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Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll 

Majority of Palestinians and Israelis prefer two-state solution over binational state or confederation

A majority of Israelis and Palestinians prefer a two-state solution as the most acceptable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, as opposed to a single binational state or a Palestinian-Israeli confederation. 

This is the clear conclusion drawn from the latest public opinion survey conducted under the auspices of the Harry S.Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. 

The March joint Israeli Palestinian poll focused on the main political outlines for a final status Palestinian- Israeli agreement. Those surveyed were asked whether they preferred a solution of two states for two peoples, a binational Palestinian-Israeli state, or a Palestinian-Israeli confederation. 

The results were as follows:

• 71% among Israelis and 57% among Palestinians supported the “two-state solution,” namely the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside of Israel.
• Compared to the two-state solution, only 24% of the Israelis and 29% of the Palestinians supported the solution of a binational state, in which Israel is unified with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to establish one state in which Palestinians and Israelis would have equal rights.
• The third outline for a political settlement is a two states for two peoples solution, with joint political institutions which will lead eventually to a confederation of the two states. Only 30% of the Israelis and 26% among Palestinians supported this solution.

In recent months the idea of a binational state has increasingly been put forth as a solution. However, it would seem to be impossible to implement this option given the strong opposition to it in the two publics.

• Palestinians and Israelis also understand that the most difficult solution to implement is the bi-national state solution: 38% of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians think so. Fewer respondents, think so about the two-state solution (29% and 32% respectively), and even less (21% and 18% respectively) believe so about the confederation.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed in person in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between March 4-6. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 501 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between March 1-10. The margin of error is 4.9%. 

The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll is supported by the Ford Foundation (Cairo) and the Adenauer Stiftung (Jerusaelm and Ramallah). The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or emailpcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

Joint Israeli Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, June 2008  

Israelis strongly oppose cease-fire with Hamas

if agreement does not include release of Gilad Shalit; Palestinians strongly oppose such an agreement if it does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between May 27 and June 7, 2008.  

Assuming that Shalit’s release was part of an agreement, the Israeli public is split in supporting an accord in which Hamas will cease the violent attacks and Kassam launching from the Gaza Strip, and Israel will stop its military operations in the Gaza Strip and remove the closure. The figures were: 50% opposing and 47% supporting such an agreement. If the agreement does not include Shalit, 68% oppose and only 30% support such an agreement. Among Palestinians, 78% support the cease-fire with Israel, but support declines sharply to around 20% if the cease-fire agreement does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt.   

The joint poll also examined Israelis’ and Palestinians’ assessments of the various negotiation tracks including the Israeli-Palestinian track, the Israeli-Syrian track and the Saudi (Arab League) plan.  

The poll indicates a hardening of Israeli opposition to the return of the Golan Heights for full peace with Syria: 67% of Israelis oppose such an agreement, compared to 56% in March 2008. There is also a noticeable decline in Israelis’ support for concessions to the Palestinians as embodied in the Clinton parameters or Taba negotiations. These parameters have been considered to be the most realistic framework for a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. For the first time since December 2003, support for Clinton’s package decreased below 50% (49%), whereas in previous polls, support reached as high as 64%. Among Palestinians, findings show that two-thirds believe that Syrian-Israeli progress or a peace agreement would contribute to successful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations or have no impact on those negotiations. Minority support among Palestinians for a package along the lines of the Taba negotiations or the Clinton Parameters remains stable at 46%.  Recent talks among Palestinians in favor of the one-state solution did not affect their public attitudes, as only 27% support this solution while a majority of 58% prefers the two-state solution.  

The weeks preceding the poll were characterized by significant political events in Israel, including the Talanski testimony and Barak’s demand of Olmert to detach himself from political decisions. Israeli data collection began after the Talanski scandal so it reflects the full impact of the testimony. Barak’s statement however was made midway the poll so it reflects only part of its impact. Israelis’ decline in support for concessions to the Palestinians and Syria can be interpreted as a result of the public’s confusion and disillusion with its leadership and Olmert’s loss of legitimacy to conduct negotiations on such crucial issues while being under police investigation.   

The Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 5 and 7, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1006 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between May 27 and June 5, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).  

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 022964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 036419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS  

(A) Current Negotiation Tracks

• Of all negotiation tracks and options currently under way, 24% of the Israelis believe that the Palestinian track should be most preferred by Israel, 20% believe that the Saudi (Arab League) option which offers a comprehensive peace agreement with all states in return for all the territories occupied in 1967 should be most preferred, and only 12% think that a full peace agreement and normalization with Syria in return for the Golan Heights should be preferred. 32% believe neither track should be preferred and only 2% think that all tracks should be pursued.
• As to which is the most promising track, 25% think it is the Palestinian track, 16% think it is the track with Syria and 17% think so about the Saudi option; 30% of the Israelis think none of the tracks currently underway is promising. These results indicate the depth of Israelis’ disenchantment with the diplomatic venues and options currently on the agenda.
• With regard to support for the main peace initiatives currently underway, our poll indicates noticeable decline among Israelis. Support for the overall package of the Clinton parameters decreased below 50% for the first time since December 2003. 49% of Israelis support the overall package now compared to majority support we found in 4 previous polls in 2005 through 2007. Among Palestinians support remains relatively stable at 46% compared to 47% last December. Opposition among Palestinians for this package stands today at 52% compared to 49% last December.  
• 67% of Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria, and 22% support it. These figures constitute a significant increase in opposition to the return of the Golan Heights compared to our March poll, where 56% opposed and 25% supported such an agreement. If in the peace agreement, Syria will commit to disconnect itself from Iran and stop its support of Hizbulla and Hamas, support increases only marginally - to 27%. In this regard, 32% of the Palestinians believe that if significant progress is made in the Israeli-Syrian talks, it will contribute to successful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, 26% think that it will represent an impediment to successful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and 35% think that it will have no impact on Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• 57% of the Israelis oppose and 39% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. These figures did not change from our March poll. Among Palestinians, 67% support the plan and 28% oppose it
• It seems that the Talanski affair stripped Olmert of his remaining legitimacy to continue with negotiations over peace agreements. Almost two thirds (64%) of the Israelis believe that it is inappropriate for Olmert to continue peace negotiations while being under police investigation; only 32% think he can continue negotiations under these circumstances. Moreover, only 32% of the Israeli public believe that the Talanski affair is an attempt by the Israeli Right to stop Olmert’s negotiations over peace agreements; 54% don’t believe so and 13% don’t know.
• 55% of the Israelis believe that the meetings between Mahmud Abbas and Ehud Olmert are not beneficial and should be stopped while 36% believe they should continue. Palestinians show even greater disappointment with these talks. Among Palestinians a sizeable majority of 68% believe the talks should come to a halt while only 27% believe they are beneficial and should be continued.
• 50% among Israelis oppose a cease fire agreement with Hamas in which Hamas will cease the violent attacks and Kassam launching from the Gaza Strip, and Israel will stop its military operations in the Gaza Strip and remove the closure; 47% support such an agreement. Opposition increases to 68% if such an agreement will not include the release of Gilad Shalit. Among Palestinians, 78% support the ceasefire with Israel but support declines sharply to 23% only if the ceasefire agreement is restricted to the Gaza Strip and does not include the West Bank. Moreover, support declines further to 20% if the agreement does not stipulate an immediate opening of the crossings, especially the Rafah crossing to Egypt.  
• Nevertheless 47% of the Israelis support and 51% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. However a sizeable Israeli majority (62%) support and only 35% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished. Among Palestinians, if Israel agrees to conduct peace negotiations with Hamas, 60% believe that Hamas should negotiate with Israel and 35% believe it should not.
• Similarly, 43% of the Israelis support and 52% oppose the release of Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiation with him, if needed to reach such an agreement. 28% of the Israelis believe that there is greater likelihood to reach a compromise agreement if negotiated with Marwan Barghouti, while 36% think that negotiations with Abu Mazin have a greater chance to succeed. 4% believe that both have similar chance to succeed, and 26% - that neither of them is likely to succeed. Among Palestinians, 31% believe that Mahmud Abbas is more able than Barghouti to force Israel to make more concessions in negotiations while 28% believe Barghouti is more able than Abu Mazin in doing so. 11% believe both are equally able to force Israel to concede while 25% believe neither one is able to do so.
• 67% of the Israelis support and 29% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement. Among Palestinians, 56% support and 43% oppose this step. The results in both publics are the same as in our March poll.
• 69% among Israelis and 66% of the Palestinians believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state during the next five years are non-existent or weak. Only 28% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians believe chances are fair or high. Despite the fact that only slightly more Palestinians believe that the one state solution is more difficult to achieve than the two state solution, a much larger percentage (58%) prefers the two-state solution and only 27% support the one state solution. The one state solution was presented to the Palestinians as one in which Israel is unified with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to establish one state whereby Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews would be equal. The two-state solution was presented as one that entails the establishment of a Palestinian state along side Israel.

