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Old Guard, Young Guard: the Palestinian Authority and the Peace Process at Crossroads

Has Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA) orchestrated and led the intifada since September 2000 in order to weaken and humiliate Israel and force it to accept exaggerated Palestinian demands for a political settlement? And have he and the PA, as a result, gained added legitimacy and popularity in the Palestinian street? Or was the intifada a spontaneous response, to a provocative Ariel Sharon’s visit to al Haram al Sharif, by an enraged but unorganized Palestinian street; a street that has additionally been disillusioned and disappointed by the failure of the peace process over a period of several years to produce an end to a thirty-three year old Israeli military occupation? While most Israelis, but specially members of the intelligence community, advocate the first thesis and explain every thing that happens in the intifada in light of it, the PA and most Palestinians subscribe to the second.

This article provides a third thesis. It argues that the intifada has been a clearly articulated and organized response by the Young Guard in the Palestinian national movement not only to Sharon’s visit to al Haram al Sharif and to the failure of the peace process to end Israeli occupation, but also to the failure of the PLO’s Old Guard to lead the Palestinian process of independence, state building, and governance. Through theintifada, and influenced by the Lebanese Hizbullah methods, the Young Guard sought to force Israel to unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to simultaneously weaken and eventually displace the Old Guard. In particular, the resort of the Young Guard to the use of arms, as means of national liberation, was conceived of as the means to help it achieve both objectives in a short period of time, not only in the face of a much superior Israeli army but also in the face of a much stronger PA armed forces and security services.

Fourteen months into the intifada, the Young Guard’s determination to do just that is unshakable. So far, it has managed to force Israel to seriously consider unilateral separation, and has succeeded in greatly weakening the Old Guard. Indeed, it has managed to assume a de facto control over most PA civil institutions, to penetrate PA security services, and to force Yasir Arafat to appease it and seek its blessings for fear of losing his own legitimacy or confront the specter of a Palestinian civil war. While developments in the Israeli-Palestinian relations will have serious consequences for the domestic dynamics, only a combination of a truly viable peace process and a serious PA commitment to good governance can begin to provide Israel and the PA with an exit strategy from their current predicament.

Two Intifada Dynamics

The intifada crystallized two highly significant dynamics within the Palestinian politics and society. The first relates to developments within the national movement and the other to the competition between the Islamists and the nationalists. The consequences of the first, entailing a split between an Old Guard and a Young Guard within the national movement, are immediate and far-reaching, greatly constraining the capacity of the PA leadership to manage the current crises and to engage in a viable political process with Israel. The consequence of the second dynamic, entailing a change in the domestic balance of power favoring the Islamists for the first time in seven years, takes a much longer time to be felt; but once entrenched, will be difficult to reverse since it brings with it ideological and social change. In the long run, the consequence of the second dynamic poses a serious challenge to the capacity of the national movement to continue to lead the Palestinian people. The failure of the peace process and the process of national reconstruction to meet the expectations of most or all Palestinians has already set the stage for these developments. This paper addresses the ramifications of the first dynamic for the PA and the peace process.

Failed Processes, Angry Street⁽¹⁾

Upon signing the Oslo agreement in September 1993, two-thirds of the Palestinian public immediately gave it support. Palestinian expectations were very high: Oslo was supposed to usher in three processes: the end of occupation, the establishment of an open and democratic political system and national authority, and a quick improvement in economic and living conditions. The golden era of the peace process did not last long. The high point was the 1995-96 period following a disappointing year in 1994. Support for the peace process in 1996 peaked to 80% and support for violence against Israeli targets dropped to 20%. Just before the general elections of January 1996, support for Fateh, the mainstream nationalist movement, reached the unprecedented level of 55%, and Arafat’s popularity skyrocketed to 65%. The size of all opposition groups, Islamists and nationalist, receded to 20% in early 1996 compared to 40% two years earlier.

When the Palestinian political system came into existence after the elections of January 1996, it had the attributes of legitimacy. Seventy-five percent of eligible voters participated in the election despite the call by the opposition groups for a boycott. Arafat received the positive support of more than 70%, with about 22% casting blank ballots, and only 8% voting for his rival, Ms. Samiha Khalil. Fateh won an unbelievable 77% of the seats of the new Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).

Between 1993-01, with the sole exception of 1994, support for the Oslo agreement never dropped below 60% despite the right wing electoral victory in the Israeli elections in mid-1996. But Palestinian expectation from, and confidence in, the peace process began to erode as a result of the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s Prime Minister and the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Not too high to begin with, Palestinian expectation that the peace process will soon bring to an end the limited self-rule arrangement leading to a permanent settlement of statehood, dropped from 44% in 1996, when Shimon Peres led Israel, to 30%, in the same year, under Netanyahu. Four years later, with Ehud Barak leading Israel and Jewish settlement expansion continuing, expectation of a permanent settlement was still very low at 24%. Upon the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel’s Prime Minister, that expectation dropped by 55%, to a mere 11%.

The loss of confidence in the ability of the peace process to deliver a permanent agreement had a dramatic impact on the level of Palestinian public support for violence against Israelis. In July 2000, right after the Camp David Summit but just before the eruption of the second Palestinian intifada, support for violence has already reached 52%. One year later, and ten months into the intifada, it reached the unprecedented level of 86%.

A second casualty has been the popularity of Arafat and the support for Fateh. In July 2000, upon returning from Camp David, Arafat’s popularity, which has been dropping steadily since 1996, plummeted to 47%. Ten months into the second intifada, Arafat suffered his greatest loss in eight years with a popularity drop of 30% in a single year to 33%. Similarly, support for Fateh dropped to 37% in July 2000, a drop of about 33% in four years. One year later, Fateh lost an additional 22% of its support dropping to 29%. Surprisingly, the Islamists did not gain much support in the four years between 1996, when their support stood at 15%, and 2000 with a 17% support. Those who deserted the nationalists did not shift loyalty to the Islamists and instead chose to remain on the sideline. The intifada changed that: by July 2001, the Islamists have increased their support by 60%, rising 27%. The intifada brought about the first significant change in the domestic balance of power since 1995 with more and more people shifting loyalty from the natioto the Islamists. Indeed, in July 2001, and for the first time ever, support for Islamist and nationalist opposition groups, standing together at 31%, surpassed that of the mainstream Fateh and its allies, standing at 30%. ⁽²⁾

The diminishing support for Arafat and Fateh has been caused by other factors in addition to a collapsing peace process and deteriorating economic and living conditions. The street has been highly disappointed and disillusioned by the perceived failure of the process of national reconstruction and good governance. Street’s evaluation of the status of democracy, PA performance, and levels of corruption have moved from bad to worse during the past six years. In 1996, 43% positively evaluated the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights. By 2000-01, that percentage dropped by more than 50% to about 21%. Similarly positive evaluation of the performance of PA institutions dropped from 64% in 1996 to 44% in 2000 and to 40% in 2001. Worse yet, while in 1996 only 49% believed that there was corruption in the institutions of the PA, that percentage increased to 76% in 2000 and to 83% in 2001

The public’s ever-multiplying disappointments have been aggravated during the intifada leading to further erosion in its confidence in the peace process and in its willingness to extend legitimacy to the PA. The unrelenting Israeli siege, closure, and collective punishment measures have succeeded in practically halting Palestinian civil, social and economic life thereby devastating the economy and creating an environment of heightened perception of threat and coercion that breeds nothing but pessimism, blind hate, and the desire to kill. The expectation, in the aftermath of the collapsed Camp David Summit, that there would be no violence and that negotiation would soon resume, gave way to much deeper pessimism ten months into the intifada, dropping from 44% to 17%. While in July 2000 only 23% saw the failure at Camp David as indicating an end to the peace process, the percentage doubled in July 2001. Correspondingly, while in July 2000 only 31% believed that violence, if resorted to, would help the Palestinians achieve goals in ways that negotiations could not, that percentage increased to 59% one year later. Indeed, in July 2001, a clear majority of 71% believed that the intifada has already achieved that.

The perceived failure of the peace process, combined with a highly negative assessment of all issues related PA governance, the continued inability of the PA to deliver services to the bulk of the population at a time of extreme economic and social hardships, and, worse yet, a prevailing perception of Arafat’s inability to project leadership in the face of an uncertain future did significant damage to PA’s legitimacy allowing other sources of legitimacy to emerge and assert themselves in the face of weakened PA. One of those new sources has been a “revolutionary legitimacy” claimed by the Young Guard. Taking advantage of the great popular anger at Sharon’s visit to al Haram al Sharif and the subsequent death of tens of Palestinian civilians in few days of popular confrontations, the Young Guard was ready to seize the moment.

Young Guard Against Old Guard

Between 1967 and 1994 the leadership of the Palestinian national leadership lived in diaspora, moving from Jordan to Lebanon, and since 1983 to Tunisia. Local leadership in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip sought to assert itself from time to time only to be decapitated by the Israelis or to be discouraged by the PLO. The defeat of the PLO during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 lessened the centrality of the PLO in Palestinian politics and weakened its hold on Palestinians in the occupied territories. Indeed, the center for gravity in Palestinian politics began to shift from the outside to the inside, i.e., to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Despite the strong role played by the outside PLO leadership during the first Palestinian intifada, it was the newly emerging leadership in the occupied territories that had initiated and sustained that intifada.

In 1994, the PLO leadership returned home to the West Bank and Gaza to establish the Palestinian Authority (PA) in implementation of the Declaration of Principles negotiated by the PLO and Israel in Oslo in 1993. Since then, the relationship between the two leaderships, the old and the established on one hand and the young and emerging on the other, has not been an easy one. Efforts to co-opt and even accommodate the young leaders of the first intifada did not always succeed due to the authoritarian nature of the PLO leadership. Nonetheless, the euphoria accompanying the partial Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory, the holding of the first general national elections in 1996, and the establishment of the first Palestinian government in modern history produced an appearance of harmony between the two groups.

The established PLO leadership is a historic one. It is composed of the founding fathers of the Palestinian national movement along with the leaders of the different guerrilla organizations and the PLO bureaucracy. It has spent most of its life in the outside. Most members of this group tend to be old, over 50 years of age. It dominates all the institutions of the PLO: the Palestinian National Council, the Central Council, and the Executive Committee. It also dominates the highest decision making body of the largest faction of the PLO, the Fateh Central Committee, as well as the PA Cabinet. One third of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) comes from this group, even though elections for this body were held in the West Bank and Gaza only. Members of this group, such as Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) Ahmad Qurie (Abu Ala) and Nabil Sha’ath have led all negotiations with Israel. This essay calls this group the Old Guard.

The Young Guard refers to newly emerging local leaders as well as the former leaders of the first intifada. They tend to be young, below or around 40 years of age. Although some individuals from this group are members of the PA Cabinet and the PLC, and few are heads or senior members of security services, the group as a whole lacks cohesion, leadership, and de jure power. Indeed, to some Palestinians some of the leaders of the Young Guard seem more like gangsters and warlords. Warlords, such as Sami Abu Samhadaneh in Rafah and Aatif Ebiat in Bethlehem have been targeted for assassination by the Israeli army, the latter was killed in October 2001. Other leaders of the Young Guard, such as Marwan Barghouti in Ramallah and Husam Khader in Nablus have more respectability in their communities. While the Young Guard has little voice in the main PLO institutions, it has much more relative power in the different Fateh bodies, namely the Tanzim and Fateh’s High Committee and its Revolutionary Council.

The Old Guard derives legitimacy from the PLO legacy as well as the Oslo agreement and its outcome. Its power is also derived from its control over the financial resources of the PLO and the PA, the diplomatic recognition accorded it by the international community, and the control it exercises over the main bodies and institutions of the PLO and the PA, including the bureaucracy and the security services.

The Young Guard relies on a claim to pre-Oslo legitimacy. Its power is derived from its alliance with the Islamists, the overwhelming public dissatisfaction with the peace process and the process of national reconstruction, and the support the public gives to the use of arms against the Israeli occupation forces and settlers. This support for the Young Guard neutralizes the Old Guard’s tools of coercive force and, under certain conditions, renders them almost irrelevant. While the size of the armed wing of the Young Guard may not be large, it is sufficient to allow it to take control of many of the crumbling PA civil institutions and to deter any attempts by the PA security services for a quick cragainst it.

Despite the fact that many of the institutions controlled by the Old Guard are steadily losing relevance in the face of the reality on the ground, thYoung Guard has not sought to create new institutions to compete with the old ones. Instead, the Young Guard seems to hope to eventually control the existing national institutions. For this reason, while clearly opposed to some of the steps and decisions taken by these institutions, the Young Guard has refrained from opposing them or questioning their legitimacy.

The Old Guard has a clear leadership hierarchy, even if authoritarian. At the top sits Arafat; he does not need approval from the Old Guard, nor does he need to demonstrate credibility to it. Indeed, the Old Guard seeks his approval and derives its own legitimacy from him. Its survival as a group depends on Arafat’s continued presence and support. The Young Guard too recognizes Arafat’s leadership and legitimacy. It does not, however, derive its legitimacy from him; indeed, it is he who needs to demonstrate credibility to it. By allowing the Young Guard to seek an alliance with the Islamists and to engage in armed confrontations with the Israeli army, Arafat gains the acceptance and approval of the Young Guard. Indeed, after Israel began to target the regular PA police and security forces, and despite the risks involved, he allowed units from the Presidential Guard and the intelligence services to participate in occasional attacks on Israeli soldiers and settlers. Arafat’s alternative option to gain the approval of the Young Guard is to open the Palestinian political system to political participation and to encourage a true transition to democracy; something he has, thus far, sought to avoid.

The Young Guard wants more from Arafat. It demands transparency, accountability, a clean-up campaign against corruption, a comprehensive political reform, and a much greater role for security services in confrontations with Israel. Statements, issued by Fateh and the Nationalist-Islamist Committee for the Intifada, have highlighted the urgent need to fight corruption. Such a fight is seen as means of encouraging more popular participation in the intifada and of unseating all those members of the Old Guard accused of corruption. The Young Guard has also called for the establishment of a national unity government that would include, not only members from among its ranks, but also senior members of Islamists and other opposition groups. The Young Guard has strongly supported local and international demands for good governance including respect for the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, stronger role for the legislature, and much stronger and more efficient public institutions.

