16-18 March 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during March 16-18, 2006. The poll deals with Palestinian perceptions and the popularity of Fateh and Hamas in the post election period, attitudes towards the peace process after Hamas’ victory, attitudes regarding the Israeli raid on Jericho jail, and several domestic issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (809) and the Gaza Strip (463) in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.  

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings

This poll was conducted less than two months after the Palestinian legislative elections which took place on 25 January 2006 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but before Hamas government was presented to the new PLC and gained its vote of confidence. At the time of the poll, the international community was threatening to suspend aid to the PA but no action had been taken at that time.

The results indicate that despite threats of sanctions and despite public expectations that donors will indeed cut off support once a Hamas government is formed, support for Hamas has never been as high as it is today. In fact, support for Hamas today is higher than the support it received on the day of elections. By contrast, Fateh’s popularity decreased significantly compared to where it was before the elections. In fact, support for Fateh today is less than the support it had on the day of elections.

These results indicate that Israeli and Western threats increase rather than decrease public support for Hamas. Support for Fateh is dropping as some Palestinians might be punishing it for the role it seems, in their eyes, to play in bringing about the downfall of Hamas and the undoing of its victory.  

But the increased support for Hamas does not indicate increased support for its views on the peace process. To the contrary, Palestinian public opinion seems today more moderate and willing to compromise than it has been at any time before. Despite public objection to a  Hamas’ recognition of Israel in response to international pressure, a majority wants Hamas to negotiate with Israel and to implement the Road Map. More importantly, a majority supports the two-state solution and in this context supports a mutual recognition of Israelas the state for the Jewish people in exchange for an Israeli recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.

(1) Hamas and Fateh in the Post Legislative Elections’ Environment

• Hamas’ popularity continues to increase: 47% would vote for Hamas and 39% for Fateh if new elections are held today
• Two main reasons are given by the public for Hamas’ victory: the desire to have an authority that would implement Islamic Sharia code and the desire to have an authority that would fight corruption
• Fateh’s loss is attributed by the public to three main factors: the voters’ desire to punish it for corruption, its divisions and fragmentation, and its failure to enforce law and order
• Majority expects Hamas’ success in government, donors’ suspension of aid, and Hamas’ success in finding alternative sources of support
• Majority opposes a Hamas recognition of Israel in compliance with donors’ demands

In the estimate of 37% of the respondents, Hamas won the January parliamentary elections because voters wanted first and foremost an Islamist authority that implements the Sharia code. But 36% believe that voters wanted instead a clean government that fights corruption, 9% believe that voters wanted a strong authority that can put an end to anarchy and enforce law and order, and 7% believe that voters wanted a fighting authority that resists occupation. In the estimate of 52% of the respondents, Fateh lost the elections because voters wanted first and foremost to punish it for the spread of corruption in the PA. But 19% attribute the loss to Fateh’s divisions and lack of leadership, 17% to its failure to put an end to anarchy, and 5% to the failure of the peace process.

If new elections are to take place today, 47% of those who would participate say they would vote for Hamas, 39% for Fateh, and 8% for the four other factions represented in the current PLC. When asked about their actual vote in the last parliamentary elections in January, 46% said they voted for Hamas, 44% for Fateh, and 8% for the four other factions. (Actual official results were 44% for Hamas, 41% for Fateh, and 12% for the four other winning factions.) 

Support for Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (45%). By contrast, support for Fateh increases in the West Bank (40%) compared to the Gaza Strip (37%). Support for Hamas increases in cities (52% compared to 36% for Fateh) and refugee camps (47% compared to 37% for Fateh). The two factions receive equal support in rural areas. Support for Hamas increases among women (51% compared to 36% for Fateh) and decreases among men (43% for Hamas compared to 41% for Fateh). It also increases among refugees (49% for Hamas compared to 37% for Fateh) and decreases among non refugees (45% for Hamas compared to 41% for Fateh). It also increases among the illiterates (57% for Hamas compared to 33% for Fateh), students (48% for Hamas compared to 37% for Fateh), housewives (51% for Hamas compared to 35% for Fateh), religious respondents (54% for Hamas compared to 35% for Fateh), and among those opposed to the peace process (68% for Hamas and 16% for Fateh).

A majority of 70% expects Hamas to succeed in leading and managing the affairs of the PA while 22% expect the opposite. A similar percentage (69%) is not worried about its personal freedom after Hamas’ victory and 30% are worried. The large percentage of those expecting a Hamas success is somewhat surprising given the fact that a similar percentage (68%) believe that the PA can not manage without donor support and that 50% of the respondents believe that aid will indeed be suspended as long as Hamas does not meet donors’ conditions. Despite the strong moderate peace tendencies of the respondents in this poll, a majority of 59% nonetheless believes that Hamas should not recognize the state of Israel in compliance with donors’ demands while 37% believe it should.

(2) The Peace Process in the Post Hamas’ Victory

• 75% want Hamas to negotiate peace with Israel
• Majority supports the implementation of the Road Map and a majority supports a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people under conditions of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state in a two-state solution
• Sharp divisions over collection of arms from armed groups but an overwhelming majority supports the integration of armed groups into PA security services
• About three quarters welcome a negotiated Israeli disengagement from the West Bank while only 23% would support the disengagement if it was unilateral
• 80% would support a declaration of Palestinian statehood if it comes as an outcome of negotiations with Israel and 59% would support it if it was unilaterally declared by the PA

Despite Hamas’ electoral victory and despite the added increase in its popularity after the elections, public support for the peace process is on the rise. Public willingness to compromise has increased significantly during the last few months with about three quarters of the Palestinians wanting Hamas to conduct peace negotiations with Israel and only 22% opposing it. A majority of 64% says it supports the peace process while only 14% says it is opposed to it. These percentages stood at 59% and 17% respectively in our exit poll on the day of elections last January. A majority of 53%, compared to 51% in the exit poll) wants the Hamas government to implement the Road Map and 40% oppose that.

But perhaps the most moderate and surprising attitude is the one toward the two state solution and mutual recognition of identity. In this poll, 66% said they would support, and 32% would oppose, the recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people in the context of peace based on a two-state solution and an Israeli recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. Support for this solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict stood at 57% and opposition at 41% last December. On the day of elections, only 49% supported this solution and 48% opposed it. As in our December poll, three quarters would support reconciliation between the two peoples under conditions of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel.

But divisions remain over how to handle the issue of arms collection. About half (49%) wants the new government to collect the arms of the various armed groups while 21% wants it to do nothing about those arms and 27% prefer to see the new parliament enacting a law that would allow armed groups to keep their arms. Identical results were registered on the day of elections.

Findings show that about three quarters of the respondents (73%) prefer to see a new Israeli disengagement from the West Bank carried out through negotiations while only 23% prefer to see it accomplished unilaterally. Moreover, the poll found that a majority (59%) believes that unilateral steps reduce the chances of eventually reaching permanent settlement to the conflict. Despite this, 59% would support a Palestinian unilateral step such as a PA unilateral declaration of statehood while 37% would oppose that. If the statehood declaration is the outcome of negotiations with Israel, a larger percentage (80%) would support it and only 17% would oppose it.

(3) Jericho Jail Raid

• A semi consensus that both the US and the UK are implicated in the Israeli raid on the Jericho jail
• 51% support non-violent reactions to protest the US and UK involvement but 46% support in various degrees other steps such as kidnappings or armed attacks

Findings show an almost total consensus among the Palestinians (93%) that the US and UK are implicated with Israel in the raid on the Jericho jail which took place few days before the poll was conducted. The raid and the arrest of Ahmad Sa’adat and his colleagues from the PFLP was followed by various types of reaction including demonstrations, attacks and burning of offices and other facilities belonging to the two countries, and kidnapping of foreigners. Findings show that 51% of the respondents supported only peaceful reaction or no reaction at all. Other types of reaction were supported to various degrees. For example, 9% supported attacks on and burning of offices and installations, 12% supported also the kidnapping of foreigners, and 25% supported also armed attacks against nationals from those two countries.

(4) Domestic Issues

• Poverty and unemployment is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today followed by Israeli occupation and PA corruption
• Three quarters do not feel safe or secure in the PA
• 91% believe corruption exists in the PA but two thirds believe it will decrease in the future
• Large percentage wants to give greater jurisdiction to the new legislative council than the president
• If new presidential elections are held today, 37% would vote for Mahmud Abbas, 25% for Mahmud Zahhar, and 15% for Mustafa Barghouti from among a closed list
• If elections are held today for a vice president, 30% would vote for Ismail Haniyyeh, 20% for Marwan Barghouti, 11% for Mahmud Zahhar, 8% for Mohammad Dahlan, 7% for Farouq Qaddoumi, and 6% each for Saeb Erikat and Mustafa Barghouti
• Support for Fateh drops considerably from 45% in our December 2005 poll to 34% in this poll. Support for Hamas increases from 28% to 37% and for the Islamists in general from 35% to 43% during the same period.

The period in the post Hamas’ victory is witnessing a significant change in public priorities. Concern is growing over economic issues such as poverty and unemployment with 44% of the respondents viewing it as the most important problem confronting the Palestinians today while only 25% views the continued occupation as the most important problem and 24% views corruption as the most important problem. On the day of elections only 27% identified poverty and unemployment as the most important problem with corruption coming first with 29% and occupation coming second, like poverty and unemployment, with 27%.

Findings also show that three quarters of the Palestinians do not feel safe in their homes. This finding is identical with that we found on the day of elections. Absence of safety is felt more strongly in the West Bank, which is under semi full Israeli control, reaching 79% compared to 68% in the Gaza Strip, which is under semi full Palestinian control.

The poll shows that Hamas’ victory has also affected public perception regarding the future of corruption in the PA. While 91% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions (the highest level registered since the formation of the PA), findings show that 65% believe that this corruption will decrease in the future. This is the first time that a majority indicated its belief that corruption will decrease in the future. Last December, only 34% believed that corruption will decrease in the future.  

But Hamas’ victory caused no change in public perception regarding the status of Palestinian democracy. Positive evaluation of democracy under the PA reached 34% in this poll compared to an almost identical result (35%) last December.

Despite the fact that 61% of the public are satisfied (and 37% are dissatisfied) with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, only a small minority of 19% wants to give him more powers than those of the newly-elected PLC. On the other hand, 44% want to give the PLC greater powers than those enjoyed by the president and 32% want both to have equal powers.

Despite this result, the popularity of Fateh’s Abbas (37%) remains higher than that of Mahmud Zahhar of Hamas (25%) and Mustafa Barghouti of other groups (15%). This came in a response to a closed question with respondents asked to choose one of the three. In another closed question on a vote for a vice president, Ismail Haniyyah, the current prime minister, emerged as the most popular with 30% followed by Marwan Barghouti with 20%, Mahmud Zahhar with 11%, Mohammad Dahlan (8%), Farouq Qaddoumi (7%) and Saeb Erikat and Mustafa Barghouti (6% each).

Findings show that support for Fateh has dropped significantly compared to last December while support for Hamas has increased during the same period. Support for Fateh stood at 45% three months ago dropping to 34% in this poll. Hamas’ popularity reached 28% last December rising to 37% in this poll. Support for the Islamists in general (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) increased from 35% to 43% during the same period. .... Full Report

04-09 December 2003

These are the results of opinion poll # 10, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 04-09 December 2003. The poll deals with Geneva Document, the peace process, Abu Ala’s government, the popularity of Arafat and the political factions. The total sample size of this poll is 1319 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face in West Bank (835) and in Gaza Strip (484), in 120 locations. The margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa at Tel 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

 

SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

The poll shows significant opposition to the Geneva document among those Palestinians familiar with it and that support for the document is lukewarm. But it also shows that only a very small minority is fully aware of the content of the document and that when respondents become aware of its main components, both support and opposition increase significantly. A majority of the Palestinians sees red lines in two components: the refugee solution and the limits imposed on sovereignty. On the other hand, a majority welcomes the proposed deployment of a multinational force in the Palestinian state and the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the basis of the 1967 lines, with equal territorial exchange.

