Critical Policy Brief, Number 1/2021

January 2021

Can a Newly Elected Parliament Repair the Damage Done to the Palestinian Political System in its Absence?

agenda for political reform

Khalil Shikaki

In mid-January 2021, president Abbas issued a decree calling for holding parliamentary elections on 22 May. It is not certain that any elections will take place in the near future and the goal of holding such elections, if they do take place, is almost certainly not the reform of the political system. Indeed, the goal most emphasized by Palestinian leaders, from Fatah and Hamas alike, is “the unification of the Palestinians people.” Nonetheless, it is essential to explore the implications of the revival of a parliamentary life, in the form of an elected PLC, on the prospects for reform even if elections do not take place soon. Once a Palestinian parliament is created, the political system will find it impossible to continue its current slide to authoritarianism.

The paper outlines the main target areas of reform which the council should focus on from the first day of its existence. Doing so is critical to the success of the parliament in making itself a strong and effective public institution, one capable of representing the public that elected it and delivering on its promises to that public. The paper outlines the expected challenges that will confront the parliament as it sets its own agenda. If not addressed, these challenges can impede the parliament’s efforts to accomplish its mission in bringing accountability back into the Palestinian political system. Based on that review, the paper proposes a list of reform priorities that are relevant to parliament’s own role and function but can also have a multiplying effect on the entire political system. Despite their importance, this policy paper does not directly address highly relevant domestic issues, such as those dynamics that led to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, how to reform the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), what to do about the Palestinian regional problems or how to improve relations with Israel. Instead, it is restricted to those political issues that are directly related to the reform of the political system and particularly those that require parliamentary intervention. Moreover, in outlining the challenges and impediments to reform, the paper is focused essentially on the functioning of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and does not directly address the Hamas’ practices in the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that these practices have been more determinantal to the future of accountability in the political system.

Challenges: evidence of authoritarianism in the Palestinian Political System, 2007-2021:

In the past several years, the PA in the West Bank has taken several measures that have severely undermined good governance. Four areas have been damaged: the separation of power, the independence of the judiciary, the independence and pluralism of civil society and its organizations, and the media and freedom of expression. These areas should constitute the reform agenda of a newly elected PLC.

Without general elections since 2006, the impact of the four measures on PA institution building and governance has been destructive: rule of law has been sacrificed, the judiciary has been weakened and its independence damaged, media freedoms have been highly curtailed, and the space for civil society has significantly shrunk as its organizations lost much of its independence from the government. The behavior of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip has not been better, indeed worse; it was more ruthless and much less bothered by constitutional principles and norms or even rule of law.

Diminished Accountability and Oversight:

The suspension of the activities of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in the West Bank in 2007, in the immediate aftermath of the Hamas violent takeover of the Gaza Strip, has been one of the most damaging governance measures taken by the PA since its creation. But the clearest evidence of the slide to authoritarianism has been the decision taken by the party that lost the 2006 elections, Fatah, to dissolve the PLC in 2018. The inevitable outcome of the suspension of the PLC meetings has been the transfer of its legislative and oversight functions to the executive authority represented by the president. Since 2007, president Abbas issued more laws by decree than those ever issued by the PLC during its entire life since the first election in 1996. Most of these laws were not urgent, as required by the Basic Law, and many of them violated the terms of that law. In the absence of a parliament, the president gave himself the power to rule by decree without accountability or oversight, with the exception of the little opposition expressed occasionally by the judiciary, the media, and civil society before they too came under the heavy hand of authoritarianism. Without a parliament able to defend its members, the president gave himself the power to annul the immunity of the PLC members, to suspend the payment of their salaries, to send them to court, and to close their offices ending eventually in his decision in December 2018 to dissolve the entire PLC utilizing for that mission the services of a body he created for that purpose, the constitutional court.[1]

Without a parliament during the period between 2007 and 2021, the Palestinian public has been denied the ability to influence legislation directly affecting their life; the political system become devoid of any formal accountability. If the PLC comes back to life soon, it will be up to it to accept or reject all those laws decreed by the president. The new parliament should also determine its own priorities in strengthening and fortifying legislative texts that the executive has managed to undermine in order to grant the president powers he did not have, such as the ability to issue normal laws by decrees during the period in which the parliament was not in session or the ability of the president and the institutions he created, such as the constitutional court, to commit grave constitutional violations.

The Diminished Independence of the Judiciary:

The need to ensure regime security in the West Bank in the aftermath of Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip provided the initial impetus to the drive to weaken the independence of the judiciary. The PA crackdown on Hamas’ military, financial, religious and political infrastructure in the West Bank aimed at destroying or weakening its organization but lacked legal justification and entailed significant violations of human rights and rule of law. The PA wanted to prevent a Hamas takeover of the West Bank, one similar to what that movement did in the Gaza Strip. When the judiciary intervened in order to impose restraint, the PA security services, which carried out most of the crackdown, simply ignored its rulings, and it got away with it. While the Palestinian Basic Law defines failure to implement court decisions by PA officials and security services as a “crime punishable by imprisonment and dismissal,” rulings by the highest court, the High Court of Justice, demanding the release of detainees, were routinely ignored by the security services. In fact, between 2007 and 2009, the PA formed military courts to try civilians. Only in early 2011, right after the eruption of the Arab Spring, did the PA stop the practice of sending civilians to military courts and began to show a little more attention to court rulings.

The attacks on the judiciary however became much more serious during the past five years. In the conflict between president Abbas and Mohammad Dahlan, the former head of the Preventive Security apparatus, the president sought a judgement from the courts accusing the latter of corruption. In order to force Dahlan, a member of the PLC, to face the court, Abbas, gave himself the right to annul the immunity of a members of the parliament. When the high court objected, deeming such a step unconstitutional, the president turned his attention in October 2016 to the judiciary, dismissing the Chief Justice and appointing a new one. In doing so, he explicitly violated the Basic Law and the Law of the Judiciary. Seeking a stamp of approval that would legalize his actions, the president amended the constitutional court law that then allowed him to form a court to his own liking[2]. In November 2016, the newly established body, the Constitutional Court, did what was expected: rubber stamped all decisions taken by Abbas regarding Dahlan and the judiciary. Abbas went further: in December of that year, the president annulled the immunity of four other pro-Dahlan members of the PLC, all from his own Fatah party.

Despite Abbas’ failure in mid-2017, under pressure from civil society, to amend the law of the judiciary in a manner that would have given him effective control over that institution, he did impose his control in violation of that law. Moreover, in 2019 he dismissed the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and appointed a transitional council in a clear violation of the Basic Law and the law of the judiciary. This was followed in January 2021 by a presidential decree that did finally amend that law in such a manner that provided him all the control he needed over the appointment of the Chief Justice, head of the high court and the head of the SJC. The amendment allowed the dismissal of the judges and forcing them into retirement.[3]

All measures taken by the president regarding the judiciary and PLC members, including the establishment of the Constitutional Court, were condemned by all mainstream civil society groups, including all human rights groups and the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), expressing shock at the manner in which the president acted and labeling his measures unconstitutional. It goes without saying that an executive control over the judiciary could dimmish the ability of the PLC to reform the Palestinian political system. Therefore, defending the judiciary by rejecting the amendments decreed by the president must be a top priority for the newly elected parliament. The PLC must also reject all changes made by the president on the constitutional court law and work closely with the judiciary and the executive to ensure the full independence of that court by disbanding the current court and establishing a new one made up by judges and professor of law with a record of integrity and independence.

Weakening the independence and pluralism of civil society:

After the first wave of attacks on civil society, which targeted Hamas’ infrastructure between the years 2007 and 2009, a second wave started in 2015, this time targeting the larger civil society. The PA’s new campaign started with the confiscation of funds belonging to an NGO established two years earlier by former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. This was followed by government decision to amend existing regulations governing the funding of Palestinian NGOs established under the non-profit companies (NPC) laws. The amended regulation instructed all NPCs to obtain “prior approval” from the cabinet before they could conduct any activities or receive any funding from local or foreign donors for their projects. In one government decision, the PA asserted its control over about 300 such civil society institutions and deprived them the ability to work without an approval from the executive despite the fact that they were operating under the terms of the law that led to their establishment. None of the existing laws in the PA grant the executive such overriding jurisdiction over civil society. The new regulation was clearly illegal and in violation of the Basic Law. Instead of serving the interests of the public they serve, the government wanted these NGOs to follow its own instructions by controlling their activities and funding. They could only function if the government approves their plans and donors. All banks operating in Palestine were instructed to reject any fund transfers to the accounts of these NGOs without a written permission form the cabinet.

The inevitable result of the government regulation has been the destruction of pluralism in Palestinian civil society. By making all non-profit companies subject to direct PA control using the threat of possible denial of approval as a tool of intimidation, the PA diminished the independence of these institutions making them less able to represent their constituencies. All Palestinian civil society and human rights organizations, without exception, opposed the new regulation, considering it a violation of the law and an attempt by the PA to restrict the ability of NGOs to operate outside the boundaries set for it by the government thereby shrinking the space for civil society.[4]

Civil society constitutes an important institution that supports and supplements the oversight responsibility of the parliament. In weakening it, the PA weakens the PLC’s role in bringing the government to accountability. In the absence of a parliament between 2007 and 2021, civil society organizations served an important role in setting limits on the PA slide to authoritarianism. It should be one of the priorities of the newly elected parliament to ensure the annulment of regulations that violate the law and restrict the ability of civil society organizations to play their role in strengthening other public institutions while ensuring an independent and pluralistic civil society. One of those regulations should be the one introduced in July 2015 that requires a prior government approval of the activities and the funding of non-profit companies.

Targeting the Media and free speech:

In the years immediately following Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip, dozens of journalists were arrested in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for expressing their views and many more were beaten while covering demonstrations and other expressions of protest against the PA or the Hamas government. The PA has gone further in 2017: with little or no consultation, the president issued a cybercrime law. The law regulates online activities, media websites, and social networks, imposing jail time and fines on those violating public order or inciting hatred. Journalists and normal citizens paid a price for expressing their own views as more arrests followed the publication of the law. Responding to a huge public outcry, the president and the government introduced various amendments and re-introduced the law again in 2018. Despite positive changes in the new law, it still continued to “criminalize acts and writings that should come under free speech.”[5] It continued to use open-ended terms, such as those used in article 39: “national security or public order or public administration” when providing justification for closing or blocking access to websites. In implementation of this article, the PA blocked access on October 2019 to 59 sites, added to another 30 that were blocked in 2017.

The newly elected parliament should strive to protect liberties and ensure the rights of the opposition, the media, and normal citizens by amending the 2018 cybercrime law by removing all these open-ended terms and by restricting the jurisdiction of the executive in blocking access to websites. It should ensure the privacy of users of the internet and social media.

Sources of Palestinian Authoritarianism

Before embarking on any serious reform effort pertaining to the previous four reform agenda, the PLC should ask itself how we arrived at this point of slide to authoritarianism: how did the PA manage to undo much of the progress it built in the first half of its existence? Without a full understanding of the forces and dynamics that brought us to where we are today, the PLC will not be able to realize and appreciate the impediments it will confront in the first day of its existence. On that day, it will have to decide whether it too wants to respect and implement the rules set by the Basic Law or put them aside as the executive authority did since 2007 claiming various justifications, such as the need to confront the consequences of the split triggered by Hamas’ violent take over of the Gaza Strip. Some of the forces and circumstances behind the Palestinian grave failure to respect the legacy of those who preceded us are obvious and have already been mentioned while others are not so obvious. The following is a list of four sources that brought us to where we are today.

The Split: The first and most obvious source of authoritarianism goes back to mid-2007, in the form of measure put in place in response to Hamas’ use of force in the Gaza Strip against forces loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas. This armed coup against the PA president, and the decisions made by Abbas immediately after the coup, led to the current political split that added further agony to the existing geographic separation between the two Palestinian regions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In response to Hamas’ coup, Abbas dismissed the National Unity Government, which was led at that time by Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh, formed a new government led by Salam Fayyad, and prevented the PLC from holding its meetings in the West Bank. This led to the creation of two governments, one in the Gaza Strip, the dismissed or caretaker government led by Haniyeh, and one in the West Bank, led by Fayyad. Fayyad’s government never obtained a parliamentary vote of confidence as required by the Basic Law. The absence of a parliamentary approval for the Fayyad government provided the Haniyeh government with the legal justification to remain in office for the entire period between 2007 and 2014, when it finally resigned in the aftermath of the formation of the “reconciliation government” led by Rami Al Hamdallah. In late 2018, the failure of the reconciliation government to unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip played a role in heightening tensions between Fatah and Hamas leading Fatah’s Revolutionary Council (the elite of the party that lost the 2006 elections) to demand from the PLO Central Council (an unelected body) the dissolution of the elected PLC, a clear indication of the extent to which the split has destroyed Palestinian political norms.

Intra-Fatah rivalry: In the last five years however, the slide to authoritarianism has received a greater impetus from a second source: the heightening of internal power struggle inside Fatah, particularly the conflict between President Abbas and Mohammad Dahlan. Between 2011 and 2014, this internal power struggle led, under Abbas’ instructions, to the expulsion of Dahlan and several other senior Fatah leaders from the Fatah movement, mostly from the Gaza Strip. However, during the period between 2015-19, the conflict spilled into the larger arena of the PA and its political system. The impact has been huge: PLC members were intimidated and their ability to criticize the executive significantly curtailed; the judiciary was brought under control and further stripped of its independence; civil society was weekend and forced to play by rules set by the executive; and the media, including social media, was brought under severe restrictions and forced to exercise self-censorship. Because of that and given prevailing apathy in the street, as people were busy struggling to make a living or respond to greater repression from the Israeli occupation and its settlers, the PA became much bolder in ignoring the Basic Law and rule of law and more open in strengthening the institution of the presidency and the executive as a whole while weakening all opposition including that of civil society.

The nature of the Palestinian ruling elite: The third source of authoritarianism came from the Palestinian political elite, particularly those staffing the executive. There is no doubt that many of the elite (particularly among the Islamist one) are anti-democratic. Nonetheless, most are simply non-democratic. The real problem lies in the fact that only few of the members of the secular nationalist elite and almost none of the Islamist elite are truly democratic. Without the breaks normally found among democratic elites, the senior Palestinian bureaucracy in the executive branch found itself free of any meaningful oversight. Without restrictions on its ability to rule as it saw fit, members of the PA cabinets, find it easier to rule without being bothered by courts, civil society, or the media.

The task of the current PA elite is made easier by the absence of an effective opposition from within and outside Fatah. The replacement of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad with al Hamdallah in 2013 accelerated this process and played a significant role in facilitating the slide to authoritarianism. The opposition to the Fayyad government from within Fatah imposed constraints on its ability to work without accountability and many of its own members, including the prime minister, built a barrier that contributed to slowing down the rush to authoritarianism. On top of its own authoritarian instinct, the Hamdallah cabinet seemed unwilling to question measures instituted by Abbas and the PA security services to undermine rule of law or weaken civil society and indeed to restructure the entire political system. Instead of correcting the PA direction, Fatah’s own political elite, not only in its Central Committee, but also in its Revolutionary Council, became apologists for the slide to authoritarianism justifying it on grounds of the split or a preoccupation with standing up to the Israeli occupation. This elite behavior demonstrated how empty and fake the calls for democracy that Fatah and other nationalist and Islamist movement pretended to embrace. This does not mean that these movement are essentially anti-democratic. But it means that the political leaderships and elite members of these movements, unlike their own base, find it easier and more natural to be authoritarian in the absence of accountability and oversight.

The diminishing role of the international community: With little or no attention from the international community, the PA has over the last decade, particularly since the Arab Spring, become bolder in ignoring its own Basic Law and rule of law while seeking to strengthen the power of the presidency and the executive as a whole and to weaken all opposition, including that of civil society. The international community seems much less interested in Palestinian good governance. American and European diplomats stationed in the Palestinian territories argued that due to rise of Islamism, civil wars, terrorism, and sectarianism in the post-Arab Spring environment, a focus on stability is replacing the traditional agenda of democracy and good governance. Moreover, given the failure of the international community to take a strong stand or concrete measures against Israeli settlement policy, the major international actors are reluctant to press the PA—which remains committed to the two-state solution-- on domestic issues. One should also keep in mind that having reduced its own financial support to the PA by almost half during the past decade, the international community has lost considerable leverage. It is not surprising that this loss of leverage has been accompanied by a gradual detachment from Palestinian governance. Rule of law and good governance is no longer a priority for any of the major donor countries.

Conclusions:

This policy brief started with a skeptical view regarding the prospect of holding Palestinian legislative elections any time soon. However, the skepticism did not stop it from looking for ways in which elections, if they were held, can be capitalized on to serve the interests of Palestinian society, particularly in the area of political reforms. The previous analysis described the various indications of the slide to authoritarianism in the Palestinian political system and the four drivers of this slide. This analysis gave implicit support to the skeptical view by raising various indications questioning the seriousness of the PA leadership and the main Palestinian political parties in holding elections.

For the Palestinian political system to exit the current slide to authoritarianism and to be able to stand on a solid ground for a transition to good governance, it will be essential for all public institutions to work in harmony, including the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, civil society, and the media. The discussion in this paper has been restricted to the role of the PLC, once elected, because it will represent the aspiration of the Palestinian people and its civil society to build a political system characterized by accountability and rule of law.

During the years of the split, Palestinians discovered that they are not different from the rest of the Arab peoples, leaders, and political parties despite their own unique experience of living under occupation and in exile. Moreover, they discovered that they too are not much different than other Arab masses that tolerated oppression and authoritarianism for decades before the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011. The Arab Barometer’s fifth round, conducted in Palestine around the end of 2018, found that only one third of the Palestinians trust their own government, that the majority does not believe that it has guarantees of freedom of expression, and 83% said there is corruption in the PA public institutions. Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority agrees that “democracy, despite its problems, is the best system there is,” about three quarters describe the status of democracy in Palestine as bad or very bad. Yet, no more than one third indicate that they participate in some kind of opposition activities.[6]

The holding of legislative (and presidential, at a latter stage) could provide the Palestinian public with the ability to make a difference and institute the change they have always aspired for through a widespread participation in these elections. Once a parliament is elected, it will have the mandate required for reforms thereby providing a solid ground for the PLC to take up the four areas of reform agenda covered in this paper. In order to succeed in its efforts to reform the PA, the PLC will have three effective tools in its arsenal: amending the Basic Law, reviewing, amending or rejecting selected laws issued by presidential decrees, and forcing a newly established government to amend or cancel anti-democratic regulations adopted by previous governments.