With regard to the peace process, the Young Guard shares with the Old Guard the same goals and aspirations for an independent state, to live in peace side by side with the state of Israel, with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital, and with a just solution to the refugee problem. In today’s highly inflamed environment, most members of the Young Guard tend to advocate hawkish position. But this is probably a reflection of the heightened threat perception generated by the daily bloodshed. Indeed, some members of the group, such as Sari Nusseibeh, the president of al Quds University and Arafat’s representative in East Jerusalem, advocate very moderate views and indeed oppose the resort by the Young Guard to arms.

For now however, the Young Guard is strongly opposed to any cease-fire agreement that would entail a crackdown on nationalist or Islamist activists. Indeed, it has expressed public opposition to both, the Mitchell Report and the Tenet Plan. In fact, it wants Arafat to “come out of the closet,” by publicly endorsing its intifada goals and methods and by ordering all PA security forces to join the armed confrontations. In its eyes, this would be the ultimate test of credibility. The Old Guard, on the other hand, is highly skeptical of the efficacy of violence. Indeed, it is greatly critical of the involvement of some of PA security forces in the confrontations. For now, many members of the Old Guard are convinced that Arafat can not seriously confront the Young Guard in the absence of a reasonable chance for a peace agreement with Israel. In fact, some accept the argument that the occasional participation of official security services in the fighting against Israel is essential for pragmatic considerations: when the time comes to put an end to the armed confrontations, only those in the security services with a credible record of fighting the Israelis will have the legitimacy and the resolve to confront and detain those who may wish to continue the fight.

Some non-PA members of the Old Guard have sought to distance themselves from the PA Old Guard and to establish a new forum for political mobilization and reform. In January 2001, the Speaker of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) called for the establishment of a “National Independence Organization,” and demanded that the PA fully addresses problems of corruption and the absence of the rule of law, put on trial those accused of corruption, respect and implement decisions of the courts, and call upon the cabinet to resign in order to form a new one and appoint a prime minister. The Young Guard was not quick to embrace the call of the PNC speaker as it suspected the motivation behind the call and sought to gain strength and assert itself, not through the open condemnation of the PA’s Old Guard, but through defeating the Israeli army through the use of arms.

The Young Guard differentiates itself from the Old Guard through the way it defines victory in its battle against occupation. The Old Guard seeks a negotiated settlement that meets the vital needs of the Palestinians. Such an outcome would not only end occupation, but would also allow the Old Guard to remain in power for years to come. The Young Guard on the other hand does not, for now, define victory in a negotiated outcome. An Israeli unilateral withdrawal or separation would fit perfectly well with the Young Guard’s definition of victory, as it can be viewed as comparable to the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon under the pressure of Hizbullah. Such an outcome would render the Old Guard’s leadership irrelevant and useless and would elevate the Young Guard to leadership position. The Young Guard cannot, however, oppose a negotiated settlement supported by the majority of the Palestinians if one becomes feasible. But it realizes that only the Old Guard can negotiate such a settlement. The Young Guard lacks the capacity to conduct serious negotiations with the Israelis: it is short of a unified national leadership and a well-articulated vision, as well as knowledge of, experience, and contacts with Israelis.

In the initial period of the intifada, the Old Guard welcomed the popular uprising hoping that it would strengthen its negotiating position in the face of Sharon’s provocation. Yet it had never been certain that once started, the Old Guard would have the capacity to bring it to a halt or even to publicly oppose it. The Young Guard on the other hand saw the intifada as the means to express opposition to the efforts of the Old Guard to bring about an end to occupation through negotiations. The failure at Camp David affirmed the Young Guard’s belief that only through popular and armed confrontation can the Palestinians bring about an end to occupation. Even though it does not publicly oppose it, the Young Guard has little or no confidence in the current diplomatic process. Instead, it hopes that by increasing the cost of occupation, it could force Israel to unilaterally withdraw its army from Palestinian areas, just as it did from South Lebanon.

In pursuing the intifada through armed confrontations, the Young Guard sought a second objective: to insure their dominance in the post-intifada/post-occupation era. In the meanwhile, by creating armed militias, the Young Guard was able to fill a power vacuum left by crumbling PA institutions. PA security services, armed but not part of the confrontation with Israel, could not challenhighly popular and armed militias engaged in confrontations with Israeli forces.

To increase the intifada’s pressure on Israel and to strengthen its doposition vis-à-vis the Old Guard, the Young Guard formed an alliance with the Islamists and other opposition forces. Despite the perceived long term Islamist threat, the Young Guard preferred to have the Islamists in its coalition and under its leadership recalling that in the first intifada, the Islamists created their own parallel leadership, institutions and strike forces.

Obviously the division along Young Guard vs. Old Guard is not the only consequential division in Palestinian politics and society. We have already referred to the nationalist-Islamist divide. There is still one more. Many influential members, in both the Young Guard and the Old Guard, continue to view the success of the Oslo peace process as a vital national interest. Young Guard members, particularly those already integrated into the PA and PLO institutions, such as Mohammad Dahlan, head of the Preventive Security service in the Gaza Strip and Jibril al Rojoub, head of the same security service in the West Bank (also others who have been influenced by the non-violent techniques of the first intifada, such as Sari Nusseibeh), are united with the majority of those in the Old Guard, in their opposition to the violent dimensions of the current one. However, under the current political stalemate and given the overwhelming support for armed confrontations in the Palestinian street, this group and the PA institutions and security services they control, remain marginal. But under certain scenarios, discussed in the following section, some of them can play a highly critical role in shaping Palestinian domestic outcomes.

Domestic Dynamics under Three Scenarios

One can view the future of Palestinian domestic dynamics in light of three possible scenarios: a continuation of the status quo, an Israeli unilateral separation, and a negotiated settlement. A continuation of the status quoassumes that violence will continue to be initiated by Israel, the Young Guard, as well the Islamists and other groups opposed to the PA, but that the PA, with or without Arafat at the helm, will remain largely reactive. It does not exclude the possibility of a serious violent escalation along the way. The continuation of the status quo serves well the interests of the Islamists. An Israeli unilateral separation, on the other hand, would benefit the Young Guard. This second scenario assumes an Israeli army withdrawal from certain parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the possibility that such a withdrawal would be accompanied by an evacuation of several isolated and sparsely populated settlements and outposts. The scenario assumes that Arafat remains in his current position, but it does not exclude the possibility that he may no longer be present. The third scenario assumes that a negotiated settlement of some sort has been reached with Arafat. The settlement might be a transitional or a permanent one. This last scenario would clearly serve the interests of the Old Guard.

The continuation of the status quo will most likely allow existing dynamics to proceed with little obstacles. In such a case, support among Palestinians for the peace process and the compromises entailed in it will continue to decrease while support for violence will remain high. The legitimacy of the PA will continue to diminish and along with it the popularity of Arafat. Within the national movement, conflict between the Young Guard and the Old Guard will continue to weaken the movement with the Young Guard gaining greater autonomy and weight while the voice of the Old Guard gradually disappearing.

In the absence of an alternative leadership, Arafat will probably assume full leadership of the Young Guard, but his room for maneuver will be extremely constrained. His absence from the scene can hasten the demise of the Old Guard and create greater opportunity for internal infighting within the Young Guard with many vying for leadership. Young guard leaders, currently integrated into the PA, such as Dahlan and Rojoub, will most probably join forces with other Young Guard members providing them with much needed foot-soldiers, added public support, and above all political respectability. In the meanwhile, with Arafat present or absent, the overall domestic balance of power will continue to shift towards the Islamists who will probably succeed in few years to become the mainstream with a majority of the Palestinian street supporting them. Indeed, current ideological and societal shifts toward conservatism and political Islam will probably intensify.

An Israeli unilateral separation fits perfectly well with the Young Guard’s definition of victory. In the absence of a negotiated outcome, the search in Israel for an alternative to the status quo will continue. The policy of unilateral separation might seem attractive to some Israelis because it does not require a partner on the other side. As more and more Israelis reach the conclusion that the Palestinians cannot or will not accept the compromise offered by their governments, they become convinced that separation is the way out as the means to reduce Israel’s vulnerabilities. Building a wall of separation is supported by a majority of Israelis today. The extent of support depends on the size of Israeli army withdrawal from Palestinian areas and the number of settlements that would have to be evacuated. The larger the withdrawal and the evacuation are, the more lukewarm the support becomes. Nonetheless, sufficient support among most or all groups across the political spectrum provides a realistic basis for this scenario.

Forcing Israel to withdraw its forces from Palestinian areas will be compared by the Young Guard to the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon. The PA is likely to behave in the same manner as the Lebanese government did, while the Young Guard is likely to behave like Hizbullah. In other words, the PA is not likely to assume control over the newly evacuated territory and settlements. The Young Guard and the Islamists will most likely declare these areas liberated and use them as bases from which to continue the war against the Israeli army in the zones remaining occupied. The alliance between the Young Guard and the Islamists is likely to be strengthened.

The ability of the Old Guard to use the occasion of the Israeli withdrawal as an opportunity to restart the negotiations is likely to be scuttled by the Young Guard. Indeed, the Young Guard will most likely utilize the circumstances of its “victory” as an occasion to openly defy and perhaps even displace the Old Guard, and thus consolidate its leadership of the national movement. Arafat will remain the only viable leader for the Young Guard until such a time as an alternative leadership, with national rather than local credential, emerges. His absence would hasten the search for new national leaders from among the Young Guard, but it may not necessarily engender greater infighting among the Young Guard. This would be particularly true if, as expected, senior Young Guard members, currently integrated into the PA, would join forces with the Young Guard. This “bandwagon” process may involve not only security chiefs referred to earlier, but also members of the Young Guard currently in senior bureaucratic positions. Interpreted as a clear victory for the Young Guard, Israeli unilateral withdrawal will dramatically increase public support for the national movement and thus impede efforts by the Islamists to secure hegemony.

A negotiated outcome can be arrived at only with the Old Guard. For the Old Guard, such an outcome could be a lifeline. The Young Guard cannot arrive at a negotiated settlement, even if it wanted one; it is leaderless, lack a clear overall vision, and has no previous dealings with the Israelis. In any case, it would be almost unimaginable for the Young Guard, who has been very critical of the Old Guard’s handling of negotiations with the Israel, to agree to something that the Old Guard could not accept at Camp David and later at Taba.

In thiscenario, the Old Guard reasserts its leadership reaching an agreement that finds support among the majority of the Palestinian stre. The Young Guard, in an alliance with the Islamists, will probably seek to torpedo any negotiated efforts, but public support for an agreement would most likely render futile attempts by the Young Guard to oppose it. More significantly, PA-integrated Young Guard security chiefs are likely to give their support, in this scenario, to the Old Guard thus tipping the scales against any violent dissent by the Young Guard. A negotiated deal with Israel, particularly if accompanied by a process of domestic political reform, can extend the life of the leadership of Old Guard. It can also open the way for more peaceful and perhaps fruitful efforts to reintegrate the two branches of the national movement in a way that can unify the two and thereby weaken the appeal of the Islamists.

What Negotiated Outcome?

But is a negotiated outcome possible? Three options are available: a comprehensive agreement, a stabilization package, and a mid-term transitional arrangement. None seems likely today. But with some American and European vision and leadership, certainly Arafat, but even Sharon, might be convinced to accept a stabilization package along the lines described below.

A Comprehensive Agreement

A comprehensive agreement would solve all the issues of conflict, including Jerusalem and refugees, thereby put an end to the conflict. As demonstrated by various Palestinian-Israeli rounds of negotiations since Camp David, a comprehensive agreement is feasible. If and when the two sides return to serious negotiation, it will most likely seek to complete the work started with the Clinton ideas in December 2000 and built on at Taba in January 2001.

For this option to become a reality, three conditions need to be met. None exists today. These are: a change of government in Israel that would bring about a leadership and a coalition less wedded to greater Israel ideology, a determined and devoted US leadership that is committed to make the process succeed, and a unity of purpose between the Old Guard and the Young Guard in the Palestinian community and leadership. This last condition could be met through domestic political reform that seeks to open the political system and to create a viable partnership between the two groups.

Furthermore, Israeli and Palestinian publics are highly skeptical of the ability of the two sides to reach such an agreement. Indeed, neither public is willing, under the present conditions of heightened threat perception, to support the painful compromises required for a successful process of full reconciliation. This should not lead to despair; but rather to the conclusion that only a strong leadership, one with a strong perception of legitimacy, can have the courage to take this path. Once reached, the two publics will most likely support such compromises, but not a day before.

On the Palestinian side, a comprehensive agreement can only be reached with the Old Guard leading the process but with the acquiescence of the emerging leaders of the Young Guard. Under the present conditions, in which political reform is absent, this is an unlikely outcome. On the Israeli side, such an agreement can be reached with a government that views Israeli democracy, combined with a Jewish character of the state, as preferable to a control over the land of “greater Israel” even if through continued occupation. With the current governmental coalition in Israel, such a development is highly unlikely.

Stabilization

A stabilization package can only serve as a stop-gap measure aiming at creating the necessary conditions for reducing mutually perceived threats, restoring public confidence in the peace process, and facilitating a return to a more promising final status negotiations. Such a package would include the following elements: a cessation of all forms of violence, a return to the pre intifada military deployment, a freeze on settlement building, an implementation of existing interim commitments most notably a credible Israeli redeployment from area “C” accompanied by PA implementation of its own interim commitments, and a return to final status negotiations. The publics on both sides are willing to support such a stabilization package as it can be rightly described and packaged as a more constructive way of implementing existing agreements.

