Poll Summary: Palestinian-Israeli Pulse

PressRelease   Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU)  and the Government of Jappan.

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

● Support for the two-state solution declines from 46% among Palestinians and Israeli Jews six months ago to 43% for both sides today. This is the lowest level of support for this concept among the two publics during the past two years of the Pulse, the lowest in more than a decade, when a steady decline in support began, and the lowest in almost two decades of joint Palestinian-Israeli survey research.  Still, fewer people on both sides support three possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights, one state without rights, and expulsion or “transfer.”

● Half of the Palestinian and Israeli samples were presented with a peace package identical to the one we presented to them four times during the past two years. Only 37% of Palestinians (compared to 40% in December 2017) and 39% of Israeli Jews (compared to 35% six months ago) support a permanent peace agreement package, along with 82% of Israeli Arabs – typical of the high level support from Israeli Arabs in previous surveys. In total, 46% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims. Forty-eight percent of Israelis (54% of Israeli Jews) and 61% of Palestinians are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package.

● A modified package, similar in every respect to the original one described above, was presented to the other half of the sample. The modified version included three additional components that previous research showed to provide positive incentives to both sides: Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic; the bilateral agreement will be part of a regional agreement along the lines of the Arab Peace Initiative; and the US and major Arab countries will insure full implementation of the agreement by both sides.  In comparison with support for the original package, the modified one received greater support from both sides: 45% of Israeli Jews and 42% of Palestinians, a 6-point and a 5-point increase respectively. Among Israeli Arabs, support rose to 91%.  

●The current survey also tested the likely impact of previously tested zero-sum incentives on the level of support for the original and the modified packages. Drawing on eight such incentives, we paired measures that show reciprocal benefits/costs to each side. The impact of the pairs on the Palestinian side was much weaker than on the Israeli side, as most of them failed to increase support for the two packages while on the Israeli side, six of the eight pairs generated higher levels of support.

●The skepticism about the two packages appears closely related to serious doubts about feasibility. Palestinians and Israelis are both divided almost equally about whether a two-state solution is still possible, or whether settlements have expanded too much to make it viable. Among all Israelis, nearly half believes the solution is still viable (48%), while 45% think settlements have spread too much for it to be viable. While Israeli Arabs remain highly optimistic, with 64% thinking this solution remains viable, only 44% of Israeli Jews agree with this assessment.  Among Palestinians, 56% say the two-state solution is no longer viable (a four-point decrease), while 39% think it is. But fully 72% and 81% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, respectively, do not expect a Palestinian state to be established in the next five years.

●When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 41% of the Palestinians (47% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) 45% of Israeli Jews and 84% of Israeli Arabs choose “reach a peace agreement.” This represents a significant increase in support for a peace agreement among Palestinians compared to only 26% who chose this option in the aftermath of the Trump declaration on Jerusalem six months ago.  27% of Palestinians (compared to 38% six months ago) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 20% call for “a definitive war with the Palestinians.” 

The Palestinian sample size was 2150 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 25 June and 1 July, 2018. The number of interviewees in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 1403 and in the Gaza Strip 747. The margin of error is +/-2.5%. The Israeli sample includes 1600 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between 25 June and 8 July 2018. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 1200, 200 West Bank settlers, 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3%.  The Palestinian and Israeli samples were divided in half, an A and a B sample on each side. The A samples received the original peace plan, which we offered to the two public in the previous four polls during the past two years and the B samples received a modified plan offered in this poll for the first time. The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, with assistance from David Reis, together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.   

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provide the respective findings for these sub groups.  

Two-state solution: In the current survey, only 43% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews support the concept of the two-state solution; 54% of Palestinians and 48% of Israeli Jews are opposed. Six months ago, 46% on each side supported this solution and a year ago, 52% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews supported it. In all cases, only the general principle was provided. Among Israeli Arabs, support remains unchanged at 82%, bringing the total Israeli average to 49%. Support for this solution among Palestinians and Israeli Jews is the lowest during the past two years of the Pulse, the lowest in more than a decade, when a steady decline in support began, and the lowest in almost two decades of joint Palestinian-Israeli survey research. As seen in the graph below, among Jews, support for the two-state principle has seen an incremental but steady decline since June 2016, when it stood at 53%. Among Palestinians support has varied: it fell from June to December 2016, when 44% supported the basic two-state solution in principle, rose to 52% last June, then declined once again to 46% and continued to decline in the current poll. 

Similar to the December 2017 poll, support for the two-state solution among Palestinians, is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 46% and 40% respectively. Last December, 48% of West Bankers and 44% of Gazans supported it. Support is also high among those Palestinians who support third parties (other than Hamas and Fatah) and among Fatah supporters (61% and 57% respectively) and low among Hamas supporters (22%). The same pattern of support is observed when looking at levels of religiosity: 56% among those who are not religious, 49% among the somewhat religious, and only 35% among the religious.

Among Israelis, as in the past, the significant variations are found among demographic groups defined by religious observance and age. Secular Israeli Jews show a majority who support two states, 54%, compared to 15% among religious Jews. Among the youngest Jews, 18-34 years old, just 27% support it, and 45% among the 35-44 group – compared to a 51% majority among older Israeli Jews.

Perceptions of public support. When asked if they believe their own societies support the two-state solution, 23% of Israeli Jews believe the majority of Israelis support it, a decline from 27% six months ago, and 59% believe the majority opposes it; thus, perceptions of their society are inaccurately weighted towards rejection, rather than the reality of a divided opinions. Among Israeli Arabs, 25% think that most Israeli Jews support the principle of a two-state solution, a 7-points decrease when compared to the December 2017 findings.

Palestinian perception of their own side’s position has changed during the past year. Today 38%, compared to 48% last June and 42% last December, believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution and 53% think a majority opposes it.

Regarding perceived attitudes of the other side, the portion of Palestinians who think Israeli Jews support the two-state solution is declining: 36% of Palestinians, compared to 42% last June and 38% last December, think the majority of Jewish Israelis support this solution and 48%, think they oppose it. Among Israeli Jews, just 31% believe Palestinians support the two-state solution.