The poll also shows a Palestinian hesitation between the desire to see armed confrontations continuing (with a majority seeing such confrontations contributing to the achievement of national rights) and the desire for a mutual cessation of violence, including readiness to support the PA in taking measures to prevent armed attacks on Israelis when a mutual ceasefire is achieved. As for the long term vision, Palestinian readiness to support reconciliation between the two peoples has never been stronger.

Finally, the findings show that the Palestinian public is willing to give Abu Ala’s government a very limited vote of confidence especially in terms of its ability to implement political reforms. Arafat’s popularity drops significantly while Fateh’s decreases slightly. Support for Islamist and nationalist opposition continues to rise.

Main Results:

(1) Geneva Document

• ·        73% have heard of the Geneva document and the rest has not. But only 4% say they have full knowledge of it.
• ·        Only 7% have learned about Geneva from the pamphlet containing the document that were distributed with al Quds and al Ayyam newspapers while 79% have heard about it from the media.
• ·        Support for the document among those who have heard of it (i.e., among 73% of the public) reaches 25% (19% of all the public), opposition 61% (44% of all the public), and the undecided 14%. 37% of all the public are either undecided or have not heard of it.
• ·        Upon reading a summary of the main points of the document, support for the full package proposed by the document (among 100% of the public) increases from 19% to 39%, opposition increases from 44% to 58%, and the undecided and uninformed decreases from 37% to 3%. All the figures below referring to the Genevadocument have been obtained after informing our respondents in detail about the various components of the Geneva document.
• ·        A majority supports two main components of the document: security arrangements involving the deployment a multinational force (58%) and the Israeli withdrawal based on the 1967 borders with mutual 1:1 territorial exchange (57%). A map showing borders and territorial exchange was presented to respondents. The percentage of opposition to the deployment of a multinational force reaches 40% and to territorial exchange 41%.
• ·        The Jerusalem component of the document received the support of 46% with 52% opposing; end of conflict received 42% support with 55% opposing; and the establishment of a state without an army received 36% support with 63% opposing.
• ·        A minority not exceeding a quarter gives support to the components of a refugee solution (25%) and the limitations on the sovereignty of the Palestinian state (23%). The percentage of opposition to the refugee component reaches 72% and to the limitation on sovereignty 76%. No difference between refugees and non-refugees exists when it comes to the Geneva refugee solution. Both segments of the society oppose it equally. 
• ·        In the eyes of the Palestinian public, the best component of the Geneva document is the one that deals with the territorial exchange and Israeli army withdrawal and the worst is the one that deals with refugees.

In this poll, we have asked respondents to express their attitudes toward the Geneva document based on what they have heard or read about it so far. We then provided them with a summary of seven core elements of the document and asked them to express attitudes regarding each element. We have finally asked them for their opinion on the whole document as a package. The findings show that the Palestinian public is lukewarm on the Geneva document and in fact has significant reservations about two of its components. On the other hand, the public is supportive of two other components while showing limited opposition to the remaining three components.

The poll found that the 73% of the public have heard of or read about the Geneva document and that among those who have heard of or read about it, support reaches 25% and opposition is 61%. Among the whole public these figures translate into 19% support and 44% opposition while the percentage of the undecided and those who have not read, or heard of, it is 37%. After informing the respondents of seven core elements of the document, support increased from 19% to 39%, opposition from 44% to 58%, and the undecided (and those who did not read or hear of it) decreased from 37% to 3%.

From among the seven components read to respondents, support is given to two only: the one dealing with the deployment of a multinational force (58%) and the one dealing with the Israeli withdrawal based on the 1967 borders with an equal territorial exchange (57%). Two components received the biggest opposition: the one dealing with refugees, opposed by 72%, and the one dealing with limitations on Palestinian sovereignty, opposed by 76%.  Support for the other three components vary with Jerusalem receiving 46%, end of conflict42%, and the de-militarization of the Palestinian state 36%. From among those who have been previously informed of the document (i.e., 73% of the public), support increases amongFateh supporters (36%) compared to Hamas’ (26%). Support for the Geneva document as a package after being informed about its main components  increases among women (42%) compared to men (35%), among non refugees (41%) compared to refugees (36%), among those with preparatory education (47%) compared to those holding a BA degree (29), among housewives (44%) and farmers (40%) compared to students (32%), and among Fateh supporters (55%) compared to Hamas’ (33%).

The following table shows refugee and non refugee attitudes toward seven main components of the Geneva documents:

(2) Peace, Violence and Reconciliation

• ·        58% believe that the Roadmap is dead, compared to 68% last October. Only one third, compared to 28% in October, believes that there is still a chance to implement it.
• ·        Percentage of support for attacks on soldiers and settlers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip remains very high at 87%. But supports for attacks on Israeli civilians drops to the lowest level since the start of the intifada (48%, compared to 59% last October).
• ·        Despite the high level of support for violence, a large majority of 83% supports mutual cessation of violence while 15% oppose it. And if an agreement on mutual cessation of violence were reached with Israel, 53% would support crackdown on those who would continue the violence. But 80% are worried that such a crackdown would lead to internal Palestinian strife; on the other hand, 73% believe that continuation of the violence would impede return to negotiations.
• ·        64% believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not.
• ·        After reaching a peace agreement with Israel, 77% would support reconciliation between the two peoples with 87% supporting open borders between the two states, 69% supporting joint economic ventures and institutions, 42% supporting enacting laws that prohibit incitement against Israel, 29% supporting joint political institutions such as a parliament, and 10% supporting school curriculum that does not call for the return of all Palestine to Palestinians.

A majority of Palestinians is not optimistic about the chances for the implementation of the Roadmap as 58% believe that it has collapsed. But this percentage is smaller than the one registered in our October poll when 68% believed it had collapsed. The poll shows a large percentage (87%) supporting armed attacks on soldiers and settlers. But support for attacks on Israeli civilians inside Israel has dropped significantly from 59% last October to 48% in this poll. The current level of support for attacks on civilians is the lowest since the start of the intifada more than three years ago. Nonetheless, the belief that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not remains high at 64%.

After reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, 77% of the Palestinians would support reconciliation between the two peoples, the Israelis and the Palestinians. As in our previous polls, support varies depending on the nature of the reconciliation measure proposed. For example, while support for joint economic ventures and institutions reaches 69%, support for enacting laws that prohibit incitement against Israelis does not exceed 42%, and support for the adoption of a school curriculum that does not demand the return of all Palestine to Palestinians is very law, at 10%.

(3) Abu Ala’s Government, Reform, and Corruption

• ·        37% are willing to give confidence to Abu Ala’ government, 42% are not, and 21% undecided. Last June, 41% gave confidence to Abu Mazin’s government and 52% refused to do so.
• ·        Confidence in the ability of Abu Ala’s government to carry out political reforms does not exceed 39%, fighting corruption 37%, improve economic conditions 45%, renewing negotiations with Israel 67%, and controlling the security situation and enforcing a ceasefire 34%. Those figures are similar to those obtained by Abu Mazin’s government last June except for that related to improving the economic conditions which received 56%.
• ·        Support for internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms reaches 89% with 9% opposing them.
• ·        Belief in the existence of corruption in PA institutions reaches 81% with less than 10% believing it does not exist. Two thirds of those who believe in the existence of corruption believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future while 21% believe that it will decrease.

Palestinian pubic is reluctant to give confidence to Abu Ala’s government (37% give it, 42% do not, and 21% are undecided). Confidence in Abu Ala’s government ability to implement political reforms does not exceed 39%. But confidence in its ability to renew negotiations with Israel is very high (67%), even though only 34% believe that the Palestinian government will be able to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire.

Confidence in Abu Ala’s government increases among non-refugees (42%) compared to refugees (33%), among those with elementary education (39%) compared to holders of BA degree (31%), among farmers (55%) and merchants (49%) compared to professionals (23%) and specialists (28%), among those working in the private sector (39%) compared to those working in the public sector (33%), and among Fateh supporters (55%) compared to Hamas’ (32%).

(4) Popularity of Arafat and the political factions

• ·        Arafat’s popularity decreases from 50% last October to 38% in this poll.
• ·         Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular (as a vice president) with 16% (compared to 17% last October). Hamas’ Abdul Aziz Rantisi is the second most popular with 14% followed by Sa’eb Erikat (7%), Ahmad Yasin (6%), Hanan Ashrawi and Farouq Qaddumi (5% each), Haider Abdul Shafi (4%), and Abu Ala’ (3%).
• ·         Fateh’s popularity stands at 25%, Hamas 20%, Islamic Jihad 5%, independent Islamists 6% (with the Islamists reaching a total of 31%). With national opposition groups (PFLP and DFLP) receiving the support of 4%, total support for nationalist and Islamist opposition stands today at 35%.The unaffiliated remains the largest group however with 40%. Last October, Fateh received the support of 28% and Hamas 21%.

Arafat’s popularity drops from 50% last October to 38% in this poll. Arafat’s popularity increased from 35% to 50% last October in the aftermath of the Israeli threats to kill or expel him. The popularity of Marwan Barghouti and Abdul Aziz Rantisi (as vice president) remain almost unchanged at 16% and 14% respectively.  The poll shows that these two are the most popular after Arafat.

Support for Fateh drops from 28% last October to 25% in this poll. Hamas’ support remains almost unchanged at 20%. But support for Islamist and nationalist opposition increases by three percentage points from 32% to 35%. Opposition forces include Hamas, Islamic Jihad, independent Islamists, PFLP, and DFLP......Full Report

15-18 June 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during June 15-18, 2006. The poll deals with the prisoners’ document and the referendum on the document, permanent settlement, peace process and violence, and domestic balance of power. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (830) and the Gaza Strip (440) in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at Tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings indicate the development of two contradictory domestic dynamics accompanied by an increase in the level of pessimism about the long and short term future, an increase in the level of support for violence, and a decrease in the support for a permanent status agreement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters, Taba negotiations, and the Geneva Initiative. Findings show the development of an internal consensus on the prisoners’ document with about three quarters supporting its contents as a package. The fact that the document has been the product of an inclusive consultation among prominent prisoners of all the factions may have contributed to its acceptance. Traditionally, prisoners have been subject on internal consensus.

Parallel to this consensus however, polarization is evident in the way the public views the call for a referendum on the same prisoners’ document and the voting intentions in that referendum if it is to take place. In other words, despite public acceptance of the ideas in the document, about half do not intend to vote for it in a referendum if one is to actually be conducted. This finding shows that Hamas has successfully managed to frame the referendum to the public in highly negative terms, as an attempt by PA president Mahmud Abbas to bypass the will of the voters, to marginalize the legislature and the cabinet, and capitulation to international pressure.

But Hamas’ success remains limited. It has failed to prevent the development of the consensus indicated above with regard to the prisoners’ document, and it has lost significant public support compared to the situation three months ago. The loss of popular support may reflect public disappointment with Hamas’ response to the prisoners’ document; it may not necessarily reflect public discontent over Hamas’ inability to deliver vital services. It is possible that the loss of Hamas’ popularity may have more to do with the shift in the source of pressure on that group. When the pressure was external – coming from the Quartet with its conditions and financial sanctions—Hamas gained greater public support. But when pressure became internal – in the form of the prisoners’ document and the apparent consensus of the various factions—Hamas lost some of its popularity.

Findings also indicate a decline in the level of short term and long term optimism and an increase in threat perception. Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians continues to rise. In fact, findings show that support for bombing attacks has more than doubled compared to the situation nine months ago. This development is also reflected in the continued decrease in the level of support for a permanent status agreement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. This decrease was first detected in the aftermath of the Sharon’s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip.  