For a successful conclusion of a stabilization package, the current Israeli government could be made a partner, as it does not require it to fully renounce its “Greater Israel” leanings. There would be a need for a more active role for the international community, including the US, something that has been made easier since 11 September 2001. On the Palestinian side, a full integration of the Young Guard into the political system and its decision-making bodies would be essential for a successful implementation of a stabilization package. In the absence of such integration, the Old Guard would be required to enforce an unpopular cease-fire against a potentially strong and violent resistance by the Young Guard in the nationalist movement and the armed wings of the Islamist and national opposition groups. In all cases, some minor violence is likely to linger threatening to poison the environment and eventually destroy the process of stabilization unless efforts to bring about a comprehensive agreement succeed first.

Stabilization requires multinational monitoring as a confidence building measure. Monitoring makes it difficult for the Young Guard to openly engage in initiated attacks against Israeli targets without openly defying and embarrassing Arafat. Therefore, the deployment of monitors increases the cost of cease-fire violation and increases the chances that the cease-fire will be self-enforced. Indeed, by placing responsibility for failure on those who ignore the terms of agreement, monitoring deters violation and insures compliance by both sides. It also helps each side verify the intentions of the other when monitors are given access to areas and information. Finally, monitoring can provide independent means of triggering the implementation of the different phases of the agreement and thereby provide an incentive for each side to fully comply with terms applying to it.

Monitoring, however, cannot solve the problem of “impasse,” as the two sides may have legitimate grievances that cannot be addressed through good intentions alone. Those grievances may lead either or both sides to freeze the implementation of their commitments or even to act in ways contrary to the explicit articles of the agreement. To provide means to partially address the issue of impasse, one may seek to upgrade the monitoring function by adding a political role to it, whereby senior officials from the countries involved in the monitoring process, may meet regularly to assess the whole process of implementation and negotiations.

On the Palestinian side, like in the first option, only the Old Guard can lead the process of negotiations toward stabilization. The Young Guard, however, would most likely seek to impede the process of stabilization if they perceive it as a means to reestablish and consolidate the control of the Old Guard. Needless to say, the Young Guard has already succeeded in imposing a de facto control over many or most of the PA civil institutions, and along with the Islamist, has greatly penetrated the PA security services.

On the Israeli side, stabilization will require steps that will most likely have an impact on the Jewish settlement enterprise. A complete freeze on settlement building will pose a serious threat to the viability of that enterprise, as it will impede settlers’ efforts to create facts on the ground and, thereby, keep alive the option of “greater Israel” and prevent the advancement toward a permanent settlement. The settlement enterprise will also suffer a serious setback when the Israeli army carries out, under this option, a third redeployment from area “C” in the West Bank. Indeed, a full and credible third redeployment would require the evacuation of many small and isolatsettlements and outposts, most built or inhabited since the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993. Such an eis likely to be opposed by the settlers and their right wing supporters in the current governmental coalition. While this may not necessarily bring down the Sharon government, it will clearly weaken the right wing support for Sharon.

A Mid-Term Transition Arrangement

The stabilization option can be upgraded to serve as a mid-term transition arrangement. Sharon may want to call this option a “long term interim agreement.” Arafat may prefer to call it a new and improved mechanism for the implementation of the existing Interim Agreement. Under an appropriate packaging, an upgraded stabilization package can be sold to both Israeli and Palestinian publics.

Under this option, four additional components would be added to those already listed above. These would include: an Israeli evacuation of the whole Gaza Strip including the removal of all settlements in the strip, an added Israeli redeployment measures in the West Bank that would insure full Palestinian territorial contiguity, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and extending the mandate of the international monitors to include the supervision of Israeli force deployment and Palestinian control over international border crossings. Israeli Foreign Minister has already advocated most of these components. Sharon has reportedly been willing to discuss the Gaza evacuation since his first visit to the US as a Prime Minister. He has repeatedly declared his willingness to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state that has contiguous territory.

Conclusion

The dramatic events of September 11 had a significant but temporary impact on domestic Palestinian conditions. International outrage and disgust with terrorism and the determination shown by the US and other Western countries to form a world alliance to combat it created certain fears and provided opportunities for the Palestinians. Arafat was determined to avoid any association with terror against civilians and eager to show solidarity with the US. Most Palestinians, including the Young Guard, were fearful that Israel would take advantage of the human tragedy and launch a devastating attack against the PA-controlled areas. In addition, Palestinian Islamists feared association, whether organizational or in goals and methods, with the terrorist group responsible for the attacks against the US. Such an association would have made them an immediate target for US retaliation. Therefore, for them, the immediate aftermath of the attack was not the appropriate time to engage in suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. For the Young Guard, the alliance it had with the Islamists threatened to become a liability, while Arafat’s and the Old Guard’s international credentials became an asset and a cover to be sought after. For Arafat, the cost of continued appeasement of the Young Guard had just increased many folds; with international attention focused elsewhere, he feared for his own survival.

Furthermore, the need for an Arab and Islamic support for the US war against terror provided opportunities. It was only in the aftermath of similar conditions, in the Gulf war of 1990-91, that an American administration exerted sufficient pressure on the then right wing Israeli government of Yitzhak Shamir to go to the Madrid international peace conference. Arafat and the Old Guard hoped for something similar this time. They effectively employed pressure and persuasion against the Young Guard who were disposed to accept a temporary calm. Even the Islamists were willing to go along. In addition to wanting to deny Sharon the opportunity to strike at them with impunity, the two allied groups were skeptical about the chances for a political breakthrough and convinced that Sharon was not going to play along an American tune in the same way Shamir did.

So far, they have been proven right. Committed to a thesis that sees Arafat’s deliberate and calculated hand behind every violent incident, Sharon and senior members of the Israeli army and intelligence community seem to have already reached the conclusion that Arafat was no longer a partner. Indeed, they may have been engaged in a steady but piecemeal process of de-legitimation and liquidation of his authority. They have understood that the relative calm was temporary. More importantly, they have assumed that the post September 11 international diplomacy may provide him a lifeline, and they were determined to make it difficult from him to get away with it. The Israeli policy of assassination and incursions into Area A continued despite the fact that Arafat had succeeded in reducing the level of violence by more that 80% in a short period of time. In the end, the vicious cycle of violence found a way to circumvent the opportunity provided by the events of September 11. International diplomacy, unable to force Arafat to make a full commitment to the cease-fire or to check Sharon’s continued provocations, was not up to the challenge.

Arafat and the Old Guard will remain for now incapable of making a full commitment to the cease-fire. They lack the capacity to enforce one. Indeed, since the eruption of the second intifada, they have to walk a delicate tightrope: the PA no longer enjoys a monopoly over the use of force, its legitimacy is questioned by the street, the public is also very supportive of violence and highly opposed to any clampdown on the Islamists or the Young Guard, and no viable political process is looming over the horizon. If Arafat acts now against the Islamists and the Young Guard, he risks, if successful, being seen by the Palestinians as an Israeli lackey, or even a “Sa’d Haddad,” the Lebanese commander of the South Lebanon army created by Israel in the late 1970s to provide security for Northern Israel. If unsuccessful, he faces the prospects of civil war. His choices are therefore limited. Under a changed political environment, one in which Arafat obtains legitimacy and public support, he can move to enforce a cease-fire. A viable political process, initiated and led by the US and supported by the international community, can help trigger the required change. September 11^th notwithstanding, the chances today for such an international effort are slim.

If the current situation is bad, imagine how it will be without Arafat. Today, his leadership is the glue that keeps together the Old Guard and the Young Guard preventing a full and immediate take-over by the former. Despite his poor communication skills, Arafat continues to give the Palestinian public a sense of stability preventing large-scale violations of law and order. His presence deters the Islamists from posing an immediate threat to the shaky dominance of the nationalists. In his absence, all hell could break lose. Arafat and the PA have an alternative to this bleak future: instead of waiting for an American-international peace plan, they can embark, now, on a process of political reform. By doing so, Arafat and the national movement can regain the support of most Palestinians and at the same time integrate the Young Guard into the PA. Indeed, for Arafat, Old Guard, and all Palestinians, the message is clear: reform or perish.

Endnotes:

Khalil Shikaki, an associate professor of political science, currently teaching at Bir Zeit University. He is the director of The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Ramallah.

(1) Data cited in this section are based on more than 75 surveys conducted by the author between 1993 and 2001. The surveys were conducted in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including Arab East Jerusalem. The sample size in each of the surveys ranged between 1300-2000 persons in face-to-face interviews. For details, visit the website of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research at www.pcpsr.org.

(2) For more details on the period between 1993-98, see, Khalil Shikaki, “Peace Now or Hamas Later,” Foreign Affairs, July-August 1998, pp. 29-43.

Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (87)

14 March 2023
In light of the recent events in Huwara and the northern West Bank, Palestinian public attitudes become more militant as support for armed struggle rises, support for the two-state solution drops, and the vast majority opposes the Aqaba meeting; parallel to that, trust in the PA declines, demand for the resignation of president Abbas rises, and for the first time since the creation of the PA, a majority says that its dissolution or collapse serves the interest of the Palestinian people
8-11 March 2023
This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8 and 11 March 2023. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the continuation of the teachers’ strike in public schools, the imposition by the PA of one Shekel added to each telecommunication bill as a donation to an East Jerusalem fund, the holding of student elections at Hebron University in which a Fatah affiliated bloc won against a Hamas affiliated one. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, armed confrontations continued to escalate in the West Bank, the PA announced a suspension of security coordination with Israel, and Israel took punitive measures against the PA including the confiscation and withholding of funds. Settlers attacked the town of Huwara and burned dozens of homes with residents inside as well as shops and cars and killed one civilian in a revenge attack following the killing of two settlers in the town earlier that day. A Palestinian-Israeli meeting took place in Aqaba, in the presence of Egyptian, Jordanian, and American delegations, to discuss means of de-escalation and the ending of unilateral measures. In Israel, tens of thousands demonstrated against the Netanyahu government’s plan to change the judicial system. Regionally, an earthquake hit Turkey and Syria bringing vast destruction and the death of tens of thousands.

This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The findings of the first quarter of 2023 indicate that the internal factional balance of power remains unchanged, with parity between Fatah and Hamas, if new parliamentary elections were to take place today, and a majority vote for Hamas’ candidate, Ismail Haniyyeh, over Mahmud Abbas in presidential elections. Satisfaction with president Abbas drops four percentage points and the demand for resignation increases by two points.

Public evaluation of internal conditions points to a greater deterioration in the standing of the PA and a significant loss of trust in it. Findings show a rise in the belief that the PA is now a burden on the Palestinian people and for the first time in our polls, a majority supports the dissolution of the PA and views its collapse as an interest for the Palestinian people. In fact, a majority thinks that the continued existence of the PA serves the interests of Israel and that its dissolution or collapse would strengthen Palestinian armed groups.

The declining status of the PA can also be seen in the vast public support, standing at 70% in the West Bank, for the strike of the West Bank teachers in public schools and the belief of about 80% or more of the public that the current PA government will fail in conducting elections, reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or improving economic conditions. Loss of trust in the PA can be seen in the overwhelming opposition to the PA’s imposition of a one-Shekel tax on the telecommunication bill to support East Jerusalem. On top of that opposition, about 80% say the money will not really go to East Jerusalemites.

Findings of the current quarter point a significant decline in the support for the two-state solution accompanied by an increase in the percentage of those who think this solution is no longer practical or feasible due to settlement expansion. Furthermore, the public expresses widespread pessimism about the ability of international organizations and the international community, including the US, the EU, and the Arab states, to impose sanctions on the current Israeli government to pressure it to change its settlement policy or its violations of international law.

In light of all that, findings show a rise in the percentage of those who support a return to armed confrontation and intifada. In fact, 70% of West Bankers expect the eruption of a third armed intifada. Moreover, more than 70% declare support for the latest Huwara shooting attack against settlers; two thirds support the formation of armed groups, such as the Jenin Battalion or the Lions’ Den; and almost all express the view that the PA security services should not arrest or disarm members of these groups. More than 60% of the West Bankers believe that members of these armed groups will resist with arms any attempt by the PA security services to disarm or arrest them. Public support for armed resistance is further confirmed by overwhelming opposition to the Palestinian participation in the Aqaba meeting. Almost all Palestinians think Israel will not honor its commitments in that meeting. A large majority, standing at 70%, think Israeli counter measures, which are meant to punish those who commit armed attacks or their families, such as home demolition, expulsion, or the imposition of the death penalty, will only lead to an increase in the intensity of such attacks.

On the background of the settlers’ attack on Huwara and given the current right wing government in Israel, two thirds of the public expect an increase in these attacks. In light of the call by the Israeli finance minister to wipe out Huwara, a large minority, approaching almost half of the public, expect Israel to commit massacres and force a large-scale mass expulsion. Three quarters of the public view the Huwara settlers’ attack as an expression of the behavior of the Israeli government and army rather than the behavior of the most extreme settlers.

(1) Armed escalation, security coordination, the Aqaba meeting, and a third intifada:

A vast majority of 73% is against and only 21% are in favor of the Palestinian attendance of the Aqaba meeting which took place last month in order to stop the escalation of the armed conflict in the West Bank.
84% think Israel will not honor its commitments in the Aqaba meeting; only 12% think Israel will implement its commitments.
64% say that now, after the Aqaba meeting, they are less optimistic regarding possible improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations, such as the prospects for the implementation of confidence building measures or the slowing down of settlement expansion next year; only 8% say they are more optimistic and 24% say they are neither more nor less optimistic.
68% of the public (71% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank) say they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 25% are against that.
Nonetheless, 52% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 44% are not worried.
83% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 12% say they are for it.
The vast majority (87%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 8% say they favor it.
A majority of 58% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 15% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 14% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups.
A majority of 61% (69% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) expect security conditions in the West Bank to continue to escalate leading to the eruption of a third armed intifada; 36% say they do not expect a third intifada.
If security conditions escalate further or if a third intifada were to erupt, a majority of 62% does not expect the PA security services to join forces with the Palestinian armed groups; 33% say they expect them to do so.
A majority of 56% says they do not expect the PA to deploy its security forces in the Jenin refugee camp or the old city of Nablus and other areas in which armed groups have recently been formed in order to enforce law and order and ensure “one authority-one gun” by disarming these groups and arresting their member in return for concessions that Israel might provide; 37% say they expect the PA to do so.
If the PA attempted to disarm the newly created armed groups, a majority of 59% thinks that members of these groups will use their arms to resist the PA security services; 8% think they will surrender; and 23% think they will resist the PA but non-violently.
A majority of 63% says it supports the ending of security coordination with Israel that was announced recently by the PA while 32% say they are opposed to it. But the overwhelming majority (79%) thinks the PA did not actually suspend security coordination with Israel; only 13% think it did.
The vast majority (77%) thinks Israel will not stop its army incursions into PA territories in order to encourage the PA to return to security coordination; 18% think Israel will do so. 61% think the PA will not return to security coordination if Israel continued its daily incursions while 32% think the PA will resume security coordination even if the Israeli army incursions continue.
70% (73% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip) believe the Israel measures aimed at punishing Palestinian attackers and their families, such as demolishing their homes, or expelling them, or imposing the death penalty, will lead to greater armed attacks; 8% think these measures will lead to lesser attacks; and 20% think they will have no impact on armed attacks.

