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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16 and 20 March 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several domestic developments including the launching of a second round of the local election campaigns in the West Bank and the holding of a special session for the PLO Central Council in which important decisions relevant to Palestinian-Israeli relations and the filling of several senior positions in the organization’s leadership. It also witnessed increased settlers’ attacks in areas labeled B and C of the West Bank and increased tension in the Shaikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. Amnesty International issued a report in which it characterized Israel as an apartheid state. Finally, after weeks of anticipation, war erupted between Russia and Ukraine. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the first quarter of 2022 indicate a return to the internal balance of power between Fatah and Hamas, as the case was before the May 2021 Israel-Hamas war. In other words, ten months after the war, Fatah's popularity returns to outperform Hamas’. It is noticeable that Fatah's popularity is rising equally in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In other words, the rise is unlikely to be associated with the launch of the West Bank’s local election campaigns. The local elections, scheduled to take place on 26 March, will take place only in the West Bank. However, the rise might be linked to two things: 

(1) the success of the so-called "confidence-building steps" between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel, and (2) Hamas's inability to translate the gains it made in the May war with Israel to positive change on the ground in the Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem.

However, President Abbas' popularity has not risen. Indeed, Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyeh is still able to win presidential elections in which only the two compete. Fatah's competitiveness is also clearly diminished when its name is associated with President Abbas', as Hamas continues to outperform Fatah when the latter is listed as "Fatah under the leadership of President Abbas." For example, when asked about the party most deserving of representing the Palestinian people, Hamas or “Fatah under President Abbas' leadership,” Hamas still beats Fatah, even if just by a little.

The results also indicate that a large majority of the Palestinian public wants the PA to take a neutral stand in the Russian-Ukrainian war, although more people blame Russia for starting that war. The results show a small majority indicating concern about the prospect of war expansion and the entry of other countries in it. Moreover, a large majority says it expects prices to rise sharply in Palestine because of that war. When asked to compare the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to that of the Ukraine and Russia, the majority asserts that the war has demonstrated a western double standards as the US and Europe show no willingness to impose any sanctions on Israel, while showing a great enthusiasm to impose crushing sanctions on Russia. Moreover, more than three quarters of the public believe that the war has also shown European discrimination in the treatment of refugees from Ukraine as opposed to refugees from the Middle Eastern wars.

We also asked the public about the PLO’s Central Council meeting in Ramallah at the beginning of February and the resolutions it made. The findings show that a majority, albeit small, believes that the current PLO remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. However, a larger majority believes that this particular meeting of the Central Council was illegitimate, although a majority, of more than sixty percent, supports the decisions it took. Perhaps the main reason for delegitimizing this meeting relates to the rejection of the results of the elections that were held during its sessions, with only a quarter or less accepting these election results, and the absence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad from the meeting. Two-thirds of the public say that Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad's entry into the PLO will make it more representative of the Palestinian people.

On Palestinian-Israeli relations, poll findings show that support for a two-state solution remains almost the same as it was three months ago while support for a one-state solution, with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, rises to about a third during the same period. Despite the increased level of approval for the one-state solution, two thirds of the public support the description of Israel is an apartheid state. Indeed, the public sees the publication of the report of Amnesty International on the subject as an indication of the beginning of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of the Palestinians, as previously happened in the case of South Africa.

The results also show an increase in support for confrontations and an armed uprising and a decrease in the belief in the effectiveness of negotiations. Finally, in this survey, we asked, for the first time, about the belief in a Qur'anic prophecy about the demise of Israel. We found that a vast majority actually believes that such prophesy does indeed exist in the Qur'an. However, the poll found that most of the public does not believe the assessment that 2022 is the precise year of Israel's demise. Even among religious people and the believers of the existence of this prophecy in the Qur'an, only a minority believes the assessment regarding a specific year.

1) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

• 43% blame Russia for starting the war; 40% blame Ukraine
• 71% want the PA to stay neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict
• 63% expect the war to lead to price increases
• A majority of 57% thinks that Western countries have shown double standard when dealing with the Israeli occupation compared to that of the Russian occupation.

The largest percentage of the public (43%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 40% blame Ukraine.  Putting the blame on Russia is higher in the West Bank (45%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in villages (52%) compared to refugee camps and cities (30% and 43% respectively), among women (45%) compared to men (41%), among non-refugees (46%) compared to refugees (39%), among the religious (49%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (28% and 40% respectively), and among supporters of Fatah and Hamas (47% and 44% respectively) compared to supporters of third parties (36%).

An overwhelming majority (71%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 10% think it should stand with Ukraine.

As for the war’s impact, a majority of 54% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 42% are not worried. The overwhelming majority thinks Palestine will be impacted by the war in the Ukraine while only 5% think the war will have no impact on Palestine. 63% think it will lead to a sharp rise in prices, 26% think Israel will exploit it to expand settlements and annex Palestinian territories, and 1% think it could lead to expansion of armed confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis.

A majority of 57% says the war show the double standard of US and Europe when the conflict is about the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories compared to that of Russia-Ukraine conflict; 28% think the two conflicts are different, and 10% think the Western countries stand against the Israeli occupation just as they stand against the Russian occupation of Ukraine.  Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 76% thinks there is a difference in the manner in which Europe treats refugees from Ukraine compared to its treatment of refugees from the Middle East; refugees from Arab and Islamic countries are treated badly and in a discriminatory manner.

2) PLO Central Council’s meeting and decisions:

• 60% support the decisions taken by the PLO Central Council but 56% say the session lacked legitimacy
• The percentage of support for the election of the various candidates for senior positions in the PLO ranges between 22 and 26.
• A majority of 51% says the PLO is its sole legitimate representative

More than 60% support the decisions made by the PLO Central Council in its latest meeting in February 2022: 67% support the suspension of the PLO recognition of Israel and 61% support the decision to end the implementation of agreements with Israel including security coordination. Support for the decisions is higher among refugees (64%) compared to non-refugees (59%), the unmarried (66%) compared to the married (60%), among those with the highest income (65%) compared to those with the lowest income (59%), and among supporters of Fatah (70%) followed by supporters of Hamas (66%) and third parties (53%).

Despite the fact that a majority of 62% support the Central Council’s decision to defer to the PLO Executive Committee on the setting of a mechanism to implement the Council’s decisions, a majority of 59% thinks the Executive Committee will not implement these decisions while only 31% think it will implement them. Indeed, 56% share the belief expressed by those who boycotted the Council’s meeting in viewing the session as illegitimate; only 29% think the session was legitimate.  The belief the council meeting was illegitimate is higher in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (54%), in cities and villages (57% and 56% respectively) compared to refugee camps (45%), among men (60%) compared to women (52%), among those whose age is 50 and above (60%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 (52%), among refugees (58%) compared to non-refugees (54%), among holders of BA degree (59%) compared to the illiterates (48%), among professionals and students (67% and 63% respectively) compared to laborers and housewives (50% and 51% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (57%) compared to those who work in the public sector (49%), among the married (57%) compared to the unmarried (50%), among the religious (58%) compared to the unreligious (49%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (73% and 68% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (39%).

The largest percentage is not in favor of the election of the various members of the Central Council to senior positions in the PLO: only 24% support the election of Rouhi Fattouh as the Speaker of the PLO’s National Council; 26% support the election of Hussein al Shaikh to the Executive Committee; and only 22% support the election of Mohammad Mustafa or Ramzi Rihan to that committee.

However, a majority of 51% views the current PLO as its own sole legitimate representative and 53% say the PLO is viewed by the Palestinian people as their sole legitimate representative.  If the PLO is reformed and Hamas and Islamic Jihad become members in that organization, 65% think it would in this case become more representative of the Palestinian people while 12% think that, in this case, it will become less representative of the Palestinian people.  The belief that the PLO would become more representative if Hamas and Islamic Jihad join it is higher among holders of the BA degree (68%) compared to the illiterates (60%), among students and professionals (75% and 74% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, and laborers (26%, 59%, and 63% respectively), among the religious (66%) compared to the unreligious (48%), and among supporters of third parties and Hamas (78% and 76% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (67%). 

3) Legislative and presidential elections:

• In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyyeh, the former receives 38% and the latter 54%
• In parliamentary elections, vote for Fatah rises to 42% and vote for Hamas declines to 36%
• But the largest percentage (31%) thinks Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to 29% who chose “Fatah under the leadership of President Abbas.”
• Turnout for the local elections is expected at 55% of eligible voters

A large majority of 72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 26% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 69% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 52% (57% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%.

Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 29% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Moreover, 73% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 71% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 35% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 41% and Haniyeh 47%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 50% and from among those, the former receives 33% and the latter 60%.  If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 37% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal 3%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad 2% each.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 64% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 42% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 14% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 38% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 47% (compared to 40% three months ago).

The largest percentage (31%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 29% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 33% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 34% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 36% said neither side deserves such a role.

In the areas in which the second stage of local elections are set to take place soon, 55% say they will participate in these elections and 38% say they will not participate.  When asked about the most important consideration that will influence their vote in the upcoming local elections, the largest percentage (42%) select the ability to deliver services to their area of residence; 14% select the political party of the list, another 14% select the closeness of the list to family and friends, and another 14% sat their vote will be influenced by the ability of the list to combat corruption. 9% say that their vote will depend on the extent to which the members of the list are religious, and 7% say it depends on the level of education among the list members.

4) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• 79% express the view that the PA government is not doing enough to limit price increases
• In the Gaza Strip, 37% say they want to emigrate; in the West Bank 20% express the same desire to emigrate
• 84% believe there is corruption in the institutions of the PA and 69% believe there is corruption in the institutions run by Hamas in the Gaza Strip
• Optimism about the success of reconciliation declines to 28%
• A large majority of 70% thinks that the incidents of internal violence reflect the lack of societal trust in the justice and law enforcement sector

A majority of 54% say that the current rise in the cost of living affects them significantly or very significantly, while 45% say it affects them moderately or slightly.  But the vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 19% say it is doing so.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 57%. Similarly, 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 37% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 31% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.  Moreover, 35% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 60% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 42% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 56% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (55%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.  Moreover, only 28% are optimistic and 69% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 39%.