Declining support linked to low perceived feasibility. To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two-state solution. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 5% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years; 72% of Palestinians say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews a larger majority of 81% think the chances are low or very low, 62% of Israeli Arabs take this view, and the weighted average for all Israelis is 78% who do not believe a Palestinian state will be established in that time.  Further, the view that the two-state solution is no longer even feasible is widespread in general social and public discourse. We tested this belief directly, asking respondents on both sides whether settlements have expanded too much, making a two-state solution impossible, or whether settlements can still be dismantled or evacuated and therefore the solution is still viable. Among Palestinians, a majority of 56% believes the solution is no longer viable, a four-point decline compared to 60% last December, but a two-point rise compared to last June. The Israelis on the other hand are once again divided: 48% among all Israelis think the solution is still viable, and a smaller portion, 45% think it is not. But among Jews, attitudes have shifted from June: at present a plurality believes the two-state solution is not viable, 47%, while 44% think it is. A year earlier, the trend was reversed: 49% of Jews said it was still viable, and 43% said it was not. Among Arab Israeli respondents, 64%, compared to 74% six months ago, believe this solution is still viable.

Three competing alternatives to the two-state solution: One state with equal rights, one state without equal rights (apartheid), and expulsion or “transfer”

The joint poll sought to ascertain the breakdown of Palestinians and Israelis regarding various alternatives to the two-state solution. Three alternative options were offered: (1) one state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians was offered to all those who rejected the two-state solution (one democratic state); (2) one state solution in which one side or the other is denied equal rights (apartheid) was offered to those who rejected the two-state solution and the one democratic state;  (3) a single state in which the other side is “transferred” or expelled from the entire territory of historic or Mandatory Palestine (expulsion) was offered to those who have rejected all three above. For options two and three, Israeli Arabs were asked the same questions asked of Palestinians, i.e., in which rights of Jews are denied in the second option and expulsion is applied to Jews in the third option.

As the two pies below show, the largest constituency is the one that supports the two-state solution. Once those respondents are excluded from the sample and the remaining public is assigned one alternative after the other, the public splits between the three alternatives. The category called “other” refers to respondents who either rejected all options or responded “do not know.” The findings among the Palestinians are almost identical to those of December 2017 with the exception in the decline in support for the two-state solution, with those abandoning it moving to the “other.” The findings among Israeli Jews show different distribution to those who abandoned the two-state solution: support for the one democratic state increased from 14% to 19%; support for expulsion declined from 14% to 8% while support for apartheid increased from 11% to 15%.

On the Palestinian side, as indicated earlier, there is a difference between Gazans and West Bankers in their preferences for the two-state solution. As the chart below shows, gaps do also emerge between the two areas in their preferences for some of the alternatives: more Gazans than West Bankers show support for apartheid and expulsion. This Gaza-West Bank difference reflects a major difference between the two regions in the level of religiosity (55% of Gazans and 36% of West Bankers describe themselves are religious), a factor that contributes, as the chart below shows, to a reduced level of support for the two-state solution and a greater support for expulsion.

Gaps also emerge when looking at the Palestinian political affiliation or vote preferences, with supporters of Fatah and the third parties showing majority support for the two-state solution.  The highest support among Hamas voters goes to expulsion followed by the two-state solution, apartheid and one democratic state. It is worth noting that support for Fatah stands in this poll as 39%, Hamas at 32%, and third parties at 9%, and the unaffiliated at 20%.

A similar examination of the Israeli Jewish side shows that a majority support for the two-state solution is found only among secular Jews. At 37%, it is the one most supported by the traditional followed by the one democratic state. The religious support apartheid and one democratic state and gives expulsion the least support. The ultra-Orthodox support equally apartheid and a one democratic state.

When looking at the political spectrum, a majority support for the two-state solution is found among the left and the center but not the right. Yet, even among the “moderate right,” at 29%, support for the two-state solution is higher than support for any of the three alternatives. Those who define themselves as “right” support apartheid and the one democratic state more than any other. It is worth noting that the size of the moderate right category in this poll is 18%, the right 36%, the “center” 23%, the moderate left 8%, and the left 7% of the Jewish sample.

Finally, when looking at Israeli Arabs, as the pie below shows, support for the two-state solution, as indicated above, is overwhelming, followed by support for the one democratic state solution.

Confederation: For the fourth time, we tested an alternative to the traditional two-state solution in the form of a confederation between two states. The confederation alternative was described as follows:

“Some people recommend the following solution: the creation of two states, Palestine and Israel, which enter into a confederation whereby citizens of one country are allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of the other but each national group votes only in its state for elections. There would be freedom of movement for all, and Jerusalem is not divided but serves as the capital of two states. Israel and Palestine would deal jointly with security and the economy.  

Support for the confederation concept drops slightly to 31% among Israeli Jews compared to 33% last December. But it is still higher than the support we found last June and in December 2016 when it stood at 26% and 20% respectively. Opposition to the confederation among Israeli Jews stands at 54%. By contrast, Palestinian support rose slightly to 30%, a two-percentage point increase compared to last December. But the current level of support is lower than the 37% we found last June. Current opposition among the Palestinians is 63%. As is the case for the two-state solutions, support for the confederation idea is highest among Israeli Arabs, at 68%, with 29% opposed.

Peace and violence. Unlike our December findings which showed significant differences between Palestinians and Israeli Jews regarding what should happen next, the current survey shows similarities between the two sides comparable to those we saw a year ago. Six months ago, right after the announcement of the Trump Administration regarding the relocation of US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and the ensuing Palestinian-Israeli street confrontations in the West Bank, Palestinian preference for diplomacy and a peace agreement dropped sharply and the preference for “armed struggle” rose.  Palestinians have now moved back to preferring peace agreement over waging an armed struggle despite the rise in tension along the Israel borders with the Gaza Strip. A plurality of Israelis and Palestinians (45% and 41% respectively) support a peace agreement. Among West Bank Palestinians the preference for a peace agreement is even higher, standing at 47% compared to 29% in the Gaza Strip. When given four options for what should happen next, only 27% of Palestinians (22% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip, a reflection of the relative calm in the West Bank compared to the tension on the Gaza border with Israel), compared to 38% last June, chose armed struggle. Among the Israelis, 20% chose “a definitive war,” against Palestinians. Last December 19% opted for the war option.

