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Special Public Opinion Poll Among Palestinians of East Jerusalem

A Special East Jerusalem Poll:
Comparing the Results of 2010 and 2022 Polls

Despite continued lack of trust in the intentions of the Jerusalem municipality and despite a firm belief in the existence of discrimination against Arabs, a comparison between the current findings and those of 2010 shows a decline in the percentage of East Jerusalemites who prefer to hold Palestinian citizenship, in a permanent peace agreement, and an increase in the preference for holding Israeli citizenship; but the majority still prefers Palestinian citizenship. Satisfaction with the services provided by Israel and the Jerusalem municipality increases while worry about living conditions in the future Palestinian state increases

The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed the electoral victory of the Likud and extreme right wing parties in the Israeli parliamentary elections and the beginning of negotiations to form a purely right wing government. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, a UN resolution asked the International Court of Justice to express its views on the legitimacy of the Israeli occupation. The period also witnessed the formation of armed groups in the Jenin and Nablus areas of the West Bank dedicated to resisting Israeli military incursions into Palestinian territories. The number of such incursions increased considerably during this period and consequently the number of Palestinian casualties increased. The period also witnessed the continuation of home demolition and the attempts to force East Jerusalem residents to evacuate their homes because the land belonged to Jews before 1948. Tension rose in the al Haram al Sharif and al Aqsa Mosque due to increased number of visits by religions Jews, some of whom prayed in the full view of the Israeli police who did not stop them.

The poll has two goals:

(1) To identify current problems and concerns of East Jerusalem Palestinians under existing political and living conditions and to identify their views and likely patterns of behavior in a future political settlement. For this purpose,

respondents have been asked about satisfaction with levels of service delivery, the nature of problems they confront in daily life, views on various peace proposals, and probable behavior under various peace scenarios.

(2) To compare the findings of the two surveys, the one conducted in 2010 and the current one. For this purpose, the questions in the two polls were identical. The comparison seeks to identify areas of change and their political implications.

The current findings show clear absence of trust in the policies and plans of the Jerusalem municipality and a strong belief that there is discrimination against the Arabs. But they also show a significant rise in the level of satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality and other aspects of life in East Jerusalem. Also, there is a significant rise in the percentage of those who, when confronting problems, seek help from Israeli government agencies or institutions. But East Jerusalemites continue to view the wall that separates them from the West Bank as a big problem. The same applies to Israeli military checkpoints, the level of corruption in the municipality, and the threat posed by the Israeli police and settlers.

The findings show what amounts to a consensus in which East Jerusalemites indicate unwillingness to participate in future Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections leading to a significant rise in the rate of nonparticipation compared to 2010. Similarly, there is a consensus against participation in the Jerusalem municipal elections even if the Palestinian Authority (PA) encouraged them to vote. There is a significant rise in the level of worry when contemplating a scenario in which East Jerusalem comes under Palestinian sovereignty in a permanent peace agreement. This increased

worry led to a significant decrease in the percentage of those who prefer to become Palestinian citizens in such agreement and a significant increas

e in the percentage of those who prefer to become Israeli citizens. Perhaps the most likely explanation for this development is the distrust in the PA and its institutions as well as the completion of the construction of the separation wall. The completion of the wall forced East Jerusalemites to turn to West Jerusalem for employment and business in order to avoid crossing the wall and the checkpoints which impedes their movement and transportation. This change tied East Jerusalem to the Israeli economy in an unprecedent manner leading to other highly important changes affecting living conditions and administrative and educational aspects of the lives of East Jerusalemites.

Findings also indicate that there is a near consensus among East Jerusalemites to refuse to participate in the future Palestinian legislative and presidential elections, as there has been a remarkable increase in the percentage of rejection compared to the situation in 2010. There is also near unanimity in refusing to participate in the Jerusalem municipal elections even if the PA asks them to participate. It also points to a significant increase in the level of anxiety and concern among the population in the event of a permanent settlement in which East Jerusalem is placed under Palestinian sovereignty. This increase in concern is reflected in several things, the most important of which is a significant decrease in the percentage of those who prefer to hold Palestinian citizenship in the permanent settlement and a significant increase in the percentage of those who prefer to hold Israeli citizenship.

Perhaps the main reason behind this development, in addition to the lack of confidence in the institutions of the PA and the future state and its various capabilities, is the transformation brought about by the completion of the construction of the wall separating East Jerusalem and the West Bank, forcing the residents of the Palestinian city to turn to West Jerusalem, instead of the West Bank, for work and trade, in order to avoid passing through the wall and its military entrances that impede movement and transportation. All of this change forced East Jerusalem residents to tie themselves to the Israeli economy in an unprecedented manner. This was followed by other important administrative, daily life, educational and other transformations that kept East Jerusalemites away from Palestinian public institutions in the West Bank. Israel's decision to prevent East Jerusalemites from participating in the Palestinian general elections in 2021, and the PA's acquiescence and capitulation to that decision by cancelling the elections instead of fighting to force Israel to allow East Jerusalemites to participate in these elections, have added further frustration among East Jerusalemites and increased their beliefs that their fate will remain tied to and under Israeli control for the foreseeable future.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the thing most liked by East Jerusalemites about their city is al Aqsa Mosque (mentioned by 57% of respondents) and the thing most disliked is the occupation and related measures like settlements, wall, siege, and other restrictions (49%) followed by issues of daily living conditions such as crowdedness and high prices, selected by 17% and 6% respectively.

The following summary covers five main issues addressed by the poll: (1) satisfaction with municipal services, (2) the Wall and the che

ckpoints, (3) political participation, (4) permanent settlement, (5) goals of the Jerusalem Municipality, home demolition, and forced evacuation.

(1) Satisfaction with municipal services

While an overwhelming majority of the residents of East Jerusalem believes that discrimination in municipal service delivery exists between Arabs and Jews, the majority is satisfied with basic and health services; yet, when problems arise, more than half seek help from family followed Israeli governmental agencies and institutions. These findings indicate a rise in the percentage of those who seek assistance from these two resources compared to 2010.

Residents of East Jerusalem are satisfied with many aspects of their life in the city but they are dissatisfied with others. For example, they are satisfied or very satisfied with service delivery in areas of health services (83%), water (82%), electricity (75%), the ease with which they can reach al Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (74%), sewage system (73%), the speed with which fire emergency services arrive (70%), and the speed with which ambulance services arrive (69%). They are also satisfied with access to transportation to Israel (64%), the ease with which they can obtain official birth certificates or other papers from government offices (60%), garbage collection in their neighborhoods (60%), living conditions in general (56%), the ease with which they obtain travel documents to travel through Ben Gurion airport (52%), and adding the names of their children to their IDs (52%). By contrast, the level of dissatisfaction is very high with other services, such as obtaining building permits, to which 73% express dissatisfaction, level of law enforcement (49% dissatisfaction), residence taxes/Arnona (69% are dissatisfied), conditions of roads in their neighborhoods (47% dissatisfaction), and access to West Bank (32%).

Figure (1): Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of Jerusalemites with service delivery- comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

These results indicate an increase in the percentage of satisfaction with 21 services, the most important of which is an increase of more than 20 percentage points in the speed of access to fire and other emergency services, the speed of arrival of ambulance services, the ease of obtaining a passport or document to travel through Ben Gurion Airport, the standard of living in general, and the ease of access to the West Bank. On the other hand, there is a decrease in satisfaction with five services, including the availability of electricity, the sewage system, access to workplaces, income tax, and Arnona tax, as indicated in the following table.

An overwhelming majority of Jerusalemites (87%) believes that discrimination against Arabs exists in municipal service delivery. The largest percentage (30%) says the discrimination is noticeable in all areas of service delivery while 9% believe it is evident in personal treatment they receive from municipal officials; 7% say it is in areas of basic infrastructure, such as roads; 6% say it is particularly evident in access to health services, and 3% say it is evident in access to building permits. When comparing current results with those obtained 12 years ago, it is clear that the perceptions of discrimination in services remain very high despite falling by nine percentage points (as indicated in Figure 2). Belief that there is no discrimination increases from 7% to 13% during the same period.

When identifying key areas of discrimination, the main differences between the current results and those we found in 2010 lie in the significant increase in the percentage of those who say discrimination covers all the services we asked about, from 17% twelve years ago to 30% in the 2022 survey. But it is also clear that there is a decrease, as we can see in Figure 3, in the percentage of those who say that there is discrimination in health services, which decreased by 9 percentage points. The percentage of those who say that there is discrimination in personal treatment decreased by 5 percentage points, and the percentage of those who say there is discrimination in issuing building permits decreased by 4 percentage points. Despite this decline, it is not at all certain that these results in their entirety indicate an improvement in the area of discrimination in these specific areas, as the percentage of those who say that there is discrimination in all these areas has increased by 13 percentage points, as mentioned above.

A majority of East Jerusalemites (59%) say that the Israeli stipulation that requires Jerusalem to be the “center of life” in order to receive some services, such as social security or insurance, affects them negatively and 18% say it affects them positively. This finding indicates an 8-point drop in the percentage of those who view the effect negatively and a 9-poiint rise in the percentage of those who view it positively.

When problems occur, or when in need for social assistance, the largest percentage (51%) seeks relief from family while 40% say they seek it from Israeli public institutions, 2% say they go to international institutions; 1% say they go to Palestinian NGOs, and 1% say they go to Waqf (Islamic Endowment). These findings indicate a 9- point rise in the percentage of those who seek help from offices of the Israeli government and a similar increase of 7 points of those who seek family help. They also indicate a 4-point drop in the percentage of those who seek help from Palestinian NGOs.

(2) Threats posed by the separation wall, the checkpoints, police and settlers

The separation wall and military checkpoints remain the most serious problems for East Jerusalem residents, but a comparison between current conditions and those prevailing 12 years ago indicates a decline in the perception of threat posed by crime and an increase in the perception of threat posed by the police, border guard, and settlers.

The 2022 findings show that 89% of East Jerusalemites identify as a problem the delays that occur during travel due to the construction of the wall that separates East Jerusalem from the West Bank. Similarly, 87% say the delays and restrictions at checkpoints pose a problem; 66% say corruption of municipal staff poses a problem; 66% describe corruption in the PA as a problem; 65% say Israeli police and border guard pose a problem; 63% view the level of crime in the city as a problem; 61% say settlers pose a problem; and threats from other Palestinians are seen as a problem by 29%.

Compared to the 2010 findings, we see the following:

(1) There is an 11-percentage point increase in the percentage of those who perceive threats and intimidation from the Israeli police and border police; a similar increase (10 points) in the percentage of those who perceive a threat from Jewish settlers; and a 9-percentage point increase in the level of perceived threats and intimidation from Palestinian factions.

(2) There is a significant decrease of 21 points in the perception of threat from the crime level; a decrease of 12 points in the threat perception from the level of corruption in the Jerusalem municipality; and a decrease of 6 points in the percentage of those who feel threatened by the level of delays and restrictions on checkpoints or due to the construction of the wall in East Jerusalem.

Figure (5): East Jerusalemites View Various Issues as problems- comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

(3) Political Participation

The overwhelming majority of East Jerusalemites did not participate in Palestinian or Israeli elections and will not participate in future Palestinian or Israeli elections even if the PA asked them to do so. Comparing the current findings with those of 2010 indicates that more Palestinians are unwilling to participate in future Palestinian or Israeli elections.

The overwhelming majority of East Jerusalemites (93%) says it did not participate in previous Palestinian elections and 6% say they did participate. The largest percentage did not participate because they were not impressed by the candidates (41%), they felt their participation was pointless (24%), or because the winners could not possibly make a difference in the lives of East Jerusalemites (14%). A small percentage of 4% say it did not participate due to fear of losing its East Jerusalem identity. These findings indicate a significant rise in the rate of nonparticipation compared to 78% in 2010, most likely due to the fact that many among the 2022 respondents were not adults in 2006. The findings also indicate an increase in the percentage of those who think the candidates were either unimpressive or will not be able to serve the interests of their community, which stood at 33% twelve years ago compared to 55% today, a 22-point increase.

If new Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections are held today, only 6% say they would participate and 92% say they would not. When asked why they would not participate, respondents provided the same explanations for their non-participation as those of 2010: 41% say will most likely see the candidates are unimpressive or that there is no point in the participation (34%) or that the winners will not be able to serve their community (16%). In comparing the current findings with those of 2010, we see a significant decline in the percentage of those who are willing to participate in the elections standing at 33 points (dropping from 39%) and we see a rise in the non-participation rate standing at 36 points (rising from 56%).

With regard to Israeli elections, 3% say they have participated in previous Knesset or municipal elections and 95% say they did not participate. The largest percentage (41%) say they did not participate because they were not impressed by the candidates; 25% say their participation would be pointless; and 9% say they boycotted the elections because East Jerusalem is an occupied city and not part of the Jerusalem municipality or the state of Israel. When comparing the current findings with those of 2010, we see an 18-point rise in the percentage of those who think they will not be impressed by the candidates and a 12-point decline in the percentage of those who say they boycotted the elections because East Jerusalem is an occupied city and not part of the Jerusalem municipality or the state of Israel.

If the PA were to ask them to participate in the Israeli Jerusalem municipal elections, only 3% say they would do so and 92% say they would not. Compared to 2010, these findings indicate a 20-point drop in the percentage of those who say they would comply with the PA request and a 17-point rise in the percentage of those who say they would refuse to comply with the PA request.

(4) Permanent Settlement

In a permanent settlement, the largest percentage prefers Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem (but significantly less than what we found in 2010); a quarter prefers international sovereignty, and about a fifth prefers Israeli sovereignty (a much higher percentage than what we found in 2010). Despite this, the majority prefers to hold Palestinian citizenship and a large minority prefers to hold Israeli citizenship.

Figure (6): Personal preferences of East Jerusalemites regarding sovereignty in East Jerusalem-comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

When Palestinians and Israelis return to negotiations, the issue of the sovereignty over East Jerusalem will be discussed.

What do you prefer? Palestinian, Israeli or international sovereignty?

The preference for Palestinian sovereignty is higher in the northern neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, standing at 46%, declining to 33% in the central and southern neighborhoods. The preference for Israeli sovereignty is also higher in the northern neighborhoods, standing at 24% and lower in the central and southern neighborhoods, 15% and 17% respectively. The preference for international sovereignty stands at 30% in the central and southern neighborhoods and at 18% in the northern neighborhoods (see appendix 1 for the distribution of East Jerusalem neighborhoods into north, central, and southern).

When asked if they prefer to have Palestinian or Israeli citizenship in the permanent settlement, 58% (compared to 63% in 2010) said they want Palestinian citizenship and 37% (compared to 24% in 2010) said they want Israeli citizenship. In other words, the demand for Israeli citizenship increased by 13 percentage points between 2010 and 2022 while the demand for Palestinian citizenship decreased by 5 points, as can be seen in figure (7) below. The preference for Palestinian citizenship is higher in the central neighborhoods, standing at 66%, followed by the southern neighborhoods (60%) and the northern neighborhoods (48%). The preference for Israeli citizenship is higher in the northern neighborhoods (44%) followed by the southern neighborhoods (34%) and the central neighborhoods (29%). As will be seen later in this section (see figure 10) when we discuss the impact of rising concerns among East Jerusalemites about the possibility that their neighborhoods would become part of a future Palestinian state in a permanent settlement, the differences between the current findings and those of 2010, point clearly to the nature of the change that has taken place among some East Jerusalemites during the past 12 years and led them to show greater preference for Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem. These findings indicate that the more concerned they are about a range of issues (such as loss of freedom of movement within Israel, fear of the level of law enforcement and rule of law in the Palestinian state, loss of Israeli unemployment benefits, loss of retirement benefits, shift from the Israeli healthcare system to the Palestinian healthcare system, and other concerns), the greater the preference for Israeli citizenship. On the other hand, the less anxiety and concerns there is, the lower the preference for Israeli citizenship, and thus the more the preference for Palestinian citizenship, as we will see later in Figure 11.

Moreover, when asked to speculate about the preference of the majority of residents in their neighborhoods, 48% said they are likely to prefer Israeli citizenship and only 43% said they are likely to prefer Palestinian citizenship. When compared to the results of 2010, the percentage of those who say that most people in their neighborhood would prefer Palestinian citizenship increased by only two points, while the percentage of those who believe that residents would prefer Israeli citizenship increased by four points.

Figure (7): Personal preferences of East Jerusalemites regarding citizenship and perception regarding likely preferences of neighborhood residents- comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%) If a permanent two state solution is arrived at, do you think that most people in your neighborhood would prefer to become citizens of Palestine, with all of the rights and privileges of other citizens of Palestine, or would they prefer to become citizens of Israel, with all of the rights and privileges of other citizens of Israel?
2010	2022

If a permanent two state solution is arrived at, would you prefer to become a citizen of Palestine or would you prefer to become a citizen of Israel?
2010	2022

After resolving the issue of sovereignty over East Jerusalem, 74% prefer to keep East and West Jerusalem as an open city, one in which Palestinians and Israelis would have full access while 26% oppose that. These findings are almost identical to those of 2010.

If the neighborhood in which they live is to become part of Israel in a permanent settlement and it was possible for them to move to the Palestinian state, 75% say they would stay in their homes and would not move while 15% say they would move to live in the Palestinian state. These findings indicate a decrease of 5 percentage points among those who would stay in that neighborhood and a limited decline of 4 percentage points among those who would move to live in the Palestinian state. Desire to move to the Palestinian state if the neighborhood falls under Israeli sovereignty increases in the northern neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, reaching 22% (compared to 34% in 2010) and decreases in the southern neighborhoods to 13% (compared to 20% in 2010) and to 9% (compared to 17% in 2010) in the southern neighborhoods.