Amending the Basic Law: This measure will be the most difficult because it is not clear that the PLC will have the majority needed to approve the proposed amendments. Nonetheless, it will be valuable for the parliament to open a debate on the need to transform the Palestinian political system into a parliamentary one or at least to take steps to decrease the powers of the office of the president so as to remove any ambiguity about the ability of a president to issue legislation during the absence of the parliament and put in place greater protection for the immunity of its members. It should ensure that the president does not have the capacity to make top senior appointments in the public sector without explicit parliamentary approval, that the executive cannot take away jurisdiction belonging to the judiciary, that free speech is guaranteed, and that the space available to civil society is not shrunk and their activities curtailed or controlled. The amendments and clarifications must make it clear, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that a government that does not receive a parliamentary vote of confidence is illegitimate and its decisions invalid.
Rule by decrees: The Palestinian political system should not tolerate rule by decree. The PLC should review, amend, or reject in its first session all those laws issued by decree that have caused great damage to the principle of separation of powers or violated the terms of the Basic Law, including those affecting the judiciary, the constitutional court, the cybercrime law, and others.
Illegal governmental regulations: The PLC should also reject all those decisions and orders issued by the various PA governments since 2007 that violated the separation of powers and represented an attack on the jurisdiction of the parliament, such as the amendment introduced in 2015 to the regulations governing the functioning of the non-profit companies.

[1] For more details on the suspension of the PLC activities, see a paper by Salah al Wadya on the impact of the split on the PLC: "أثر الانقسام السياسي على المجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني،" أبريل 25, 2018، https://icspr.ps/ar/?p=1644 ،22.12.2018.

See also, قانونيون ونواب لـوطن: قرار حل التشريعي غير قانوني وخطير

https://www.wattan.net/ar/news/271807.html

المركز الفلسطيني لحقوق الانسان: العملية التشريعية والرقابة البرلمانية خلال فترة الانقسام السياسي الفلسطيني ( من يونيو 2007 وحتى أغسطس 2012 )

http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/2012/bookPCHR12-2012.pdf

و "مفتاح، تقرير أداء المجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني 2009":

http://www.miftah.org/Publications/Books/The_Performance_of_the_Palestinian_Legislative_Council4.pdf

[2] See the letter sent to president Abbas by the Independent Commission for Human Rights and a group of civil society organizations requesting the withdrawal of the amended law of the constitutional court and viewing the changes decreed by the president as an effort to impose the hegemony of the executive over the other branches of the PA and a challenge to the independence of the judicial authority “in violation of the PA priorities of rule of law and separation of power:”

الهيئة المستقلة لحقوق الانسان 'ديوان المظالم' - مواضيع مهمة (ichr.ps)

[3] For more details on the efforts of the president and the executive to weaken the judiciary, see the following:

"نقابة المحامين ومؤسسات المجتمع المدني وفصائل يطالبون بإلغاء القرارات بقوانين الاخيرة المتعلقة بالقضاء ويؤكدون ان ما يحدث هو جريمة بكل المقاييس"، كانون ثاني (يناير) 2021

https://www.wattan.net/ar/video/330598.html

"بيان صادر عن المؤسسات الحقوقية ومؤسسات المجتمع المدني نحو تعزيز واستقلال السلطة القضائية." أكتوبر 2016:

http://www.istiqlal.ps/?q=node/101

عصام عابدين، "ملاحظات على القرار بقانون بتعديل قانون المحكمة الدستورية العليا"، الحق، مارس 2013:

https://www.alhaq.org/ar/publications/7933.html

"المركز الفلسطيني لحقوق الانسان: شريعة القانون أم شريعة الغاب، المركز يقرع ناقوس الخطر: استقلالية القضاء الفلسطيني في مهب الريح،" 2016

http://pchrgaza.org/ar/?p=12844

الهيئة المستقلة لحقوق الانسان: مذكرة للرئيس الفلسطيني لسحب قراره المُعدِّل لقانون المحكمة الدستورية، 2016

http://ichr.ps/ar/1/17/1756

وانظر كذلك نص المذكرة القانونية حول القرار بقانون رقم (40) لسنة 2020 بشأن تعديل قانون السلطة القضائية رقم (01) لسنة 2002 التي أصدرتها الهيئة والائتلاف الأهلي لإصلاح القضاء وحمايته تعرب فيها عن أسفها لإصدار القرار بقانون المعدل لقانون السلطة القضائية وذلك لأن هذا القرار ينسف جهود الإصلاح القضائي، ويعزز من هيمنة السلطة التنفيذية على القضاء، إضافة إلى مساسها الخطير باستقلال القاضي الفرد، "في انتهاك واضح لمبادئ سيادة القانون، والفصل بين السلطات، واستقلال القضاء، التي يقوم عليها النظام الدستوري الفلسطيني وفقاً لما جاء في القانون الأساسي المعدل لسنة 2003 وتعديلاته"، وطالبت بالإلغاء الفوري لهذه القرارات، وتشكيل مجلس قضاء أعلى دائم وفقاً لقانون السلطة القضائية رقم (01) لسنة 2002. وانظر أيضا: الهيئة المستقلة" تطالب بالإلغاء الفوري للقرارات بقوانين الأخيرة المتعلقة بالشأن القضائي، 9.01.2021

https://www.wattan.net/ar/news/330615.html

[4] See statements by al Haq, and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights and the Independent Commission for Human Rights:

قراءة في تعديلات نظام الشركات غير الربحية وعلاقتها بالمنظمات الاهلية، أغسطس 2015:

https://www.alhaq.org/ar/publications/7929.html

المركز الفلسطيني لحقوق الانسان: التقرير السنوي 2016.

http://pchrgaza.org/ar/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Annual-report-arabic2016.pdf

"بموجب مذكرة قدمتها لرئيس الوزراء الهيئة المستقلة تطالب مجلس الوزراء التراجع عن القرارين (7) و(8) لعام 2015 بنظام معدل لنظام الشركات غير الربحية رقم (3) لسنة 2010",

http://ichr.ps/ar/1/17/1716

[5] See the statement issued by the Independent Commission for Human Rights: "الهيئة ترحب بصدور القرار بقانون رقم (10) لسنة 2018 بشأن الجرائم الإلكترونية وتقدم مجموعة من الملاحظات والتحفظات"، آيار 2018

الهيئة المستقلة لحقوق الانسان 'ديوان المظالم' - الهيئة ترحب بصدور القرار بقانون رقم (10) لسنة 2018 بشأن الجرائم الإلكترونية وتقدم مجموعة من الملاحظات والتحفظات (ichr.ps). See also, statements issued by al Haq and Mada: : الحق: الانقسام الفلسطيني صفحة سوداء في مسار الحقوق والحريات، نوفمبر 2011

https://www.alhaq.org/ar/publications/7945.html

الهيئة المستقلة لحقوق الانسان: الهيئة المستقلة لحقوق الإنسان تعبر عن قلقها لتزايد توقيف واحتجاز مواطنين على خلفية الرأي والتعبير والعمل الصحافي، فبراير 2016

http://ichr.ps/ar/1/26/1325/

مدى: انتهاكات الحريات الإعلامية في فلسطين التقرير السنوي 2017. ص31- ص44:

http://www.madacenter.org/images/text_editor/annualrepA2017.pdf

[6] https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-v/

العربية

Critical Policy Brief, Number 1/2022

June 2022

With Recent Shifts in the Structure of the Palestinian Political System, What Choices Remain for a Safe Succession Process?

Jehad Harb

The decision by President Mahmoud Abbas to place the General Secretariat of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) with all its staff, departments and facilities under the direct responsibility of the Speaker of the Palestinian National Council (PNC)[1] has sparked debate on the process of implanting PLO institutions into those of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Basic Law, which created the PA institutions, including the PLC, and described their functions and jurisdiction, does not recognize the PLO institutions, including the PNC, as legitimate components of the PA structure. Imposing PNC control over the PLC creates a hybrid PA-PLO system and brings about a significant transformation of the PA’s political system. A serious debate is now underway about the wisdom and implications of this shift, particularly on the prospects for a safe transition of power in the event of a vacancy of the post of PA President.

Relying on political decisions to create an institutional or a "constitutional" foundation to ensure a smooth succession process, or filling the vacancy in the post of the head of state, will create an internal constitutional and political crisis due to the fact that the rules governing the selection of the head of state differ in PA legal system from that of the PLO’s. The PLO legal system relies on a decision by the Central Council for the appointment of the Head of State. In the PA legal system, article 115 of the amended Basic Law of 2003 stipulates that it applies throughout the “Transitional Period” and can be extended until the new Constitution of the Palestinian State comes into force." The same law stipulates that the President must be elected by the Palestinian people.

The vacancy of the post of Head of State poses an additional challenge to the Palestinian political system already under extremely complex circumstances. First, the system lacks legitimacy due to the absence of elections. Second, the internal division and the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have never been as deep as they are today. Third, the hidden internal conflicts over succession and the jockeying for power within the PLO institutions and the PA civil and security agencies are mounting.

This Critical Policy Brief aims to review the shifts in the nature of the Palestinian political system, the placement of the PLO institutions into the PA and the impact of the decisions of the Central Council on the future of the succession process. It describes the two most likely options available today to fill the vacancy in the position of the president or head of state and examines the positions of the various parties with direct influence in the political system. The Brief seeks to make recommendations to state institutions in order to avoid an institutional conflict when the position of the president or head of state becomes vacant in the hope of reducing internal differences and preserving a level of legitimacy in the political system.

This Critical Policy Brief aims to review the shifts in the nature of the Palestinian political system, the placement of the PLO institutions into the PA and state institutions and the impact of the decisions of the Central Council on the future of the succession process. It presents the two most likely options available today to fill the vacancy in the position of president or head of state and examines the positions of the various parties with direct influence in the political system. The paper seeks to make recommendations to state institutions in order to avoid an institutional conflict when the position of the president or head of state becomes in the hope of reducing internal differences and preserving a level of legitimacy in the political system.

Three turning points in altering the Palestinian political system

In the last 10 years, there have been three shifts in the nature of the political system towards the process of placing the PLO institutions into those of the PA, that was established in 1994 on the basis of the Palestinian-Israeli Oslo Accords, under the guise of transitioning from PA institutions to State of Palestine institutions. The first turning point came following the elevation of the status of Palestine at the United Nations to an observer state in November 2012. One of the manifestations of this decision was the replacement of the name of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) with the State of Palestine in official Palestinian institutions, thereby removing the title of the “President of the PA” from the President's signature on presidential decrees and other decisions and replacing it with the title of “President of the State of Palestine” and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO.

The second turning point came following the decision to dissolve the Legislative Council, in accordance with the Constitutional Court's interpretative decision on December 12, 2018, to "dissolve the Legislative Council and call for legislative elections within six months." Now, the phrasing of the decrees changed. As of issue 152 of the Official Gazette, issued on 19 February 2019, the customary words "on the basis of the provisions of the amended Basic Law of the year 2003 and its amendments” were removed from the decrees’ introductory statements to that of "based on the statute of the Palestine Liberation Organization." Moreover, the decrees now omitted any reference to the article was written in all decree stipulating that the “law by decree must be presented to the Legislative Council at its first session for approval,” an article that had been until then contained in all laws by decree.[2] This constitutional change was an attempt to abolish the existence of the PLC from the political system and to assign a substitute in the form of the PLO Central Council, which was now, in the PNC’s 2018 decision, granted the full legislative and oversight powers of the PNC.[3]

The third turning point came in the PLO Central Council’s decision in its 31st session on 6-8 February 2022, which called for "the need to continue to work to adapt the legal status and international relations of institutions of the State of Palestine in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 19/67 of 2012 that recognized the status of Palestine as a state. The Central Council asserted its jurisdiction and constitutional powers over the executives’ organs and institutions of the PLO as well as the PA. One of the manifestations of the central council's decision was the president's decision to place the General Secretariat of the PLC “under the responsibility of the Speaker of the National Council." The Central Council now holds its meetings at the PLC building; essentially turning it into the Parliament of the State of Palestine, as a fait accompli.[4]

Conflicting constitutional rules governing succession

A safe process of transition for the high office, one that maintains the legitimacy of one of the most important constitutional authorities in the country, requires the implementation of clear and agreed upon constitutional and legal rules, respect for the roles of existing political institutions, and the exercise of constitutional powers in a manner that preserves rule of law and strengthens public institutions. Unfortunately, in the event of a vacancy for the post of the PA President, the probability of conflicting constitutional and legal conflict is high given the contradictions between the rules governing the transition envisaged in the Basic Law compared to that of PLO by-laws and that of the PNC’s various decisions regarding the selection of the president of the State of Palestine.

Article 37 of the amended Basic Law 2003 states that the position of the president of the PA becomes vacant in case of death, resignation, or loss of legal capacity on the basis of a decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court and the approval of the Legislative Council by a two-thirds majority of its members. In any of these cases, the speaker of the PLC assumes the presidency for no more than 60 days, during which free and direct elections are to be held to elect a new president in accordance with the Palestinian electoral.

Law by decrease number 1 of 2021, which amended the 2007 election law, stipulates the direct election of the PA president by the Palestinian people. Article 3 stipulates that the person calling for elections is the Head of State of Palestine, chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO.[5]

Accordingly, the speaker of the PLC must serve as the interim president, which of course assumes the prior existence of a parliament. Yet, none of the other actors in the Palestinian political system can serve in that capacity, as this constitutional rule has not granted the interim presidency to any of the other parties in the political system. Given the fact that the PLC has been dissolved, the Palestinians will have to confront the prospect of a constitutional and legal vacuum and potentially a crisis. This provision is also based on the assumption that the political system relies on democratic rules for the political transition. However, if the need arises in the near future, the Palestinians will face a conflict of constitutional rules due to the absence of the PLC or a parliament directly elected by the Palestinians. This fact puts the Palestinian political system in constitutional crisis.

On the other hand, the provisions of the PLO Statute or bylaws refer to the mechanism for selecting the chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO in the event of a clear vacancy of the post. Article 13, section 2, stipulates that "the chairman of the Executive Committee is elected by the Committee members", which is elected only by the PNC. However, at its 23rd session in Ramallah, the PNC transferred to the Central Council all its powers.

The two likely options for the selection of the president

This section of the paper reviews two options that are most likely to be relied on to choose the next Palestinian president based on the constitutional rules governing the formal political system under the status quo. The analysis does not take into consideration, non-institutional political or societal transformations that may arise and force a change in the structure of the existing political system. It also excludes the possibility of holding general elections in the very near future.

Option #1: the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee becomes president

Following the vacancy of the position of president, the Chairman of the Executive Committee the PLO would be nominated as president of the state of Palestine. He assumes the position by a vote in the Central Council. Article 13 of the PLO Statute provides for the mechanism for selecting the chairman of the Executive Committee as outlined above.

This option is easy to make and only needs a session of the Central Council. It does not require presidential elections in the foreseeable future; at least in the absence of the ability to hold them, and keeps both positions "the PLO chairman and Head of State" in the hands of one person to prevent a conflict of powers between the pillars of the dual political system. It promotes the process of dissolving the PA political system in favors of the PLO institutions at the expense of the public institution established after 1994 under the Oslo Agreement. The Chairman of the Executive Committee is also able to deal with international and regional parties, especially since he will be a well-known member of the Committee and does not need international recognition or external legitimacy.

However, this option carries with it multiple risks, including internal power struggle within Fatah in light of the potential rivalry and jockeying for positions of influence. Also, it will probably exacerbate the division between Fatah and Hamas, and will worsen relations within the PLO institutions and increase the opposition of other members of the PLO institutions.

Finally, this option poses serious risks to the prospects of a future Palestinian democracy by squandering the opportunity for elections and for the citizens to choose their president. It doing so, it will be a clear violation of articles (5)[6] and (34)[7] of the amended Basic Law of 2003 which stipulates that the President must be directly elected by the Palestinian people. It will also be in violation of article 37 of the amended Basic Law of 2003 governing the vacancy of the post of President. Such violations will reinforce the shift towards a more authoritarian regime in which no elections are held and in which the executive and legislative powers remain in the hands of a single individual.

Option #2: PNC Speaker becomes an interim president:

This second option assumes that the PNC Speaker becomes the interim president. This option is consistent with the current tendencies within the PLO Central Council and its February 2022 resolutions. One of those stated that “The Central Council assumes "its constitutional powers and oversight mandate over the executive bodies, organs and institutions of the PLO, the PA and the work of unions, trade unions and associations in accordance with the laws governing their work."

One of the most important advantages of this option lies in the fact that it is relatively more consistent than the previous one with the provisions of article 37 of the Basic Law governing the transfer of power in the event of a vacancy in the office of President. It is also consistent with the decisions of the Central Council. Furthermore, it maintains the hope that presidential elections will be held within 60 days of the vacancy of the post of President and show some respect for some of the provisions of the Basic Law, especially articles 5 and 34. It also contributes somewhat to alleviating some of the immediate conflicts and rivalries within Fatah over the succession issue. It may also be accepted, or at least not rejected, by other PLO factions.

On the other hand, this option carries with it multiple risks, including with regard to residual internal conflicts within Fatah. Given the fragmentation within the movement, the selection of its candidate for the presidential elections might not be easy. Needless to say, any general elections will exacerbate the division within the movement. Moreover, conflict between Fatah and Hamas will not disappear, particularly over the selection of the interim president, a job Hamas might think has been stolen from it. This option also has risks to the nature of the political system by effectively placing the unelected Central Council as an alternative to the elected PLC and in doing so, violate the clear provisions of the Basic Law of 2003. On top of everything else, nothing in this option guarantees the holding of any general elections in the aftermath of its implementation. In the meanwhile, the emergence power of the interim presidency might become permanent.

Conclusion:

There is no doubt that the above-mentioned analysis strongly raises the concern about the PLO’s identification and immersion into the PA and the substitution of PA institutions by those of the PLO. This concern becomes more serious when it comes to the issue of succession at a time when the holding of general elections in 60 days cannot be taken for granted and might be delayed for a long time. In this case, the PLO will be under pressure given its obligations under the Oslo Agreement and its various annexes. The failure to hold general elections also increases the risk of the lack of legitimacy in the entire PA and its public institutions and the prospect of internal strife.

The choice between the above-mentioned options must be based on the assessment of which one is more consistent with the provisions of the amended Basic Law, and is better able to open the door for the holding of general elections, particularly presidential elections, thereby reducing the prospect of the emergence of a highly authoritarian regime, one that monopolizes both the legislature and the executive authorities while being rejected by the majority of the public and factions. It must also be based on the assessment of which one is more likely to help reduce the likely gap in the positions of the various Palestinian factions, not just within the PLO but also within Fatah’s various blocs and with other Palestinian groups. In this case, the second option, the one that allows the speaker of the PNC to become the interim president, seems to be largely in line with these criteria and might help mitigates the illegality and lack of legitimacy that will soon overwhelm the entire political system.