Detailed packages for implementation  

As in all four previous surveys of the current series of joint polls, Palestinians and Israelis were asked in this survey to support or oppose a detailed combined peace package based on the two-state solution, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The package addressed all issues of the so-called permanent status negotiations, such as borders, security, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees, as well as mutual recognition and end of conflict. In addition to the original package presented in the past four surveys, the current study includes a modified version of the package and a new experiment designed to build on the findings of the previous surveys. For the last two years, incentives had been developed to try and convince respondents who opposed the detailed combined package to shift towards support; thus, the previous surveys tested whether opposition to the agreement is fixed or flexible. Over thirty such incentives were developed and tested: some were incentives for one side only, while others were shared incentives, meaning that identical items were offered to both sides. While many of the one-sided incentives were zero-sum in nature, as they would predictably increase support among those receiving them, they would reduce support among the other side, others were not. The current survey includes an experiment that aimed at testing the value of the previous research on incentives in two ways: (1) integrating some of the shared incentives in a modified version of the peace plan in order to test their impact on support for the new version; and (2) separately pairing some of the zero-sum incentives in order to determine their benefits as well as the harm they might inflict on the support for both the original and the modified peace packages.

From all the incentives tested in four surveys over the last two years, we identified three successful “shared” items, those asked of both Israelis and Palestinians who opposed the detailed original agreement at first. These are the items that convinced a large or reasonable number of those respondents who had rejected the comprehensive package to change their mind, and which were also identical for both Israelis and Palestinians. The three incentives were:

• The future Palestinian state will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures. The state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law.
• The agreement will include formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides.
• The agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative

For this final survey, these incentives were added to the original comprehensive package and tested as regular items of the detailed agreement, but only among half of the Israeli and Palestinian samples. The other half of each sample was given the original detailed package with the items that have been tested in all previous surveys in this project.

As indicated earlier, the sample size of Israelis and Palestinians was increased in the current survey, to ensure that each half was large enough to represent the demographic breakdown of each society. The larger sample also helped ensure that there were not significant pre-existing ideological or political differences to explain different outcomes.[1]

Palestinians and Israelis were asked to respond first to each item separately, as component parts; following nine such items in the original and the modified packages and three more items in the modified package, they were asked if they support or opposed the combined package, and given a short summary of the basic elements.

The results show the potential for raising support in favor of a detailed two-state solution if certain adjustments are made.  Among both Palestinians and Israelis, the modified package with the incentives added as additional items received higher support than the original detailed package.

• Among Palestinians, 42% of those who were asked about the new agreement said they would support it, five points higher than those who supported the original plan (37%).  A majority of 61% opposed the original package while 56% opposed the modified version.  As the chart below shows, the current level of support for the original package is the lowest in two years, reflecting the continued decline in support for the two-state solution as shown earlier; the highest level of support for the original plan stood at 43% in June 2017. Six months ago, 40% of Palestinians supported the original package and 57% opposed it.
• Among all Israelis, a majority of 53% supported the modified agreement, compared to 46% among all Israelis who supported the original package –seven points higher – as will be shown, among Jews only, the gap is six points, very close to the gap among Palestinians.  Among Jewish Israelis, 45% supported the modified plan, compared to 39% who supported the original package. Here too, Jewish support for the new package exceeds the Jewish support for the original package since the project began (the lowest support was 32%, in June 2017 and the highest was 41% in December 2016). The number also slightly surpasses total Jewish support for a general two-state solution in this survey (43%). Six months ago, 35% of Israeli Jews supported and 55% opposed the original package. Israeli Arab respondents also showed even stronger enthusiasm for the new plan, compared to their already-high support for the original comprehensive package in the past.  While 82% supported the original package, a relatively consistent finding over time, over 91% supported the modified version.

These findings indicate that there is still significant room to raise support should further incentive combinations be identified as effective and identical for both sides, so that they can be added to the comprehensive plan. That challenge is explored later in this report.

Among Israelis, the modified plan with the additional items received the highest support for a comprehensive agreement since the project began in 2016. It is also the first time support for the detailed agreement has reached a majority, and the first time support for the detailed agreement surpassed support for the general concept of a two state solution (50% among the half-sample that was asked about the modified agreement).

Items of an agreement. A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the original package follows (non-italicized questions were asked of Israeli Jews and if no other wording appears, also for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Italics refer to the questions worded separately for Palestinians; some of the Palestinian wordings were used for Israeli Arabs). The figures after each of the first 9 items indicate support of the entire expanded sample. The new components of the modified package are listed below at the end of the breakdown. As can be seen below, among both populations, the specific new items inserted into the modified plan received positive feedback when tested separately. The idea that the Palestinian state would be a democracy received the highest support of all items among the Israeli respondents. A democratic Palestinian state was also the most successful item of the modified package among Palestinian respondents. Among Jews, a majority supported the idea that the agreement would be part of a larger agreement with all Arab states.   

1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side. 62% of Israeli Jews support this item.

Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side. 43%, of Palestinians support mutual recognition and 85% of Israeli Arabs support mutual recognition.

2. The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry). Only 20% of Palestinians support this (14% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).  Among Israeli Jews, 59% support this item and among Israeli Arabs only 44% support it. 

3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Among Palestinians, 41% support this (37% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip). Israeli Jews support stands at 48% and Israeli Arab support at 73%.

4. The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. 31% of Palestinians support this (25% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip). Among Israeli Jews, 40% support this, and among Israeli Arabs 55% support it.

5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. 31% of Palestinians support this (26% among West Bankers and 40% among Gazans). 40% of Israeli Jews support this and 64% of Arabs support it.

6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel. Just a little over a quarter of Palestinians (26%) support the territorial exchange (21% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip). 36% of Israeli Jews support this, and 62% of Israeli Arabs.  

7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Less than a quarter (24%) of Jews support this item. 