After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 20% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28% of the public expect success and 67% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 71% expects failure and 25% expects success.

The vast majority (70%) says that domestic violence in which individual killings turn into family and clan confrontations for revenge reflects primarily the society's weak confidence in the justice and law enforcement system, while 27% say it reflects the traditional and tribal nature of Palestinian society.  To stop these incidents of internal violence, the vast majority (72%) says law enforcement services should be strengthened, while 24% say tribal reform committees should be strengthened.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV and Maan (11% each), Palestine Today (9%), al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%).

5) The Coronavirus and PA performance during the pandemic:

• 53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Corona virus
• A two-third majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA Ministry of Health

53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 46% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, 57% expressed satisfaction.  The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 67% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.

6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• 40% support the two-state solution and 58% oppose it
• 32% support the one-state solution with equal rights to Jews and Palestinians
• A majority of 63% views positively the confidence building measures undertaken by Israel and the PA
• But the largest percentage (44%) thinks that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation; only 25% think negotiations are the most effective
• 70% are opposed to unconditional return to negotiations with Israel; 64% are opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US
• 73% believe the Qur’an contains a prophecy about the demise of the state of Israel; but only 32% think the year for this demise is 2022
• 64% want the PA security forces to confront the Israeli forces when they enter Palestinian cities
• Two thirds view Israel as an apartheid state

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 32% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 63% expressed opposition.  Support for the position articulated by Abbas in favor of a one-state solution with equal rights is higher in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (30%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to villages and cities (26% and 32% respectively), among those whose age is between 23 and 29 years (36%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (30%), among those with the highest income (35%) compared to those with the lowest income (29%), among the unreligious (62%) compared to the religious (29%), and among supporters of Fatah (46%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (25% and 24% respectively).

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 52% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 52% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 63% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 61% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.

A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 36% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 30% believe the chances to be medium or high.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 44% chose armed struggle, 25% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 42% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. However, when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 38%; 57% are opposed. Similarly, 64% are opposed, and 30% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.  

The vast majority (73%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 22% say it does not.  However, the majority (57%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 32% say they believe it.  The belief in the existence of the prophecy is higher in the West Bank (74%) compared to the Gaza Strip (70%), among students and laborers (77% each) compared to farmers, merchants, and professionals (52%, 57%, and 65% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (76%) compared to those who work in the private sector (69%), among the married (74%) compared to the unmarried (68%), among the religious (79%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (37% and 71% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 73% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (68%).

The belief that the prophecy will be fulfilled this year (2022) is higher in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to the West Bank (29%), in refugee camps (50%) compared to villages and cities (30% and 31% respectively), among refugees (37%) compared to non-refugees (29%), among the married (33%) compared to the unmarried (25%), among the religious (36%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (24% and 30% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (52%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (21% and 23% respectively).

Against the backdrop of the assassination of three members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Nablus, a majority of 64% says it is the duty of the Palestinian security forces to confront the Israeli armed forces when they enter areas under the control of the PA: 32% say they do not agree. The main reason for the failure of the Israeli army to stop settlers’ terrorism in the eyes of a majority of 54% is that the settlers are a tool in the hands of the army and it uses them to fight the Palestinian residents in order to expel them from their land; 20% say the reason is that settlers are the decision makers in the Israeli government; 12% say that settlers hide and wear masks, and 10% say that the army does not have the jurisdiction to arrest settlers.  When asked why the Palestinian police and national security forces could not protect the residents from settlers’ terrorism in Area B, the largest percentage (34%) says it is because the Palestinian leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with the Israeli army than to provide protection to the Palestinian population; 29% say it is because the Palestinian police and national security forces do not want to engage in armed conflict with the Israeli army; 20% say it is because the Palestinian police does not have jurisdiction to protect the residents of area B; and 12% say terrorist attacks take place at night when Palestinian security services are not present.

Two-thirds of the public (65%) approve and 27% disapprove of the assessment that Israel is an apartheid state. Moreover, 48% agree and 40% disagree that Amnesty International's report on Israel's racism is an indication of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of Palestinians and against Israel, as it has previously did regarding apartheid in South Africa.  The percentage of those who view Israel as an apartheid state is higher in refugee camps and villages (72% each) compared to cities (64%), among those who work in the public sector (76%) compared to those who work in the private sector (68%), among the married (67%) compared to the unmarried (57%), among those with the lowest income (73%) compared to those with the highest income (65%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (74% and 70% respectively) compared to the religious (59%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (79% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (65%).

7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 38% express the view that the most vital Palestinian goal should be ending occupation and building a Palestinian state
• The most pressing problem for Palestinians today is occupation followed by corruption

38% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (25%; 17% in the Gaz Strip and 30% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 19% said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 15% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 28% said it is corruption, 14% said it is unemployment, 14% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

Over 80% of the Palestinians support turning to the UN to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state. About 70% of Israelis think that if the UN recognizes a Palestinian state Israel should accept the decision 

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem. 

In the poll we explored Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding the Palestinian appeal to the UN to obtain recognition as an independent state. We also explored salient domestic issues in each public. 

83% of the Palestinians believe they should go to the UN to obtain recognition for their state. 

Majorities on both sides, 77% of the Palestinians and 79% of the Israelis, believe that the US will use its veto power in the UN Security Council in order to prevent the UN from admitting the state of Palestine as a UN member. 

69% of Israelis think Israel should accept the decision if indeed the UN recognizes a Palestinian state, and either start negotiations with the Palestinians about its implementation (34%) or not allow any change on the ground by the Palestinians (35%); 16% believe Israel should oppose the decision and intensify the construction in the settlements; 7% think that Israel should annex to Israel the PA territory; and 4% think Israel should  invade the PA and use force in order to prevent the establishment of  a Palestinian state. 

If the UN recognizes the Palestinian state, 26% of Palestinians support a return to armed attacks on army and settlers to force Israel to withdraw from their state, 37% think peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw; 30% think negotiations with Israel can bring it to withdraw. 54% of Palestinians in the West Bank say they would join large peaceful demonstrations in the West Bank and Jerusalem if they were to take place after the recognition of the Palestinian state. 

As to the recent social protest in Israel, 44% of Israelis think the protest movement should turn into a political party and run in the elections. If indeed such a party participates in the next elections, 27% of the Israelis claim they will vote for it. Two thirds of Palestinians say the rising cost of living and their inability to provide a better future for themselves and their families could push them to demonstrate as well. 

The Palestinian sample size was 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between September 15 and 17, 2011. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 605  adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic, or Russian between September 11-14, 2011. The margin of error is 4.0%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il. 

MAIN FINDINGS 

 (A) Israeli and Palestinian attitudes and expectations regarding the recognition by the UN of the Palestinian state

• 74% of the Palestinians believe they should go to the UN in September to obtain recognition for their state, since there is no point to return to negotiations now.
• Majorities on both sides believe that the US will use its veto power in the UN Security Council in order to prevent the UN from admitting the state of Palestine as a UN member. 77% of the Palestinians and 79% of the Israelis think so, while 16% and 17% respectively think that the US will not use its veto power. A majority of Israelis (60%) also believes that if the Palestinians turn to the UN General Assembly for recognition of a Palestinian state, they will succeed to obtain a two thirds majority; 36% believe they will not succeed to obtain this majority.
• 50% of Palestinians think that a state of Palestine will become a UN member in September, while 43% do not believe so. Among Israelis, 37% think this will happen while 57% do not believe so.
• A majority of Israelis (57%) believe that if Palestinians appeal for the recognition of the UN, Israel should take diplomatic measures to prevent such a step; 20% think Israel should support this step, and 13% believe Israel should threaten to annex the Palestinian Authority territories in this case.
• If indeed the UN recognizes a Palestinian state, 69% of the Israelis think Israel should accept the decision and either start negotiations with the Palestinians about its implementation (34%) or not allow any change on the ground by the Palestinians (35%). 27% believe Israel should oppose the decision, of them 16% think it should intensify the construction in the settlements; 7% that it should annex to Israel the PA territory, and 4%  that it should invade the PA and use force in order to prevent the establishment of  a Palestinian state.
• On the Palestinian side, 68% believe that if the Palestinians request UN membership, Israel will respond by stopping transfer of custom funds to the PA and making conditions of occupation harsher with more checkpoints and settlement activities, 10% believe Israel will only stop the transfer of custom funds, 12% think Israel will not stop transfer of custom funds but conditions of occupation will become harsher; and 8% believe Israel will do nothing and the status quo will prevail.
• We asked Palestinians how they think Palestinians can force Israel to withdraw from the territories, if the UN recognizes the Palestinian state, and Israelis what they think Palestinians will do. 46% of Israelis think the Palestinians will resume the Intifada including armed confrontations, while 31% think they will start non-violent resistance such as peaceful demonstrations. More Palestinians however think peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw (37%) than armed attacks on army and settlers (26%). 30% of the Palestinians think negotiations with Israel can bring it to withdraw, and 16% of the Israelis think the Palestinians will resume negotiations.
• 54% of Palestinians in the West Bank say they would join large peaceful demonstrations in the West Bank and Jerusalem if they were to take place after the recognition of the Palestinian state. 44% will not participate.
• We asked Palestinians what they think the PA should do after the UN recognizes the Palestinian state in September. 75% think the PA president and government should enforce Palestinian sovereignty over all the territories of the West Bank, for example by opening roads in area C, start building an airport in  the Jordan valley, and deploy Palestinian security forces in area C even if this leads to confrontations with the Israeli army and settlers. 21% think the PA should not do that. Similarly, 73% think the PA should insist on assuming control over the Allenby Bridge terminal from the Israeli side even if this leads to the closure of the terminal. 23% think the PA should not do that.
• 28% of Palestinians and 10% of Israelis expect that after the Palestinians seek membership in the UN, there will be negotiations between the sides and armed confrontations will stop; 28% and 38% respectively think that there will be negotiations between the sides but some armed attacks will continue; and 23% of Palestinians and 49% of Israelis expect the sides not to return to negotiations and armed confrontations not to stop.  