But if the neighborhood comes under Palestinian sovereignty and it was possible to move to Israel, 69% say they would stay in their homes and would not move to Israel and 18% say they would move to Israel.

Perhaps the most notable difference here with the 2010 results is a 4-percentage point drop in the total number of people moving to Israel. The percentage of those who want to move to live in Israel if the neighborhood falls under Palestinian sovereignty increases in the northern neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, standing at 24%, compared to 41% in 2010, 22% in the southern neighborhoods (compared to 4% in 2010), and 20% in the central neighborhoods (compared to 14% in 2010).

Figure (8): East Jerusalemites choices of place of residence under two peace scenarios-

comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

If your current neighborhood became an internationally recognized part of Palestine, and you were allowed to move to a different home inside Israel, how likely are you to move to a different home in an Israeli neighborhood of Jerusalem, or elsewhere inside Israel, and to become a citizen of Israel?

2010

2022


If your current neighborhood became an internationally recognized part of Israel, and you were allowed to move to a different home inside the new state of Palestine, how likely are you to move to a different home inside of Palestine and to become a citizen of Palestine?
2010	2022

If their neighborhood becomes part of Israel and they were to become Israeli citizens, most or at least some East Jerusalemites would worry or be concerned about various aspects of their lives: 64% would worry about discrimination against them because they are Arabs; 43% would worry about losing freedom of movement inside the Palestinian state; 41% would worry about loss of access to al Aqsa or the old city (if they come under Palestinian sovereignty); 36% would worry about losing access to adequate education to their children. When comparing the current results with those of 2010, we find a significant reduction in the level of anxiety in all of the items mentioned, as shown in the following figure below. The largest decrease (31 percentage points) came in the issue of access to the Old City or Al-Aqsa Mosque, followed by the decrease in concern about the possibility of losing freedom of movement within the Palestinian state, which fell 24 points, then concern about losing access to a suitable education for their children, which fell 22 points, and then concern about the possibility of discrimination against them because they were Arabs, Muslims or Christians, which fell 18 percentage points.

Figure (9): Areas of concern or no concern of East Jerusalemites about their neighborhood becoming part of Israel and they

becoming Israeli citizens- comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

By contrast, if their neighborhood were to become a part of the new state of Palestine and they were to become citizens of Palestine, most or some Jerusalemites say they would worry or be concerned about the following things: 79% about changing from the Israeli health care system to a Palestinian health care system; 75% about possible increase in the level of corruption in the Palestinian state; 70% about possible reduction in the level of law enforcement; 67% about possible reduction in the level or quality of city services such as garbage pickup and road repair; 66% about changing from Israeli unemployment benefits to Palestinian unemployment benefits; 66% about changing from Israeli retirement benefits to Palestinian retirement benefits; 65% about possible changes in their ability to write and speak freely; and 63% about access to Jerusalem’s Old City and al Aqsa Mosque (if they come under Israeli sovereignty); and 49% about losing access to adequate education for their children.

Figure (10): Areas of concern or no concern of East Jerusalemites about their neighborhood becoming part of the

new Palestinian state and they becoming Palestinian citizens- comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

The most significant political implication of the increased level of concern in the event that the neighborhood inhabited by East Jerusalemites becomes part of the future Palestinian state is the decrease in the percentage of those who would prefer to hold Palestinian citizenship and the increase in the percentage of those who would prefer to hold Israeli citizenship in the permanent settlement. As shown in Figure 11 below, the preference for Palestinian citizenship is related to the degree of concern about the conditions in the PA/Palestinian state: the greater the level of concern, the lower the percentage of those who prefer to hold Palestinian citizenship and the lower the level of concern the greater the percentage of those who prefer to hold Palestinian citizenship. The same applies to the preference for Israeli citizenship, but in the opposite direction: the greater the level of concern, the greater the preference for Israeli citizenship, and the lower the level of concern, the lower the preference for Israeli citizenship. However, it is necessary to point out the obvious fact that regardless of whether or not there is concern, a majority prefers to hold Palestinian citizenship, ranging between 53% and 69%, as shown in the following figure.

Figure (11): Preference for Palestinian citizenship vs. Israeli citizenship based on the expressed level of concern by East Jerusalemites if their neighborhood became part of the future Palestinian state

(5) Goals of the Jerusalem Municipality, home demolition, and forced evacuation

Findings show total absence of trust in the intentions of the Jerusalem municipality: about two thirds believe the goal of the Jerusalem municipality is to demolish the homes of Arabs and replace them with Jews. An overwhelming majority of 90% believes that demolition of homes and eviction of Arabs is a policy aiming at punishing them to force them to leave the city and not aiming at enforcing the law.

With regard to the goals of the Jerusalem municipality, 64% say it is to demolish Arab homes and neighborhoods, evict Arab residents, and replace them with Jews, 10% say the goal is to reduce the level of municipal services to Arabs, 10% say it is to maintain the current status quo for the Arab residents, 4% say it is to introduce some improvement in the level of municipal service delivery to the Arabs, and 1% say it is to build new residential neighborhoods for the Arabs and improve the level of municipal service delivery to them.

An overwhelming majority of 90% says that the policy of home demolition and eviction aims at punishing the Arabs to force them to abandon the city while only 8% say the goal is to enforce the law.

Almost 70% are sympathetic with the residents threatened with home demolishment or eviction to the extent that they would be willing to participate in demonstrations while 27% say they do not wish to participate in such demonstration.

20% say the EU is indeed sympathetic with the plight of residents threatened with home demolition or eviction and 81% say it is not. As to the US, only 9% say it is sympathetic and 93% say it is not.

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Appendix (1): Sample Characteristics