East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of the Israel. 26% of Palestinians support this (23% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip).  63% of Israeli Arabs support this item.

8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. 28% of Israeli Jews support the Old City arrangement.

In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian quarters and al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. Here again, just one-quarter of Palestinians support the division of the Old City (22% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip). 63% of Israeli Arabs support this.

9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.  48%of Palestinians support this (39% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip). This item receives the lowest support from Israeli Jews out of all the items tested: 21% support the arrangement on refugees, Israeli Arabs show the opposite trend: 84% support it.

10. Modified Version only: The future Palestinian state will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures. The state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law.  Among the Palestinians, support stands at 48% (44% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip).  62% of Israeli Jews and 91% of Israeli Arabs support it.

11. Modified Version only: The agreement will include formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides.  Among the Palestinians, support stands at 43% (36% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip).  46% of Israeli Jews and 67% of Israeli Arabs support it.

12. Modified Version only: The agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative. Among the Palestinians, support stands at 46% (40% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip).  51% of Israeli Jews and 85% of Israeli Arabs support it. 

Perception of social support for package. On both sides, respondents perceive their own society’s support for the original plan to be low. Moreover, the elevated support for the modified plan and the relatively high support for the additional constituent items did not have a significant impact on people’s perceptions of how their own society or the other side would react to it. Thus, when Palestinians were asked if most Palestinians would support the original plan, 32% stated that most would support it; slightly more, 36%, said a majority would support the modified plan, among respondents who had heard the new plan. Among Israelis, 22% and 25% said the majority of their fellow Israelis would support the original plan or the modified plan, respectively.

And when asked if they believe the other side would embrace the original or the modified peace package, exactly 36% of Palestinians believed a majority of Jews might support either the old or the new plan. In a mirror image, 33% and 35% of Israelis thought the majority of Palestinians would accept either the original or the modified plan, respectively. 

Regional and demographic trends. The internal breakdowns of each population show which sub-groups respond differently to the two options. Among Palestinians, there are variations in responses among different groups. Nearly all sub-groups reflect higher support for the modified plan, even among some hardline respondents.

• As in previous surveys, Gaza respondents are more supportive of the modified agreement (as they are also slightly more supportive of the original package than West Bankers). Half of all Gazans supported the new plan, seven points higher than their level of support for the old plan (43%). Among West Bank respondents, 37% supported the new plan, three points higher than for the old plan (34%). It is worth noting that while support for the two-state solution among Gazans in lower than it is among West Bankers, as indicated earlier, support in the Gaza Strip for the two packages is higher than it is in the West Bank. In fact, Gazans’ support for the concept of the two-state solution is less than the support they give to either detailed package while West Bankers’ support for the concept is larger than the support they give to either package. Part of the explanation for this surprising finding has to do with the difference in the impact of viability on two Palestinian groups: Gazans who think the two-state solution is no longer viable support that concept by almost half the support among the same group of West Bankers (17% vs. 33% respectively) but Gazans who think it remains viable support it by a higher percentage than West Bankers (72% vs. 66% respectively). Similarly, Gazans who think the two-state solution remains viable support the two packages by much higher percentages than like-minded West Bankers: 76% vs 48% for the original package and 78% vs. 59% for the modified package respectively.
• Among Fatah supporters, 57% support the modified plan, four points higher than support for the original plan (53%); Even Hamas supporters showed some flexibility: 21% supported the original plan and 24% supported the modified version – leading to the same level of support as among religious Jews showed for the new plan (24%, as cited below).
• Support for the two packages package is higher among those who are less religious, and lower among those who are more religious. Among Palestinians who define themselves as “not religious” a majority supports the two plans, the original and the modified. Support among the religious for the original plan stands at 29% rising to 36% for the modified one, a seven-point increase.
• Young Palestinians between 18 and 22 years of age, which in past surveys were associated with hardline views, show little or no age differences this time.

Among Israelis, as shown in the chart below, the internal breakdowns of the population show variations similar to those we saw among Palestinians. Like the Palestinians, almost all sub-groups reflect higher support for the modified plan, even among some hardline respondents.

• The lowest levels of support for the two packages is found among religious Jews; higher support is found among the ultra-Orthodox and traditional Jews while the majority among secular Jews support both packages. The findings reflect a very consistent religious-secular divide. When comparing the two versions of the package, a somewhat higher portion of secular Israeli Jews support the modified package, 59% compared to 53% for the original one, while among traditional Jews who are a key constituency, 31% support the original package and 37% support the new one. Although the sample size is limited, the survey also found a significant difference among religious Israeli Jews: just eight percent supported the original package, but three times more, 24%, responded that they would support the modified package with the additional incentives.
• Center and left-wing Israelis showed the greatest contrast between the two plans, while the right-wing responded with only minimal difference. Among left-wing Jews, 79% supported the modified agreement, 15 points higher than those who supported the original agreement (64% among left-wing Jews). Israeli Jews who identify as centrist show an important difference as well: from less than half who supported the original agreement (44%), a clear majority of 58% support the new agreement. Right-wing Israeli Jews showed less difference, with just below one-third supported either package: 31% supported the original agreement and 33% for the modified one. 
• Similarly, although young Jewish respondents are often more hard-line than older people, as seen earlier regarding the general two-state solution, in this survey youth support for the package, while somewhat relevant for the modified version, is not too different from other age groups of Jews for the original package.

Feasibility - doubts. Beyond demographic and political differences that typically characterize those who support or oppose the two-state solution and the detailed package, background attitudes are also clearly linked to support. In previous surveys, it has been clear that trust in the other side is a powerful factor, and the belief that the other side wants peace. It also became clear that the perception of viability is important.  Among Israeli Jews who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 51% support the original combined package and 61% support the modified package. Further, for Israeli Jews, support for the original and the modified agreements rises significantly in part on whether the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

Among the Palestinians who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 58% support the original combined package and 66% support the modified version. Further, support for the two versions of the agreement rises incrementally the more the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

INCENTIVE PAIRS

A second experiment considered a new mode of testing incentives. In previous surveys, as indicated earlier, some of the incentives proposed were developed specifically for one side or the other. To offset the possibility that an incentive for one side, such as the zero-sum measures, might alienate the other side, in the current survey we paired incentives to show reciprocal benefits to each side. The incentives were paired thematically, drawing on eight items, representing some of the top-ranked incentives from the last two years. Thus, each pair offered each side a favorable condition on a specific topic – usually related, but not identical to the benefit included to the other side.