[1] See Palestine Gazette, 191 (al-Waqai' al-Filastiniyya), Law Number 31 of 2022, Concerning the General Secretariate of the PLC, p. 34: https://t.ly/Wtybe
[2] See, AMAN’s annual report on the assessment of integrity and anticorruption in Palestine in 2021, p.26: 1

https://www.aman-palestine.org/reports-and-studies/16789.html

[3] See the PNC decision here: http://wafa.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=44C019a819631600293a44C019

[4] See the PLO Central Council’s decision of February 2022: https://www.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/41150

[5] See the text of the law by decree that amended the 2007 election law here: http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=17403

[6] “Palestine’s political system is democratic …. Whereby the president is directly elected by the people.” Amended Basic Law, article 5.

[7] “The president of the PA is directly elected by the Palestinians in accordance with the Election Law.”

العربية |

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Public Opinion Poll No (81)

While almost all Palestinians followed the news about the Gilboa prison break on daily basis viewing it as inspiring to popular resistance, the killing of the opposition activist Nizar Banat and the PA behavior in its aftermath damage the standing of the PA as almost 80% of the public demand the resignation of president Abbas

15-18 September 2021

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2021 show the centrality of domestic issues on shaping public attitudes. Three developments in particular are worth observing: the killing of the political activist Nizar Banat by PA security services, the manner in which PA security services dealt with protests during the last few months, and the residual impact of the last Hamas-Israel war of May 2021. Findings also show the great importance attached by the public to the issue of prisoners in Israeli jails. Impacted by all of the above, findings reflect continued PA loss of status and support.

A large majority rejects that the notion that the killing of Banat was a mistake unintentionally made by security officers. Instead, the public is confident that the death of the political activist was premediated, ordered by the political or security leadership. Because of that, the public is not

satisfied with the step taken by the PA to ensure justice by putting all security officers involved on trial. The public is also angry with the manner in which the PA cracked down on public protests that demanded justice in the Banat case. In fact, three quarters view the behavior of the security services as a violation of liberties and human rights.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public has been following, on daily basis, the news regarding the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel. The overwhelming majority views the prisoners’ behavior, even after they were captured, as inspiring to the Palestinians to rise and take the initiative to resist the occupation. Yet, on this issue of public consensus, one in which the PA is not a party, the Palestinian leadership and the security establishment do not come out looking good at all. While the public is easily convinced by Hamas’ proclamations and plans for freeing the prisoners, the PA is distrusted with the majority believes that the PA security services would not defend the prisoners.

The impact of the May 2021 confrontations in Jerusalem and the war between Hamas and Israel is still strongly felt in this poll. An overwhelming majority still thinks Hamas came out the winner and that Hamas goal has been to defend East Jerusalemites and al Aqsa Mosque. Indeed, the largest percentage (but not the majority) believes that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people. The majority calls upon Hamas to relaunch rockets against Israel if East Jerusalemites are expelled from their homes in the city or if restrictions are imposed on Palestinian access to al Aqsa Mosque. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that now, after three months have passed since our last poll, we do see some decline in some of those indicators that measure the ascendance of Hamas. In almost all indicators, we see a small decline ranging between two to eight percentage points.

If new presidential and parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would do relatively well compared to Fatah. This is particularly true for a presidential election, assuming president Abbas is Fatah’s candidate. The outcome would be dramatically different and more beneficial to Fatah if its candidate for the presidency is Marwan Barghouti. Most importantly for Fatah, findings show a significant increase in the demand for Abbas’ resignation, with almost 80% making the demand, an unprecedent PSR finding.

Findings show that in the context of increased Covid-19 infection rates, the majority is in favor of mandatory vaccination; but opposition is slightly more than a third. Yet, even among those who reject making vaccination mandatory to all of the public, a minority favors making it mandatory to those working in the public sector such as schools and ministries.

Findings on the peace process show continued but slow decline in support for the two-state solution. They also show high levels of support for armed struggle as the best means of ending the occupation with almost half of the public endorsing this position. Consistent with that we find a slim majority opposing a resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Despite this, a majority of Palestinians view positively the confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

(1) Prisoners escape from the Gilboa prison:

86% followed up the news of the six Palestinian prisoners who escaped from the Gilboa prison; 87% think the event will serve as an inspiration to the Palestinians
81% think that Hamas will succeed in freeing the six prisoners in a prison exchange deal with Israel
But 68% think the Palestinian Authority would not have protect the prisoners if they had succeeded in entering the West Bank

An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (86%) says that it has heard about and followed on daily basis the news about the escape of the six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel and the capture of some of them while 12% say they did that occasionally and only 2% say they have not heard about or followed the news. Similarly, 87% say the escape of the six prisoners and the capture of some of them will serve as an inspiration to Palestinians outside the prison to take the initiative and actively work toward the ending of occupation; only 7% think the escape and capture will have the opposite impact of bringing frustration and despair; 5% say it will have no impact.

81% believe that Hamas will soon succeed in making a deal with Israel on a prisoners’ exchange that will include the release of the escaped and recaptured prisoners; 14% believe no such exchange will take place soon. The belief that Hamas will soon reach a prisoners’ exchange deal with Israel which would include the release of the six prisoners is higher in the West Bank (83%) compared to the Gaza Strip (77%), among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (76% and 78% respectively), and among the religious and the somewhat religious (85% and 80% respectively) compared to the non-religious (55%).

On the other hand, if the escaped prisoners managed to reach the Palestinian territories, only 24% think the PA security services would in this case protect them while 68% think they would not do so. The belief that the PA security services would not protect the escaped prisoners is higher in the West Bank (70%) compared to the Gaza Strip (66%), among the holders of BA degree (75%) compared to the illiterates (57%), among professionals, merchants, and laborers (76%, 75%, and 69% respectively) compared to farmers and students (58% and 60% respectively), among those working in the private sector (73%) compared to those who work in the public sector (57%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (90% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (46%), and among the religious and the somewhat religious (70% and 68% respectively) compared to the non-religious (51%).

(2) The death of Nizar Banat:

63% believe the death of Nizar Banat was a deliberate measure ordered by the PA political or security leaders, not an intentional mistake
69% believe the PA measures taken to ensure justice in the Banat case are not sufficient
74% believe that the arrest of demonstrators is a violation of liberties and human rights

A majority of 63% of the public believes that the killing of Nizar Banat soon after his arrest by PA security officials was a deliberate measure ordered by the PA political or security leaders while only 22% believe it was an unintentional mistake by those who arrested him. The belief that the killing of Nizar Banat was a deliberate act of PA leadership is higher in the West Bank (64%) compared to the Gaza Strip (61%), among men (65%) compared to women (61%), among professionals and students (72% and 68% respectively) compared to merchants, farmers, and employees (53%, 58%, and 60% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (65%) compared to those who work in the public sector (53%), among supporters of Hamas (93%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (39% and 61% respectively), and among the religious (67%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (61% and 52% respectively).

A large majority of 69% feels the measures taken by the PA to ensure justice in the Banat case, including putting on trial all 14 security officials who took part in his arrest, are insufficient; only 20% think they are sufficient. Moreover, a majority of 63% support and 28% oppose the demonstrations that erupted after the death of Banat demanding the departure of the president from office and the removal of his government. Almost three quarters (74%) believe the steps taken by the PA security services in arresting the demonstrators who demanded justice for Banat is a violation of liberties and human rights while only 18% view these measures as a legitimate enforcement of law and order.

(3) Three months after the Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

71% believe that Hamas came out a winner in its last war with Israel
Two thirds believe that the launching of rockets by Hamas at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque
45% believe that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people; only 19% believe Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving

An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (71%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 3% think Israel came out a winner; 21% say no one came out a winner and 3% think both sides came out winners. Three months ago, 77% thought Hamas came out the winner. Moreover, 63% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 29% think it did not. Three months ago, 65% said Hamas has achieved its declared goal

Two thirds think that Hamas’ decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 10% think it came as a protest against the PA cancelation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 19% think Hamas’ decision was motivated by these two drivers. Three months ago, 72% thought that Hamas’ decision came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque.

In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 45% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while only 19% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 28% think neither side deserve such a role. Three months ago, 53% thought Hamas is more deserving of representation and leadership and 14% thought Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is the more deserving.

If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 60% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 20% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 13% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

(4) Legislative and presidential elections:

73% demand the holding of presidential and legislative elections, but 56% do not think such elections will take place soon
In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 34% of the vote and the later 56%; if the elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 55% and the latter 39%
Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 24% and demand for his resignation stands at 78%
If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 37% of the popular vote and Fatah 32%

Almost three quarters (73%) say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 23% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 82% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 56% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 34% and Haniyeh 56% of the votes (compared to 59% for Haniyeh and 27% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 34% of the votes (compared to 30% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 60% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 33% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 59% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 49% and from among those the former receives 31% and the latter 60%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 26% and Haniyyeh 63%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 33% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 22% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and another 6% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 22% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas six months ago stood at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Moreover, 78% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 19% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 68% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 78% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 37% say they will vote for Hamas and 32% say they will vote for Fatah, 13% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 41% and Fatah at 30%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 27% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 38% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 32% three months ago).

(5) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

27% want to emigrate; 36% in the Gaza Strip and 21% in the West Bank
83% believe there is corruption in the PA institutions
59% view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people; 34% view it as an asset
Public expectations from the Shtayyeh government remains negative in three areas: reconciliation, the holding of elections, and improvement of economic conditions
54% favors the formation of a new government under a new prime minister
57% view societal violence that erupts from time to time as an indication of public distrust in the justice and law enforcement system

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 23%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 67% and in the West Bank at 59%. When asked about interest in emigrating from Palestine, 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 36% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 15% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 42% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 83%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 61% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 57% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

On free speech, 38% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 18% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 58% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 37% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 43% of Gazans said it was good or very good.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 34% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 35% viewed it as an asset.

After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 70% expect failure; only 22% expect success. When asked about the prospects for reconciliation, 32% expressed optimism and 63% expressed pessimism. Three months ago, optimism stood at 41%. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29% of the public expect success and 63% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 64% expects failure and 30% expects success.

We asked the public about its view regarding the demands for a change in the current PA government. A majority of 54% expresses support for comprehensive change leading to the appointment of a new government and a new prime minister, while 26% want only to change some of the ministers, and 14% do not want to make any change and want the government to stay as it is. Support for a comprehensive change in which the government and the prime minister are replaced is higher in refugee camps and cities (59% and 54% respectively) compared to villages/towns (48%), among men (60%) compared to women (47%), among those whose age is 30 years or higher (55%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (50%), among holders of BA degree (62%) compared to the illiterates (27%), among those who work in the private sector (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (49%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (74% and 52% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (34%).

We also asked the public about its views on the recuring internal violence similar to the one witnessed recently in which an incident between two individuals led to widespread family and tribal violence. A majority of 57% expressed the view that such incidents indicate a weak pubic trust in the justice system including law enforcement agencies; but 35% expressed the view that such incidents reflect the traditional nature of Palestinian society that is difficult or impossible to change. When asked how should the PA deal with such incidents, 66% expressed the view that first and foremost, the PA should strengthen the law enforcement authorities while 27% expressed the view that the PA should strengthen the tribal reform committees and cooperate with them. Findings show that the percentage of those who think the PA should strengthen the law enforcement agencies in order to address societal violence is higher in the West Bank (69%) compared to the Gaza Strip (63%), among men (69%) compared to women (64%), among holders of BA degree (75%) compared to the illiterates (58%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (72% and 70% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (64%), and among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (71% and 67% respectively) compared to the religious (61%).

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 23%, followed by Palestine TV (14%), al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine Today (11%), Maan (10%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (2%).

(6) The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

A majority of 63% support making the Covid-19 vaccination mandatory
74% are satisfied with the PA efforts to ensure the availability of the Covid-19 vaccine
But only 45% are satisfied with the PA efforts to contain the spread of the virus

With the big rise in the number of Covid infections, we asked the public about the steps it thinks the PA government should take in order to protect people from the pandemic: 39% said it should follow the normal procedures of enforcing social distance, face masks, and payment of fines for violators; a similar percentage (37%) said it should make vaccination mandatory to all those who are allowed to take it; 5% said it should impose a full closure; and 15% said they are in favor of all of the above. When then asked specifically about mandatory vaccination, a majority of 63% expressed support while 35% expressed opposition. Support for mandatory vaccination is higher in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (62%), in refugee camps and villages (70% and 67% respectively) compared to cities (62%), among men (65%) compared to women (62%), among students and laborers (72% and 66% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, and housewives (57%, 61%, and 62% respectively), among supporters of Fatah (74%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (64% and 55% respectively), and among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (72% and 65% respectively) compared to the religious (61%). Among those who reject mandatory vaccination, 29% are in favor, and 69% are not in favor, of making it mandatory to those who work in the public sector such as those working in schools and ministries.

48% (55% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 27% (19% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24 say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.

Almost three quarters (74%, 84% in the Gaza Strip and 68% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 24% are dissatisfied. But only 45% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 53% are dissatisfied. The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 59% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at only 39%.

(7) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

Support for the two-state solution drops to 36% and opposition rises to 62%
73% do not believe that a Palestinian state will be created alongside Israel during the next five years
About half of the public believe that armed struggle is the most effective means for ending the occupation; only 28% think negotiations are the most effective means
44% attribute the low levels of popular participation in none violent confrontations to the absence of public trust in the PA leadership and the political parties
54% are in favor of a return to an armed intifada, 27% are in favor of abandoning the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution
39% are in favor of resuming negotiations with Israel under the sponsorship of the Quartet
A majority of 56% looks positively at confidence building measures that aim at improving living conditions

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 36% and opposition stands at 62%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%. A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 73% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle. When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 48% chose armed struggle, 28% negotiations, and 19% popular resistance. Three months ago, 49% chose armed struggle and 27% chose negotiations.

We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 39% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 16% selected the loss of the will to fight.

When asked about support for specific policy choices, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 54% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 54% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 60% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 47% supported dissolving the PA, and 20% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

Under current conditions, a majority of 61% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. 58% are opposed, and 36% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet stands at 39% and 52% are opposed. Moreover, 49% do not believe, and 41% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 56% said it looks positively, while 35% said it looks negatively, at such measures. The percentage of those who view positively such confidence building measures is higher in the West Bank (57%) compared to the Gaza Strip (53%), in villages and cities (58% and 56% respectively) compared to refugee camps (46%), among supporters of Fatah (73%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (42% and 51% respectively), and among the non-religious (62%) compared to the religious and the somewhat religious (54% and 56% respectively).

(8) American withdrawal from Afghanistan:

43% do not expect, and 36% think expect, the Afghanistan scenario to happen in Palestine in the event of an Israeli withdrawal
46% believe the main lesson for the Palestinians in the Afghanistan example is the need to strengthen Palestinian armed groups while 28% think it is the need to strengthen the PA and its legitimacy

We asked the public about the meaning of the developments leading to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan: 40% viewed the events as a victory for Taliban against the US and its Afghani allies. But a third (33%) thought that the events leading to the US withdrawal were orchestrated ahead of time between the US and Taliban; 27% say they not know.

The largest percentage of the public (43%) does not expect what happened in Afghanistan to happen in Palestine in case of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, a scenario in which such withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the PA and its government and the takeover of armed Islamist groups, such as Hamas; but 36% believe this scenario could indeed happen and 21% do not know. The belief that what happened in Afghanistan could happen in Palestine in the event of an Israeli withdrawal, leading to PA collapse, is higher in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (25%), in refugee camps and cities (40% and 38% respectively) compared to villages/towns (28%), among refugees (47%) compared to non-refugees (28%), among holders of PA degree (39%) compared to illiterates (17%), among students, employees, and professionals (43%, 41%, and 40% respectively) compared to farmers and laborers (15% and 30% respectively), among laborers in the public sector (40%) compared to laborers in the private sector (35%), among supporters of Hamas (66%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (21% and 36% respectively), and among the religious (40%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (29% and 34% respectively).

Moreover, 46% believe the Palestinians should learn a lesson from what happened in Afghanistan by strengthening the forces of armed resistance, but not the PA and its government, while 28% think the lesson should lead us to strengthen the PA and its legitimacy so that it would not collapse as the Afghani government did. The belief that the lesson should be to strengthen the armed groups is higher in the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in refugee camps (55%) compared to villages and cities (42% and 46% respectively), among men (51%) compared to women (40%), among those whose age is 30 years or higher (47%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (40%), among refugees (50%) compared to non-refugees (42%), among the holders of BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (17%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (80% and 49% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (23%), and among the religious (50%) compare to the somewhat religious and the non-religions (43% each).

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

44% view the ending of occupation and building of the state as the most vital goal for the Palestinians
Continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip and unemployment and poverty as the two most important problems confronting Palestinian society today

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 10% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (36%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 40% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip, 23% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 13% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 10% said it is the spread of corruption, and 6% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

العربية

أوراق سياساتية نقدية، رقم 2023/3

تموز (يوليو) 2023

تحديات وحلول لمشاركة القدس الشرقية في انتخابات برلمانية ورئاسية فلسطينية مقبلة

هبة الحسيني، دكتوراه في القانون*ن

مقدمة:

أجريت كل من الانتخابات الرئاسية والتشريعية للسلطة الفلسطينية مرتين منذ عام 1996، وكان آخرها في عامي 2005 و2006 على التوالي. في عام 2021 أعلن الرئيس محمود عباس (الذي انتخب في عام 2005 لولاية مدتها خمس سنوات، تم تمديدها في عام 2009) أن الانتخابات الرئاسية والتشريعية ستجرى في الربيع والصيف في قطاع غزة والضفة الغربية والقدس الشرقية. تم تحديد حق سكان القدس الشرقية في الانتخاب في اتفاقيات أوسلو. لكن في نيسان/أبريل 2021، وقبل شهر واحد فقط من الموعد المقرر لتوجه الفلسطينيين إلى صناديق الاقتراع لانتخاب مجلس تشريعي فلسطيني جديد، أعلن عباس تأجيل الانتخابات إلى أجل غير مسمى، مدعيا رفض دولة إسرائيل السماح بإجراء الانتخابات في القدس الشرقية.[1] وبعد مرور عامين، لا يزال هذا التأجيل مستمرا، على حساب حق الناخبين الفلسطينيين في حكم أنفسهم واختيار قيادتهم. لم يصوت الكثير من المواطنين الفلسطينيين أبدا في انتخابات وطنية بعد أن بلغوا 18 عاما بعد عام 2006.

ستسلط هذه الورقة الضوء على التحديات الحرجة التي تواجه الانتخابات المستقبلية في القدس الشرقية، وتحديدا تعاون إسرائيل (أو عدم تعاونها) في إجراء الانتخابات، والمشاركة السياسية لسكان القدس الشرقية (بما في ذلك العقبات التي يواجهها سكان القدس الشرقية في المشاركة في العملية السياسية). وستقوم بعد ذلك بتقييم الخيارات أو الحلول المتاحة لصانعي القرار الفلسطينيين والمجتمع الدولي للتغلب على هذه التحديات.