 (B) Threat perceptions and support of violence  

·        Among Israelis, 63% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 74% three months ago, after the shooting attack in the religious seminary in Jerusalem. Among Palestinians 56% fear that their security and safety and that of their family is not assured compared to 63% three months ago in the aftermath of the Israeli major incursion into the Gaza Strip that left more than 130 Palestinians dead.

• With Palestinian threat perception reduced, Palestinians support of armed attacks against Israeli civilians drops considerably from 67% last March to 55% in this poll. Similarly, support for launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities such as Sderot and Ashkelon drops during the same period from 64% to 57%.
• Among Israelis, 29% suggest that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues, just as in our March poll; 43% think that Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out compared to 41% in March. Only 22% compared to 27% three months ago believe that Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, November-December 2010 

A majority of Israelis opposes intolerant steps toward Arab citizens. Palestinians incorrectly believe that the majority of Israeli Jews supports such steps  

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem. 

In recent months Israel witnessed a wave of intolerance directed toward its Arab citizens. It is expressed by calls of rabbis not to rent apartments to Arab students and by several legislation proposals pending in the Knesset. We included several questions on these issues to examine the degree of support of these expressions in the Israeli public. Our poll indicates that only minorities of Israelis and of Israeli Jews support these steps. Palestinians however err in their assessment of the Israeli sentiment in this regard and believe that the majority of Israelis supports such expressions. 

 44% of Jews support and 48% oppose the call to avoid renting apartments to Arabs. 40% support a law that would allow small communities to reject admission of new candidates based on social national or economic suitability; 48% oppose it. 41% support and 52% oppose a law that would ban the use of burkas or other face cover of women in public places. However regarding a law that would require candidates for citizenship to pledge allegiance to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, 27% of Israeli Jews oppose such a law altogether, and 55% support its application to all candidates. 

There is a significant increase in support for the Clinton permanent settlement framework among Israelis and a marginal increase among Palestinians compared to 2009. 52% of Israelis support and 39% oppose it; 40% of Palestinians support and 58% oppose it. 

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 16 and 18, 2010. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 511 adult Israeli Jews and 408 Israeli Arabs weighted according to their proportion in the population interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between November 21 and 29, 2010. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il. 

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding the recent wave of  intolerance directed toward the Arab citizens of Israel

• 44% of the Israeli Jews support the call to avoid renting apartments to Arab students in the city of Safed (Tzfat or Safad) while 48% oppose such a call. Among Israeli Arabs, 7% support and 90% oppose it. Overall, a slim majority in the general population (52%) opposes such a step. Palestinians (71%) however incorrectly believe that the Israeli majority supports such a step .
• A law considered these days by the Knesset proposes to allow small communities to reject candidates based on social, national or economic suitability. 40% of Israeli Jews 50% of Israeli Arabs oppose the law altogether.  40% of the Jews and 20% of the Arabs support such a law, 3% of the Jews and 22% of the Arabs oppose the law if it facilitates discrimination between Jews and Arabs, 5% of the Jews and 1% of the Arabs oppose the law if it facilitates discrimination between secular and religious. Palestinians (75%) however incorrectly believe that the Israeli majority supports such a law that would allow Israeli communities to reject admission of non-Jewish residents.
• Still another pending law is to ban the use of burkas or other face covers of women in public places. 52% of Israeli Jews and 88% of Israeli Arabs oppose such a law altogether. 10% of Israeli Jews and 3% of Israeli Arabs support the law if it applies only to Muslims, less than 1% of the Arabs and Jews support it if it applies only to Jews, 30% of Jews and 9% of Arabs support the law if it applies to all. Palestinians (78%) however incorrectly believe that the Israeli majority supports such a law.
• As to a law that would require candidates for citizenship to pledge allegiance to Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state, 6% of the Jews and 3% of the Arabs support such a law if it applies only to non- Jews; 9% of the Jews and 8% of the Arabs support the law if it applies only to Jews. 55% of the Jews and 17% of the Arabs support a law that would apply to all candidates for citizenship. 27% of Jews and 69% of Arabs oppose such a law altogether. Palestinians (71%) correctly perceive that the Israeli majority supports such a law.

(B) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda  

The Saudi Plan

• 61% of the Israelis oppose and 32% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee’s problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In our October 2010 poll 56% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 33% supported it. Among Palestinians, 54% support the plan and 42% oppose it; 57% supported it in October and 39% opposed it.

Clinton/Geneva Parameters 

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues several times in the past since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the intensified diplomatic activity of the US with regard to the conflict and the efforts to resume the peace talks between the parties.

• The findings indicate that support for the overall package and most of its components on both sides increased compared to August 2009.
• 52% of the Israelis support the overall package and 39% oppose it. This level of support is significantly higher than in 2009. It is similar to the levels of support we observed in the years 2006, 2007 and 2008, but represents a significant decline compared to the close to two thirds majority support for the package among Israelis in 2004 and 2005.
• Among Palestinians 40% support the overall package in the current poll, compared to 38% support in August 2009.
• Since we have been tracking these issues in 2003, there was only once majority support for this package on both sides, in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat which was followed by a surge of optimism and considerable moderation in both publics. 

Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton permanent status package. 
 

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 49% support or strongly support and 50% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in August 2009, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 49% and opposition at 50%.

Among Israelis 49% support and 43% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of the West bank and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In August 2009 47% of the Israelis supported this component while 48% opposed it.

(2) Refugees

Among Palestinians 41% support and 57% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In August 2009, 37% agreed with an identical compromise while 61% opposed it.

Among Israelis 36% support such an arrangement and 52% oppose it. In August 2009, 36% supported it and 58% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 36% support and 63% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In August 2009, an identical compromise obtained 31% support and 68% opposition.

Among Israelis, 38% agree and 58% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In August 2009, 34% supported this arrangement and 62% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 24% support and 74% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in August 2009 24% support, and opposition reached 76%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

Among Israelis 62% support and 34% oppose this arrangement compared to 56% support and 40% opposition obtained in August 2009.

(5)  Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 38% support and 61% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In August 2009, 34% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 64% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 52% support and 39% oppose this arrangement compared to 49% who supported it and 44% who opposed it in August 2009.

(6) End of Conflict  

In the Palestinian public 58% support and 41% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. In August 2009 55% supported and 44% opposed this item.

In the Israeli public 68% support and 25% oppose this component in the final status framework. In August 2009, similarly, 68% of the Israelis supported it while 28% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 40% support and 58% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In August 2009, 38% supported and 61% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 52% support and 39% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In August 2009 46% supported and 46% opposed such a package. 

It is important to see that the pattern of support for the overall package is more than the sum of its parts, suggesting that people’s calculus is compensatory and trade-offs are considered. Despite strong reservations regarding some of the components, the overall package always receives greater support in both publics, where the desirable components and the chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the undesirable parts. 

• 32% of the Israelis estimate that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package; 51% believe that the majority opposes it. These perceptions tap the normative facet of public opinion and indicate that the package has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 40% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 51% believe that the majority opposes it.
• A  majority among Palestinians (53%) incorrectly assumes that the majority of Israelis oppose the package, The assessment of Israelis of the Palestinian majority is split: 40% of Israelis think that a majority of Palestinians supports the parameters, 41%% think that a majority opposes them. 
   

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement Framework 2003-2010 

(C) Conflict management and threat perceptions 

• Given the stalemate in the direct negotiations, 10% of the Israelis and 19% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will continue and armed confrontations will stop, 46%of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will continue but some armed attacks will continue as well, 36% of the Israelis and 35% of the Palestinians think that armed attacks will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations.
• 54% of the Israelis support and 41% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. However 57% think that the majority of the Israeli public opposes such negotiations and only 24% think a majority supports it.
• 27% of Israelis support full construction freeze in all settlements, 37% support the continuation of construction only in the settlement blocks which will remain under Israeli rule in a future agreement, and 29% support unlimited construction in all settlements. This distribution of opinion is quite similar to that obtained in October 2010.
• In our poll we also examine periodically Israelis’ and Palestinians’ readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 63% of the Israeli public, Jews and Arabs alike, support such a mutual recognition; 29% of the Jews and 32% of the Arabs oppose such a mutual recognition of identity. Among Palestinians, 49% support and 49% oppose this step. In October 2010, 64% of the Israelis supported and 24% opposed this mutual recognition of identity, among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were 49% and 48%.
• Among Israelis, 54% are worried and 43% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, just like in our previous poll in October. Among Palestinians 75% are worried and 25% are not worried that they or a member of their family might be hurt by Israelis or that their land might be confiscated or homes demolished. In October 76% of the Palestinians were worried and 24% were not worried.
• Neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider it likely that an independent Palestinian State will be established next to the State of Israel in the next five years. 71% of the Palestinians and 66% of the Israelis think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low; 29% of Israelis and 27% of Palestinians believe the chances are medium or high. In October 2010, two thirds of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis thought that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low.
• Now that the US has stopped to demand an Israeli settlement freeze as a condition for returning to direct negotiations and after Israel has resumed settlement construction, 67% of the Palestinians oppose and 30% support Palestinian entry into indirect negotiations with Israel through American mediation. Despite this, 59% of the Palestinians believe that Israel would come out the winner if the Palestinian side did not return to indirect negotiations with Israel through American mediation. While only 13% believe the Palestinians will come out the winner, 16% believe both sides will come out losers and 9% believe both sides will come out winners.
• In the absence of negotiations, going to the UN Security Council to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state is the option receiving the greatest level of support among Palestinians (31%) followed by the option calling for a return to armed confrontations and attacks against Israel (29%), and organizing widespread peaceful and nonviolent confrontations and dissolving the PA (16% each). 

