Search

Fateh-Hamas Agreement:

A Deal worth Nurturing 

Khalil Shikaki *

The agreement signed on 8 February by Fateh, represented by President Mahmud Abbas, and Hamas, represented by the head of its political bureau Khalid Mishal, in Mecca to form a national unity government represents a return in Palestinian political culture to the traditions of dialogue and consensus building that guided most of the history of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It represents recognition that neither Fateh nor Hamas, when acting alone, can deliver effective governance or enforcement of signed agreements with Israel. However, as in all previous efforts to moderate Palestinian politics, consensus building produces only limited and gradual, though steady progress. Instead of searching for faults in the text of the agreement, the international community needs to nurture it by fully engaging the national unity government. As the case was with the Palestinian nationalist movement in the 1970s and the 1980s, only such an engagement can create an environment conducive to more moderation.

Instead of demanding an iron-clad guarantee that the national unity government headed by a Hamas prime minister would fully commit itself to agreements signed by the PLO, President Abbas opted for the more ambiguous term of “respecting signed agreements.”  In Mecca, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas changed his hierarchy of priorities. Up until recently he viewed the immediate and complete lifting of financial sanctions and diplomatic boycott as his top priority. Now, however, aborting civil war became his top priority. Moreover, the Saudi role was important: political support of the country closest to the US means that the US reaction could not be very hostile even if it did not like the agreement. Maintaining Saudi-American alliance in the face of terrorism and Iranian threat, he probably calculated, would prevent the US from rejecting the deal outright.

But as importantly, Abbas is not Arafat, the man who turned Palestinian politics in the second half of the 1990 into authoritarianism. He could not rule by dictate. As he did when he was first elected in January 2005, Abbas sought Hamas’s cooperation in arranging a ceasefire with Israel by integrating it into the formal political process, an integration that eventually led to its electoral victory. But it was not the dictates of electoral politics that led to the Mecca Agreement; Hamas already has a 60% majority in the parliament. Instead, it was the recognition of both Fateh and Hamas that the alternative to mutual compromise is continued bloodshed. Consensus building, not electoral politics, will now dominate Palestinian politics. This is a positive development that needs to be encouraged because it is the most effective means of bringing Hamas into the larger Palestinian and international consensus on the need for a two-state solution to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

There are other reasons to view the Mecca Agreement positively. First, it is not a bad deal. Hamas dropped its insistence that the government's "respect" for PLO-Israel agreements and commitments be conditioned by its own definition of what is in Palestinian interest. The Mecca Agreement now "commits" the government to all PLO National Council and Arab Summit resolutions. This includes the National Council’s 19th session, referred to specifically in the Agreement, which explicitly endorses the two-state solution and recognizes the state of Israel. It also includes the Beirut Summit which endorsed the Saudi initiative with its conditional recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel. Second, without a deal, violence would have continued and public polarization increased. Israel would have been dragged into the conflict and Fateh would probably have lost out to Hamas in Gaza even if Abbas remains in control in the West Bank. Public opinion would not have been able to understand why Fateh and Abu Mazin rejected such a deal. Abu Mazin would have been weakened considerably and his ability to negotiate with Israel would have diminished.

Third, the agreement brings Fateh and its allies (like Salam Fayyad) to power in a power-sharing mechanism that does not give Hamas a majority vote. Yes, Hamas can bring the government down by a vote of no confidence, but by initiating such a process, it would be blamed for its outcome, i.e., civil war. Hamas is likely to think twice before voting the unity government out of office if it remains opposed to holding new elections. Control over money will be in the hands of Abu Mazin and Fayyad who enjoys the confidence of the US and Israel. Fourth, Abu Mazin will emerge much stronger domestically than before. In any area of cabinet responsibility, a disagreement in the government leaves Abu Mazin, the referee, in charge. This will apply most importantly to matters related to control over security services, but can also apply to conflicts related to the functioning of the judiciary, foreign policy, and public finance.

Fifth, Abu Mazin will emerge stronger in negotiations with Israel. While part of a national unity government with him, Hamas will not have a free hand to "frame" any deal he makes with Israel as "treason." Of course, this means he needs to bring Hamas into the consultation process, but this can only mean that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would become more rational.

Ultimately, this is a good deal because only a coalition of Fateh and Hamas has the capacity and willingness to enforce law and order domestically as well as a ceasefire with Israel. Most likely, it will quickly lead to the release of the imprisoned Israeli soldier and to the extension of the ceasefire to the West Bank. Only such a coalition has the capacity to neutralize Islamic Jihad, war lords, and other spoilers. Finally, at the regional level, the deal will reduce Hamas' ties with Iran and strengthen its ties with Saudi Arabia. Without Hamas on board, the ability of the Saudis to confront the threat of Iran and Shiites in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf would be reduced.