Appendix (2): Map of East Jerusalem Neighborhoods

Appendix (3): Table of Findings

Jerusalem Poll: Comparing 2010 and 2022 findings

	Total 2010	Total 2022
04 -1) What are the things that you like most about living in East Jerusalem?
1) Al-Aqsa Mosque	44.8	55.3
2) Old town	5.0	3.8
3) Everything	16.3	9.3
4) Holy places	5.4	1.7
5) Home and family	9.6	10.3
6) Nothing	2.4	1.5
8) Location and climate	2.3	5.6
9) Other	5.3	1.5
10)Things of life such as services, employment, social relation	9.0	11.0
05-1) What are the things that you like least about living in East Jerusalem t? [open ended]
01) Occupation, the presence of Jewish, settlements	45.3	38.3
02) The wall, the siege, Israeli harassment	9.7	10.7
03) Other	8.2	2.6
04) Nothing	7.2	10.3
05) Everything	1.4	0.0
06) The economic situation and high cost of living	3.9	6.1
07) Transport and streets and Overcrowding	3.1	16.8
08) Moral corruption	3.6	0.5
9) Social relations	4.5	1.4
10) Entertainment, hygiene, chaos, and services	9.1	13.2
08) Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with each of these aspects of your life in East Jerusalem. 08-1) The quality of the teachers in your kids' schools
1) Not satisfied at all	8.5	2.7
2) Not satisfied	9.2	5.6
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	13.8	8.2
4) Satisfied	32.2	35.2
5) Very satisfied	4.5	6.6
6) DK/NA (do not read)	1.1	1.7
7) Does not apply	30.7	40
08-2) The number of students in your kids' classrooms
1) Not satisfied at all	14.1	3
2) Not satisfied	18.7	8.6
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	7.5	6.4
4) Satisfied	22.8	33.3
5) Very satisfied	2.9	5.1
6) DK/NA (do not read)	2.6	3
7) Does not apply	31.3	40.6
08-4) The condition of the roads in your neighborhood
1) Not satisfied at all	31.8	22.2
2) Not satisfied	28.8	24.4
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	11.4	12.2
4) Satisfied	25.9	35.2
5) Very satisfied	2.0	4.9
6) Does not apply, DK/NA	0.2	1.1
08-5) The garbage pickup in your neighborhood
1) Not satisfied at all	22.4	12.4
2) Not satisfied	22.5	14.8
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	10.9	13
4) Satisfied	42.0	52
5) Very satisfied	1.9	7.5
6) DK/NA (do not read)	0.3	0.3
08-6) The water supply in your neighborhood
1) Not satisfied at all	7.1	2.2
2) Not satisfied	7.6	8
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	5.6	7.9
4) Satisfied	73.2	66.9
5) Very satisfied	6.1	14.9
6) DK/NA (do not read)	0.2	0.1
08-7) The electrical supply in your neighborhood
1) Not satisfied at all	3.8	3.5
2) Not satisfied	5.1	9.7
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	5.3	12
4) Satisfied	78.4	60.3
5) Very satisfied	7.0	14.5
6) DK/NA (do not read)	0.2	0
7) Does not apply	0.1	0
08-8) The sewage system in your neighborhood
1) Not satisfied at all	8.1	7.8
2) Not satisfied	7.4	9
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	6.0	9.2
4) Satisfied	72.6	61
5) Very satisfied	5.4	12.4
6) DK/NA (do not read)	0.3	0.3
7) Does not apply	0.2	0.3
08-12) Access to the Al Aqsa Mosque/ Holy Sepulcher for Christians
1) Not satisfied at all	9.2	6.2
2) Not satisfied	15.0	10.4
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	9.9	9.2
4) Satisfied	58.0	60.3
5) Very satisfied	4.9	13.4
6) DK/NA (do not read)	0.3	0.3
7) Does not apply	2.6	0.2
08-13) Access to your job
1) Not satisfied at all	3.3	1.9
2) Not satisfied	4.9	3.7
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	4.8	5.9
4) Satisfied	35.9	28.8
5) Very satisfied	4.5	5.7
6) DK/NA (do not read)	1.2	0
7) Does not apply	45.3	54
08-18) The speed with which ambulance services arrive to the scene after requesting it
1) Not satisfied at all	8.6	3.6
2) Not satisfied	11.4	11.4
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	7.1	5.9
4) Satisfied	40.2	10.8
5) Very satisfied	5.5	55.2
6) DK/NA (do not read)	8.5	4
7) Does not apply	18.8	1.4
08-19) The overall health system
1) Not satisfied at all	3.6	1.2
2) Not satisfied	5.5	6.1
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	14.1	8.9
4) Satisfied	66.1	64.3
5) Very satisfied	6.9	18.9
6) DK/NA (do not read)	0.9	0.1
7) Does not apply	2.9	0.5
08-20) Your personal interactions with officials from the Jerusalem municipality
1) Not satisfied at all	13.5	6.1
2) Not satisfied	10.5	9.3
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	11.1	12.1
4) Satisfied	19.2	32.4
5) Very satisfied	1.6	3.2
6) DK/NA (do not read)	8.4	14.7
7) Does not apply	35.6	22.2
08-21) The ease or difficulty of obtaining building permits
1) Not satisfied at all	51.9	64.6
2) Not satisfied	11.3	8.6
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	1.1	0.8
4) Satisfied	3.3	5.4
5) Very satisfied	0.1	0.7
6) DK/NA (do not read)	5.1	6.2
7) Does not apply	27.1	13.7
08-22) The unemployment benefits available to you
1) Not satisfied at all	7.9	4.1
2) Not satisfied	5.7	3.9
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	2.0	2.1
4) Satisfied	4.7	9.7
5) Very satisfied	0.3	1.2
6) DK/NA (do not read)	3.8	6.8
7) Does not apply	75.6	72.2
08-24) The retirement benefits available to you
1 not satisfied at all	4.6	2.7
2 not satisfied	5.1	2.7
3 neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	2.5	3.3
4 satisfied	6.7	16.1
5 very satisfied	0.3	1.8
6) DK/NA (do not read)	4.1	7.4
7) Does not apply	76.7	66
08-25) The level of law enforcement in your area
1) Not satisfied at all	30.5	23.6
2) Not satisfied	23.8	25.1
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	14.1	18.6
4) Satisfied	21.0	24.9
5) Very satisfied	1.1	1.5
6) DK/NA (do not read)	5.0	2.5
7) Does not apply	4.4	3.8
08-26) The speed with which fire and other emergency services arrive to the scene
1) Not satisfied at all	10.2	3.2
2) Not satisfied	12.3	10
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	9.0	9.5
4) Satisfied	39.1	56.5
5) Very satisfied	3.1	13.7
6) DK/NA (do not read)	6.8	6.5
7) Does not apply	19.6	0.6
08-27) Your personal interactions with Israeli Jews, overall
1) Not satisfied at all	16.1	12.3
2) Not satisfied	12.3	14.9
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	16.6	18.8
4) Satisfied	24.3	30.3
5) Very satisfied	1.6	2.5
6) DK/NA (do not read)	4.8	6.8
7) Does not apply	24.2	14.4
08-28) Your access to travel throughout Israel
1) Not satisfied at all	7.1	5.8
2) Not satisfied	10.9	10.4
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	9.2	11.7
4) Satisfied	47.8	57.5
5) Very satisfied	4.3	6.5
6) DK/NA (do not read)	4.0	3.1
7) Does not apply	16.7	5
08-29) Ability to obtain passport or travel document to travel through Ben Gurion airport
1) Not satisfied at all	11.1	7.5
2) Not satisfied	9.9	13.9
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	4.6	10.6
4) Satisfied	27.7	48.6
5) Very satisfied	2.0	3.6
6) DK/NA (do not read)	10.7	7.4
7) Does not apply	34.0	8.4
08-30) Ability to add name of your daughter or son to your ID card
1) Not satisfied at all	11.3	5.5
2) Not satisfied	11.0	7.5
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	5.5	6.6
4) Satisfied	44.5	46.4
5) Very satisfied	5.3	5.6
6) DK/NA (do not read)	1.4	0.4
7) Does not apply	21.0	28
08-31) Ability to obtain birth certificate or other official papers from Israeli government offices
1) Not satisfied at all	13.9	9.5
2) Not satisfied	14.7	12.4
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	8.8	9.1
4) Satisfied	44.8	52.4
5) Very satisfied	4.6	7.3
6) DK/NA (do not read)	1.9	1.5
7) Does not apply	11.3	7.8
08-32) Income tax demanded/required of you
1) Not satisfied at all	33.2	31.2
2) Not satisfied	20.2	15.6
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	5.4	5.8
4) Satisfied	9.3	12.8
5) Very satisfied	0.7	0.6
6) DK/NA (do not read)	3.3	4.8
7) Does not apply	27.9	29.2
08-33) Arnona (home ownership) tax demanded/required of you
1) Not satisfied at all	49.7	52.1
2) Not satisfied	19.5	17.2
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	5.8	6.1
4) Satisfied	12.5	11.2
5) Very satisfied	0.7	0.3
6) DK/NA (do not read)	1.8	3.5
7) Does not apply	9.9	9.6
08-34) Your access to areas inside the West Bank
1) Not satisfied at all	36.4	14.1
2) Not satisfied	23.1	17.8
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	10.2	16
4) Satisfied	24.6	42.8
5) Very satisfied	1.9	4.9
6) DK/NA (do not read)	0.7	1.8
7) Does not apply	3.1	2.6
08-35) Your overall standard of living
1) Not satisfied at all	16.0	5
2) Not satisfied	16.6	11.6
3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	31.4	27.2
4) Satisfied	33.3	53.6
5) Very satisfied	1.9	2.5
6) DK/NA (do not read)	0.3	0.1
7) Does not apply	0.4
09) In your view is there any discrimination in the services provided to Arab and Jews by the Jerusalem municipality?
1) Certainly yes	78.1	50.8
2) Yes	9.0	27.6
3) No (go to Q11)	5.4	10.7
4) Certainly no (go to Q11)	1.0	2.4
5) (Don not read) DK/NA (go to Q11)	6.4	7.6
		0.9
10-1) If the answer is certainly yes or yes, in which areas you see discrimination?
1) In everything	16.7	29.8
2) Building Permits	6.8	2.8
3) Quality Street	10.1	6.8
4) Health Services	15.1	5.9
5) Other services	18.4	33.4
6) Treatment	13.9	8.5
7) Insurance, employment, wages	9.4	8.4
8) Other	9.5	4.3
11) Israel requires those residents who receive services like social security or insurance to have Jerusalem as the "center of their life." To what extent does this requirement affect, negatively or positively, your decision regarding the choice of the location of your work, home, or schools for your children?
1) Great positive effect	3.9	11.9
2) Positive effect to some extent	5.1	5.8
3) Neither positively nor negatively	20.9	17.8
4) Negative to some extent	25.1	26.2
5) Great negative effect	41.6	32.8
6) (Do not read) DK/NA	3.4	2.9
		2.6
12) When you travel to other countries by air, you travel mostly through
1) Ben Gurion airport	49.6	53.4
2) Amman airport	34.9	34.6
3) Other (specify -------------- )	15.5	12
13) Tell us to what extent does the following issue represent a problem in East Jerusalem? Is it a big, small, or no problem at all? 13-1) The level of crime
1) Very big problem	72.6	47.4
2) Somewhat a problem	11.5	15.2
3) A very small problem	7.8	13.9
4) Not a problem at all	5.1	20.3
5) DK/NA (do not read)	2.7	2.8
6) Does not apply (do not read	0.3	0.4
13-2) The level of corruption from Israeli Jerusalem municipal officials
1) Very big problem	66.7	48.1
2) Somewhat a problem	11.1	17.5
3) A very small problem	3.0	8.8
4) Not a problem at all	5.4	11.6
5) DK/NA (do not read)	12.2	12.7
6) Does not apply (do not read	1.5	1.3
13-3) The level of corruption from Palestinian Authority officials
1) Very big problem	57.3	53.9
2) Somewhat a problem	11.5	11.6
3) A very small problem	3.1	3.7
4) Not a problem at all	9.0	10.7
5) DK/NA (do not read)	16.1	12.4
6) Does not apply (do not read	3.0	7.7
13-4) The level of threat and intimidation from Palestinian groups
1) Very big problem	14.3	20.8
2) Somewhat a problem	6.1	7.9
3) Avery small problem	4.8	7.7
4) Not a problem at all	47.1	38.7
5) DK/NA (do not read)	9.1	9.4
6) Does not apply (do not read	18.5	15.5
13-5) The level of threat and intimidation from Jewish settlers
1) Very big problem	36.6	12.9
2) Somewhat a problem	13.8	9.2
3) A very small problem	6.6	23.3
4) Not a problem at all	29.3	2.1
5) DK/NA (do not read)	3.7	4.1
6) Does not apply (do not read)	10.0	12.9
13-6) The level of threat and intimidation from Israeli police and border guards
1) Very big problem	38.2	50.7
2) Somewhat a problem	16.2	14.7
3) A very small problem	7.0	8.3
4) Not a problem at all	27.7	21.3
5) DK/NA (do not read)	3.3	1.5
6) Does not apply (do not read)	7.5	3.5
13-7) The level of delays and restrictions at checkpoints
1) Very big problem	84.2	70.9
2) Somewhat a problem	9.0	16.5
3) A very small problem	2.0	5
4) Not a problem at all	3.0	4.7
5) DK/NA (do not read)	0.7	1.3
6) Does not apply (do not read)	1.1	1.6
13-8) The level of delays and restrictions created by the building of the wall in Jerusalem
1) Very big problem	87.8	72.9
2) Somewhat a problem	5.8	16.2
3) A very small problem	1.3	4.5
4) Not a problem at all	2.9	3.7
5) DK/NA (do not read)	0.9	1.4
6) Does not apply (do not read)	1.2	1.3
23) Did you participate in the last Palestinian parliamentary or presidential elections?
1) Yes	21.7	6.1
2) No	78.3	93.2
3) Does not apply		0.7
24) If you did not participate, what was the main reason for not participating?
1) I was less than 18	9.6	6.7
2) It was difficult to reach voting stations	5.2	0.5
3) Busy doing other things and did not have time	14.3	3.5
4) Pressure from family or society	1.0	0.2
5) Was not convinced with candidates	25.6	41.3
6) Fear of losing Jerusalem ID	2.7	3.5
7) Felt my participation was pointless	8.8	24.2
8) Felt that winners, no matter who they were, could not possibly serve East Jerusalem	9.6	13.7
9) Other reasons (specify ----------------------- )look at (24-2)	18.1	1.7
10) (Do not read) DK/NA	5.1	4.6
25) If new presidential or parliamentary elections were to take place and you were given the opportunity to participate, do you wish to participate or not participate?
1) Yes	38.9	6.4
2) No	56.0	92.3
3) DK/NA	5.2	1.3
26) If you do not wish to participate, what are the reasons for that?
1) Difficult to reach voting stations	2.1	0.2
2) Pressure from family or society	1.4	0.0
3) Not convinced with elections or candidates	32.2	41.0
4) Fear of losing Jerusalem ID	3.3	3.8
5) My participation would be pointless	20.5	33.6
6) Winners, no matter who they were, cannot possibly serve East Jerusalem	15.9	16.0
7) Other reasons (specify ----------------------- )	16.1	1.6
8) DK/NA (do not read)	8.6	3.8
27) And did you participate in Israeli elections, like Jerusalem's municipal elections or Knesset elections?
1) Yes	8.1	2.7
2) No	91.4	95.4
3) DK/NA	0.5	1.8
4) Not applicable		1
28) If you did not participate, what was the main reason for not participating?
1) I was less than 18	5.2	1.3
2) 2 it was difficult to reach voting stations	1.1	0.2
3) busy doing other things and did not have time	6.2	2.6
4) pressure from family or society	0.6	0.4
5) was not convinced with candidates	23.1	41.3
6) I boycotted the elections because East Jerusalem in my view is not part of the Israeli Jerusalem municipality or Israel	20.8	9.3
7)felt my participation was pointless	11.0	25.3
8) felt that winners, no matter who they were, could not pos	9.7	14.8
9) other reasons (specify ----------------------- ) look at (28-2)	16.5	1.7
10) (do not read) DK/NA	5.8	3.1
29) What if the Palestinian Authority were to ask you to participate in the Israeli municipal elections, would you in this case be willing or unwilling to participate?
1) I certainly would be willing	8.6	1.2
2) I probably would be willing	13.1	1.7
3) I probably would not be willing	15.3	9.5
4) I certainly would not be willing	59.8	82.3
5) DK/NA	3.3	2.5
6) Does not apply		2.8
30) When you have a problem or need a social assistance, where do you normally go for relief?
1) Offices of the Israeli government	30.6	40.2
2) Palestinian NGOs	5.3	1.2
3) International organizations	2.0	1.8
4) Palestinian political parties	1.4	0.3
5) Family	43.7	50.7
6) Religious endowment (waqf)	4.2	0.7
7) other (specify	12.8	5.1
31) When Palestinians and Israelis return to negotiations, the issue of the sovereignty over East Jerusalem will be discussed. What do you prefer? Palestinian, Israeli or international sovereignty?
1) Palestinian	51.8	38.0
2) Israeli	6.1	19.2
3) International	27.0	25.4
4) Other	15.1	17.4
32) If the issue of sovereignty over East Jerusalem is resolved, do you support or oppose in this case making West and East Jerusalem one open city in which movement is free between the Israeli and Palestinian parts for Palestinians and Israelis alike?
1) Certainly support	50.6	46.1
2) Support to some extent	24.4	27.4
3) Oppose to some extent	7.6	15.7
4) Certainly oppose	17.4	10.8
34) If your neighborhood becomes part of Israel in the permanent peace agreement and you wanted to become an Israeli citizen with the full rights and privileges of other Israelis, would you in this scenario worry or not worry about the following matters: 34-2) losing freedom of movement inside Palestinian state
1) Not concerned at all	17.2	35.4
2) Somewhat not concerned	10.7	13.4
3) In the middle	2.5	5.9
4) Somewhat concerned	23.6	19.5
5) Very concerned	43.0	23.7
6) DK/NA (do not read)	3.0	2.1
34-3) Losing access to adequate education to my children?
1) Not concerned at all	19.3	22.2
2) Somewhat not concerned	10.3	11.4
3) In the middle	4.5	6.0
4) Somewhat concerned	20.8	13.9
5) Very concerned	37.1	22.1
6) DK/NA (do not read)	8.0	24.4
34-4) Access to Jerusalem's Old City and al Aqsa Mosque
1) Not concerned at all	14.2	39.3
2) Somewhat not concerned	8.7	14.2
3) In the middle	2.9	5.1
4) Somewhat concerned	19.4	14.6
5) Very concerned	52.4	26.2
6) DK/NA (do not read)	2.5	0.6
34-7) Possible discrimination against you because you are an Arab (Muslim or Christian)
1) Not concerned at all	7.8	18.1
2) Somewhat not concerned	5.0	9.3
3) In the middle	3.0	6.9
4) Somewhat concerned	25.3	20.2
5) Very concerned	56.5	43.9
6) DK/NA (do not read)	2.5	1.6
35) If your neighborhood becomes part of the new Palestinian state and you wanted to become a Palestinian citizen with the full rights and privileges of other Palestinians, would you in this scenario worry or not worry about the following matters:
35-2) Losing access to free movement inside Israel?
1) Not concerned at all	21.6	19.7
2) Somewhat not concerned	12.9	8.5
3) In the middle	4.3	6.4
4) Somewhat concerned	22.5	20.8
5) Very concerned	37.0	39.8
6) DK/NA (do not read)	1.7	4.8
35-4) Possible reduction in the level or quality of city services such as garbage pickup and road repair?
1) Not concerned at all	20.4	13.8
2) Somewhat not concerned	14.3	9.9
3) In the middle	5.6	7.2
4) Somewhat concerned	27.4	21.4
5) Very concerned	29.1	45.1
6) DK/NA (do not read)	3.3	2.6
35-5) Possible reduction in the level of law enforcement?
1) Not concerned at all	18.8	11.2
2) Somewhat not concerned	13.9	7.9
3) In the middle	8.1	7.9
4) Somewhat concerned	25.0	25.0
5) Very concerned	30.5	44.8
6) DK/NA (do not read)	3.7	3.2
35-6) Possible increase in the level of corruption?
1) Not concerned at all	13.5	7.7
2) Somewhat not concerned	9.5	6.5
3) In the middle	6.4	7.2
4) Somewhat concerned	27.7	25.2
5) Very concerned	38.9	49.4
6) DK/NA (do not read)	3.9	4
35-7) Possible changes in your ability to write and speak freely?
1) Not concerned at all	18.2	13.9
2) Somewhat not concerned	11.6	8.8
3) In the middle	8.2	7.4
4) Somewhat concerned	25.9	21.6
5) Very concerned	31.4	43.6
6) DK/NA (do not read)	4.8	4.7
35-8) Changing from the Israeli health care system to a Palestinian health care system?
1) Not concerned at all	14.8	6.3
2) Somewhat not concerned	10.3	6.4
3) In the middle	5.2	5.0
4) Somewhat concerned	24.7	20.7
5) Very concerned	42.0	58.3
6) DK/NA (do not read)	3.1	3.1
35-9) Changing from Israeli unemployment benefits to Palestinian unemployment benefits?
1) Not concerned at all	21.1	5.0
2) Somewhat not concerned	10.8	5.5
3) In the middle	4.6	4.8
4) Somewhat concerned	20.7	15.6
5) Very concerned	32.3	50.3
6) DK/NA (do not read)	10.4	18.8
35-10) Changing from Israeli retirement benefits to Palestinian retirement benefits?
1) Not concerned at all	21.3	4.5
2) Somewhat not concerned	10.1	5.1
3) In the middle	4.9	4.1
4) Somewhat concerned	21.2	14.4
5) Very concerned	30.9	51.3
6) DK/NA (do not read)	11.7	20.4
35-12) Losing access to adequate education to my children?
1) Not concerned at all	21.6	11.3
2) Somewhat not concerned	13.5	6.6
3) In the middle	4.4	6.5
4) Somewhat concerned	22.5	15.1
5) Very concerned	31.6	34.0
6) DK/NA (do not read)	6.3	26.2
35-13) Access to Jerusalem's Old City and al Aqsa Mosque
1) Not concerned at all	14.7	19.8
2) Somewhat not concerned	8.3	9.3
3) In the middle	3.2	6.0
4) Somewhat concerned	22.6	19.5
5) Very concerned	48.8	43.3
6) DK/NA (do not read)	2.4	2.1
36) If a permanent, two state solution is arrived at, do you think that most people in your neighborhood would prefer to become citizens of Palestine, with all of the rights and privileges of other citizens of Palestine, or would they prefer to become citizens of Israel, with all of the rights and privileges of other citizens of Israel?
1) Definitely citizen of Palestine	28.3	35.4
2) Probably citizen of Palestine	12.2	7.5
3) Probably citizen of Israel	19.0	33.6
4) Definitely citizen of Israel	24.9	14.0
5) (Do not read) DK/NA	15.5	9.5
37) If a permanent, two state solution is arrived at, would you prefer to become a citizen of Palestine or would you prefer to become a citizen of Israel?
1) Definitely citizen of Palestine	52.8	52.0
2) Probably citizen of Palestine	9.9	5.5
3) Probably citizen of Israel	8.5	24.6
4) Definitely citizen of Israel	15.4	11.6
5) (Do not read) DK/NA	13.3	6.3
38) If your current neighborhood became an internationally recognized part of Israel, and you were allowed to move to a different home inside the new state of Palestine, how likely are you to move to a different home inside of Palestine and to become a citizen of Palestine?
1) Certainly will not move	66.2	67.2
2) Probably will not move	4.9	8.1
3) Not sure	5.2	7.1
4) Probably will move	11.1	8.6
5) Certainly will move	10.5	6.2
6) (Do not read) DK/NA	2.1	2.8
39) If your current neighborhood became an internationally recognized part of Palestine, and you were allowed to move to a different home inside Israel, how likely are you to move to a different home in an Israeli neighborhood of Jerusalem, or elsewhere inside Israel, and to become a citizen of Israel?
1) Certainly will not move	68.6	61.2
2) Probably will not move	4.8	7.4
3) Not sure	4.2	10.1
4) Probably will move	9.0	10.7
5) Certainly will move	11.0	7.4
6) (Do not read) DK/NA	2.4	3.2
41) And what about the mayor of the municipality of Jerusalem Nir Barakat? What do you think his goals are for East Jerusalem for next few years?
1) Build new residential neighborhoods for the Arabs and improve the level of municipal service delivery to them	1.3	1.4
2) Introduce some improvement in the level of municipal service delivery to the Arabs	2.5	3.6
3) Maintain the current status quo for the Arab residents	6.2	9.7
4) Reduce the level of municipal service delivery or the Arab residents	6.2	9.5
5) Demolish Arab homes and neighborhoods, evict Arab residents, and reduce the level of municipal services	65.9	64.3
6) Other	2.5	0.2
7) DK/NA	15.4	11.3
42) The Jerusalem municipality and the Israeli police have been demolishing Palestinian homes and evicting Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem. In your opinion, what is the aim of these measures? Are they meant to enforce law and order or to punish Palestinian residents in order to make their lives difficult so they would leave the city or for some other reason?
1) Certainly the goal is to enforce law and order	3.2	2.5
2) I think the goal is to enforce law and order	4.4	5.6
3) I think the goal is to punish the residents so they would leave the city	15.0	20.1
4) I am certain the goal is to punish residents so they would leave the city	74.0	70.2
5) Others (specify ------- )	3.4	1.6
43) Some Palestinians, international supporters, and Israelis participate in demonstrations against home demolition or eviction of residents in East Jerusalem in sympathy with the Palestinian residents. What about you? Do you sympathize with the residents to the extent that you wish to participate in demonstrations even if you are unable to do that?
1) Certainly wish to participate	45.9	43.7
2) Wish to do that to some extent	22.7	25.3
3) Do not wish to some extent	13.3	10.0
4) Certainly do not wish to participate	15.2	16.9
5) DK/NA	2.9	4.1
44-1) And how do you evaluate the role of international actors such as the EU regarding their position on home demolition or eviction? Do you find it sympathetic or unsympathetic with the Palestinian residents?
1) Certainly sympathetic	7.3	4.8
2) Somewhat sympathetic	28.2	14.7
3) Somewhat unsympathetic	15.2	14.3
4) Certainly unsympathetic	49.4	66.2
44-2) And how do you evaluate the role of international actors such as the US regarding their position on home demolition or eviction? Do you find it sympathetic or unsympathetic with the Palestinian residents?
1) Certainly sympathetic	1.6	1.3
2) Somewhat sympathetic	5.5	8.2
3) Somewhat unsympathetic	12.9	11.6
4) Certainly unsympathetic	80.1	78.9

العربية

Critical Policy Brief, Number 4/2023

August 2023

Armed Groups in Northern West Bank:

The Beginning of an Armed Intifada or the Seeds of an Internal Palestinian Conflict?

Alaa Lahlouh

Introduction:

Public opinion polls show that a majority of 54% of the public in the West Bank expects an armed intifada to erupt soon, while a majority of 58% of the same public fears internal armed clashes between Palestinian armed groups and the Palestinian security forces. In less than a year, the Jenin and Nablus governorates witnessed several confrontations between armed groups and Palestinian security forces following the arrest of members of these groups by the PA security forces. The question that arises is the following: why have we come to this point and where are we heading?

In 2022, armed groups emerged in the northern West Bank (e.g., in Jenin refugee camp and Nablus city) and engaged in armed confrontations with the Israeli occupation forces. Polls conducted over the past yer have shown wide support among the Palestinian public for these groups. A combination of factors helped the emergence of these groups and their spread to other areas in the northern and central West Bank (e.g., in Aqbat Jaber refugee camp, Nablus, Tulkarm, and Qabatiya, Jaba' and Burqin towns in Jenin), such as the failure of the peace process, the continued policies of the Israeli governments of confiscating land and Judaizing Jerusalem, and the continued attacks by settlers against Palestinian citizens. Internal factors have also contributed to this development. These included the weakness of the Palestinian Authority and the public loss of confidence in it as a result of several reasons, the most important of which is its inability to provide security and safety for Palestinian citizens who face Israeli army incursions and settlers’ terrorism or enforce law and order in areas where tribes and clans have taken the law into their own hands. On top of that, the PA’s political system witnessed highly negative governance developments during the past decade that affected its legitimacy and weakened the protection for human rights.

This paper aims to examine the conditions pushing toward a new armed intifada and those that may increase the possibility of an internal Palestinian conflict. It explores similarities with those witnessed during the second intifada and proposes recommendations that aim at preventing the deterioration toward internal conflict. The analysis and conclusions are based on in-depth conversations with figures from various Palestinian parties who are familiar with the current internal developments. They are also influenced by the findings of public opinion polls conducted in the Palestinian territories during the past two years.

