Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (96)

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by PCPSR-Polling and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22-25 October 2025. The immediate period prior to the poll witnessed the announcement of the Trump Plan at the end of September followed by a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel based on that plan. Few days before the conduct of the poll interviews, Israeli hostages were and Palestinian hostages were released by Hamas and Israel respectively. Israel allowed humanitarian aid to enter the Gaza Strip and president Trump announced the end of the two-year Gaza War. Meanwhile, conditions in the West Bank continued to deteriorate due to increased settler violence. Settler attacks wreaked havoc on Palestinians during olive harvest which normally take place in October. The Israeli army evacuated tens of thousands of people from the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps and demolished dozens of buildings in those camps. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank also continued and entrances to most towns and villages were closed by the Israeli army in order to prevent residents from accessing main roads.

This poll covers all of the above issues as well as other issues such as domestic condition and the internal balance of power, the peace process and the alternatives available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted with residents in areas to the west, south and north of what came to be known as the “yellow line,” areas that were free of Israeli army presence. Residents of the areas that were under Israeli military occupation, such as Rafah, and parts of Northern Gaza, and Khanyounis, were interviewed in shelters.

This survey was conducted face-to-face in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip using tablets or phones. When each interview is completed, it is automatically sent directly to our server where only our researchers can access. There is no way for anyone to intercept or manipulate the collected data.

The sample size of this survey was 1200 people, of whom 760 were interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank (in 76 residential locations) and 440 in the Gaza Strip (in 44 locations).  Interviews in the Gaza Strip were conducted in 23 “counting areas,” or areas that existed before the war but were mostly destroyed. Residents of these “counting areas,” including those whose homes were completely or partially destroyed were interviewed either in their original homes or in tents erected between the rubbles of their homes. Residents of inaccessible areas, such as those of Rafah and most of Northern Gaza, were interviewed in 6 built-up shelters and 15 tent shelters.

The margin of error stands at +/-3.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Palestinian opinion on the Trump Plan is widely known and split: roughly seven in ten have heard of it, and when framed in Arab/Islamic terms support is near even, with Gazans much more favorable than West Bankers. Majorities back Hamas’s response yet draw a hard red line against disarming Hamas. Most doubt the plan will end the war or produce a state within five years; many expect renewed fighting, and nearly half anticipate Arab normalization even without statehood. Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about PA reforms. Palestinian public opinion reveals a profound crisis of confidence in the current leadership. Overwhelming dissatisfaction with President Abbas and a Palestinian Authority viewed as corrupt creates a leadership vacuum, filled by Fatah’s popular Marwan Barghouti in presidential polls, while Hamas consistently outpolls Fatah as a party. Regarding the October 7th war, majority support for Hamas’s decision to attack persists, even as expectations of its victory decline. However, a core, cross-regional red line remains: overwhelming opposition to disarming Hamas, complicating any post-war arrangement.  A stark divide separates the Palestinian territories: despite immense suffering, Gazans exhibit greater pragmatism, showing more openness to negotiated settlements and practical governance. Conversely, West Bankers are more skeptical of external plans and more supportive of armed struggle. Overall, deep skepticism about the viability of external peace plans prevails, alongside a strong public demand for internal legitimacy through elections and self-reliant security, reflecting deep distrust in both the PA and the Israeli army. This complex landscape suggests that any sustainable path forward must address the dual crises of Israeli occupation and internal leadership legitimacy.

The following is a summary of the main findings:

The Trump Plan: Awareness of the Trump Plan is high: more than 70% have heard of it; but Palestinian public opinion on the Plan is deeply ambivalent, shaped by its framing and a significant divide between the West Bank and Gaza. Presented with a favorable “Arab and Islamic” framing, the plan is nearly split (47% support vs. 49% opposition), yet this masks a stark regional difference: almost 60% of Gazans support the framed plan, while the same percentage of West Bankers oppose it.  Support is also higher among those aware of the plan (50% vs about 40% among the unaware of the plan). Despite this ambivalence toward the plan itself, there is strong majority support for Hamas’s response to it, coupled with high satisfaction with the prisoner exchange list Hamas secured. This support is linked to a core red line: about 70% of Palestinians, including almost 80% in the West Bank and 55% in Gaza, staunchly oppose the disarmament of Hamas, even as a condition to prevent the war’s return.