____________________________________________________________________

* Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah

The agreement signed on 8 February by Fateh, represented by President Mahmud Abbas, and Hamas, represented by the head of its political bureau Khalid Mishal, in Mecca to form a national unity government represents a return in Palestinian political culture to the traditions of dialogue and consensus building that guided most of the history of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It represents recognition that neither Fateh nor Hamas, when acting alone, can deliver effective governance or enforcement of signed agreements withIsrael. However, as in all previous efforts to moderate Palestinian politics, consensus building produces only limited and gradual, though steady progress. Instead of searching for faults in the text of the agreement, the international community needs to nurture it by fully engaging the national unity government. As the case was with the Palestinian nationalist movement in the 1970s and the 1980s, only such an engagement can create an environment conducive to more moderation.

Instead of demanding an iron-clad guarantee that the national unity government headed by a Hamas prime minister would fully commit itself to agreements signed by the PLO, President Abbas opted for the more ambiguous term of “respecting signed agreements.”  In Mecca, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas changed his hierarchy of priorities. Up until recently he viewed the immediate and complete lifting of financial sanctions and diplomatic boycott as his top priority. Now, however, aborting civil war became his top priority. Moreover, the Saudi role was important: political support of the country closest to the US means that the US reaction could not be very hostile even if it did not like the agreement. Maintaining Saudi-American alliance in the face of terrorism and Iranian threat, he probably calculated, would prevent the US from rejecting the deal outright.

But as importantly, Abbas is not Arafat, the man who turned Palestinian politics in the second half of the 1990 into authoritarianism. He could not rule by dictate. As he did when he was first elected in January 2005, Abbas sought Hamas’s cooperation in arranging a ceasefire with Israel by integrating it into the formal political process, an integration that eventually led to its electoral victory. But it was not the dictates of electoral politics that led to the Mecca Agreement; Hamas already has a 60% majority in the parliament. Instead, it was the recognition of both Fateh and Hamas that the alternative to mutual compromise is continued bloodshed. Consensus building, not electoral politics, will now dominate Palestinian politics. This is a positive development that needs to be encouraged because it is the most effective means of bringing Hamas into the larger Palestinian and international consensus on the need for a two-state solution to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

There are other reasons to view the Mecca Agreement positively. First, it is not a bad deal. Hamas dropped its insistence that the government's "respect" for PLO-Israel agreements and commitments be conditioned by its own definition of what is in Palestinian interest. The Mecca Agreement now "commits" the government to all PLO National Council and Arab Summit resolutions. This includes the National Council’s 19th session, referred to specifically in the Agreement, which explicitly endorses the two-state solution and recognizes the state of Israel. It also includes the Beirut Summit which endorsed the Saudi initiative with its conditional recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel. Second, without a deal, violence would have continued and public polarization increased. Israel would have been dragged into the conflict and Fateh would probably have lost out to Hamas in Gaza even if Abbas remains in control in the West Bank. Public opinion would not have been able to understand why Fateh and Abu Mazin rejected such a deal. Abu Mazin would have been weakened considerably and his ability to negotiate with Israel would have diminished.

Third, the agreement brings Fateh and its allies (like Salam Fayyad) to power in a power-sharing mechanism that does not give Hamas a majority vote. Yes, Hamas can bring the government down by a vote of no confidence, but by initiating such a process, it would be blamed for its outcome, i.e., civil war. Hamas is likely to think twice before voting the unity government out of office if it remains opposed to holding new elections. Control over money will be in the hands of Abu Mazin and Fayyad who enjoys the confidence of the US andIsrael. Fourth, Abu Mazin will emerge much stronger domestically than before. In any area of cabinet responsibility, a disagreement in the government leaves Abu Mazin, the referee, in charge. This will apply most importantly to matters related to control over security services, but can also apply to conflicts related to the functioning of the judiciary, foreign policy, and public finance.

Fifth, Abu Mazin will emerge stronger in negotiations with Israel. While part of a national unity government with him, Hamas will not have a free hand to "frame" any deal he makes with Israel as "treason." Of course, this means he needs to bring Hamas into the consultation process, but this can only mean that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would become more rational.

Ultimately, this is a good deal because only a coalition of Fateh and Hamas has the capacity and willingness to enforce law and order domestically as well as a ceasefire with Israel. Most likely, it will quickly lead to the release of the imprisoned Israeli soldier and to the extension of the ceasefire to the West Bank. Only such a coalition has the capacity to neutralize Islamic Jihad, war lords, and other spoilers. Finally, at the regional level, the deal will reduce Hamas' ties with Iran and strengthen its ties with Saudi Arabia. Without Hamas on board, the ability of the Saudis to confront the threat of Iran and Shiites in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf would be reduced.

PressRelease  

Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU).