 (B) Conflict management and threat perceptions

• Majorities on both sides - 72% of Israelis and 64% of Palestinians - do not think that if a peaceful popular revolt like in Egypt or Tunisia were to erupt against the Israeli occupation in the West Bank it would be capable of ending occupation. Only 19% of Israelis and 34% of Palestinians think it would be capable of ending occupation. Nonetheless, 54% of the Palestinians believe that if large peaceful demonstrations were to  take place in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, they would contribute to speeding the process of ending Israeli occupation.
• In our poll we also examine periodically Israelis’ and Palestinians’ readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 58% of the Israelis support such a mutual recognition of identity and 36% oppose it. Among Palestinians, 46% support and 52% oppose it.
• Among Palestinians, 73% are worried and 27% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. Among Israelis, 58% are worried and 42% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life.
• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 58% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 19% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinians’ aspirations in the long run are to conquer the state of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (38%); 20% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 21% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 37% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967. 

(C)  Domestic developments

• 34% of Israelis think that the main reason for the eruption of the protest is the big gap in wealth distribution, 30% think it is the need for welfare policies that will relieve citizens’ economic difficulties, 20% think it is the housing problem of young people, and 12% believe the main reason is a left wing plot to bring down the government.
• 17% of the Israelis declared they participated in person in the protest. Among those who participated in the protest, 13% claim they built a tent, 35% expressed their views regarding the protest on the internet, 41% signed a petition, and 88% say they participated in a demonstration.
• Among the general Israeli public, 81% support the social justice protest, and between 64% and 89% support their specific demands.
• 44% of Israelis think the protest movement should turn into a political party and run in the elections. If indeed such a party participates in the next elections, 27% of the Israelis claim they will vote for it.
• 24% of the Palestinians regard the widespread popular demonstrations for social justice in Israel as something good for the Palestinians; 25% regard these demonstrations as something bad, and 45% think they have no effect on Palestinians.
• Interestingly, 66% of Palestinians say the rising cost of living and their inability to provide a better future for themselves and their families would push them to demonstrate, while 33% say these concerns would not push them to demonstrate in order to demand a better standard of living and a better life.

This PSR poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah

• Following the war in Gaza in the summer of 2014 50% of Israelis and 38% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative. These results are lower than the figures in December 2013 when 54% of the Israelis and 46% of the Palestinians supported the package.
• Given the Gaza war and the increasing tensions in Jerusalem and the West Bank, 47% of Israelis and 36% of Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations: 39% of the Israelis and 26% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and some armed attacks will take place; 8% of the Israelis and 10% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks. By contrast, in June 2014, 28% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians thought that the two sides will not return to negotiations and some armed attacks will take place and 7% of the Israelis and 13% of the Palestinians thought that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.
• At the same time - consistent with previous results - each side perceives the other side as constituting a threat to its very existence. 58% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals in the long run are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens. 24% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 37% of the Israelis think that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 18% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 3 and 6, 2014. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 616 adult Israelis interviewed in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 7 and 12, 2014. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Ifat Maoz, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, and the Department of Communication, and Director of the Swiss Center for Conflict Research, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

MAIN FINDINGS

 (A) Conflict management and threat perceptions

• Following the war in Gaza in the summer of 2014 and the increasing tensions in Jerusalem and the West Bank, we asked both sides about their expectations for the future: 7% of the Israelis and 24% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will soon return to negotiations. 32% of the Israelis and 37% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will return to negotiations but some armed attacks will take place. 39% of the Israelis and 26% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and some armed attacks will take place. Finally, 8% of the Israelis and 10% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks. In June 2014, 28% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians thought that the two sides will not return to negotiations and some armed attacks will take place and 7% of the Israelis and 13% of the Palestinians thought that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.
• Among Israelis, 62% are worried and 36% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life. Among Palestinians, 82% are worried and 19% are not worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.
• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 58% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 24% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (37%); 18% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 16% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part (6%) or all (10%) of the territories occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security. 33% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain all (17%) or some (16%) of the territories conquered in 1967.
• At the same time: 11% of the Israelis say the aspirations of Israel are to withdraw to the 1967 borders after guaranteeing Israel’s security. 32% say the aspirations of Israel in the long run are to withdraw from parts of the territories after guaranteeing Israel’s security. 18% say they are to annex the West Bank without granting political rights to the Palestinians living there. 13% say the aspirations of Israel in the long run are to annex the West Bank and expel the Palestinians living there.
• Among the Palestinians 38% say that the aspirations of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO are to regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war. 31% say the aspirations of the Palestinian Authority in the long run are to regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war. 14% say they are to conquer the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine. 12% say the aspirations of the Palestinian Authority in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel.

(B) Attitudes, perceptions and expectations regarding a permanent settlement

Clinton/Geneva Parameters

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We address these issues regularly since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues, amidst a turbulent Middle East and the recent war in Gaza.

• 50% of Israelis and 38% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters. The results are lower than the figures in December 2013 (54% support among Israelis and 46% support among Palestinians).
• Since 2003, we observed only once majority support for such a settlement on both sides: in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat. The level of support then was 64% among Israelis and 54% among Palestinians.

Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton / Geneva permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 45% support or strongly support and 54% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2013, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 52% and opposition at 48%.

Among Israelis 41% support and 47% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2013, 44% of the Israelis supported this component while 48% opposed it.

(2) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 28% support and 71% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2013 28% support and opposition reached 71%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians, as in previous polls. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

Among Israelis 59% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 60% support and 33% opposition obtained in December 2013.

(3) Jerusalem

Among Palestinians 29% support and 71% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2013, an identical compromise obtained 32% support and 68% opposition.

Among Israelis, 32% support and 59% oppose an arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2013, similarly, 37% supported this arrangement and 56% opposed it.

(4) Refugees

Among Palestinians 40% support and 58% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2013, 46% agreed with an identical compromise while 52% opposed it.

Among Israelis 36% support such an arrangement and 48% oppose it. In December 2013, 39% supported it and 50% opposed.

 (5) End of Conflict

In the Palestinian public 61% support and 37% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. In December 2013, 63% supported and 36% opposed this item.

In the Israeli public 64% support and 27% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2013, similarly, 66% of the Israelis supported it while 28% opposed it.

 (6) Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 46% support and 53% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In comparison, in December 2013, 52% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 48% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 49% support and 37% oppose this arrangement compared to 52% who supported it and 39% who opposed it in December 2012.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 38% support and 60% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2013, 46% supported and 53% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 50% support and 40% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In December 2013, 54% supported and 37% opposed such a package.

We asked the Palestinians who opposed the full package how they would react if Israel, as part of the permanent peace package, also accepted the Arab Peace Initiative and the Arab states supported in return the peace treaty. 23% said they would in this case change their mind and accept the full package and 68% said they would not change their mind.

 (C) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda

The Saudi Plan

• 27% of the Israelis and 43% of the Palestinians support the Saudi peace plan, 63% of the Israelis and 53% of the Palestinians oppose it. In June 2014, 29% of the Israelis and 50% of the Palestinians supported the Saudi peace plan, 64% of the Israelis and 46% of the Palestinians opposed it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations.

The Israeli-Palestinian Track

• Dismantling settlements - 42% of the Israelis support and 50% oppose the dismantling of most of the settlements in the West Bank as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
• 58% of Israelis and 48% of Palestinians support the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution and 37% of Israelis and 51% of Palestinians oppose it. In June 2014, 62% of Israelis supported a two-state solution and 34% opposed it; 54% of Palestinians supported it and 46% opposed it.
• Mutual Recognition - As we do periodically in our joint polls, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 54% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 36% opposes it. Among Palestinians, 39% support and 60% oppose this step. In June 2014, the corresponding figures were similar to the current poll, 52% of the Israeli public supported such a mutual recognition and 38% opposed it. Among Palestinians, 40% supported and 59% opposed this step. 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 7 and 10 December 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a decision by the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas, to form a high judicial council under his chairmanship, a new reconciliation agreement reached in Algeria by Palestinian factions, and media outlets reporting various cases of drowning of Palestinian emigrants in the Mediterranean Sea. On the Israeli side, after winning the November parliamentary elections, the Likud and other right wing and extreme right-wing groups agreed to form a governing coalition under Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, a UN agency adopted a decision to seek the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the Israeli occupation. Moreover, various armed groups resisting the Israeli occupation in the northern parts of the West Bank, such as the “Lions’ Den,” which received a wide press coverage, went public during this period. In Qatar, the World Cup football games started and were widely followed by the Palestinians due to a considerable expression of support for and solidarity with Palestine by the fans attending the games.

This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The findings of the last quarter of 2022 point to a limited change in the domestic balance of power favoring Hamas and centering in the West Bank. Moreover, the popularity of president Abbas drops several percentage points, mostly in the West Bank. In other domestic issues, findings indicate that only one quarter of the public thinks that the factional agreement in Algeria will lead to actual reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the level of pessimism about the prospects for reunification exceeds 70%. Findings also show that the public views negatively Abbas’ decree forming a high council for the judiciary under his chairmanship as only one in five Palestinians think it aims to strengthen the judiciary while a vast majority of more than 70% think it aims at weakening the independence of the judiciary.

The findings of the current quarter also indicate a significant decline in the level of support for the two-state solution accompanied by a significant rise in the percentage of those who think this solution is no longer feasible or possible due to settlement expansion. This change is not accompanied by an increase in the percentage of those who support the one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights. To the contrary, support in the current quarter for this one-state solution has also dropped. These findings point to the possibility that the change in attitudes toward the political settlement with Israel reflects a hardening of public attitudes signifying less willingness to compromise. This hardening of attitudes can also be seen in the significant rise in support, in the West Bank, for a return to armed intifada. Furthermore, findings show a significant decrease, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in the percentage of those who view positively Israeli-Palestinian confidence building measures. On top of that, more than 70% of the public support the idea of forming armed groups, such as the “Lions’ Den,” and only one in ten says the PA has the right to arrest members of these groups or disarm them.