Respondents were asked directly if these pairs – an incentive to their own side coupled with a benefit to the other side – raised or lowered their support for an agreement. By contrast to previous surveys, all respondents were asked these questions, not only those who rejected the agreement. The goal was to see whether in a real situation where people are likely to learn of all benefits/incentives offered to all sides, whether respondents of either disposition would switch: would supporters defect and oppose an agreement, would rejectionists possibly switch towards support? And for those who had not made up their mind, could the mutual incentives convince them to support an agreement, or push them to oppose it?

The following is the list of pairs tested. The only difference is the order of the items within each pair: for each side, the question began with the incentives geared at them (Palestinian versions are in italics).

The state of Palestine will recognize the Jewish religious and historic roots in the historic land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael) and Israel would recognize the Palestinian religious and historic roots in the historic land of Palestine.

Israel will recognize the Palestinian religious and historic roots in the historic land of Palestine and Palestine will recognize the Jewish religious and historic roots in the historic land of Palestine.

Palestine will acknowledge the Jewish character of the state of Israel and Israel will acknowledge the Arab and Islamic character of the state of Palestine.

Israel will acknowledge the Arab and Islamic character of the state of Palestine and Palestine will acknowledge the Jewish character of the state of Israel.

An agreed number of Israelis, including settlers, will be allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Palestine while maintaining their Israeli citizenship, as long as they are law abiding and an agreed number of Palestinians, including refugees, will be allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Israel while maintaining their Palestinian citizenship, as long as they are law abiding.

An agreed number of Palestinians, including refugees, will be allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Israel while maintaining their Palestinian citizenship, as long as they are law abiding and an agreed number of Israelis, including settlers, will be allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Palestine while maintaining their Israeli citizenship, as long as they are law abiding.

The Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation like today, including sharing intelligence with Israeli security forces, arresting terror suspects and preventing attacks and the Israeli government will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners when the peace agreement takes effect.

The Israeli government will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners when the peace agreement takes effect, and the Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation with Israel like today, including sharing intelligence with Israeli security forces, arresting terror suspects and preventing attacks. 

As a sign of reconciliation, Jews will be allowed to visit at the Temple Mount (al Haram al Sharif) and all other religious sites holy to Jews in the Palestinian state and Israel will allow Palestinians to visit Muslim and Christian holy sites in the state of Israel.

As a sign of reconciliation, Israel will allow Palestinians to visit Muslim and Christian holy sites in the state of Israel and Jews will be allowed to visit at the Temple Mount (al Haram al Sharif) and other sites holy to Jews in the Palestinian state.

Jews who left their homes and property in the Arab countries after the 1948 War and the establishment of the state of Israel will be compensated by the Arab countries for the lost homes and properties left behind and the state of Israel will recognize the Nakba and apologize for the suffering of the Palestinian refugees

The state of Israel will recognize the Nakba and apologize for the suffering of the Palestinian refugees and Jews who left their homes and property in the Arab countries after the 1948 War and the establishment of the state of Israel will be compensated by the Arab countries for the lost homes and properties left behind

The state of Palestine will agree to change school textbooks to remove incitement against Jews  and the state of Israel will agree to change school textbooks so that they not include incitement against Palestinians

The state of Israel will agree to change school textbooks so that they not include incitement against Palestinians and the state of Palestine will agree to change school textbooks to remove incitement against Jews

Palestinians formally end of the global boycott campaign against Israel, and Israel formally ends its opposition to Palestine joining all global organization and will support Palestinian membership in such bodies.

Israel formally ends its opposition to Palestine joining all global organization and will support Palestinian membership in such bodies and Palestinians formally end of the global boycott campaign against Israel.

Since all respondents received these questions, those who said the item raised their support but who already supported the initial agreement were set aside, and the same for those opposed. Focusing on those who switched sides, we then calculated new levels of predicted support following each pair.

It is worth noting that when compared to the incentives directed separately at the opposition in previous surveys, the pairs were predictably weaker particularly among the Palestinians. For the top ten incentives in past surveys tested among Israeli Jews who rejected the package, the average portion who said they would switch to support was 40%. Among Palestinians, the average portion of rejectionists who would switch based on the top ten from previous surveys is almost identical – 41%.

Comparing just those who opposed the plans (either the original comprehensive package or the new version explored above) in the current survey, the average responses for the paired, mutual incentives is as follows:

• On the Israeli side, those who rejected the original plan had an average of 36% who changed their mind – four points below the original incentives, and 28% of those who opposed the new plan changed their minds as an average of all eight mutual pairs. This is likely due to the fact that the new plan received considerably higher support among Israelis; therefore, a larger portion of those who rejected the new plan were more hardline views from the start (39% of those who opposed the original plan were firm right, while among those who opposed the new plan, 57% identified themselves as firm right).

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• Among Palestinians, the average portion of those who changed from rejection to support is just 14% for the new plan; and 18% for the original version, significantly lower than the 41% of rejectionists who changed to support when the incentives were tested in previous surveys. It is possible that unlike the Israelis, Palestinian respondents felt the trade-offs in most of the proposed pairs of incentives favored the other side; that they required less concession from the Israelis and more from the Palestinians. This perception of imbalance in the pairs might have been reinforced in this poll, at this particular time, due to the prevailing general frustration and lack of hope in light of the utter collapse of trust in US credibility and the so-called “Deal of the Century.” This might have also been responsible for the further decline, in this poll, in support for the concept of the two-state solution and the original detailed peace plan and increased doubts about the intentions of the other side.

On the Israeli side, the relative success of the pairs is seen in the fact that six of the eight pairs generated higher levels of support than the initial level for the original comprehensive plan, among Israeli Jews. Ending incitement on both sides caused the greatest level of favorable net shift, and brought support for the original plan up to 61%, from a baseline of 39% - this is consistent with the high rate of success this incentive received in previous surveys as well. Among those who heard the new version of the comprehensive plan, ending incitement was also the most successful pair, yielding a total net support of 58%, compared to 46% support in the initial responses.