Background:

In mid-2021, the first armed group in Jenin camp, the Jenin Brigade, was formed and began to operate openly. It is worth recalling that the Jenin camp provided an incubator and a launching platform for most of the armed and bombing attacks during the second intifada. For this reason, it witnessed fierce battles between armed groups and the Israeli army that lasted for about 13 days in April 2002. During that battler, the occupation forces bombed and destroyed large areas in the camp’s buildings. Moreover, the year 2021 witnessed the daring escape of six prisoners from the Gilboa prison inside Israel; all the prisoners were from the Jenin governorate, five of them from the Islamic Jihad movement and a prisoner from the Fatah movement, Zakaria al-Zubaidi. Al Zubaidi is a member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, and one of the most prominent commanders of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades during the second intifada. He witnessed all the battles of Jenin camp.[1] The atmosphere that prevailed in the Jenin governorate in general, and in the Jenin refugee camp and city in particular, helped many young men from other areas in the governorate to join these armed groups. At the end of 2021, small armed groups in Nablus started to target Israeli checkpoints and military vehicles in the vicinity of the city, eventually leading in mid-2022 to the formation of the Lions' Den armed group. The group made the Old City of Nablus its home base. Here too, it is worth mentioning that in April 2002, the Old City of Nablus witnessed fierce battles that lasted for about a week, after which the Israeli army was able to impose its control over the Old City. Throughout most the second intifada, that part of Nablus remained a stronghold of armed groups.

In 2022, several armed attacks inside Israel were carried out by young Palestinians, most of who, came from the Jenin area. These attacks led to the killing of several Israelis. Shooting attacks were also carried out in the vicinity of Jenin governorate against Israeli soldiers and settlers, killing and wounding many soldiers and settlers. The same development was repeated in the Nablus district.

Reasons behind the rise of the armed groups:

There are many reasons for the rise of armed groups in the northern West Bank, some of which are related to the daily hardships imposed by the unending Israeli occupation and settlers’ terror attacks against Palestinians. Needless to say, public loss of confidence in the peace process led to despair as more and more people came to the conclusion that diplomacy and negotiations were no longer viable. But other factors were internal. Internal governance failures produced high levels of distrust and loss of confidence in the Palestinian political system and its leadership. The PA was seen as unable to provide protection for the citizens. On top of that, the regime's loss of electoral legitimacy, the existence of widespread popular perception of corruption within the PA, and the repeated violations of human rights contributed greatly to weakening the PA. In a published study[2] by Dr. Omar Rahhal, the author lists eight reasons for the rise of armed groups, the most important of which are the PA’s failure to protect its own citizens, its emphasis on negotiations as the only option for a political solution, the willingness of the Palestinian people to sacrifice, and the PA neglect of the youth and their concerns. Palestinian public opinion polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) during the last five years have often shown that these and other reasons are directly or indirectly linked to the escalation of negative popular attitudes against the PA and the Israeli military occupation.

In addition to these forces, it is worth highlighting the following recent developments as they have contributed to providing a permissive environment that facilitated the rise of the armed groups:

The escalating Israeli land confiscation policy and the measures aiming to Judaize East Jerusalem united the Palestinians in the belief that a Palestinian response should be forthcoming. The spring of 2021 witnessed popular confrontations in the city of Jerusalem and its various neighborhoods as a result of the Israeli government's attempts to expel seven families from Sheikh Jarrah from their homes. These escalating confrontations led to a military confrontation between Israel and Hamas in May 2021 that was accompanied by street confrontations in the West Bank and similar confrontations inside Israel, particularly in mixed Arab-Jewish cities. It should be noted that the rise of the armed groups in the Jenin refugee camp coincided, and was perhaps propelled by this Hamas-Israel war and the accompanying confrontations. These events were followed a month later by the Israeli assassination of one of the commanders of the Al-Quds Brigades in Jenin. This sequence of developments was particularly emphasized by Maher al-Akhras, a spokesman for Islamic Jihad, in an interview conducted with him by the author.[3]
A blocked political horizon and a failed peace process cemented a popular conclusion that peace was no longer viable; that it has reached a dead-end and that Palestinians must look for alternative means to end the Israeli occupation. The formation during the past years of right wing and extreme Israeli coalitions led by Benjamin Netanyahu has been emphasized by interviewees, most prominently by a member of the Palestinian legislative Council (PLC), Jamal Huwail, who is also a member of Fatah's Revolutionary Council and one of the leaders of the April 2002 battle of the Jenin camp.[4] While Israeli measures of settlement expansion continue to tear apart the geographical contiguity of the promised Palestinian state and continue to Judaize the city of Jerusalem, the Palestinian leaders refused, in the past, to return to negotiations unless settlement expansion was stopped. The US efforts during this period were unsuccessful in producing a sustained progress in peace making throughout President Obama's first term. Despite US Secretary of State John Kerry's efforts and success in holding negotiations between the two sides in 2013 and 2014, these efforts met the same fate of failure. After that, the negotiations entered a state of clinical death. Yet, the Palestinian leadership remained committed to negotiations as the only option for ending the Israeli occupation. Despite its declared advocacy of peaceful resistance, the Palestinian leadership has not succeeded in activating this option. One of the consequences of the failure of diplomacy and the expansion of settlements has been the declining willingness of the Palestinians public to make concessions. For example, polls show a significant decline in public support for the two-state solution in recent years, reaching the lowest level in 2023, standing at 27% and 28% in two successive polls conducted in March and June. Moreover, these polls show that negotiations are no longer seen as the most effective means of ending Israeli occupation or building a Palestinian state.
One of the reasons for the willingness of Palestinian youth to challenge the PA is the loss of confidence in that authority and due to its mounting weakness. As indicated earlier, this has been the result of the PA’s inability to provide security and safety for its citizens in the face of Israeli incursions, army and settlers, and in the face of clan and tribal conflicts, in addition to various damaging PA practices in recent years. Ayman Daraghmeh, a member of the PLC representing the Change and Reform bloc, highlighted this reason in particular in an interview with the author.[5] Confidence in the PA has also declined as a result of its loss of electoral legitimacy. The president's term expired in 2010 and since then he ruled for 13 years without a popular mandate. During these years, parliamentary and presidential elections have not been held. As a result, public trust in the PA government fell from 68% when it was first elected in 2006 to 27% by the end of 2021. The public's perception in the existence of corruption in PA institutions has reached 86% for most of the past decade. During the same period, the vast majority of Palestinians demanded the resignation of President Abbas, with 80% calling for his resignation today. Palestinians now view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinian people, and the majority sees its continuation in the interest of Israel and its disintegration or collapse in the interest of the Palestinian people.[6]
The formation of armed groups in the West Bank reflects the emergence of a new Palestinian young generation. Those who observe the armed clashes realize that most of the Palestinian fighters are young people, as young as twenty-five years old. This generation was mostly born after the invasion in 2002, or were only several years old. This generation grew up under the harsh conditions of the military occupation and its efforts to control the people and the land. They have witnessed what they perceive as a leadership failure and an Arab abandonment. They lived through Palestinian division and the widening gap between the people and the PA. A weak PA left a political vacuum that the new generation is trying to fill. As Fatah leader Fathi Khazim (also known as “Abu Ra’ad”) said in an interview with the author: “nature does not accept a vacuum."[7] Faced with disappointment and disillusionment and in an attempt to break away from the resilient status quo, these youths organized themselves in various military formations while putting political divisions and loyalties behind them. This can be seen in the formation of the Lions' Den in Nablus, which included elements from all Palestinian factions (such as Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front) as well as independents and the nonaffiliated. The same can be said about the Jenin groups, where various military wings work together, including the Al-Quds, Al-Aqsa, Al-Qassam, and Abu Ali Mustaf Brigades.

The spread to other areas and the potential for a new intifada:

Soon, armed groups spread to new areas. By the end of last year and the beginning of this year new armed formations were created in Tulkarm and Jericho, as well as in the towns inside the Jenin governorate and in the refugee camps in the Nablus area. As mentioned earlier, these groups enjoy great sympathy from the Palestinian street. Public opinion polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in late 2022 and the beginning and mid-2023 showed clear support for the formation of these groups: 72% of the public said that they support the formation of armed groups, such as the Lions’ Den and the Jenin Brigade, that are not operating under PA control and are not part of the official security forces; only 22% say they are against the formation of these groups. Support for the formation of armed groups increases among young people aged 18-29 years compared to older Palestinians, 75% and 72% respectively.[8] In March 2023, 68% of the public supported the formation of these groups and 25% opposed their formation.[9] Three months later, 71% of the public supported and 23% opposed the formation of these groups.[10] Moreover, a majority of the public (58%) expects these armed groups to spread to other areas in the West Bank.[11]

Three of the factors that have contributed to the formation of the armed groups also push toward the eruption of a third intifada:

Israel's unending occupation of the Palestinian territories is turning into de facto annexation as the campaign to confiscate land, build settlements, and impose Israeli law is widening in the absence of an effective official PA or international response.
The apparent and growing weakness of the PA in an environment in which known organized political factions are also absent thereby generating a vacuum that these armed groups are trying to fill.
The escalation of violence carried out by the Israeli occupation forces and the settlers against armed groups and against peaceful civilians in Palestinian villages and towns, as we have recently witnessed in Hawara, Turmus'ayya, Um Safa and other Palestinian towns.

The prospects for internal strife:

Public opinion polls conducted among the Palestinians during the past nine months indicate that a majority of the public, ranging between 52% and 59%, fears that the formation of Palestinian armed groups will lead to internal armed clashes between them and the Palestinian security forces. We noted that while support for the formation of these groups increases, trust in the PA and its institutions drops sharply. When asked about their expectation that the official security services would join forces and participate alongside armed groups in the event of an armed intifada, 62% said they did not expect that.[12] When asked about their views regarding the option for the armed men to surrender to the PA security services in order to obtain protection against Israeli assassination, between 80% and 83% of the public said they are against members of these armed groups surrendering themselves and their weapons to the Palestinian Authority[13]. If the PA were to try to disarm the armed groups, a majority of 59% expects them to resist the PA security services with arms, only 8% expect members of this group to surrender, and only 23% believe that resistance by armed groups to the Palestinian security services would be unarmed.[14] An overwhelming majority (87%) of the public believes that the PA has no right to arrest members of these armed groups to prevent them from carrying out armed attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection.[15]

The in-depth interviews conducted by the author highlighted a number of factors and developments that might increase the prospects for internal Palestinian conflict:

The PA does not condone the existence of these armed groups or support the eruption of a third intifada. The PA leadership, especially President Abbas, supports nonviolence and it is still fully committed to negotiations and a peaceful solution as the only strategic option for ending the occupation. President Abbas rejects the idea of armed resistance in all its forms. By contrast, when the second intifada broke out in 2000, the PA leadership, under Yasser Arafat, believed in preserving all options, including armed resistance if necessary. Arafat did not hesitate to provide support to armed groups, or even allow the security services to participate in the intifada or turn a blind eye to their participation.
The ramifications of the internal political division between the West Bank, under Fatah’s control, and the Gaza Strip, under Hamas’, are still haunting the PA. Needless to say, the split in the Palestinian political system and territories have left a great constraining impact even on all resistance options. The Palestinian Authority and its ruling party, Fatah, have great fears that any increased power and influence of Hamas in the West Bank could turn into a highly destabilizing source in Palestinian politics leading to similar developments as those that happened in the Gaza Stirp in 2007, when Hamas took over control of that area using its own armed wing to achieve a full armed control.
The media exchange between Fatah and Hamas is poisonous. The widespread hate speech in the Palestinian media, especially between Fatah and Hamas, is highly alarming. This has been one of the issues particularly emphasized by Fathi Khazem (Abu Ra’d) who said that this exchange "leads to an aggravation of the internal situation and provides a fertile environment for the occurrence of an internal Palestinian conflict."[16] The observers of this media can easily see the volume of hate speech that is broadcast through satellite channels, websites or social network sites. It spreads accusation of treason against the other thereby creating an atmosphere that helps accelerate the pace towards internal conflict.
The armed groups are not reluctant to target PA forces or openly challenge its monopoly over force. This is evident in the recent cases in the northern West Bank when some of these groups attacked the PA headquarters or organized military parades in the middle of towns thereby posing a direct challenge to Abbas’ assertion that the PA is enforcing the “one arm, one authority” principle.
Concerns about regime security could compel the PA to take coercive measures. The ruling elite's fear of the collapse of the PA, as a result of its inability to confront the armed groups, could increase its willingness to take risks. This has been one of the issues raised by Ayman Daraghmeh who pointed out that the “PA’s imperative of self-preservation might be highly worrying, particularly given its failure to enforce order in the Jenin refugee camp and the old city of Nablus and in light of the regional and international pressure on it to act and confront the armed groups.”[17]
The PA has shown that it is willing and able to occasionally arrest members of the armed groups. Such arrests have normally been followed by armed confrontations with members of these groups. A decision by the PA to mass arrest or disarm members of the armed groups in their home bases could lead to wide spread and prolonged internal violence.
Finally, a highly disruptive, but unseen, lack of societal trust among the Palestinians could add an additional driver of internal strife, particularly when the PA weakness becomes evident to the public to see. Societal trust expresses the extent to which any society is able to remain intact in the face of serious internal and external threats. In this sense, it is an expression of the societal immunity to disintegration. The greater the internal immunity of the Palestinian society, the lower the prospects for infighting; the greater the societal distrust, the greater the risk of internal conflict in the face of severe shocks or increased internal or external challenges. The results of the Arab Barometer surveys in Palestine indicate a decline in the percentage of societal trust from 39% in 2008 to only 14% in 2019, in the fifth round of the Barometer. The last round of the Barometer, in 2021-22, shows that the percentage has now dropped to only 10%. If this societal flaw is added to the very low level of trust in the PA public, especially toward those responsible for enforcing law and order, as we have indicated above, the challenge facing Palestinian society becomes critical.

Recommendations:

The following recommendations are based on the interviews conducted and the positions expressed by the various stakeholders. They are addressed to the PA as well as the armed groups:

To the PA:

The Palestinian leadership fears a third armed intifada and is working, under difficult constraints, to prevent one from erupting. President Mahmoud Abbas has expressed this view in various interviews in recent years. On the other hand, this PA leadership must also work to avoid throwing the Palestinian people into an internal strife, regardless of the motivation. Therefore, the Palestinian leadership must first work to regain the initiative through several steps that aim at regaining public trust, namely:

Prepare for general presidential and legislative elections: This recommendation was emphasized in particular by Fathi Khazem, Jamal Huwail, and Ayman Daraghmeh. All agreed on the importance of electoral legitimacy as the main barrier to internal strife. This must begin by setting a date for the election. Election can resuscitate the legitimacy of the entire political system and its various public institutions thereby providing the PA with the requested claim to monopoly over coercive force.[18]
Make serious efforts to end the internal division and restore unity between the two parts of the Palestinian territories. Reunification is critical for regaining public trust, restore societal trust, and strengthening the Palestinian negotiating position.
Adopt a national program around which a high level of consensus can be built. In this program, the role and function of the armed groups can be identified and their organizations integrated. Jamal Huwail, from Fatah, believes that this course of action constitutes a safe way out from the current impasse. He proposes various roles that can be assigned to these groups. For example, as long as the PA seeks to avoid direct confrontation with settlers, the protection of Area B from settlers’ terror can be assigned to these armed groups. Similarly, if the PA decides, at one point in the future, to protect its control over Area A against Israeli incursions, but without confronting the Israeli army, it can assign this task to the armed groups.[19]
End all cases of imprisonment for political reasons. This should be a guiding principle in dealing with the armed groups. The PA should refrain from arresting activists from these armed groups. This recommendation has been particularly emphasized by Islamic Jihad’s spokesman Maher al-Akhrass who believes that "the Palestinian security services should stop arresting members of these groups for those legitimate activities entailing resisting the occupation forces. In return, members of these groups are required to respect law and order and refrain completely from attacking PA headquarters in order to preserve the sanctity of Palestinian blood."[20]
Stop the promotion of incitement and hate speech against political opponents in the local media. Political opposition, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whose media attacks are even more provocative, must in return refrain from using inflammatory rhetoric against the PA and its leadership.

To the armed groups:

Avoid any confrontation with the PA security services and refrain from blocking their entry into Palestinian areas in order to enforce law and order. Armed groups must respect the law and set an example in this in order to send a message to the PA they do not seek to supplant its role or challenge its jurisdiction.
If the PA attempts to arrest members of these groups, they should not confront it; instead, they should withdraw and evade, by all means, confronting it. Ayman Daraghmeh stressed that members of armed groups must redeploy outside their home base in those cases where the PA security forces seek to deploy. This should reduce those instances of armed confrontations between the armed groups and the PA security services.[21]
The armed groups are already very popular with the Palestinian public, but this is not necessarily the kind of relations between the armed groups and the PA. Moreover, the presence of these groups within the society might trigger tension with the public. It is imperative that the groups strife to avoid any conflict with the public. Moreover, as Maher al Akhras pointed out, the groups must also strife to maintain a smooth and amicable relations with the PA: "members of armed groups are required to respect the citizens and avoid all kinds of problems, whether with citizens or the PA”.[22]
Visible militarization by the armed groups is destructive, not only because it makes them easy targets for the Israeli army, but also because it increases the pressure on the PA to take effective measures to arrest and disarm them. Jamal Huwail argues for keeping the armed groups completely underground as one way by which they can assure the PA that they do not seek to replace it in their areas of operation.[23]
Lack of internal coordination between the armed groups could led to internal in-fighting. To avoid this outcome, the armed groups need to create joint institutions and leadership. These joint institutions can help the groups articulate their vision and negotiate with the PA and societal forces in order to reduce any existing threat perception and contribute to wining hearts and minds.

[1] All six prisoners were rearrested by the Israeli forces.

[2] Omar Rahhal, “The transformation of Palestinian attitudes in the West Bank regarding the confrontation with the occupation,” Amman: Center for Middle East Studies, 2022 (Arabic)

[3] Phone interview with Maher al Akhras, spokesperson of Islamic Jihad, 15 July 2023.

[4] Interview with Jamal Huwail, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, 15 July 2023.

[5] Interview with Ayman Daraghmeh, PLC member representing Change and Reform bloc in the parliament, 9 August 2023.