Overwhelming skepticism clouds the plan's long-term prospects. A vast majority (70%) does not believe it will lead to a Palestinian state within five years, and most (more than 60%) doubt it will permanently end the war. This pessimism is more pronounced in the West Bank, where residents are also more likely to expect the conflict to resume soon. Furthermore, nearly half believe the plan will facilitate Arab normalization with Israel even without a Palestinian state. While Gazans express some optimism that PA reforms could create a path to statehood, West Bankers remain largely unconvinced.

The Day After arrangements in the Gaza Strip: Palestinian opinion on "day after" governance in Gaza is deeply divided, revealing significant distrust in external plans and a strong preference for autonomous Palestinian control, though with notable regional differences. A slight majority opposes a committee of unaffiliated professionals managing Gaza under an international umbrella, as envisioned in the Trump Plan. However, this opposition flips to strong support from both West Bankers and Gazans when the proposal is framed as a Palestinian-led expert committee overseeing reconstruction with international support, omitting any mention of political non-affiliation.

There is minimal appetite for a return of direct Palestinian Authority (PA) control; only one-third of the public favors a scenario where the PA has full or shared governance. The idea of an armed Arab force entering Gaza to maintain security is overwhelmingly rejected by almost 70%, especially in the West Bank. Opposition softens somewhat, particularly in Gaza, if the force's mission is framed around border security and cooperation with local police, explicitly omitting the controversial goal of disarming Hamas. This highlights a core red line: any arrangement seen as undermining Palestinian arms is widely opposed. Finally, the prospect of the PA merely "coordinating" the work of an expert committee is met with majority opposition in the West Bank but finds majority support in Gaza, underscoring Gaza’s greater willingness to engage with pragmatic governance solutions.

October 7 and the Gaza War: Public opinion following the October 7th war reveals complex and evolving attitudes. Support for Hamas’s decision to launch the offensive, while declining from its peak, remains a majority at more than 50%, with recent gains in Gaza and sustained high support in the West Bank. Humanitarian conditions in Gaza present a stark contrast: while food access has significantly improved, a staggering 72% of Gazans report a family member has been killed or injured, and the vast majority have been displaced multiple times. Most Palestinians continue to blame Israel for this suffering, and a near-unanimous do not believe Hamas committed the atrocities against civilians depicted in international media.

Politically, expectations of a Hamas victory have fallen to about 40%, revealing a major split: West Bankers remain more optimistic, while a notable portion of Gazans, 3 in 10, now anticipate an Israeli win. This has not translated into a desire for capitulation, as an overwhelming majority opposes disarming Hamas to end the war, including 85% in the West Bank and 55% in Gaza. Satisfaction ratings reflect these dynamics, with Hamas (60%) enjoying far greater approval than President Abbas (about 20%). Regionally, Yemen’s Houthis are most popular, then Qatar, Hezbollah, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Internationally, China comes first followed by Russia, Spain, France, UK, and finally the US or President Trump.

Domestic conditions: A profound sense of insecurity pervades the West Bank, where 85% of residents feel unsafe—a dramatic decline from about half two years prior. This is compounded by a widespread belief that the PA institutions are corrupt.  Recent dismissals—of the transportation minister accused of bribery and the Director General of Crossings and Borders—do not convince most; more than half say these are not serious signals of an anti‑corruption drive. Consequently, a majority views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people, compared to 40% who see it as an asset. Asked which step the PA should prioritize to address conditions in Gaza, enable West Bank–Gaza reunification, and engage Israel/international actors on statehood, the largest percentage favors holding presidential and legislative elections including Hamas, followed by forming a national unity government including Hamas, and thirdly ensure immediate reconciliation with Hamas. Media consumption is dominated by Al Jazeera, with far higher viewership than any other.

Palestinian elections: About two thirds support holding presidential and legislative elections in the West Bank and Gaza a year after the current Gaza ceasefire; support is higher in the West Bank than Gaza, suggesting some Gazans who oppose a one‑year timeline may prefer earlier elections. Yet 60% believe the PA does not genuinely intend to hold elections within a year and do not expect them to occur within a year, while only about one third think they will, with little difference between the two Palestinian areas. Furthermore, a significant majority opposes President Abbas’s precondition that all electoral candidates must accept PLO obligations, including agreements with Israel. This opposition is particularly strong in the West Bank. On the logistical challenge of voting in East Jerusalem if Israel bars East Jerusalem voting under Oslo arrangements, the largest percentage favors internet voting, followed by voting in holy places, and finally bussing voters to PA‑controlled areas.