(1) Prisoners’ Document and Referendum

• 74% support the National Conciliation Document and 23% oppose it
• Support for the document’s articles ranges between 62% and 85%
• But support for holding a referendum does not exceed 53% while opposition reaches 43%
• Despite support for the substance of the document, only 47% would actually vote for it if a referendum is to be held and 44% would vote against it
• If Hamas rejects the document after it was approved in a referendum, 65% would support taking steps against it
• If President Abbas refuses the formation of a national unity government based on Hamas’ program after the document was rejected in a referendum, 39% would call for his resignation

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians (74%) supports the national conciliation document, also known as the prisoners’ document, as one package and 23% oppose it. Support for the main items of the document ranges between 62% and 85% and opposition ranges between 13% and 34%. The greatest support (85%) goes to the three items dealing with: goal of establishing an independent Palestinians state in the areas occupied in 1967 with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital, right of return, and freeing of prisoners in accordance with international legitimacy, Hamas and Islamic Jihad would join the PLO based on proportional representation, a national unity government based on the national conciliation document and a joint program would be  established with the participation of Fateh and Hamas. Slightly less support (73%) goes to the item that concentrate resistance to Israeli occupation to areas occupied since 1967, 70% support the item that calls for the acceptance of international and Arab legitimacy, 69% support the item that asserts that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they are located, and 62% support the item that asserts that Negotiations with Israel is the responsibility of the PLO and the president of the PA and agreements reached should be submitted to a vote in the PLO National Council or to a referendum.

But support for the conduct of a referendum on the prisoners’ document is much less than the support for the document itself with 53% in favor and 43% opposed. Moreover, despite the overwhelming support for the prisoners’ document, if the referendum is to take place today, only 47% would vote in favor of it and 44% would vote against it. 9% remain undecided. Only 56% agrees that PA president Mahmud Abbas has the right to call for a referendum on the prisoners’ document and 38% do not agree. And if Hamas called for a boycott of the referendum, 44% would boycott it and 50% would participate in it.

If the referendum was conducted and a majority approved the document, 67% believe that the Hamas government would still reject the document and 23% believe it would accept it. If the Hamas government rejects the document after a majority voted in favor of it in the referendum, 65% would support the taking of steps against it such as reducing its powers and jurisdiction (17%), dismissal of the government and the formation of an emergency government (14%), or the dismissal of government and the dissolution of the parliament and the holding of new elections (33%)

If the referendum was conducted and a majority rejected the document, 60% believe that PA president and Fateh would not accept Hamas’ program and would not form a national unity government based on that program, but 31% believe they would do so. If PA president and Fateh refuse to form a national unity government based on Hamas’ program after a majority rejected the prisoners’ document in the referendum, 61% would in this case support either the reduction of the powers and responsibilities of the president (22%) or his resignation (39%). 

(2) Peace Process and support for Violence

• 61% would support and 36% would oppose a mutual recognition of identity after reaching a political settlement and the resolution of all issues of the conflict
• 52% support and 43% oppose the Quartet Road Map and 58% support collection of arms from armed factions today
• 71% would support reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state
• But 49% believe that reconciliation will never be possible and only 13% expect the two sides to return to negotiations and violence to stop 
• 70% believe that Hamas should negotiate with Israel and 26% believe it should not
• Significant increase in the level of support for violence against Israeli civilians

A majority of 61% agrees and 36% disagree with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict with Israel, there would be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. Only 54% of the Palestinians however believe that a majority of Palestinians supports such a proposal and 34% think a majority opposes it.

A majority of 52% supports and 43% oppose the Road Map. In this context, 58%, the highest since the Road Map became public, support and 39% oppose collection of arms from Palestinian armed factions as mandated by the Road Map. Moreover, if the collection of arms were restricted to the Gaza Strip, support would increase to 70% and opposition would drop to 27%. Support for the current ceasefire, another requirement of the Road Map, reaches 71% and opposition 27%.

When a permanent status agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel, 71% would support reconciliation between the two peoples and 27% would oppose it. From among various reconciliation steps, 85% would support open border to free movement of people and goods, 74% would support the creation of joint economic institutions and ventures, 37% would support the creation of joint political institutions designed eventually to lead to a confederation between the two states, 33% would support taking legal measures against incitement against Israelis, and 10% would support adopting a school curriculum that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians. At the personal level, 32% would under conditions of peace invite an Israeli colleague to visit in their homes and a similar percentage would visit an Israeli colleague in his or her home.

After reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, belief that reconciliation between the two peoples will be achieved within the next few years or the next generation stands at 26% while 49% believe that reconciliation is not possible ever. Moreover, 51% believe that a political settlement with Israel is impossible while only 23% believe that such a settlement is possible within the next few years or the next generation.

With regard to short term expectations, only 13% expect the two sides to go back to negotiations and that armed confrontations would stop. On the other hand 39% believe that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 38% believe that the two sides will return to negotiations but some armed confrontations will continue.

A majority of 70% thinks that if Israel agrees to enter peace negotiation with Hamas, the Islamist group should agree to do so and 26% think that it should not. In March, 75% said Hamas should enter peace negotiations with Israel if it agrees to do so. Despite this, two thirds in this poll believe that Hamas should not accept international demands regarding recognition of Israel as a precondition for continued donor support for the Palestinian Authority and 30% believe it should. Belief that Hamas should accept international demands reached 37% and belief that it should not reached 59% last March.

Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel continues to rise. Today 56% support it and 42% oppose it. Support for such attacks stood at 52% last March and 40% last December while opposition stood at 45% and 58% respectively. Similarly, findings show that support for the bombing attack that took place last April stood at 69% and opposition at 27%. Support in September 2005 for the last suicide attack before the one in April, the one that took place in August 2005, stood at 37% and opposition at 56%. It is worth mentioning that this poll was conducted during the period in which Israeli shelling of the Gaza Strip led to a high number of casualties among Palestinian civilians at a Gaza beach and in populated areas.  But while findings show a significant increase in support for violence against Israelis based on emotional drivers, a significant drop has been registered in this poll in the percentage of those who believe that armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not from 69% last March to 54% in this poll.  

(3) Permanent Status Agreement

• Support for a permanent status agreement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters, the Taba Talks, and the Geneva Initiative continues to drop compared to the situation 6 months and 18 months ago: 44% support this agreement today and 53% oppose it
• A majority of 54% supports the compromise on permanent borders and 58% support the item on end of conflict
• Support for the compromise on refugees reaches 41% and Jerusalem 35%
• Support for the item on creating a state without an army reaches 25% and the item on Israeli use of Palestinian airspace and control of two early warning stations in Palestinian territories reaches 40%

Support for a package of a permanent status deal similar in various degrees to the Clinton Parameters, the Taba negotiations, and the Geneva Initiative reaches 44% and opposition 53%. Support for this solution stood at 54% in December 2004 but went down to 46% one year later in December 2005. 43% of the Palestinians believe that a majority of Palestinians supports this solution and 44% believe a majority opposes it. Moreover, 39% of the Palestinians believe that a majority of Israelis supports this solution and 46% believe that a majority of Israelis opposes it.

Support for the item on final borders, which would be based on the 1967 lines except for about 3% of the West Bank which would be exchanged with an Israeli territory of equal size, reaches 54%. Support for this item stood at 63% in December 2004 and 55% in December 2005.

Support for the item on refugees, which would be based on UNGA resolution 194 while giving refugees five different options for permanent residency with return to Israel being subject to Israeli decision, reaches 41%. Support for this item stood at 46% in December 2004 and 40% in December 2005. 

Support for the item on Jerusalem, which would make East Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state but would put Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, reaches 35%. Support for this item stood at 44% in December 2004 and 33% in December 2005.

Support for the item on the establishment of a Palestinian state that has no army but with an international force deployed in it reaches 25%. Support for this item stood at 27% in December 2004 and 20% in December 2005. 

Support for the item on security arrangements, which would allow Israel to use Palestinian airspace and maintain two early warning stations in Palestinian territories, reaches 40%. Support for this item stood at 53% in December 2004 and 43% in December 2005.

Support for the item on ending the conflict once the permanent status agreement is implemented, which would allow neither side to make further claims and would require both sides to acknowledge that Palestine and Israel are the homelands of their peoples, reaches 58%. Support for this item stood at 69% in December 2004 and 64% in December 2005. 

(4) Domestic Balance of Power and Other Domestic Issues

• If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fateh and Hamas would receive 39% each; 13% are undecided
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas drops from 61% to 53% in three months
• Poverty and unemployment is the most important problem confronting Palestinians according to 33% followed by the practices of Israeli occupation according to 26%
• 86% believe that there is corruption in the PA and 82% say they lack personal safety and security

About five months after the parliamentary elections, the gap between Fateh and Hamas narrows to zero. If new elections are held today Fateh’s list would receive the support of 39%, Change and Reform 39%, and all other lists 9%. 13% remain undecided. Three months ago, the gap between Fateh and Hamas stood at 8 percentage points in favor of Hamas with 47% voting for Change and Reform and 39% for Fateh.

Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas drops from 61% last March to 53% in this poll. If new elections are held, 30% say they would vote for Abbas, 14% for current prime minister Ismail Haniyeh, 4% for Marwan Barghouti, and 2% each for Mahmud Zahhar, Mustafa Barghouti, and Khalid Misha’al. 38% say they do not know to whom they would give their vote. In a vote for a vice president, the percentage of undecided is 49% while 8% say it will vote for Ismail Haniyeh, 7% for Mahmud Zahhar, 6% for Dahlan, 5% for Marwan Barghouti, 3% for Saeb Erikat, and 2% each for Farouq Qaddumi and Mustafa Barghouti. The two questions on vote intentions were open questions, with no list of names provided.

The largest percentage of Palestinians, 33%, puts poverty and unemployment on top of Palestinian problems today followed by continuation of the Israeli occupation (26%), spread of corruption and lack of reforms (22%), and finally internal anarchy (17%). Last March, the percentage of those who selected poverty and corruption reached 44% and internal anarchy 7%.

Percentage of those who believe that corruption exists in the PA stands at 86% while the percentage of those who believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future stands at 51%. Last March, percentage of those who believe that corruption will stay the same or increase in the future stood at only 29%.

Percentage of those who say their personal security and safety are assured stands at 18% while those who say they lack them stand at 82%. Last March, percentage of those who said their safety and security are assured stood at 25%. In this context, 48% support and an identical percentage oppose the deployment of the paramilitary unit established by the minister of interior in the Gaza Strip. A larger percentage (64%) opposes, and 32% support the deployment of a similar force established by Fateh in the cities of Jenin and Tulkarm. A majority of 62% blames both Fateh and Hamas for the internal shooting incidents in the Gaza Strip in which armed men and civilians were killed while 15% blame Fateh, 11% blame Hamas, and 9% blame neither. The overwhelming majority (86%) supports the integration of the members of the armed groups belonging to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fateh into the PA security services while 13% oppose that.

Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy drops from 34% last March to 28% in this poll.

Support for the various factions among the total population, not just those intending to vote, shows equal support for Fateh (34%) and Hamas (33%). But support for all the Islamists reaches 37% and support for all other factions stands at 8%. 21% say they do not support any of the existing factions.....Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 September 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a US announcement about an agreement between the UAE and Israel to normalize relations between the two countries. This normalization agreement stipulated an Israeli suspension or delay of the planned annexation of parts of the West Bank. The period also witnessed a rise in the daily number of coronavirus infections and continued stalemate in Palestinian-Israeli relations that followed a PA decision to sever all security and civil links with Israel which led during the past months to a significant financial loss to the PA. This PA decision came in response to an Israeli announcement about the intention to annex about 30% of the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Finding of the September 2020 poll show a great Palestinian public anger with the UAE decision to normalize relations with Israel viewing it as serving only the interests of Israel and as a betrayal or an abandonment of the Palestinian cause and at the same time as a big failure of Palestinian diplomacy. Additionally, the overwhelming majority estimates that the Palestinian leadership has lost its Arab allies as Saudi Arabia will soon follow the UAE in normalizing relations and that Egypt, by endorsing the deal, has in effect abandoned PA president Mahmoud Abbas.  Nonetheless, most believe that the majority of the Arab public is opposed to the normalization deal. Findings show that the public blames the Palestinians 

themselves for this development: the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the fact that they had normalized relations with Israel before many others may have hastened the arrival of this day.

The public does not show an appreciation of the fact that the UAE-Israel deal requires the suspension of the annexation plan. The reason for this is the fact that three quarters think that the suspension is only temporary and will soon take place, the normalization deal notwithstanding. Moreover, based on this assessment, the public is opposed to the restoration of PA-Israel security coordination despite the fact that half of the public wishes to restore civil and fiscal relations between the two sides.