1) خلفية:

عندما أجل الرئيس عباس الانتخابات في نيسان/أبريل 2021، أشار إلى رفض إسرائيل السماح بإجراء انتخابات في القدس الشرقية. خلال الجولة الأخيرة من الانتخابات التشريعية في عام 2006، قلصت إسرائيل الانتخابات من خلال السماح فقط لسكان القدس الشرقية بالتصويت في ضواحي المدينة وفي مكاتب البريد. مع استمرار احتلال إسرائيل للقدس الشرقية، والإصرار على أنها جزء من "العاصمة الموحدة" التي يحظر فيها النشاط السياسي الفلسطيني، كان من غير المرجح أن يكون مثل هذا الحل الوسط ممكنا لو جرت الانتخابات في عام 2021. وعلى الرغم من أن وزارة الخارجية الإسرائيلية قالت إن الانتخابات هي "قضية فلسطينية داخلية، وأن إسرائيل ليس لديها نية للتدخل فيها أو منعها"، فمن المرجح أن يكون الواقع مختلفا تماما.[2] ومن المفيد الإشارة أيضا إلى أن ذلك القول لم يترافق مع بيان تأييد لحق الناخبين الفلسطينيين في انتخاب ممثليهم السياسيين، أو ما شابه ذلك. لو كان عباس قد مضى قدما في إجراء الانتخابات، وهو يعلم أنه لن يصوت أي من سكان القدس الشرقية لممثليهم السياسيين، لكان من الممكن تفسير ذلك على أنه قبول من السلطة الفلسطينية بالاحتلال والضم غير القانوني للقدس الشرقية.

ومع ذلك، رفضت جميع الفصائل الفلسطينية الأخرى تقريبا قرار الرئيس عباس، بل وصفت حماس التأجيل بأنه "انقلاب". كان هناك شعور بين بعض معارضي عباس وحركة فتح بأن عدم تعاون إسرائيل هو مجرد ذريعة للتغطية على الانقسامات الداخلية داخل حزب عباس.[3] فالرئيس يواجه منافسة شديدة من بعض الجماعات المتحدية لسيطرته على حركة «فتح» بقيادة أفراد من بينهم مروان البرغوثي (الذي يقضي حاليا خمسة أحكام بالسجن مدى الحياة في سجن إسرائيلي)، وناصر القدوة (ابن شقيق ياسر عرفات)، ومحمد دحلان (رئيس الأمن الوقائي السابق). وصف دحلان التأجيل بأنه "غير قانوني" وأنه إجراء اتخذه رئيس "فقد شرعيته".[4] وقد أشير إلى البرغوثي، على وجه الخصوص، كمرشح مفضل للناخبين الفلسطينيين في استطلاعات الرأي التي أجراها المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية.[5] ومن المحتمل أن يكون عباس قد كان قلقا من أن فوز حماس قد يضعف فتح ويقسمها لمجموعات متنافسة، أو أن يفقد مكانته كرئيس لحركة فتح وللسلطة الفلسطينية.

وقد يكون التخوف من احتمال فوز «حماس» قد أدى لتبلور ضغوط دولية وإقليمية لتأجيل الانتخابات. فقد ذكرت صحيفة القدس أن عباس واجه ضغوطا عربية وأمريكية لتأجيل التصويت، خوفا من فوز حماس.[6] وكانت حماس قد انتصرت على فتح في انتخابات عام 2006، وسيطرت منذ 2007 بحكم الأمر الواقع على قطاع غزة. وفوق كل ذلك، فإن حركة حماس موصوفة كجماعة إرهابية من قبل كل من الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي.

2) التحديات الرئيسية لإجراء الانتخابات في القدس الشرقية

رفض إسرائيل للتعاون

إن احتمال إجراء أي انتخابات فلسطينية في القدس الشرقية في المستقبل يتضاءل مع استمرار الاحتلال الإسرائيلي وقيامها بضم أجزاء من الضفة الغربية، وكلما تعزز الافتراض بأن الحكومة الاسرائيلية ستتدخل أو تمنع إجراء الانتخابات. زادت الحكومة الإسرائيلية منذ عام 2006 من توسعها العدواني في القدس الشرقية وتتميز الحكومة المنتخبة مؤخرا، بقيادة بنيامين نتنياهو، بمواقف متطرفة تدعو للمزيد من الضم وتعميق الاحتلال.

في انتخابات عام 2006، أظهرت الحكومة الإسرائيلية عدم رغبتها في السماح بإجراء انتخابات حرة ونزيهة في القدس الشرقية. وحظرت افتتاح مراكز للتصويت والاقتراع، مما أجبر الناخبين على الإدلاء بأصواتهم في مكاتب البريد في القدس حيث كانت الشرطة الإسرائيلية تشرف عليها. وعلى الرغم من أن الأثر الفعلي لهذا السلوك المقيد لحرية التصويت غير مؤكد، فإنه يمكن للمرء أن يفترض أن هذا الإشراف من قبل شرطة الاحتلال خلق جوا عدائيا يثبط المشاركة الديمقراطية. وعلاوة على ذلك، تمت مداهمة جميع مكاتب حماس وإغلاقها، وحرم مرشحو حماس من الإذن بالقيام بحملاتهم الانتخابية.

قبل انتخابات 2021 المفترضة، ذكرت الحكومة الإسرائيلية أنه ليس لديها "خطة" للتدخل في الانتخابات، لكنها رفضت التعليق على وضع القدس، ولم تصدر أي بيان دعم للانتخابات أو حق المجتمع الفلسطيني في انتخاب ممثليه. كان ينبغي أن يكون هذا هو الرد الأساسي على أي أسئلة حول الانتخابات. ويدعي الرئيس عباس أن المسؤولين الإسرائيليين قد أبلغوه مباشرة بأنه لن يسمح بإجراء الانتخابات، ولكن لا يمكن التحقق من صحة هذا الادعاء.

تنص القوانين الإسرائيليين الراهنة على حظر كافة الأنشطة السياسية المرتبطة بالسلطة الفلسطينية في القدس. ومن غير المرجح أن يتغير هذا الوضع، وهذا بالطبع بالإضافة إلى حظر حملات «حماس» ومشاركتها في الانتخابات في المستقبل المنظور.

مثل هذا العقبات تجعل الانتخابات المستقبلية صعبة لأسباب عدة. يمكن للمرء أن يتوقع مستويات كبيرة من الاضطراب في أي عملية تصويت، إما عن طريق تكرار أساليب التضييق المستخدمة في عام 2006، أو عن طريق التصعيد حيث يتم منع ناخبي القدس الشرقية من التصويت في المدينة تماما. يمكننا أن نفترض أن الناخبين قد يمنعون أيضا من التنقل إلى خارج المدينة للتصويت. ومن المرجح أن يقترن هذا التضييق باستخدام القوة والعنف لتحقيق أقصى قدر من الاضطراب. إن الوجود الفعلي للقوات الإسرائيلية، بغض النظر عما إذا كانت تستخدم القوة أم لا، هو عمل من أعمال التخويف السياسي. إنه تذكير مرئي بمن يمسك بالسلطة في المدينة، وتذكير بالعنف الذي استخدمته هذه القوة في الماضي. وعلاوة على ذلك، فإن الإشراف على التصويت من قبل الشرطة الإسرائيلية المسلحة يعزز إنكار الدور السياسي الفلسطيني ويؤكد الصورة النمطية الاستعمارية التاريخية بأن فلسطين مجتمع "غير متحضر" يتطلب إشرافا ناضجا (أي غربيا) ليتطور إلى دولة تتمتع بالحكم الذاتي، كما حددها الانتداب الأصلي لعصبة الأمم في عام 1923.

وقد يؤدي هذا التدخل أيضا إلى تطرف المجتمع الفلسطيني في القدس الشرقية، إذ كلما طالت مدة حجب الانتخابات عن الناخبين، زاد احتمال تبني الناخبين لأساليب التغيير غير السلمية، حيث ينظر إلى الأساليب الديمقراطية على أنها ميؤوس منها.

غياب الثقة بالنظام السياسي

إذا جرت أية انتخابات في القدس الشرقية، فستصعد للسطح مشكلة خطيرة تتعلق بالمشاركة السياسية والإيمان بإمكانية التغيير التشريعي. في استطلاع أجراه المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية في عام 2022، قال 93٪ من سكان القدس الشرقية إنهم لم يشاركوا في الانتخابات الفلسطينية السابقة. وكان العديد من المجيبين أصغر من أن يصوتوا في عام 2006. لكن الأهم من ذلك أن 6٪ فقط قالوا إنهم سيشاركون في انتخابات فلسطينية مستقبلية. هذا انخفاض بمقدار 33 نقطة مئوية عن نسبة الذين قالوا من بين سكان القدس الشرقية إنهم سيشاركون في استطلاع للمركز نفسه في عام 2010. وحقيقة أن هذه المشكلة قد تفاقمت على مدى عقد من الزمان تظهر استياء متزايدا من السلطة الفلسطينية. كانت هناك زيادة بمقدار 22 نقطة في التصور بأن السياسيين غير مؤثرين ولا يمكنهم مساعدة سكان القدس الشرقية.[7] من المعقول أن نفترض أن تأجيل الانتخابات في عام 2021 لم يؤد إلا إلى زيادة هذه المخاوف.

من المهم الإشارة إلى أن الانخفاض في الدافعية للمشاركة لا يقابله ارتفاع مماثل في نسبة الاعتقاد بفائدة الانتخابات الإسرائيلية، حيث أن لهذه الانتخابات مستويات مشاركة مماثلة (95٪ من المستطلعين قالوا إنهم لم يشاركوا في انتخابات الكنيست أو الانتخابات البلدية). ومع ذلك، من المهم الإشارة إلى أن هناك انخفاض بمقدار 12 نقطة في نسبة سكان القدس الشرقية الذين يؤكدون على مقاطعة الانتخابات البلدية أو انتخابات الكنيست الإسرائيلية على أساس أن الاحتلال يجعل هذه السلطة غير شرعية.[8] قد لا يعني هذا أن هؤلاء المستطلعين ينظرون الآن إلى السلطة الإسرائيلية على أنها شرعية، بل يمكن أن يشير إلى انهيار الاعتقاد بأن المقاطعة جديرة بالاهتمام أو فعالة وتعزيز فكرة أن سكان القدس الشرقية يجب أن يحاولوا جعل الأمور تعمل في ظل الاحتلال الحالي.

وإلى جانب الانخفاض في عدد المشاركين الذين قاطعوا الانتخابات بسبب الاحتلال، هناك انخفاض مقابل في عدد المستطلعين الذين كانوا على استعداد للتصويت في الانتخابات الإسرائيلية في حال طلبت السلطة الفلسطينية منهم ذلك. في عام 2010، قال 23٪ من المستجيبين إنهم سينفذون الطلب. أما في عام 2022 ، فقال ذلك 3٪ فقط،[9] وهذا يشير إلى انهيار كبير في مكانة السلطة الفلسطينية في القدس الشرقية.

وإذا افترضنا أن هذه الاتجاهات ستتأكد في حال إجراء انتخابات رئاسية أو تشريعية في المستقبل القريب، فإن نسبة إقبال أقل من 10 في المائة في القدس الشرقية ستضر بشكل لا يصدق بشرعية السلطة الفلسطينية أو الرئيس المنتخب حديثا. لذلك من الضروري محاولة معالجة مثل هذه المخاوف قبل الانتخابات.

في ظروف مثالية، مثلا في حال خففت فيه الحكومة الإسرائيلية قيود الاحتلال المشددة وسمحت بإجراء الانتخابات، من المرجح أن يخفف ذلك من الرأي القائل بأن مسؤولي السلطة الفلسطينية لا يستطيعون مساعدة القدس الشرقية. ومع ذلك، فإن احتمال حدوث ذلك ضئيل. وثمة عامل آخر هو عدم قدرة المرشحين على الوصول إلى سكان القدس الشرقية لأن إسرائيل لن تسمح لهم بالقيام بحملة انتخابية هناك. وبالتالي، فإن التأثير المحتمل لهذه الانتخابات وهؤلاء المرشحين على القدس الشرقية كدائرة انتخابية يبقى غير واقعي وغير مؤكد بالنسبة لسكان القدس الشرقية. لا يمكن معرفة ما إذا كان سيتم الاستماع إلى هذه المخاوف أم لا. ومن المرجح أن القضايا المتعلقة بجودة المرشحين لا يمكن تغييرها بشكل جاد إلا بمرور الوقت والانتخابات المتتالية حيث يثبت المسؤولون أنفسهم للناخبين على أنهم جديرون بالثقة وقادرون على إجراء تحسينات ذات مغزى في حياة سكان القدس الشرقية.

عقبات أخرى أمام المشاركة السياسية

بصرف النظر عن التدخل الإسرائيلي وعدم الثقة بالنظام السياسي الفلسطيني، هناك مشاكل إضافية – مرتبطة إلى حد كبير باحتلال القدس الشرقية –يمكن أن تقوض المشاركة السياسية في الانتخابات.

يواجه سكان القدس الشرقية انتهاكات يومية لحقوقهم في حرية التنقل والتعبير والتعليم. هذه أداة قوية للحكومة الإسرائيلية لإحداث تقليص تدريجي على شعور الفلسطينيين بالهوية وتقرير المصير والحرية. إن التأثير التراكمي لذلك في النظام الديمقراطي مدمر بشكل لا يصدق حيث يستسلم الناخبون لقبول الاضطهاد، أو على الأقل لأن يتعبوا من الاحتجاج - على اضطهادهم.

كما تم تقييد التعليم وتعطيله من قبل الاحتلال، مع فرض رقابة خاصة على المواد التعليمية التي تشير إلى الهوية الوطنية الفلسطينية. وهذا يشكل مشكلة للمشاركة السياسية إذ من الذي سيغرس في الأطفال الشعور بالمسؤولية المدنية للمشاركة في العمليات الديمقراطية.

ويشكل تقييد حرية التنقل تحديا خاصا. فحتى لو سمح بالتصويت المحدود في مكاتب البريد، على سبيل المثال، فإن هذا سيقتصر بشكل أكبر على أولئك الذين يمكنهم أخذ إجازة من العمل للسفر ولديهم الوسائل للقيام بذلك.

3) الخيارات السياساتية:

في ضوء التحديات الحرجة آنفة الذكر، هناك العديد من الخيارات المتاحة لواضعي السياسات للنظر فيها:

تأجيل الانتخابات لأجل غير مسمى:

الخيار الأول الذي يجب النظر فيه هو استمرار الوضع الراهن، أي تأجيل الانتخابات التشريعية والرئاسية إلى أجل غير مسمى، حتى يمكن ضمان إجراء الانتخابات في القدس الشرقية دون تدخل إسرائيلي كبير.

يجب تجنب هذا الخيار بأي ثمن. إن. التبرير الرئيسي لهذا الخيار هو أنه في إجراء الانتخابات من دون القدس الشرقية، ستكون السلطة الفلسطينية، أو يمكن أن تفهم على أنها تقبل ضمنيا الاحتلال الإسرائيلي غير القانوني وتتخلى عن حقوق سكان القدس الشرقية.

ومع ذلك، فإن السلطة الفلسطينية، باتخاذها موقفا ضد التدخل الإسرائيلي، تضمن استمرار حرمان بقية الناخبين الفلسطينيين من حقهم في تقرير المصير والمشاركة في الانتخابات. تأثير هذا يمكن أن يكون كارثيا. لقد فازت حماس بالفعل في الانتخابات السابقة للسلطة الفلسطينية ، وتخاطر فتح بتنفير الناخبين منها، وخاصة إذا اعتقدوا أنها تصرفت لما فيه مصلحتها الحزبية الذاتية. وكما قال النقاد بعد التأجيل، يمكن اتهام فتح بالسماح لإسرائيل فعليا باستخدام حق النقض (الفيتو) على الانتخابات الفلسطينية.[10]

علاوة على ذلك، يجب على السلطة الفلسطينية أن تثبت قدرتها على الإدارة الحكومية الفاعلة وعلى الالتزام بالقانون الدولي وإجراء انتخابات منتظمة. وهذا أمر جوهري لتعزيز الدعم الداخلي ضد الاحتلال الإسرائيلي، وتوحيد الفلسطينيين خلف مؤسساتهم الوطنية، ولكن أيضا لحشد الدعم الدولي كدولة قادرة على حكم نفسها وكلاعب مساو لإسرائيل.

وتبقى الحقيقة الأساسية هي أن الانتخابات لم تحدث منذ عام 2006، وأن نسبة كبيرة من الناخبين الفلسطينيين تتراوح أعمارهم اليوم بين 18 و34 عاما، مما يعني أنهم لم يصوتوا أبدا في الانتخابات الفلسطينية. وهذا واقع غير مقبول ولا يضمن إلا استمرار خيبة الأمل السياسية ويضعف شرعية السلطة الفلسطينية وبالتالي يقلل من قدرتها على الحكم.

إجراء الانتخابات بدون القدس:

هناك عدة بدائل للتأجيل إلى أجل غير مسمى. الأول هو المضي قدما في كل من الانتخابات التشريعية والرئاسية بغض النظر عما إذا كانت إسرائيل تسمح بإجرائها في القدس الشرقية. كما ذكرنا سابقا، هناك جوانب سلبية واضحة لإجراء هذه الانتخابات مع العلم أن عددا كبيرا من الناخبين لن يتمكنوا على الأرجح من التصويت، ومن المؤسف أن السلطة الفلسطينية يمكن أن ينظر إليها في هذه الحالة على أنها مسؤولة عن حرمان سكانها من التصويت.

ومع ذلك، من الأهمية بمكان أن يتأسس المجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني، وأن يتم انتخاب رئيس بولاية جديدة. إن وجود دليل على أن التصويت قد تم قمعه يمكن أن يوفر للمجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني المنتخب حديثا نقطة انطلاق قوية في وضع أجندة سياسية قوية تقف في وجه العدوان الإسرائيلي. ويمكن اتخاذ إجراءات رمزية لتمثيل الممثلين المفقودين من القدس الشرقية، مثل ترك المقاعد فارغة.

إجراء الانتخابات مع القدس:

ثمة خيار آخر لا يتمثل في المضي قدما في الانتخابات فحسب، بل أيضا محاولة إجراء شكل من أشكال التصويت في القدس الشرقية. كان هذا هو الخيار المفضل لحماس في عام 2021. صرحت لجنة الانتخابات المركزية الفلسطينية قبل أيام من قرار عباس أنها تعتقد أن ما يقرب من 150,000 ناخب فلسطيني ممن يحق لهم حق الاقتراع من ضواحي القدس الشرقية (ما يقرب من نصف سكان المدينة الفلسطينيين) لن يحتاجوا لموافقة إسرائيل من أجل أن يتمكنوا من لتصويت.[11] قد تكون هذه فرصة عظيمة لإظهار المقاومة وخاصة إذا حضرت أعداد كبيرة للتصويت على الرغم من التهديدات الإسرائيلية.