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, August 2009 

Israelis are more apprehensive and Palestinians somewhat more favorable about US involvement in the Peace Process compared to their expectations last December after Obama’s election

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 25 June 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including several armed attacks by Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel, the Israeli army incursions into Jenin’s refugee camp, and the killing of al Jazeera journalists Shireen Abu Akleh by Israeli gunfire in one of the Jenin incursions.  Other developments included the organization of the Flag March by the Israeli right wing inside the Old City of East Jerusalem without ending up in an armed confrontation between Hamas and Israel as many had expected. Internally, a student body associated with Hamas was able to win the majority of seats in the Birzeit University student council elections, President Abbas transferred control of the secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council, and assigned to the PLO Executive Committee member from Fatah, Hussien al Sheikh, the responsibilities of the Committee’s secretariate. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the second quarter of 2022 show a significant change in the domestic balance of power in favor of Hamas and its leadership only three months after Fatah had managed to restore some of the popularity it had lost in the aftermath of the April 2021 cancellation of the legislative and presidential elections, the May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel, and the killing of the opposition figure Nizar Banat at the hands of the Palestinian security services.

Today, Hamas and Fatah enjoy almost the same level of public support, with the gap narrowing to one percentage point in favor of Hamas after it was six points in favor of Fatah in March 2022. It is noticeable that the drop in Fatah’s popularity has occurred in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, though the drop has been greater in the latter. Fatah’s declining popularity is evident in two other ways. For one, the gap in popularity between the head of Fatah, President Abbas, and the head of Hamas, Ismail Haniyyeh, has now reached 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh after it was only 16 points three months ago. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’ resignation, from the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA), has risen to over three quarters while those still in favor of Abbas have dwindled in size to less than one fifth of the public. Another indicator of Fatah’s decline can be seen when looking at the widening gap between those who think Hamas is the more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to those who think “Fatah under Abbas” is more deserving than Hamas. Today, the gap stands at 10 percentage points in favor of Hamas compared to just two points in favor of Hamas three months ago.

Perhaps one of the main reasons behind the shift in the internal balance of power has been the rise of Hamas' role over the past few months in defending Jerusalem. Other reasons might have been the release by the PA of those Preventive Security men accused of killing Nizar Banat on bail, or because the vast majority of the public believes that the Palestinian government does not make an effort to mitigate the consequences of the rise in prices, or the objection of the majority of the public to President Abbas's internal decisions, such as the transfer of powers over the Secretariat of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council or the appointment  of PLO Executive Committee member Hussein al-Sheikh to serve as the head of the Secretariat of that Committee,.

In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the results for the second quarter indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution.  The results show one of the likely reasons for the decline: a significant increase in the belief that a two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion, rising to 70%. But the findings also indicate a similar decline in support for a one-state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, indicating a hardening of public attitudes similar to what we saw in mid-2021 in the aftermath of the Hamas-Israel war. Support for a return to an armed uprising is also rising to form a clear majority, reinforced by a broad support for the recent shootings inside Israel by individual Palestinians who did not belong to known forces and movements.  However, there are significant differences in the attitudes of Gazans compared to West Bankers, where the largest percentage of the latter remains opposed to armed attacks.

Increased Palestinian-Israeli clashes over the past three months may have contributed to this attitudinal shift regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations, starting with the Israeli Flag March, the repeated incursions into the Jenin camp, the killing of the very well-known and liked Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, the crackdown by the Israeli police on the raising of the Palestinian flag, and the frequent confrontations between the Israeli police and the Palestinian worshippers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque; all might have led to a hardening of the Palestinian public attitudes.

However, it is worth noting that the percentage of those viewing positively the recent "confidence-building" measures between the PA and Israel has risen to about two-thirds. Moreover, despite the rising tension over al Aqsa Mosque, the majority continues to view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a national conflict, over land and sovereignty, rather than a religious conflict. 

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyyeh, the former receives 33% of the popular vote and the latter 55%
• In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 61% and the latter 34%
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%; 77% demand the resignation of Abbas
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 36% of the popular vote and Fatah 35%
• 33% say Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people and only 23% say “Fatah under Abbas’ is more deserving

A majority of 71%  supports the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 54%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 49% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 55% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 31% and Haniyeh 50%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 47% and from among those, the former receives 26% and the latter 61%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (30%) selected him in an open-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (16%), Mohammad Dahlan (6%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%), and 34% said they do not know or have not decided. It is worth noting that this is the first time that al Sheikh’s name has been mentioned by the respondents in an open-ended question. This means that we will continue to ask about his standing as a successor in the next four quarterly poll. In an closed ended questions about succession, Marwan Barghouti is preferred by 39%, Haniyyeh by 19%, Dahlan by 6%, Sinwar by 5%, Khalid Mishal by 2%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 1% each. Al Sheikh’s name was not among those listed in the closed ended question.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 73% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 72% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 69% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 7% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 37% (compared to 47% three months ago).

The largest percentage (33%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 38% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 31% selected Hamas, 29% Fatah under Abbas, and 33% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• 57% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the PLC’s secretariate to the Speaker of PLO National Council; 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to appoint Hussein al Sheikh as the Secretary General of the PLO Executive Committee
• 59% believe the electoral  victory of Hamas’ student body at Birzeit University is an expression of protest against the performance of the PA
• 79% say the PA is not doing enough to mitigate the consequences of high prices
• 26% want to emigrate from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• 86% believe there is corruption in the PA
• 59% believe the PA has now become a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset
• Only one quarter is optimistic about the future of reconciliation
• A large majority does not expect the Shtayyeh government to succeed in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the holding of general elections, or the improvement of economic conditions

A majority of 57% is opposed to President Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the Secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council; only 27% support Abbas’ decision.  The opposition the president’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (54%), among the holders of BA degree (64%) compared to the illiterates (36%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (73% and 83% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (36%).

Similarly, a majority of 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to ask the PLO’s Executive Committee member from Fatah, Husein al Sheikh, to assume the responsibility over the secretariate of that Committee; only 23% support Abbas’ decision.

In explaining the reasons for the electoral victory of the Hamas-affiliated student body at Birzeit University, the majority (59%) attributed it to students’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the PA while about one third (32%) said the victory came as a result in a shift in public opinion in favor of Hamas. The belief that there is a shift in public attitudes in favor of Hamas is higher in the Gaza strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (26%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (37%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (33%), among refugees (36%) compared to non-refugees (29%), among merchants and students (47% and 40% respectively) compared to laborers and housewives (25% and 32% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (38%) compared to those who work in the private sector (32%), among the lowest income group (38%) compared to the highest income group (34%), among the religious (40%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (27% and 17% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (61%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (22% and 16% respectively).

The majority (57%) of the public says it was supportive of the teachers’ strike who were demanding better representational and associational rights from the government and led to a partial halt to the educational process in public schools; 31% say they were opposed. Support for the strike is higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 63% and 48% respectively.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 48%. The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 18% say it is doing so.

26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 27% and in the West Bank at 26%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 37% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

42% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 54% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 38% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 62% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 55% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.

26% are optimistic and 70% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 28%.

After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 73% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 23% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 75% expects failure and 19% expects success.

The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 41%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (11% each), Palestine TV (10%), Maan (6%), al Arabiya (3%), al Mayadeen (2%), and al Manar (1%). 

(3) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the two-state solution declines from 40% to 28%
• Support for the one-state with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis declines from 32% to 22%
• 55% support a return to confrontations and armed intifada and 47% support dissolving the PA
• 59% view armed attacks against Israelis inside Israel as serving the national interest in ending the occupation and 56% support these attacks
• 65% view positively Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures
• 78% think the versus of the Quran contain a prophecy regarding the demise of the state of Israel; but 63% do not believe that this demise will take place in the year 2022
• A semi consensus that the killing of the journalist Shireen Abu Akleh was a deliberate assassination
• A majority of 53% believes the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains national, over land and sovereignty and 45% believe it has become a religious conflict   
• Half of the public welcomes the resumption of US aid to the PA

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 69%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  A majority of 70% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 60% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 32%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 48% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 51% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

A majority of 59% says that the armed attack inside Israel carried out by Palestinians unaffiliated with known armed groups contributes to the national interest of ending the occupation; 37% believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest. The belief that armed attacks contribute to the national interest is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (46%), in cities and refugee camps (59% respectively) compared to villages/towns (50%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (69%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or older (57%), among refugees (68%) compared to non-refugees (51%), among students (66%) compared to professionals (51%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in  the private sector (55%), among the lowest income group (71%) compared to the highest income group (55%), and among supporters of Hamas (86%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third powers (51% and 55% respectively).