These findings come in a context of three major political and security-related developments, during the current quarter, that might have shaped Palestinian public attitudes, particularly in the West Bank:

• Perhaps the single most important development has been the escalating military clashes between Palestinian armed groups and the Israeli army in the northern part of the West Bank. The number of armed clashes and Israeli military incursions and the number of Palestinian casualties have been unprecedented since the end of the second intifada. This particular development sheds light on the fact that the most significant changes in our findings are centered in the West Bank.
• The results of the Israeli elections and the start of negotiations to form a right-wing coalition government, between the Likud, the religious parties, and the extreme right wing in Israeli politics, might have contributed to the increase in the percentage of those who think the two-state solution is no longer practical or possible. This same development might have also contributed to the rise in the belief that armed struggle, not negotiations, is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation. Indeed, the findings indicate that a large Palestinian majority expects the worse from the upcoming Israeli government including high expectation that it will change the status quo in holy places in al Haram al Sharif in East Jerusalem, expel Palestinian families from their homes in East Jerusalem, transfer Bedouin residents, such as Arab al Jahalin, from their villages and encampments in the southeastern parts of Jerusalem to other locations, and annex settlements or the Jordan Valley to Israel.
• Finally, it is clear from the findings that the pro-Palestine scenes at the World Cup in Qatar have contributed to a restoration of the confidence of the Palestinians in the justice of their cause and their right to resist the occupation by all legitimate means. The vast majority of the Palestinians say they have now regained much, or some, of the lost confidence in the Arab peoples in light of the solidarity with Palestine expressed by the fans during the football games. The findings show strong association between the restoration of trust and attitudes regarding the two-state solution and the return to an armed intifada. 

(1) “Lions’ Den” and other armed groups:

• 72% support the formation of armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den”
• 79% stand against the surrender of the members of the armed groups or their arms to the PA
• 87% say the PA does not have the right to arrest members of the armed groups
• 59% expect the armed groups to spread to other areas in the West Bank 

A majority of 72% of the public says they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 22% are against that.  Support for the formation of armed groups is higher in the Gaza Strip (84%) than in the West Bank (65%), in refugee camps and cities (76% and 73% respectively) compared to villages/towns (70%), among women (74%) compared to men (70%), among those whose age is between 18 and 29 (75) compared to those whose age is 30 or above (72%), among refugees (78%) compared to non refugees (68%), among students and professionals (77% and 75% respectively), compared to merchants and employees (60% and 69% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (71%) compared to those who work in the pubic sector (65%), among the religious (77%) compared to the somewhat religious (68%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (87% and 78% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (66%).

Nonetheless, 59% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 39% are not worried. Despite this, 79% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 17% say they are for it. Similarly, the vast majority (87%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 10% say they favor it.

A majority of 59% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 15% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 14% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups.

(2) The formation of a new Israeli government of right wing and extreme right

• 61% expect the policies of the upcoming Israeli government led by Netanyahu to be more extreme than the previous one
• 58% expect the new Israeli government to change the status quo at al Haram al Sharif; 64% expect it to expel Palestinian families in al Sheikh Jarrah; 68% expect it to transfer Arab al Jahalin community; and 69% expect it to annex it to annex Israeli settlements or the Jordan Valley
• 67% are less optimistic today about the prospects for an improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations 

A majority of 61% expects the policies of the upcoming Israeli government, that is currently being formed under the leadership of Netanyahu from the right wing and the extreme right, to be more extreme and aggressive while 30% expect them to be similar to the current policies; 4% expect them to be less extreme.  For example, a majority of 58% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to change the status quo in al Haram al Sharif in East Jerusalem by allowing Jews to pray at the site; 38% do not expect that. Similarly, a majority of 64% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to expel Palestinian families from al Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem; 33% do not expect that. Moreover, a majority of 68% expects the new Israeli government under Netanyahu to transfer the Palestinian Bedouin community currently living in the area between Jerusalem and Jericho, such as Arab al Jahalin, in order to build a big settlement to the east of Abu Din and al Ezariyya; 28% do not expect that. Also, a majority of 69% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to annex settlements or the Jordan Valley to Israel; 27% do not expect that.

A majority of 67% is less optimistic about the prospects of an improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations, such as reaching new agreements on confidence building measures or reducing the expansion of the settlements during next year; 12% say they are more optimistic today; and 20% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.   

(3) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 69% support holding general elections now, but 63% do not expect elections to take place anytime soon
• In a competition between president Abbas and Hamas’ Ismael Haniyyeh, the latter wins by 54% and the former receives 36% of the vote; but Marwan Barghouti, from Fatah, defeats Haniyyeh 61% to 34%
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23%; and 75% demand his resignation
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah and Hamas receive equal percentage of popular vote, 34% each 

A majority of 69% supports the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 29% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 63% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 36% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 53% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 60%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 36% and Haniyeh 46%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 62% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 31% and the latter 60%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (39%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Mohammad Dahlan (5%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), Mohammad Shtayyeh, Khalid Mish’al and Hussein al Sheikh (3% each), and 22% said they do not know or have not decided.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 74%. Moreover, a vast majority of 75% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 20% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 73% in the West Bank and 79% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 65% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 34% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 44% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 21% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 38% three months ago).

28% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 25% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 40% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 27% selected Hamas, 26% Fatah under Abbas, and 42% said neither side deserves such a role.

(4) Domestic conditions, the “assassination” of Yasir Arafat, independence of the Judiciary, and those responsible for the drowning of Palestinian emigrants:

• 64% believe that a Palestinian actor played a role in the death of Yasser Arafat, either alone (14%) or in cooperation with Israel (50%)
• 72% think the decree by president Abbas to form a high judiciary committee under his chairmanship aims at weakening the independence of the judiciary
• 27% blame Hamas for the drowning of Gazan illegal emigrants; 24% blame Israel; and 18% blame the PA
• 24% say they want to emigrate; 30% in the Gaza Strip and 20% in the West Bank
• 81% think there is corruption in PA institutions; 69% think there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas
• 59% think the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people
• 72% are pessimistic about the prospects for reconciliation
• The vast majority does not expect the Shtayyeh’s government to succeed in holding general elections, delivering reconciliation, or improving economic conditions 

In light of the leaks in the media regarding the investigation into the death of Yasir Arafat, 50% of the public believe a Palestinian party or actor had implemented the plot to get rid of Arafat but that the planning had been done by Israel; 24% think no Palestinian actor or party had been involved in the death of Arafat; and 14% think a Palestinian party or actor had plotted and implemented the killing of Arafat. The belief that a Palestinian actor implemented an Israel plot to get rid of Arafat is higher in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (45%), in villages and refugee camps (55% and 52% respectively) compared to cities (49%), among men (52%) compared to women (48%), among those whose age is 30 and above (52%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 (42%), among holders of BA degree (51%) compared to the illiterates (33%), among farmers and merchants (70% and 68% respectively) compared to laborers and students (44% and 47% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (60% and 54% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (39%).

A large majority of 72% thinks the decree issued by president Abbas to form a high judiciary council under his chairmanship was meant to weaken the independence of the judiciary; 19% think it was meant to strengthen it. The percentage of those who think the decree aims at weakening the independence of the judiciary is higher in villages/towns and cities (75% and 72% respectively) compared to refugee camps (68%), among men (75%) compared to women (68%), among holders of BA degree (76%) compared to the illiterates (31%), among merchants, employees, and professionals (89%, 82%, and 80% respectively) compared to housewives and laborers (64% each), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (86% and 88% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (49%).

We asked the public about the party indirectly responsible for the drowning in the Mediterranean Sea of Palestinian emigrants from the Gaza Strip while attempting to illegally reach Europe. The largest percentage (27%) puts the responsibility on Hamas, 24% on Israel, 18% on the PA, another 18% blame the emigrants themselves, and 3% blame Egypt. The percentage of those putting the blame on Hamas is higher in the Gaza Strip (31%) than in the West Bank (25%), in refugee camps (33%) compared to villages/towns and cities (24% and 27% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (28%) compared to those who work in the public sector (19%), among the unmarried (35%) compared to the married (26%), among those with the least income (33%) compared to those with the highest income (23%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 29% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (3%).

24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 30% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 29% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 77% and in the West Bank at 46%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 86% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 73% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

A large minority of 46% of West Bankers thinks people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 51% think they cannot. In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 57% viewed the PA as a burden and 38% viewed it as an asset.

Only 26% are optimistic and 72% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 25%. When asked about the prospects for the implementation of the agreement reached in factional meetings sponsored by Algeria, only 26% expressed the belief that the agreement would lead to actual reconciliation while 67% expressed the belief that it will not lead to reconciliation.

After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 78% expect failure; only 18% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 20% of the public expect success and 76% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 79% expects failure and 17% expects success.

We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 31%, followed by Palestine TV (13%), al Aqsa TV (11%), Palestine Today TV (9%), Maan TV (6%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Mayadeen (2%).

(5) Palestinian-Israeli Relations, the Peace process, and the decision to go to ICJ:

• Support for the two-state solution drops from 37% to 32% and 69% think this solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion
• 26% favor a one-state solution with equal rights; 71% are opposed to that solution
• A majority of 55% support the return to an armed intifada
• A majority of 51% believe armed action is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation
• Half of the public believes that going to the International Court of Justice will not benefit the Palestinian people 

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 32% and opposition stands at 66%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 37%.  A majority of 69% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 28% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 64% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 26% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 71% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 30%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 59% supported joining more international organizations; 51% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 48% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 46% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.  Support for the return to an armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (61%) than in the West Bank (51%), in refugee camps (58%) compared to villages/towns and cities (50% and 55% respectively), among men (58%) compared to women (52%), and among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (50% and 40% respectively).  