ومع ذلك، يمكن أن يكون هذا عملا استفزازيا خطيرا يؤدي إلى العنف في جميع أنحاء القدس وربما في أماكن أخرى. ومن المرجح أن تشهد اعتقالات جماعية لأي شخص يحاول تسهيل الانتخابات في القدس الشرقية. ولن تكون هذه هزيمة نفسية قوية للسلطة الفلسطينية فحسب، بل يمكن أن تزيد أيضا من زعزعة استقرار السلطة الفلسطينية إذا تم اعتقال أعداد كبيرة من المسؤولين، مما يحول دون القدرة التشغيلية للسلطة الفلسطينية.

تشجيع الإسرائيليين على التعاون:

بطبيعة الحال، سيكون السيناريو المثالي هو أن تسمح إسرائيل بإجراء تصويت كامل وحر ونزيه في القدس الشرقية. ولتمكين حدوث ذلك، من المرجح أن يتطلب الأمر ضغطا دوليا أقوى بكثير على إسرائيل للسماح بإجراء الانتخابات، والتزاما أكبر من المجتمع الدولي بالدفاع عن حق السكان الفلسطينيين في الديمقراطية. ويمكن أن يتخذ ذلك شكل التزام المجتمع الدولي بالعمل مع السلطة المنتخبة (على الأرجح مع التحذير من أنها يجب أن تلتزم بالقانون الدولي). وربما يكون هذا الالتزام ضروريا لحشد دعم الأطراف الدولية مثل الاتحاد الأوروبي الذي يعتبر حماس جماعة إرهابية. وللحصول على دعم الولايات المتحدة، ربما يتعين إجراء انتخابات عاجلا وليس آجلا بينما لا يزال الديمقراطيون يسيطرون على الرئاسة، حيث من المفترض أن تشهد عودة دونالد ترامب (أو مرشح مماثل) إلى البيت الأبيض موقفا أكثر تأييدا لإسرائيل.

ويتعين على المجتمع الدولي أن يكون واضحا في تحديد العواقب إذا تدخلت إسرائيل في الانتخابات؛ وينبغي تطبيق هذه العقوبات بحزم إذا لزم الأمر. وكما أشار عباس نفسه في خطابه أمام الأمم المتحدة في أيار/مايو 2023 في الذكرى ال75 للنكبة، كان هناك أكثر من ألف قرار للأمم المتحدة بشأن فلسطين ولكن لم يتم تنفيذ أي منها على الإطلاق.[12] وإذا استطاع المجتمع الدولي أن يحدد العواقب ويطبقها، فقد تكون هذه لحظة حاسمة لاستعادة الشعور الفلسطيني بالثقة في المؤسسات الدولية.

يواجه هذا الخيار مشاكل كبيرة تتعلق بمدى واقعيته. لا يستطيع صانعو السياسات الفلسطينيون إجبار الجهات الدولية الفاعلة على اتباع خط العمل هذا. يركز المجتمع الدولي حاليا إلى حد كبير على الحرب في أوكرانيا ولا ينظر إلى فلسطين على أنها أولوية عالية. ومع ذلك، يمكن أن يكون هذا هو المكان الذي يركز فيه المجتمع الدولي جهده في الضغط والدبلوماسية، لأن هذا هو الخيار الأكثر واقعية في أن يجلب تعاونا من إسرائيل.

معالجة الدوافع الأخرى لتأجيل الانتخابات:

تستند جميع الخيارات المذكورة أعلاه إلى افتراض أن عباس كان صادقا في تبريره لتأجيل الانتخابات. ومع ذلك، إذا افترضنا أن منتقديه محقون في تسليط الضوء على المخاوف من فوز «حماس» والتحديات المحتملة من داخل «فتح»، فهناك خيارات أكثر جدوى لصانعي القرار للنظر فيها.

لقد اتخذت فتح وحماس بالفعل خطوات لتحسين الأوضاع بينهما. اعتبارا من عام 2022، وافقت جميع الفصائل ال 14 على إجراء انتخابات وطنية في غضون عام.[13] ووعدت كل من فتح وحماس بأن هذا لن يكون وعدا فارغا آخرا لن يتم الوفاء به، ولكن الوقت وحده سيكون الحكم. يمكن لصانعي القرار أيضا ممارسة الضغط على حماس وأي فصيل آخر يدعو إلى استخدام القوة كأداة سياسية للالتزام باتباع القانون الدولي إذا تم انتخابه.

إن الانقسام الداخلي في حركة فتح ليس شيئا يمكن معالجته مباشرة من قبل صانعي القرار، لكن يمكنهم ممارسة الضغط على فتح لإقناعها بوضع مصلحة البلاد أمام مصلحة الحزب، الأمر الذي قد يجني ثماره.

معالجة قضية المشاركة السياسية:

كما هو مبين في بداية هذه الورقة، حتى لو أجريت الانتخابات، فإن السلطة الفلسطينية تواجه تحديا صعبا يتمثل في عدم الرغبة لدى سكان القدس الشرقية في المشاركة السياسية. إن من الصعب على صانعي القرار محاولة معالجة هذا الأمر دون إعطاء وعد ثابت بإجراء الانتخابات في المستقبل. كما أن المشاكل المتعلقة بتقييد الحقوق، لا سيما حرية الحركة والعمل السياسي والتعليم ، صعبة بشكل خاص. ومع ذلك، فإن أحد المجالات التي يمكن معالجتها هو الفساد والثقة في القادة السياسيين. ويمكن لصانعي القرار أن يركزوا طاقاتهم على ضمان قدر أكبر من المسؤولية والمساءلة في الحكومة، وبالتالي بناء الثقة تدريجيا في السياسيين والمؤسسات العامة.

4) الخلاصة:

إن احتمال إجراء انتخابات مستقبلية في القدس الشرقية وفلسطين هو احتمال قاتم. تواجه السلطة الفلسطينية الصعوبات في جبهتين منفصلتين: إسرائيل واللامبالاة السياسية، ويجب إزالة كليهما أو معالجتهما من أجل إجراء الانتخابات بنجاح.

على المدى القصير، ينبغي على صانعي القرار أن يركزوا غالبية جهودهم على إقناع حركة «فتح» بإجراء شكل من أشكال الانتخابات في أقرب وقت ممكن، بموافقة إسرائيل أو بدونها. كما أن الضغط على المجتمع الدولي للحصول على دعم أكبر يمكن أن يجني ثماره، على الرغم من أن احتمال حدوث أي تحول كبير في الوضع الراهن ضئيل. وعلى المدى الطويل، يجب على صانعي القرار معالجة اللامبالاة الخطيرة تجاه المشاركة السياسية. إن إجراء الانتخابات من شأنه أن يقلل جزئيا من هذه اللامبالاة، لكنه لن يحلها تماما.

** " شكر خاص من هبة الحسيني للأنسة أيونا كلارك لمساهمتها في البحث والكتابة لهذه الورقة. الآنسة كلارك تحضر لشهادة الدكتوراه في جامعة كامبردج في تخصص السياسة والدراسات الدولية."

[1] European Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Mapping Palestinian Politics’. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/elections-2021/

[2] Abbas delays Palestinian parliamentary polls, blaming Israel, Al Jazeera, 20 April 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/30/palestinian-factions-reject-abbas-decision-to-delay-polls

[3] Ibid, Palestinian leader delays parliamentary and presidential elections, blaming Israel, Reuters, 30 April 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-elections-delayed-says-president-mahmoud-abbas-2021-04-29/

[4] Abbas delays Palestinian parliamentary polls, blaming Israel, Al Jazeera, 20 April 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/30/palestinian-factions-reject-abbas-decision-to-delay-polls

[5] Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No (86), 7 December 2022. https://pcpsr.org/en/node/926

[6] Abbas delays Palestinian parliamentary polls, blaming Israel, Al Jazeera, 20 April 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/30/palestinian-factions-reject-abbas-decision-to-delay-polls

[7] Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, A Special East Jerusalem Poll:

Comparing the Results of 2010 and 2022 Polls. https://pcpsr.org/ar/node/932

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Abbas delays Palestinian parliamentary polls, blaming Israel, Al Jazeera, 20 April 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/30/palestinian-factions-reject-abbas-decision-to-delay-polls

[11] Jørgen Jensehaugen and Erling Lorentzen Sogge, ‘The Palestinian elections that weren't’, The Loop. https://theloop.ecpr.eu/palestinian-elections-hang-in-the-balance/

[12] ‘Marking Anniversary of Nakba, President Tells Palestinian Rights Committee ‘Tragedy Constitutes a Scar on Humanity’’, Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, UN Meetings Coverage, 15 May 2023. https://press.un.org/en/2023/gapal1453.doc.htm.

[13] Lamine Chikhi and Nidal Al-Mughrabi, ‘Palestinian rivals agree to hold elections but doubts persist’, Reuters, 13 October 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-rivals-agree-elections-end-dispute-doubts-persist-2022-10-13/

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Palestinian Pubic Perception of Japan

Report on Results of a Public Opinion Poll among Palestinians,

Based on the findings of PCPSR’s December 2021 public opinion poll

Khalil Shikaki

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a public opinion poll among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the period between 8 and 11 December 2021. The poll sought to assess public perception of Japan, its people, and its policies regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several domestic and Palestinian-Israeli developments including the preparation for the holding of the first phase of local elections in rural areas and small towns in the West Bank. Hamas prevented the holding of the local elections in the Gaza Strip. This period witnessed also various violent incidents among students in some Palestinian universities and the death of one student. Israel classified 6 Palestinian human rights NGOs as terrorist organizations. The UK labeled Hamas as a terrorist organization. In the months leading to the conduct of the poll, Israeli-Palestinian relations witnessed some positive developments when the Palestinian president met with the Israeli defense minister to discuss confidence building measures aimed at improving daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as family unifications, transfer of funds to the PA, and an increase in the number of laborers working in Israel.
Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. ..Full Report

العربية

Critical Policy Brief, Number 3/2022

September 2022

Can the Demographic Advantage be an Effective Weapon in the Struggle to Achieve Palestinian Rights?

Walid Ladadweh and Khalil Shikaki

Introduction:

All Palestinian attempts over the past fifty-five years to end the occupation that began in 1967 have failed. Negotiations failed because Israel, right, center, and left, refused to settle for 78 percent of historic Palestine. The armed struggle has failed because the balance of power has always tilted in Israel's favor. The failure to rely on Arab support was the product of internal and regional challenges in all Arab countries making the Palestinian issue a secondary one. Reliance on international legitimacy has failed because the Western world that established Israel has not been willing to force it to abide by that legitimacy, even though it was the West itself that laid down the foundations of the contemporary international order. Reliance on the strength of public institutions and the state-building model has failed because the ruling Palestinian elite in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip found in the Arab models of authoritarianism and political corruption a preferred system thereby losing the trust of its people before losing the confidence of the rest of the world. The non-violent popular resistance failed because of its great ability to slide quickly into armed action, its failure to gain credibility with the Palestinian public, which continued to view it as an ineffective mechanism for the struggle to end the occupation and because of the public’s firm conviction that the Israelis understand nothing but the language of force.

The Palestinian side has no advantage over Israel except in its ability to win the numerical demographic "battle" by staying on its own land and seeking political alternatives based on this numerical advantage in the hope of protecting its land and achieving its rights. Can the Palestinians develop a plan for the next twenty years that could enable them to mobilize and strengthen the advantage they enjoy despite the great internal difficulties that will stand in their way?

This Critical Brief aims first to review the steps that the Palestinian side can take to successfully fight its demographic "battle", and secondly to identify external sources of threat and internal impediments to any Palestinian strategy that seeks to capitalize on the demographic asset. But it start with numbers and their significance on Arab-Palestinian versus Israeli-Jewish population growth in the current situation and in the years to come.

What the status quo and the demographic numbers say:

In May 2021, the Palestinians demonstrated the unity of their national identity by joining in a common struggle against the Israeli occupation when the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Palestinian citizens of Israel clashed with the Israeli army and police in defense of Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem. That demonstration expressed the Palestinian people's rejection of the status quo in Palestinian-Israeli relations and affirmed the overriding goal of ending the occupation. But it is clear that this status quo is resilient and difficult to change.

The status quo has several features that threaten the vital Palestinian interest in self-determination, but it also has at least one feature that helps serve this interest. On the negative side, the status quo is described as “self-government,” one devoid of sovereignty while under full foreign military control. It is characterized by an expansion of settlements and a creeping annexation fueled by that settlement enterprise that flourishes in a clear violation of international law. There seems to be no possibility of stopping this creeping annexation. To add insult to injury, several Arab countries established strong political, security, and economic relations with Israel, reinforcing the resilience of the status quo.

Internally, the status quo is characterized by a deepening split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, an enormous deterioration in good governance, and a weakened PA capacity to impose law and order or protect its people from settler terrorism and attacks by the Israeli army. These developments rob the PA of legitimacy and deny it almost all public trust. The international community makes grandiose declarations affirming the primacy of international law and provides funding to the PA as a contribution to maintaining the status quo and compensating the Palestinians for its unwillingness or inability to compel Israel to comply with international legitimacy. The ruling Palestinian elite defends the status quo, despite its stated rejection of and dissatisfaction with it, and relies on authoritarianism to compensate for the loss of trust of its people in it and to sustain its control. Finally, under the prevailing status quo, Israel cooperates with the Palestinian ruling elite and facilitates some of its work as long as it sees that this elite is interested, in action and behavior, in maintaining the status quo or at least does not seek to challenge it by force.

But despite its bleak reality, the status quo allows for the consolidation of the Palestinian numerical advantage. By the end of 2022 the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, also known as historic Palestine, will be characterized by a ruling Jewish minority that controls a majority of Palestinians. The Palestinian and Israeli statistical services, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), agree that the ratio of the Palestinian-Jewish population in historic Palestine, namely the West Bank (including Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip, and Israel, has since the beginning of this year been tilting toward equality and that by the end of this year Palestinians will become the majority. This is clearly attested to by the end-of-2021 figures showing that the Palestinian population at that time stood, according to PCBS, at 6,976,481, of which 2,849,974 were in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, 2,136,507 in the Gaza Strip, and 1,990,000 were, according to CBS, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel as well as the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. Israel's Jewish population was set by CBS at 6,982,000 and the rest (472,000) were defined as “others,” neither Jews nor Palestinians.[1]

As the following figure indicates[2], the percentage of projected population increase, including projections of immigration to Israel, indicates a Palestinian population growth over the coming years driven by the small average age of Palestinian society compared to the Israeli society, with birth rates in Palestine for 2021, as UN data indicate, reaching 27.76 per thousand people compared to 19.39 in Israel (including the Palestinian citizens of Israel). The mortality rate in Palestine for the same year was 3.45 per thousand people and in Israel 5.30. The relatively high mortality rate in Israel is due to the older average age of the population. However, it should be noted that life expectancy at birth is higher in Israel than in Palestine (82.74 and 73.82 respectively)[3].

”PCBS predictions for the demographic balance between Palestinians and Jew and others in “historic Palestine

The discourse among Israeli specialists on the demographic issue and its expected significance to possible solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the prospects for the continuation of the status quo have recently intensified. In March 2018, the demographer at the Hebrew University of Israel, Sergio Della Pergola, noted that the number of Jews and Arabs in historic Palestine had become almost equal.[4] Pergola was commenting on Uri Mendes, from the office of the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), presentation of demographic data to a Knesset committee. The presentation indicated the realization of a parity of the Palestinian and Jewish population in historic Palestine. Member of the Knesset Mordechai Yogev of the Jewish Home commented on the data by saying they were based on false Palestinian data, while MK Nahman Shai of the Zionist Union referred to the same data as the final warning to every Israeli who wants his state to remain Jewish and democratic.[5]

In August of this year, three Israeli researchers from the Reichmann University in Herzliya described the 2022 demographic change as a "coup" and said that the State of Israel was heading towards a reality that might undermine the entire Zionist project while asserting that the Palestinians have already become the majority in historic Palestine, citing recent information published by the Israeli Civil Administration.[6] Arnon Sofer, a professor of geography at the University of Haifa, who is a careful follower of Israel's demographic affairs, commented on the article by these three researchers by saying that Israeli Jews have already become a minority in historic Palestine, stressing that the real percentage of the population officially recognized by Israel as Jews is between 46% and 47% only and that there are about 650,000 Israelis who are neither Arabs nor Jews.[7]

Sofer explained to Israel Army Radio that the reason for the Palestinian population increase was the small average age of Palestinians compared to Israel.[8] Indeed, figures from PCBS indicate that the percentage of Palestinians under the age of 25 stands at 60% while the corresponding Israeli percentage stands at only 43% (including Palestinian citizens of Israel). Non-Israeli Jewish figures have also expressed great concerns about the demographic developments, with Ronald Lauder, president of the World Jewish Congress and former U.S. ambassador to Austria, posting an op-ed in the Washington Post in which he described the Palestinian numerical demographic advantage as a "grave existential threat" to Israel.[9]

But the Israeli public does not seem to be very interested in the demographic issue. With Israel's growing economic growth, military power and technology unmatched by any other regional power, and with rising international and regional standing, the Israeli public tends to believe that the Jewish majority will be guaranteed, either because the figures on Palestinian population growth are exaggerated, as the right in Israel claims,[10] or because the Gaza Strip is not in fact part of the demographic equation, or because Israel has the ability to expel or displace the Palestinian population when it has the opportunity to do so.[11] Above all, just under half of Israeli Jewsprefer that the response to the Palestinian demographic advantage, if it occurs, be to deny equality to the Palestinian majority.[12]

How would a strategy of demographic advantage look like?

A strategy based on numerical demographic advantage does not need to adopt in advance, that is, at the present stage, a specific political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, such as a two-state solution, a one-state solution, or any other solution. Failure to commit in advance to a specific political settlement would not pose a threat or even weaken a strategy aimed at maximizing Palestinian numerical demographic advantage. But such a strategy is required to do four things: (1) preserve what exists while looking for ways to enhance steadfastness on the ground and seek ways to compete with Israel in the qualitative realm in order to reduce the qualitative gap that exists today, (2) reduce the size of Palestinian emigration, (3) strengthen public institutions capable of accomplishing the two things mentioned above, and (4) search for means of integration and socio-economic alignment between the different Palestinian communities in order to strengthen identity and maximize common interests.