Similarly, a majority of 56% (73% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank) supports armed attacks similar to those carried out lately by unaffiliated Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel; 39% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) say they are opposed to such armed attacks.

A majority of 56% expects the acts of armed resistance in the Jenin refugee camp to spread to other parts of the West Bank. However, a large minority of 41% expects the acts of armed resistance to remain restricted to the Jenin camp.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 65% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 63% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 50% chose armed struggle (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank), 22% negotiations, and 21% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 25% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 69% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

65% are opposed, and 29% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.  

The vast majority (78%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 17% say it does not.  However, the majority (63%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 25% say they believe it.

When asked why they think Hamas did not launch rockets against Israel on the day of the Flag March throughout East Jerusalem, the largest percentage (35%) said that the movement did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for; one third said that Hamas was willing to comply with the advice and mediation of Arab and international actors. Only 13% said it was afraid of the Israeli reaction against it and the Gaza Strip. One tenth (11%) said that Hamas did not threaten to launch rockets against Israel if he Flag March took place in the Old City of East Jerusalem. The belief that Hamas did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (28%), in refugee camps (43%) compared to villages and cities (30% and 35% respectively), among women (37%) compared to men (33%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (44%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (31%), among the holders of BA degree (38%) compared to the illiterates (19%), among students (39%) compared to employees and laborers (33% each), among the lowest income group (44%) compared to the highest income group (29%), among the religious (37%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (34% and 28% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (48%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (28% and 31% respectively).

The largest percentage (40%) believes that Hamas’ unwillingness to launch rockets against Israel during the Flag March will encourage Israeli to take more measures against Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque. By contrast, 26% said that Hamas’ decision will deter Israel in the future, and 28% said it will neither encourage nor deter Israel.

A consensus is emerging regarding the killing of the al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh: 92% believe Israel has deliberately sought to kill her while only 5% think the killing by the Israeli army was accidental.

A majority of 61% believes that the reasons the Israeli police attacked the funeral procession of Abu Akleh in Jerusalem had to do with the fac that the funeral demonstrated the unity of the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. On the other hand, one third thinks that the police attack was prompted by the raising of the Palestinian flag during the funeral.

When asked why Israel insists on preventing the raising of the Palestinian flag in Jerusalem and other occupied territories and in areas inside Israel, the public was split evenly, 49% said the reason has to do with Israeli rejection of the Palestinian national identity while an identical percentage said it has to do with Israeli fear of the Palestinian national identity.

A majority of 53% (56% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) says that despite the repeated incidents of attacks by the Israeli police against Palestinian worshipers at al Aqsa Mosque, the conflict remains first and foremost over land and sovereignty while 45% say the conflict has now become first and foremost a religious one. The percentage of those who believe the conflict has now become religious is higher in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (41%), in cities and refugee camps (46% and 45% respectively) compared to villages/towns (39%), among the illiterates (58%) compared to the holders of BA degree (45%), among those who work in the private sector (50%) compared to those who work in the public sector (42%), among the highest income group (51%) compared to  the lowest income group (43%), among the religious (50%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (42% and 41% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (58%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (39% and 41% respectively). 

We asked the public about the expectations that the US aid to the PA will soon resume and asked if they welcome or do not welcome aid resumption. The public is evenly split on US aid: 48% welcome it and 49% do not. It is worth noting that Gazans are more likely to welcome US aid, by 59%, while the percentage drops to 40% in the West Bank.  The percentage of those welcoming the resumption of US aid is higher in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in cities and refugee camps (49%) compared to villages/towns (41%), among refugees (53%) compared to non-refugees (44%), among employees and professionals (57% and 55% respectively) compared to farmers and merchants (33% and 36%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in the private sector (43%), among the highest income group (57%) compared to the lowest income group (52%), and among supporters of Fatah (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (44% and 48% respectively). 

(4) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

• 42% blame Russia for starting the war in Ukraine and 35% blame the Ukraine
• Three quarters want the PA to remain neutral in the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine

The largest percentage of the public (42%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 35% blame Ukraine. An overwhelming majority (75%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 6% think it should stand with Ukraine. A majority of 43% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 53% are not worried. Three months ago, the percentage of those expressing worry that the war would expand stood at 54%.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe the ending of occupation to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state should be the top priority of the Palestinian people
• Unemployment and poverty followed by corruption are the two most important problems confronting the Palestinian society today; but the largest percentage (32%) view the ending of the Israeli occupation as the most urgent problem.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 9% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 26% (29% in the Gaz Strip and 23% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; 25% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 17% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 12% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 13% (17% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 23% said it is corruption, 17% said it is unemployment, 16% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13 and 17 September 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli army without the participation of Hamas, the visit of the US president Joe Biden to Bethlehem and his meeting with president Abbas, the appointment of Yair Lapid as a prime minister replacing Bennet and the setting of a date for new Israeli elections, an announcement by the United Arab Emirates of $25  millions in support to al Makasid Hospital in East Jerusalem, talk about opening the Israeli Ramon airport to Palestinian travel, an Israeli decision to increase the number of Gazan laborers working in Israel, an attempted assassination against the former deputy prime minister in Hamas’ government, Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir, near Nablus, a PA announcement that salaries of Palestinian laborers working in Israel would be paid via Palestinian banks, plans by the PA to reduce the number of employees working in the public sector, and Abbas talk during his visit to Germany of 50 Holocausts.  This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The results of the third quarter of 2022 show a limited change in the domestic balance of power as the gap between Fatah and Hamas is now two percentage points in favor of Fatah while, three months ago, it was one point in favor of Hamas. Similarly, the gap in the 

popularity of president Abbas vs. Ismail Haniyyeh has now narrowed to 15 percentage points in favor of Haniyyeh while, three months ago, it was 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh. It seems there are two main reasons for this limited change: the disapproval of Hamas, especially in the West Bank, regarding its non-involvement in the armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad and Israel in August and the rise of Abbas popularity, also especially in the West Bank, in light of the Israeli and German criticism of his reference to the “Holocaust” when describing the Israeli massacres against the Palestinians.

Among the findings on the domestic side, three in particular stand out and should raise an alarm:

1. There is a widespread worry among all Palestinian sectors, reaching about 70% in the West Bank, who view the attempted assassination of Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir as an indication that an internal armed strife might erupt in the West Bank when conditions are ripe, as happened in the past in the Gaza Strip.
2. The narrative of the PA government, regarding the transfer of salary payments to Palestinian laborers who work in Israel, has no credibility among the public as the poll finds only one in ten Palestinians trusting the PA statements regarding this matter while the vast majority stand with the laborers and sympathize with their fears.
3. There is a widespread rejection, reaching about 80%, of the PA government plans to cut down the number of the public sector employees. In case the PA goes ahead with its plans, a large majority wants the cuts to take place in the security sector only which reveals existing concerns among the public regarding the justification for having such a large security sector to begin with.

On Israeli- Palestinian relations, support for the two-state solution and for the one-state solution rises in this poll. It now resembles the support that existed about 6 months ago. This development is accompanied, as expected, with a decline in the percentage of those who think the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion. The findings also show a continued rise in the positive view of the public regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures, reaching 70% for the first time, with an even greater appreciation of the measure in which a larger number of work permits are issued by Israel for laborers from the Gaza Strip.