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 51% chose armed struggle, 21% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 41% chose armed struggle and 30% chose negotiations.   The belief that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation is higher in the Gaza Strip (53%) than in the West Bank (50%), in refugee camps and cities (53% each) compared to villages/towns (42%), among men (56%) compared to women (47%) among holders of BA degree (61%) compared to illiterates (48%), and among supporters of Hamas (76%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (50% and 36% respectively).  

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 57% said it looks positively, while 38% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 69% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.

When asked about PA negotiations with the upcoming Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu, 47% said they opposed such negotiations while 25% said they support negotiations with him on a peace agreement and confidence building measures while 11% said they support negotiations if restricted to a peace agreement and 12% said they support negotiations with him if restricted to confidence building measures. In other words, a total of 36% are in favor of negotiations with Netanyahu about a peace agreement and 37% are in favor of negotiations with him about confidence building measures.  

In light of the decision by a UN agency to go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to ask for its consultative opinion on the legality of the Israeli occupation, half of the public (50%) say the decision and any opinion by the ICJ will have no benefits for the Palestinian people; 28% say the benefit will be symbolic but will have no impact on Israeli policies; 16% say the decision will have an impact on constraining Israeli policies on matters such as settlement construction. The belief that going to the ICJ will not be beneficial is higher in the West Bank (56%) than in the Gaza Strip (40%), among men (54%) compared to women (46%), among holders of BA degree (49%) compared to the illiterates (28%), among those who work in the private sector (54%) compared to those who work in the public sector (44%), and among supporters of Hamas (52%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (42% and 40% respectively). 

(6) World Cup in Qatar:

• Two thirds say they have regained the lost trust in the Arab masses after seeing the solidarity with Palestine during the World Cup
• 68% think the international standing of Qatar has improved as a result of its effective organization of the World Cup 

Two thirds of the public say that they, now after having seen the scenes of solidarity and support for Palestine in the World Cup in Qatar, have regained much of the trust in the Arab peoples after many disappointments stemming from the Arab normalization with Israel; 21% say they have regained some of that trust; 5% say their trust in the Arab peoples has remained small; and 4% say they have no trust at all in the Arab World.

In light of the Qatari organization of the World Cup, 68% of the Palestinians say they think Qatar’s international standing has improved a lot compared to where it was before; 17% say it has improved somewhat; 8% say Qatar’s standing has not changed; and 1% say it has worsened.

We asked the public about its predictions for the winner in the World Cup. When the number of remaining country teams was eight, 48% said it expected Morocco to win; when the number of country teams went down to six, 54% expected Morocco to win. By contrast, 22% expect Argentina to win; and 15% expect France to win.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 39% say the most vital goal of the Palestinians should be the ending of Israeli occupation
• 25% say the spread of corruption is the main problem confronting Palestinian society today
• 38% say the Israeli occupation is the most pressing problem confronting Palestinians today 

A plurality of 39% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 25% (8% in the Gaz Strip and 36% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 21% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 20% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction;  17% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 10% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 15% said it is unemployment, 15% said it is the split or division, and 6% said it is the internal violence.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 June 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the decision by the PA president to postpone the holding of Palestinian elections that were scheduled to take place on 22 May 2021. It also witnessed the release of various Israeli decisions on an imminent expulsion of several Palestinian families from their homes in al Shaikh Jarrah and the impositions of various restrictions regarding Muslim’s access to al Aqsa Mosque during the month of Ramadan. These developments led to popular non-violent confrontations with the Israeli police and settlers in East Jerusalem that escalated to rocket attacks carried out be Hamas against Israeli cities. Hamas claimed that the attacks came in defense of East Jerusalem. The ensuing war between Hamas and Israel lasted for 11 days and led to the death of more than 250 Palestinians, including 66 children, and more than 10 Israelis, including two children. The period also witnessed a PA campaign to vaccinate Palestinian adults in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip against the coronavirus. The campaign led to a significant reduction in the daily rates of deaths and infections, particularly in the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2021 show significant changes in public attitudes toward the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leadership, Hamas, and relations with Israel. Two drivers seem to have triggered the change: the popular confrontations in East Jerusalem, the Israel-Hamas war, and their public perception of their outcomes on the one hand and the postponement of elections by the PA leadership on the other.

The findings show a semi-public consensus that Hamas had won the confrontation with Israel and that Hamas’ launching of rockets at Israeli cities has been motivated by its desire to defend al Aqsa Mosque and the Palestinian families in al Shaikh Jarrah. Findings also show widespread public discontent with the performance of the PA government and leadership as well as Fatah during the confrontations and the war. They also show a two-third majority rejection of Abbas’ decision to postpone the elections. Two thirds of the public believe that Abbas has postponed the elections because he was afraid of their outcome, not because Israel has prevented the holding of elections in East Jerusalem.

As a result, support for Hamas, and willingness to vote for it, increases dramatically while support for Fatah drops significantly. Moreover, Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyyeh, manages to deliver an unprecedented victory over Abbas in a presidential election, if one is held today. Perhaps most importantly, a majority of the Palestinians think that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while a small percentage thinks Fatah under Abbas’ leadership is the one who deserves to do that.

Findings also show that more than 70% want to hold legislative and presidential elections soon and a similar percentage wants the PA to impose elections in East Jerusalem despite Israeli objection, rather than wait for an Israeli approval. The poll results do not have good news for most of the newly created electoral lists that registered for the legislative elections as only nine out of 36 managed to cross the threshold of 1.5% required to win seats in the parliament.

The confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel did not have an impact on the level of support for the two-state solution, which remained unchanged. But they did greatly impact other matters related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For example, support for a return to armed confrontations and intifada rose sharply to 60%, and support for a resumption of negotiations with Israel and the belief that negotiation is the most effective means of ending occupation dropped.  Moreover, the confrontations within Israel between the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Israeli police seem to have contributed to a significant reduction in support for the one-state solution, which declined from a third to a fifth in three months.

It is worth noticing however that the current findings are not fundamentally different from similar findings we obtained in the past immediately after similar Hamas-Israel confrontations. Therefore, they might be reflecting a temporary emotional reaction that might revert back to where things stood before the confrontations. The change from emotional to normal attitudes usually takes three to six months, as can be seen in our previous polls. But it should be pointed out that a return to “normal” attitudes has in the past been associated with a Hamas failure to maintain its gains and a success on the part of the PA to take measures that helped to pacify the public and win back its trust.

For the new Israeli government led by prime minister Naftali Bennett, about a fifth seems to think that it is better for Israeli-Palestinian relations than a government led by Netanyahu. Findings also show that while the largest percentage, but not the majority, is opposed to the participation of the Unified Arab List led by Mansour Abbas in the current coalition government, a similar percentage does support (or does not oppose or support) such participation.

(1) Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

• An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (77%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 1% think Israel came out a winner; 18% say no one came out a winner and 2% think both sides came out winners. Moreover, 65% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 26% think it did not.
• 72% think that Hamas’ decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 9% think it came as a protest against the PA cancelation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 17% think Hamas’ decision was motivated by these two drivers.
• In an evaluation of the performance of 10 local and regional actors during the Jerusalem confrontations and the ensuing war between Israel and Hamas, the overwhelming majority describes as excellent that of the residents of Jerusalem and its youth (89%) followed by that of Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel (86%), followed by that of Hamas (75%). About one fifth describes as excellent the performance of each of the following governments: Egypt’s (22%), Turkey’s (21%), Jordan’s (21%), and Iran’s (18%). Finally, only 13% describe as excellent the performance of Fatah, 11% the PA government, and 8% Abbas’.
• A majority of 64% views the residents of East Jerusalem as the group most willing to defend Jerusalem and its holy places, followed by Hamas at 29%, and the PA at 3%. In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, a majority of 53% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 14% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians.
• A majority of 60% thinks the participation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel in the recent confrontation was driven, first and foremost, by their desire to defend the holy sites, while 28% think it was driven by their desire to express rejection of integration in the Israeli society and their attachment to their national identity, and only 10% think it came as part of their struggle for equality and rejection of discrimination.
• If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 68% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 18% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 9% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
• When asked about their expectations from the PA under Abbas leadership in case Israel expelled the Shaikh Jarrah families, the largest percentage (38%) said the PA will do nothing; 24% said it will write a complaint to the UN and the ICC; 20% think it will end security coordination with Israel, and 14% think it will launch popular non-violent resistance.
• Public expectations from Hamas are very different: If Israel expels the Shaikh Jarrah families, 77% think Hamas will respond by launching rockets at Israeli cities; 10% think it will wage a non-violent campaign, 6% think it will issue protest statements, and only 5% think it will do nothing.
• A majority of 55% think Israel will not expel the Shaikh Jarrah families and 40% think it will.
• Two thirds of the public think there is a high or a medium chance that Hamas and Israel will reach a long-term truce that will ease the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 31% think the chances are slim.
• A majority of 52% think that the incident in al Aqsa Mosque in which chants were made against the Jerusalem PA-appointed Mufti during his Friday sermon in the aftermath of the ceasefire between Israel and the “resistance” forces does not reflect its views while 44% think it does reflect them.
• 94% say they are proud of the performance of the Gaza Strip during the May confrontation with Israel while 6% say they are not. When asked about the main reason for being proud, 39% said they are proud because Gaza has delivered a military and rocket strike in defense of Jerusalem that demonstrated the weakness of the Israeli army; another 39% said they were proud because Gaza has brought the Palestinian cause back to forefront of Arab and international politics; and 13% said the reason they are proud is because Gaza has sacrificed and endured all the death and destruction while expressing patience and dignity in defense of Jerusalem.