Public opinion reveals continued profound dissatisfaction with President Mahmoud Abbas, with three quarters disapproving of his performance and 80% wanting his resignation. This unpopularity is reflected in presidential polls where Abbas secures only 13% of the vote. In sharp contrast, Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti emerges as the most popular leader, decisively winning hypothetical elections against Hamas’s Khalid Mishal in both three-way and two-way contests. On the party level, Hamas maintains a significant lead over Fatah, both in general preference and in a potential legislative election. This is reinforced by the perception that Hamas is more deserving of leadership than Fatah under Abbas. However, a substantial segment of the public is deeply disillusioned with the status quo, as nearly a third believe neither party is worthy of representing the Palestinian people. In terms of political dynamics, findings clearly indicate that public support for Hamas has grown over the past two years, a trend observed in both Palestinian areas but more pronounced in the West Bank.

Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Palestinian public opinion on a political settlement is deeply divided and conditional. A slight majority opposes the general concept of a two-state solution, a sentiment rooted in the belief that it is no longer practical due to settlement expansion. Support for the solution erodes further when linked to compromises like demilitarization or Arab normalization. This reveals a stark internal divide: Gazans are consistently far more supportive of negotiated settlements, even with significant conditions, than West Bankers. For example, support for a detailed two-state agreement is nearly twice as high in Gaza. Regarding strategies to end the occupation, there is a notable tension. While non-violent tactics like joining international organizations garner majority support, "armed struggle" is still viewed as the single most effective method, particularly in the West Bank. This is mirrored in responses to settler violence, where an overwhelming majority feels unprotected by both the complicit Israeli army and absent PA police forces, leading to significant public backing for either deploying PA police or forming local armed groups to ensure community defense.