Perhaps because of the above, but also due to the negative public assessment of the last armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad and Israel, the findings indicate a significant decline in support for armed attacks or a return to an armed intifada and a significant rise in support for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 69% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 29% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 78% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 57%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 53% of the votes (compared to 55% for Haniyeh and 33% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 37% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 59%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 40% and Haniyeh 46%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 63% and Haniyeh 33%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 45% and from among those, the former receives 32% and the latter 60%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (41%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Mohammad Dahlan (5%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), Mohammad Shtayyeh (3%), Hussein al Sheikh (2%), and 22% said they do not know or have not decided.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 26% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, a vast majority of 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 77% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 34% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 44% (compared to 43% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 21% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 37% three months ago).
• 27% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 26% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 42% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 33% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 38% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 76% and in the West Bank at 54%.
• 25% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 29% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 26% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 27% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 73% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 86% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 71% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 46% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 54% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (57%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 38% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 36% viewed it as an asset.
• 25% are optimistic and 73% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 26%.
• After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 25% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 73% expects failure and 22% expects success.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 67% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 68% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 49%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 41%.
• We asked the public about its expectations regarding the identity of the perpetrators of the attempted assassination against Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir near Nablus two months ago. The responses did not indicate a clear trend but about 27% pointed the figure at the Palestinian security services and Fatah: 14% said the security services and 13% said armed men from Fatah. Additionally, about 14% said the assassination attempt came as a result of a struggle within al Najah university, where Dr. al Sha’ir works, while an identical percentage accused the Israeli army, 9% thought it resulted from personal or family conflict, and 6% thought it resulted from conflict within Hamas.
• A large majority of 63% is worried that this assassination attempt might lead to internal armed confrontations when conditions are ripe as had happened in the past in the Gaza Strip; 28% say they are not worried. The level of worry is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 69% and 53% respectively.
• A majority of 61% is opposed the lawyers’ strike which was waged to protest the decisions of the PA president to amend legislation affecting the judiciary; 26% stand in favor.
• An overwhelming majority of 79% says it opposes PA plans to cut down the size of the public sector while only 19% say they are in favor.  When asked about the sector whose size should be cut, the majority (62%) selected the security sector, 15% selected education, 10% selected health, and 6% selected social affairs.
• The overwhelming majority (85%) expresses solidarity with Palestinian laborers who work in Israel in rejecting the PA announcement that the salaries of these laborers will be paid to them via Palestinian banks while only 12% say they trust the government assurances to the laborers that this measure will help protect their interests, allowing them to benefit from the banking services, and that no new taxes will be imposed on those salaries. Trust in the PA assurances stands at 6% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip.
• The vast majority (73%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 25% say it is doing so.
• We asked the public about the burden imposed on their households due to the rise in prices and asked them to tell us which sector or sectors were the most affected: 48% selected the food sector; 27% selected energy such as electricity, solar, and gasoline, 14% said rent, 6% said education, 3% said transportation, and 3% said health.   
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 29%, followed by al Aqsa TV (11%), Maan, Palestine Today TV, and Palestine TV (10% each), al Arabiya (4%), al Mayadeen (3%), and al Manar (1%).

(3) Islamic Jihad-Israel armed confrontation:

• The largest percentage (42%) thinks that neither Israel nor Islamic Jihad won the last armed confrontations between the two sides last month. But 27% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank) think Israel came out a winner while only 12% think Islamic Jihad came out a winner. Surprisingly, 11% think Hamas, who did not participate in the confrontation, came out a winner.
• Half of the public (50%) says that Hamas’ decision not to become directly involved in the armed exchange between Islamic Jihad and the Israeli army was the correct decision while 37% say it was the wrong decision. The percentage of those who think it was the correct decision is much higher in the Gaza Strip (68%) than in the West Bank (38%).
• But only 27% expect Hamas’ decision to lead to an improvement in economic conditions in the Gaza Strip while the largest percentage (42%) thinks economic conditions will remain unchanged and 22% think they will worsen. In the Gaza Strip, 34% expect conditions to improve while only 23% of West Bankers think that.

(4) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 37% and opposition stands at 60%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 28%.   When few details were added, such as “two states for two peoples” along the lines of 1967 with small and equal border modifications, support rose slightly to 38% and opposition dropped to 57%.
• A majority of 64% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 76% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 18% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 70% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 30% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 67% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 22%.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 55% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 48% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 46% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 55% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 41% chose armed struggle (50% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank), 30% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 22% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 69% said it looks positively, while 27% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 65% of the public said it viewed these measures positively. A vast majority of 78% looks positively at the Israeli decision to increase the number of laborers from the Gaza Strip who work in Israel; only 20% look at that decision negatively.
• We asked the public about its willingness to use the Israeli Ramon airport, located near Elate, instead of the Amman or Cairo airports: 41% expressed willingness to do so while a majority of 55% said it is not willing to do so.  But when we asked the public if it looks positively or negatively about the possibility of allowing Gaza residents to use that airport, the majority (58%) said it looks at such a step positively and only 37% said it looks at it negatively.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 68% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about support and opposition to negotiations with Israel under Arab and international sponsorship, 42% were in favor and 56% against.
• Similarly, when asked about PA negotiations with the current Israeli prime minister, Yair Lapid, only 35% said they opposed such negotiations while 30% said they support negotiations with him on a peace agreement and confidence building measures while 13% said they support negotiations if restricted to a peace agreement and an identical percentage said they support negotiations with him if restricted to confidence building measures. In other words, a total of 43% are in favor of negotiations with Lapid about a peace agreement and an identical percentage is in favor of negotiations with him about confidence building measures.  
• The largest percentage (36%) expects Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and form the next government while 21% expect Lapid to win the elections; 26% say neither will win.
• 61% are opposed, and 34% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the US administration under president Joe Biden.  
• In light of the visit to Bethlehem by the US president Joe Biden, 53% say they are less optimistic about the prospects for improvement in economic conditions after the visit and the meeting with Abbas while only 16% express optimism and 26% say they are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
• Similarly, 53% are less optimistic that internal conditions, such as reconciliation or the holding of elections, will improve now after the visit by Biden; 17% are more optimistic and 27% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
• Moreover, 58% are less optimistic that Israeli-Palestinian relations, such as agreement on more confidence building measures or reduction in settlement construction, will see improvement now after the Biden visit; only 13% are more optimistic and 27% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
• Despite the overall lack of optimism, 43% say they now, after the Biden visit, expect the US to increase its aid to the PA while 53% say the do not expect that.
• Two-thirds think it was right for Abbas to use the “Holocaust” in reference to Israeli massacres against Palestinians during his visit to Germany; 26% think it was wrong for him to use that term.

(5) Support from the UAE to East Jerusalem hospital:

• We asked about the support provided by the United Arab Emirates to al Makasid Hospital in East Jerusalem: 61% said the support helps the steadfastness of the Palestinians while 36% said it does not help.
• We then asked about expectations that other Arab countries, that recently normalized relations with Israel, such as Bahrain and Morocco, would also provide similar support to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank: a majority of 54% said it does not expect that while 42% said they expect that.
• We then asked the public if it welcomes or does not welcome support to Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip from these countries that recently normalized relations with Israel: two thirds said the do not and 31% said they do.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 40% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 17% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 27% (28% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; another 27% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% (34% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 11% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 8% (11% in the Gaza Strip and 6% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (36%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the split or division, and 9% said it is the internal violence.

10-12 March 2005

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between March 10-12, 2005. The poll deals with the peace process,Sharon’s disengagement plan, Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation, and internal Palestinian matters. Total size of the sample is 1319 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (835) and the Gaza Strip (484) in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3% and rejection rate 2%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

MAIN RESULTS:

The poll finds a significant change in public attitudes regarding violence, particularly suicide attacks. Support for such attacks has dropped sharply to its lowest level in seven years. This public rejection of a return to violence at this time reflects continued and widespread public support for mutual cessation of violence, and a desire to return to normal life and to allow the newly elected president, Abu Mazin, a chance to revive the peace process. But the public is opposed to steps taken by the Palestinian Authority (PA) to crackdown on those who are carrying out attacks against Israelis, such as arrests. This opposition might reflect public perception that the future of the peace process is still uncertain and that Israel might not be serious about or willing to end its occupation and that therefore the PA should maintain the option of returning to violence if the need arise in the future.

The findings indicate also that the public prefers a see negotiations leading to a permanent agreement rather than a new interim one. This attitude reflects public belief that the Osloprocess has failed in part due to its interim and partial nature. The public seems more willing than any time before to pay the price of a permanent settlement as the findings show greater levels of support for reconciliation between the two peoples once a permanent settlement is reached.

Three quarters of the public view, as the case has been during the past year, the Israeli disengagement plan as a victory for armed struggle. Despite that, two thirds would oppose continued armed attacks against Israelis from the Gaza Strip once the Israelis fully withdraw.

Internally, the findings show a rise in the popularity of Hamas and a decline in the support for Fateh. The public believes that Hamas’ victory in the December 2004 and January 2005 local elections has been due to incorruptibility of its candidates while Fateh and the PA are perceived as corrupt. The public also believes that the unity and discipline within Hamas vs. the fragmentation and lack of discipline within Fateh has been a second reason for Hamas’ victory.

(1) Peace Process

• ·      Support for bombing (or suicide) attacks inside Israel drops from 77% last September to 29% in this poll. But support for arrest of the perpetrators of suicide attacks does not exceed 40%.
• ·      84% support return to negotiations and 59% prefer a permanent, rather than interim agreement. 59% believe that it is possible to reach a compromise agreement with the Israeli leadership.
• ·      59% support the Road Map and 35% oppose it.
• ·      79% support the participation of Hamas in the negotiations with Israel while 79% prefer to see more active American involvement in the search for a peace agreement.
• ·      A majority believes that the Oslo peace process failed because Israel was not forthcoming and continued to build Israeli settlements. Similarly, a majority blames Israel for the failure of the Camp David Summit believing the Israeli offer was insufficient.