For respondents of both halves of the Israeli Jewish sample, the idea that Palestinians would end the boycott, while Israel would allow Palestinians to join international organizations also generated majority support among Israeli Jews: 53% from among those who heard the new plan, and 55% from among those who heard the original comprehensive package.

Among Palestinians, the pairs were mostly not successful at raising total net support beyond original levels. For those who heard the original comprehensive package, two pairs generated supported slightly higher than the baseline of 37%: the prisoner release coupled with ongoing security cooperation with Israel attained a net support of 43%; If Israel were to allow Palestine to join international organizations while ending Palestinian boycott against Israel, enough people would shift to reach 40% support.

Among those who heard the new package, baseline support began at 42%, and none of the items reached net support that surpassed this. Once again, the top pair was the Palestinian prisoner release coupled with ongoing security cooperation, which achieved a new net support of 41%, alongside 56% opposition.

The range of new support following the pairs among those who received the new comprehensive plan was almost the same as the range among the first half of the Palestinian sample, who heard the original plan. However, because the initial support for the updated plan was higher, it was more of a challenge to raise support beyond that level.

Moreover, as we have seen through incentive testing in previous surveys, certain pairs have the opposite impact. This is the case for the release of Palestinian prisoners and ongoing security cooperation – which is among the strongest pairs raising support on the Palestinian side, but for Israelis generates lower support and higher opposition relative to responses to the original plan, and has the most negative effect of all other pairs.

However, one pair emerged as relatively successful on both sides. For Israelis, the idea that Palestine would end the international boycott against Israel while it would allow the new state to join international organizations was among the most successful pairs, and in both cases raised support above initial support for either plan. Among Palestinians, this pair ranked as the second most successful for both halves of the sample. This indicates that the incentive has potential to influence both sides favorably if made part of a future agreement.

Negotiation Framework and Third Parties: We sought to examine support for alternatives to the US-brokered negotiation processes that characterized the last two decades. In the last four surveys, we tested five models for a multi-lateral approach to negotiations: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led peace process; 3) an EU-led peace process; 4) a UN-led peace process; 5) and finally, a US-Russian-led peace process. Findings show that in all surveys, Palestinians are most receptive to the first, or Arab regional, approach (31% in December and June 2017, 27% in December 2017, and 22% in the current survey) followed by a UN and an EU approaches (19% and 14% respectively at present); 5% choose an American-Russian led peace process, and 4% selected a US-led multi-lateral process. It is worth noting that support for the preferred approach, the Arab regional, continues to decline and that the largest percentage of Palestinians (31%) chose “none of the above.”

Israeli Jews prefer practically the opposite approach, with a clear preference for US involvement: the plurality consistently chooses a US-led peace process, with 31% selecting it in the current survey, while 24% selected a US-Russian approach, and 17% selected a regional approach led by Arab states. A UN-led process was selected by just 6% of Israeli Jews and support for an EU-led process is just 3% - this reflects ongoing perceptions in Israeli society that both bodies are biased against Israel, a theme regularly repeated in public discourse. It is worth noting that only 8% of Israeli Jews selected “none of the above.” 

Among Israelis Arabs, an EU-led peace process is preferred by 20%, followed by a UN-led process (16%), and the Arab-led regional (15% each). 6% chose a US-led process and an identical percentage chose a US-Russian approach.  As in the Palestinian case, the largest percentage of Israeli Arabs (26%) selected “none of the above.”

We asked the two sides about perceptions of both the other, and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does, whether they trust and whether they fear the other side. We probed the extent of zero sum beliefs. The picture is mostly consistent with trends in our recent surveys, although assessment of each side of its own conditions, particularly among Palestinians in the West Bank, but not in the Gaza Strip, show significant improvement.

Does the other side want peace? Among Palestinians, 39% agree that most Israelis want peace, a slight increase from December 2017, when 37% of Palestinians gave this response, but a decline from June 2017 when 44% agreed with that statement. Among Israeli Jews 35% agree that Palestinians want peace, a five-point increase from December. In December 2016, 41% thought this way, then just 33% in June 2017. Among Israeli Arabs 81% agree that most Palestinians want peace, and 60% agree that Israeli Jews want peace.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: As in previous recent surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. Among Palestinians a solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy (89% - identical to December finding). The majority of Israeli Arabs feel the opposite regarding Israeli Jews: 61% agree that Israeli Jews can be trusted, and 32% disagree. On the Israeli Jewish side, 68% believe that Palestinians cannot be trusted, a drop from last December (when three quarters believed that) and June 2017 (when 77% believed that). A quarter in this poll indicated that they believe that Palestinians can be trusted.

Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 47% of Israeli Jews (compared to 51% in December), 64% of Israeli Arabs (compared to 53% in December), and 71% of Palestinians (compared to 72% in December) agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization.

Fear: More Palestinians fear Israeli soldiers and armed settlers more than they fear Israeli Jews. 52% agreed with the statement “I feel fear towards Israeli soldiers and armed settlers,” but 40% agreed with the statement made about Jews. This trend is nearly unchanged from December 2016. The current findings however, show a rise in Palestinian fear in both cases from 46% and 35% respectively.  When asked whether they agree with the statement that they fear soldiers and settlers but not civilians, only 41% agreed with that statement. There are significant differences between West Bank and Gaza respondents: 57% from the West Bank fear soldiers and settlers, while just 44% of Gazans do – this could reflect the fact that West Bankers have more significant daily contact with such figures. The Gaza percentage represents an 8-point increase, probably reflecting the high tension associated with March of Return and the resulting death of dozens of Gazans before and during the collection of data.  

Among Israeli Jews, a majority of 55% agree with the statement “I feel fear toward Palestinians,” a slight decline from December and June 2017 when 57% and 67% respectively felt that way. Among settlers 70% agree. Regarding Arab-Jewish relations among Israeli citizens, 44% of Jews agree that they fear Israeli Arabs, but only 16% of Israeli Arabs agree with a statement that they fear Israeli Jews.