• The majority of the Palestinians (71%) has heard of the Trump Plan, three quarters in the West Bank and about two-thirds (65%) in the Gaza Strip.  We presented the public with the Trump Plan, using the Arab and Islamic framing of that plan as follows: the plan ends to the war on Gaza, releases hostages and Palestinian prisoners, abandons the forced transfer of Gazans, allows the entry of humanitarian aid,  requires the gradual Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, requires the disarmament of Hamas, requires reforming the Palestinian Authority, and calls for the start of a political process toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. Given this deliberate framing of the Trump Plan, we asked the public whether it supports or oppose it: 47% supported the plan in this Arab and Islamic framing and 49% opposed it. Support is much higher in the Gaza Strip compared Satisfaction to the West Bank, 59% and 39% respectively. Support is also higher among those who have heard of the plan compared to those who have not: 50% t0 39% respectively.
• A majority of the Palestinians (62%) supports Hamas’ response to the Trump plan, with greater supported in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 65% and 56% respectively. Support is much higher among those who have heard of the plan compared to those who did not hear of it: 71% and 41% respectively.  We asked specifically about public satisfaction with the names of Palestinian prisoners whose release Hamas has secured. A vast majority  (69%) of all Palestinians indicated satisfaction, but satisfaction is much higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 76% and 59% respectively.
• The majority of Palestinians (62%) does not think the Trump Plan will succeed in ending the War in the Gaza Strip once and for all. Although Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not think the Trump Plan will indeed bring a permanent end to the war, this pessimism is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 67% and 54% respectively; only 42% of Gazans and 27% of West Bankers believe it will indeed put an end to the war once and for all. Moreover, in light of the statement by the Israeli prime minister Netanyahu that after the return of the hostages to Israel, Israel will return to the war on Gaza if Hamas does not give up its arms, a majority in the West Bank (59%) thinks the Gaza war will return soon while Gazans are divided evenly, 49%-48%. In the West Bank, only 33% think the war on Gaza will not return soon. 
• The public in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but more in the former, is highly opposed (69%) to the element in the Trump plan that demands the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza Strip even “if this is a condition for the war to not to return the Gaza Strip,” with opposition standing at 78% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip. Support for disarming Hamas stands at 18% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip.
• The vast majority of West Bankers and Gazans (70%) do not believe that the Trump Plan will lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within the next five years; only 21% of West Bankers and 34% of Gazans think it will indeed lead to that.
• We asked the public about its views regarding the role of PA reforms, “if fully implemented,” in opening “the door to the establishment of a future Palestinian state in a manner that fulfills the aspirations of the Palestinian people:” While a majority of Gazans (59%) are optimistic that such real reforms would indeed achieve that outcome, the opposite is true in the West Bank, with only 44% think it would do that. A slim majority of West Bankers (51%) do not believe that such reforms, even if fully implemented, would indeed lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
• But when asked about the possibility that the Trump Plan “will lead to Arab and Islamic normalization with Israel within a year or two from now, even if a Palestinian state has not been established before then,” a half of the Palestinians (49%) said it will indeed lead to that while 48% said it will not. Both, West Bankers and Gazans, think that, 53% and 42% respectively think the Trump Plan will lead to Arab normalization with Israel even if a Palestinian state has not been established.
• We asked the public about the Day After arrangements pertaining to governing Gaza, the role of the PA, and the role of international bodies: We started by asking the public about its support and opposition to the formation of a Palestinian committee of professionals, that is not affiliated with the PA or Hamas, to manage the affairs of the Gaza Strip under and international umbrella in the accordance to the Trump Plan. A majority of 53% said it is opposed to such committee but a large minority (45%) supported it. It is noticeable that a slim majority of 51% of Gazans supported the formation of this committee while only 41% of the West Bankers supported it.
• When the question about the nature of this committee of Palestinian professionals omits reference to the fact that the committee will not be affiliated with Hamas or the PA and when the international auspices is linked to the implementation of the reconstruction program, attitudes change and the gap between West Bankers and Gazans narrow considerably. Indeed, a large majority of Palestinians (67% in total, 67% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip) supports the “administration of the Gaza Strip by a committee of Palestinian experts and specialists, including the implementation of the reconstruction program under international auspices and support.”  Opposition stands at 31%.
• We asked the public about its support for an alternative governing arrangement for the Gaza Strip whereby the PA would resume full control over governance in the Gaza Strip including the management of reconstruction. The largest percentage (41%) expressed opposition to the two options (44% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip); about a quarter (24%) preferred the independent committee of professional; a similar percentage (23%) expressed support for the return of the PA to fully control the Gaza Strip; and a small percentage of 10% expressed preference to the committee if it came under the administration of the PA. In other words, only 33% prefer a full or shared PA control over the Gaza Strip.
• In the event in which the Palestinian committee of professional assumes responsibility over the affairs of the Gaza Strip under an international umbrella in accordance of the Trump Plan, a large majority (68%) would be opposed to the entry of an armed Arab force from Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab and Islamic countries to maintain security and disarm Hamas. It is worth noting that the opposition is much greater in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 78% and 52% respectively.
• When the question omits reference to one of the missions of the international force, disarming Hamas, public response changes, particularly in the Gaza Strip. We asked about support and opposition to the “entry into Gaza of an international force from Arab States whose mission is to secure the borders, prevent the entry of arms and ensure internal security in cooperation with the Committee of Experts and the local Palestinian police.” A majority of Gazans (53%) and a large minority of West Bankers (43%) supported this mission while 47% of Gazans and 60% of West Bankers opposed it.
• We asked about support and opposition to a specific role for the PA in which it would “coordinate” the work of the committee of experts and professionals in the administration of the Gaza Strip. A majority of West Bankers (56%) expressed opposition while only 40% expressed support, while a majority of Gazans (54%) supported and 45% opposed that “coordination.”

• For the sixth time since October 7, 2023, we asked respondents from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip what they thought of Hamas' decision to launch the October 7 attack, whether it was correct or incorrect: 53% compared to 50%, in May 2025, and 54% in September 2024, and 67% in June 2024, and 71% in March 2024, said it was the right decision. The increase in this poll came from the Gaza Strip, where it stands today at 44%, an increase of 7 percentage points, and 59% in the West Bank, compared to an identical percentage in May 2025.

• 87% of Gazans say they have enough food for a day or two; 13% say they don't have enough food for a day or two. These results show a significant improvement over the results we obtained five months ago when only 53% said they had enough food for a day or two.
• 51% of Gazans say that one or more members of their family were killed during the current war, and in a separate question, 63% say that one or more members of their family were injured during this war. When combining the answers to the two questions and omitting the overlap, the results show that 72% report that one or more of their family members have been killed or injured. These results are almost identical with those we obtained five months ago.