(2) The postponement of the legislative and presidential elections:

• 65% oppose and 25% support the decision of president Abbas to postpone legislative and presidential elections because Israel refuses to allow the holding of elections in East Jerusalem. Two thirds of the public believe that Abbas postponed the elections because he was worried about the results while 25% think he postponed the elections because Israel refused to allow them in East Jerusalem.
• The largest percentage (43%) believes that there is no point in protesting Abbas’ decision to postpone the elections and that we should therefore accept it. On the other hand, 31% think that there should be protests but they should be conducted through non-violent demonstrations; 17% think the protests should be expressed through the courts and the judicial system routes.
• 72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank.
• 69% say we should not wait for an Israeli approval of elections in East Jerusalem and that we should impose these elections on Israel while 15% say it is better to wait for an Israeli approval. The majority (56%) of those who want the PA to hold elections without an Israeli approval demands holding elections immediately, 24% are in favor of holding the elections within three months, and 13% within a year or more. But about half of the Palestinians (49%) believes there will be no elections in the near future while 44% think elections will take place in the near future.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 27% and the latter 59% of the votes (compared to 46% for Haniyeh and 47% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 30% of the votes (compared to 44% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 60% (compared to 56% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 25% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 59% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 51% and Haniyeh 42%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 26% and the latter 63%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 48% and Haniyyeh 44%. 
• In an open-ended question on the preferred president, in case Abbas is not nominated, 29% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 28% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% Dahlan, 3% Yahia Sinwar, and 2% for each of the following: Khalid Mishaal, Mohammad Shtayyeh, Mustafa Barghouti, and Salam Fayyad.  In a closed-ended question, about potential Abbas successors, 29% say they prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 28% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad (3% each), and Khalid Mishal (2%).
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, that participated in the 2006 elections, 73% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 41% say they will vote for Hamas and 30% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 43%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 36% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 38% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Fatah at 32% (compared to 53% three months ago).
• We also asked about the vote for the 36 electoral lists that registered to compete in the parliamentary elections that was scheduled for May 2021. Only nine lists managed to pass the threshold of 1.5%: the largest percentage went to Hamas’ list, “Jerusalem is Our Call”  (36%) followed by Fatah’s list with 19%, “the freedom list” led by Nasser al Qidwah (9%), “the Future List” of Dahlan (3%), the “National Initiative” 2%, and the following lists managed to pass the threshold: the PFLP, “Together” led by Salam Fayyad, the “Democratic Change” led by Ibrahim Abu Hijlah, and “Palestine for All” led by Mufeed al Hasayneh. 

(3) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 24%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 65% and in the West Bank at 60%.
• 26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 42% and in the West Bank at 15%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 40% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 57% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 70% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 52% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 19% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 50% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 47% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 46% of Gazans said it was good or very good.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a slight majority of 56% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 35% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 51% viewed the PA as a burden and 44% viewed it as an asset.
• 70% oppose and 26% support making payments to the families of martyrs and prisoners based on need assessment and number of family members rather than on the act committed by the martyr or the number of years in jail.
• 41% are optimistic and 56% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 34%.
• Two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 65% expect failure; only 29% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, one third of the public expects success and 60% expects failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 62% expects failure and 32% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV (13%), Palestine TV (12%), Palestine Today (10%), Maan (7%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (1%). 

(4) The Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• 23% (28% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 40% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 35% (37% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.
• 66% (81% in the Gaza Strip and 57% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 31% (18% in the Gaza Strip and 40% in the West Bank) are dissatisfied.
• A majority of 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 41% are dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction in the West Bank stands at 48% and in the Gaza Strip at 30%.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 68% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at 49%. 

(5) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  
• Support for the two-state solution increases to 41% and opposition drops to 56% when the borders of the Palestinian state are described as being based on the 1967 lines and its capital as East Jerusalem. When the public is asked to pick a choice from among three, 46% pick the two-state solution based on the 1967 lines, 10% pick a Palestinian-Israeli confederation, and only 6% pick a one-state for Jews and Arabs.
• We asked the public about its support for the idea of making Jerusalem, both East and West, an open city, whereby the Eastern part would be the capital of the Palestinian state and Western part would be the capital of the state of Israel. Less than a quarter (23%) supported and 73% opposed the idea.
• A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 33% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 67% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 29% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 36% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 26% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 49% chose armed struggle, 27% negotiations, and 18% popular resistance. Three months ago, 37% chose armed struggle and 36% chose negotiations.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 19% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices, 66% supported joining more international organizations; 58% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 60% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 20% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 43% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 42% supported dissolving the PA, and 33% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• 54% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Moreover, 63% are opposed, and 29% are supportive of a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the US leadership. Support for such negotiations stands at 38% under the leadership of the international Quartet and 55% are opposed. Moreover, 52% do not believe, and 38% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.
• The largest percentage (45%) are opposed to the participation of Israeli Arab parties in the Israeli governmental coalitions while 26% say they support Mansour Abbas’ decision to join the current coalition in Israel, and 21% say they neither support or oppose such participation.
• About one fifth (19%) thinks that an Israeli government led by Naftali Bennett from the extreme right wing Yamina party will be better for Israeli-Palestinian relations than a government led by Netanyahu; a large majority of 69% disagree with that.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 47% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 8% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (24%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 20% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip, 21% (27% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the spread of corruption, 20% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 17% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 14% (19% in the Gaza Strip and 10% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and 3% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 25 June 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including several armed attacks by Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel, the Israeli army incursions into Jenin’s refugee camp, and the killing of al Jazeera journalists Shireen Abu Akleh by Israeli gunfire in one of the Jenin incursions.  Other developments included the organization of the Flag March by the Israeli right wing inside the Old City of East Jerusalem without ending up in an armed confrontation between Hamas and Israel as many had expected. Internally, a student body associated with Hamas was able to win the majority of seats in the Birzeit University student council elections, President Abbas transferred control of the secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council, and assigned to the PLO Executive Committee member from Fatah, Hussien al Sheikh, the responsibilities of the Committee’s secretariate. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the second quarter of 2022 show a significant change in the domestic balance of power in favor of Hamas and its leadership only three months after Fatah had managed to restore some of the popularity it had lost in the aftermath of the April 2021 cancellation of the legislative and presidential elections, the May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel, and the killing of the opposition figure Nizar Banat at the hands of the Palestinian security services.

Today, Hamas and Fatah enjoy almost the same level of public support, with the gap narrowing to one percentage point in favor of Hamas after it was six points in favor of Fatah in March 2022. It is noticeable that the drop in Fatah’s popularity has occurred in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, though the drop has been greater in the latter. Fatah’s declining popularity is evident in two other ways. For one, the gap in popularity between the head of Fatah, President Abbas, and the head of Hamas, Ismail Haniyyeh, has now reached 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh after it was only 16 points three months ago. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’ resignation, from the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA), has risen to over three quarters while those still in favor of Abbas have dwindled in size to less than one fifth of the public. Another indicator of Fatah’s decline can be seen when looking at the widening gap between those who think Hamas is the more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to those who think “Fatah under Abbas” is more deserving than Hamas. Today, the gap stands at 10 percentage points in favor of Hamas compared to just two points in favor of Hamas three months ago.

Perhaps one of the main reasons behind the shift in the internal balance of power has been the rise of Hamas' role over the past few months in defending Jerusalem. Other reasons might have been the release by the PA of those Preventive Security men accused of killing Nizar Banat on bail, or because the vast majority of the public believes that the Palestinian government does not make an effort to mitigate the consequences of the rise in prices, or the objection of the majority of the public to President Abbas's internal decisions, such as the transfer of powers over the Secretariat of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council or the appointment  of PLO Executive Committee member Hussein al-Sheikh to serve as the head of the Secretariat of that Committee,.

In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the results for the second quarter indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution.  The results show one of the likely reasons for the decline: a significant increase in the belief that a two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion, rising to 70%. But the findings also indicate a similar decline in support for a one-state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, indicating a hardening of public attitudes similar to what we saw in mid-2021 in the aftermath of the Hamas-Israel war. Support for a return to an armed uprising is also rising to form a clear majority, reinforced by a broad support for the recent shootings inside Israel by individual Palestinians who did not belong to known forces and movements.  However, there are significant differences in the attitudes of Gazans compared to West Bankers, where the largest percentage of the latter remains opposed to armed attacks.

Increased Palestinian-Israeli clashes over the past three months may have contributed to this attitudinal shift regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations, starting with the Israeli Flag March, the repeated incursions into the Jenin camp, the killing of the very well-known and liked Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, the crackdown by the Israeli police on the raising of the Palestinian flag, and the frequent confrontations between the Israeli police and the Palestinian worshippers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque; all might have led to a hardening of the Palestinian public attitudes.

However, it is worth noting that the percentage of those viewing positively the recent "confidence-building" measures between the PA and Israel has risen to about two-thirds. Moreover, despite the rising tension over al Aqsa Mosque, the majority continues to view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a national conflict, over land and sovereignty, rather than a religious conflict.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 71% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 54%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 49% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 55% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 31% and Haniyeh 50%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 47% and from among those, the former receives 26% and the latter 61%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (30%) selected him in an open-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (16%), Mohammad Dahlan (6%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%), and 34% said they do not know or have not decided. It is worth noting that this is the first time that al Sheikh’s name has been mentioned by the respondents in an open-ended question. This means that we will continue to ask about his standing as a successor in the next four quarterly poll. In an closed ended questions about succession, Marwan Barghouti is preferred by 39%, Haniyyeh by 19%, Dahlan by 6%, Sinwar by 5%, Khalid Mishal by 2%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 1% each. Al Sheikh’s name was not among those listed in the closed ended question.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 73% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 72% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 69% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 7% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 37% (compared to 47% three months ago).
• The largest percentage (33%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 38% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 31% selected Hamas, 29% Fatah under Abbas, and 33% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• A majority of 57% is opposed to President Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the Secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council; only 27% support Abbas’ decision.
• Similarly, a majority of 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to ask the PLO’s Executive Committee member from Fatah, Husein al Sheikh, to assume the responsibility over the secretariate of that Committee; only 23% support Abbas’ decision.
• In explaining the reasons for the electoral victory of the Hamas-affiliated student body at Birzeit University, the majority (59%) attributed it to students’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the PA while about one third (32%) said the victory came as a result in a shift in public opinion in favor of Hamas.
• The majority (57%) of the public says it was supportive of the teachers’ strike who were demanding better representational and associational rights from the government and led to a partial halt to the educational process in public schools; 31% say they were opposed. Support for the strike is higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 63% and 48% respectively.
• The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 18% say it is doing so.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 48%.
• 26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 27% and in the West Bank at 26%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 37% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 42% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 54% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 38% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 62% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 55% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.
• 26% are optimistic and 70% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 28%.
• After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 73% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 23% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 75% expects failure and 19% expects success.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 41%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (11% each), Palestine TV (10%), Maan (6%), al Arabiya (3%), al Mayadeen (2%), and al Manar (1%). 