General Conditions of the two sides: 62% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the Palestinian territories as bad or very bad (57% in the West Bank and 72% in the Gaza Strip) and 15% describe them as good or very good. These findings indicate a 15-point decrease in the negative assessment of conditions among West Bankers in December (when tension was high after the Trump statement on the relocation of US embassy to Jerusalem) and a 3-point increase in the Gaza Strip. Among Israeli Jews, only 16% described conditions in Israel as bad or very bad and 52% describe them as good or very good.  Among settlers, 57% give positive assessment and 16% give a negative one. Six months ago, 46% of Israeli Jews (and settlers) described conditions as good or very good.  Among Israeli Arabs, only 39% describe conditions as good or very good. Around 31% among all Israeli groups, and 23% of Palestinians, say conditions are “so-so.”

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Jews were asked about the values of: (1) a Jewish majority, (2) Greater Israel, (3) Democracy, (4) Peace. Among Israeli Jews, peace and a Jewish majority are seen as the most important values (28% and 27% respectively) though overall the percentage who chose peace has declined four points since the project began in June 2016, followed by democracy (21%) and greater Israel (18%). The portion who chose democracy rose five points since December, but has essentially remained consistent over the two years, with just a one-point rise overall from June 2016. However, there has been a notable shift in the priority placed on Jewish majority and Greater Israel: the former declined by eight points and the latter rose exactly by eight points as the total net change since June 2016; this most likely reflects the growing legitimization of the concept of annexation of portions of the West Bank in Israeli discourse, which entails the implicit acceptance of the outcome that there would not be a Jewish majority

Among the Palestinians, we asked about the following goals: (1) Israeli withdrawal and establishing a Palestinian state, (2) Obtaining right of return for refugees to ’48 Israel, (3) Establishing a democratic political system, (4) Building a pious or moral individual and religious society. For Palestinians, the ranking has been relatively stable, with little change over the course of the past two years. The top priority for Palestinian goals remains Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem (43% chose this compared to 48% last December and 43% last June), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (29%), building a democratic political system (14%, a 5-point increase from December), and building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (13%).

It is important to note that in general both societies contain a wide variety of attitudes among different subsections of the population. The overall findings regarding willingness to support a two-state solution, the detailed package, and the means of raising support are valuable – but we have also sought a deeper understanding of trends among the groups that present the greatest obstacles. These are the communities that need strategic attention in order to shift some portion to supporting a future agreement. In addition, there are groups that can be considered “swing” – they are not inherently ideologically opposed, but they are not as convinced as the top supporters. These are people who might be won over in greater numbers if their attitudes are followed closely over time. 

To this end, after five surveys over a two-year period, we are positioned to made broader statements about each key group. 

Examining the findings shows that the following groups are important to understand on the strategic levels described above: 

Israeli Jews:

• Religious
• Settlers
• Centrists
• Young (18-34)

Palestinians:

• Religious
• Hamas supporters
• Independent/undecided voters 

To be sure there is some overlap between these groups, but it is partial. For example: a high portion of settlers are religious Jews, but not all religious people are settlers. Further, note that the most supportive communities are not analyzed with this level of detail, due to the fact that they already support the principle of two states, the specific items and overall package at rates well above the other groups, and above the average for each society. These include: 

• Seculars and left-wing respondents among Israeli Jews, and Israeli Arabs/Palestinian citizens of Israel
• Fatah supporters and the somewhat religious/not religious in Palestine. Gazan respondents also show a somewhat higher level of support in general. 

The following is a brief account of how each group has responded overall to the two-state solution over time, the items of an agreement and the comprehensive package, as well as incentives to change their minds. The reciprocal pair exercise is not included as it forms the basis of this report in general. 

Israeli Jews: For this section, note that the average support for the general two state solution among Israeli Jews throughout this time is 48%, and the trend has been moving steadily downward in small increments. The average support over this time for the comprehensive agreements was 37% among Israeli Jews. The most popular item of the comprehensive accord was mutual recognition of the two states as the homeland of their respective peoples, with 63% average support among Israeli Jews; the greatest obstacle to the comprehensive two state agreement is the proposal on Palestinian right of return, with just 19% support as a two-year average among Jews. The top incentives for all Jewish Israelis who were opposed to the comprehensive package were the following:

• Jews would be guaranteed access to visit the Temple Mount (47% changed their mind leading to 61% total support)
• The Palestinians would commit to ongoing security cooperation like today (44% changed their mind, leading to 59% total support)
• Palestine officially recognizes Israel as a Jewish state (43% changed their mind, leading to a total of 59% support for the comprehensive agreement) 

Settlers. Throughout the two-year period, the average support for the two state solution in general is 23%, less than half the rate for Israeli Jews overall, but without a clear trend direction – this low level is relatively stable. Just 20% on average supported the comprehensive agreement, only slightly lower than those who supported it in principle. Mutual recognition is the most supported item in an agreement (42%), just like among Israeli Jews in general, and the two items tied for lowest support are the right of return clause, as well as the arrangement for division of the Old City (10% each). The top three incentives for raising support after changing the minds of those opposed to an overall agreement is the ability to visit the Temple Mount (54% in total would support an agreement in that case), regional peace with Arab states and a clause specifying no full right of return for Palestinians, only family reunification (each of these clauses caused 45% of settlers in total to support an agreement.) 

National Religious Jews. Throughout the two-year period, the average support for the two state solution in general is 18%. The average support for the comprehensive agreement was just 11%, significantly lower than among settlers. The main reason they reject the comprehensive agreement however is identical: Palestinian right of return and the Old City arrangement are tied for the last place, at just 7% support each; similarly, mutual recognition receives the highest support – 43%, almost identical to settlers. Like the settlers, the incentives tested in December 2017 were the most successful relative to earlier surveys: again, the ability to visit the Temple Mount is the top incentive, generating a total of 57% support among this group. 