Historically, the demographic question and the conflict between Palestinian and Jewish identities have been central to the partition of Palestine and the two-state solution. Today, demography plays a similar fundamental role but for some it is based on the argument that it is impossible to implement a two-state solution, which leads them to call for a one-state solution with equal rights for the Palestinian and the Israeli Jews. However, some of the steps required for an effective one-state solution, such as an immediate dissolution for the PA or the official abandonment of the two-state solution, may bring with them high political and economic costs that would generate enormous pressures on the population to emigrate, which could compromise the Palestinian numerical advantage. In contrast, a strategy that preserves a two-state solution may be able to provide a political, legal, and administrative framework that would create conditions that would enable the protection and maximization of the demographic advantage if accompanied by other conditions, such as good governance and an effective governing elite characterized by integrity and a commitment to democratic values. In other words, a strategy based on demography favors moving away from adopting a one-state solution, at least for now. This flexibility allows for a subsequent reassessment of the situation according to developments on the ground and the attendant Palestinian success or failure in dealing with the challenges that ensue.

The basis for protecting the demographic advantage lies in blocking any threats to the territorial integrity of the Palestinian territories and in strengthening the resilience and steadfastness of the Palestinian society. Needless to say, this cannot be done without the restoration of unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while ensuring political stability, economic prosperity, a reasonable degree of social trust and national unity, and a minimum consensus on a national strategy.

Numerical demographic advantage requires reducing the demand for emigration, especially among young people and particularly in the Gaza Strip. The findings of public opinion polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research over the past ten years indicate that a high percentage of Palestinians want to emigrate. The overall rate of demand for emigration over the past ten years is 30%. Available data from this period indicate that one of the main reasons for the demand for emigration is the negative assessment among those seeking emigration of the general conditions in their area of residence, the lack of security and personal safety, and the high degree of pessimism about reconciliation and the prospects for reunification of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As expected, the average demand for immigration in the Gaza Strip rises to 41% compared to 23% in the West Bank.

Demand for emigration in the Gaza Strip has risen to more than 60% during certain period of the past decade. These rates were recorded in March 2013, June and September 2015, and in January 2018. In the West Bank, the rate of demand for emigration has sometimes reached 40 percent or more, as seen in March 2013, September and December 2013, June 2016, June 2017 and September 2020. The results also indicate that youth, between 18 and 29 years old, is the group most willing to emigrate, both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Among this group, the desire for emigration during the past ten years, has reached an average of 42% (35% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip).

The demographic-based strategy favors strengthening PA public institutions because any effort to maintain the numerical advantage and reduce the qualitative gap with Israel requires enormous efforts that would not be possible without such institutions. It should be borne in mind that a weak PA poses a strong internal threat to Palestinian numerical advantage and condemns to failure any efforts it may make to improve the quality of Palestinian demography. Israelis outperform Palestinians in all indicators related to scientific and technological progress, individual productivity, human development, and per capita income. For example, in the annual global Human Development Index, Palestine ranks 106^th while and Israel comes in 22^nd place. The following figure, which traces the annual per capita income in dollars over the previous twenty-one years, shows a more devastating picture. The figure shows that the current 2021per capita income in Palestine stands at $ 3,664 while in Israel at $ 51,430, a ratio of 1:14.

GDP per capita income in US dollar[13]

Finally, the demographic-based strategy favors strengthening Palestinian identity by creating alliances and large-scale cooperation with the Palestinian citizens of Israel. This requires building joint civil society institutions for both sides, undertaking joint investment cooperative projects, and building political and economic partnerships between them. Achieving this requires a shared vision and institutional leadership at the highest political, religious and societal levels and will not be possible to achieve through initiatives from civil society or the private sector alone despite the great importance of their role in this strategy.

Threats and impediments:

Any Palestinian strategy aimed at maximizing the Palestinian numerical advantage must identify the sources of the external threat and internal impediments to that advantage and, if possible, neutralize them. Although internal constraints are the most important, because they are the ones Palestinians can fix if they so desire, we must first begin by assessing the magnitude of external threats.

External threats stem from three sources: Israel's military and economic power and qualitative demographic advantage, the loss of the Arab depth, and the absence of effective international legitimacy.

Israel's military and economic power, occupation policies, and qualitative demographic advantage: Israel can annex the occupied Palestinian territories without posing a direct threat to Palestinian numerical advantage. But the direct Israeli threat comes from Israel's superior military power, reinforced by Israel's qualitative advantage over the Palestinians in most human and economic development indicators that work together to make Israel's per capita income higher than that of fourteen Palestinians combined. The military component of the threat means that the Palestinian side lacks the ability to prevent the Israeli army from expelling its people from its homeland under certain circumstances, as happened in 1948 and in some areas in 1967, and weakens Palestinian numerical advantage in favor of Israeli qualitative advantage.

In other circumstances, Israel can work to displace the Palestinian population and expel them from their lands by administrative and economic means that force residents to seek a better life in neighboring countries and elsewhere. In this context, the settler arm of the State of Israel may be the most effective force in creating those conditions that contribute to the displacement of the Palestinian population. Above all, Israeli occupation policies constitute daily incitement and motivation for individual and collective armed resistance. All of this contributes to threatening internal stability and reducing the chances for the steadfastness of the Palestinians.

The loss of Arab support: The second external threat comes from the Arab regional environment, which gives Israel declared and undeclared acceptance and normalization from most Arab regimes. This normalization reinforces right-wing Israeli militancy and generates Palestinian frustration at the leadership and popular levels, while strengthening the sense of betrayal and abandonment of the cause of Palestine and its people, which may lead them to adopt angry responses that do not serve their interests. This development translates into minimum or no Arab support for Palestinian steadfastness; it also contributes to enhancing Israeli capabilities and widening the quantitative gap against the Palestinians.

Ineffective international legitimacy: The third source of the external threat comes from the international environment in which Israel is treated with grand exceptionalism, the result of the historical circumstances that accompanied the Second World War and the establishment of the State of Israel, the most important of which of course is the Holocaust. This exceptionalism means that the Western world remains a military and political ally of Israel, despite the fact that its continued occupation of the Palestinian territories constitutes a clear violation of international laws and values, the same laws and values that have been established by the Western world. This threat means that the solution to the Palestinian issue will always lack a route based on international legitimacy, no matter how willing the victims are to give up some of their rights and their historical narrative. But more importantly, the conclusion is that this Western world may stand by and watch, as it is doing now, even if it becomes clear to it without a shadow of a doubt that Israel has indeed become an apartheid state ruled by an Israeli Jewish minority over a Palestinian majority.

The internal obstacles boil down to four: the struggles for power between the ruling elites; the diminishing legitimacy of the political system; serious political and security instability and economic decline; and finally, a weak performance of the PA institutions and economy, each of which strikes at aspects of the Palestinian demographic advantage and hinders the possibility of formulating an effective strategy to use it.

The struggle for power among the ruling elites in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: The struggle for power and influence between the two main forces of the political system, Fatah and Hamas, prolongs the period of the split and geographical separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reinforcing beliefs among Palestinians and others that it has become, or will soon become, permanent. This result takes the Gaza Strip out of the demographic equation and restores Israel's numerical advantage.

An illegitimate political system: The components of the political system lack constitutional and electoral legitimacy, as well as public trust and satisfaction. The presidential term has ended more than 12 years ago, no general elections has taken place since 2006, and no Palestinian government has received the mandatory parliamentary vote of confidence since 2007. For these and other reasons, the resulting system lacks separation of powers, independent judiciary, and oversight and accountability. The parliament that was elected in 2006 has been dissolved by the head of the executive branch, who himself lacks electoral legitimacy. He ignored the constitutional requirement of periodic elections and cancelled, in April 2021, the only election that reached its final stage of preparation. Inevitably, under these conditions, PA policies have led to a significant erosion in liberties and inflicted an enormous damage on pluralism in civil society.

All of this generates a lack of trust in the government and the presidency among the vast majority of the public, as opinion polls indicate, and a near-mass consensus that corruption exists in PA public institutions. These developments contribute to the decline of societal trust, that is, people's trust in each other, and weaken national identity in addition to its secondary role in increasing emigration rates.

Diminishing political and security stability and greater economic weakness: There is no doubt that the collapse of the political settlement and the two-state solution and the increased prospects for armed conflict and popular confrontations generate various levels of instability. This situation is reinforced by the weakness of the Palestinian Authority and its loss of legitimacy and popular satisfaction. The longer this reality lasts, the closer the situation will arrive to a major turning point in which an explosion against the PA and Israel becomes inevitable. One can easily imagine a situation in which the ability of the PA to provide services, especially to enforce law and order, collapses, as happened during the second intifada, which could generate widespread security chaos. An escalation of armed action led by armed groups that are not subject to a well-known and publicly accepted political leadership could lead to a resounding fall of public order and create an internal security vacuum leading to increased crime, a decrease in economic activity, and a decline in social services, all of which are major incentives for large-scale emigration.

Weak institutional and economic performance: This weakness is manifested in the PA's declining ability to provide services as well as poor individual productivity. It negatively affects the quality of Palestinian demographic advantage in favor of an Israeli qualitative advantage.

Conclusions:

The demographic trajectory, not the military and economic balance of power, may decide the future of the Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli peoples. But for Palestinians to compete in this field, they must adopt a strategy that maximizes their numerical advantage and reduces the gap that currently exists in the qualitative realm between the two peoples. What are the prospects for success in doing so under the current reality?

It is inevitable to conclude sadly that a review of the current reality, especially official and partisan Palestinian performance, suggests that the chances for success of a strategy based on numerical demographic advantage do not seem high, and may even be very small. This is due to the severity of the threats and obstacles, especially the internal ones, which can be summarized as follows:

The ongoing relinquishment of the numerical demographic advantage driven by the policies of the two major political parties responsible for sustaining the current Palestinian split is the most prominent threat today to an effective Palestinian strategy based on demographic advantage. It goes without saying that these policies unwittingly take the Gaza Strip out of the demographic equation.
The lack of legitimacy in the political system, the erosion of trust in it by the vast majority of the Palestinian public, and the decline in societal trust over the past decade are the two most prominent threats to Palestinian national identity, despite the widespread popular rally around the Palestinian flag in May last year.
Instability, economic decline, low incomes, and weak law enforcement capacity of the PA and the Hamas authorities are the main drivers of emigration, especially from the Gaza Strip.
Finally, the institutional weakness of the Palestinian Authority, in addition of course to the severe impact of the Israeli military occupation, contribute significantly to the current widening of the gap in qualitative demographic competition between the two peoples in terms of science, knowledge, technology, and the economy.

These four challenges are primarily the product of our own doing before they are due to the superiority and success of our enemy. But this conclusion does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it would be easier for us to overcome if we are able to summon the will to do so. The internal impaired performance is not limited to the regime and its ruling elite, despite the importance of their role; it applies equally to the political opposition as well as the society. Nonetheless, this is a path to conflict management that should not be neglected.

[1] The source for the Palestinian figures mentioned here is the report issued by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in December 2021: The Palestinians at the End of 2021: [1] https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2595.pdf. The source for the Israeli figures is the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). In December 2021, CBS reported that the number of Jews, including those living in settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, stood at 6.982 million, the Arabs at 1.99 million, and “others” at 0.472 million. See"Israel approaches 9.5 million residents on eve of 2022,” Times of Israel, 30 December 2021: Israel approaches 9.5 million residents on eve of 2022 | The Times of Israel. On the eve of the Jewish new year, on 20 September 2022, CBS reported that the number of Israeli Jews has reached 7.096 million (74%), Arabs 2.026 million (21%), and “others” 0.498 million (5%). See, Yaron Druckman, “Israel's population nears 10 million, report,” Ynet, 20 September 2022: Israel's population nears 10 million, report (ynetnews.com)

[2] Data from PCBS, Palestinians at the End of 2021, p. 22.

[3] World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2021:

https://databank.albankaldawli.org/reports.aspx?source=2&type=metadata&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.CD

[4] See, Aron Heller, “Expert confirms Jews and Arabs nearing population parity,” Times of Israel, 27 March 2018:

https://www.timesofisrael.com/expert-confirms-jews-and-arabs-nearing-population-parity/

[5] See, Sue Surkes and Michael Bachner, “MKs argue over claim that Palestinians have reached demographic parity with Jews,” Times of Israel, 26 March 2018: https://www.timesofisrael.com/mks-argue-over-claim-that- palestinians-have-reached-demographic-parity-with-jews/

[6] Haaretz, 5 August, 2022.

[7] Haaretz, 29 August, 2022

[8] See, al Ayyam, 30 August 2022.

[9] Ronald S. Lauder “Even as it flourishes, Israel faces a growing demographic challenge,” Washington Post, July 13, 2022: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/13/israel-demographics-arabs-biden-future/

[10] Sara Hatzani Cohen, “The empty bottle of the demographic demon‎," Israel Hayom, 1 September 2022:

הבקבוק הריק של השד הדמוגרפי (israelhayom.co.il)

[11] See footnote #7 above.

[12] The most recent 2022 report by the Israel Democracy Institute shows that 48% of Israeli Jews agree with the statement that “Israeli Jewish citizens should enjoy more rights than non-Jewish citizens.” See, Tamar Herman, The Israeli Democracy Index, 2021 (The Israel Democracy Institute, 2021): final-madd-d2021-eng_web.pdf (idi.org.il). It is worth mentioning that the piece by the three Israeli researchers referred to earlier in footnote #6 indicate that one third of Israeli Jews said that they support the establishment of a non-democratic state between the [Jordan] River and the [Mediterranean] Sea. The Peace Index, issued by Tel Aviv University in July 2022 show that 35% of Israeli Jews are in favor of annexing the Palestinian territories while giving the Palestinians restricted rights. See, “The Peace Index,” July 2022.

[13] World Bank, World, Development Indicators, updated 20 July 2022:

https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators#

العربية

Public Opinion Poll No (83)

The public favors a neutral stand in the Russian war against Ukraine even as slightly more people blame Russia for starting the war; closer to home, Israel-PA “confidence building measures” are increasingly viewed favorably even as two-thirds share the view that Israel is an apartheid state; and domestically, ten months after the Israel-Hamas War, Fatah’s popularity returns to its pre-May 2021 level despite the fact that almost three quarters continue to demand the resignation of president Abbas

16-20 March 2022

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16 and 20 March 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several domestic developments including the launching of a second round of the local election campaigns in the West Bank and the holding of a special session for the PLO Central Council in which important decisions relevant to Palestinian-Israeli relations and the filling of several senior positions in the organization’s leadership. It also witnessed increased settlers’ attacks in areas labeled B and C of the West Bank and increased tension in the Shaikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. Amnesty International issued a report in which it characterized Israel as an apartheid state. Finally, after weeks of anticipation, war erupted between Russia and Ukraine. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the first quarter of 2022 indicate a return to the internal balance of power between Fatah and Hamas, as the case was before the May 2021 Israel-Hamas war. In other words, ten months after the war, Fatah's popularity returns to outperform Hamas’. It is noticeable that Fatah's popularity is rising equally in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In other words, the rise is unlikely to be associated with the launch of the West Bank’s local election campaigns. The local elections, scheduled to take place on 26 March, will take place only in the West Bank. However, the rise might be linked to two things:

(1) the success of the so-called "confidence-building steps" between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel, and (2) Hamas's inability to translate the gains it made in the May war with Israel to positive change on the ground in the Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem.

However, President Abbas' popularity has not risen. Indeed, Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyeh is still able to win presidential elections in which only the two compete. Fatah's competitiveness is also clearly diminished when its name is associated with President Abbas', as Hamas continues to outperform Fatah when the latter is listed as "Fatah under the leadership of President Abbas." For example, when asked about the party most deserving of representing the Palestinian people, Hamas or “Fatah under President Abbas' leadership,” Hamas still beats Fatah, even if just by a little.

The results also indicate that a large majority of the Palestinian public wants the PA to take a neutral stand in the Russian-Ukrainian war, although more people blame Russia for starting that war. The results show a small majority indicating concern about the prospect of war expansion and the entry of other countries in it. Moreover, a large majority says it expects prices to rise sharply in Palestine because of that war. When asked to compare the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to that of the Ukraine and Russia, the majority asserts that the war has demonstrated a western double standards as the US and Europe show no willingness to impose any sanctions on Israel, while showing a great enthusiasm to impose crushing sanctions on Russia. Moreover, more than three quarters of the public believe that the war has also shown European discrimination in the treatment of refugees from Ukraine as opposed to refugees from the Middle Eastern wars.

We also asked the public about the PLO’s Central Council meeting in Ramallah at the beginning of February and the resolutions it made. The findings show that a majority, albeit small, believes that the current PLO remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. However, a larger majority believes that this particular meeting of the Central Council was illegitimate, although a majority, of more than sixty percent, supports the decisions it took. Perhaps the main reason for delegitimizing this meeting relates to the rejection of the results of the elections that were held during its sessions, with only a quarter or less accepting these election results, and the absence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad from the meeting. Two-thirds of the public say that Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad's entry into the PLO will make it more representative of the Palestinian people.

On Palestinian-Israeli relations, poll findings show that support for a two-state solution remains almost the same as it was three months ago while support for a one-state solution, with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, rises to about a third during the same period. Despite the increased level of approval for the one-state solution, two thirds of the public support the description of Israel is an apartheid state. Indeed, the public sees the publication of the report of Amnesty International on the subject as an indication of the beginning of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of the Palestinians, as previously happened in the case of South Africa.

The results also show an increase in support for confrontations and an armed uprising and a decrease in the belief in the effectiveness of negotiations. Finally, in this survey, we asked, for the first time, about the belief in a Qur'anic prophecy about the demise of Israel. We found that a vast majority actually believes that such prophesy does indeed exist in the Qur'an. However, the poll found that most of the public does not believe the assessment that 2022 is the precise year of Israel's demise. Even among religious people and the believers of the existence of this prophecy in the Qur'an, only a minority believes the assessment regarding a specific year.

1) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

43% blame Russia for starting the war; 40% blame Ukraine
71% want the PA to stay neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict
63% expect the war to lead to price increases
A majority of 57% thinks that Western countries have shown double standard when dealing with the Israeli occupation compared to that of the Russian occupation.

The largest percentage of the public (43%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 40% blame Ukraine. Putting the blame on Russia is higher in the West Bank (45%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in villages (52%) compared to refugee camps and cities (30% and 43% respectively), among women (45%) compared to men (41%), among non-refugees (46%) compared to refugees (39%), among the religious (49%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (28% and 40% respectively), and among supporters of Fatah and Hamas (47% and 44% respectively) compared to supporters of third parties (36%).

An overwhelming majority (71%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 10% think it should stand with Ukraine.

As for the war’s impact, a majority of 54% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 42% are not worried. The overwhelming majority thinks Palestine will be impacted by the war in the Ukraine while only 5% think the war will have no impact on Palestine. 63% think it will lead to a sharp rise in prices, 26% think Israel will exploit it to expand settlements and annex Palestinian territories, and 1% think it could lead to expansion of armed confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis.