(2) Whose interest is served by the continued existence or the collapse of the PA?

The largest percentage (41%) says Israeli punitive measures against the PA aim at weaking it; 27% think Israel aims at forcing a PA collapse; and 27% think Israel does not want to weaken the PA or bring it to collapse.
When asked to define Israel’s interest regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse, the majority (57%) says the survival of the PA is in Israel’s interest while 39% think Israel’s interest lies in the collapse of the PA.
When asked to define the interest of the Palestinian people regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse or dissolution, a majority of 52% says the Palestinian people’s interest lies in the collapse or dissolution of the PA while 42% define the continued existence of the PA as a Palestinian interest.
In the event that the PA becomes weak or collapses, such a development is seen by 57% of the public as leading to the strengthening of the armed groups in the West Bank while 12% think it will weaken them; 27% think it will neither weaken nor strengthen the armed groups.
If it becomes pretty clear that Israel aims at weakening the PA or even forcing its collapse, 67% of the public thinks the major Arab countries, such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia, will abandon the PA; 28% think they will stand with the PA.

(3) The shooting in Huwara, the settler’s terror, and the absence of PA police:

A large majority of 71% say they support the shooting of two settlers in Huwara while 21% express opposition to this and similar armed attacks.
Three quarters (75%) believe the settlers’ terror attack on Huwara after the killing of the two settlers is an expression of the policy of the Israeli government and army while 20% think it is an expression of the behavior of the extreme settlers only.
Two thirds (67%) expect increased settlers’ attacks under the current right wing Israeli government, but 16% say there will less attacks, and 14% think the frequency of settlers’ attacks will remain unchanged.
When asked why the PA police and other security services were unable to protect the residents of Huwara and other towns located in area B of the West Bank, despite the fact that the PA has jurisdiction over law enforcement in such areas, the public was divided into four groups. One group of 32% thinks the PA leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with Israel over protecting its own people. A second group, of 27%, thinks the PA police and national security forces do not wish to engage the Israeli army in an armed confrontation. A third group, of 24%, thinks the PA police does not have a jurisdiction over the settlers and cannot arrest them. A fourth group, of 11%, thinks the settlers’ attacks occur during the night when the PA police is not present in the targeted areas.
When asked what should the PA do to protect the residents of Huwara and other towns located in area B of the West Bank, the largest percentage (39%) says it should form civil guards units made up of volunteers from these towns; 27% say it should build police stations or place permanent police units in these areas; 13% say it should complain to the UN and the International Criminal Court; and 9% say it should issue statements of condemnation.
In light of the call by Smotrich, the Israeli minister of finance, to wipe out the town of Huwara, a large minority of 44% expects the Israeli government to commit massacres and force a mass expulsion of Palestinians if and when Palestinian armed attacks expand; but a majority of 53% says it does not expect that.

(4) Legislative and presidential elections:

68% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 28% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 76% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 69% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon.
If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 36% and Haniyeh 52% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 36% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 61%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% and Haniyeh 43%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 62% and from among those, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 29% and the latter 60%.
If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (35%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (18%), Khalid Mish’al (5%), Mohammad Dahlan and Mohammad Shtayyeh (4% each), Yahya al Sinwar (3%), and Hussein al Sheikh (2%); 26% said they do not know or have not decided.
Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 19% and dissatisfaction at 77%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 17% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 75% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 76% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip.
If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 33% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 43% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 38% three months ago).
26% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 24% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 44% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 28% selected Hamas, 25% Fatah under Abbas, and 40% said neither side deserves such a role.
A majority of 53% thinks that the recent student election results of Hebron University, in which the student bloc affiliated with Fatah won sixty percent of the vote against the Islamic bloc, which received forty percent of the vote, does not necessarily reflect the balance of power between Fatah and Hamas in the larger Palestinian society in the West Bank or in the Hebron district; 19% think it reflects the balance of power in the Palestinian society in the West Bank; and 15% think it reflects the balance of power in the Hebron district.

(5) Domestic conditions, the “assassination” of Yasir Arafat, independence of the Judiciary, and those responsible for the drowning of Palestinian emigrants:

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 9% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%.
Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 46%. Three months ago, the perception of safety and security in the West Bank stood at 64% and at 77% in the Gaza Strip.
Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 81% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 51% think they cannot.
In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (63%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 36% viewed it as an asset.
22% are optimistic and 75% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 26%.
After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 81% expect failure; only 14% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 16% of the public expect success and 79% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 81% expects failure and 16% expects success.
24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 32% and in the West Bank at 19%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 30% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
A vast majority of 71% says it opposes the imposition of tax of one Shekel on each telecommunication bill to support an East Jerusalem fund and 28% say are in favor. A large majority of 79% thinks the collected funds will not go to the benefit of East Jerusalemites while only 12% think the money will go to the residents of East Jerusalem.
A majority of 56% says it supports the strike of the public school teachers in the West Bank while 42% say they are against it. Support for the strike in the West Bank rises to 65% and declines to 44% in the Gaza Strip.
In light of the devastating earthquake in Turkey and Syria last month, a majority of 52% thinks that the chances that a similar one might hit Palestine during this or next year are slim to nonexistent while 36% think they are high or medium. When asked about their impressions about the PA’s capacity to deal with such earthquake if it were to happen in Palestine, the vast majority (81%) thinks it is slight or nonexistent while 18% think it is high or medium.
We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Palestine Today TV (9%), Maan TV (6%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Mayadeen (2%).

(6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations, the Peace process, and the decision to go to ICJ:

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 27% and opposition stands at 71%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 32%.
A majority of 74% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 24% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 74% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 69% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 26%.
When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 57% supported joining more international organizations; 49% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 58% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 52% supported dissolving the PA; and 28% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 55% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 54% chose armed struggle (55% in the Gaza Strip and 54% in the West Bank), 18% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 51% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations.
A vast majority of 69% says that international organizations, such as the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice, will not be able to constrain Israeli policies that violate international law and that these organizations will be content with expressions of opposition and condemnation. Only 13% think they will be able to constrain these Israeli policies while 12% think they will have a limited impact.
The overwhelming majority (84%) thinks the Biden Administration will not impose sanctions on Israel to pressure it to change its settlement policy; only 12% think the US will impose such sanctions.
Similarly, 82% think the European Union and European countries like France, the UK, and Germany will not impost sanctions on Israel in order to pressure it to change its settlement policy; 14% think they will do so.
Moreover, 83% think the Arab countries that have recently normalized relations with Israel, such as UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, will not impose sanctions on Israel in order to pressure it to change its settlement policy; only 15% think they will do so.
In light of the anti-government demonstrations in Israel, half of the public (50%) thinks they could lead to the fall of the Netanyahu government while 44% think they do not expect that to happen.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

37% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 16% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 15% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 26% (12% in the Gaz Strip and 35% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 21% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 18% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 20% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 16% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 9% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 11% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.
When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 24% said it is corruption, 15% said it is the split or division, 13% said it is unemployment, and 5% said it is the internal violence.

العربية

Public Opinion Poll No (76) Press-Release

23 June 2020

Two-thirds of the public expect Israel to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the West Bank and the majority expresses support for the PA policy of ceasing to implement the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with Israel. But large majorities express worry about the likely consequences of the PA policy on them and on their daily lives. Findings also show that despite a decrease in the popularity of president Abbas and Fatah movement in this poll, large majorities of the pubic are satisfied with the performance of the government in managing the Corona crisis.

17-20 June 2020

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17-20 June 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the spread of the Corona virus throughout the world and in the Palestinian territories leading the Palestinian Authority to impose a lockdown throughout the Palestinian territories which brought to a standstill many economic activities. It also witnessed the formation of a new Israeli government lead by prime minister Netanyahu and the announcement of the government intentions to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank. In response, the PA announced ending its commitment to the Oslo agreement and severed relations with Israel in security and civil realms. This was followed by ending Palestinian-Israeli security coordination and Israel stopped the transfer of Palestinian clearance funds thereby negatively affecting the PA’s ability to pay salaries for the month of May 2020. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

This quarterly poll was conducted during a period in which the spread of the Corona virus was believed to have been brought under control thereby allowing us to conduct face-to-face interviews throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The poll covered various

Issues, most importantly the intention of the Israeli government to annex Palestinian territories and the Palestinian response to the Israeli plans which amounted to a decision to stop implementation of the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with the Israeli government. We also focused on public perception of the PA government and its performance during the Coronavirus pandemic.

Findings show that two-thirds of the public believe that the new Israeli government led by prime minister Netanyahu will indeed annex Palestinian territories. This realization created a great deal of public concern and worry about the future. Public worry focused on the salary payment to the public sector, access to medical treatment, shortages in water and electricity supplies, eruption of armed clashes, return of security chaos and anarchy, PA collapse, and inability to travel to Jordan.

A large majority supports a Palestinian response to annexation that involves stopping the implementation of the agreements with Israel and severing all relations with it. But the public has doubts about the sincerity of the PA in stopping security coordination with Israel. Despite the fact that a slim majority supports responding to the plan by returning to armed struggle, the findings of this poll in fact show a decrease in supporting armed struggle compared to the findings of our last poll which was conducted four months ago. Moreover, despite the fact that two-thirds are worried about the likely collapse of the PA, only one third thinks that Israel will bring back its military rule and civil administration to the Palestinian territories; three quarters express rejection of such return, if it were to happen.

With regard to the government performance in managing the Coronavirus pandemic, a large majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA and with the various measures taken by the PA government. More than three quarters indicate that they trust that the government has been working to protect the interests of public. But two-thirds say that their income or salary has been reduced and a majority indicates that it has stopped working or has become unemployed during that period. Moreover, more than three quarters express the view that the PA government did not do its best to compensate those who suffered the most due to the closure and lockdown. It is interesting that despite the tense relations between the PA and Israel, two-thirds of the public express agreement with Palestinian-Israeli cooperation and coordination in the health sector that took place during the period of the pandemic.

Findings show a rise in favor of the two-state solution but half of the public remains opposed to this solution. Findings also show a consensus against the Trump plan, or the deal of the century, with a prevailing perception that the plan does not end the Israeli occupation and does not lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. Indeed, most of the public believe now that the plan has returned the conflict to its original existential roots. For all of this, a large majority is opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US.

Finally, despite a decline in the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, findings indicate that he would lose a presidential election in which he competes against Ismail Haniyyeh. Findings also show that the gap between Fatah and Hamas, which stood at 6 points four months ago in Fatah’s favor, has now narrowed to 2 points in its favor.

(1) Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories and its potential consequences:

Two-thirds (66%) believe that the new Israeli government will indeed annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank while 28% think it will not do so.
However, the majority (59%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach a prisoners’ exchange deal with Hamas; in fact, 56% expect Israel to wage war against the Gaza Strip while 36% do not expect it to do so.
Similarly, the majority (57%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach peace arrangements with the PA in the West Bank while the largest percentage (48%) expects, and 43% do not expect, Israel to wage war against the PA to force it to collapse.
However, a large majority of 73% expects the new Israeli government to deepen the normalization steps with some of the Arab Gulf countries but 53% do not expect, and only 30% expect, Israel to wage war against Iran.
When asked what the PA should do in response to an Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories: (1) the largest majority (71%) said it should, and 21% said it should not, stop implementing the Oslo agreement and should sever all relations with Israel; (2) 61% said Palestinians should resort to peaceful resistance and 35% disagreed with that; (3) 52% said they support and 42% oppose a return to armed struggle; (4) 37% said they support the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution; and (5) 36% said they support, and 53% said they oppose, a return to the negotiation with Israel and the US based on a detailed Palestinian peace plan that can serve as a counter proposal to the Trump plan.
When forced to choose only one of these five possible responses, the largest percentage (31%) says that it prefers a return to armed struggle, 23% prefer resumption of negotiations based on a detailed Palestinian counter proposal, 18% prefer non-violent resistance, 15% prefer abandoning the Oslo agreement and the severing of relations with Israel, and 6% prefer to abandon the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
We asked the public about its expectations regarding the likely responses of external actors to an Israeli annexation, if one is to actually take place. A majority expresses pessimism with 63% indicating that they do not expect Jordan to abandon its peace agreement with Israel; 70% do not expect Jordan or Egypt to recall their ambassadors from Israel; 78% do not expect European countries to impose sanctions on Israel; and another 78% do not expect Arab countries in the Gulf, or some of them, to end normalization measures with Israel.
Twice we asked the public about its support for the PA leadership’s declared policy of stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, stopping security coordination, and severing relations with Israel, once before detailing possible consequences of such a policy and once again after going over these details. The initial response showed that a majority of 59% support and 31% oppose the leadership’s decision.
When the questions turns to the details and possible consequences, the public indicates great worries about the future. For example, 81% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 73% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 70% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 65% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 65% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 63% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 62% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.
Despite all these concerns, in answer to the second question about support/opposition to the PA leadership decision to sever relations with Israel, a larger majority of 63% says it supports the decision and only 29% say they oppose it. Yet, the level of support for the PA decision in response to both questions is lower than the support the public is willing to grant to the policy itself, which, as we indicated above, stood at 71%.
It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (57%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 32% believe it indeed did.
A majority of 55% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (33%) expects Israel to do so.
A large majority of 74% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 18% say they do prefer that.
50% of the public believe that the PA will back down and resume relations with Israel if the latter declares its intention to resume its direct military rule over the Palestinian territories while 37% believe the PA will not back down.