Findings also show a significant decline in support for the two-state solution compared to the situation three months ago. They also show that the consensus in rejecting the Trump plan, the deal of the century, first documented in PSR’s February 2020 poll, remains unchanged. Similarly, the overwhelming majority remains opposed to a resumption of contacts with the Trump administration. Despite the majority expectation that Trump will lose the upcoming US presidential elections, only one fifth expects positive policy change if the Democratic candidate Joe Biden wins.  

Domestically, findings show continued satisfaction with the PA measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus pandemic despite significant decline in the level of satisfaction, especially with the prime minister’s performance. Moreover, a majority is opposed to the severing of coordination and cooperation with Israel in the fight against the spread of the coronavirus.

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas rises in this poll. Parallel to this, satisfaction with the performance of the president has declined. As a result, if elections were held today, Hamas’ Haniyyeh would win a majority of the public vote. This development might have been boosted by the current economic difficulties in the West Bank resulting from the severing of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel and the resulting inability of the PA to pay the public sector in full. Findings also show a drop in the perception of safety and security in the West Bank and an increase in the desire to emigrate. Despite these developments, the popularity of Fatah in the West Bank is not negatively affected; to the contrary, the findings show a little improvement in its popularity.

(1) UAE-Israel normalization agreement:

• A majority of 63% view the normalization agreement between the UAE and Israel as a major event that represents a significant regional shift while 32% view as minor development.
• Findings show a consensus (86%) that the agreement serves only the interests of Israel while 8% think it serves the interests of both the Palestinians and the Israelis and only 1% think it serves the interests of the Palestinians only.
• We asked the public to pick one word that represents its sentiments toward the normalization agreement: the majority (53%) picked “betrayal,” 17% picked “abandonment” 13% “insult,” 9% “indifference,” 6% “sadness,” while only 1% picked words like “satisfaction,” “pride,” and “joy.”
• Most Palestinians (57%) believe that the majority among the Arab public is opposed to the normalization agreement while 20% believe an Arab majority supports it.
• A large majority (70%) believes that other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, Oman, Sudan, and Morocco, will sign similar agreements with Israel while 24% believe they will not do that.
• An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that Saudi Arabia has given the green light to the UAE to sign the normalization agreement and a similar majority (82%) believes that Saudi Arabia too will sign a similar public agreement.
• Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the public (78%) believes that the Egyptian position welcoming the agreement represents an abandonment of the Palestinian leadership led by Abbas while 18% do not share this view.
• A majority of 55% believes that Mohammad Dahlan was one of the participants in the making of the UAE-Israel normalization agreement while 24% do not share this view.
• Nonetheless, a majority of 53% believes that the blame for the normalization deal falls on the shoulders of the Palestinians themselves due to their division and due to the fact that they have recognized Israel and normalized relations with it long before the others; 42% disagree with this view.
• Also, a majority of 62% views the UAE defection from the previous declared Arab consensus on Palestine as a great failure for Palestinian diplomacy; 31% do not share this view.

(2) Annexation and the severing of relations with Israel in post UAE-Israel normalization:

• Three quarters of the public (75%) believe that the normalization agreement forces Israel to merely postpone annexation while 19% think it forces it to put an end to it.
• Now, after the normalization agreement, a majority of 62% is opposed to the restoration of security coordination with Israel while 32% are in favor of restoring it.
• But half of the public (50%) supports, and 45% oppose, the restoration of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel.
• If Israel conditioned resumption of civil and fiscal coordination with a resumption of security coordination, a majority of 59% will oppose, and 35% will support, the resumption of relations.
• In response to an actual Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories, the public is divided on how to respond. When asked to choose one of five possible responses, 28% favored resumption of armed struggle, 20% selected stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, another 20% favored return to negotiations with Israel and the US on the basis of a Palestinian peace plan, 19% preferred waging nonviolent resistance, and 6% selected the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• The public indicates great worries about the future in case of continued severing of relations with Israel. For example, 74% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 75% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 77% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 59% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 59% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 70% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 60% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.
• It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (63%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 30% believe it indeed did.
• A majority of 61% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (32%) expects Israel to do so.
• A large majority of 75% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 21% say they do prefer that.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 45%.  
• A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 31% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 36% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 14% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 28% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 38% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 41% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 26% popular resistance. Three months ago, 45% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 92% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Three months ago, 88% expressed opposition to the plan.
• If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 55% think the chances are zero; 26% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.
• A majority of 71% is opposed and 19% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Three months ago, 69% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
• A majority of 61% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 30% expect him to win it. Nonetheless, only 21% expect a positive change if Biden wins while 34% believe US policy will not change and 35% expect it to become worse.

(4) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• A two-third majority (68%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to prevent travel between the various governorates in order to contain the Coronavirus pandemic.
• Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 64% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 57% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 48% today compared to 62% three months ago.
• The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 70% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 52% say they stopped working or became unemployed.
• A majority of 55% say that are dissatisfied with the PA decision during the past several months to stop cooperation and coordination with Israel in the health sector with the aim of combating the coronavirus, 42% are satisfied with that decision.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• 62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 58% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 54% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 36% (44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 39% and the latter 52% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh threw months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 42% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 41% and the latter 51%.
• We asked in an open-ended question about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 22% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 18% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Mohammad Shtayyeh is preferred by 5%, Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad by 2%. 
• We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 42% three months ago).

(6) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 16%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 57%.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 25% and in the West Bank at 24%. Three months ago, only 18% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. Three months ago, 81% expressed a similar view.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 62% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, only 52% viewed the PA as a burden.
• A year and a half since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 60% expect failure; only 31% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 33% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expects success.
• An overwhelming majority of the public (80%) is opposed to the arrest by the PA security services of activists who were planning to demonstrate or were demonstrating against corruption in the PA while 17% support these arrests. 
• 56% (66% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 36% (23% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.  Six month ago, 42% said it believes it will receive a fair trial.
• A majority of 64% (75% in the West Bank and 49% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary rules according to whims and interests; 31% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law. Six month ago, 41% said the judiciary and courts rule according to the law.  
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (13%), Maan TV at 12%, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 4% each, and finally al Manar at 2%.  

(7) Reconciliation: 

• 37% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.
• Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 45% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 11% believe unity will return soon.

(8) Muslims in China: 

• 80% of the Palestinians believe that if press reports about the treatment of the Uighur Muslims in China are true, Palestinians should condemn the Chines policy towards its Muslim community and 15% disagree with that.
• An overwhelming majority of 79% indicates that it does not believe the statement of the Chinese government that the camps built by China to allegedly detain the Uighur Muslims are in fact teaching centers aiming at eradicating extremism; 10% believe the Chinese statement.
• Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 83% believes that world Muslims should express solidarity with the Uighur Muslims against the Chinese government while 10% disagree with that.
• An overwhelming majority of 80% approves of the Turkish president Erdogan’s decision to transform the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque; 16% disapprove.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; 13% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%,  the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 10%.

07-14 October 2003

These are the results of opinion poll # 9, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 07-14 October 2003. The poll deals with Arafat’s popularity and other domestic issues, peace and security, public perception of the United States, and local elections. The total sample size of this poll is 1318 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face in West Bank (823) and in Gaza Strip (495), in 120 locations. The margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa at Tel 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org 

SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

The results of this poll point to a degree of contradictions in Palestinian public attitudes toward domestic political issues as well as issues of peace and security. The results show a large increase in Arafat’s popularity not seen during the last five years. They also show widespread support for his decision to declare a state of emergency and to appoint Ahmad Qurai’ as a prime minister. In addition, 60% support placing all Palestinian security services under the control of a national security council headed by Arafat. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians believe the increase in support for Arafat is due to Sharon’s recent threats against him. Moreover, more than 90% still support internal and external calls for extensive political reforms in the PA and 82% still believe that corruption exists in the PA.

In the realm of peace and security, the findings show widespread support, reaching 75%, for the suicide attack at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, where 20 Israelis were killed. More than two thirds believe that the Roadmap is dead and 78% believe that current Israeli measures, including the building of the separation wall, reduces that chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the future. Nonetheless, almost two thirds support a return to the Hunda, 85% support mutual cessation of violence, and, for the first time since the establishment of the PA, 59% support taking measures to prevent attacks on Israelis after reaching an agreement on mutual cessation of violence. Furthermore, about two thirds still support a solution based on two states: Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Main Results:

(1) Arafat and Palestinian Domestic Conditions:

• Arafat’s popularity increases from 35% last June to 50% in this poll. This is his highest level of support in five years.
• About 80% of Palestinians believe that Arafat has become stronger and more popular due to Israeli threat to expel or assassinate him.
• Two thirds support Arafat’s declaration of state of emergency while 26% oppose it
• 61% support the appointment of Ahmad Qurai (Abu Ala’) as prime minister and 27% oppose it, but only 48% are willing, and 37% unwilling, to give confidence to his government.
• 60% support placing all Palestinian security services under the command of a national security council headed by Arafat.
• 46% believe that Abu Ala’ and his government will be more capable than Abu Mazin and his government in dealing with Arafat and the presidency; only 12% believe in the opposite.
• But only 22% believe that Abu Ala’ and his government will be more capable than Abu Mazin and his government in reaching an agreement with Israel; 23% believe in the opposite.
• While 62% believe that Abu Ala’ and his government will be able to return to negotiations with Israel, only 33% believe they will be able to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire. 44% believe they will be able to carry out political reforms.
• Fall of Abu Mazin and his government is the equal responsibility of Arafat and Israel (27% each). Only 17% put the blame on Abu Mazin himself.
• 32% are satisfied with the reform steps taken by Abu Mazin and 54% are not satisfied
• 90% support internal and external calls for extensive political reforms.
• 82% believe there is corruption in the PA and 71% believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future.
• Popularity of Fateh increases slightly from 26% last June to 28% in this poll. Hamas’ popularity remains almost unchanged (21%). Total support for Islamists reaches 29% compared to 31% last June.
• Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular Palestinian figure for the position of vice president 17%, followed by Abdul Aziz Rantisi (14% compared to 3% in an open-ended question last June), Sa’eb Erikat (9%), Ahmad Yasin and Haidar Abdul Shafi (7% each), Farouq Qaddoumi and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), Ahmad Quarie’ (4%), Mohammad Dahlan (2%), and Mahmoud Abbas (1%).

One of the main results of this poll is the large increase in Arafat’s popularity rising to 50%. This is the highest level of support for Arafat in five years. Arafat’s popularity stood at 35% last June, which is the average percentage for Arafat’s popularity during the three years of the intifada. The majority of the Palestinian public (79%) believes that the Israeli threats to expel or assassinate Mr. Arafat has made him stronger and more popular. The findings also show that Arafat’s decisions to declare a state of emergency, appoint Ahmad Quarai’ (Abu Ala’) as prime minister, and to put the security services under the control of a national security council headed by Mr. Arafat enjoy popular support (66%, 61%, and 60% respectively).

But the street is reluctant to support Abu Ala’s government, with only 48% willing to give it a vote of confidence. In a comparison between Abu Ala’ and his government and Abu Mazin and his government, regarding the ability to deal with Arafat and the office of the presidency, the street tends to believe that Abu Ala is better able to do so. When it comes to reaching an agreement with Israel, the street sees no difference between the two.

Despite the increase in support for Arafat, the overwhelming majority (90%) still supports internal and external calls for wide scale political reforms in the PA and 82% still believes that corruption exists in the PA.

No important change has taken place in the domestic balance of power compared to the situation last June. Fateh’s popularity increased slightly from 26% to 28% and the total for the Islamists decreased from 31% to 29% during the same period. Marwan Barghouti, at 17%, remains the most popular candidate for the office of the prime minister despite the drop from his June’s 21%. But the most dramatic development has been the increase in the popularity of Abdul Aziz Rantisi, one of the main Hamas leaders, rising to 14% compared to 3% in an open-ended question last June. The increase in the popularity of Rantisi may reflect the public response to repeated Israeli attempt to assassinate him.

Arafat’s popularity increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (47%), in refugee camps (54%) compared to villages and towns (48%), among the illiterates and those with elementary education (66% and 56% respectively) compared to holders of BA degree (44%), among housewives (54%) compared to students (43%), among those employed in the public sector (59%) compared to those in the private sector (42%), among the most religious men (55%), (with religiosity measured by the number of praying time in mosques) compared to the least religious men (37%), among those with the lowest income (51%) compared to those with the highest income (33%), and among supporters of Fateh (81%) compared to supporters of Hamas (30%).