[6] Khalil Shikaki, “The Road to Collision: a Weak Palestinian Authority and a New National-Religious Israel,” Critical Policy Brief, Ramallah, PSR, June 2023: https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/942

[7] Interview with Fathi Khazim, leader and activist at the Jenin Refugee Camp, 5 August 2023.

[8] Public Opinion Poll No (86) | PCPSR

[9] Public Opinion Poll No (87) | PCPSR

[10] Public Opinion Poll No (88) | PCPSR

[11] Public Opinion Poll No (88) | PCPSR

[12] Public Opinion Poll No (87) | PCPSR

[13] Index PSR Polls | PCPSR

[14] Public Opinion Poll No (87) | PCPSR

[15] Index PSR Polls | PCPSR

[16] Interview with Khazim.

[17] Interview with Daraghmeh.

[18] Interviews with Khazim, Huwail, and Daraghmeh.

[19] Interview with Huwail.

[20] Interview with al Akhras.

[21] Interview with Daraghmeh.

[22] Interview with al Akhras.

[23] Interview with Huwail.

العربية

Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (84)

28 June 2022

Significant drop in support for Fatah and its leadership and a similar drop in support for the two-state solution and the one democratic state accompanied by a rise in support for a return to armed intifada and a majority support for the recent armed attacks inside Israel; but about two-thirds view positively “confidence building” measures and the largest percentage of West Bankers is opposed to armed attacks

22-25 June 2022

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 25 June 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including several armed attacks by Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel, the Israeli army incursions into Jenin’s refugee camp, and the killing of al Jazeera journalists Shireen Abu Akleh by Israeli gunfire in one of the Jenin incursions. Other developments included the organization of the Flag March by the Israeli right wing inside the Old City of East Jerusalem without ending up in an armed confrontation between Hamas and Israel as many had expected. Internally, a student body associated with Hamas was able to win the majority of seats in the Birzeit University student council elections, President Abbas transferred control of the secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council, and assigned to the PLO Executive Committee member from Fatah, Hussien al Sheikh, the responsibilities of the Committee’s secretariate. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the second quarter of 2022 show a significant change in the domestic balance of power in favor of Hamas and its leadership only three months after Fatah had managed to restore some of the popularity it had lost in the aftermath of the April 2021 cancellation of the legislative and presidential elections, the May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel, and the killing of the opposition figure Nizar Banat at the hands of the Palestinian security services.

Today, Hamas and Fatah enjoy almost the same level of public support, with the gap narrowing to one percentage point in favor of Hamas after it was six points in favor of Fatah in March 2022. It is noticeable that the drop in Fatah’s popularity has occurred in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, though the drop has been greater in the latter. Fatah’s declining popularity is evident in two other ways. For one, the gap in popularity between the head of Fatah, President Abbas, and the head of Hamas, Ismail Haniyyeh, has now reached 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh after it was only 16 points three months ago. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’ resignation, from the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA), has risen to over three quarters while those still in favor of Abbas have dwindled in size to less than one fifth of the public. Another indicator of Fatah’s decline can be seen when looking at the widening gap between those who think Hamas is the more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to those who think “Fatah under Abbas” is more deserving than Hamas. Today, the gap stands at 10 percentage points in favor of Hamas compared to just two points in favor of Hamas three months ago.

Perhaps one of the main reasons behind the shift in the internal balance of power has been the rise of Hamas' role over the past few months in defending Jerusalem. Other reasons might have been the release by the PA of those Preventive Security men accused of killing Nizar Banat on bail, or because the vast majority of the public believes that the Palestinian government does not make an effort to mitigate the consequences of the rise in prices, or the objection of the majority of the public to President Abbas's internal decisions, such as the transfer of powers over the Secretariat of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council or the appointment of PLO Executive Committee member Hussein al-Sheikh to serve as the head of the Secretariat of that Committee,.

In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the results for the second quarter indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution. The results show one of the likely reasons for the decline: a significant increase in the belief that a two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion, rising to 70%. But the findings also indicate a similar decline in support for a one-state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, indicating a hardening of public attitudes similar to what we saw in mid-2021 in the aftermath of the Hamas-Israel war. Support for a return to an armed uprising is also rising to form a clear majority, reinforced by a broad support for the recent shootings inside Israel by individual Palestinians who did not belong to known forces and movements. However, there are significant differences in the attitudes of Gazans compared to West Bankers, where the largest percentage of the latter remains opposed to armed attacks.

Increased Palestinian-Israeli clashes over the past three months may have contributed to this attitudinal shift regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations, starting with the Israeli Flag March, the repeated incursions into the Jenin camp, the killing of the very well-known and liked Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, the crackdown by the Israeli police on the raising of the Palestinian flag, and the frequent confrontations between the Israeli police and the Palestinian worshippers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque; all might have led to a hardening of the Palestinian public attitudes.

However, it is worth noting that the percentage of those viewing positively the recent "confidence-building" measures between the PA and Israel has risen to about two-thirds. Moreover, despite the rising tension over al Aqsa Mosque, the majority continues to view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a national conflict, over land and sovereignty, rather than a religious conflict.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

71% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 54% believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 49% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 55% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 31% and Haniyeh 50%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 47% and from among those, the former receives 26% and the latter 61%.
If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (30%) selected him in an open-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (16%), Mohammad Dahlan (6%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%), and 34% said they do not know or have not decided. It is worth noting that this is the first time that al Sheikh’s name has been mentioned by the respondents in an open-ended question. This means that we will continue to ask about his standing as a successor in the next four quarterly poll. In an closed ended questions about succession, Marwan Barghouti is preferred by 39%, Haniyyeh by 19%, Dahlan by 6%, Sinwar by 5%, Khalid Mishal by 2%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 1% each. Al Sheikh’s name was not among those listed in the closed ended question.
Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 73% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 72% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip.
If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 69% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 7% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 37% (compared to 47% three months ago).
The largest percentage (33%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 38% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 31% selected Hamas, 29% Fatah under Abbas, and 33% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

A majority of 57% is opposed to President Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the Secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council; only 27% support Abbas’ decision.
Similarly, a majority of 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to ask the PLO’s Executive Committee member from Fatah, Husein al Sheikh, to assume the responsibility over the secretariate of that Committee; only 23% support Abbas’ decision.
In explaining the reasons for the electoral victory of the Hamas-affiliated student body at Birzeit University, the majority (59%) attributed it to students’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the PA while about one third (32%) said the victory came as a result in a shift in public opinion in favor of Hamas.
The majority (57%) of the public says it was supportive of the teachers’ strike who were demanding better representational and associational rights from the government and led to a partial halt to the educational process in public schools; 31% say they were opposed. Support for the strike is higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 63% and 48% respectively.
The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 18% say it is doing so.
Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%.
Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 48%.
26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 27% and in the West Bank at 26%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 37% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
42% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 54% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 38% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 62% think they cannot.
In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 55% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.
26% are optimistic and 70% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 28%.
After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 73% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 23% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 75% expects failure and 19% expects success.
The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 41%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.
We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (11% each), Palestine TV (10%), Maan (6%), al Arabiya (3%), al Mayadeen (2%), and al Manar (1%).

(3) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 69%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.
Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 32%.
When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 48% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 51% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
A majority of 59% says that the armed attack inside Israel carried out by Palestinians unaffiliated with known armed groups contributes to the national interest of ending the occupation; 37% believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest. Gazans are more likely to view such attacks positively compared to the West Bankers, 77% and 46% respectively. Worth noting also that 47% of West Bankers believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest.
Similarly, a majority of 56% (73% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank) supports armed attacks similar to those carried out lately by unaffiliated Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel; 39% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) say they are opposed to such armed attacks.
A majority of 56% expects the acts of armed resistance in the Jenin refugee camp to spread to other parts of the West Bank. However, a large minority of 41% expects the acts of armed resistance to remain restricted to the Jenin camp.
We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 65% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 63% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
A majority of 70% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 60% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 50% chose armed struggle (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank), 22% negotiations, and 21% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 25% chose negotiations.
Under current conditions, a majority of 69% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
65% are opposed, and 29% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.
The vast majority (78%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 17% say it does not. However, the majority (63%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 25% say they believe it.
When asked why they think Hamas did not launch rockets against Israel on the day of the Flag March throughout East Jerusalem, the largest percentage (35%) said that the movement did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for; one third said that Hamas was willing to comply with the advice and mediation of Arab and international actors. Only 13% said it was afraid of the Israeli reaction against it and the Gaza Strip. One tenth (11%) said that Hamas did not threaten to launch rockets against Israel if he Flag March took place in the Old City of East Jerusalem.
The largest percentage (40%) believes that Hamas’ unwillingness to launch rockets against Israel during the Flag March will encourage Israeli to take more measures against Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque. By contrast, 26% said that Hamas’ decision will deter Israel in the future, and 28% said it will neither encourage nor deter Israel.
A consensus is emerging regarding the killing of the al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh: 92% believe Israel has deliberately sought to kill her while only 5% think the killing by the Israeli army was accidental.
A majority of 61% believes that the reasons the Israeli police attacked the funeral procession of Abu Akleh in Jerusalem had to do with the fac that the funeral demonstrated the unity of the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. On the other hand, one third thinks that the police attack was prompted by the raising of the Palestinian flag during the funeral.
When asked why Israel insists on preventing the raising of the Palestinian flag in Jerusalem and other occupied territories and in areas inside Israel, the public was split evenly, 49% said the reason has to do with Israeli rejection of the Palestinian national identity while an identical percentage said it has to do with Israeli fear of the Palestinian national identity.
A majority of 53% (56% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) says that despite the repeated incidents of attacks by the Israeli police against Palestinian worshipers at al Aqsa Mosque, the conflict remains first and foremost over land and sovereignty while 45% say the conflict has now become first and foremost a religious one.
We asked the public about the expectations that the US aid to the PA will soon resume and asked if they welcome or do not welcome aid resumption. The public is evenly split on US aid: 48% welcome it and 49% do not. It is worth noting that Gazans are more likely to welcome US aid, by 59%, while the percentage drops to 40% in the West Bank.

(4) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

The largest percentage of the public (42%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 35% blame Ukraine.
An overwhelming majority (75%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 6% think it should stand with Ukraine.
A majority of 43% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 53% are not worried. Three months ago, the percentage of those expressing worry that the war would expand stood at 54%.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 9% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 26% (29% in the Gaz Strip and 23% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; 25% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 17% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 12% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 13% (17% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.
When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 23% said it is corruption, 17% said it is unemployment, 16% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

العربية

ARAB BAROMETER 8 in Palestine

15 January 2024
Report I: Domestic Balance of Power and Palestinian-Israeli Relations before and after October the 7^th
Domestically, AB8 Shows most Palestinians did not support Hamas on the eve of October the 7th war; but the war led to a significant rise in Hamas’ popularity and a significant decline in the standing of the PA leadership among the Palestinians. The war also led to a significant rise in support for armed struggle in the West Bank. Nonetheless, after the eruption of the war, Hamas did not gain a majority support in either Gaza or the West Bank and support for the two-state solution did not decline

28 September and 8 October 2023

These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side.

The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30^th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement.

This report is the first in a series of reports that cover the findings of the current wave of AB. It addresses two important issues covered by AB8: the domestic balance of power in the Palestinian territories and the state of Palestinian-Israeli relations. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding these two topics, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in two of its regular polls, one conducted before AB8 and one after it. The poll conducted after AB8 came several weeks after the launch of Hamas’ October the 7^th offensive against Israeli towns and military bases bordering the Gaza Strip and the Israeli launch of the current ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. In the meanwhile, in the West Bank, the Israeli army blocked or restricted Palestinian access to main roads while settler attacks increased against vulnerable towns and villages in various parts of the B and C areas.

Methodology:

The Arab Barometer interviews were conducted face-to-face during the period between 28 September and 8 October 2023 with a random sample of 1,189 adults in 120 residential locations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The interviews in the Gaza Strip were completed on October 6, one day before the start of Hamas's offensive on the Gaza periphery, which Hamas called the "Al-Aqsa Flood." The sample size in the Gaza Strip is 399 people and in the West Bank 790, and the margin of error is +/-3%.

The other two surveys that are cited frequently, for comparative purposes, in this report, were conducted before and after this AB poll. The first was conducted than a month before AB8, between 6-9 September 2023, and the second was conducted less than two months after the AB poll, between 22 November and 2 December 2023. Respondents in the first poll were interviewed face-to-face and the sample size was 1,270 adults randomly selected in 127 residential locations with a margin of error of +/-3%. For further details on the methodology and findings of this survey, see PSR’s report here: https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/955

The third poll in this report, the one conducted after the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop, had a sample size of 1,231 people, of whom 750 were interviewed in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip. All interviewed for this poll were conducted face-to-face in 121 randomly selected locations. The sample was representative of the residents of the two areas. Because of the fact that residents had to abandon their homes during the war, interviews with residents of the northern cities and localities of the Gaza Strip were conducted in 24 UNRWA or government shelters. The margin of error for this poll was +/- 4%. The increased margin of error for this poll, despite the large sample size, reflects the lack of reliable information regarding the number of individuals who did not leave their homes in the northern Gaza Strip and were therefore not included in the sample. For further details on the methodology and findings of this survey, see PSR’s report here: https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963

Main Findings:

Domestic Balance of Power: On the eve of October the 7^th war, Arab Barometer 8 in Palestine found the Palestinian domestic setting favoring nationalist groups, such as Fatah, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. At the national level, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip combined, more than 2 in 5 favored the nationalists, such as Fatah and third parties, while only 1 in 5 favored Islamists, such as Hamas, and the rest disliked both. Even in the Gaza Strip, which is traditionally more religious and Islamist, support for Hamas was slightly higher than a quarter while support for nationalists stood at half. When looking at the findings of PSR’s earlier poll, conducted immediately before the AB poll, the trend in both areas, but more clearly in the Gaza Strip, was decidedly moving against Hamas. The October 7 war reversed that trend leading to a great rise in Hamas’s popularly and a great decline in Fatah’s in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, support for Hamas did not reach a majority in either area; only slightly more than 2 in 5 favored Hamas by early December 2023. Furthermore, as shown in all previous PSR polls, Hamas’ increased popularity during wars begins to erode soon after the wars end, eventually returning to where it was before the war.

But the nationalist’s Achilles heel lies in its ruling leadership. Long before October the 7^th, the current PA president lost public support as the overwhelming majority demanded his resignation. Even within his own political party, the majority wanted him out. The events in October, exposed the tremendous public dissatisfaction with the performance of that leadership. One of the most important ramifications of that loss of public satisfaction with the PA leadership has been the unwillingness of the nationalist public to vote in an election in which he would compete against a Hamas candidate thus ensuring a resounding victory for the Islamist. Nonetheless, the nationalists do have a leader who cannot lose regardless of who the other candidate is: Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti, currently serving several life sentences in an Israeli jail. Even after October the 7^th, he is still able to defeat Hamas’ most popular leader, Ismail Haniyeh.

Palestinian-Israeli relations AB8 explored attitudes of Palestinians toward various solutions that would put an end to the conflict. The poll offered three solutions: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the one-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis, and a confederation between the two states. Respondents can select one of the three or alternatively reject all three and select “other” solutions. The poll found a slim majority favoring the two-state solution followed by “other” solutions, one-state solution, and the confederation. Palestinian youth and those who support Hamas are more likely to oppose the two-state solution while older Palestinians and those who support all other factions are more likely to support that solution.

This is the second time that AB has asked this question. Two years ago, the findings were greatly similar to the current ones. Nonetheless, the current level of support for the two-state solution is much higher than the support documented by PSR when the question is about support and opposition to that solution. This report argues that one reason for this has to do with substance, the fact that while the regular support-opposition question omits any reference to the borders of the state, the single most important attribute of statehood for Palestinians, the question on the three solutions defines these borders as those of the 1967 lines. A second reason has to do with the formal framing of the question. While the regular support-opposition question forces respondents to oppose the two-state solution if they prefer some other negotiated ones, the three-solution framing forces respondents to select their most preferred negotiated outcome or alternatively select their own preferred solutions. As pointed out in the report, PSR regualr polls conducted before and after the eruption of the October 7 war shows that support for the two-state solution in its regular format did not decline; to the contrary it slightly increased.

The report shows that those who support the two-state solution in its regular framing (support-opposition), tend to overwhelmingly support the two-state solution in its three-solution framing. Most other two-state supporters prefer one of the other two negotiated solutions, i.e., the one-state and the confederation. Most importantly however, some of those who oppose the two-state solution in that regular framing, change their mind and support it, presumably because that solution now defines the borders as those of 1967. AB8 asked about Palestinian priorities. We crosstabulated the answers to this question with those of the three-solution question. As expected, the findings show that those who prioritize Palestinian statehood and a system of rights and freedoms over other Palestinian goals, such as the right of return and religious society, tend to favor the two-state solution by the largest percentage. AB8 also asked about perception of Israeli discrimination against Palestinians. Here too, we crosstabulated the answers to this question with those of the three-solution question. Is seems that the concern about potential discrimination against Palestinians in a future one-state solution might have deterred respondents from supporting that solution.

(1) Domestic balance of power:

The domestic balance of power between the various Palestinian political parties has been explored in two ways: party preferences and electoral behavior. To explore the popularity of Palestinian figures, we asked about vote in hypothetical elections in which the contest was between the current PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, and the two most popular rivals, Marwan Barghouti from Fatah and Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas.

PARTY PREFERENCES

On the eve of the October the 7^th war, AB8 asked about public preferences for the various political parties: when asked which party is closest to you, respondents selected Fatah by 30% (same percentage in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and Hamas by 21% (17% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip); and third parties by 12% (6% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip). The largest percentage, 37% (47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip), selected “none of the above.”