• We asked residents of the Gaza Strip how often they had to move from one shelter to another since the war began on October 7, 2023: 31% said it ranged from two to three times, 36% said it ranged from four to six times, 13% said it ranged between 7 and 10 times, and 7% said it was once.
• A majority of 54% (compared to 51% five months ago) blames Israel for the current suffering of Gazans while 24% (compared to 28% five months ago) blame the US; only 14% (compared to 12% five months ago) blame Hamas; and only 6% (compared to 7% five months ago) blame the PA. It is worth noting that the percentage of Gazans blaming Hamas stood at 21% in the current poll compared to 23% five months ago.

• When asked if Hamas had committed the atrocities seen in the videos shown by international media displaying acts or atrocities committed by Hamas members against Israeli civilians, such as killing women and children in their homes. The overwhelming majority (86%) said it did not commit such atrocities, and only 10% said it did.

• As we did in our previous five polls since the war, we asked in the current poll about the party that will emerge victorious in this war: 39% of the public expects Hamas to win, compared to 43% five months ago, 50% 12 months ago, and 67% 15 months ago. It is worth noting, as the figure below shows, that a larger percentage of Gazans, at 27% today, expect Hamas to win compared to the results five months ago. However, Hamas's expectation of victory has dropped in the West Bank, where today it stands at only 48% compared to 56% five months ago. It is also worth noting that while 6% in the West Bank expect Israel to win the current war, 29% of Gazans expect Israel to win.

• When asked whether it supports or opposes the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to permanently end the war on the Gaza Strip, an overwhelming majority of 69% (87% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) said it is opposed to that; only 29% support it.

• As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:
• On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with Hamas' performance rises to 60% (66% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Fateh (30%; 25% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip), the PA (29%; 23% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip), and finally, president Abbas (21%; 16% in the West Bak and 29% in the Gaza Strip).

• As for satisfaction with Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate went to Houthis in Yemen, as we found in our previous polls, today at 74% (84% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Qatar (52%), Hezbollah (50%), and Iran (44%).  The findings show a significant rise in satisfaction with Qatar, Hizballah and Iran. We also asked, in this poll, about satisfaction with Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and the findings were 42%, 34%, and 27% respectively.

• For the international actors, China received the highest satisfaction (34%), followed by Russia (25%), and the United States (6%; in this poll we asked about president Trump). We also asked, in this poll, about satisfaction with Spain, the UK, and France and the findings were 35%, 14%, and 20% respectively.

• When asked about its support and opposition to the holding of Palestinian elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after a year of the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the majority (65%) said yes and only 32% said no. The majority in the West Bank is much larger than that in the Gaza Strip, 72% and 54% respectively, which might mean that those opposed to the holding of these elections might wish to hold these elections sooner than a full year from now.
• However, we found that the majority of the Palestinians (60%), with little differences between West Bankers and Gazans, believe the PA does not really intend to hold presidential and legislative elections a year from now; only a third believe the PA will hold such elections.  Therefore, an identical majority (60%) does not think that Palestinian presidential and legislative elections will indeed be held a year from now. Only a third believe elections will indeed be held within a year from now.
• The majority of the public (63%) is opposed to the condition set by president Mahmoud Abbas on those who wish to participate in the elections, which required them to accept all the obligations of the PLO, including the agreements with Israel. The opposition is wider in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 70% and 52% respectively; and support for this condition stands at 24% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip.
• We asked the public about its view on the best arrangements that would allow East Jerusalemites to participate in future Palestinian elections if Israel does not allow them to do so according to arrangement stipulated in the Oslo agreement. Three alternative arrangements were offered to the public: the largest percentage (41%) selected “voting through the Internet,” followed by “voting in the holy places,” selected by 31%; and finally, 22% selected providing “ free transportation of voters in buses to areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority.”
• We asked the public about its perception of Hamas two years after the Gaza war: has their support for the organization increased or decreased: 18% said its support for Hamas was big and it has not changed while 19% said its support increased a lot, and 17% said its support increased a little. By contrast, 16% said it did not support Hamas before and that its opposition to Hamas has not changed; 12% said its support decreased a little, and 10% said its support for Hamas has decreased a lot. The conclusion from these numbers is that the past two years have led to greater support for Hamas rather than the opposite and that this conclusion is true in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but more so in the former.
• If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, turnout would be 68%. Vote for Marwan Barghouti among the participants in the elections stands at 49%, followed by Khalid Mishal (36%) and Abbas (13). The following figure shows the results of the vote among all participants in the poll including those who do not intend to participate in the elections.