Support for Abu Ala’, as a prime minister, increases in villages and cities (64% and 63% respectively) compared to refugee camps (53%), among the old (68%) compared to the young (54%), among the illiterates (70%) compared to holders of BA degree (56%), among merchants and housewives (68% and 65% respectively) compared to students (50%), among the least religious men (63%) compared to most religious (56%), and among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas (48%).

(2) Peace and Security:

• 75% support the suicide attack at Maxim Restaurant in Haifa leading to the death of 20 Israelis.
• 78% believe that current Israeli measures, including the building of the separation wall, reduce the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the future.
• But 64% still support a two-state solution (Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), while only 12% support a one-state solution (for Palestinians and Israelis). 21% want all Palestine back to the Palestinians.
• Percentage of those believing that armed confrontations will not stop and negotiations will not resume soon increases from 24% last June to 39% in this poll. 46% (compared to 56% last June) believe that the two sides will return to negotiations while some violence will continue.
• 68% believe that the roadmap is dead, but 28% believe that it can still be implemented
• 64% want a return to the Hudna that prevailed few weeks ago while 34% oppose it; but 85% (compared to 80% last June) support a mutual cessation of violence while only 14% oppose it.
• If an agreement is reached on a mutual cessation of violence, 59% (compared to 50% last June) would support taking measures by the PA to prevent attacks on Israelis.
• Despite the widespread support for the Hudna and the mutual cessation of violence, 58% would still support Hamas’ decision to oppose the ceasefire.
• 59% believe that current armed confrontations have helped the Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. In June, 65% shared that belief.

The findings indicate a high degree of pessimism regarding the chances for peace, with two thirds believing that the Roadmap has collapsed while more than three quarters believing that the Israeli measures in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including the building of the separation wall, reduces the chance for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the future. Moreover, the percentage of those believing that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations increases from 24% in June to 39% in this poll. The percentage of those believing that the two sides will return to negotiations and confrontations will stop decreased from 17% to 10% during the same period. This may explain why such a high percentage (75%) supports the suicide bombing attack at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa in which 20 Israelis were killed. It may also explain whey a majority of 58% would support Hamas’ opposition to a ceasefire.

Despite the pessimism and the high level of support for violence, the findings show an additional side to the Palestinian street, one that fully supports a mutual cessation of violence (85%) while a majority (64%) supports a return to the Hudna that prevailed few weeks ago. More importantly, an unprecedented majority of 59% now supports taking measures by the PA to prevent attacks on Israelis once the two sides reach an agreement on mutual cessation of violence. Despite the continued buildup of the separation wall, a majority of 64% still supports a solution based on a two-state solution, while only 12% support a one-state solution, and 21% support a solution that would restore all of historic Palestine to the Palestinians.

Support for the bombing attack at the Maxim restaurant increases in the Gaza Strip (82%) compared to the West Bank (70%), in refugee camps (84%) compared to towns and villages (69%), among women (79%) compared to men (71%), among the young (78%) compared to the old (66%), among students (81%) compared to professionals (33%), and among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fateh (69%).

Support for the two-state (Palestine-Israel) solution increases in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (61%), among the old (69%) compared to the young (52%), among the illiterates (70%) compared to holders of BA degree (59%), among the professionals (72%) compared to students (48%), among married persons (66%) compared to the unmarried (53%), and among supporters of Fateh (74%) compared to supporters of Hamas (56%).

(3) Perceptions of the US:

• 96% believe that the US is not sincere when it says it works toward the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.
• 92% believe that the US is not sincere when it says it wants political reforms and clean government in the PA.
• 78% believe the US is not serious in its declared opposition to the Israeli decision to expel or assassinate President Yasir Arafat.
• 97% believe the current US policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is biased in favor of Israel.
• But Palestinian evaluation of the current US conditions and policies varies on case by case basis. For example, positive evaluation reaches 85% when evaluating American medicine, science, and technology, and reaches 74% when evaluating the status of gender equality, and 63% when evaluating the status of US economic conditions. Positive evaluation drops to 53% with regards to arts and entertainment, 53% with regard to freedom of press and expression, and 44% to democracy and respect for human rights. Positive evaluation drops further when it comes to treatment of minorities (17%), respect for religious freedom (27%), or foreign policy (23%).

The findings show a clear lack of trust in the US policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli issue. But Palestinians show a positive evaluation of American values and achievements. For example, almost all Palestinians (97%) believe the US policy is biased in favor of Israel, while 96% believe the US is not sincere when it says it is working toward the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the Palestinians believes the US is not sincere in its position toward Palestinian political reform and that it is not serious about its opposition to the Israeli decision to expel or assassinate Yasir Arafat.

On the other hand, the Palestinians tend to give a positive evaluation to US achievements in medicine, science, and technology (85%), US gender equality (74%), arts and entertainment (53%), and freedom of the press (53%). Positive evaluation drops when it comes to democracy and human rights (44%), religious freedom (27%), foreign policy (23%), and treatment of minorities (17%).

It is clear that the US response to 11 September has affected Palestinian evaluation of internal American conditions regarding human rights, religious freedom and treatment of minorities especially Arabs and Muslims. The Bush Administration’s support for Israeli assassination and incursion policy may have contributed to the clear distrust in the USintentions in the peace process. While half of the Palestinians were convinced last June the belief that President Bush was determined to implement the Roadmap and move the peace process forward, this conviction has completely disappeared in this poll.

(4) Municipal Elections:

• 60% support holding local elections today, but 32% support the continued functioning of the appointed local councils due to existing conditions
• If elections are held today, 61% oppose holding them piecemeal, wherever possible, and demand holding them in all areas at once
• 80% support the direct election of the head of the local council by the voters while 18% support the election of the council head by the elected members of the council
• 67% support the participation of refugee camps located inside cities in the local elections while 25% support independent elections of local camp committees
• 42% give a positive evaluation for the work of the local councils in their areas; 46% believe these councils does represent the majority of the residents while 47% believes that they do not.
• If elections take place today, 33% would vote for the current local council in their area
• If elections take place today, 70% would participate
• Despite the support for local elections and despite the high level of readiness to participate, 51% believe that if local elections are held today, they would not be honest while only 38% believe they would be.
• 80% say they would vote for the candidate in accordance with their knowledge of the candidate’s positions, ethics, and qualifications, while 11% say they would vote for the candidate chosen by the family or tribe. In all cases, 81% say they would vote that candidate even if it turns out to be a woman. 16% say they would not vote for a woman candidate.

The findings show a majority of 60% in support of holding local elections today, while a third of the public supports, due to current conditions, the continued functioning of the existing PA-appointed councils. If a decision is made to hold elections now, a majority of 61% would oppose holding them piecemeal, wherever possible, and would insist on holding them simultaneously in all Palestinian areas. Two thirds of the public support the participation of the residents of refugee camps that are located within the municipal boundaries of existing cities, while 25% support holding separate elections for independent camp committees. There are no differences between refugees and non-refugees regarding the inclusion of the refugee camps in the municipal elections. But in refugee camps, support for the participation of refugee camp residents in the local elections decreases to 58% while support for separate elections for camp committees increases to 36%. The opposition to refugee camp participation in local elections does not exceed 5% among the public at large and among the residents of the camps. The findings also show that the overwhelming majority (80%) supports the direct elections of council heads, while only 18% support the election of the council heads by elected council members.

If local elections are held today, 70% say they would participate in them. When participating, 80% say they would vote for based on their knowledge of the candidate’s positions, ethics, and qualifications. 11% say they would vote for the candidate chosen by their family while only 6% say they would for the candidate chosen by their political party or faction. In all cases, an overwhelming majority (81%) says that it would vote for its preferred candidate even if it was a woman.

Despite the fact that a majority supports holding local elections today, and despite the fact that a large percentage is ready to participate in them if held today, confidence in the honesty of such elections is not high, not exceeding 38% while 51% say they would not be honest. Perhaps the reason for demanding elections now despite the lack of confidence in their honesty is the belief of almost half of the public (47%) that the current appointed councils do not represent the majority of the residents in their areas while only 46% believe that they do indeed represent the majority of the residents. Moreover, the percentage of the positive evaluation of the performance of the appointed local councils does not exceed 42%. In case local elections are held today, only 33% would vote the current heads of their local councils....Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 7 and 10 December 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a decision by the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas, to form a high judicial council under his chairmanship, a new reconciliation agreement reached in Algeria by Palestinian factions, and media outlets reporting various cases of drowning of Palestinian emigrants in the Mediterranean Sea. On the Israeli side, after winning the November parliamentary elections, the Likud and other right wing and extreme right-wing groups agreed to form a governing coalition under Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, a UN agency adopted a decision to seek the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the Israeli occupation. Moreover, various armed groups resisting the Israeli occupation in the northern parts of the West Bank, such as the “Lions’ Den,” which received a wide press coverage, went public during this period. In Qatar, the World Cup football games started and were widely followed by the Palestinians due to a considerable expression of support for and solidarity with Palestine by the fans attending the games.

This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The findings of the last quarter of 2022 point to a limited change in the domestic balance of power favoring Hamas and centering in the West Bank. Moreover, the popularity of president Abbas drops several percentage points, mostly in the West Bank. In other domestic issues, findings indicate that only one quarter of the public thinks that the factional agreement in Algeria will lead to actual reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the level of pessimism about the prospects for reunification exceeds 70%. Findings also show that the public views negatively Abbas’ decree forming a high council for the judiciary under his chairmanship as only one in five Palestinians think it aims to strengthen the judiciary while a vast majority of more than 70% think it aims at weakening the independence of the judiciary.

The findings of the current quarter also indicate a significant decline in the level of support for the two-state solution accompanied by a significant rise in the percentage of those who think this solution is no longer feasible or possible due to settlement expansion. This change is not accompanied by an increase in the percentage of those who support the one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights. To the contrary, support in the current quarter for this one-state solution has also dropped. These findings point to the possibility that the change in attitudes toward the political settlement with Israel reflects a hardening of public attitudes signifying less willingness to compromise. This hardening of attitudes can also be seen in the significant rise in support, in the West Bank, for a return to armed intifada. Furthermore, findings show a significant decrease, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in the percentage of those who view positively Israeli-Palestinian confidence building measures. On top of that, more than 70% of the public support the idea of forming armed groups, such as the “Lions’ Den,” and only one in ten says the PA has the right to arrest members of these groups or disarm them.

These findings come in a context of three major political and security-related developments, during the current quarter, that might have shaped Palestinian public attitudes, particularly in the West Bank:

• Perhaps the single most important development has been the escalating military clashes between Palestinian armed groups and the Israeli army in the northern part of the West Bank. The number of armed clashes and Israeli military incursions and the number of Palestinian casualties have been unprecedented since the end of the second intifada. This particular development sheds light on the fact that the most significant changes in our findings are centered in the West Bank.
• The results of the Israeli elections and the start of negotiations to form a right-wing coalition government, between the Likud, the religious parties, and the extreme right wing in Israeli politics, might have contributed to the increase in the percentage of those who think the two-state solution is no longer practical or possible. This same development might have also contributed to the rise in the belief that armed struggle, not negotiations, is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation. Indeed, the findings indicate that a large Palestinian majority expects the worse from the upcoming Israeli government including high expectation that it will change the status quo in holy places in al Haram al Sharif in East Jerusalem, expel Palestinian families from their homes in East Jerusalem, transfer Bedouin residents, such as Arab al Jahalin, from their villages and encampments in the southeastern parts of Jerusalem to other locations, and annex settlements or the Jordan Valley to Israel.
• Finally, it is clear from the findings that the pro-Palestine scenes at the World Cup in Qatar have contributed to a restoration of the confidence of the Palestinians in the justice of their cause and their right to resist the occupation by all legitimate means. The vast majority of the Palestinians say they have now regained much, or some, of the lost confidence in the Arab peoples in light of the solidarity with Palestine expressed by the fans during the football games. The findings show strong association between the restoration of trust and attitudes regarding the two-state solution and the return to an armed intifada. 