A month earlier, in early-September when respondents in one of PSR’s regular polls were asked “which political party you prefer, 26% selected Fatah (26% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip), 22% selected Hamas (12% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip, 13% (12% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip) selected third parties, and 40% (52% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip) selected “none of the above.”

A third poll was conducted in late November and early December 2023, about six weeks after the Hamas launch of its October 7 offensive. The poll, one of PSR’s regular polls, was conducted during the ceasefire period in which West Bank women and children held prisoners by Israel were exchanged for Israeli civilian hostages held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Respondents in this post-Gaza War poll were asked “which political party you prefer?" Finding of that post-Gaza War poll indicated a dramatic rise in the popularity of Hamas in the West Bank and a slight rise in the Gaza Strip. Support for Hamas in the West Bank increased considerably by more than three times to 44% but increased slightly in the Gaza Strip to 42% for a total of 43%. Support for Fatah dropped considerably to 17% only (16% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip). The preference for third parties and others dropped by one percentage point to 12% (4% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of those who selected “none of the above” dropped by11 points to 28%.

Figure (1): Party Preference before and after the eruption of the October 2023 Gaza War

“AB8: Which party is closest to you?” or “PSR polls: Which party you prefer?”

ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR:

1. Parliamentary Elections

The 8^th Arab Barometer survey in Palestine explored electoral behavior: how respondents would vote in new parliamentary elections, AB8 shows support for Fatah standing at only 24% (23% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip), while support for “Change or Reform,” i.e., Hamas stood at only 15% (9% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip); 8% supported known third parties that participated in the last parliamentary elections in 2006; and 10% did not support any of the parties.

The reason for the decline in the percentage of those willing to vote for Fatah and Hamas compared to the percentage of favorability or preference, mentioned above, is the fact that a large number of respondents decline to participate in the elections. The percentage of those refusing to participate in the elections in early October stood at and 41% (51% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip). In other words, 51% of the entire public either refused to vote or selected “none of the above.”

When the vote is restricted to those actually participating in the elections, support for Fatah rises to 40% (46% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) and support for Hamas rises to 25% (18% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of the undecided rises to 21%.

In early September 2023, the vote for Fatah stood at 23% (22% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip), Hamas at 21% (13% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), third parties at 6% (5% in the West Bank and 7% in the Gaza Strip), and the undecided at 13% (14% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of those who declined to participate in these elections stood at 36% (46% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip). In other words, 49% either refused to vote or selected “none of the above.”

When the vote is restricted to those actually participating in the elections, vote for Fatah rises to 36% (40% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) and vote for Hamas rises to 34% (24% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of the undecided rises to 21% (26% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip).

The October 7 war dramatically changed the hypothetical electoral behavior. Vote for Fatah declined by 10 points to 13% (11% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) while the vote for Hamas rose by 14 points to 35% (31% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip), and third parties received the vote of 3% (2% in the West Bank and 5% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of the undecided stood at 17% (18% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip) and the percentage of those who declined to participate stood at 31% (38% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip). In other words, 48% either refused to vote or selected “none of the above.”

When the vote is restricted to those actually participating in the elections, i.e., 69% of the eligible voters, Fateh receives 19% (18% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip), Hamas' Change and Reform 51% (50% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip), all other lists combined 5% (3% in the West Bank and 6% in the Gaza Strip), and 25% (28% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip) select “none of the above.”.

It is worth noting that AB8 shows support among the voters for Fatah and Hamas is higher among those 30 years of age or older (43% and 26% respectively) compared to only 35% for Fatah and 22% for Hamas among those between 18 and 29 years old. The percentage of youth is higher among those voting for third parties or those undecideds (17% and 26% respectively) while the percentage for older voters stand at 12% and 19% respectively. Religiosity is an important driver of the vote: support for Hamas among the religious stands at 37% compared to 18% among the somewhat religious and zero among the not religious. By contrast, support for Fatah among the religious stands at 35% compared to 45% among the somewhat religious and 41% among the not religious. Support for third parties stands at 11% among the religious, 11% among the somewhat religious, and 44% among the not religious. The undecided receives 18% from the religious, 26% from the somewhat religious, and 15% among the not religious.

2. Presidential Elections

Like other PSR polls, Palestine’s AB8 found that Marwan Barghouti is the most popular presidential candidate. If elections took place on the eve of the October Gaza war, 34% (35% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) would have voted for him. Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, would have come second, with 16% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank). Current PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, receives 8% (12% in the Gaza Strip and 6% in the West Bank). The rest of the public, 40% (47% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip declined to participate in the elections.

When restricting the vote distribution to those participating, Barghouti receives 57% (66% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip); Haniyeh receives 27% (21% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip, and Abbas receives 14% (10% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip). About a month earlier, in early September, the vote for Barghouti stood at only 49% (63% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), while 36% (25% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip) voted for Haniyeh, and 13% (10% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip) for Abbas. In other words, Barghouti became more popular and Haniyeh less popular on the eve of the October Gaza war. In that September The war reversed this trend. By the end of November and early December, the vote for Barghouti declined to 47% (55% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) while the vote for Haniyeh increased significantly to 43% (39% in the West Bank and 49% in the Gaza Strip), and the vote for Abbas declined by about half to 7% (3% in the West Bank and 13% in the West Bank).

Figure (4): vote in presidential elections; voters only

It is worth noting that AB8 shows support for Barghouti, when competing about Haniyyeh and Abbas simultaneously, is almost the same regardless to age and gender. But it is higher among the somewhat religious (63%) compared to the religious (51%). Surprisingly, 66% of Fatah voters give their vote to Barghouti. Also, surprisingly 70% of those who select “none of the above” vote for him. He receives more votes from those voting for third parties (73%) and receive only 9% of Hamas voters.

3. Demand for the resignation of president Abbas:

The 8th Arab Barometer survey in Palestine explored other aspects of the domestic balance of power, most importantly the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, the ability of the Palestinians to hold elections and the reasons why national elections have not been held since 2006.

AB8 found the demand for the resignation of president Abbas on the eve of the Gaza October 7 war standing at 78% (85% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip). A month earlier, PSR found 79% (78% in the West Bank and 79% in the Gaza Strip) demanding the resignation of president Abbas. The October 7 war increased the demand for the resignation of Abbas to 88% (92% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip).

Figure (5): Demand for the resignation of President Mahmoud Abbas in three polls

“If it were up to you, would you want to have Abbas resign or not resign?”

It is worth noting that AB8 shows support for the resignation of Abbas is almost the same among the young and the olde, the men and the women. But it does show that support for that resignation is highest among the religious (82%) declining to 77% among the somewhat religious, and 59% among the not religious. Surprisingly, a majority of 54% of those voting for Fatah, among those taking part in hypothetical parliamentary elections, demand the resignation of Abbas. The demand for Abbas’ resignation is much higher among voters of third parties, those selecting “none of the above” and those voting for Hamas: 77%, 80%, and 95% respectively.

The public is almost evenly split on whether the Palestinians can today elect their own national leadership, with 48% saying “yes” and 50% saying no. In the Gaza Strip, 58% said “no” compared to 46% in the West Bank. Among those who said “no,” the largest percentage (33%) said the Palestinians cannot elect their own national leadership due to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip making it difficult to hold elections in the two areas simultaneously. This belief is slightly stronger in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank, 36% and 32% respectively. Another 29% of those who said the Palestinians cannot elect their own national leadership said the reason for that is the fact that the PA leadership in the West Bank is afraid of losing the elections. This view is stronger in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 36% and 20% respectively.
A majority of 60% of the Palestinians believe the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people while 37% believe it is an accomplishment. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans, 66% and 52% respectively, think the PA is a burden.

(2) Palestinian-Israeli relations:

The 8^th Arab Barometer survey in Palestine explored aspects of Palestinian-Israeli relations, most importantly the support for various solutions to end the conflict, the place of Palestinian statehood in Palestinian priorities, solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and the extent of racial discrimination in the Israeli control over the Palestinians. It should be pointed out that PSR has asked about support for the two-state solution in two different manners. In all regular poll, the traditional manner has been to ask about support and opposition to that solution. Occasionally however, the question was more specific allowing respondents to opt for other negotiated solutions, such as the one-state solution, or reject all solutions and state their own preferences. The following analysis reviews the findings for both, the regular support-opposition and the three-solution questions.

Three solutions to end the conflict: AB8 offered Palestinians three possible solutions to the conflict with Israel, solutions that would help end the conflict between the two side, and asked them which one they prefer. All three solutions offered were possible outcome of peace negotiations, but respondents could opt for some “other” solution, if they so wish. The three included a two-state solution, one-state solution, and confederation. It should be noted that the “one-state solution” did not specify that the two sides would have equal rights. Therefore, theoretically one could select this solution regardless of whether Israeli Jews or Palestinians would receive equal rights. The two-state solution received the largest support (51%) with Gazans showing a little more support than West Bankers, 54% and 49% respectively. The one state solution received 10% and the confederation received 7% support. One quarter, 28% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip opted for “other” and 7% said they do not know or gave no answer. In other words, 32% did not support any of these three proposed solutions.

It is also worth noting that support for the two-state solution in this AB8 poll is higher among those who are 30-year-old or older compared to youth between the ages of 18 and 29 years, 54% and 45% respectively. It is also higher among voters of third parties and voters of Fatah, as well as those who select “none of the above,” 61%, 55%, and 47% respectively, compared to the voters of Hamas, 34%.

Palestine’s AB7 asked the exact same question two years earlier, in October 2021. The findings are greatly similar to those obtained in the latest AB wave of October 2023. Support for the two-state solution stood at 53% (49% in the West Bank and 58% in the Gaza Strip) while support for the one state solution stood at 8% (10% in the West Bank and 4% in the Gaza Strip), and support for the Palestinian-Israeli confederation stood at 6% (3% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip). Those opting for “other” and those who did not provide an answer stood at 34% (38% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).

The same three-solutions question was asked in PSR’s December 2020 and June 2021 regular polls. Support for the two-state solution stood at 49% (44% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) in December 2020. About a third (31%) selected “other” or did not give any answer. Six months later, one month after the May 2021 Hamas-Israel fourth war, support for the two-state solution dropped slightly to 46% (41% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) while support for “others” and those who did not select an answer rose to 38% (48% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip).

Figure (6): support for three possible solutions to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict:

“Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

Understanding the high level of support for the two-state solution in AB8: As indicated above, the three solutions presented to respondents in the four polls mentioned above, including in AB7 and AB8, are negotiation-based solutions of which respondents are forced to select one or alternatively reject them all and describe one they favor. The alternative and more regular manner in which we asked about the two-state solution was asked in the September and December 2023 but not in AB8. The findings in September showed that about one third (32%) supported and two thirds opposed the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details of the solution. It is worth mentioning that three months before that, in June 2023, support for that solution stood at 28%. The December 2023 poll showed that despite the October the 7^th war and the significant rise in support for Hamas and for armed struggle, support for the two-state solution did not drop. In fact, it increased slightly to 34% and opposition dropped from 67% to 64%. As shown below, in figure (7), support for the two-state solution in December 2023 was the highest in that year.

Figure (7): Support and opposition to the two-state solution throughout 2023

“Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution”

A crosstabulation between this three solution-question and the regular question normally asked in PSR’s surveys, on support and opposition to the two-state solution, reveals that more than three quarters of those who support the two-state solution in the regular question tend to favor that same solution in the three solution-question and the majority of those who oppose the two-state solution in the regular question tend to opt for “other” or refuse to answer when forced to choose a negotiated solution.

As shown in the figure below, the vast majority of those who supported the two-state solution in PSR’s regular June 2021 poll question (76%) gave their support to the two-state solution when forced to choose one of the three negotiated solutions, while 9% of them supported the one-state solution, and 6% supported the confederation solution. In other words, some of the supporters of the one state and the confederation solutions, in the three-solution question, were forced in the regular question (about support or opposition to that solution) to select that solution despite the fact that they preferred these two other solutions. By contrast, the majority (56%) of those opposed to the two-state solution in the regular PSR question opted to select “other” or refused to answer when asked to select one of the three negotiated solutions. Moreover, 5% of those opposed to the two-state solution preferred a one-state solution and 12% preferred the confederation solution. Nonetheless, 27% of those who expressed opposition to the two-state solution opted to select that solution when forced to choose one of three negotiated solutions. The reason why this might have happened has probably to do with the fact that while the regular question about the support and opposition to the two-state solution does not describe the borders of the Palestinian state while the three-solution question define that solution as one based on the 1967 borders.

Figure (8): Crosstabulation of support and opposition to the two-state solution “Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution” with support for the three negotiated solutions “Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

Linking Palestinian priorities to support for the two-state solution: AB8 finding that a slim majority of the Palestinians support the two-state solution, under the two conditions outlined above, i.e., when the borders of the Palestinian state are defined as those of 1967 and when respondents are forced to choose one of three negotiated solutions, is supported by other findings of that October survey. When asked to select the most vital Palestinian goal, 46% (50% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) selected the building of a Palestinian state along the lines of the 1967 while 32% selected the “right of return for the refugees,” 11% selected the establishment of a system with Palestinian rights and freedoms and another 11% selected the building of a pious religious society that applies Islamic teaching. In other words, the percentage of those prioritizing the Palestinian state and its democratic nature stands at 57%. As the figure below indicates, when the hierarchy of priorities is crosstabulated with the support for the various solutions, the greatest support for the two-state solution comes from those who prioritize Palestinian statehood followed by those who prioritized a system of rights and freedoms, 64% and 43% respectively.

Figure (9): Crosstabulation of the hierarchy of Palestinian priorities/goals “which in your view should be the first most important one most important goal that the Palestinian people should strive to achieve? with support for the three negotiated solutions “Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

Role of perception of Israeli discrimination against the Palestinians and the low level of support for the one-state solution: Finally, in the context of public attitudes toward the three negotiated solutions, it is worth looking into the reason for public reluctance to embrace the idea of “one state for Palestinians and Israeli Jews” when two other alternatives are offered, i.e., the two-state solution and the Palestinian-Israeli confederation. AB8 provides one possible explanation: when asked about the extent to which racial discrimination by Israelis against Palestinians exists today, 92% said yes, it does exist to a greater or medium extent while only 8% said it exists to a small extent or does not exist at all. As indicated earlier, this solution did not specify that it would be based on equal rights for the two national groups. Therefore, this concern about potential discrimination against Palestinians in a future one-state solution might have deterred respondents from selecting it. The figure below shows that the greater the extent of perceived discrimination, the smallest the support (8%) and the absence of perceived discrimination leads to the greatest level of support for that one state solution (24%).

Figure (10): Crosstabulation of perception of Israeli discrimination against Palestinians “To what extent do you believe racial discrimination by Israelis against Palestinians is a serious problem in the West Bank and Gaza? with support for the three negotiated solutions “Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

العربية

Critical Policy Brief, Number 2/2023

June 2023

The Road to Collision: a Weak Palestinian Authority and a New National-Religious Israel

Khaili Shikaki

This moment might prove to be a turning point in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, perhaps as important as the one that unfolded 30 years ago and became known as the Oslo process. While it is difficult to assess the future outcome of the current dynamics, it does not look good for Palestine or Israel.

The near future will be shaped by the collision of two developments, one Palestinian and one Israeli. On the Palestinian side, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has now reached the point where it can no longer fully meet Israel’s security expectations in ensuring a “monopoly” over coercive force in areas under its control. This development is currently evident in the formation of armed groups led by young Palestinians in cities and refugee camps, most prominently in the northern part of the West Bank. On top of that, Palestinians strongly believe that it was the costs imposed on Israel during the first and second intifadas that convinced it to view a Palestinian state as an Israeli national interest. It is this belief in the utility of force that is now fueling the rise of armed groups in the West Bank.

On the Israeli side, a “New Israel” is emerging, one characterized by a national-religious ideology eager to push away the Secular Israel that Palestinians have known during most of the past 30 years of the Oslo agreement and assert Israel’s permanent control over the West Bank. The formation of the current Israeli right wing and extreme government, dominated for the first time in Israel’s history by mostly religious and national-religious political parties, is the clearest sign to date of the second development. In the “New Israel,” the national-religious coalition seems to take the Palestinian-Israeli conflict back to its existential roots.

This paper explores the conditions that have led to the current developments in Israel and Palestine, conditions that might lead to the anticipated collision, and how Palestinians and Israelis might be able to avert it. In the scenario of collision, the PA continues to lose legitimacy and the trust of its own people. It is weakened further by Israeli punitive measures and increased military incursions into the Palestinian territories. The combined effect could lead to reduced PA law enforcement capacity thereby generating increased security vacuum in parts of the West Bank and the resultant formation of new Palestinian armed groups willing to challenge both the PA security forces and those of Israel. As the Israeli army seeks to fill the vacuum, it further weakens the PA leading to a vicious cycle of violence and bloodshed. Last year was the most violent in Palestinian-Israeli relations since the end of the second intifada. The number of armed clashes [1] with the Israeli army has increased at least three times compared to 2021. Palestinian deaths in the West Bank alone stood at 146, the highest since 2005 [2]. Israeli deaths stood at 31, the highest since 2008 [3]. Settlers’ violent incidents against Palestinians stood in 2022 at 755 compared to 496 in 2021 and 358 in 2020.