(2) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

Large majorities are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Coronavirus pandemic. But the level of satisfaction differs from one measure to the other. For example, 88% are satisfied with the closure of areas that witnessed the spread of the virus; 80% are satisfied with the closure of schools and universities; 77% are satisfied with the cessation of transportation between the various governorates; 73% are satisfied with the ban on laborers working in Israeli settlements; 60% are satisfied with the closure of mosques and churches; and 57% are satisfied with the ban on Friday prayers and Sunday mass.
Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 82% express satisfaction with the ministry of health; 75% are satisfied with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas; 67% are satisfied with the performance of the “emergency committee” in their area; 65% are satisfied with the performance of the government spokesperson, Mr. Ibrahim Milhem; 64% are satisfied with the performance of the local municipalities or councils; 62% are satisfied with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh; and 61% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area.
Similarly, 76% say they have trust, and 22% say they have no trust, that the government, in taking the measures it took, has been working for the interest of the people.
We asked about the amount of donations made to the “dignity fund:” 48% are satisfied and 44% are dissatisfied. But an overwhelming majority of 77% says that it is not certain that the donation would reach those who truly need it.
Public trust in the government is also evident in the fact that 56% believe the announcements regarding the number of infections and deaths while 36% believe that the government has not been transparent. Similarly, 57% express the belief that the measures taken by the PA have been adequate, while 23% believe them to be inadequate, and 18% believe they were exaggerated.
The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 67% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 55% say they stopped working or became unemployed.
When asked about its impression about of people’s implementation of social distancing, the largest percentage (45%) say it believes the implementation was medium, 18% say it was high, and 36% say it was low.
A majority of 69% indicates that the closure and lockdown did not cause domestic problems within their own families while 29% indicates that they did have such problems.
57% think that remote education has not been useful while 37% think it has been.
65% believe that it was not appropriate to allow laborers to continue to work in Israel during the closure and lockdown while 31% think it was appropriate.
A small majority of 54% believes the pandemic is a divine punishment for people and states for their corruption and injustice while 37% believe it is not. However, the largest percentage (45%) thinsk the virus is manmade and not natural while a similar percentage of 43% thinks it is a product of nature.
A two-third majority (67%) agrees with the cooperation and coordination in the health sector which took place between the PA and Israel during the period in which the Coronavirus was spreading while 25% say they disagreed with that.
44% say popular social solidarity, such as debt forgiveness, increased during the pandemic while 31% say the level of solidarity did not change and 23% think it decreased.
More than three quarters of the public (77%) believe that the government has not done all it could to compensate those who suffered the most from the closure and lockdown, such as laborers, farmers, cattle breeders, and others, and only 16% believe it did all it could.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

Support for the concept of the two-state solution rises to 45% and opposition stands at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Four months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 51% believe that the majority opposes it.
A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.
The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 38% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 13% prefer to keep the status quo. Four months ago, 22% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 45% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 45% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Four months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations.
We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 88% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Four months ago, 94% expressed opposition to the plan when presented to them in its full details.
Similarly, 87% believe that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the plan and 8% believe a majority supports it. By contrast, 66% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the American plan while 23% think a Jewish majority is opposed to it.
In light of the terms of the US plan, a majority of 70% believes the plan brings the conflict with Israel to where it originally was, as an existential conflict, while 5% think the plan makes peace more attainable.
If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 57% think the chances are zero; 22% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.
A majority of 69% is opposed and 16% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Four months ago 76% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
A majority of 68% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 24% expect him to win it.

(4) Legislative and presidential election

58% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Four months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 48% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Four months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).
If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 44% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh four months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% four months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 63% four months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 54% four months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% four months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 36%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% and the latter 45%.
We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 2% each.
We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 36% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Four months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 43% four months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 30% four months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 22% four months ago) and Fatah at 42% (compared to 45% four months ago).

(5) Domestic conditions:

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.
Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 65%.
24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 34% and declines in the West Bank to 18%.
Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. Four months ago, 85% expressed a similar view.
The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 52% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
With more than a year passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 56% expect failure; only 33% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% expects failure and 34% expect success. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 57% expects failure and 34% expects success.
We asked the public about its reaction to the PA decision not to accept medical supplies sent by the UAE via two planes that landed at Ben Gurion airport. About half (49%) of the public indicated approval of the decision but 41% expressed disapproval.
We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last four months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (14%), Maan TV at 13%, Palestine Today TV at 10%, Al Arabiya at 4%, and finally al Mayadeen at 3%.

(6) Reconciliation:

Only 29% are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Four months ago, optimism stood at 40%.
Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 12% believe unity will return soon.
While waiting for reunification, we asked the public if it would meanwhile support some form of confederation between the two areas. A majority of 60% expressed opposition while 31% supported this type of relationship.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.
The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 33% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, and the spread of corruption in public institutions (27%); 6% say see lack of national unity as the most serious problem and 5% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

العربية

Public Opinion Poll : Migration of Palestinian Christians

Migration of Palestinian Christians: Drivers and Means of Combating it
Results of a public opinion poll among Palestinian Christians

27 January-23 February 2020

This poll was conducted with support from the Philos Project: https://philosproject.org/

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a public opinion poll among Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the period between 27 January and 23 February 2020. The poll sought to explore the reasons that drive Christians to emigrate from their homeland in Palestine to other countries and the various means that could potentially stem the flow. The period during the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the release of Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” and its immediate rejection by the Palestinian leadership. The Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo a few days later and unanimously rejected the plan. A similar rejection followed by representatives of the Islamic countries. Internally, Fatah and Hamas issued conciliatory statements calling for reconciliation, but this was not followed by any concrete measures or efforts to hold Palestinian elections. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, tensions rose significantly during the fieldwork period as popular confrontations developed in various cities and signs of an emerging trade crisis were visible. Total size of the sample is 995 Christian adults interviewed face to face in 98 selected locations in seven Palestinian governorates. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Summary of Findings:

The findings clearly show that the desire to emigrate is much higher among Palestinian Christians than Palestinian Muslims. Indeed, the percentage among Christians in the West Bank is almost twice as much as that of Muslims. The largest percentage of those wishing to emigrate say that they would like to go to the US, and Canada and Europe placed second and third, respectively. The largest percentage indicate that their desire to emigrate stems from economic reasons, while a smaller percentage indicate a desire to search abroad for educational opportunities, a safer, more stable, and less corrupt place, and a place that allows greater liberties and religious tolerance.

The poll found other reasons for the emigration, some having to do with the conditions of the Israeli occupation and others with the domestic conditions. For example, Christians complain about the impact of occupation measures, such as checkpoints, settlers’ attacks, and land confiscation.

Others complain about the lack of safety and security and a majority believes that the Israeli occupation seeks to expel them from their homeland. Certain domestic conditions are also conducive to a greater demand for emigration. For example, there are complaints and worries about lack of safety, fear of crime and theft, absence of liberties and rule of law, and the spread of corruption. Moreover, there is evidence of worry about the existence of religious Salafist groups in Palestinian society and the presence of armed groups such as Hamas and those that represent political Islam.

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Palestinian Christians indicate that they face no irritation or harassment from their Muslim neighbors, or at schools and workplaces, findings do show that somewhere between a fifth and a quarter complain of hearing swearwords or curses and accusations of blasphemy. Indeed, a very large minority believe that most Muslims do not wish to see them in the country. Similarly, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority indicate that they do not suffer from religious discrimination, findings show that a fifth to a quarter feel discrimination when searching for jobs or when seeking PA services. The overwhelming majority indicate that they feel integrated into Palestinian society. Still, three out of ten do not see themselves integrated or feel hated by the Muslim citizens. About a quarter say that some of their Muslim acquaintances invite them to convert to Islam and seven out of ten say they have, at one time or another, heard a Muslim asserting that Christians will go to hellfire.

Findings also show that Christians, like Muslims, do not trust the Palestinian government or the PA security services and the justice sector. Indeed, the majority tend to have no trust in the Christian religious leaders or civil society organizations. The majority believe that corruption exists in the PA institutions. While the overwhelming majority indicates that the democratic system is the best, only one in ten describe the Palestinian system as democratic. Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Christians believe that one should be careful in his/her dealings with other people while only one in ten believes that it is possible to trust most people.

The poll found more than half of the Christians hope for a political settlement that leads to the creation of a single state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea in which Palestinians and Israelis would have equal rights while three out of 10 prefer a two-state solution. Half of the Christians view the one-state solution as safer than the two-state solution for Palestinian Christians.

The poll also found that one additional reason for the larger Christian emigration is that a large percentage of Palestinian Christians have relatives who have emigrated in the past, and believe that those relatives would help them if they showed interested in emigrating. About half of the sample believe that immigration laws in counties of destination favor Christians. Other external factors, found among two-thirds of the sample, are the regional political developments, which constitute an additional driver pushing people out from Palestine and the entire region.

Finally, when asked about the means of combating the phenomena of Christian emigration, respondents focus on the need for Palestinian policy makers and the leaders of the church to pay more attention to the problem and to develop means to decrease the outflow. Respondents’ suggestions focused on the importance of improving economic conditions, such as creating job opportunities, providing financial assistance to those in need, facilitating greater access to homes and apartments. Other suggestions focused on improving conditions of safety and security, including greater PA capacity to enforce law and order, and promoting values of democracy and tolerance.

Migration Trends Among Palestinians

Official Israeli statistical sources indicate that the total net emigration among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the period between 1967 and 1989 stood at around 300,000, which means 13,000 per year. For the period between 1990 until the end of 1994, while highlighting the return of the PLO and its security forces to these Palestinian territories, Israeli sources indicate a net return of 30,000 Palestinians after subtracting those who emigrated during that period. For the period between 1995 and 2003, the same Israeli sources indicate a net loss of 88,000, an annual average of 11,000 emigrants. Findings of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) pointed out in a survey conducted in 2010 that 33,000 emigrated from the Palestinian Territories during the period between 2005 and 2009, an annual average of 7,000 and that during this same period more than 30,000 immigrants returned home to Palestine. There are no published or credible numbers on the current conditions, but estimates suggest that the annual average of emigration during the past ten years might be more than 10,000. Moreover, the opening of the Rafah Crossing with Egypt in a semi-permanent manner in 2018 might have opened the door, according to unconfirmed reports, of about 24,000 emigrants from the Gaza Strip in that year alone, while Israeli governmental sources believe the number to be 35,000.

Among Palestinian Christians, the historic record indicates that emigration has been greater than that of Palestinian Muslims. With the end of the Ottoman era in Palestine and the beginning of the British Mandate in 1922, Christians constituted 11% of the population of the entire historic Palestine with the number standing at 70,429. In 1946, the percentage declined to 8% as the British Mandate was about to end, despite the fact that the number had increased to 145,063. In 1949, the number of Christians in the West Bank stood at 51,053 and in the Jordanian 1961 census, 45,855. As the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip started in 1967, the percentage of Palestinian Christians in the occupied Palestinian territories stood at 6% with a total number of 42,719. When the first PA census was completed in 1997, three years after the creation of the PA, the number of Palestinian Christians stood at 40,055, constituting 1.5% of the total Palestinian population. The second PA census in 2007 indicated a slight increase in the number, now standing at 42,565 but constituting only 1.2% of the population. In 2017, the third census showed 46,850 Christian citizens making up only 1% of the population.

The decline in the Christian population has been attributed first and foremost to emigration, particularly among the youth. But other factors have also contributed to this development. For example, population growth has been slower among the Christians compared to Palestinian Muslims. Higher age of marriage among Christians has been another factor. The Palestinian Arab Barometer poll, conducted at the end of 2018, found that 39% of the Christian population in Palestine was over the age of 50, compared to only 21% among the Muslims.

The decline in the Christian population during the past 100 years is evident in the makeup of some of the main Palestinian cities that have traditionally been Christian. For example, the Christian population of Bethlehem declined from 84% in 1922 to only 28% in 2007; in Beit Jala from 99% to 61% and in Beit Sahour from 81% to 65% during the same period.

The Demographic Characteristics of the Christian Poll Sample

PSR selected a sample of 995 Christians from all West Bank and Gaza Strip governorates with a Christian population. The numbers were distributed based on the number of Christians in each governorate with the exception of the Gaza Strip in which 100 people were added and the sample size was reweighted to reflect the proportionate size of Christians in that area. Moreover, 20 Gazan residents presently residing in the West Bank were selected randomly from a list of 100 provided by a Christian source familiar with status of those Gazans. The total number of Christians in the various governorates was obtained from PCBS census data. But PCBS did not provide data on the number of Christians in the various locations in each governorate and therefore fieldwork was conducted in order to assess the distribution in each governorate. Some areas, with a very small number of Christians, were excluded from the sample. With the assistance of local councils and churches, estimates of numbers were made in the various locations. These were cross tabulated with PCBS data to ensure harmony. Maps were developed for all of the locations that were selected, and were drawn and subdivided based on the number of homes in each location. PSR selected 98 locations, and 10 adult Christians were interviewed in each of the selected locations. Using Kish table, one individual was selected in each home. The interviews were conducted face to face by data collectors that were trained for that particular purpose. One focus group was organized by PSR with more than a dozen Christian participants before the conduct of the fieldwork in order to assess the utility of the questionnaire and to gain insights into the best means of gaining the trust of Palestinian Christians and reducing their concerns about the planned survey. The team of data collectors was formed mostly from Christian fieldworkers and each team consisted of two members under the direct supervision of a field coordinator. Data collectors were instructed not to reveal their religion to the respondents by any means including appearance. Interviews were conducted face-to-face using tablets in all cases with the exception of 15 interviews that were conducted over the phone among Gazans residing in the West Bank.