(3) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 69%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 32%.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 48% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 51% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• A majority of 59% says that the armed attack inside Israel carried out by Palestinians unaffiliated with known armed groups contributes to the national interest of ending the occupation; 37% believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest. Gazans are more likely to view such attacks positively compared to the West Bankers, 77% and 46% respectively. Worth noting also that 47% of West Bankers believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest.
• Similarly, a majority of 56% (73% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank) supports armed attacks similar to those carried out lately by unaffiliated Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel; 39% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) say they are opposed to such armed attacks.
• A majority of 56% expects the acts of armed resistance in the Jenin refugee camp to spread to other parts of the West Bank. However, a large minority of 41% expects the acts of armed resistance to remain restricted to the Jenin camp.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 65% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 63% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
• A majority of 70% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 60% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 50% chose armed struggle (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank), 22% negotiations, and 21% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 25% chose negotiations.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 69% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• 65% are opposed, and 29% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.  
• The vast majority (78%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 17% say it does not.  However, the majority (63%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 25% say they believe it.
• When asked why they think Hamas did not launch rockets against Israel on the day of the Flag March throughout East Jerusalem, the largest percentage (35%) said that the movement did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for; one third said that Hamas was willing to comply with the advice and mediation of Arab and international actors. Only 13% said it was afraid of the Israeli reaction against it and the Gaza Strip. One tenth (11%) said that Hamas did not threaten to launch rockets against Israel if he Flag March took place in the Old City of East Jerusalem.
• The largest percentage (40%) believes that Hamas’ unwillingness to launch rockets against Israel during the Flag March will encourage Israeli to take more measures against Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque. By contrast, 26% said that Hamas’ decision will deter Israel in the future, and 28% said it will neither encourage nor deter Israel.
• A consensus is emerging regarding the killing of the al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh: 92% believe Israel has deliberately sought to kill her while only 5% think the killing by the Israeli army was accidental.
• A majority of 61% believes that the reasons the Israeli police attacked the funeral procession of Abu Akleh in Jerusalem had to do with the fac that the funeral demonstrated the unity of the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. On the other hand, one third thinks that the police attack was prompted by the raising of the Palestinian flag during the funeral.
• When asked why Israel insists on preventing the raising of the Palestinian flag in Jerusalem and other occupied territories and in areas inside Israel, the public was split evenly, 49% said the reason has to do with Israeli rejection of the Palestinian national identity while an identical percentage said it has to do with Israeli fear of the Palestinian national identity.
• A majority of 53% (56% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) says that despite the repeated incidents of attacks by the Israeli police against Palestinian worshipers at al Aqsa Mosque, the conflict remains first and foremost over land and sovereignty while 45% say the conflict has now become first and foremost a religious one.
• We asked the public about the expectations that the US aid to the PA will soon resume and asked if they welcome or do not welcome aid resumption. The public is evenly split on US aid: 48% welcome it and 49% do not. It is worth noting that Gazans are more likely to welcome US aid, by 59%, while the percentage drops to 40% in the West Bank.

(4) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

• The largest percentage of the public (42%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 35% blame Ukraine.
• An overwhelming majority (75%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 6% think it should stand with Ukraine.
• A majority of 43% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 53% are not worried. Three months ago, the percentage of those expressing worry that the war would expand stood at 54%.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 9% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 26% (29% in the Gaz Strip and 23% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; 25% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 17% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 12% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 13% (17% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 23% said it is corruption, 17% said it is unemployment, 16% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17-20 June 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the spread of the Corona virus throughout the world and in the Palestinian territories leading the Palestinian Authority to impose a lockdown throughout the Palestinian territories which brought to a standstill many economic activities. It also witnessed the formation of a new Israeli government lead by prime minister Netanyahu and the announcement of the government intentions to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank. In response, the PA announced ending its commitment to the Oslo agreement and severed relations with Israel in security and civil realms. This was followed by ending Palestinian-Israeli security coordination and Israel stopped the transfer of Palestinian clearance funds thereby negatively affecting the PA’s ability to pay salaries for the month of May 2020. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

This quarterly poll was conducted during a period in which the spread of the Corona virus was believed to have been brought under control thereby allowing us to conduct face-to-face interviews throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The poll covered various   

issues, most importantly the intention of the Israeli government to annex Palestinian territories and the Palestinian response to the Israeli plans which amounted to a decision to stop implementation of the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with the Israeli government. We also focused on public perception of the PA government and its performance during the Coronavirus pandemic.

Findings show that two-thirds of the public believe that the new Israeli government led by prime minister Netanyahu will indeed annex Palestinian territories. This realization created a great deal of public concern and worry about the future. Public worry focused on the salary payment to the public sector, access to medical treatment, shortages in water and electricity supplies, eruption of armed clashes, return of security chaos and anarchy, PA collapse, and inability to travel to Jordan.

A large majority supports a Palestinian response to annexation that involves stopping the implementation of the agreements with Israel and severing all relations with it. But the public has doubts about the sincerity of the PA in stopping security coordination with Israel. Despite the fact that a slim majority supports responding to the plan by returning to armed struggle, the findings of this poll in fact show a decrease in supporting armed struggle compared to the findings of our last poll which was conducted four months ago. Moreover, despite the fact that two-thirds are worried about the likely collapse of the PA, only one third thinks that Israel will bring back its military rule and civil administration to the Palestinian territories; three quarters express rejection of such return, if it were to happen.

With regard to the government performance in managing the Coronavirus pandemic, a large majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA and with the various measures taken by the PA government. More than three quarters indicate that they trust that the government has been working to protect the interests of public. But two-thirds say that their income or salary has been reduced and a majority indicates that it has stopped working or has become unemployed during that period. Moreover, more than three quarters express the view that the PA government did not do its best to compensate those who suffered the most due to the closure and lockdown. It is interesting that despite the tense relations between the PA and Israel, two-thirds of the public express agreement with Palestinian-Israeli cooperation and coordination in the health sector that took place during the period of the pandemic.

Findings show a rise in favor of the two-state solution but half of the public remains opposed to this solution. Findings also show a consensus against the Trump plan, or the deal of the century, with a prevailing perception that the plan does not end the Israeli occupation and does not lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. Indeed, most of the public believe now that the plan has returned the conflict to its original existential roots. For all of this, a large majority is opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US.

Finally, despite a decline in the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, findings indicate that he would lose a presidential election in which he competes against Ismail Haniyyeh. Findings also show that the gap between Fatah and Hamas, which stood at 6 points four months ago in Fatah’s favor, has now narrowed to 2 points in its favor.   

(1) Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories and its potential consequences:

• Two thirds believe Israel will annex the Jordan Valley and settlements areas
• 71% want the PA to stop implementing the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with Israel while 52% support a return to armed struggle in a response to annexation
• 36% support and 53% oppose the initiation of a Palestinian counter proposal to the Trump plan and to enter negotiations with Israel and the US based on that proposal
• Large majorities believe that Arab and non-Arab countries will not impose sanctions on Israel because of the annexation
• The public is highly worried about the consequences of the annexation and the PA response, such as the inability to pay salaries to the public sector or even the collapse of the PA
• But a majority does not expect Israel to return its direct military rule or the its civil administration

Two-thirds (66%) believe that the new Israeli government will indeed annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank while 28% think it will not do so.  However, the majority (59%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach a prisoners’ exchange deal with Hamas; in fact, 56% expect Israel to wage war against the Gaza Strip while 36% do not expect it to do so.  Similarly, the majority (57%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach peace arrangements with the PA in the West Bank while the largest percentage (48%) expects, and 43% do not expect, Israel to wage war against the PA to force it to collapse.  However, a large majority of 73% expects the new Israeli government to deepen the normalization steps with some of the Arab Gulf countries but 53% do not expect, and only 30% expect, Israel to wage war against Iran.

When asked what the PA should do in response to an Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories: (1) the largest majority (71%) said it should, and 21% said it should not, stop implementing the Oslo agreement and should sever all relations with Israel; (2) 61% said Palestinians should resort to peaceful resistance and 35% disagreed with that; (3) 52% said they support and 42% oppose a return to armed struggle; (4) 37% said they support the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution; and (5) 36% said they support, and 53% said they oppose, a return to the negotiation with Israel and the US based on a detailed Palestinian peace plan that can serve as a counter proposal to the Trump plan.

Support for abandoning the Oslo agreement and severing ties with Israel is higher among men (75%) compared to women (67%), among holders of BA degree (74%) compared to illiterates and those who finished elementary school (67% each), among those who work in the public sector (79%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (70%), among those who support third parties and Hamas (84% and 76% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (70%).

By contrast, support for a return to negotiations based on a Palestinian counter proposal is higher in the West Bank (40%) compared to the Gaza Strip (30%), in villages/towns (51%) compared to cities and refugee camps (34% and 36% respectively), among the non-refugees (39%) compared to refugees (33%), among holders of BA degree (39%) compared to illiterates (29%), among professionals, laborers, and merchants (48%, 42%, and 39% respectively) compared to students (24%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (41%) compared to those who work in the public sector (32%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (49% and 42% respectively) compared to the religious (30%), among those with the highest income (43%) compared to those with the lowest income (27%), and among supporters of Fatah (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (12% and 38% respectively).

When forced to choose only one of these five possible responses, the largest percentage (31%) says that it prefers a return to armed struggle, 23% prefer resumption of negotiations based on a detailed Palestinian counter proposal, 18% prefer non-violent resistance, 15% prefer abandoning the Oslo agreement and the severing of relations with Israel, and 6% prefer to abandon the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution. 