Findings show that support for the Tel Aviv night club suicide attack, which took place about three weeks ago, reaches 29% compared to 77% for the Bir Shiba suicide attack in September 2004 and 75% for the Maxim Restaurant suicide attack in Haifa in October 2003. Opposition to the Tel Aviv attack reaches 67%. But support for the steps taken by the PA to punish the perpetrators, such as arrests, does not exceed 40% while 57% oppose them. Public opposition to a crackdown on those who commit violence against Israelis might reflect belief that the peace process has not yet been revived. For example, only 44% view positively the achievements of Sharm al Sheikh summit in reviving the peace process. In other words, the public seeks to maintain the option of returning to violence if diplomacy fails.

Opposition to the Tel Aviv suicide attack increases in the Gaza Strip (70%) compared to the West Bank (65%), among holders of BA degree (71%) compared to illiterates (61%), among retired individuals and among employees (86% and 75% respectively) compared to students (62%), among the eldest (69%) compared to the youngest (61%), among individuals willing to buy lottery tickets (74%) compared to those unwilling to buy them (64%), and among supporters of Fateh (75%) compared to supporters of Hamas (53%).

In the current Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the public organizes its short term priorities as follows: release of prisoners is on top followed by three issues having the same exact importance: freezing settlement construction, stop building the separation barrier inside the West Bank, and return of laborers to work inside Israel. The next priority is the removal of Israeli checkpoints. In the West Bank alone, the list of priorities puts stopping the barrier in second place after release of prisoners, then the freeze of settlement construction, and the removal of checkpoints. In the Gaza Strip, release of prisoners’ is also the top priority but it is followed by return of laborers to work inside Israel.

The poll also examined Palestinian preferences concerning the next steps that should be taken in the course of the peace process. 84% of the Palestinians support a return to negotiations on a comprehensive settlement and 59% prefer immediate return to final status negotiations on all issues in dispute at once, while 31% prefer a gradual step by step approach. Despite these preferences, 51% of the Palestinians say they will support their leadership decision to proceed in the peace process with the approach they prefer less, and 41% will not support their leadership decision in such a case. 

59% of the Palestinians believe that it is possible to reach a compromise settlement with the other side’s current leadership while 41% don’t think it is possible. 62% believe the Palestinian leadership is strong enough to convince its constituency to accept such an agreement. Moreover, 65% of the Palestinians believe that the Israeli leadership is strong enough to convince its public to accept such a compromise.

Palestinians were further asked to assess the reasons for the Oslo process and the Camp David summit failures. A majority of the Palestinians (54%) put the blame mainly on Israel for not being forthcoming enough and continuing to build settlements. Only 5% of the Palestinian believe that the main reason for why the Oslo process failed was because the Palestinians were not forthcoming enough and maintained the use of violence. 33% blame the step by step approach for the failure. As to the Camp David summit, 50% of the Palestinians believe it failed because Barak yielded much less than he claimed he did. Only 5% believe that it failed because Arafat did not seriously intend to reach a final and comprehensive settlement with Israel.  36% of Palestinians think the problems were too numerous and the differences too big to be solved all at once.

59% of the Palestinians support the Quartet’s Roadmap plan compared to 35% among Palestinians who oppose it. Moreover, 79% support the participation of the Hamas in the negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel compared to 19% who oppose it. Despite this, an identical percentage (79%) believe that the US should increase its involvement in trying to solve the Israeli Palestinian conflict, while 15% say it should decrease its involvement.

(2) Sharon’s Disengagement Plan

• ·      Three quarters see Sharon’s disengagement plan as victory for armed struggle against Israeli occupation.
• ·      Only 30% believe the PA has high capacity to control things in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal.
• ·      Two thirds oppose continued armed attacks against Israelis from the Gaza Strip after a full Israeli withdrawal from it.

Three quarters of the Palestinians see Sharon’s plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, while 23% do not see it as such. Despite that, only 29% of the Palestinians support and 68% oppose the continuation of armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip after full Israeli disengagement.  30% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Authority has high capacity to control matters in the Gaza Strip after Israel’s disengagement, 43% of think it has reasonable capacity and 23% think it has low or no capacity.

(3) Reconciliation between the Two Peoples

• ·      81% support reconciliation between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples after reaching a peace agreement with Israel.
• ·      Increase in the levels of support for various reconciliation measures: 89% support open borders between the two states; 73% support joint economic ventures and institutions; 40% support building joint political institutions; 42% support taking legal measures against incitement; and 13% support adopting school curriculum that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians

With Arafat’s departure from the scene and with the renewed political activity, expectations and support for reconciliation following a comprehensive solution increased in a meaningful way for the first time. 24% of the Palestinians expect full reconciliation to be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years compared to 15% last June. 81% of the Palestinians support reconciliation today compared to 67% last June. 

More important however is the consistent across the board increase in support for a list of specific reconciliation steps 89% of the Palestinians will support open borders to free movement of people and goods after a comprehensive settlement is reached, compared to 82% who said so last June. 73% support joint economic institutions and ventures compared to 66% and 66% respectively last June. 40% will support joint political institutions designed eventually to lead to a confederate system given a comprehensive settlement compared to 26% who said so last June. 42% support taking legal measures against incitement directed towards Israelis compared to 35% who said so in June 2004. 13% of the Palestinians will support adoption of a school curriculum that recognizes the sovereignty of the other state and educates against irredentist aspirations. In June 2004, only 4% of the Palestinians thought so.

 (4) Internal Palestinian Conditions

• ·      Three quarters are satisfied with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas in the peace process and 62% think he is serious about fighting corruption.
• ·      Only 45% give confidence to the new cabinet headed by Abu Ala’.
• ·      80% view success in holding the presidential elections as a step forward toward democracy in Palestine, but only 35% give positive evaluation of the current status of Palestinian democracy.
• ·      Three quarters support a quota system for women whereby they are guaranteed 20% of the seats of the parliament. But the public is divided on the preferred electoral system: a district-based majority system, a proportional representation system, or a mixed system.
• ·      Hamas’ victory in local elections in December 2004 and January 2005 is attributed by the public to incorruptibility of its candidates and to the unity and disciple of its members while Fateh’s loss is attributed to the corruption within the PA and the lack of the discipline within that movement.
• ·      Support for Fateh drops to 36% and increases for Hamas to 25%.

Findings show that 80% of the Palestinians believe that the successful January elections for presidency could be seen as a step forward towards democracy in the PA, while 17% don’t see the elections as such. 35% think there are slim chances that a democratic system will be established in the PA or a future Palestinian State. 44% think there are medium chances for that, and 19% give it high chances. Despite the appreciation of the role of the presidential elections in bringing about a possible democratic transition, only 35% evaluate the current state of democracy in the PA as good or very good, 34% think it is fair and 29% think democracy is in bad or very bad condition.

Three quarters are satisfied with Abu Mazin’s performance with regard to steps taken to revive the peace process, such as the ceasefire and release of prisoners. 70% are satisfied with his dismissal of senior security officers, and 62% believe that Abu Mazin is serious about fighting corruption in the PA.  On the other hand, only 45% give confidence in the new cabinet headed by Abu Ala’. Despite that, 71% believe the new cabinet will be able to return to the peace process; 57% believe it will be able to improve economic conditions; 52% believe it will be able to control the security situation including the enforcement of a ceasefire; a similar percentage believes the new cabinet will be able to fight corruption; and 49% believe it will be able to carry out political reforms.

With regard to the current debate on the election law, 75% support a women quota of 20% guaranteed seats in the legislative council. But the public is split on the electoral system with 39% supporting the current district-based majority system, 26% supporting a proportional representation system, and 25% supporting a mixed system combining elements of the two other systems.

With regard to reform, 91% support internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms in the PA, and 87% believe there is corruption in the PA, and 51% believe this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future.

Support for Fateh reaches 36% (compared to 40% last December) and for Hamas 25% (compared to 18% last December). The public expects close results for Fateh and Hamas in the upcoming May local elections and a victory for Fateh in the legislative elections scheduled for July 2005. But in the Gaza Strip, the public expects a major victory for Hamas in the local elections and a victory for Fateh in the legislative elections. The public believes that Hamas’ victory in the previous local elections has been due firstly to the integrity and incorruptibility of its candidates and secondly to the unity and discipline within the movement. Fateh’s loss is attributed firstly to the spread of corruption in the PA and Fateh and secondly to divisions and lack of discipline in the movement.