Conditions could further escalate if in the midst of this cycle, Abbas becomes marginal or even departs the scene. The most probable outcome in this scenario, is increased anarchy in the West Bank that could be followed by an Israeli return to the reoccupation of parts or all of the occupied territories, as it did in 2002 in the midst of the second intifada. To avoid this outcome the PA needs to restore its legitimacy. Despite the low probability of this outcome under the current Palestinian leadership, the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections is the most critical and urgent remedial step without which the current dynamics cannot be stopped or mitigated. For Israel, the most critical measure is to restore the viability of the two-state solution, a step the current Israeli government cannot take, which means only dramatic Palestinian action or external pressure can slow down the gradual demise of the two-state solution.

Four features

Without Palestinian elections and the reversal of Israel’s efforts to consolidate its occupation and make it permanent, the next step in the escalatory process will most likely be the reoccupation of all or parts of West Bank urban areas. Given Israel’s experience with the 2002 reoccupation of the West Bank, the decision to do so in the near future might not be seen as too risky.

But the conditions that might be triggered by this anticipated Israeli reoccupation might be different than those prevailing back then in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian urban areas. Four main features of the current reality explain the difference between this scenario and that of 2002. The first is that the PA back then was still enjoying considerable legitimacy and support and was therefore able to maintain its capacity and restore control once the Israeli army pulled out. By contrast, the current PA, depending on the prevailing Palestinian domestic conditions during the reoccupation, might be deprived, partly or completely, of that capacity thus compelling the Israeli army to stay longer.

Secondly, while the Israeli governing coalition in 2002 was not at all interested in annexing, or even fully controlling, the entire West Bank, the current one is at least open to the idea of keeping its army in place or even annexing large parts of the West Bank. A new Palestinian-Israeli order would thereby be created, one that would replace the currently dying order created by the Oslo process.

Thirdly, in 2002 the international community, led by the US and the Quartet, made up of the US, Russia, the EU, and the UN, were still deeply involved in the Middle East and were willing to step in and provide a “Performance-based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” That plan provided for a political process out of the raging violence. Under current conditions, particularly given the US withdrawal from the Middle East, the US and the international community are not likely to play any tangible role. The current efforts led by the US, Jordan, and Egypt to facilitate a Palestinian-Israeli de-escalation, as in the meetings in Aqaba and Sharm al Sheikh [4], seem too little too late to make a dent on the current escalatory dynamics.

Fourthly, while the Arab World was willing at that time to come together in an unprecedented manner and offer Israel its Arab Peace Initiative (API), a Saudi initiative that offered to permanently end the Arab-Israeli conflict that was endorsed by the Beirut Arab Summit in 2002, the Arab world is now much less interested in the Palestinian issue. Instead, it is focused on the regional threat of Iran. The Abraham Accords have shattered the API and contradicted its logic by offering Israel peace with Arab countries without necessarily ending its occupation or allowing the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. While these accords might not expand under current conditions, it is highly unlikely that Israel or its Arab normalization partners would be interested in making the Palestinian-Israeli peace central to their efforts. The Negev Forum that joins these normalizers with Israel in facilitating economic and security cooperation already excludes the Palestinians. Even if the PA is invited to join the forum, it will find it impossible to do so in the absence of a commitment to restore Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on the basis of API, a condition that will most likely be rejected by Israel and the Arab normalizers. The end result is that the PA will continue to be unable to find the means to regain Arab political or financial support

As these two developments described above begin to collide, US efforts, and those of the rest of the international community and the main regional Arab players, are currently restricted to encouraging de-escalation. These efforts are not interested in addressing the dynamics that have gradually generated the new developments. They will therefore fail. It is true that all international players seem to endorse the two-state solution that leads to the creation of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel. But no one is willing to take effective measures to make it a reality; the support, therefore, is empty rhetoric.

To understand the reason behind the expectations of failure, one needs to understand the nature of the dynamics that produced the two developments: what brought us to this point, and the long-term implications.

The birth of the “New Israel”

What characterizes the New Israel in addition to the dominance of religious-nationalist forces is the rejection of the two-state solution and any engagement with the Palestinians in peace negotiations based on that solution. It is also characterized by a de facto creeping annexation, one that is gaining momentum driven by policies of the new government and that will soon be further facilitated by the weakening of the Israeli judiciary. The religious agenda of New Israel could undermine and eventually destroy the status que in holy places in Jerusalem. The New Israel is showing greater determination to impose punitive measures against the PA due to the latter’s international campaign against Israel. In February 2023, the new Israeli finance minister doubled the amount of the Palestinian monthly custom revenues Israel normally withholds, by directing an additional $40 million to the families of Israeli victims of Palestinian attacks in a punitive measure against the PA’s international campaign against Israel.[5] In doing so, the minister, Bezalel Smotrich, leader of the Religious Zionist Party, made it clear that he has no interest in the continued existence of the PA. The inevitable outcome is that the current weakening of the PA will accelerate.

Three external factors contributed to the current development over a period of almost 15 years, giving Israel’s right wing and national-religious extremism room to grow and rule. The first was the failure of the US to use leverage on the newly created right-center coalition government led by Netanyahu in 2009, when the Palestinian leadership was still enjoying popular legitimacy and hence was still capable of making peace. The Obama Administration did pressure Israel to freeze settlement construction, but it did nothing to press Netanyahu to continue the so-called Annapolis process that was initiated more than a year earlier by the Bush Administration. In the contest between Obama and the Israeli prime minister, it was Netanyahu who managed to demonstrate that Israel had at least parity in the bilateral relations and that Israel, in fact, had significant leverage over the US administration.

Then came the perception of invincibility. Donald Trump’s four years in office gave Israel’s right-wing polity and public the perception that their state can do whatever it wants without regard to international law or the most vital interests of the Palestinians. By mid-2020, support among Israeli Jews for the annexation of parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley, exceeded half, standing at more than 70%[6] among right wing voters. Support for the two-state solution among Israeli Jews dropped from 51% in mid-2016, before Trump took office, to 42% by August 2020, just before the end of the Trump term in office; a 9-point drop[7].

Then came the greatest temptation. Before Trump left office, Arab regional players, pushed by perceived regional threats and pulled by Israeli successes and Palestinian impotence, rewarded Israel with normalization of security and economic relations. Why make concessions to the Palestinians if the fruits of Arab-Israeli peace can be gained without having to pay a price. Arab normalization contributed to the ongoing weakening of secular Israel and the empowerment of the national-religious one. After two years of Arab normalization, by December 2022, Israeli Jewish support for the two-state solution dropped further to just one third; another 8-point drop in just two years, and just 14% among right wing voters. Support for a single state in entire area of historic Palestine where Jews enjoy full rights and Palestinians enjoy partial rights received more support than the support for the two-state solution, 37% and 34%[8] respectively.

Domestically, in addition to the gradual shift to the right in Israeli political life, a process that started in 1977, perhaps the first and most critical contribution to the making of national-religious Israel was the trend that started in 2009 and consolidated in 2015, by which religious and extreme national-religious groups, allied themselves in government coalitions solely to Netanyahu and his right-wing Likud party. To take full advantage of his coalition making gains, the secular Netanyahu needed to appease and legitimize the most extreme fringe thus making them mainstream. In 2022, he made efforts to help small extremist parties to join forces, most importantly those represented in the electoral list of Religious Zionism and its allies from Otzma Yehudit and Noam party, so that all of them would be able to pass the electoral threshold. Then came Netanyahu’s personal legal problems. His corruption trial forced him in late 2022 to form a coalition with only those who could allow him to restructure the Israeli judiciary and weaken its independence.

Given these developments, it goes without saying that the current national-religious Israel can be expected to only take additional measures that would accelerate the demise of the two-state solution rather than saving it. To save it, the Palestinian leadership would have to prepared to take confrontational measures that could risk the collapse of the PA, a step the current leadership will most likely insist on avoiding. Alternatively, the PA leadership could seek Arab and international support for steps that might make it more difficult for national-religious Israel to completely destroy what remains of the two-state solution. With US and EU support, it could coordinate its own policy with the Arab countries interested in normalizing relations with Israel, such as Saudi Arabia and others. Additional normalization could be conditioned on concrete Israeli quid pro quo, such as an Israeli withdrawal from most of area C, greater PA jurisdiction in areas of its current control, opening area C for Palestinian economic activities, and the construction of a PA-controlled corridor linking the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. None of these measures will be acceptable to the current Israeli government without a strong and unified Arab and international stand, highly unlikely under current conditions and the lack of focus on the Palestinian-Israeli issue.

Palestinian failures

What characterizes Palestinian recent developments in addition to the growing inability to maintain monopoly over coercive force is an inability to organize elections or reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the absence of a peace process, Palestinian-Israeli relations became hostile. The main venue for PA confrontation with Israel has been international institutions. This confrontation is costly, mostly due to the fact that it is asymmetric; the PA has little leverage over Israel while Israel can punitively impose financial costs on it by denying the Palestinians resources and economic opportunities.

What made the PA so weak that it cannot ensure monopoly over force? The answer lies in its loss of legitimacy, electoral and non-electoral. The term of the president ended in 2010. He ruled for 13 years without a popular mandate. For all these years the PA president has prevented the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections. As a result, public trust in the PA government declined from 68% when it was first elected in 2006 to 27% by the end of 2021. Perception that corruption exists in the PA institutions went as high as 86% for most of the past decade. During the same period, the vast majority of Palestinians demanded the resignation of president Abbas [9]; demand for his resignation stands today at 80%. Palestinians now view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people; a majority views its continued existence as serving the interests of Israel and views its dissolution or collapse [10] as serving the interest of the Palestinian people.

This PA failure came mostly from its own internal dynamics. In the past decade, the PA in the West Bank has taken several measures that have severely undermined good governance and eliminated any meaningful accountability in the political system. Four areas have been severely damaged: the separation of power, the independence of the judiciary, the independence and pluralism of civil society and its organizations, and the media and freedom of expression. Without general elections since 2006, the damage inflicted in these four areas was destructive: the parliament was dissolved, rule of law has been sacrificed, the judiciary has been weakened and its independence damaged, media freedoms have been highly curtailed, and the space for civil society has significantly shrunk as its organizations lost much of its independence from the government.

It should be pointed out that, as the case with Israel, external factors were also critical. With little or no attention from the international community, the PA had over the last decade, particularly since the Arab Spring, become bolder in ignoring its own Basic Law and rule of law while seeking to strengthen the power of the presidency and the executive as a whole and to weaken all opposition, including that of civil society. Fearing Islamism, terrorism, and civil wars, the international community seemed much less interested in Palestinian good governance. A post Arab Spring a focus on stability was replacing the traditional agenda of democracy and good governance.

Nonetheless, Palestinian authoritarianism is home grown. As early as 2007, when Hamas violently took over control over the Gaza Strip, the early seeds of authoritarianism in Palestinian politics were planted. It led the PA under Abbas to take immediate measures that sacrificed constitutional requirements and rule of law. Internal rivalry inside Fatah came next, leading to a power struggle in which further damage to rule of law, freedom of speech, and pluralism in civil society was easily done. The reason it was easy can only be explained by the non-democratic nature of the ruling Palestinian elite. Only few of the members of the secular nationalist elite and almost none of the Islamist elite are truly democratic. Without the brakes normally found among democrats, the senior Palestinian bureaucracy in the executive branch found itself free of any meaningful oversight or accountability. Without restrictions on its ability to rule as it saw fit, members of the PA leadership, most importantly the president and his ministers, found it easier to rule without being bothered by a parliament, courts, civil society, or the media.

The PA will almost certainly not embrace a strong or decisive stance in confronting the new national-religious Israel, such as forging a national consensus on a one-state solution, leading a large-scale peaceful popular resistance campaign, or adopting an armed defense strategy in areas under its control. Similarly, holding elections under current conditions might also be out of the question. If so, perhaps steps should be taken to slow down or reverse the authoritarian measures the PA has taken during the past decade. With Arab and international support, efforts could be made to form a national unity government with Hamas and other opposition groups that could reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Short of holding elections, four tasks might be entrusted in the new government. It could adopt a legislative agenda that seeks to amend existing presidential decrees to make them consistent with the Palestinian Basic Law. The restoration of a truly independent judiciary could be a second vital measure for the national unity government. That government could also remove current debilitating restrictions on civil society and the media allowing them to prosper and regain the strength and vitality they had lost during the past decade. Finally, the national unity government could restore liberties and respect for human rights and put an end to the excesses of the security services and bring those services to accountability. While these measures might not be sufficient to restore full legitimacy to the PA and its leadership, it could help to restore some of the lost trust in public institutions and allow the PA to regain the initiative thereby giving it the courage to make difficult decisions.

Where to?

The dynamics described above might usher in a new era in Palestinian-Israeli relations. With the prospects for peace based on a two-state solution coming to an end, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict enters a new phase, one in which partition of the land might no longer an option. With that comes the end of diplomacy and negotiations. Attention of the actors now shifts to other means of resolving the conflict. For the Israelis, this means consolidated settlements construction and domestic legal steps to change the status quo regarding control and sovereignty over the land and the holy places. For the Palestinians, it could mean a return to the use of force.

The PA and the international community will find it difficult to acknowledge this reality. Nonetheless, they are not stupid; they just have no viable alternative. The PA is interested in survival and continued donor support. For that, it is highly dependent on Israel and therefore cannot directly challenge it. Instead of taking effective concrete measures of its own to shape conditions on the ground and counter the punitive measures of the new Israel, it is content with calling upon the international community do so. Thus, it is faced with navigating its conflicting interests at a time when it is at a historically low point in terms of legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of its own public. As it becomes weaker the prospects for a violent conflict with Israel increases.

The US and the rest of the international community cannot but realize that the process that is now ongoing can only end in the demise of the two-state solution. Nonetheless, they are unwilling to take the only effective measures to force Israel and the PA to turn away from the path of folly: elections for the Palestinians and a commitment, in words and deeds, to the two-state solution for Israel.

[1] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/26/why-israeli-raids-killed-many-p...

[2] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/29/palestinians-killed-west...

[3] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-palestine-number-killed-highes...

[4] https://www.state.gov/joint-communique-from-the-march-19-meeting-in-shar...

[5] https://www.timesofisrael.com/withholding-millions-from-pa-smotrich-says...

[6] https://en.idi.org.il/articles/31539

[7] http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/823

[8] http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/928

[9] http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/940

[10] https://pcpsr.org/en/node/938

العربية |

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ARAB BAROMETER 9 in Palestine

26 January 2026
Report I: Governance and the Domestic Balance of Power after Two Years of War on the Gaza Strip

Gaza War reshaped Palestinian society: priorities shifted from growth to basic services; trust mixed but satisfaction fell; civil liberties eroded. Public still values democracy yet increasingly favors a strong leader who can deliver stability. Politically, Fatah's support has collapsed, while Hamas has maintained its base, but the largest group is the politically alienated. Social norms grew more conservative. This landscape signals a deep crisis of governance and a public desire for new leadership.
8-26 October 2025

These are summary findings from the latest round of the Arab Barometer survey in Palestine, the ninth since these surveys began in the Arab world nearly twenty years ago. The survey was conducted by the institute for Polling and Survey Research West Bank and Gaza Strip during 8–26 October 2025.

The period preceding the survey witnessed several important developments, including the continuation of the war on the Gaza Strip until a ceasefire was reached two days after fieldwork began. In the West Bank, settler violence and terror continued against vulnerable, unprotected Palestinian towns without intervention by either the Palestinian or Israeli police to stop these assaults—indeed with complicity and even encouragement in some cases from the Israeli government and with the army providing protection to settlers only. The Israeli army enforced closures on Palestinian areas and restricted Palestinians’ access to main roads in the West Bank.

The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip came as part of what is known as the 20‑point Trump Plan, which made no reference to the situation in the West Bank. The period before fieldwork also saw a sharp decline in government services due to Israeli punitive measures against the Palestinian Authority (PA), including the seizure of clearance revenues, which forced the PA to pay only a portion of public‑sector salaries and curtailed its ability to provide many basic services. Israel also imposed stringent conditions, demanding “reforms” rejected by Palestinian public opinion—such as amending school curricula and halting payments to the families of prisoners and martyrs.

This first report on the results of the ninth Arab Barometer (AB9) survey in Palestine addresses two important issues: governance and the internal balance of power in the Palestinian territories. Subsequent reports will cover other aspects of the findings, such as conditions in the Gaza Strip, peace, and international relations. Although the focus here is on AB9 findings regarding these two topics, the report compares them to those of the previous AB survey conducted two years earlier.

It should be noted that most governance‑related topics in this report were not asked in the Gaza Strip due to the war conditions; in Gaza the focus was on living and humanitarian conditions and other topics related to the Gaza war.

Methodology:

Interviews for AB9 were conducted face‑to‑face between 8 and 26 October 2025 with a random sample of 1,655 adults across 160 residential localities in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem. The sample size was 855 in the Gaza Strip and 800 in the West Bank, in 80 locations in each; the margin of error was ±3%. All West Bank interviews were conducted in “counting areas,” as defined by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. In the Gaza Strip, interviews were held in 33 counting areas; the remainder were conducted in a representative sample of shelters, built-up and tent shelters, selected by systematic random selection, with quotas to represent areas destroyed by the war or those that were not safely accessible because they were under Israeli military occupation.