(1) “Lions’ Den” and other armed groups:

• 72% of the public (84% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank) say they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 22% are against that.
• Nonetheless, 59% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 39% are not worried.
• 79% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 17% say they are for it.
• The vast majority (87%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 10% say they favor it.
• A majority of 59% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 15% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 14% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups. 

(2) The formation of a new Israeli government of right wing and extreme right

• A majority of 61% expects the policies of the upcoming Israeli government, that is currently being formed under the leadership of Netanyahu from the right wing and the extreme right, to be more extreme and aggressive while 30% expect them to be similar to the current policies; 4% expect them to be less extreme.
• A majority of 58% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to change the status quo in al Haram al Sharif in East Jerusalem by allowing Jews to pray at the site; 38% do not expect that.
• A majority of 64% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to expel Palestinian families from al Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem; 33% do not expect that.
• A majority of 68% expects the new Israeli government under Netanyahu to transfer the Palestinian Bedouin community currently living in the area between Jerusalem and Jericho, such as Arab al Jahalin, in order to build a big settlement to the east of Abu Din and al Ezariyya; 28% do not expect that.
• A majority of 69% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to annex settlements or the Jordan Valley to Israel; 27% do not expect that.
• A majority of 67% is less optimistic about the prospects of an improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations, such as reaching new agreements on confidence building measures or reducing the expansion of the settlements during next year; 12% say they are more optimistic today; and 20% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.   

(3) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 69% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 29% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 63% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 36% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 53% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 60%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 36% and Haniyeh 46%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 62% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 31% and the latter 60%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (39%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Mohammad Dahlan (5%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), Mohammad Shtayyeh, Khalid Mish’al and Hussein al Sheikh (3% each), and 22% said they do not know or have not decided.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 74%. Moreover, a vast majority of 75% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 20% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 73% in the West Bank and 79% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 65% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 34% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 44% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 21% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 38% three months ago).
• 28% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 25% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 40% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 27% selected Hamas, 26% Fatah under Abbas, and 42% said neither side deserves such a role. 

(4) Domestic conditions, the “assassination” of Yasir Arafat, independence of the Judiciary, and those responsible for the drowning of Palestinian emigrants:

• In light of the leaks in the media regarding the investigation into the death of Yasir Arafat, 50% of the public believe a Palestinian party or actor had implemented the plot to get rid of Arafat but that the planning had been done by Israel; 24% think no Palestinian actor or party had been involved in the death of Arafat; and 14% think a Palestinian party or actor had plotted and implemented the killing of Arafat.
• A large majority of 72% thinks the decree issued by president Abbas to form a high judiciary council under his chairmanship was meant to weaken the independence of the judiciary; 19% think it was meant to strengthen it.
• We asked the public about the party indirectly responsible for the drowning in the Mediterranean Sea of Palestinian emigrants from the Gaza Strip while attempting to illegally reach Europe. The largest percentage (27%) puts the responsibility on Hamas, 24% on Israel, 18% on the PA, another 18% blame the emigrants themselves, and 3% blame Egypt.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 30% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 29% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 77% and in the West Bank at 46%.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 86% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 73% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 51% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 57% viewed the PA as a burden and 38% viewed it as an asset.
• 26% are optimistic and 72% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 25%. When asked about the prospects for the implementation of the agreement reached in factional meetings sponsored by Algeria, only 26% expressed the belief that the agreement would lead to actual reconciliation while 67% expressed the belief that it will not lead to reconciliation.
• After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 78% expect failure; only 18% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 20% of the public expect success and 76% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 79% expects failure and 17% expects success.
• We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 31%, followed by Palestine TV (13%), al Aqsa TV (11%), Palestine Today TV (9%), Maan TV (6%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Mayadeen (2%). 

(5) Palestinian-Israeli Relations, the Peace process, and the decision to go to ICJ:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 32% and opposition stands at 66%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 37%.  
• A majority of 69% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 28% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 64% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 26% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 71% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 30%.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 59% supported joining more international organizations; 51% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 48% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 46% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 51% chose armed struggle (53% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank), 21% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 41% chose armed struggle and 30% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 57% said it looks positively, while 38% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 69% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
• When asked about PA negotiations with the upcoming Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu, 47% said they opposed such negotiations while 25% said they support negotiations with him on a peace agreement and confidence building measures while 11% said they support negotiations if restricted to a peace agreement and 12% said they support negotiations with him if restricted to confidence building measures. In other words, a total of 36% are in favor of negotiations with Netanyahu about a peace agreement and 37% are in favor of negotiations with him about confidence building measures.  In light of the decision by a UN agency to go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to ask for its consultative opinion on the legality of the Israeli occupation, half of the public (50%) say the decision and any opinion by the ICJ will have no benefits for the Palestinian people; 28% say the benefit will be symbolic but will have no impact on Israeli policies; 16% say the decision will have an impact on constraining Israeli policies on matters such as settlement construction. 

(6) World Cup in Qatar:

• 66% of the Palestinians say that they now, after having seen the scenes of solidarity and support for Palestine in the World Cup in Qatar, have regained much of the trust in the Arab peoples after many disappointments stemming from the Arab normalization with Israel; 21% say they have regained some of that trust; 5% say their trust in the Arab peoples has remained small; and 4% say they have no trust at all in the Arab World.
• In light of the Qatari organization of the World Cup, 68% of the Palestinians say they think Qatar’s international standing has improved a lot compared to where it was before; 17% say it has improved somewhat; 8% say Qatar’s standing has not changed; and 1% say it has worsened.
• We asked the public about its predictions for the winner in the World Cup. When the number of remaining country teams was eight, 48% said it expected Morocco to win; when the number of country teams went down to six, 54% expected Morocco to win. By contrast, 22% expect Argentina to win; and 15% expect France to win. 

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 39% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 25% (8% in the Gaz Strip and 36% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 21% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 20% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction;  17% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 10% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 15% said it is unemployment, 15% said it is the split or division, and 6% said it is the internal violence.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16 and 20 March 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several domestic developments including the launching of a second round of the local election campaigns in the West Bank and the holding of a special session for the PLO Central Council in which important decisions relevant to Palestinian-Israeli relations and the filling of several senior positions in the organization’s leadership. It also witnessed increased settlers’ attacks in areas labeled B and C of the West Bank and increased tension in the Shaikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. Amnesty International issued a report in which it characterized Israel as an apartheid state. Finally, after weeks of anticipation, war erupted between Russia and Ukraine. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the first quarter of 2022 indicate a return to the internal balance of power between Fatah and Hamas, as the case was before the May 2021 Israel-Hamas war. In other words, ten months after the war, Fatah's popularity returns to outperform Hamas’. It is noticeable that Fatah's popularity is rising equally in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In other words, the rise is unlikely to be associated with the launch of the West Bank’s local election campaigns. The local elections, scheduled to take place on 26 March, will take place only in the West Bank. However, the rise might be linked to two things:

(1) the success of the so-called "confidence-building steps" between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel, and (2) Hamas's inability to translate the gains it made in the May war with Israel to positive change on the ground in the Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem.

However, President Abbas' popularity has not risen. Indeed, Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyeh is still able to win presidential elections in which only the two compete. Fatah's competitiveness is also clearly diminished when its name is associated with President Abbas', as Hamas continues to outperform Fatah when the latter is listed as "Fatah under the leadership of President Abbas." For example, when asked about the party most deserving of representing the Palestinian people, Hamas or “Fatah under President Abbas' leadership,” Hamas still beats Fatah, even if just by a little.

The results also indicate that a large majority of the Palestinian public wants the PA to take a neutral stand in the Russian-Ukrainian war, although more people blame Russia for starting that war. The results show a small majority indicating concern about the prospect of war expansion and the entry of other countries in it. Moreover, a large majority says it expects prices to rise sharply in Palestine because of that war. When asked to compare the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to that of the Ukraine and Russia, the majority asserts that the war has demonstrated a western double standards as the US and Europe show no willingness to impose any sanctions on Israel, while showing a great enthusiasm to impose crushing sanctions on Russia. Moreover, more than three quarters of the public believe that the war has also shown European discrimination in the treatment of refugees from Ukraine as opposed to refugees from the Middle Eastern wars.

We also asked the public about the PLO’s Central Council meeting in Ramallah at the beginning of February and the resolutions it made. The findings show that a majority, albeit small, believes that the current PLO remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. However, a larger majority believes that this particular meeting of the Central Council was illegitimate, although a majority, of more than sixty percent, supports the decisions it took. Perhaps the main reason for delegitimizing this meeting relates to the rejection of the results of the elections that were held during its sessions, with only a quarter or less accepting these election results, and the absence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad from the meeting. Two-thirds of the public say that Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad's entry into the PLO will make it more representative of the Palestinian people.

On Palestinian-Israeli relations, poll findings show that support for a two-state solution remains almost the same as it was three months ago while support for a one-state solution, with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, rises to about a third during the same period. Despite the increased level of approval for the one-state solution, two thirds of the public support the description of Israel is an apartheid state. Indeed, the public sees the publication of the report of Amnesty International on the subject as an indication of the beginning of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of the Palestinians, as previously happened in the case of South Africa.

The results also show an increase in support for confrontations and an armed uprising and a decrease in the belief in the effectiveness of negotiations. Finally, in this survey, we asked, for the first time, about the belief in a Qur'anic prophecy about the demise of Israel. We found that a vast majority actually believes that such prophesy does indeed exist in the Qur'an. However, the poll found that most of the public does not believe the assessment that 2022 is the precise year of Israel's demise. Even among religious people and the believers of the existence of this prophecy in the Qur'an, only a minority believes the assessment regarding a specific year.

(1) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

• The largest percentage of the public (43%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 40% blame Ukraine.
• An overwhelming majority (71%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 10% think it should stand with Ukraine.
• A majority of 54% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 42% are not worried.
• The overwhelming majority thinks Palestine will be impacted by the war in the Ukraine while only 5% think the war will have no impact on Palestine. 63% think it will lead to a sharp rise in prices, 26% think Israel will exploit it to expand settlements and annex Palestinian territories, and 1% think it could lead to expansion of armed confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis.
• A majority of 57% says the war show the double standard of US and Europe when the conflict is about the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories compared to that of Russia-Ukraine conflict; 28% think the two conflicts are different, and 10% think the Western countries stand against the Israeli occupation just as they stand against the Russian occupation of Ukraine.
• An overwhelming majority of 76% thinks there is a difference in the manner in which Europe treats refugees from Ukraine compared to its treatment of refugees from the Middle East; refugees from Arab and Islamic countries are treated badly and in a discriminatory manner. 

(2) PLO Central Council’s meeting and decisions:

• More than 60% support the decisions made by the PLO Central Council in its latest meeting in February 2022: 67% support the suspension of the PLO recognition of Israel and 61% support the decision to end the implementation of agreements with Israel including security coordination.
• Despite the fact that a majority of 62% support the Central Council’s decision to defer to the PLO Executive Committee on the setting of a mechanism to implement the Council’s decisions, a majority of 59% thinks the Executive Committee will not implement these decisions while only 31% think it will implement them.
• Indeed, 56% share the belief expressed by those who boycotted the Council’s meeting in viewing the session as illegitimate; only 29% think the session was legitimate.
• The largest percentage is not in favor of the election of the various members of the Central Council to senior positions in the PLO: only 24% support the election of Rouhi Fattouh as the Speaker of the PLO’s National Council; 26% support the election of Hussein al Shaikh to the Executive Committee; and only 22% support the election of Mohammad Mustafa or Ramzi Rihan to that committee.
• However, a majority of 51% views the current PLO as its own sole legitimate representative and 53% say the PLO is viewed by the Palestinian people as their sole legitimate representative.
• If the PLO is reformed and Hamas and Islamic Jihad become members in that organization, 65% think it would in this case become more representative of the Palestinian people while 12% think that, in this case, it will become less representative of the Palestinian people.  