Support for Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (21%), in refugee camps (29%) compared to villages and towns (21%), among women (29%) compared to men (21%), among students and housewives (28% and 31% respectively) compared to employees and merchants (18% and 13% respectively), among those with the lowest income (32%) compared to those with the highest income (23%),  among the youngest (30%) compared to the eldest (20%), among those who would strongly refuse to buy lottery tickets (37%) compared to those who would buy such tickets (14%), and among the most religious (28%) compared to the least religious (6%)..... Full Report

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

10-12 December 2015

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the preparation for the holding of the first phase of local elections in rural areas and small towns in the West Bank but without a confirmation of the date for holding the second phase of local elections in cities and big towns. Hamas prevented the holding of the local elections in the Gaza Strip. The first phase of local elections was held in the West Bank on 11 December, the last day of the field work, in 154 localities and the participation rate stood at 66% according the Palestinian Central Elections Commission. The number of participants stood at 262,827 voters. This period witnessed also various violent incidents in Palestinian universities and the death of one student. Israel classified 6 Palestinian human rights NGOs as terrorist organizations. The UK labeled Hamas as a terrorist organization. This press release addresses some of these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2021 show that while the public is pessimistic about the prospects of holding parliamentary or presidential elections in the near future, it is optimistic that the second phase of local elections will take place soon. The second phase of local elections is now set to take place in cities and big towns on 26 March 2022. The findings show that Fatah is more popular than Hamas in West Bank cities that will participate in the second phase of the local elections while Hamas is more popular in the Gazan cities that might participate in the second phase of the local elections.  Nonetheless, the findings show that the overall domestic balance of power between Fatah and Hamas has not changed compared to our findings of September 2021. Hamas is more popular than Fatah, and Ismail Haniyyeh easily wins against president Abba and prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh in one to one competitions. But Marwan Barghouti, also from Fatah, wins against Haniyyeh with two-thirds voting for him. Three quarters of the public demand the resignation of president Abbas.

What is noticeable however is that despite the stability in the domestic balance of power, there is a clear disappointment in Hamas’ leadership indirectly expressed by the public compared to the situation six and even three months ago. The findings show that the percentage of those who choose Hamas to represent and lead the Palestinian people has declined significantly and the gap between those who choose Hamas compared to those who choose Fatah, under Abbas’ leadership, has now narrowed to 11 percentage points in favor of Hamas; in September, the gap stood at 26 points in favor of Hamas and in June, a month after the Hamas-Israel May 2021 war, the gap stood at 39% in favor of Hamas. The percentage of those who believe that neither Fatah, under Abbas, nor Hamas deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people has now increased considerably.

In this poll, we have asked about various political solutions to the conflict with Israel and about the confidence building measures that seek to improve the daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The findings show the following:

• The majority is still opposed to the two-state solution. But support for this solution has increased compared to the September 2021 findings and decreased compared to the October 2021 findings.  
• The two-state solution remains the one with the largest percentage of support compared to other solutions, including that of the one-state solution in which the two sides, Palestinians and Israeli Jews, enjoy equal rights; support for the one-state solution is higher than one quarter and less than one third.
• There is a clear majority, higher than 60%, in favor confidence building measures that improves Palestinian daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the current level of support is higher than that of September 2021 when we first asked about the issue.

Findings also show that despite a two-third opposition to a resumption of unconditional bilateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, a large minority approaching about half of the public is in favor of a resumption of such negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Moreover, despite the opposition of the majority to the resumption of dialogue between the US and PA, a large minority approaching half of the public believes that the US is the most effective in influencing the decisions of the Palestinians and the Israelis on the matter of the renewal of the peace process. Also on the peace process, findings show a decrease in the percentage of those who believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and an increase in the percentage of those who believe that negotiation is the most effective. Nonetheless, armed struggle is viewed as more effective than negotiations.

Findings also show that the largest percentage of respondents believes the main Israeli motivation behind the labeling of six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations is to weaken the ability of these organizations to document Israeli violations of human rights and to weaken the PA efforts to take Israelis to the International Criminal Court.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 70% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 27% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 52% (62% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Nonetheless, a majority of 59% (68% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) expect the holding of the second stage of local elections in cities and big towns in the near future; 34% do not expect that.
• Fatah is more popular than Hamas (38% to 30%) in West Bank cities which will participate in the second phase of local elections while Hamas is more popular than Fatah (47% to 29%) in the cities in the Gaza Strip that might participate in the second phase of local elections.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 35% and Haniyeh 58% of the votes (compared to 56% for Haniyeh and 34% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 33% of the votes (compared to 34% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 52% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 65% and from among those Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 52% and from among those the former receives 33% and the latter 59%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received 31% and Haniyyeh 60%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 35% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 5% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 27% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 21% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 78% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 38% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 37% and Fatah at 32%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 27% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 38% three months ago).
• In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 34% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 36% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 45% selected Hamas, 19% Fatah under Abbas, and 28% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 79% and in the West Bank at 51%.
• 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 31% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 21% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 36% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 83% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 61% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 59% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (56%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 34% viewed it as an asset.
• 33% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 32%.
• After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 71% expect failure; only 23% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29% of the public expect success and 65% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 69% expects failure and 27% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 27%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Maan (10%), Palestine Today (9%), al Mayadeen (4%), and al Arabiya (3%).

(3) The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• 58% (68% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 18% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24% say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.
• 77% (87% in the Gaza Strip and 71% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 21% are dissatisfied.
• 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 42% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, only 45% expressed satisfaction.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 69% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 69% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 39%.

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 36%.  
• When asked about their preferences regarding a political solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from among three specific solutions, one third (33%) preferred the “two state solution, the state of Palestine next to the state of Israel,” 16% preferred a “one state solution, from the River to the Sea, with equal rights to Jews and Arabs,” and 11% preferred a one state solution in which the status of the Palestinians would be “the same as the status of the inside Palestinians,” and 32% preferred other solutions, such as “historic Palestine,” or “full Palestine,” or “independent Palestine,” and others.
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 29% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 65% expressed opposition.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 56% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 50% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 61% said it looks positively, while 33% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 56% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
• A majority of 59% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 42% chose armed struggle, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 48% chose armed struggle and 28% chose negotiations.
• A majority of 61% thinks that current international, regional, and local conditions does not make possible a resumption of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis while 35% think that these conditions make a resumption of negotiations possible.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 66% opposes and 26% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 46%; 49% are opposed.
• 56% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Yet, when asked about the country or party that is most influential in convincing the Palestinian and Israeli sides to return to the peace process, 46% said the US, 33% said Arab countries such as Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, or Qatar, 10% said Europe, and 3% said Russia.
• We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 38% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 19% selected the loss of the will to fight.
• When asked about the country or party most responsible for derailing the peace process in the region, 65% said it is Israel, 15% said it is the US, 15% said it is Arab countries, and 3% said Palestine.
• We asked the public about its views on the reason Israel labelled six Palestinian human rights NGOs, such as Al Haq and Addameer, as terrorists organizations. The largest percentage (40%) said the Israeli decision aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights; 20% said it aimed at weakening the PA-led campaign to try Israelis at the International Criminal Court; 17% said it aimed at weaking the ability of these NGOs to document PA violations of human rights in the West Bank; 11% said it aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Hamas’ violations of human rights in the Gaza Strip, and another 11% said it aimed at weakening the PFLP.   
• In reaction to the UK government decision to label Hamas as a terrorist organization and the idea of boycotting British products, 49% expressed the belief that such a boycott would be effective in forcing the UK government to rescind its decision while 45% think the boycott would not be effective.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (26%; 15% in the Gaz Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 22% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 20% said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 5%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 26% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the internal violence, and 10% said it is the split or division.

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll

With Support for a Permanent Deal Along the Clinton Parameters Dropping among Israelis and Palestinians, only 46% of the Israelis Support Olmert’s Realignment Plan and only 47% of the Palestinians would Approve the Prisoners’ Document in a Referendum

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted June12-17 jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah 

The joint poll examined the impact of the recent political developments in Israel and the Palestinian Authority on Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding President Clinton’s package for a Palestinian-Israeli final status settlement. This is the first time we revisit these issues after Hamas victory in the Palestinian Parliamentary elections and the establishment of Hamas government in the PA. The findings indicate a noticeable decrease in support among Israelis and some decrease in support among Palestinians compared to six months ago. Among Israelis a majority of 55% support these parameters as a combined overall package, down from 64% support in December 2005. Among Palestinians, 44% support the package now, compared to 46% in December 2005. In December 2004, a majority of Israelis (64%) and Palestinians (54%) supported the same parameters as a package. 

The poll further examined Palestinians’ and Israelis’ reactions to Abu Mazin’s call for a referendum in the PA over the prisoners’ national conciliation document, and Israelis’ reactions to Olmert’s realignment plan. With regard to the prisoners’ document, in the PA an overwhelming majority of Palestinians (74%) supports the national conciliation document, also known as the prisoners’ document, and 23% oppose it. Despite the overwhelming support for the prisoners’ document, if the referendum were to take place today, only 47% would vote in favor of it and 44% would vote against it. 9% remain undecided. As to Israelis, 63% are familiar with the prisoners’ document. Of them only 35% believe it can serve as basis for negotiations with the Palestinians. 

As to Olmert’s Realignment plan, 46% of the Israelis support and 50% oppose his plan to evacuate within a few years most of the settlements in West Bank, while realigning into large blocks of settlements along the line of the separation fence. While 54% of the Israelis believe that the outcome of the last election grants Olmert a mandate to carry out his realignment plan, 58% believe a referendum should be carried out over this plan. It should be kept in mind that Israelis usually support calls for referenda as they provide the public a voice in policy making. Nevertheless, this might indicate that the struggle over the legitimacy of Olmert’s plan is not over. 