The distribution of the sample in the West Bank stood at 88% of the total, 10% in the Gaza Strip, and 2% were Gazans residing in the West Bank. Bethlehem had the largest percentage of interviews (42%) followed by Ramallah (24%), Jerusalem (15%), Gaza (12%), Jenin (5%), and Nablus and Jericho (1% each). Males constituted 50% and females 50%. Age distribution shows that the biggest group (64%) came from those whose age is over 40 years, followed by those between the ages of 18 and 29 years (19%) and those between 30 and 39 years (17%). The percentage of illiterates stood at 3%, those who completed elementary school (6%), preparatory education (9%), secondary education (33%), two-year college (19%), BA degree (25%), and MA and higher (5%). The percentage of the married respondents stood at 65%, the unmarried 24%, and widowed or divorced 10%. Those who worked in PA institutions represented only 3% of the sample, Church institutions 7%, private sector 29%, NGOs 6%, Israeli institutions 3%, housewives 25%, unemployed 9%, retirees 7%, and students 5%.

Data collectors and their impressions: The team of data collectors included 17 fieldworkers, most females, of whom 15 were Christians and were distributed as follows: 2 in the Gaza Strip, 3 in the northern West Bank, 6 in the south, and 6 in the middle of the West Bank.[1]

Detailed Findings

[1] Data collectors in the fieldwork teams deployed in the various parts of the West Bank were pleased with public response, as most of the respondents were cooperative and the rejection rate did not exceed 2%. Data collectors also expressed the belief that the overwhelming majority of respondents did not show fear to express political views or affiliation. But conditions were different in Jerusalem where data collectors found concern and fear and a higher rejection rate that exceeded 20% particularly in places like Beit Safafa, al Tur, and Beit Hanina. In other Jerusalem areas, such as the Old City, the reception was much better and the rejection rate did not exceed 7%. Fieldworkers also indicated that in Jerusalem they were repeatedly asked about their own personal religion. As instructed by PSR for such cases, the fieldworkers replied that they could not reveal their religion for fear it might influence responses. In the Gaza Strip, data collectors were also pleased with the public response as the rejection rate did not exceed 10%. PSR’s data collectors expressed the belief that little or no fear was shown by the Gazan respondents.

العربية

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Poll 21 - September 2006

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll

IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR IN LEBANON, PALESTINIAN SUPPORT FOR HAMAS UNCHANGED WITH GREATER PRAGMATISM AMONG ISRAELIS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted September 10-19 jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah

The joint poll examined Israelis’ and Palestinians’ attitudes on the conflict in the aftermath of the second war in Lebanon. It tracked both publics’ attitudes regarding the resumption of a political process and their assessments of the impact of the war on the propensity for further violence in the Israeli-Palestinian arena.

67% of the Israelis support negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which includes Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement. Even when a Hamas-led government is concerned, we observe increased moderation among Israelis: 56% support and 43% oppose talks with a Hamas government if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In our June 2006 poll before the war, 48% supported such talks with 49% opposing it. Among Palestinians, however, we observe some hardening in this regard. Before the war, in our June poll, 70% thought that a Hamas-led PA should negotiate with Israel and 26% believed it should not; after the war, 59% support such talks while 38% oppose them.

As to the impact of the war on attitudes towards violence, our findings suggest that Hizballah tactics provide an attractive model for Palestinians’ armed resistance. A majority of Palestinians (63%) agree that Palestinians should emulate Hizballah’s methods by launching rockets at Israeli cities, compared to 35% who disagree. Similar levels of support for emulating Hizballah’s methods were obtained in July 2000, following Israel’s evacuation of Southern Lebanon (63% of the Palestinians supported it with 29% who opposed). However, the context of the question we asked in 2000 was quite different from the present context. The model of violence then implied mainly guerrilla war directed against the Israeli army. Regarding other modes of violence, following the war, there is no change in Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel. 56% of the Palestinians supported it before the war in March 2006 compared to 57% who support it now. When the abduction of Israeli soldiers for exchange with Palestinian prisoners is concerned, 75% of the Palestinians support such operations compared to 23% who oppose it. Despite the militant views of the Palestinians in the aftermath of the war in Lebanon, 77% of the Palestinians support the call for a ceasefire between Palestinians and Israelis and 74% believe that Palestinians can not depend on armed action only and must reach a political settlement.

The poll also examined the sentiments of Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel toward the war in the context of public criticism regarding Arab sympathy towards Hizballah and its military goals during the war.

The results show both discrepancies and agreements in Jewish and Arab respondents’ assessments of the degree of solidarity between Hizballah and the Arab citizens of Israel. While only 24% of the Israeli Jews believe that Nasrallah cares for the fate of the Arab citizens of Israel, 70% of Israel’s Arab citizens believe that he cares for their fate. Looking at it the other way around, both sectors are much more in agreement. 77% of the Israeli Jews and 68% of the Arabs believe that the Arab citizens of Israel care for the fate of Hizballah in Lebanon.

In a separate Israeli omnibus survey conducted August 28-30, we followed up on Israeli attitudes towards a settlement with Syria, previously studied in August 2000, following the collapse of the Syrian-Israeli talks that year. This allows us to assess whether these attitudes have changed following the war in Lebanon, which has brought back this question to the public agenda.

The findings indicate that Israelis’ attitudes regarding a settlement with Syria have not been affected by the war and remain remarkably similar to those held six years earlier in August 2000. In our recent survey, 56% of the Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a full peace agreement with Syria, 32% support it, and 12% are somewhere in the middle. Six years earlier, in August 2000, 55% opposed such a settlement, 34% supported it, and 10% were in the middle. Israelis’ expectations with regard to the feasibility of such a settlement however changed drastically. While 49% of the Israelis believed in August 2000 that within five years such a settlement will take place, only 26% thought so in our recent survey.

Total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between September 14 and 16, 2006. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of 500 Israeli Jews and a representative sample of 401 Israeli Arabs. The Israeli sample was properly weighted according to the proportion of the respective sectors in the population to produce the overall Israeli estimates (overall sampling error of 3.9%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between September 10 and 19.

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

(A) Impact of the War in Lebanon on the Israeli-Palestinian Arena

In our survey we attempted to assess by comparison to our previous survey the extent to which the war had a moderating, hardening, or rather mixed impact on Israelis’ and Palestinians’ sentiments regarding the conflict between them.

Both publics believe that the war strengthened Palestinian willingness to use armed resistance against Israel. 59% of the Israelis and 73% of the Palestinians think so, 12% of the Israelis and 5% of the Palestinians believe it weakened these tendencies, and 28% of the Israelis and 20% of the Palestinians think they did not change.
Examining this issue more directly, 63% among Palestinians agree that Palestinians should emulate Hizballah’s methods by launching rockets at Israeli cities compared to 35% who disagree. In July 2000, followingIsrael’s evacuation of Southern Lebanon, similar levels of support for emulating Hizballah’s methods were obtained (63% of the Palestinians supported it and 29% opposed). At that time however the question implied guerilla war against the Israeli army rather than launching rockets against Israeli cities.
Regarding other modes of violence, following the war, there is no change in Palestinians’ support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel. 56% of the Palestinians supported it before the war in March 2006, compared to 57% who support it now. However when the abduction of Israeli soldiers for exchange with Palestinian prisoners is concerned, 75% of the Palestinians support such operations compared to 23% who oppose it.
74% of the Palestinians and 73% of the Israelis support negotiations between Israel and Abu Mazin over a final status settlement. Despite these levels of support only 44% of the Palestinians and 51% of the Israelis believe that it is possible to reach nowadays a compromise settlement between Abu Mazin and Olmert.
The war in Lebanon seems to have facilitated Israelis’ willingness to overcome the hurdle of a Hamas government in order to resume a political process for resolving the conflict. 67% of the Israelis support negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which includes Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement.
Even when a Hamas-led government is concerned, we observe greater pragmatism among Israelis. 56% of the Israelis support and 43% oppose talks with it if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In our June 2006 poll before the war, 48% supported such talks with 49% opposing it.
Among Palestinians, however, we observe some hardening in this regard. While in our June poll before the war 70% thought that a Hamas-led PA should negotiate with Israel and 26% believed it should not, after the war, only 59% support such talks now while 38% oppose them. This is consistent with Palestinian support (67%) for Hamas’ refusal to recognize the state of Israel in order to meet international donor demands and Palestinians’ feelings of empowerment following their perception of the results of the war. 86% of the Palestinians believe that Hizballah emerged as a winner in the Lebanon war and 2% see Israel as a winner and 11% think neither won. Among Israelis, 25% believe Hizballah, won, 12% think Israel won and 64% think neither won.

The joint poll further focused on lessons both publics can learn from the war pertinent to the Israeli-Palestinian arena. Three major lessons seem to have trickled down to the discourse of both publics.

First, that reliance on military power or armed action is futile and a political settlement must be reached. 80% of the Israelis and 74% of the Palestinians agree to that.
Secondly and not unrelated, both publics believe that in order to prevent in the future a war between them similar to the war in Lebanon, there is a need to reach soon a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. 65% of the Israelis agree to this. Among Palestinians 84% agree that there is a need to establish soon a Palestinian State for that purpose.
Thirdly, both publics seem to have become more forthcoming of the role of the international community in the conflict resolution process. 70% of the Israelis agree that Israel cannot rely only on itself and must also count on the international community. Similarly, 76% of the Palestinians agree that Palestinians need the support and understanding of the international community because they cannot depend only on themselves.

(B) Assessment of the War in Lebanon by Israeli Jews and Arabs

33% of the Israeli Arabs and 23% of the Jews believe that Hizballah came out the winner from the war in Lebanon. 4% of the Arabs and 13% of the Jews think Israel was the winner and 59% of the Arabs and 64% of the Jews think neither one was the winner.
Regarding the reasons for the outbreak of the war, Israeli Jews stress the responsibility of Hizballah while Arabs emphasize Israel’s role. 46% of the Jews and 17% of the Arabs think the reason was Hizballah’s taking over of Southern Lebanon and the threat it posed to Israel, 37% of both Jews and Arabs think that the main reason was Israel’s excessive response to the abduction of the soldiers by Hizballah, 24% of the Arabs and 1% of the Jews believe that the main reason was Israel’s persistent control of the Shaba farms, 14% of the Jews and 12% of the Arabs think the main reason was Iran and Syria’s intention to hurt the US by hurting Israel.
78% of the Israeli Jews and 15% of the Arabs believe that Israel should have launched a war after the abduction of the soldiers; 21% of the Jews and 84% of the Arabs think it should not have launched a war.
21% of the Arabs and 13% of the Jews, believe that the war in Lebanon strengthened the identification of the Arab citizens with the state of Israel, 40% of the Arabs and 36% of the Jews, believe it weakened their identification, 36% of the Arabs and 47% of the Jews believe it did not change their identification. 52% of the Israeli Arabs and 65% of the Jews agree that many of the Arab citizens of Israel identify with Israel in private but refrain from expressing it in public due to social pressures. 45% of the Arabs and 31% of the Jews disagree.
77% of the Israeli Jews and 68% of the Arabs believe that the Arab citizens of Israel care for the fate of Hizballah in Lebanon.
As to Nasrallah’s sentiment towards the Arab citizens of Israel, 70% of Israel’s Arab citizens believe that Nasrallah cares for their fate compared to 24% of the Israeli Jews who believe so.

(C) Impact of the War on the Israeli-Syrian Arena

In a separate Israeli omnibus survey conducted August 28-30, we followed up on Israelis’ attitudes towards a settlement with Syria, previously studied in August 2000, following the collapse of Syrian-Israeli talks that year. The results indicate that Israelis’ attitudes regarding a settlement with Syria remained remarkably similar to those held six years earlier in August 2000.

40% of the Israelis will vote for and 59% will vote against in a referendum about returning the Golan Heights to Syria for full peace and proper security arrangements. In August 2000, 41% said they will vote for and 53% were against.
Israeli expectations with regard to the feasibility of a settlement involving the return of the Golan however changed dramatically. While 49% of the Israelis believed in August 2000 that within five years such a settlement will take place, only 26% thought so in our recent survey.

In the survey we also examined changes in Israelis’ justifications for their position on the Golan. Here Israelis seemed to draw on their recent experience from the war:

66% of the Israelis reject and 33% accept the argument that holding to territory is less important to security in an era of modern weaponry. In August 2000, 54% rejected and 43% accepted this very argument.
62% of the Israelis reject and 37% accept the argument that peace with Syria will restrain Hizballah in Lebanon and guarantee tranquility to the communities in the north. In August 2000, 50% rejected and 49% accepted this argument.
79% of the Israelis reject and 21% accept the argument that following the death of Hafez Assad and the coming to power of Bashar, there is a window of opportunity for peace with Syria. In August 2000, 52% rejected and 43% accepted this argument.
67% of the Israelis reject and 33% accept the argument that if a peace agreement with Syria is not reached now, war is bound to erupt in the future. In August 2000, the results were virtually identical: 66% rejected and 33% accepted the same argument.

(D) Other Conflict Resolution Issues

67% Of the Palestinians do not believe Hamas should recognize the state of Israel in order to meet international donor demands. But 63% would support a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a state for the Jewish people after a peace agreement is reached, a Palestinians state is established, and all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem, are settled.
While 57% of the Palestinians support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and while 57% believe that armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not, 77% support the call for a ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinians and 22% oppose it.
62% Of the Palestinians have not heard of Olmert’s realignment plan to evacuate most of the West Bank settlements while realigning into large blocks of settlements along the line of the separation barrier. 70% do not welcome Olmert’s plan and only 20% believe it will be implemented. But 75% believe that the evacuation of the settlements in the Gaza Strip was a victory for armed struggle.

(E) Palestinian Domestic Balance of Power The Palestinian poll found that only 42% are satisfied with the overall performance of the Hamas government and 54% are dissatisfied. Despite the dissatisfaction with the performance of Hamas’ government, the percentage of those willing to vote for it in new elections remain as it was three months ago (38%) while Fateh’s popularity increases slightly to 41%.