Young Jews (18-34). Young people have been an increasingly hardline constituency in part due to demographics (a higher portion of this cohort is religious, which carries hardline political attitudes), and in part due to coming of age at a time of no experience with political progress. Throughout the two-year period, the average support for the two-state solution in general is 34%. Average support for the combined two-state package was nearly one third (32%), slightly lower than the Jewish average. They too were most supportive of mutual recognition, with a majority of 51% who support it (still lower than the Jewish average of 63%). Among young people a majority are willing to support the agreement following 16 different incentives tested over the two years (a total of nearly 30). The top such incentive was Palestinians acknowledge historic/religious links between Jews and historic Palestine, which led a total of 58% of young people to support an agreement following the shift of opinion among those opposed. Visiting the Temple Mount, ongoing security cooperation, and the reassurance that Palestinians would not have full right of return were close behind, causing 57%, 56% and 56% to support an agreement, respectively. 

Centrist Jews. In general, the center is a key constituency in Israeli society, for its powerful position within Israeli politics and the ability to join governing coalitions, combined with widespread support for the two-state ideas. About two-thirds of centrists supported the two-state solution in principle over the last two years, with mostly stable trends. However, an average of just 47% supported the detailed agreement, indicating a significant gap most likely caused by lack of detailed knowledge about the agreement. A near-consensus (78%) of this group agrees to mutual recognition, while the lowest item – as other groups – is the Palestinian right of return proposal (22% support this). However, they are among the most flexible groups in the survey: three different incentive items caused so many people to shift and support an agreement, that total support reached over 80%. By contrast to the groups above in which the successful items were those tested in December 2017, these incentives were all tested in the earlier part of the project, June 2016. The top incentives mentioned included a reassurance message on the right of return similar to the one mentioned above (88% total support following shifts), Palestine recognizing Israel as a Jewish state (84%), and the US signing a defense treaty to boost Israel’s security (81% total support).

Palestinians.

Total Palestinian support for the general principle of a two-state solution is not distinctly different from those of Israeli Jews: the average is 47%, and the trend has been slightly less even but a net decline from 51% in June 2016. The total average support for the two-state comprehensive agreement is 40%, a slightly smaller gap than among Israeli Jews. Only one item receives majority average support among Palestinians, the proposal for resolving the right of return: 51% over the two years; this leads by a large gap relative to the next most successful item – mutual recognition (43% average support). The most valuable incentives for changing Palestinians’ minds among those who opposed an agreement were as follows: 

• Freeing Palestinian prisoners (56% of those opposed changed their minds, leading to over three-quarters total who would support an agreement)
• Palestinian laborers would be allowed to work in Israel (44% change their mind, leading to two-thirds total support)
• Israel would acknowledge the historic and religious links between Palestine and its historic homeland (44% change their mind, leading to two-thirds total support) 

Religious. Among self-defined religious Palestinians, the average support for a two-state solution has been 42%. For the combined package, the average support over two years was 34%. The item which garners the most support is the proposal to resolve the right of return, with 49% support, very close to the general Palestinian average. Mutual recognition receives 38% support, while 37% support a multinational force. The items with the lowest support are demilitarization (18%) and the two Jerusalem proposals regarding the division of the city and the arrangement for the Old City (23% support for each item). Regarding incentives for those who were opposed, the most successful item was the release of prisoners: 56% of the religious Palestinians who did not support the package would move to support it if it included the release of all Palestinian prisoners, moving total support to nearly three-quarters. If Israel would recognize Palestine as an Islamic/Arab state, total support among religious Palestinians could reach over two thirds (68%). 

Hamas. General support for a two-state solution among Hamas supporters during the past two years has been 29% on average. Average support for a combined package stood at 24%, significantly lower than the 40% average among all Palestinians. As for the other groups, the proposal to resolve the Palestinian refugees issue is the most successful item and receives 41% support, while all other items lag behind. The second-highest item, mutual recognition, receives 27% support. The lowest-ranked items are demilitarization of the Palestinian state, with only 13% support, and the two Jerusalem items, with 16% support each. Over time, support for a multinational force has risen considerably: from 19% in June 2016 to 31% in June 2018. Similar to the religious group, the Palestinian prisoner release is the most successful incentive for Hamas supporters: 51% would change their mind to support an agreement if it included this item, bringing total support to 63%. Other incentives manage to push total support past the 50% mark: Israeli recognition of the Nakba and compensation for refugees (54%), Israeli recognition of Palestine as a Islamic/Arab state (54%), and an Israeli apology for the suffering caused to refugees (51%). It is important to note that the incentive item of ensuring that Palestine will be a democracy also raises total support up to 51% among Hamas supporters. 

Independents/undecided voters.  This group that does not belong to or support any of the existing Palestinian factions, such as Fatah, Hamas or third parties, and who are currently undecided about their vote, is a significant part of the population, averaging 23% of the likely voters during the past two years. Among this group, average general support for a two-state solution is 48%. Average support for a detailed package has been 39%. As with other groups, the item regarding Palestinian refugees and right to return receives the most support: 52%. Mutual recognition and the idea of a multinational force receive 39% support as a two-year average for each, while demilitarization receives only 19%. Among this group, there are several incentives which bring support up to around 70%. Israeli recognition of the historic and religious roots of Palestinians in historic Palestine, release of all Palestinian prisoners, and ensuring the freedom of Palestinian laborers to work in Israel increase total support to 69%, 72%, and 68% respectively. 

Summary conclusions regarding key constituencies: In the toughest constituencies who represent the most rejectionist attitudes on both sides, including Hamas supporters and religious Palestinians, as well as Israeli settlers, there is a minority in support of the comprehensive package, 11% in the case of religious Jews, but ranging from one-fifth to one-third among the other groups cited. 

Flexible, possible “swing” constituencies include the Israeli Jewish center, which is significantly more supportive than the hardline populations from the start, and displays both anxiety about the details of a plan, but high responsiveness to new incentive items. Palestinians who are independent or do not belong to any political faction, similar to the Israeli Jewish center, are more supportive than the hardliners, and those who initially oppose the agreement display high responsiveness to the new incentives. These populations could give a significant base of support to existing constituencies that favor a two-state solution and create a more widespread perception of public support beyond the predictable base.