Other issues examined in this poll are attitudes towards mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish People and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian People and attitudes towards reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis. 

Total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 15 and 18, 2006. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 609 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between June 12 and 15, 2006. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Clinton Parameters 

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, including (1) Final borders and territorial exchange, (2) Refugees, (3) Jerusalem, (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state, (5) Security arrangements, and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues three times before, in December 2003, December 2004, and December 2005. In the current poll we revisit these crucial issues for the first time after the establishment of Hamas government in the Palestinian Authority.

The findings indicate a noticeable decrease in support among Israelis and some decrease in support among Palestinians compared to six months ago. Among Israelis a majority of 55% support these parameters as a combined overall package, a decrease of 9 percentage points from the 64% support in December 2005. Among Palestinians 44% support the package now compared to 46% in December 2005. 

Apparently these results reflect the intensification of the conflict and the ongoing violence between the two sides. The decline in support among Israelis may also be attributed to the increased pessimism with regard to the prospects for reaching a settlement in the conflict following the rise of Hamas to power in the PA.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 54% support or strongly support and 44% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2005. At that time, support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 55% and opposition at 42%.

Among Israelis 47% support and 47% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel.Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2005, 53% of the Israelis supported this component while 42% opposed it.

(2) Refugees

Among Palestinians, 41% support and 55% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries likeAustralia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2005, 40% agreed with an identical compromise while 57% opposed it.

Among Israelis 43% support such an arrangement and 53% oppose it, just as in December 2005.

(3) Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 35% support and 63% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2005, an identical compromise obtained similar results with 33% supporting it and 65% opposing it.

Among Israelis, 37% agree and 60% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2005, 38% supported this arrangement and 60% opposed it.

Apparently, the positions of both sides on the most complex issues in Clinton’s package - Jerusalem and refugees - exhibit much stability over time.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 25% support and 74% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2005 the support of 20% and the opposition of 78%.

Among Israelis 63% agree and 36% disagree to this arrangement compared to 69% who agreed and 30% who disagreed to it in December 2005.

(5) Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 40% support and 57% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2005, 43% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 55% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 52% support and 44% oppose this arrangement compared to 62% who supported it and 33% who opposed it in December 2005. The decline in support in both publics for this component probably reflects security concerns elevated by the recently renewed violence in the Gaza strip.

(6) End of Conflict.  

In the Palestinian public 58% support and 40% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2005 the support of 64% and the opposition of 34%.

In the Israeli public 70% support and 27% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2005, 80% of the Israelis supported it while 18% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 44% support and 53% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2005, 46% supported and 50% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 55% support and 40% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. This constitutes a noticeable decline in support for the Clinton’s final status settlement package compared to six months ago when support stood at 64% support with 33% opposition. 

41% of the Israelis know that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package; 44% believe that the majority opposes it. This level of awareness indicates that despite the solid support for the package it has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 43% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 44% believe that the majority opposes it. In addition a plurality in both Palestinian and Israeli societies believe that the other side’s majority opposes such a package: 50% of the Israelis and 45% of the Palestinians think so.

SUMMARY TABLE OF THE FINDINGS

(B) Olmert’s Realignment Plan 

• Only 46% of the Israelis support Olmert’s plan to evacuate within a few years most of the settlements in Judea ad Samaria, while realigning into large blocks of settlements along the line of the separation fence. 50% oppose it.
• While 54% of the Israelis believe that the outcome of the last election grants Olmert a mandate to carry out his realignment plan, 58% believe a referendum should be carried out over this plan. It should be kept in mind that Israelis usually support calls for referenda as they provide the public a voice in policy making. Nevertheless, this might indicate that the struggle over the legitimacy of Olmert’s plan is not over.
• These results should be seen in the context of the increased violence and Kassam shelling from the Gaza strip and Israelis’ disillusion with the outcome of Sharon’s disengagement there. 54% see the evacuation from theGaza strip a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle. Similarly 54% of the Israelis believe that the Palestinian armed struggle has achieved Palestinian national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve.

(C) Prisoners’ Document and Call for Referendum in the PA 

• The overwhelming majority of Palestinians (74%) supports the national conciliation document, also known as the prisoners’ document, as one package, and 23% oppose it. But support for the conduct of a referendum on the prisoners’ document is much less than the support for the document itself with 52% in favor and 43% opposed. Moreover, despite the overwhelming support for the prisoners’ document, if the referendum were to take place today, only 47% would vote in favor of it and 44% would vote against it. 9% remain undecided. Only 56% agree that PA president Mahmud Abbas has the right to call for a referendum on the prisoners’ document and 38% do not agree. And if Hamas called for a boycott of the referendum, 44% would boycott it and 50% would participate in it.
• 48% of the Israelis support negotiations with Hamas if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. This percent does not change even if Hamas’ government recognizes Israel indirectly by endorsing the prisoners’ document or the Saudi peace plan. Moreover, only 35% of the Israelis who are familiar with the prisoners’ document (63%) believe it can serve as basis for negotiations.
• 70% among Palestinians think that if Israel agrees to enter peace negotiations with Hamas, the Islamist group should agree to do so and 26% think that it should not. Despite this, two thirds of the Palestinians believe that Hamas should not accept international demands regarding recognition of Israel as a precondition for continued donor support for the Palestinian Authority; 30% believe it should.

(D) Other Conflict Resolution Issues 

• A majority of 61% among Palestinians and 67% of the Israelis agrees with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict, there would be mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. 36% and 29% respectively disagree to this step. 54% of the Palestinians and Israelis believe that a majority in their public supports such a proposal, and 34% and 31% respectively think the majority opposes it.
• A majority of 52% of the Palestinians and 63% of the Israelis supports the Road Map; 43% of the Palestinians and 34% of the Israelis oppose it. In this context, 58% among Palestinians - the highest since the Road Map became public - support and 39% oppose collection of arms from Palestinian armed factions as mandated by the Road Map. Moreover, if the collection of arms were restricted to the Gaza Strip, support would increase to 70% and opposition would drop to 27%. Support for the current ceasefire, another requirement of the Road Map, reaches 71% and opposition 27%.
• When a permanent status agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel, 71% among Palestinians and 79% of the Israelis would support reconciliation between the two peoples; 27% and 19% respectively would oppose it.
• After reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, belief that reconciliation between the two peoples will be achieved within the next few years or the next generation stands at 26% of the Palestinians while 49% believe that reconciliation is not possible ever. Among Israelis, 50% believe that reconciliation will be achieved within the next few years or the next generation, and 30% think that it is not possible ever. 51% of the Palestinians and 23% of the Israelis believe that a political settlement with the other side is impossible. Only 23% of the Palestinians and 58% of the Israelis believe that such a settlement is possible within the next few years or the next generation.
• With regard to short term expectations, only 13% of the Palestinians and 6% of the Israelis expect that the two sides will go back to negotiations and that armed confrontations will stop. On the other hand 39% and 40% respectively believe that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 38% of the Palestinians and 48% of the Israelis believe that the two sides will return to negotiations but some armed confrontations will continue.
• Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel continues to rise. Today 56% support it and 42% oppose it. Support for such attacks stood at 52% last March and 40% last December while opposition stood at 45% and 58% respectively. Similarly, findings show that support for the bombing attack that took place last April stood at 69% and opposition at 27%. Support in September 2005 for the last suicide attack before the one in April, the one that took place in August 2005, stood at 37% and opposition at 56%. It is worth mentioning that this poll was conducted during the period in which Israeli shelling of the Gaza Strip led to a high number of casualties among Palestinian civilians at a Gaza beach and in populated areas. 
• But while findings show a significant increase in support for violence against Israelis based on emotional drives, a significant drop has been registered in this poll in the percentage of those who believe that armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not from 69% last March to 54% in this poll.  

(E) Palestinian Domestic Balance of Power 

• About five months after the parliamentary elections, the gap between Fateh and Hamas narrows to zero. If new elections were held today Fateh’s list would receive the support of 39%, Change and Reform 39%, and all other lists 9%. 13% remain undecided. Three months ago, the gap between Fateh and Hamas stood at 8 percentage points in favor of Hamas with 47% voting for Change and Reform and 39% for Fateh.
• Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas drops from 61% last March to 53% in this poll. If new elections were held, 30% say they would vote for Abbas, 14% for current prime minister Ismail Haniyeh, 4% for Marwan Barghouti, and 2% each for Mahmud Zahhar, Mustafa Barghouti, and Khalid Misha’al. 38% say they do not know to whom they would give their vote. In a vote for a vice president, the percentage of undecided is 49% while 8% say they would vote for Ismail Haniyeh, 7% for Mahmud Zahhar, 6% for Dahlan, 5% for Marwan Barghouti, 3% for Saeb Erikat, and 2% each for Farouq Qaddumi and Mustafa Barghouti. The two questions on vote intentions were open questions, with no list of names provided.