Satisfaction with the performance of president Mahmud Abbas reaches 55%. But if new elections are held today, only 31% would elect him, 24% would elect Ismail Haniyeh, 13% Marwan Barghouti, 5% Mustafa Barghouti, and 3% Mahmud Zahhar.

العربية

Mr. Waleed Ladadweh Biography

MR. Walid Ladadwa:

Walid Ladadweh

Walid Ladadweh is the head of the Survey Research Unit at PSR. He completed his Master’s degree in Society from Birzeit University in 2003 and completed training courses in survey research techniques at the University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, USA, in 2010. Between 2005 and 2008, he served in the Advisory Committee of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Mr. Ladadweh supervised more than 50 public opinion surveys in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. His responsibilities included sample design, supervision of data collection, fieldwork training, data entry, and statistical data analysis using SPSS. He presented a paper on “Religion in Palestinian Society and Politics” at a conference on the Rise of Public Engagement: the Region and the World” in 2013. He wrote a chapter on “Methodology Used During Exit Poll” and “Demographic Characteristics of Voters—2005-2006” published in The Second Palestinian Elections: Presidential, Parliamentary, and Local Government,” edited by Khalil Shikaki and Jehad Harb, 2007.

Email: Waleed Ladadweh

العربية

Waleed Ladadweh

Walid Ladadweh is the head of the Survey Research Unit at PSR. He completed his Master’s degree in Sociology from Birzeit University in 2003 and completed training courses in survey research techniques at the University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, USA, in 2010. Between 2005 and 2008, he served in the Advisory Committee of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Mr. Ladadweh supervised more than 50 public opinion surveys in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. His responsibilities included sample design, supervision of data collection, fieldwork training, data entry, and statistical data analysis using SPSS. He presented a paper on “Religion in Palestinian Society and Politics” at a conference on the Rise of Public Engagement: the Region and the World” in 2013. He wrote a chapter on “Methodology Used During Exit Poll” and “Demographic Characteristics of Voters—2005-2006” published in The Second Palestinian Elections: Presidential, Parliamentary, and Local Government,” edited by Khalil Shikaki and Jehad Harb, 2007.

العربية

Fateh-Hamas Agreement: A Deal worth Nurturing

Fateh-Hamas Agreement:

A Deal worth Nurturing

Khalil Shikaki *

The agreement signed on 8 February by Fateh, represented by President Mahmud Abbas, and Hamas, represented by the head of its political bureau Khalid Mishal, in Mecca to form a national unity government represents a return in Palestinian political culture to the traditions of dialogue and consensus building that guided most of the history of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It represents recognition that neither Fateh nor Hamas, when acting alone, can deliver effective governance or enforcement of signed agreements with Israel. However, as in all previous efforts to moderate Palestinian politics, consensus building produces only limited and gradual, though steady progress. Instead of searching for faults in the text of the agreement, the international community needs to nurture it by fully engaging the national unity government. As the case was with the Palestinian nationalist movement in the 1970s and the 1980s, only such an engagement can create an environment conducive to more moderation.

Instead of demanding an iron-clad guarantee that the national unity government headed by a Hamas prime minister would fully commit itself to agreements signed by the PLO, President Abbas opted for the more ambiguous term of “respecting signed agreements.” In Mecca, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas changed his hierarchy of priorities. Up until recently he viewed the immediate and complete lifting of financial sanctions and diplomatic boycott as his top priority. Now, however, aborting civil war became his top priority. Moreover, the Saudi role was important: political support of the country closest to the US means that the US reaction could not be very hostile even if it did not like the agreement. Maintaining Saudi-American alliance in the face of terrorism and Iranian threat, he probably calculated, would prevent the US from rejecting the deal outright.

But as importantly, Abbas is not Arafat, the man who turned Palestinian politics in the second half of the 1990 into authoritarianism. He could not rule by dictate. As he did when he was first elected in January 2005, Abbas sought Hamas’s cooperation in arranging a ceasefire with Israel by integrating it into the formal political process, an integration that eventually led to its electoral victory. But it was not the dictates of electoral politics that led to the Mecca Agreement; Hamas already has a 60% majority in the parliament. Instead, it was the recognition of both Fateh and Hamas that the alternative to mutual compromise is continued bloodshed. Consensus building, not electoral politics, will now dominate Palestinian politics. This is a positive development that needs to be encouraged because it is the most effective means of bringing Hamas into the larger Palestinian and international consensus on the need for a two-state solution to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

There are other reasons to view the Mecca Agreement positively. First, it is not a bad deal. Hamas dropped its insistence that the government's "respect" for PLO-Israel agreements and commitments be conditioned by its own definition of what is in Palestinian interest. The Mecca Agreement now "commits" the government to all PLO National Council and Arab Summit resolutions. This includes the National Council’s 19th session, referred to specifically in the Agreement, which explicitly endorses the two-state solution and recognizes the state of Israel. It also includes the Beirut Summit which endorsed the Saudi initiative with its conditional recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel. Second, without a deal, violence would have continued and public polarization increased. Israel would have been dragged into the conflict and Fateh would probably have lost out to Hamas in Gaza even if Abbas remains in control in the West Bank. Public opinion would not have been able to understand why Fateh and Abu Mazin rejected such a deal. Abu Mazin would have been weakened considerably and his ability to negotiate with Israel would have diminished.

Third, the agreement brings Fateh and its allies (like Salam Fayyad) to power in a power-sharing mechanism that does not give Hamas a majority vote. Yes, Hamas can bring the government down by a vote of no confidence, but by initiating such a process, it would be blamed for its outcome, i.e., civil war. Hamas is likely to think twice before voting the unity government out of office if it remains opposed to holding new elections. Control over money will be in the hands of Abu Mazin and Fayyad who enjoys the confidence of the US and Israel. Fourth, Abu Mazin will emerge much stronger domestically than before. In any area of cabinet responsibility, a disagreement in the government leaves Abu Mazin, the referee, in charge. This will apply most importantly to matters related to control over security services, but can also apply to conflicts related to the functioning of the judiciary, foreign policy, and public finance.

Fifth, Abu Mazin will emerge stronger in negotiations with Israel. While part of a national unity government with him, Hamas will not have a free hand to "frame" any deal he makes with Israel as "treason." Of course, this means he needs to bring Hamas into the consultation process, but this can only mean that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would become more rational.

Ultimately, this is a good deal because only a coalition of Fateh and Hamas has the capacity and willingness to enforce law and order domestically as well as a ceasefire with Israel. Most likely, it will quickly lead to the release of the imprisoned Israeli soldier and to the extension of the ceasefire to the West Bank. Only such a coalition has the capacity to neutralize Islamic Jihad, war lords, and other spoilers. Finally, at the regional level, the deal will reduce Hamas' ties with Iran and strengthen its ties with Saudi Arabia. Without Hamas on board, the ability of the Saudis to confront the threat of Iran and Shiites in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf would be reduced.

____________________________________________________________________

* Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah

Fateh-Hamas Agreement: A Deal worth Nurturing

Dr. Khalil Shikaki

The agreement signed on 8 February by Fateh, represented by President Mahmud Abbas, and Hamas, represented by the head of its political bureau Khalid Mishal, in Mecca to form a national unity government represents a return in Palestinian political culture to the traditions of dialogue and consensus building that guided most of the history of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It represents recognition that neither Fateh nor Hamas, when acting alone, can deliver effective governance or enforcement of signed agreements withIsrael. However, as in all previous efforts to moderate Palestinian politics, consensus building produces only limited and gradual, though steady progress. Instead of searching for faults in the text of the agreement, the international community needs to nurture it by fully engaging the national unity government. As the case was with the Palestinian nationalist movement in the 1970s and the 1980s, only such an engagement can create an environment conducive to more moderation.

Third, the agreement brings Fateh and its allies (like Salam Fayyad) to power in a power-sharing mechanism that does not give Hamas a majority vote. Yes, Hamas can bring the government down by a vote of no confidence, but by initiating such a process, it would be blamed for its outcome, i.e., civil war. Hamas is likely to think twice before voting the unity government out of office if it remains opposed to holding new elections. Control over money will be in the hands of Abu Mazin and Fayyad who enjoys the confidence of the US andIsrael. Fourth, Abu Mazin will emerge much stronger domestically than before. In any area of cabinet responsibility, a disagreement in the government leaves Abu Mazin, the referee, in charge. This will apply most importantly to matters related to control over security services, but can also apply to conflicts related to the functioning of the judiciary, foreign policy, and public finance.

Palestinian-Israeli Pulse

February 16, 2017

A majority of Israelis and just under half of Palestinians still support the two state solution in principle, but under half on both sides support the detailed framework for its implementation. However, despite mutual fear, distrust and pessimism regarding the likelihood and feasibility of the two-state solution, a majority of Palestinians and Israelis may support comprehensive peace agreement that ends the conflict if offered additional symbolic or concrete incentives

PressRelease

Table of findings

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU).

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

A majority of Israelis (55%) and a large minority of Palestinians (44%) support the two-state solution. By contrast, support for a one-state solution stands at 36% among Palestinians, 19% among Israeli Jews and 56% among Israeli Arabs.
Support for a detailed permanent agreement package, one based on previous rounds of negotiations, is lower than the support for the two-state solution. Only 42% of Palestinians, 41% of Israeli Jews, and 88% of Israeli Arabs support a peace agreement package that comprises: a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, a family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims.
A quarter to one-third of Israelis and Palestinians who oppose the permanent agreement package are willing to reconsider their opposition to the peace deal if it was accompanied by a peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Initiative's principles (for the Israeli public), and an Israeli acceptance of that initiative (for the Palestinian public). This incentive alone increases the overall support for the combined package on both sides, up to 57% to 59%, when those who changed their minds are added to the original supporters. While some of the incentives presented to those who opposed the package manage to change the attitude of fewer people, others, including non-zero sum ones, presented separately to each side, are able to change the attitude of many more people, 40% and above of the opposition, thereby considerably increasing the support to the combined package to much higher levels, up to 65% on both sides.
In selecting between bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral approaches to peacemaking, Palestinians prefer the multilateral (51%) while the Israelis prefer the bilateral (61%). Of various multilateral forums, an Arab forum, in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate, is the least rejected by the two sides. All other multilateral forums – an American-led, an EU-led, a US-Russian led, or an UN-led forum – are acceptable to one side while unacceptable to the other.
Two-thirds of the Israelis and more than three quarters of the Palestinians view US President Donald Trump as pro-Israel. Moreover, a minority on both sides, 28% of Israeli Jews and 10% of Palestinians, think he will seek to renew peace negotiations
Large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians estimate as low the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.

The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 8 and 10, 2016. Number of interviewees in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 830 and in the Gaza Strip 440. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1,207 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 19 and 30, 2016. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 727, West Bank settlers 300, and Israeli Arabs 180. Size of Israeli settlers and Israeli Arabs was deliberately increased in order to allow for detailed analysis of their attitudes. But the combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these two groups in the Israeli society. The data file was further reweighted to reflect current societal religious-secular division. The margin of error is 3%. The following summary has been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki and Walid Ladadwa from PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provided the respective findings for these sub groups.

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Two-state solution, one-state solution, and two-state confederation: Today, a majority of Israelis and a large minority of Palestinians– 55% of Israelis (50% among Jews and 82% among Arabs) and 44% of Palestinians – support what is known as the two-state solution in a general question testing the concept, but without giving specific details about an agreement. Six months ago, in June 2016, 59% of Israelis (53% among Jews and 87% among Arabs) and 51% of Palestinians supported that solution. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view on their side and on the other side regarding this solution. Findings indicate that that the Israelis underestimate and incorrectly assess the level of support for this solution on their side while the Palestinians correctly estimate the level of support on their side: only 26% of the Israelis said the majority of their own public supports while 63% of the Israelis said the majority opposes it; among the Palestinians, 41% said a majority supports and 53% said a majority opposes it. But while the Israelis correctly estimate the level of support for the concept of the two-state solution on the other side, the Palestinians underestimate the level of support for that solution among the Israelis: only 33% of the Palestinians believe the majority of Israelis supports that solution and 38% of the Israelis believe the majority of Palestinians supports it. However, wide majorities are skeptical about the implementation of such a solution. Over 80% of Israeli Jews and 72% of Palestinians do not believe a Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.

The joint poll sought to ascertain the current level of support for the idea of a one-state solution “by which Palestinians and Jews will be citizens of the same state and enjoy equal rights.” Support for the idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 56%). Only a minority among Palestinians (36%) and among Israeli Jews (19%) support this option (although 26% of settlers supported the one-state solution). When we asked Israeli Jews if they are for or against the annexation of the West Bank without granting the Palestinians their full citizen rights, two thirds said they are against it and only 31% said they support it. Forty-six percent of settlers supported annexation without full rights for Palestinians (almost precisely the same portion, 45%, of settlers are opposed).

We also sought to assess the level of support for the idea of a confederation between the state of Israel and the state of Palestine whereby citizens of one country would be free to reside in the territory of the other and live under its own laws and where two the states jointly decide on matters of political, security and economic policy. As the case in the one-state solution, support for the confederation idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 74%, significantly higher than Israeli Arab support for a one-state solution). But only a minority of Palestinians (34%) and Israeli Jews (20%) support the idea.

Permanent status package: For the second time in six months, we presented Palestinians and Israelis with a detailed combined package of a permanent settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and asked them if they would support or oppose each of its components and the combined package. Findings show that the level of support for the package has increased slightly on both sides: 48% of the Israelis (41% among Israeli Jews and 88% among Israeli Arabs) and 42% of the Palestinians (40% among West Bankers and 46% among Gazans) support the combined package. Six months ago, only 39% of Israeli Jews and 39% of Palestinians supported the package. Current findings indicate that the majority on both sides, 56% of Israeli Jews and 55% of Palestinians, continue to oppose the combined package, if offered to them without any other additional incentives (see below the section on incentives).

A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the package follows:

1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis and Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side: a minority among the Palestinians (43%) and a majority among the Israelis (69%; 66% among Israeli Jews and 84% among Israeli Arabs) supported this item.