• If only two candidates were in the competition for the presidency, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, turnout would drop to 53%. In this case, among the actual voters Mishal stands at 63% and Abbas at 27%. Five months ago, only 25% among the actual voters chose Abbas and 68% chose Hamas’s candidate.  The following figure shows the results of the vote among all participants in the poll including those who do not intend to participate in the elections.

• If the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti of Fatah and Mishal of Hamas, turnout would rise to 64%. In this case, the vote for Barghouti among the participants in the elections would be 58% and for Mishal 39%. The following figure shows the results of the vote among all participants in the poll including those who do not intend to participate in the elections.

• In a closed question, we asked the public to choose the person it deems appropriate as President Abbas's successor from a predetermined list of options. The largest percentage (39%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti, 25% said they prefer Khalid Mishal, 11% chose Mohammed Dahlan, 7% chose Mustafa Barghouti, and 18% said they do not know or chose someone other than those listed.
• Satisfaction with President Abbas' performance stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 75%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 18% in the West Bank (compared to 13% five months ago) and in the Gaza Strip at 31% (compared to 29% five months ago).
• 80% want President Abbas to resign while 20% want him to remain in office. Five months ago, 81% said they want the president to resign. Today, 83% of the demand for the president's resignation comes from the West Bank and 73% comes from the Gaza Strip.

• When asked which political party or movement they support, the largest percentage (35%) said they prefer Hamas, followed by Fatah (24%), 9% selected third parties, and 32% said they do not support any of them or do not know. Five months ago, 32% said they support Hamas and 21% said they support Fatah. These results mean that support for Hamas over the past five months has increased by 3 percentage points, and the same is true for Fatah. Support for Hamas today stands at 32% in the West Bank (compared to 29% five months ago) and for Fatah at 20% (compared to 18% five months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas stands at 41% (compared to 37% five months ago) and support for Fatah at 29% (compared to 25% five months ago).

• But if new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, 65% say they will participate in them, and among the participants in the elections 44% say they will vote for Hamas, 30% for Fatah, 10% for third parties, and 16% have not yet decided. Compared to the results we obtained five months ago, the current results among voters actually participating in the elections indicate a very minor increase in the vote for both, Hamas and Fatah. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Hamas among voters participating in the elections stands at 49% (compared to 49% five months ago), and vote for Fatah among voters participating in the elections stands at 32% (compared to 30% five months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 40% (compared to 38% five months ago) and Fatah among voters participating in elections stands at 29% (compared to 27% five months ago). The following figure shows the results of the vote among all participants in the poll including those who do not intend to participate in the elections.

• 41% (compared to 40% five months ago) believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 22% (compared to 19% five months ago) believe that Fatah led by president Abbas is the most deserving. Less than a third, (31%) compared to 35% seven months ago, believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership.

• We asked the public in the West Bank about its personal and family safety and security. The findings show that only 15% feel safe and secure while 85% feel unsafe and unsecure. Five months ago, the perception of safety stood at 11% and two year ago at 48%.
• The poll found that 80% of the Palestinians (92% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip) believe that there is corruption in the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. We asked the public about its views regarding the recent steps taken by the Palestinian Authority, such as the dismissal of the current government's Minister of Transportation, who is accused of bribery, or the Director General of Crossings and Borders. A slim majority (52%) does not think such steps represent a serious indication of the PA's intention to fight corruption while 45% think that they do indicate that.
• We asked the public about its views on the most important measures that the PA leadership should take now “to address the current conditions in Gaza in a manner that would allow the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and negotiation with Israel and the international community regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state.” Three choices were offered: the largest percentage (37%) selected “the conduct presidential and legislative elections with the participation of all political factions including Hamas,” followed by the formation of “a national unity government that would include all political factions including Hamas,” selected by 31% ; and finally came bringing about “immediate reconciliation with Hamas as a first step,” selected by 27%.
• Al Jazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine as 58% selecting it as the one they watched the most during the past two months. Due to the current war conditions, residents of the West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to watch Aljazeera, 74% and 34% respectively. The second most popular stations is Palestine Today and Al-Aqsa TV (3% each), followed by Palestine TV and Al-Arabiya and Al-Mayadeen TV (2% each), and finally Ma'an (1% each).
• A majority of 56% (compared to 60% five months ago) believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 40% (compared to 35% five months ago) believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people.