We asked the public about its expectations regarding the likely responses of external actors to an Israeli annexation, if one is to actually take place. A majority expresses pessimism with 63% indicating that they do not expect Jordan to abandon its peace agreement with Israel; 70% do not expect Jordan or Egypt to recall their ambassadors from Israel; 78% do not expect European countries to impose sanctions on Israel; and another 78% do not expect Arab countries in the Gulf, or some of them, to end normalization measures with Israel.

Twice we asked the public about its support for the PA leadership’s declared policy of stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, stopping security coordination, and severing relations with Israel, once before detailing possible consequences of such a policy and once again after going over these details. The initial response showed that a majority of 59% support and 31% oppose the leadership’s decision.

When the question turns to the details and possible consequences, the public indicates great worries about the future. For example, 81% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 73% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 70% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 65% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 65% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 63% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 62% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.

Despite all these concerns, in answer to the second question about support/opposition to the PA leadership decision to sever relations with Israel, a larger majority of 63% says it supports the decision and only 29% say they oppose it.  Yet, the level of support for the PA decision in response to both questions is lower than the support the public is willing to grant to the policy itself, which, as we indicated above, stood at 71%.  

It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (57%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 32% believe it indeed did.

A majority of 55% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (33%) expects Israel to do so.  A large majority of 74% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 18% say they do prefer that.  50% of the public believe that the PA will back down and resume relations with Israel if the latter declares its intention to resume its direct military rule over the Palestinian territories while 37% believe the PA will not back down.

(2) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• `Satisfaction with the performance of the Palestinian government in dealing with the Coronavirus pandemic ranges between 80% and 57%
• Similarly, 62% are satisfied with the performance of prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh in managing the crisis
• Two thirds say they have suffered economically due to the pandemic
• Two thirds agree with the cooperation that took place with Israel in managing the Coronavirus pandemic

Large majorities are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Coronavirus pandemic. But the level of satisfaction differs from one measure to the other. For example, 88% are satisfied with the closure of areas that witnessed the spread of the virus; 80% are satisfied with the closure of schools and universities; 77% are satisfied with the cessation of transportation between the various governorates; 73% are satisfied with the ban on laborers working in Israeli settlements; 60% are satisfied with the closure of mosques and churches; and 57% are satisfied with the ban on Friday prayers and Sunday mass.  Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 82% express satisfaction with the ministry of health; 75% are satisfied with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas; 67% are satisfied with the performance of the “emergency committee” in their area; 65% are satisfied with the performance of the government spokesperson, Mr. Ibrahim Milhem; 64% are satisfied with the performance of the local municipalities or councils; 62% are satisfied with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh; and 61% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area.  Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in managing the Coronavirus pandemic is higher in the West Bank (76%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in villages/towns (83%) compared to cities and refugee camps (60% and 48% respectively), among those whose age is 50 years and above (67%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (58%), among the non-refugees (69%) compared to the refugees (54%), among the illiterates (77%) compared to the holders of BA degree (60%), among farmers and laborers (69% and 67% respectively) compared to students (48%), among those who work in the private and the non-governmental sector (64%) compared to those who work in the public sector (57%), among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (70% and 69% respectively) compared to the religious (54%), among those with the highest income (77%) compared to those with the lowest income (52%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (85% and 62% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%).

Similarly, 76% say they have trust, and 22% say they have no trust, that the government, in taking the measures it took, has been working for the interest of the people. But when asked about the amount of donations made to the “dignity fund:” 48% expressed satisfaction and 44% dissatisfaction. But an overwhelming majority of 77% says that it is not certain that the donation would reach those who truly need it.

Public trust in the government is also evident in the fact that 56% believe the announcements regarding the number of infections and deaths while 36% believe that the government has not been transparent. Similarly, 57% express the belief that the measures taken by the PA have been adequate, while 23% believe them to be inadequate, and 18% believe they were exaggerated.

The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 67% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 55% say they stopped working or became unemployed.

When asked about its impression about of people’s implementation of social distancing, the largest percentage (45%) say it believes the implementation was medium, 18% say it was high, and 36% say it was low. A majority of 69% indicates that the closure and lockdown did not cause domestic problems within their own families while 29% indicates that they did have such problems.  57% think that remote education has not been useful while 37% think it has been.  65% believe that it was not appropriate to allow laborers to continue to work in Israel during the closure and lockdown while 31% think it was appropriate.

A small majority of 54% believes the pandemic is a divine punishment for people and states for their corruption and injustice while 37% believe it is not. However, the largest percentage (45%) thinks the virus is manmade and not natural while a similar percentage of 43% thinks it is a product of nature. The belief that the pandemic is a divine punishment is higher in the Gaza Strip (58%) compared to the West Bank (51%), in cities and refugee camps (55% and 51% respectively) compared to villages/towns (46%), among those whose age is 50 years or over (57%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (50%), among the illiterates (72%) compared to the holders of BA degree (42%), among farmers (75%) compared to professionals (44%), among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (46% and 36% respectively), among those with the least income (64%) compared to those with the highest income (48%), and among supporters of Hamas (63%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 35% respectively).

A two-third majority (67%) agrees with the cooperation and coordination in the health sector which took place between the PA and Israel during the period in which the Coronavirus was spreading while 25% say they disagreed with that. Approval of cooperation with Israel in the health sector is higher in the West Bank (74%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%), in villages/towns (77%) compared to refugee camps and cities (69% and 65% respectively), among men (71%) compared to women (64%), among those whose age is 50 and over (68%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (56%), among non-refugees (72%) compared to refugees (61%), among those who hold a BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (62%), among laborers and employees (75% and 69% respectively) compared to students (45%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (82% and 76% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (55%).

44% say popular social solidarity, such as debt forgiveness, increased during the pandemic while 31% say the level of solidarity did not change and 23% think it decreased. More than three quarters of the public (77%) believe that the government has not done all it could to compensate those who suffered the most from the closure and lockdown, such as laborers, farmers, cattle breeders, and others, and only 16% believe it did all it could.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

• Support for the two-state solution rises from 39% to 45%
• The public is divided on the best means of ending the Israeli occupation: 45% believe it is armed struggle, 24% think it is negotiation, and 22% think it is non-violent resistance
• 88% reject the Trump plan and only 5% accept it
• 69% oppose a resumption of PA dialogue with the US Administration

Support for the concept of the two-state solution rises to 45% and opposition stands at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Four months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 51% believe that the majority opposes it. A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 38% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 13% prefer to keep the status quo. Four months ago, 22% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 45% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 45% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Four months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations. Support for armed struggle is higher in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (41%), in refugee camps (66%) compared to cities and villages/towns (52% and 44% respectively), among men (56%) compared to women (48%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (55%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or above (52%), among refugees (56%) compared to non-refugees (48%), among holders of BA degree (57%) compared to the illiterates (45%), among employees and students (67% and 66% respectively) compared to professionals, laborers, and housewives (43%, 46%, and 48% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (61%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (51%), among the religious (56%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (45% and 48% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (70%) compared to supporters of the third parties and Fatah (49% and 46% respectively).

We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 88% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Four months ago, 94% expressed opposition to the plan when presented to them in its full details.  Similarly, 87% believe that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the plan and 8% believe a majority supports it.  By contrast, 66% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the American plan while 23% think a Jewish majority is opposed to it.  In light of the terms of the US plan, a majority of 70% believes the plan brings the conflict with Israel to where it originally was, as an existential conflict, while 5% think the plan makes peace more attainable.  If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 57% think the chances are zero; 22% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.

A majority of 69% is opposed and 16% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Four months ago 76% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.  A majority of 68% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 24% expect him to win it.

(4) Legislative and presidential election

• Demand for Abbas’ resignation drops from 62% to 58%
• But in new presidential elections, Ismail Haniyyah from Hamas receives the support of 49% of the public and Abbas 42%
• Marwan Barghouti receives the support of 57% to Haniyyah’s 36% while prime minister Shtayyeh receives the support of 48% to Haniyyah’s 45%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah wins 36% of the vote and Hamas 34%

58% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Four months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 48% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Four months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 44% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh four months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% four months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 63% four months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 54% four months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% four months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 36%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyah, the former receives 48% and the latter 45%. We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 2% each. 

We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in parliamentary elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 36% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Four months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 43% four months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 30% four months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 22% four months ago) and Fatah at 42% (compared to 45% four months ago).

(5) Domestic conditions:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 74% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank
• Demand for emigration stands at 24%
• Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions stands at 81%
• 52% view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.  Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 65%.  24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 34% and declines in the West Bank to 18%.  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. Four months ago, 85% expressed a similar view. Overall, the public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 52% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

With more than a year passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 56% expect failure; only 33% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% expects failure and 34% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 57% expects failure and 34% expects success.

We asked the public about its reaction to the PA decision not to accept medical supplies sent by the UAE via two planes that landed at Ben Gurion airport. About half (49%) of the public indicated approval of the decision but 41% expressed disapproval. Support for the PA decision is higher in the West Bank (51%) compared to the Gaza Strip (47%), in cities (50%) compared to refugee camps (45%), among supporters of Fatah (56%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (48% and 46% respectively).

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last four months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (14%), Maan TV at 13%, Palestine Today TV at 10%, Al Arabiya at 4%, and finally al Mayadeen at 3%.  

(6) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the success of reconciliation declines to 29% only
• But a majority is opposed to the idea of a confederation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an alternative to full reunification

Only 29% are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Four months ago, optimism stood at 40%.  Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 12% believe unity will return soon.  While waiting for reunification, we asked the public if it would meanwhile support some form of confederation between the two areas. A majority of 60% expressed opposition while 31% supported this type of relationship.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% think the most vital goal of the Palestinians should be the ending of Israeli occupation and the building of a Palestinian state
• One third of the public believes that the most serious problem confronting the Palestinian society today is continued occupation and settlement expansion

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 33% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, and the spread of corruption in public institutions (27%); 6% say see lack of national unity as the most serious problem and 5% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.