(3) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 26% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 69% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 52% (57% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 35% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 41% and Haniyeh 47%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 50% and from among those, the former receives 33% and the latter 60%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 37% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal 3%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad 2% each.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 29% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Moreover, 73% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 71% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 64% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 42% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 14% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 38% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 47% (compared to 40% three months ago).
• The largest percentage (31%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 29% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 33% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 34% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 36% said neither side deserves such a role.
• In the areas in which the second stage of local elections are set to take place soon, 55% say they will participate in these elections and 38% say they will not participate.
• When asked about the most important consideration that will influence their vote in the upcoming local elections, the largest percentage (42%) select the ability to deliver services to their area of residence; 14% select the political party of the list, another 14% select the closeness of the list to family and friends, and another 14% sat their vote will be influenced by the ability of the list to combat corruption. 9% say that their vote will depend on the extent to which the members of the list are religious, and 7% say it depends on the level of education among the list members.  

(4) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• A majority of 54% say that the current rise in the cost of living affects them significantly or very significantly, while 45% say it affects them moderately or slightly.  
• The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 19% say it is doing so.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 57%.
• 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 37% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 31% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 35% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 60% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 42% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 56% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (55%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.
• 28% are optimistic and 69% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 39%.
• After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 20% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28% of the public expect success and 67% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 71% expects failure and 25% expects success.
• The vast majority (70%) says that domestic violence in which individual killings turn into family and clan confrontations for revenge reflects primarily the society's weak confidence in the justice and law enforcement system, while 27% say it reflects the traditional and tribal nature of Palestinian society.
• To stop these incidents of internal violence, the vast majority (72%) says law enforcement services should be strengthened, while 24% say tribal reform committees should be strengthened.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV and Maan (11% each), Palestine Today (9%), al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%). 

(5) The Coronavirus and PA performance during the pandemic:

• 53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 46% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, 57% expressed satisfaction.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 67% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.  

(6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 32% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 63% expressed opposition.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 52% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 52% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 63% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 61% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
• A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 36% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 30% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 44% chose armed struggle, 25% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 42% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiations.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. However, when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 38%; 57% are opposed.
• 64% are opposed, and 30% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.  
• The vast majority (73%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 22% say it does not.  However, the majority (57%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 32% say they believe it.
• Against the backdrop of the assassination of three members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Nablus, a majority of 64% says it is the duty of the Palestinian security forces to confront the Israeli armed forces when they enter areas under the control of the PA: 32% say they do not agree.
• The main reason for the failure of the Israeli army to stop settlers’ terrorism in the eyes of a majority of 54% is that the settlers are a tool in the hands of the army and it uses them to fight the Palestinian residents in order to expel them from their land; 20% say the reason is that settlers are the decision makers in the Israeli government; 12% say that settlers hide and wear masks, and 10% say that the army does not have the jurisdiction to arrest settlers.
• When asked why the Palestinian police and national security forces could not protect the residents from settlers’ terrorism in Area B, the largest percentage (34%) says it is because the Palestinian leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with the Israeli army than to provide protection to the Palestinian population; 29% say it is because the Palestinian police and national security forces do not want to engage in armed conflict with the Israeli army; 20% say it is because the Palestinian police does not have jurisdiction to protect the residents of area B; and 12% say terrorist attacks take place at night when Palestinian security services are not present.
• Two-thirds of the public (65%) approve and 27% disapprove of the assessment that Israel is an apartheid state. Moreover, 48% agree and 40% disagree that Amnesty International's report on Israel's racism is an indication of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of Palestinians and against Israel, as it has previously did regarding apartheid in South Africa. 

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 38% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (25%; 17% in the Gaz Strip and 30% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 19% said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 15% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 28% said it is corruption, 14% said it is unemployment, 14% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 27-30 June 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the formation of a new government led by Mohammad Shtayyeh, the intensification of the PA financial crisis as the PA was unable to provide full salary payment to its public sector, and the leaking of documents indicating illegal salary hikes for ministers by the previous government. It also witnessed the continued failure of reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas and the inability of Israel and Hamas to reach a long term hudna or cessation of violence. Jifna, a predominantly Christian town in the West Bank, came under attack from some Palestinian Muslims who had quarreled earlier with one of its residents. Despite the personal nature of the attack, it nonetheless generated concerns about Muslim-Christian tensions. In Israel, the right wing won the elections but could not form a government leading to the dissolution of the new parliament with new snap elections called for in September. This Israeli development led the Trump Administration to postpone the release of its long-awaited peace deal, the so-call “Deal of the Century.” This was followed by the holding of an economic workshop in Bahrain in which the US Administration unveiled the economic side of its peace plan. Finally, tensions escalated in the region after Iran downed a US unmanned drone, a further threat to the region as concerns grow about a possible war. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2019 show a widespread rejection of the US Administration, the “Deal of the Century,” and the Bahrain workshop: Ninety percent say that they do not believe or trust the US administration; about 80% supported the PA decision to boycott the Bahrain workshop; three quarters want the PA to reject the Trump peace plan when released; and more than three quarters believe that the US economic plan will not bring them economic prosperity. Similarly, an overwhelming majority reject the participation of Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, in the Bahrain workshop and 80% view that participation as an abandonment of the Palestinian cause. 

Findings also show that half of the public continues to oppose the two-state solution, a solution which is viewed by the majority as impractical or infeasible due to West Bank settlement expansion. The public is divided into three groups in its assessment of the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation: armed action comes first followed by negotiations and then popular nonviolent resistance. Findings show that the majority expects the future Israeli government, that will be formed after the upcoming elections, to annex settlement areas in the West Bank, wage war against the Gaza Strip, and take measures that would bring about PA collapse.

On internal matters, the public is not yet willing to give the Shtayyeh government a passing grade, as most view its performance similar or worse than that of the previous government while a small number views positively that performance. Similarly, findings show that despite public support for the PA decision to refuse to accept the Israeli transfer of partial custom revenues, the majority is worried that this decision could lead to PA collapse. A large majority, more than two-thirds, views the sudden discovery that the former government has illegally increased the salaries of its ministers as an indication that PA corruption is deep rooted while only a quarter believes that PA corruption is limited and subject to accountability.

The majority of the public remains pessimistic about the prospects for reconciliation. A majority is opposed to those preconditions imposed on reconciliation by Fatah, i.e., the “one gun” demand, and Hamas, i.e., the demand to keep the “resistance arms.” Nonetheless, two thirds of those who oppose these two preconditions reject Abbas’s demand to disarm Hamas. Those who support preconditions are divided equally: one half sides with Hamas’s and the other with Fatah’s. As we found in previous polls, the overwhelming majority demands the immediate removal of sanctions imposed previously by Abbas against Hamas and the Gaza Strip.

Finally, findings show that the domestic balance of power remains largely stable compared to the first quarter. Fatah did manage to increase the gap in its popularity with Hamas slightly in its favor. But the gap in the vote for Abbas vs. Ismail Haniyyeh, in a presidential election, narrowed slightly in Haniyyeh’s favor. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’s resignation continues to decline despite the fact that it remains very high. The overwhelming majority of the public demands the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose elections restricted to the parliament.

(1) The Bahrain economic workshop and Trump peace plan:

• An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (79%) supports the PA decision to boycott the Bahrain economic workshop while 15% are opposed.
• After describing the details of the economic part of the US peace plan, we asked public if it thinks the US Administration will succeed in implementing it: two thirds (68%) say it will not succeed and 22% say it will.
• Similarly, the overwhelming majority of the public (76%) says that based on what it has heard about the outcome of the Bahrain workshop, it does not expect the US economic plan to lead to Palestinian prosperity; 17% do expect it to do that.
• An overwhelming majority of 90% indicates that it does not trust the US Administration when it says that the goal of the Bahrain workshop is to improve Palestinian economic conditions; only 6% trust the US Administration.
• Similarly, 80% say that the participation of Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, in the Bahrain workshop signifies an Arab abandonment of the Palestinians while 12% believe the participation of these countries signifies support for the Palestinians.
• When asked if it believes that the PA leadership will show willingness to accept the Trump peace plan in order to benefit from its economic dimension, about two thirds (65%) say it will not while 27% say it will.
• When asked to choose between economic prosperity and independence, the overwhelming majority (83%) opts for independence; only 15% chose economic prosperity.
• Can economic prosperity be achieved under Israeli occupation? 73% say it cannot, as restrictions imposed by the occupation impede prosperity, while 24% say that it is possible to have prosperity while still under occupation. 
• When we shift to the political dimension of the Trump peace plan, the overwhelming majority (86%) says that based on what it has heard so far about the plan, it feels pessimistic about its content while only 9% express optimism.
• We asked the public if it thinks acceptance of the Trump peace plan by the PA would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 85% say no; only 10% say yes it would.
• When asked if it thinks the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 72% says it does and only 22% say it does not.
• Almost three quarters (73%) believe that in response to Palestinian rejection of the Trump peace plan, the US will impose further sanctions on the Palestinians; 18% say it will amend its plan in case of Palestinian rejection. 
• Nonetheless, three quarters believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan; 15% say it should accept it with reservations; and 4% believe it should accept it without reservation.
• Moreover, a majority of 66% is opposed and 24% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• Only 41% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 47% believe no elections will take place.
• An overwhelming majority (71%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 11% want parliamentary elections only. 13% do not want any elections.
• If elections were held for a parliament and a president, 73% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 21% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip. 
• 57% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 60% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 49% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 55% in the West Bank and 68% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 58%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 42% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 34% (40% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter 42% of the vote (compared to 51% for Abbas and 41% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 43% of the vote (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 52% (compared to 51% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 55% three months ago) and Haniyeh 36% (compared to 33% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 34%.
• In an open-ended question, we ask about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 27% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 18% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 4% (1% in the West Bank and 11% in the Gaza Strip) and Khalid Mishal, Salam Fayyad, and Mustafa Barghouti are selected after him by 2% each.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 67% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 30% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 33% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 25% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 43% (compared to 45% three months ago). 

(3) A new government led by Mohammad Shtayyeh:

• With more than two months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (53%), the economy (44%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (53%), the preparation to hold general elections (55%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (54%). But a percentage ranging between 45% and 24% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while  a percentage ranging between 7% and 12% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government.
• Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 59% expects failure; only 28% expects success.
• In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% expects failure and 34% expects success.
• In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 57% expects failure and 30% expects success.

(3) Domestic conditions:

• A majority of 62% supports and 29% oppose the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues. However, a majority of 52% says that it is worried that this decision could lead to the collapse of the PA while 39% indicat that it could not. A majority of 65% believes that the new Israeli government that will be formed after the upcoming elections will continue to deduct money from the Palestinian custom revenues while 25% expect it to stop this practice.
•  Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 67%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 59%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 64% and in the West Bank at 57%.
• 26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 42% and declines in the West Bank to 18%.
• Only 40% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 57% say that they cannot. Three months ago, 65% of West Bankers said they could not criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. When asked about the measures taken by the previous government in illegally raising the salaries of its ministers, 67% indicate that they believe that this kind of corruption is deep rooted in the PA while only 25% think it is partial and subject to accountability; 4% think that there is no corruption in the PA.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 48% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• Asked about the implications of the incident in the predominantly Christian town of Jifna in the West Bank, in which a group of Palestinians attacked the town, 69% indicated that they believe Palestinian Christian-Muslim relations are normal, as one would expect from the people who belong to one nation; but 24% thought relations between the two communities might be heading to greater tensions.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 21%, followed by Palestine TV (14%), Maan TV (13%), Al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV (9%), and al Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (4% each).  

(4) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government: 

• 33% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%.
• When asked about the preconditions imposed by Fatah (the demand for “one arm”) and Hamas (the demand for the preservation of the “arms of the resistance,”) on reconciliation and reunification, a majority of 53% of the public indicates that it opposes such preconditions and 38% indicate support.
• Among those who support the imposition of preconditions (i.e., the 38% of the public), the respondents are divided evenly between those who support Hamas’s precondition (42%) and those who supported Fatah’s (41%).
• However, among those who oppose the imposition of preconditions (i.e., the 53% of the public), the majority of the respondents (67%) indicates its opposition to disarming Hamas while only 29% express opposition to preserving party-affiliated armed groups alongside the PA security forces.
• Moreover, the overwhelming majority (79%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 17% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government.
• A majority of 51% (down to 41% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 8% believe the chances are high.