2. A demilitarized independent Palestinian state will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: a minority of Palestinians (22%; 29% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) and a majority (56%) among Israelis supported this item.

3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides: among the Palestinians, a minority (42%) supported it, and among the Israelis, a majority (53%) supported it.

4. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years: on both sides only a minority supported this item: on the Palestinian side 35% (29% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) and among the Israelis, 44% (42% among Israeli Jews and 57% among Israeli Arabs).

5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlements, which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements: a minority (37%) among the Palestinians (33% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip), and 50% among the Israelis supported it (among the Israeli Jews 48% supported it).

6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel: minorities on both sides (31%) among the Palestinians (34% in the Gaza Strip and 29% in the West Bank) and 47% of Israelis supported it. (The Israeli Jews were split: 45% supported it while 48% opposed it).

7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state: again, minorities – among the Palestinian 27% and among the Israelis 36% (29% among Israeli Jews and 76% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Western Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty: a minority (28%) among Palestinians and a similar minority (37%) among Israelis (33% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated: among the Palestinians, 52% (50% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) supported it and among the Israelis, 30% (20% among Israeli Jews and 81% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

It is worth noting that among Israeli Jews, support for the combined package among settlers stands at 16% compared to 42% among non-settlers. Support is much higher among Israeli Jews who define themselves as secular, standing at 61% compared to 34% among traditionalists (masortim), 9% among the religious, and 10% among the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox). Secular people make up the plurality of Israeli Jews, with roughly 45%; about one-third of Jews are traditional, and under one-quarter are religious (orthodox) or Haredi. Among Israelis, support also varies depending on where respondents place themselves on the right-left political continuum: Among Jews, 89% of the left, 47% of the center, and 18% of the right support the package.

Among the Palestinians, as we saw six months ago, support for the combined package is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. But it is worth pointing out however that the findings show no difference in support between refugees and non-refugees (43% and 42% respectively). Nonetheless, residents of refugee camps (estimated to be less than 60% of all refugees) are the least supportive of the combined package, standing at 38% compared to 42% among residents of cities and 49% in rural areas. Moreover, support for the package is higher among those who define themselves as “not religious” and “somewhat religious” (64% and 47%) compared to those who define themselves as religious (35%); and among Fatah voters (64%) compared to Hamas voters (21%).

Beyond this regular demographic and political differences that typically signify support or opposition to peace, background attitudes also affect support. Among Israelis who believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution, support for the combined package is higher than among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians opposes that solution (53% to 33%). These comparisons are closely similar to those found in our previous joint poll six months ago. As in the Israeli case, support for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians who believe that a majority of Israelis supports the two-state solution compared to those who believe that an Israeli majority is opposed to that solution (52% vs. 34%).

Peace Incentives: Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible.” For this end, we offered those who opposed the package various incentives in an attempt to understand the source of their opposition and the extent to which change was possible. Israeli Jews opposed to the package (56% of the total Jewish sample) were offered eight different incentives and Palestinians and Israeli Arabs opposed to the package (55% of all Palestinians, and 9% of the Israeli Arabs) were offered seven incentives in total. Only three of the incentives offered to the two sides were identical or almost identical. The remaining incentives sought to address either presumed Palestinian or Israeli concerns. In this regard, it should be noted that Israeli Arabs were offered the same four distinct incentives offered to the Palestinian respondents. Below is a detailed breakdown of the responses to the various incentives:

Israeli Incentives (offered only to those Israeli Jews and Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):

1. And if the Jews who left their homes and property in the Arab countries when they had to leave following the 1948 War and the establishment of the state of Israel will be compensated for the lost assets left behind? 40% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

2. And if the Palestinians acknowledge the historic and religious links between Jews and historic Palestine? 34% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

3. What if the agreement includes recognition by the Palestinian state of Israel as a Jewish state? 32% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

4. And if the agreement would include peace with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 30% of Israeli Jews and 13% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept package if it included this amendment.

5. And if free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was assured? 24% of Israeli Jews and 50% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

6. And if the agreement guarantees that Israelis are guaranteed free access to holy sites in Jerusalem and other places? 23% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

7. And if settlers are allowed to choose to stay in their homes after the Israeli withdrawal, to keep their Israeli citizenship and at the same time have their safety guaranteed by the Palestinian state? 21% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

8. And if the holy sites are not under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty but are placed under the custody of a multi-national committee made up of Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US? 10% of Israeli Jews and 31% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

In short, on the Israeli Jewish side a minority ranging between 10% and 40% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it were certain conditions to be met. On the Israeli Arab side, 13% to 50% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it based on the incentives offered to both Jews and Arab Israelis.

Palestinian incentives in addition to the combined package (offered only to Palestinians/Israeli Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):

1. And if Palestinian laborers can freely work in Israel after the establishment of the Palestinian state? 44% of Palestinians and 47% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
2. And if the state of Israel acknowledges the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine? 44% of Palestinians and 38% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
3. And if refugees in camps in the Palestinian state are compensated and provided with homes and land in which they can be settled and rehabilitated? 42% of Palestinians and 56% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
4. And if free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was assured? 40% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
5. And if the peace agreement between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel is based on a long term hudna between the two sides? 34% of Palestinians and 31% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment;.
6. If Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty? 28% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
7. And if the holy sites are not under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty but are placed under the custody of a multi-national committee made up of Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US? 19% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
In short, on the Palestinian side, a minority ranging between 19% and 44% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it. On the Israeli Arab side, 31% to 56% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it.

As the findings detailed above indicate, of the three identical or almost identical incentives, a broader regional peace involving the Arab World and Israel is the least mutually opposed, as 30% of Israeli Jews and 28% of Palestinians who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept a package with this amendment. This incentive alone increases the level of support for it among Palestinians from the initial 42% to 57% and among Israeli Jews from the initial 41% to 58%. Of the distinct Palestinian incentives, three proved highly effective leading 42% to 44% of the opposition to change its view and accept the package: access to Israeli labor market for Palestinian laborers, an Israeli acknowledgement of the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine, and granting refugees homes and land in the Palestinian state. On the Israeli side, the most effective incentive, reversing the attitude of 40% of the opposition, proved to be the compensation of Jews from Arab countries for the lost assets left behind. On both sides, gestures of symbolic recognition of their historical attachment, identity and experience are among the more powerful motivator for changing attitudes in support of the package.

(2) Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Bilateral vs. multilateral approaches: We explored issues related to the process of peacemaking, specifically the most effective or “most promising” approaches to reviving Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the role of outside actors. In selecting between two possible approaches, bilateral and multilateral, findings show that Palestinians and Israeli Arabs prefer the multilateral, while the Israeli Jews prefer bilateral between the Israeli government and the Palestinians.

Among the Palestinians (51%) and among the Israeli Arabs (52%) preferred a multilateral forum in which major powers sponsor the negotiations, while only 27% of the Israelis Jews preferred this approach. Only 29% of the Palestinians preferred bilateral negotiations while 61% of the Israeli Jews preferred this approach.

We also sought a deeper understanding of Israeli and Palestinian views of the multilateral approach. Five models of this approach were presented to the two publics: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led peace process; 3) an EU-led peace process; 4) a UN-led peace process; 5) and finally, a US-Russian-led peace process. Findings show that Palestinians are most receptive to the first, or Arab regional, approach (31%) followed by a UN and an EU approaches (14% and 13% respectively); 7% selected the US-Russian peace process. Only 4% preferred a US-led effort. Israeli Jews preferred a US-led peace process (32%) followed by the regional approach and a US-Russian approach (18% each). The two other approaches, a UN-led process and EU-led process were selected by 5% and 4% of the Israeli Jewish public, respectively. Among Israelis Arabs, equal support (17%) went to an EU-led process, a UN-led process, and a regional process.

The Trump Administration: Our findings show that two thirds of the Israeli Jews (69%) and more than three quarters of Palestinians (77%) believe that Donald Trump is pro-Israel; 18% of the Israeli Jews and 8% of the Palestinians think he is neutral. We asked the two sides to tell us what they expect Trump to do about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Only 28% of Israeli Jews (still a plurality, with the highest score relative to other options offered) and 10% of Palestinians think the new US president will seek to renew peace negotiations and smaller percentages (16% of Israeli Jews and 8% of the Palestinians) think he will seek to impose a solution on both sides. But almost half of the Palestinians (47%) and a quarter of all Israelis (27%) think he will side with one side against the other while 19% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians think he will do nothing.

Role of Israeli Arabs in the peace process: In assessing the role of Israeli Arabs in the peace process, we asked the two sides to tell us how they view them: as Israelis or Palestinians, or both. While 63% of the Palestinians view them as Palestinians, only 23% of Israeli Jews view them as such. Among Israeli Arabs, 31% said they view themselves as Palestinians. Only 10% of Palestinians compared to 41% of Israeli Jews and 27% of Israeli Arabs view them as Israelis. About one quarter (24%) of the Palestinians and 34% of Israeli Jews, and 37% of Israeli Arabs view them as both (Palestinians and Israelis). We also asked both sides to speculate about the manner in which Israeli Arabs view the PLO and its role in the peace process: do Israeli Arabs see it as representing them and all other Palestinians or do they see it as representing other Palestinians only? About half the Palestinians (49%) think that Israeli Arabs view the PLO as their representative as well as the representative of all Palestinians with only 41% thinking that they view it as representing other Palestinians only. By contrast, about half of the Israeli Jews (49%) think that Israeli Arabs view the PLO as representing other Palestinians only; 32% of Israeli Jews think Israeli Arabs view the PLO as their representative. Israeli Arabs think the same as Israeli Jews: 63% believe that Israeli Arabs see the PLO as representing other Palestinians only; 21% believe that they see it as their representative.

Bottom-up peace efforts: We asked the two sides for their assessment of the effectiveness of grassroots movements and religious leaders in putting pressure on leaders to pursue peace. Over two-thirds of the Israeli Jewish respondents (69%) think that groups such as “Women Wage Peace” are not effective but 53% think religious leaders are. Israeli Arabs think differently when it comes to groups such as “Women Wage Peace”: 68% think they are effective. But they think the same as the Israeli Jews when it comes to religious leaders: 61% think they are effective. Among the Palestinians 49% think peace groups are not effective and 41% think they are; and 47% think men of religion are not effective and 46% think they are.

Violence and countering violence: We asked Palestinians if they support or oppose attacks, such as stabbings, on Israeli civilians: 49% opposed such attacks and 47% supported them. Opposition to such attacks in the West Bank (60%) is twice as much as it is in the Gaza Strip (30%). Although the difference could be partly explained by the fact that West Bank residents experience Israeli retaliatory measures, Palestinians are likely to deny the effects. When Palestinian respondents were asked about the deterrent effect of the Israeli measures, such as home demolitions, used against the families of the attackers, more than three quarters (78%; 84% among West Bankers and 69% among Gazans) answered that such measures do not deter potential attackers. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view among the Palestinians regarding such attacks. Findings indicate that a majority on both sides (53% among the Palestinians and 52% among Israeli Jews) think a majority of Palestinians support them. We asked Israeli Jews if they support harsh policies (such as prolonged closures or curfews) against all residents of a village of town from which Palestinians attacked with knives or committed other violent acts against Israelis. A majority of Israeli Jews (58%) support such harsh measures and 38% oppose them.

(3) How Israelis and Palestinians View Each Other:

We asked the two sides whether they have met or talked to each other and how they view the other. Issues raised included wanting peace, trust, fear, and how good or bad their current conditions are. But we also asked them how they view the nature of the conflict, in zero sum terms, or with some openness towards the other side. While the picture that emerges is discouraging, there are nonetheless, a few glimmers of hope.

Talking to each other: Palestinians and Israelis were asked if they have talked with each other during the past few months: 12% of Palestinians said they have talked to Israelis, other than soldiers and settlers, and 23% of Israeli Jews and 78% of Israeli Arabs said that they have talked to Palestinians. Among the Palestinians, 71% said the talk with the Israelis was pleasant and 95% of the Israeli Jews and the Israeli Arabs indicated the same.

Want Peace: 38% of the Palestinians and 41% of the Israeli Jews agree with a statement that the other side wants peace; 79% among Israeli Arabs agree that Palestinians want peace and 53% agree that Israeli Jews want peace.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: The most disturbing, but not surprising, finding relates to the question of trust. Among Palestinians a solid majority (86%) feel Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. On the Israeli Jewish side, a somewhat smaller majority (71%) also indicated that Palestinians cannot be trusted. Among Israeli Arabs, two-thirds (67%) indicated that Palestinians can be trusted. Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 51% of Israeli Jews, 48% of Israeli Arabs, and 68% of Palestinians agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization. As with various other questions in the survey, young Israeli Jews show higher levels of hardline thinking and distrust than other groups: among 18-34 year old Jews, 59% agree with the zero-sum statement, compared to 43% among Jews aged 35-54.

Fear: We asked Palestinians and Israeli Jews about fear of each other. Among Israeli Jews, 66% indicate they feel fear toward the Palestinians but among the Palestinians, only 43% indicate that they fear Israeli Jews. When asked about fear of Israeli soldiers and armed settlers 52% of Palestinians replied in the affirmative. We also asked Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs about fear of each other: 48% of the Jews feel fear toward Israeli Arabs while 82% of Israeli Arabs do not feel fear toward Israeli Jews. Jews living as settlers in the West Bank are more fearful of both Palestinians and of Israeli Arabs, relative to Jews inside Israel – 72% of settlers are afraid of Palestinians, and 60% are afraid of Israeli Arabs.

General Conditions of the two sides: 54% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the Palestinian territories as bad or very bad while only 22% of Israeli Jews and 34% of Israeli Arabs describe conditions in Israel in general as bad or very bad.

(4) Values and Goals

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Among Israeli Jews, Jewish majority is seen as the most important value (34%), followed by democracy (27%), peace (23%), and Greater Israel (14%). Among the Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital was seen as the most important value (46%), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (30%), building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (13%) and building a democratic political system (11%).

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