• 45% support and 53% oppose the concept of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details. Last September, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 40%. As the figure below show, the rise in support in this poll came entirely from the Gaza Strip.

• Support for a two-state solution is usually linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for a Palestinian state. Today, 56% (compared to 64% five months ago) believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion, but 41% (compared to 33% five months ago) believe it remains practical. Moreover, 61% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent and 37% believe the chances are medium or high.
• In the context of the two-state solution, but with few added details, we asked about support and opposition to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the borders of June 4, 1967, one that would be demilitarized, with East Jerusalem as its capital, with limited land swaps so that it can live in peace with the State of Israel, with international guarantees. A majority of 53% expressed opposition and 44% expressed support. It is worth noting that support in the Gaza Stirp for this solution, with its various conditions, is almost twice in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank, 61% and 33% respectively. Opposition to this solution stands at 63% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip.
• In the same context, but one in which we added the issue of Arab normalization with Israel, we found a majority of Palestinians (59%) in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 63%% and 54% respectively, do not support “reaching a political and security agreement to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that includes the establishment of a Palestinian state through a regional agreement between the Arab states and Israel and the normalization of relations between them,” while 34% of West Bankers and 45% of the Gazans do support such agreement.
• We came back again to the same two-state solution issue. This time we asked the public if it agrees or disagrees with the following sentence: "I support a Palestinian political agreement that guarantees an end to the war, an end to the occupation, the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state and the normalization of relations between Israel and neighboring Arab states:” two thirds expressed opposition and only 31% expressed support. Support is higher among Gazans compared to West Bankers, 45% and 22% respectively. Opposition stands at 75% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip.
• We asked about the public support for three possible solutions to the conflict: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the solution of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel, and a one-state solution in which the Jews and Palestinians live with equality, 47% (47% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, while 18% (8% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) prefer a confederation between two states. 12% (10% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the establishment of a single state with equality between the two sides. 24% said they did not know or did not want to answer.
• When asked about the public's support or opposition to specific political measures to break the deadlock, 73% supported joining more international organizations, 54% supported resorting to unarmed popular resistance, 41% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 45% supported the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Five months ago, 46% supported a return to confrontations and an armed intifada, 50% supported unarmed popular resistance, 42% supported the dissolution of the PA, and 26% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We found that a majority of 53% thinks that the recognition of Palestine by France, Britian, Canada, Australia, and other European countries brings the Palestinians closers to ending the Israeli occupation and reaching a real Palestinian state; 45% do not think so.
• A larger majority (65%) thinks that the global popular solidarity with the Palestinian people, such as the Global Steadfastness Flotilla, the ships breaking the siege, the popular demonstrations in the capitals of the world, and the decline in support for Israel in the world, including in the United States, does bring the Palestinians closer to ending the occupation and reaching a real state; one third do not think so.
• We presented the public with three ways to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective one: 41% (49% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip) chose "armed struggle"; 36% (37% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) chose negotiations; and 19% (13% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) chose popular peaceful resistance. As shown in the figure below, these results indicate a very slight decrease in support for armed struggle, a 3-percentage point increase in support for negotiations, and a very slight decrease in support for peaceful resistance.

• We asked the public about the most effective means to confront settler terrorism: relying on the Israeli army to prevent such attacks, deploying Palestinian police forces in areas subject to attack, forming armed groups from the residents of those areas, or forming unarmed groups from those areas. The results were as follows:  

1. The option to deploy Palestinian police forces in these areas came in first place with 30% support.  Similarly, reliance on the Israeli army came also in the first place with 30%.  
2. A quarter of the public said that forming armed groups is the most effective option  
3. The option of forming unarmed groups came last with only 10% opting for it. 

• However, when asked about the role of the Israeli army in preventing or stopping settler attacks, a majority of 75% say the army supports settler attacks
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (93%) say that the Palestinian security services do not enter the areas that are attacked by settlers, whether during or after the attacks. 

• 41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages; 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; and 10% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (43%; 46% in the Gaza Strip and 40% in the West Bank) said it is the Israeli occupation; 22% said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; 12% said it is settlers’ attacks in the West Bank; 12% said it is corruption; and 8% said it is unemployment. Five months ago, 43% said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip and 30% said it is the Israeli occupation.