national project’s” crisis and the reality and the future of the PLO and its liberation program. The parties and fronts of the third force must also study the causes of failure of the aforementioned strategies and reconsider the reading and characterization of the status quo to be able to provide real programs and tools, removed from slogans. This requires a review of the pillars of the status quo and how to deal with them. For example, many leaders of these parties and fronts describe the situation that exists between the river and the sea as a reality of one state, ruled by Israel as “an apartheid system.” This is true, but how can this reality be marketed to the world to end it, given the continued existence of the PA apparatus? Here, it must be recalled that the majority of the Palestinian public (55%) sees the continued existence of the PA as a burden on it and on its cause.

The forces of the left that wish to become an alternative influential third force must instate a dramatic change that restores the confidence of their cadres and popular bases in them. They must take quick, practical steps, for example by electing or selecting a committee for unity and elections, from outside the governing bodies of each front/party, because these bodies have proved that they are part of the problem and cannot to be part of the solution. The public is eager to see new, young faces. The members of these committees may all be candidates for the upcoming legislative elections on a united left list. These committees should convene for several days to elect a leadership committee of 21 members from among them (it should be named the Higher Committee of Unity), with one representative, at least, of each party/front. This committee should make its decisions by an absolute majority (50%+1), in order to prepare the election program and everything related to the election campaign, and its decisions should be binding for the participating parties and fronts.

Among the disadvantages of this proposal is the lack of time (before the end of the candidacy period on March 31). Also, there does not seem to be real will among the leaders of the target forces to waive the privileges that they currently enjoy; rather, they will probably seek to uphold them. On the other hand, one of the advantages of this proposal is that it may be able to restore the confidence and energies of all the cadres and bases of the left forces, and may even represent a breakthrough, capable of attracting broad groups of society, as mentioned previously. This proposal, if adopted, make it more likely that the left will be better prepared to understand the nature of the status quo and present a political program that bypasses the challenges that led to the failure of previous strategies and slogans. If this happens, the leftist forces, with this new reality, will have a strong and influential presence in the political system, whether they are part of the government or the opposition.