A majority of 57% says the war show the double standard of US and Europe when the conflict is about the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories compared to that of Russia-Ukraine conflict; 28% think the two conflicts are different, and 10% think the Western countries stand against the Israeli occupation just as they stand against the Russian occupation of Ukraine. Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 76% thinks there is a difference in the manner in which Europe treats refugees from Ukraine compared to its treatment of refugees from the Middle East; refugees from Arab and Islamic countries are treated badly and in a discriminatory manner.

2) PLO Central Council’s meeting and decisions:

60% support the decisions taken by the PLO Central Council but 56% say the session lacked legitimacy
The percentage of support for the election of the various candidates for senior positions in the PLO ranges between 22 and 26.
A majority of 51% says the PLO is its sole legitimate representative

More than 60% support the decisions made by the PLO Central Council in its latest meeting in February 2022: 67% support the suspension of the PLO recognition of Israel and 61% support the decision to end the implementation of agreements with Israel including security coordination. Support for the decisions is higher among refugees (64%) compared to non-refugees (59%), the unmarried (66%) compared to the married (60%), among those with the highest income (65%) compared to those with the lowest income (59%), and among supporters of Fatah (70%) followed by supporters of Hamas (66%) and third parties (53%).

Despite the fact that a majority of 62% support the Central Council’s decision to defer to the PLO Executive Committee on the setting of a mechanism to implement the Council’s decisions, a majority of 59% thinks the Executive Committee will not implement these decisions while only 31% think it will implement them. Indeed, 56% share the belief expressed by those who boycotted the Council’s meeting in viewing the session as illegitimate; only 29% think the session was legitimate. The belief the council meeting was illegitimate is higher in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (54%), in cities and villages (57% and 56% respectively) compared to refugee camps (45%), among men (60%) compared to women (52%), among those whose age is 50 and above (60%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 (52%), among refugees (58%) compared to non-refugees (54%), among holders of BA degree (59%) compared to the illiterates (48%), among professionals and students (67% and 63% respectively) compared to laborers and housewives (50% and 51% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (57%) compared to those who work in the public sector (49%), among the married (57%) compared to the unmarried (50%), among the religious (58%) compared to the unreligious (49%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (73% and 68% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (39%).

The largest percentage is not in favor of the election of the various members of the Central Council to senior positions in the PLO: only 24% support the election of Rouhi Fattouh as the Speaker of the PLO’s National Council; 26% support the election of Hussein al Shaikh to the Executive Committee; and only 22% support the election of Mohammad Mustafa or Ramzi Rihan to that committee.

However, a majority of 51% views the current PLO as its own sole legitimate representative and 53% say the PLO is viewed by the Palestinian people as their sole legitimate representative. If the PLO is reformed and Hamas and Islamic Jihad become members in that organization, 65% think it would in this case become more representative of the Palestinian people while 12% think that, in this case, it will become less representative of the Palestinian people. The belief that the PLO would become more representative if Hamas and Islamic Jihad join it is higher among holders of the BA degree (68%) compared to the illiterates (60%), among students and professionals (75% and 74% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, and laborers (26%, 59%, and 63% respectively), among the religious (66%) compared to the unreligious (48%), and among supporters of third parties and Hamas (78% and 76% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (67%).

3) Legislative and presidential elections:

In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyyeh, the former receives 38% and the latter 54%
In parliamentary elections, vote for Fatah rises to 42% and vote for Hamas declines to 36%
But the largest percentage (31%) thinks Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to 29% who chose “Fatah under the leadership of President Abbas.”
Turnout for the local elections is expected at 55% of eligible voters

A large majority of 72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 26% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 69% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 52% (57% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%.

Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 29% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Moreover, 73% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 71% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 35% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 41% and Haniyeh 47%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 50% and from among those, the former receives 33% and the latter 60%. If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 37% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal 3%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad 2% each.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 64% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 42% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 14% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 38% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 47% (compared to 40% three months ago).

The largest percentage (31%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 29% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 33% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 34% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 36% said neither side deserves such a role.

In the areas in which the second stage of local elections are set to take place soon, 55% say they will participate in these elections and 38% say they will not participate. When asked about the most important consideration that will influence their vote in the upcoming local elections, the largest percentage (42%) select the ability to deliver services to their area of residence; 14% select the political party of the list, another 14% select the closeness of the list to family and friends, and another 14% sat their vote will be influenced by the ability of the list to combat corruption. 9% say that their vote will depend on the extent to which the members of the list are religious, and 7% say it depends on the level of education among the list members.

4) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

79% express the view that the PA government is not doing enough to limit price increases
In the Gaza Strip, 37% say they want to emigrate; in the West Bank 20% express the same desire to emigrate
84% believe there is corruption in the institutions of the PA and 69% believe there is corruption in the institutions run by Hamas in the Gaza Strip
Optimism about the success of reconciliation declines to 28%
A large majority of 70% thinks that the incidents of internal violence reflect the lack of societal trust in the justice and law enforcement sector

A majority of 54% say that the current rise in the cost of living affects them significantly or very significantly, while 45% say it affects them moderately or slightly. But the vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 19% say it is doing so.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 57%. Similarly, 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 37% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 31% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas. Moreover, 35% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 60% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 42% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 56% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (55%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset. Moreover, only 28% are optimistic and 69% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 39%.

After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 20% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28% of the public expect success and 67% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 71% expects failure and 25% expects success.

The vast majority (70%) says that domestic violence in which individual killings turn into family and clan confrontations for revenge reflects primarily the society's weak confidence in the justice and law enforcement system, while 27% say it reflects the traditional and tribal nature of Palestinian society. To stop these incidents of internal violence, the vast majority (72%) says law enforcement services should be strengthened, while 24% say tribal reform committees should be strengthened.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV and Maan (11% each), Palestine Today (9%), al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%).

5) The Coronavirus and PA performance during the pandemic:

53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Corona virus
A two-third majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA Ministry of Health

53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 46% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, 57% expressed satisfaction. The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 67% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.

6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

40% support the two-state solution and 58% oppose it
32% support the one-state solution with equal rights to Jews and Palestinians
A majority of 63% views positively the confidence building measures undertaken by Israel and the PA
But the largest percentage (44%) thinks that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation; only 25% think negotiations are the most effective
70% are opposed to unconditional return to negotiations with Israel; 64% are opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US
73% believe the Qur’an contains a prophecy about the demise of the state of Israel; but only 32% think the year for this demise is 2022
64% want the PA security forces to confront the Israeli forces when they enter Palestinian cities
Two thirds view Israel as an apartheid state

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%. Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 32% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 63% expressed opposition. Support for the position articulated by Abbas in favor of a one-state solution with equal rights is higher in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (30%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to villages and cities (26% and 32% respectively), among those whose age is between 23 and 29 years (36%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (30%), among those with the highest income (35%) compared to those with the lowest income (29%), among the unreligious (62%) compared to the religious (29%), and among supporters of Fatah (46%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (25% and 24% respectively).

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 52% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 52% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 36% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 30% believe the chances to be medium or high. When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 44% chose armed struggle, 25% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 42% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. However, when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 38%; 57% are opposed. Similarly, 64% are opposed, and 30% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.

The vast majority (73%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 22% say it does not. However, the majority (57%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 32% say they believe it. The belief in the existence of the prophecy is higher in the West Bank (74%) compared to the Gaza Strip (70%), among students and laborers (77% each) compared to farmers, merchants, and professionals (52%, 57%, and 65% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (76%) compared to those who work in the private sector (69%), among the married (74%) compared to the unmarried (68%), among the religious (79%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (37% and 71% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 73% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (68%).

The belief that the prophecy will be fulfilled this year (2022) is higher in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to the West Bank (29%), in refugee camps (50%) compared to villages and cities (30% and 31% respectively), among refugees (37%) compared to non-refugees (29%), among the married (33%) compared to the unmarried (25%), among the religious (36%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (24% and 30% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (52%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (21% and 23% respectively).

Against the backdrop of the assassination of three members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Nablus, a majority of 64% says it is the duty of the Palestinian security forces to confront the Israeli armed forces when they enter areas under the control of the PA: 32% say they do not agree. The main reason for the failure of the Israeli army to stop settlers’ terrorism in the eyes of a majority of 54% is that the settlers are a tool in the hands of the army and it uses them to fight the Palestinian residents in order to expel them from their land; 20% say the reason is that settlers are the decision makers in the Israeli government; 12% say that settlers hide and wear masks, and 10% say that the army does not have the jurisdiction to arrest settlers. When asked why the Palestinian police and national security forces could not protect the residents from settlers’ terrorism in Area B, the largest percentage (34%) says it is because the Palestinian leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with the Israeli army than to provide protection to the Palestinian population; 29% say it is because the Palestinian police and national security forces do not want to engage in armed conflict with the Israeli army; 20% say it is because the Palestinian police does not have jurisdiction to protect the residents of area B; and 12% say terrorist attacks take place at night when Palestinian security services are not present.

Two-thirds of the public (65%) approve and 27% disapprove of the assessment that Israel is an apartheid state. Moreover, 48% agree and 40% disagree that Amnesty International's report on Israel's racism is an indication of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of Palestinians and against Israel, as it has previously did regarding apartheid in South Africa. The percentage of those who view Israel as an apartheid state is higher in refugee camps and villages (72% each) compared to cities (64%), among those who work in the public sector (76%) compared to those who work in the private sector (68%), among the married (67%) compared to the unmarried (57%), among those with the lowest income (73%) compared to those with the highest income (65%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (74% and 70% respectively) compared to the religious (59%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (79% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (65%).

7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

38% express the view that the most vital Palestinian goal should be ending occupation and building a Palestinian state
The most pressing problem for Palestinians today is occupation followed by corruption

38% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (25%; 17% in the Gaz Strip and 30% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 19% said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 15% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy. When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 28% said it is corruption, 14% said it is unemployment, 14% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

العربية

Public Opinion Poll No (84)

28 June 2022

Significant drop in support for Fatah and its leadership and a similar drop in support for the two-state solution and the one democratic state accompanied by a rise in support for a return to armed intifada and a majority support for the recent armed attacks inside Israel; but about two-thirds view positively “confidence building” measures and the largest percentage of West Bankers is opposed to armed attacks

22-25 June 2022

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 25 June 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including several armed attacks by Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel, the Israeli army incursions into Jenin’s refugee camp, and the killing of al Jazeera journalists Shireen Abu Akleh by Israeli gunfire in one of the Jenin incursions. Other developments included the organization of the Flag March by the Israeli right wing inside the Old City of East Jerusalem without ending up in an armed confrontation between Hamas and Israel as many had expected. Internally, a student body associated with Hamas was able to win the majority of seats in the Birzeit University student council elections, President Abbas transferred control of the secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council, and assigned to the PLO Executive Committee member from Fatah, Hussien al Sheikh, the responsibilities of the Committee’s secretariate. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the second quarter of 2022 show a significant change in the domestic balance of power in favor of Hamas and its leadership only three months after Fatah had managed to restore some of the popularity it had lost in the aftermath of the April 2021 cancellation of the legislative and presidential elections, the May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel, and the killing of the opposition figure Nizar Banat at the hands of the Palestinian security services.

Today, Hamas and Fatah enjoy almost the same level of public support, with the gap narrowing to one percentage point in favor of Hamas after it was six points in favor of Fatah in March 2022. It is noticeable that the drop in Fatah’s popularity has occurred in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, though the drop has been greater in the latter. Fatah’s declining popularity is evident in two other ways. For one, the gap in popularity between the head of Fatah, President Abbas, and the head of Hamas, Ismail Haniyyeh, has now reached 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh after it was only 16 points three months ago. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’ resignation, from the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA), has risen to over three quarters while those still in favor of Abbas have dwindled in size to less than one fifth of the public. Another indicator of Fatah’s decline can be seen when looking at the widening gap between those who think Hamas is the more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to those who think “Fatah under Abbas” is more deserving than Hamas. Today, the gap stands at 10 percentage points in favor of Hamas compared to just two points in favor of Hamas three months ago.

Perhaps one of the main reasons behind the shift in the internal balance of power has been the rise of Hamas' role over the past few months in defending Jerusalem. Other reasons might have been the release by the PA of those Preventive Security men accused of killing Nizar Banat on bail, or because the vast majority of the public believes that the Palestinian government does not make an effort to mitigate the consequences of the rise in prices, or the objection of the majority of the public to President Abbas's internal decisions, such as the transfer of powers over the Secretariat of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council or the appointment of PLO Executive Committee member Hussein al-Sheikh to serve as the head of the Secretariat of that Committee,.

In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the results for the second quarter indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution. The results show one of the likely reasons for the decline: a significant increase in the belief that a two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion, rising to 70%. But the findings also indicate a similar decline in support for a one-state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, indicating a hardening of public attitudes similar to what we saw in mid-2021 in the aftermath of the Hamas-Israel war. Support for a return to an armed uprising is also rising to form a clear majority, reinforced by a broad support for the recent shootings inside Israel by individual Palestinians who did not belong to known forces and movements. However, there are significant differences in the attitudes of Gazans compared to West Bankers, where the largest percentage of the latter remains opposed to armed attacks.

Increased Palestinian-Israeli clashes over the past three months may have contributed to this attitudinal shift regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations, starting with the Israeli Flag March, the repeated incursions into the Jenin camp, the killing of the very well-known and liked Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, the crackdown by the Israeli police on the raising of the Palestinian flag, and the frequent confrontations between the Israeli police and the Palestinian worshippers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque; all might have led to a hardening of the Palestinian public attitudes.

However, it is worth noting that the percentage of those viewing positively the recent "confidence-building" measures between the PA and Israel has risen to about two-thirds. Moreover, despite the rising tension over al Aqsa Mosque, the majority continues to view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a national conflict, over land and sovereignty, rather than a religious conflict.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyyeh, the former receives 33% of the popular vote and the latter 55%
In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 61% and the latter 34%
Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%; 77% demand the resignation of Abbas
In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 36% of the popular vote and Fatah 35%
33% say Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people and only 23% say “Fatah under Abbas’ is more deserving

A majority of 71% supports the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 54% believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 49% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 55% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 31% and Haniyeh 50%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 47% and from among those, the former receives 26% and the latter 61%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (30%) selected him in an open-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (16%), Mohammad Dahlan (6%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%), and 34% said they do not know or have not decided. It is worth noting that this is the first time that al Sheikh’s name has been mentioned by the respondents in an open-ended question. This means that we will continue to ask about his standing as a successor in the next four quarterly poll. In an closed ended questions about succession, Marwan Barghouti is preferred by 39%, Haniyyeh by 19%, Dahlan by 6%, Sinwar by 5%, Khalid Mishal by 2%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 1% each. Al Sheikh’s name was not among those listed in the closed ended question.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 73% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 72% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 69% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 7% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 37% (compared to 47% three months ago).

The largest percentage (33%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 38% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 31% selected Hamas, 29% Fatah under Abbas, and 33% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

57% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the PLC’s secretariate to the Speaker of PLO National Council; 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to appoint Hussein al Sheikh as the Secretary General of the PLO Executive Committee
59% believe the electoral victory of Hamas’ student body at Birzeit University is an expression of protest against the performance of the PA
79% say the PA is not doing enough to mitigate the consequences of high prices
26% want to emigrate from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
86% believe there is corruption in the PA
59% believe the PA has now become a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset
Only one quarter is optimistic about the future of reconciliation
A large majority does not expect the Shtayyeh government to succeed in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the holding of general elections, or the improvement of economic conditions

A majority of 57% is opposed to President Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the Secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council; only 27% support Abbas’ decision. The opposition the president’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (54%), among the holders of BA degree (64%) compared to the illiterates (36%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (73% and 83% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (36%).

Similarly, a majority of 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to ask the PLO’s Executive Committee member from Fatah, Husein al Sheikh, to assume the responsibility over the secretariate of that Committee; only 23% support Abbas’ decision.

In explaining the reasons for the electoral victory of the Hamas-affiliated student body at Birzeit University, the majority (59%) attributed it to students’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the PA while about one third (32%) said the victory came as a result in a shift in public opinion in favor of Hamas. The belief that there is a shift in public attitudes in favor of Hamas is higher in the Gaza strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (26%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (37%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (33%), among refugees (36%) compared to non-refugees (29%), among merchants and students (47% and 40% respectively) compared to laborers and housewives (25% and 32% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (38%) compared to those who work in the private sector (32%), among the lowest income group (38%) compared to the highest income group (34%), among the religious (40%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (27% and 17% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (61%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (22% and 16% respectively).

The majority (57%) of the public says it was supportive of the teachers’ strike who were demanding better representational and associational rights from the government and led to a partial halt to the educational process in public schools; 31% say they were opposed. Support for the strike is higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 63% and 48% respectively.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 48%. The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 18% say it is doing so.

26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 27% and in the West Bank at 26%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 37% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

42% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 54% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 38% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 62% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 55% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.

26% are optimistic and 70% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 28%.

After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 73% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 23% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 75% expects failure and 19% expects success.

The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 41%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (11% each), Palestine TV (10%), Maan (6%), al Arabiya (3%), al Mayadeen (2%), and al Manar (1%).

(3) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

Support for the two-state solution declines from 40% to 28%
Support for the one-state with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis declines from 32% to 22%
55% support a return to confrontations and armed intifada and 47% support dissolving the PA
59% view armed attacks against Israelis inside Israel as serving the national interest in ending the occupation and 56% support these attacks
65% view positively Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures
78% think the versus of the Quran contain a prophecy regarding the demise of the state of Israel; but 63% do not believe that this demise will take place in the year 2022
A semi consensus that the killing of the journalist Shireen Abu Akleh was a deliberate assassination
A majority of 53% believes the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains national, over land and sovereignty and 45% believe it has become a religious conflict
Half of the public welcomes the resumption of US aid to the PA

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 69%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%. A majority of 70% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 60% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 32%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 48% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 51% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

A majority of 59% says that the armed attack inside Israel carried out by Palestinians unaffiliated with known armed groups contributes to the national interest of ending the occupation; 37% believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest. The belief that armed attacks contribute to the national interest is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (46%), in cities and refugee camps (59% respectively) compared to villages/towns (50%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (69%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or older (57%), among refugees (68%) compared to non-refugees (51%), among students (66%) compared to professionals (51%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in the private sector (55%), among the lowest income group (71%) compared to the highest income group (55%), and among supporters of Hamas (86%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third powers (51% and 55% respectively).

Similarly, a majority of 56% (73% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank) supports armed attacks similar to those carried out lately by unaffiliated Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel; 39% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) say they are opposed to such armed attacks.