For comparison, this report cites another survey conducted in late September/early October 2023—i.e., just before October 7 of that year—the eighth Arab Barometer (AB8) survey. The Palestine reports for that survey can be found here:
ARAB BAROMETER 8 in Palestine | PCPSR

ARAB BAROMETER 8 in Palestine | PCPSR

Main Findings:

A Society in Transition: Palestinian Public Opinion Before and After October 7

This first report of AB9 in Palestine examines governance under the PA, as well as the internal balance of power. A comparative analysis of the two Barometer surveys conducted in Palestine—on the eve of the October 7, 2023 attack (AB8) and two years later in October 2025 (AB9)—reveals a society profoundly reshaped by war, trauma, and political disappointment. The results portray a public whose immediate priorities shifted from the economy to survival; whose trust in institutions changed selectively; and whose views on governance, democracy, and leadership hardened in response to a harsh new reality. Comparing AB8 and AB9 provides a data‑driven narrative of a Palestinian society transformed by the shock of war. The period between the eve of October 7, 2023 and October 2025 was a rupture: it accelerated some pre‑existing trends and generated entirely new social and political dynamics. The data point to four key insights into this new reality.

First, the war reshaped public priorities: The Gaza war changed Palestinian public priorities, not only in the Gaza Strip—as a later report will show—but also in the West Bank. Before the war, Palestinians, like many publics, prioritized long‑term economic development. AB8 data showed the economy as the dominant concern. AB9 reveals a notable shift: as life itself came under threat, the public re‑prioritized basic needs—education and health. In the West Bank, demand for education and health care rose while concern with economic development receded: the percentage of those prioritizing education increased from 25% to 30%. This is not merely a change of opinion; it reflects a society grappling with existential fears—an indicator of a population in survival mode, where the building blocks of a functioning future take precedence over abstract economic growth. This foundational shift explains why, despite a rise in trust in some institutions, satisfaction with government performance collapsed precisely in these sectors. Public demand for basic services has become existential, and the PA is failing to meet it. While trust in some government institutions rose slightly, satisfaction with government performance actually fell—particularly in the vital education and health sectors. The public remains highly pessimistic about the PA’s ability to address core challenges like unemployment, price inflation, and security. Meanwhile, the desire to emigrate is growing, driven by a potent mix of economic despair, security fears, and political hopelessness.

Second, the public sits in a deep governance paradox: it yearns for democracy yet is increasingly willing to accept authoritarianism in exchange for stability. Politically, the Gaza war sparked a large increase in public interest in politics—from 29% to 39%—as Palestinians confront existential questions about their future. Yet this heightened interest is accompanied by a bleak assessment of civil liberties: beliefs that freedom of expression and the right to protest are guaranteed collapsed, with only 16% and 13% respectively feeling these rights are protected. This has fueled a desire for faster, more decisive reform, even as a cautious majority still prefers gradualism. Despite these pressures, baseline attitudes toward democracy remain surprisingly stable: both waves show strong, steady, and principled support for democracy as the best system of governance—60% still hold this view. However, the war exposed a deep pragmatism born of despair. While Palestinians value democracy in principle, an increasing majority now prioritizes a strong leader (51%, up from 41%) who can deliver economic stability and impose order, even at democracy’s expense. This shift is reflected in the public’s deteriorating view of Western democracies, with a sharp drop in confidence in the American and German models. Although the principled preference remains, lived experience since October 7—of chaos, violence, and institutional collapse—has severely eroded confidence in democratic practice. The sharp rise in support for a “strong leader” and the prevalent belief that order and economic stability outweigh the type of political system are the clearest indicators. Palestinians have not abandoned democratic rights—as evidenced by anger over declining civil liberties—but they have lost faith in any democratic process’s capacity to rescue them from the current crisis. This has opened a dangerous window for a form of “authoritarian pragmatism.”

Third, the internal political map has been redrawn—but not in the way many outside observers might expect: the immediate outcome is not increased support for Hamas, but rather a catastrophic collapse of Fatah and PA legitimacy in the West Bank. Fatah’s voter base has nearly halved, an indictment of its inaction and loss of initiative during the war. Fatah’s support in the West Bank has collapsed—from 23% to 14%—while Hamas’s support remained relatively stable and even dipped slightly in Gaza, where it maintained its core base, leaving it a permanent actor that cannot be ignored in any future political arrangement. The real “winner,” however, is deep, broad political alienation: over half of the population refuses to align with or identify with any faction. In a hypothetical presidential election, imprisoned Fatah figure Marwan Barghouti remains the frontrunner, clearly outpacing both Hamas’s Khaled Mishal and the incumbent President Mahmoud Abbas. Barghouti’s sustained popularity is crucial: he is not merely a Fatah leader; he symbolizes a different politics—combining resistance with a vision of unity and clean governance. His continued lead in presidential polling across both waves confirms that the public seeks a leader who can transcend the failed models of both the PA and Hamas.

Fourth, the war appears to have triggered a social retrenchment toward more conservative, traditional norms, especially regarding gender roles: Along with religiosity remaining high, there is a notable increase in support for traditional gender roles: 75% now agree that men are better suited as political leaders—up sharply from 63% two years ago. This suggests societal retrenchment in response to instability and deep crisis. The sharp rise in the belief that men are better political leaders is a significant, troubling development. In times of acute crisis and social collapse, societies often revert to traditional hierarchies and patriarchal structures as imagined sources of order and stability. This finding indicates that the shock of war has not only reshaped Palestinian politics but has also begun to undo some social progress achieved in previous years, with long‑term implications for women’s rights and participation in public life.

In short, Palestine in late 2025 is a society scarred by loss, defined by disappointment, grappling with fundamental questions about its future. The public is more politically engaged but feels less free; desires democracy but longs for stability; and is deeply alienated from its current political leadership. These Arab Barometer findings do not point to an imminent solution or a clear path forward, but they paint a vivid portrait of a people at a historic crossroads, forced to navigate a landscape in which many old certainties have been swept away.

1) Media

The war reshaped media consumption habits. While social media remains a primary news source for 60% of Palestinians, its dominance has fallen from 74% in 2023. Television, by contrast, has made a dramatic comeback, with 35% now relying on it as a main news source, up from just 17%—likely due to the war in Gaza and daily TV coverage. Al Jazeera remains overwhelmingly the dominant and most trusted news outlet, cited by 85% of respondents as their top source of news.

2) Public Priorities, Trust in Institutions, and Satisfaction with Government and Service Delivery:

Priorities: The Gaza war altered some public priorities in the West Bank. Before the conflict, economic concerns were paramount: in AB8, 25% of West Bankers cited economic development as their top priority. By AB9, economic development is no longer the top priority, standing today at 23%, as it is overtaken by a rise in the prioritization of education (up from 25% to 30%) and health (from 13% to 15%). This shift reflects a society grappling with disruption and anxiety, in which the core pillars of social well‑being take precedence over long‑term economic growth.

Trust in government: Paradoxically, even as daily life became more dangerous, trust in some public institutions—including the government—saw increases, albeit modest in some cases. This may reflect a “rally around the flag” effect during a national crisis. Seventy‑one percent say they distrust or trust the Palestinian government only a little, while just 25% say they have trust or great trust—an eight‑point increase from 17% two years earlier (AB8).

When West Bank residents were asked about trust in the PA government in the West Bank, 23% said they trust it and 76% said they do not (vs. 19% and 76% respectively two years earlier). When Gaza Strip residents in AB9 were asked about trust in the Gaza government (i.e., Hamas’s government), 32% said they trust it and 67% said they do not.

Trust in the PA president: In the West Bank, distrust of the PA president rose by five points to 77%, while trust fell from 22% in AB8 to 19% in AB9.

Trust in the police and National Security Forces: In the West Bank, trust in the Palestinian police rose to 47% (from 38% two years ago), while distrust stands at 53% (down from 58%). Notably, distrust of the National Security Forces is higher than distrust of the police—an unusual change from two years ago, when distrust levels were identical. The likely reason is the heightened sense of threat from Israeli settlers and the public perception that the National Security Forces are not protecting them from this threat, despite the forces’ raison d’être and the significant resources allocated to them—compared to the police, which are responsible for crime prevention. Nonetheless, perhaps due to growing fear of external threats, trust in the National Security Forces in the West Bank is 39% (up five points), and distrust is 58% (unchanged from AB8). Two years ago, trust stood at 34%.

Perception of safety: AB9 shows a clear rise in feelings of insecurity. In AB8, when West Bankers were asked about safety in their area or neighborhood, 74% said their area was very or somewhat safe, while only 26% said it was unsafe. AB9 found that the sense of safety has dropped to 58%, while the sense of insecurity has risen to 42%.

Trust in the courts and judiciary: Sixty‑three percent of Palestinians express distrust in the courts and judiciary, while 34% express trust. Two years earlier, just 27% said they trusted the courts and legal system.

Trust in civil society: Trust in civil society organizations rose to 38% in AB9, up from 27% in AB8 (2023). Fifty‑nine percent say they do not trust CSOs.

Trust in religious leaders: Trust in religious leaders stands at 25%, a six‑point increase over AB8 (2023). In AB9, 71% express distrust in religious leaders.

Trust in Hamas: AB9 indicates a huge increase in trust in Hamas—from 18% in AB8 to 46% in AB9. Forty‑three percent say they do not trust Hamas.

Trust in aid and service institutions in Gaza: We asked Gaza residents about their trust in three institutions: UNRWA, the Red Crescent, and the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. Trust in UNRWA stands at 75%; in the Red Cross at 66%; and in the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation at 22%.

Satisfaction with government performance: We asked the Palestinian public in the West Bank about satisfaction with overall government performance and with specific sectors such as the education system, health care, garbage collection, electricity provision, and water supply. Despite nominal increases in trust in public institutions, AB9 found a decline in overall satisfaction. Satisfaction with government performance fell slightly from 32% to 29%, with a catastrophic collapse in satisfaction with the education system (from 44% to 21%). The public remains highly pessimistic about the PA’s ability to address core challenges such as unemployment (13% satisfied), narrowing the gap between rich and poor (14%), or reducing prices (11%).
• Overall satisfaction with government performance is 29%, and dissatisfaction 69%—a three‑point decline in satisfaction compared to AB8.

• Satisfaction with the education system is 21%, dissatisfaction 78%—a 23‑point drop in satisfaction compared to AB8 (2023).

• Satisfaction with the health care system is 47%, dissatisfaction 53%—a six‑point decline in satisfaction from AB8.

• Satisfaction with garbage collection is 70%, dissatisfaction 30%—an 18‑point increase in satisfaction compared to AB8.

• Satisfaction with electricity provision is 76% (dissatisfaction 24%); satisfaction with water availability is 47% (dissatisfaction 52%).

Assessment of government performance: We asked West Bank Palestinians to assess government performance in three areas: providing security, narrowing the rich‑poor gap, and keeping prices low:
• Positive assessment (“good” or “very good”) for providing security is 31%; negative assessment (“bad” or “very bad”) is 67%—a two‑point drop in positive assessment compared to AB8 (2023).

• Positive assessment for narrowing the gap between rich and poor is 14%; negative 80%—a two‑point increase in positive assessment from AB8 (2023).

• Positive assessment for “keeping prices low” is 11%; negative 89%—a four‑point rise in positive assessment compared to AB7.

Government responsiveness: We asked West Bank residents how responsive the government is to people’s demands. Only 17% believe the government is very or largely responsive; 81% say it is not very or not at all responsive. These views are similar to AB8 when 16% said the government was responsive and 83% said it was not.

3) Perceptions of Corruption and Government Anti Corruption Efforts

An overwhelming majority of West Bank Palestinians (87%) believe there is corruption in PA institutions—either to a great extent (62%) or to some extent (24%). Five percent say it exists to a small extent, and 4% say it does not exist at all. These results are lower than in AB8, when 94% of West Bank Palestinians believed there was corruption in PA institutions—either to a great extent (67%) or to some extent (27%)—and slightly lower than AB7 (2021).

We also asked about the extent of government efforts to combat corruption. Sixty‑nine percent believe the government is not fighting corruption at all or is doing so only to a small extent (44% “not at all,” 25% “to a small extent”). By contrast, 29% believe it is fighting corruption (5% “to a great extent,” 24% “to a moderate extent”). In 2023, 64% believed the government was not fighting corruption or only to a small extent, and 35% believed it was (12% “great extent,” 23% “moderate”)—a six‑point decline in the percentage of those who think the PA is combating corruption.

4) Political Participation, Freedoms, Democracy, Migration, and Social Attitudes

The war on the Gaza Strip led to a notable increase in public interest in politics—from 28% to 39%. Yet this increased interest is accompanied by a bleak assessment of civil liberties under the PA: the share believing freedom of expression is guaranteed fell from 27% to 16%, and the share believing the right to participate in demonstrations is guaranteed fell from 25% to 13%. This has fueled a desire for faster, more decisive reform, with the share preferring immediate, one‑off reforms rather than gradual reforms rising from 32% to 38%.

This has likely contributed to a growing sense of despair. Despair is evident in the desire to emigrate: a quarter of West Bank residents (24%) now consider leaving Palestine, driven primarily by economic reasons (71%), security (38%), and politics (37%)—all notably more prominent since 2023 when only 21% expressed a desire to emigrate.

Despite these pressures, baseline attitudes toward democracy remain surprisingly stable: 60% still see it as the best system of governance. However, the war has revealed a deep‑seated pragmatism born of despair. While Palestinians value democracy in principle, a slim majority now supports a strong leader (51%, up from 41%) who can deliver stability and order, even at the expense of democratic practice. This is reinforced by the belief of 68% that the nature of the political system does not matter so long as the government is able to solve economic problems. The war has also worsened views of Western democracies, with positive evaluations of American democracy falling from 57% to 42% and of German democracy from 56% to 42%.

The war has also left its mark on socio‑religious attitudes. While overall religiosity remains high and largely stable, there is a marked shift toward more conservative gender norms. The percentage of those who agree that men are better suited as political leaders rose from 63% to 75%. Similarly, the share who believe men should have the final say in family matters rose from 44% to 57%. This signals a societal shift toward traditional patriarchal structures in response to instability and deep crisis.

5) Leadership and the Domestic Balance of Power

We examined the domestic balance of power among Palestinian political parties in three ways: support for different political leaders, party support, and parliamentary voting behavior.

Presidential elections: To gauge the popularity of Palestinian figures, we asked about voting intentions in a hypothetical race among the incumbent President Mahmoud Abbas and the two most popular and well‑known rivals: Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti and Hamas’s Khaled Mishal. The question on leaders’ popularity was restricted to the Gaza Strip and was not asked in the West Bank, which typically tends to support Marwan Barghouti and reject President Abbas. In a hypothetical presidential election, Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti remains the frontrunner in the Gaza Strip, with 30% of the vote, followed by Hamas’s Khaled Mishal (22%), while the incumbent Mahmoud Abbas trails far behind at 13%. These figures do not differ significantly from 2023, indicating that Barghouti’s standing as a symbol of resistance and unity transcends the immediate political aftershocks of the war—even though he, like Abbas, is a Fatah leader at a time when Fatah’s popularity has collapsed, as discussed below. Thirty‑four percent say they would not participate in such an election. In AB8, the results were 32% for Barghouti, 24% for Hamas’s then‑candidate Ismail Haniyeh, and 12% for Abbas.

Factional support: The party support question was restricted to the West Bank and not asked in Gaza. When asked “Which party is closest to you?”, respondents chose Fatah at 18% (vs. 30% before the war in AB8), Hamas at 24% (vs. 17% before the war), third powers at 7% (vs. 6% before), while a slim majority of 51% (vs. 47% before) chose “none of the above.”

Two years of war reshaped the internal political scene. Fatah’s support in the West Bank collapsed, with its electoral base falling from 23% in the eighth wave to just 14% in the ninth. By contrast, Hamas’s support in the West Bank increased, with 17% of voters now backing it (up from 9%). Notably, support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip saw a slight decline from 24% to 22%. A slim majority of Palestinians (51%) do not identify with any party, indicating deep alienation from the established political factions.

Parliamentary elections: AB9 examined voting behavior in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—how respondents would vote in new legislative elections in each area. The results show that the Fatah vote share is 16% (14% in the West Bank, 19% in the Gaza Strip), compared to 24% in AB8 two years earlier; the “Change and Reform” list (Hamas) stands at just 19% (17% in the West Bank, 22% in Gaza). Ten percent would vote for third parties that competed in the last legislative elections in 2006, and 14% would vote for none of the competing parties.

The reason the Fatah and Hamas vote shares are lower than the simple party support figures cited above is that a large number of respondents refuse to participate in elections. Non‑participation in this survey stands at 41% (47% in the West Bank and 32% in Gaza). In other words, the survey found that 55% of the overall public either refused to vote or chose “none of the above.” When voting is limited to those who would actually participate, Fatah’s share rises to 27% (25% in the West Bank, 28% in Gaza), Hamas’s to 33% (33% in the West Bank, 32% in Gaza), and the undecided—or those who chose “none of the above”—to 24%.

Notably, among likely voters, Hamas’s vote share in AB9 is higher among those aged 30 and above (35%) compared to just 25% among 18–29‑year‑olds. By contrast, the undecided share among youth reaches 27%, while among older voters the third party and undecided shares are 15% and 23% respectively. Religiosity is a better indicator of intended voting patterns: Hamas support is 34% among the religious, 32% among the moderately religious, and 9% among the non‑religious. Fatah’s support is 25% among the religious, 28% among the moderately religious, and 43% among the non‑religious. Third party support is 21% among the religious, 12% among the moderately religious, and 18% among the non‑religious. The undecided are drawn primarily from the non‑religious and moderately religious, and lastly from the religious.

AB9: Demographic variables affecting electoral behavior.

Electoral lists	Men	Women	18-29	30 years and above	Religious	Somewhat religious	Unreligious
Fatah	30%	23%	26%	27%	25%	28%	43%
Change and Reform (Hamas)	30%	36%	25%	35%	34%	32%	9%
Third parties	15%	19%	22%	15%	21%	12%	18%
Undecided	26%	22%	27%	23%	20%	28%	30%

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