5) The peace process

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 47% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 48%. 44% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 48% believe that the majority opposes it.  Similarly, 48% support and 45% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative.
• A majority of 56% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 40% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 71% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 36% of the public while 34% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 10% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 39% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 30% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• The public is divided over the role of negotiations and armed struggle in the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 38% think armed struggle is the most effective means; 35% think that negotiation is the most effective means; and 23% believe that non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 37% said negotiation is the most effective means and 36% said armed struggle is the most effective means.
• Similarly, when asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public splits into three groups: 38% chose armed struggle, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 62% support popular non-violent resistance; 47% support a return to an armed intifada; 38% support dissolving the PA; and 31% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 47% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 41% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
• A majority of 57% expects the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 18% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections. 
• A majority of 59% expects the future Israeli government, that will be formed after the upcoming Israeli elections, to annex some West Bank settlements while 30% think the Israeli talk of annexation is merely an election campaign slogan.
• Similarly, 52% expect the future Israeli government to force the PA to collapse while 38% believe it will seek to maintain the PA.
• A majority of 56% believes the future Israeli government will wage a war against the Gaza Strip while 33% expects it to seek a long term hudna of cessation of violence with Hamas.

6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 32% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 29% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 19% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 16% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-23 October 2021. The six-month period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several important developments including the indefinite postponement of the parliamentary elections that were planned for May 2021, the eruption of popular confrontations in East Jerusalem in protest against conflict over access to Muslim holy places and the threat of expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in al Shaikh Jarrah which were followed by the fourth Hamas-Israel war that was triggered by these confrontations. The Palestinians were also preoccupied with the killing of a political activist, Nizar Banat, by the Palestinian security services. PA president Mahmoud Abbas met with the Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz in Ramallah to talk about Palestinian-Israeli relations and means of improving them while strengthening the PA by implementing various trust-building measures. The period witnessed the escape and recapture of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel. Finally, the period witnessed the setting of the month of December 2021 as a date for the holding of local elections in villages and small towns with population of less than 11,000. This press release addresses a selected number of domestic issues such as the evaluation of the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights, the internal balance of power, and the results of legislative and presidential elections if they were to take place today. It also covers attitudes regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations, such as the two-state solution, return to negotiations, and the best means to end the Israeli occupation given the current stalemate. Total size of the sample is 1800 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

This poll was conducted six months after the indefinite postponement of legislative elections that were scheduled to take place in May 2021 and two months before the holding of the first phase of local elections, scheduled for December 2021. The past six months witnessed important developments that significantly decreased the popularity of Fatah and president Abbas, most importantly in addition to the postponement of elections, the fourth war between Hamas and Israel and the killing of the opposition activist Nizar Banat by members of a Palestinian security service.

In order to analyze the findings, we compared the levels of support for Fatah and Hamas before and during these developments. We also compared public attitudes regarding domestic issues and Palestinian-Israeli relations. Specifically, we compared the results obtained in March 2021 in the areas that will now go to the first phase of the local elections with the current findings for the same exact areas. The number of the relevant areas that were part of our sample in March and are part of the current sample is 27 and the total number of respondents is 270 in March and 405 in the current poll.

The current findings show that Fatah continues to suffer the consequences of the developments of the past six month but they also show that it has managed to narrow the gap with Hamas which gives it the ability to effectively compete in the upcoming first phase of the local elections, which will take place in places that are mainly rural. But it remains unable to win in the second phase of the local elections, which will take place mostly in cities and big towns. The findings show that the overall support for Fatah has increased and it is now higher than that of Hamas. But the gap between the two parties today, five percentage points in favor of Fatah, is smaller that the one that prevailed in March, which stood at 13 percentage points in favor of Fatah. Nonetheless, the current findings represent a huge improvement for Fatah compared to the findings of June 2021 when the gap between the two stood at 11 percentage points in favor of Hamas. The levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of president Abbas and the demand for his resignation remain very high as about three quarters continue to make that demand. Perhaps one reason for the rise in Fatah’s popularity might be the implementation by Israel of some of the confidence building measures that the PA and Israel agreed to recently, such as family unifications and the rise in the number of laborers working in Israel. It is worth mentioning that a month ago, in our September 2021 poll, majority of the Palestinians supported such measures.

The current findings indicate a significant rise in support for the two-state solution compared to our findings during the past six months. Similarly, the current poll shows an increase in public belief in the effectiveness of negotiations. Indeed, for the first time in six months the percentage of those who prefer to change the status quo through negotiations is higher than those who prefer to do so through waging armed struggle. It is possible that this change is driven by the same dynamics that increased the support for Fatah.

1) Domestic conditions: democracy, elections, the performance of the president, and the balance of power:

• We asked Palestinians to evaluate people’s ability to criticize the authority without fear in the area where they live, 71% of West Bankers believe that people in their area cannot criticize the PA without fear. In the Gaza Strip, 62% say people in that area cannot criticize Hamans’ authority without fear; 28% of West Bankers and 38% of Gazans say people in their areas can do that without fear.
• We asked the public to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the areas where they live, under the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and under Hamas’ control in the Gaza Strip: 22% of West Bankers and 29% of Gazans describe these conditions as good or very good, 50% of West Bankers and 35% of Gazans describe them as bad or very bad, and the rest describe the conditions as neither good nor bad.
• As indicated in chart (1) below, positive (good or very good) evaluation of democracy and human rights is higher among those with the highest income (30%) compared to those with the lowest income (18%), among supporters of Fatah and Hamas (33% and 30% respectively) compared to supporters of third or other parties (13%).

• If parliamentary and presidential elections were to take place today, the following should, in the eyes of the public, be the top five priorities that these elections should aim to achieve: the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (selected by 29% of the public), followed by improving economic conditions (25%), combating corruption (15%), lifting the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip (14%), and strengthening the resistance to occupation (9%). The percentage of those who selected “improving economic conditions” stands at 35% in the Gaza Strip, making it the top priority for Gazans, while the percentage of selecting “combating corruption” stands at 20% in the West Bank, making it the second priority in that area after the “unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” which is selected by 33% of the West Bankers.
• When asked about the party or faction that is better able to achieve the priority selected by the respondents, 26% selected Hamas while only 18% selected Fatah and 14% selected third or other parties. One third (33%) believe all factions and parties have equal ability to achieve the priorities selected. Hamas is selected as the most able by those who selected the following priorities: strengthen the resistance to occupation (45% selected Hamas as most able), lift the siege and blockade (39%), combat corruption and unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (24% each). Those who select Fatah are more likely to have selected the improvement of economic conditions (25%) and making progress in the peace process (21%). The peace process was not among the top five priorities selected by the Palestinian public. Those who selected the priority of creating a democratic political system with periodic elections, another priority that was not among the top five, selected third parties as the most able faction or political party (30%).
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 27% and dissatisfaction at 71%. About three quarters (74%) want Abbas to resign while 22% want him to stay in the office. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stood at 78% in September 2021.
• If new presidential elections were to take place today with three candidates competing, president Abbas, Ismail Haniyyeh from Hamas, and Marwan Barghouti from Fatah 64% of the public would participate and from among those the first receives 16%, the second 30%, and the third 51%. Vote for Barghouti in this three-way competition is higher in the West Bank (61%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (96% and 57% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%), among the somewhat religious (57%) compared to the religious and the not religious (47% and 44% respectively), among those working in the private sector (60%) compared to those who work in the public sector (39%), among those with the highest income (51%) compared to those with the lowest income (45%). Vote for Haniyyeh is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (23%), among women (33%) compared to men (28%), among the religious (40%) compared to the not religious and the somewhat religious (7% and 23% respectively), among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (1% and 2% respectively). Vote for Abbas is higher in the Gaza Strip (20%) compared to the West Bank (12%), among men (18%) compared to women (13%), and among supporters of Fatah (39%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (1% and 2% respectively).

• If the competition was between two, Abbas and Haniyyeh, only 46% say they would participate and from among those the former receives 39% and the latter 55%. But if the competing two candidates were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, 62% would participate and from among those, the former would receive 65% and the latter 32%.
• If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, 60% would participate and from among those Fatah receives 38%, Hamas 33%, and the third parties combined 10%; 20% are undecided. It is worth mentioning that in September, Hamas received 37% of the vote and Fatah 32%. Voting for Fatah is higher in the West Bank (39%) compared to the Gaza Strip (36%), among men (40%) compared to women (35%), among those with the highest income (40%) compared to those with the lowest income (35%). Vote for Hamas is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (28%), among the religious (42%) compared to the not religious and the somewhat religious (12% and 27% respectively), and among those with the least income (39%) compared to those with the highest income (28%).

• 43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 10% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

2) Comparing attitudes in areas of the first phase of local elections with attitudes in other areas:

• In order to assess attitudes of the residents of the villages and towns in which local elections will take place in December 2021, we divided respondents into three categories: those residing in the areas of the first phase of the local election, residents of cities and other urban areas in which the second phase of the local elections will take place, and residents of refugee camps who will not participate in local elections. Here below are the main attitudinal differences between the three areas:

1. Fatah enjoys more support than Hamas and third parties (41%, 27%, and 7% respectively) in those areas where the first phase of the local election will take place. It is worth mentioning that back in March 2021 Fatah received the support of 56% of respondents in those areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections while Hamas received the support of only 23% in those same areas. These findings are confirmed when looking at the outcome of a three-way presidential elections in which Marwan Barghouti receives 59% compared to Ismael Haniyyeh (23%) and Mahmoud Abbas (14%).  It is worth mentioning that Fatah receives the highest percentage of the vote in the refugee camps followed by the areas participating in the first phase of the local elections and thirdly in cities and other urban areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections: 48%, 41%, and 35% respectively. Hamas receives its highest vote from cities and other urban areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections followed by areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections, and finally in refugee camps (35%, 28%, and 27% respectively). In other words, Hamas and Fatah have exactly the same level of support in the areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections.
2. Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections while standing at 24% in the urban areas that will participate in the second phase and 37% in refugee camps. Demand for Abbas resignation in the areas of the first phase of the local elections stands at 68% compared to 66% in refugee camps and 77% in cities and other urban areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections.
3. Evaluation of the status of democracy and human rights, standing at 25%, is the lowest among the residents of the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections, followed by the urban aeras that will participate in the second phase of the local elections (24%) and refugee camps (28%).
4. Support for the two-state solution is the lowest in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections (40%) compared to urban areas which will participate in the second phase (46%) and finally in refugee camps (50%).
5. Support for waging an armed struggle against the occupation is the lowest in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections, standing at 30% only, compared to 34% in the cities and urban areas and 38% in refugee camps.
6. Support for a return to negotiations under US leadership is the lowest in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections (27%) while standing at 35% in urban areas and 37% in refugee camps.

Comparing attitudes of those residing in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections to other areas

(3) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 46% and opposition stands at 53%. No description or details were provided for the concept. One months ago, support for the concept stood at 36%.  Support for the two-state solution is higher among men (48%) compared to women (43%), among the not-religious and the somewhat religious (54% and 50% respectively) compared to the religious (39%), among supporters of Fatah (64%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (43% and 31% respectively). More than three quarters (76%) believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.

• One third (33%) support return to negotiations with Israel under US leadership but a majority of 64% oppose it. Support is higher in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (32%), among the somewhat religious and the not-religious (37% and 34% respectively) compared to the religious (29%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 38% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (20%).
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 44% chose armed struggle, 36% negotiations, and 16% popular resistance. One month ago, 48% chose armed struggle and 28% chose negotiations. Support for armed struggle is higher in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among men (50%) compared to women (39%), among supporters of Hamas (74%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (28% and 45% respectively). Support for negotiations is higher among women (38%) compared to men (34%), among those whose age in between 40 and 59 years (36%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (29%), and among supporters of Fatah (51%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (16% and 27% respectively).
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 36% of the public while 34% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 9% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 19% prefer to keep the status quo. One month ago, 28% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle. The percentage of those who prefer waging an armed struggle is higher in the Gaza Strip (39%) compared to the West Bank (30%), among men (38%) compared to women (30%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 29 years (37%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 59 years (32%), and among supporters of Hamas (61%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (20% and 35% respectively).