A majority of 56% expects the acts of armed resistance in the Jenin refugee camp to spread to other parts of the West Bank. However, a large minority of 41% expects the acts of armed resistance to remain restricted to the Jenin camp.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 50% chose armed struggle (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank), 22% negotiations, and 21% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 25% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 69% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

65% are opposed, and 29% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.

The vast majority (78%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 17% say it does not. However, the majority (63%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 25% say they believe it.

When asked why they think Hamas did not launch rockets against Israel on the day of the Flag March throughout East Jerusalem, the largest percentage (35%) said that the movement did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for; one third said that Hamas was willing to comply with the advice and mediation of Arab and international actors. Only 13% said it was afraid of the Israeli reaction against it and the Gaza Strip. One tenth (11%) said that Hamas did not threaten to launch rockets against Israel if he Flag March took place in the Old City of East Jerusalem. The belief that Hamas did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (28%), in refugee camps (43%) compared to villages and cities (30% and 35% respectively), among women (37%) compared to men (33%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (44%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (31%), among the holders of BA degree (38%) compared to the illiterates (19%), among students (39%) compared to employees and laborers (33% each), among the lowest income group (44%) compared to the highest income group (29%), among the religious (37%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (34% and 28% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (48%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (28% and 31% respectively).

The largest percentage (40%) believes that Hamas’ unwillingness to launch rockets against Israel during the Flag March will encourage Israeli to take more measures against Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque. By contrast, 26% said that Hamas’ decision will deter Israel in the future, and 28% said it will neither encourage nor deter Israel.

A consensus is emerging regarding the killing of the al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh: 92% believe Israel has deliberately sought to kill her while only 5% think the killing by the Israeli army was accidental.

A majority of 61% believes that the reasons the Israeli police attacked the funeral procession of Abu Akleh in Jerusalem had to do with the fac that the funeral demonstrated the unity of the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. On the other hand, one third thinks that the police attack was prompted by the raising of the Palestinian flag during the funeral.

When asked why Israel insists on preventing the raising of the Palestinian flag in Jerusalem and other occupied territories and in areas inside Israel, the public was split evenly, 49% said the reason has to do with Israeli rejection of the Palestinian national identity while an identical percentage said it has to do with Israeli fear of the Palestinian national identity.

A majority of 53% (56% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) says that despite the repeated incidents of attacks by the Israeli police against Palestinian worshipers at al Aqsa Mosque, the conflict remains first and foremost over land and sovereignty while 45% say the conflict has now become first and foremost a religious one. The percentage of those who believe the conflict has now become religious is higher in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (41%), in cities and refugee camps (46% and 45% respectively) compared to villages/towns (39%), among the illiterates (58%) compared to the holders of BA degree (45%), among those who work in the private sector (50%) compared to those who work in the public sector (42%), among the highest income group (51%) compared to the lowest income group (43%), among the religious (50%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (42% and 41% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (58%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (39% and 41% respectively).

We asked the public about the expectations that the US aid to the PA will soon resume and asked if they welcome or do not welcome aid resumption. The public is evenly split on US aid: 48% welcome it and 49% do not. It is worth noting that Gazans are more likely to welcome US aid, by 59%, while the percentage drops to 40% in the West Bank. The percentage of those welcoming the resumption of US aid is higher in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in cities and refugee camps (49%) compared to villages/towns (41%), among refugees (53%) compared to non-refugees (44%), among employees and professionals (57% and 55% respectively) compared to farmers and merchants (33% and 36%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in the private sector (43%), among the highest income group (57%) compared to the lowest income group (52%), and among supporters of Fatah (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (44% and 48% respectively).

(4) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

42% blame Russia for starting the war in Ukraine and 35% blame the Ukraine
Three quarters want the PA to remain neutral in the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine

The largest percentage of the public (42%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 35% blame Ukraine. An overwhelming majority (75%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 6% think it should stand with Ukraine. A majority of 43% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 53% are not worried. Three months ago, the percentage of those expressing worry that the war would expand stood at 54%.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

45% believe the ending of occupation to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state should be the top priority of the Palestinian people
Unemployment and poverty followed by corruption are the two most important problems confronting the Palestinian society today; but the largest percentage (32%) view the ending of the Israeli occupation as the most urgent problem.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 9% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 26% (29% in the Gaz Strip and 23% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; 25% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 17% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 12% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 13% (17% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 23% said it is corruption, 17% said it is unemployment, 16% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

العربية

ARAB BAROMETER 8 in Palestine

26 June 2024
Report IV: Emigration
On the eve of October 7, about a third of Gazans and about a fifth of West Bankers said they were considering emigrating from Palestine. The main drivers seem economic, political, educational, security and concerns about corruption. The most preferred destination for immigration is Turkey, followed by Germany, Canada, the United States and Qatar. The vast majority of Palestinians reported receiving no remittances from relatives in the diaspora. The vast majority supports the right of foreign domestic workers in Palestine to always have their passports, to a day off a week, and to a bank account in which they receive their salaries.
28 September and 8 October 2023

These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. This report is restricted to findings related to Palestinian perception of migration. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side.

The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement.

This report is the fourth in a series covering the results of the current eighth wave of the Arab Barometer in Palestine (AB8). The first report reviewed the findings regarding the internal balance of power and Palestinian-Israeli relations before and after October 7. The second report reviewed Palestinian perceptions and beliefs regarding various international and regional actors and other international issues. The Third report addressed Palestinian perception of governance. The current report is focus on perception of emigration. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding this topic, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in AB7, conducted two years earlier.

Methodology:

The Arab Barometer interviews were conducted face-to-face during the period between 28 September and 8 October 2023 with a random sample of 1,189 adults in 120 residential locations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The interviews in the Gaza Strip were completed on October 6, one day before the start of Hamas's offensive on the Gaza periphery, which Hamas called the "Al-Aqsa Flood." The sample size in the Gaza Strip is 399 people and in the West Bank 790, and the margin of error is +/-3%.

The other survey cited in this report for comparative purposes is AB7, which was conducted in November 2021. Palestine report on AB7 can be accessed here: https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Arab-Barometer-VII_Palestine-Report-2021-2022.pdf

Main Findings:

This fourth report of the eighth round of the Arab Barometer in Palestine, which was conducted in the last few days of September 2023 and the first week of October 2023 and was completed in the Gaza Strip just one day before October 7, addresses five issues, all related to migration:

Demand for emigration: On the eve of October 7, 2023, a quarter of Palestinians, 31% in the Gaza Strip and 21% in the West Bank, said they were considering emigrating from Palestine. Among those considering emigrating, 30% say they would do so even if they don't have the required papers.

Reasons driving emigration: When asked about the reasons for migration, the largest percentage said that they were economic reasons, while the second and third reasons are "political" reasons or educational opportunities. The fourth reason is security, and the fifth is corruption.

Top five destinations for emigration: The most preferred destination for immigration is Turkey, followed by Germany, Canada, the United States and Qatar

Remittances from family members living abroad: The vast majority of Palestinians reported receiving no remittances from relatives in the diaspora, while a small percentage said they received remittances monthly or annually.

Support for the rights of foreign domestic workers in Palestine: The poll found that more than three quarters of Palestinians strongly support or somewhat support a law that guarantees the right of foreign domestic workers in Palestine to always have their passports, and an even larger percentage supports the right of foreign domestic workers in Palestine to a day off a week, and the right of these workers to a bank account in which they receive their salaries.

1) Thinking about emigration from Palestine:

A quarter of Palestinians say they have thought about emigrating. For obvious reasons related to economic and political conditions, demand for emigration is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 31% and 21% respectively. The total findings are identical to those recorded in AB7 in 2021 despite minor differences when looking at the West Bank and the Gaza Strip separately, as shown in the figure below.

As we found in previous waves, demand for emigration is highest among men and the youth. It is worth noting that while the gap between the totals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip stands at 10 percentage points, it grows considerably when looking at specific groups in the two areas

Gender: As the table blow illustrates, males in the Gaza Strip are much more likely than males in the West Bank to seek emigration, 38% and 21% respectively, a 17-point gap.

Age: Similarly, the youth in the Gaza Strip are much more likely than the youth in the West Bank to seek emigration, 44% to 28% respectively, a gap of 16 points.

Education: Surprisingly, while education matters in the West Bank, it is much less important in the Gaza Strip. Among West Bankers, the higher the education, the higher the demand for emigration, 29% among those with a high level of education beyond high school and 17% among those with a high school education or less. In the Gaza Strip, by contrast, the less educated are more interested in emigrating than the more educated, 33% and 28% respectively.

Vote in elections: It is also worth noting that those who intend to vote for third parties are more likely than others to seek to emigrate. Moreover, in the West Bank, those intending to vote for Hamas are slightly more likely than those who intend to vote for Fatah to seek emigration. The opposite in true in the Gaza Strip, as those who intend to vote for Fatah are a lot more likely to seek emigration compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas, 31% and 14% respectively. Finally, Gazans who say they will not vote for any electoral list and those who say they will not take part in the elections, are much more likely to seek emigration than those who intend to vote for Hamas or Fatah.

Table (1): Demand for emigration in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip based on selected indicators

	Age		Gender		Education		Vote intentions
	18-29 years	30 years and over	Male	Female	Tawjihi (high school) or less	Above Tawjihi	Fatah	Hamas	Third parties	None	Will not participate in elections
West Bank	28%	17%	21%	20%	17%	29%	16%	19%	48%	22%	20%
Gaza Strip	44%	23%	38%	24%	33%	28%	31%	14%	45%	43%	34%

As shown in the following figure, the current finding indicates a slight decline compared to the period between 2012 and 2019 but it is higher than the demand for emigration in the first and second waves of the Arab Barometer in 2006 and 2010 respectively.

Among those who have considered emigrating, 30% say they would do so even if they did not have the required papers. Here too, the percentage is much higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 43% and 16% respectively. The current total figure is identical to the one we found two years ago in AB7.

2) Reasons for emigration:

When asked about the reasons for wanting to emigrate, the largest percentage (45%) indicated economic reasons, with a majority of Gazans (54%) compared to only 37% of West Bankers providing that answer. The second and third responses received the same percentage (13% each) mentioned “political” reasons or education opportunities. The second reason for West Bankers were political, indicated by 19%. But only 5% of Gazans indicated the same reason. The education opportunities was stated by Gazans more than West Bankers, 18% and 9% respectively. The fourth reason stated is security, indicated by 12% of all Palestinians, but with a higher percentage in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 16% and 7% respectively. The West Bankers at the time of the survey were suffering from Israeli settler violence that gained significant momentum in 2023 after the formation of one of Israel’s most extreme and nationalist religious governments in its entire history. The fifth reason indicated by 10% of people was corruption, with West Bankers stating it more often than Gazans, 12% and 7% respectively.

It is worth noting that in AB7, in November 2021, a majority of 56% stated that they were thinking about emigration for economic reasons followed by 14% stating “political” reasons. Only 9% gave educational reasons, 8% gave security reasons, and 4% referred to concerns about corruption.

3) Top five destinations for emigration:

When asked about the most preferred destination for emigration, the top country selected was Turkey, as was the case in AB7, followed by Germany, Canada, the US, and Qatar. Two years earlier, the US came second followed by Canada, the UAE, and Qatar. Other countries selected in the current wave included the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Australia, and several West European countries. It is worth noting, as indicated in the figure below, that Gazans were more likely than West Bankers to select Turkey and Germany while West Bakers were more likely to select the US.

4) Remittance from family member living abroad:

When asked if their family receive remittances from any immediate or extended family member living abroad, the vast majority of Palestinians, 88%, exactly as the case was in 2021, reported that they receive none. All other 2023 findings are almost identical to those reported in 2021: 3% reported receiving remittances on monthly basis, 5% few times a year, and 4% once a year. Findings show that in total, Gazans are more likely to receive remittances than West Bankers, 20% and 6% respectively.

5) Support for rights of foreign domestic workers in Palestine:

We asked the respondents about the rights of foreign domestic workers in Palestine. More than three quarters of Palestinians strongly support or somewhat support a law that would guarantee the right of foreign domestic workers in Palestine to always have possession of their passports; 20% somewhat oppose or strongly oppose that. Support for such law is a little higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 80% to 74% respectively.

Similarly, 90% of the public somewhat support or strongly support a law that would guarantee the right of foreign domestic workers in Palestine to have one day off per week; 8% are opposed. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to strongly support such a law, 64% and 45% respectively.

A similar percentage (88%) somewhat or strongly support a law that would guarantee the right of these workers to have a bank account where they can receive their salaries; 9% are opposed. Here too, West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to strongly support this law, 61% and 47% respectively.

العربية

Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (83)

22 March 2022

16-20 March 2022

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

(1) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

The largest percentage of the public (43%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 40% blame Ukraine.
An overwhelming majority (71%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 10% think it should stand with Ukraine.
A majority of 54% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 42% are not worried.
The overwhelming majority thinks Palestine will be impacted by the war in the Ukraine while only 5% think the war will have no impact on Palestine. 63% think it will lead to a sharp rise in prices, 26% think Israel will exploit it to expand settlements and annex Palestinian territories, and 1% think it could lead to expansion of armed confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis.
A majority of 57% says the war show the double standard of US and Europe when the conflict is about the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories compared to that of Russia-Ukraine conflict; 28% think the two conflicts are different, and 10% think the Western countries stand against the Israeli occupation just as they stand against the Russian occupation of Ukraine.
An overwhelming majority of 76% thinks there is a difference in the manner in which Europe treats refugees from Ukraine compared to its treatment of refugees from the Middle East; refugees from Arab and Islamic countries are treated badly and in a discriminatory manner.

(2) PLO Central Council’s meeting and decisions:

More than 60% support the decisions made by the PLO Central Council in its latest meeting in February 2022: 67% support the suspension of the PLO recognition of Israel and 61% support the decision to end the implementation of agreements with Israel including security coordination.
Despite the fact that a majority of 62% support the Central Council’s decision to defer to the PLO Executive Committee on the setting of a mechanism to implement the Council’s decisions, a majority of 59% thinks the Executive Committee will not implement these decisions while only 31% think it will implement them.
Indeed, 56% share the belief expressed by those who boycotted the Council’s meeting in viewing the session as illegitimate; only 29% think the session was legitimate.
The largest percentage is not in favor of the election of the various members of the Central Council to senior positions in the PLO: only 24% support the election of Rouhi Fattouh as the Speaker of the PLO’s National Council; 26% support the election of Hussein al Shaikh to the Executive Committee; and only 22% support the election of Mohammad Mustafa or Ramzi Rihan to that committee.
However, a majority of 51% views the current PLO as its own sole legitimate representative and 53% say the PLO is viewed by the Palestinian people as their sole legitimate representative.
If the PLO is reformed and Hamas and Islamic Jihad become members in that organization, 65% think it would in this case become more representative of the Palestinian people while 12% think that, in this case, it will become less representative of the Palestinian people.

(3) Legislative and presidential elections:

72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 26% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 69% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 52% (57% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 35% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 41% and Haniyeh 47%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 50% and from among those, the former receives 33% and the latter 60%.
If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 37% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal 3%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad 2% each.
Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 29% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Moreover, 73% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 71% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.
If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 64% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 42% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 14% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 38% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 47% (compared to 40% three months ago).
The largest percentage (31%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 29% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 33% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 34% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 36% said neither side deserves such a role.
In the areas in which the second stage of local elections are set to take place soon, 55% say they will participate in these elections and 38% say they will not participate.
When asked about the most important consideration that will influence their vote in the upcoming local elections, the largest percentage (42%) select the ability to deliver services to their area of residence; 14% select the political party of the list, another 14% select the closeness of the list to family and friends, and another 14% sat their vote will be influenced by the ability of the list to combat corruption. 9% say that their vote will depend on the extent to which the members of the list are religious, and 7% say it depends on the level of education among the list members.

(4) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

A majority of 54% say that the current rise in the cost of living affects them significantly or very significantly, while 45% say it affects them moderately or slightly.
The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 19% say it is doing so.
Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.
Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 57%.
27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 37% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 31% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
35% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 60% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 42% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 56% think they cannot.
In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (55%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.
28% are optimistic and 69% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 39%.
After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 20% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28% of the public expect success and 67% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 71% expects failure and 25% expects success.
The vast majority (70%) says that domestic violence in which individual killings turn into family and clan confrontations for revenge reflects primarily the society's weak confidence in the justice and law enforcement system, while 27% say it reflects the traditional and tribal nature of Palestinian society.
To stop these incidents of internal violence, the vast majority (72%) says law enforcement services should be strengthened, while 24% say tribal reform committees should be strengthened.
We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV and Maan (11% each), Palestine Today (9%), al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%).

(5) The Coronavirus and PA performance during the pandemic:

53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 46% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, 57% expressed satisfaction.
The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 67% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.

(6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.
Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 32% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 63% expressed opposition.
When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 52% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 52% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 63% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 61% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 36% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 30% believe the chances to be medium or high.
When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 44% chose armed struggle, 25% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 42% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiations.
Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. However, when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 38%; 57% are opposed.
64% are opposed, and 30% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.
The vast majority (73%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 22% say it does not. However, the majority (57%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 32% say they believe it.
Against the backdrop of the assassination of three members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Nablus, a majority of 64% says it is the duty of the Palestinian security forces to confront the Israeli armed forces when they enter areas under the control of the PA: 32% say they do not agree.
The main reason for the failure of the Israeli army to stop settlers’ terrorism in the eyes of a majority of 54% is that the settlers are a tool in the hands of the army and it uses them to fight the Palestinian residents in order to expel them from their land; 20% say the reason is that settlers are the decision makers in the Israeli government; 12% say that settlers hide and wear masks, and 10% say that the army does not have the jurisdiction to arrest settlers.
When asked why the Palestinian police and national security forces could not protect the residents from settlers’ terrorism in Area B, the largest percentage (34%) says it is because the Palestinian leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with the Israeli army than to provide protection to the Palestinian population; 29% say it is because the Palestinian police and national security forces do not want to engage in armed conflict with the Israeli army; 20% say it is because the Palestinian police does not have jurisdiction to protect the residents of area B; and 12% say terrorist attacks take place at night when Palestinian security services are not present.
Two-thirds of the public (65%) approve and 27% disapprove of the assessment that Israel is an apartheid state. Moreover, 48% agree and 40% disagree that Amnesty International's report on Israel's racism is an indication of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of Palestinians and against Israel, as it has previously did regarding apartheid in South Africa.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

38% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (25%; 17% in the Gaz Strip and 30% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 19% said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 15% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.
When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 28% said it is corruption, 14% said it is unemployment, 14% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

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تموز (يوليو) 2023

[5] See, Sue Surkes and Michael Bachner, “MKs argue over claim that Palestinians have reached demographic parity with Jews,” Times of Israel, 26 March 2018: https://www.timesofisrael.com/mks-argue-over-claim-that- palestinians-have-reached-demographic-parity-with-jews/

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