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

• A majority of Israelis (55%) and a large minority of Palestinians (44%) support the two-state solution. By contrast, support for a one-state solution stands at 36% among Palestinians, 19% among Israeli Jews and 56% among Israeli Arabs.
• Support for a detailed permanent agreement package, one based on previous rounds of negotiations, is lower than the support for the two-state solution. Only 42% of Palestinians, 41% of  Israeli Jews, and 88% of Israeli Arabs support a peace agreement package that comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, a family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims.
• A quarter to one-third of  Israelis and Palestinians who oppose the permanent agreement package are willing to  reconsider their opposition to the peace deal if it was accompanied by a peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Initiative's  principles (for the Israeli public), and an Israeli acceptance of that initiative (for the Palestinian public).  This incentive alone increases the overall support for the combined package on both sides, up to 57% to 59%, when those who changed their minds are added to the original supporters. While some of the incentives presented to those who opposed the package manage to change the attitude of fewer people, others, including non-zero sum ones, presented separately to each side, are able to change the attitude of many more people, 40% and above of the opposition, thereby considerably increasing the support to the combined package to much higher levels, up to 65% on both sides.  
• In selecting between bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral approaches to peacemaking, Palestinians prefer the multilateral (51%) while the Israelis prefer the bilateral (61%). Of various multilateral forums, an Arab forum, in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate, is the least rejected by the two sides. All other multilateral forums – an American-led, an EU-led, a US-Russian led, or an UN-led forum –  are acceptable to one side while unacceptable to the other.
• Two-thirds of the Israelis and more than three quarters of the Palestinians view US President Donald Trump as pro-Israel. Moreover, a minority on both sides, 28% of Israeli Jews and 10% of Palestinians, think he will seek to renew peace negotiations
• Large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians estimate as low the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.

The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 8 and 10, 2016. Number of interviewees in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 830 and in the Gaza Strip 440. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1,207 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 19 and 30, 2016. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 727, West Bank settlers 300, and Israeli Arabs 180. Size of Israeli settlers and Israeli Arabs was deliberately increased in order to allow for detailed analysis of their attitudes. But the combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these two groups in the Israeli society. The data file was further reweighted to reflect current societal religious-secular division. The margin of error is 3%.  The following summary has been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki and Walid Ladadwa from PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provided the respective findings for these sub groups.  

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Two-state solution, one-state solution, and two-state confederation: Today, a majority of Israelis and a large minority of Palestinians– 55% of Israelis (50% among Jews and 82% among Arabs) and 44% of Palestinians – support what is known as the two-state solution in a general question testing the concept, but without giving specific details about an agreement. Six months ago, in June 2016, 59% of Israelis (53% among Jews and 87% among Arabs) and 51% of Palestinians supported that solution. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view on their side and on the other side regarding this solution. Findings indicate that that the Israelis underestimate and incorrectly assess the level of support for this solution on their side while the Palestinians correctly estimate the level of support on their side: only 26% of the Israelis said the majority of their own public supports while 63% of the Israelis said the majority opposes it; among the Palestinians, 41% said a majority supports and 53% said a majority opposes it. But while the Israelis correctly estimate the level of support for the concept of the two-state solution on the other side, the Palestinians underestimate the level of support for that solution among the Israelis: only 33% of the Palestinians believe the majority of Israelis supports that solution and 38% of the Israelis believe the majority of Palestinians supports it.  However, wide majorities are skeptical about the implementation of such a solution. Over 80% of Israeli Jews and 72% of Palestinians do not believe a Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.

The joint poll sought to ascertain the current level of support for the idea of a one-state solution “by which Palestinians and Jews will be citizens of the same state and enjoy equal rights.” Support for the idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 56%). Only a minority among Palestinians (36%) and among Israeli Jews (19%) support this option (although 26% of settlers supported the one-state solution). When we asked Israeli Jews if they are for or against the annexation of the West Bank without granting the Palestinians their full citizen rights, two thirds said they are against it and only 31% said they support it. Forty-six percent of settlers supported annexation without full rights for Palestinians (almost precisely the same portion, 45%, of settlers are opposed).

We also sought to assess the level of support for the idea of a confederation between the state of Israel and the state of Palestine whereby citizens of one country would be free to reside in the territory of the other and live under its own laws and where two the states jointly decide on matters of political, security and economic policy. As the case in the one-state solution, support for the confederation idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 74%, significantly higher than Israeli Arab support for a one-state solution). But only a minority of Palestinians (34%) and Israeli Jews (20%) support the idea.

Permanent status package: For the second time in six months, we presented Palestinians and Israelis with a detailed combined package of a permanent settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and asked them if they would support or oppose each of its components and the combined package. Findings show that the level of support for the package has increased slightly on both sides: 48% of the Israelis (41% among Israeli Jews and 88% among Israeli Arabs) and 42% of the Palestinians (40% among West Bankers and 46% among Gazans) support the combined package. Six months ago, only 39% of Israeli Jews and 39% of Palestinians supported the package. Current findings indicate that the majority on both sides, 56% of Israeli Jews and 55% of Palestinians, continue to oppose the combined package, if offered to them without any other additional incentives (see below the section on incentives).

A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the package follows:

1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis and Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side: a minority among the Palestinians (43%) and a majority among the Israelis (69%; 66% among Israeli Jews and 84% among Israeli Arabs) supported this item.

2. A demilitarized independent Palestinian state will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: a minority of Palestinians (22%; 29% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) and a majority (56%) among Israelis supported this item.

3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides: among the Palestinians, a minority (42%) supported it, and among the Israelis, a majority (53%) supported it.

4. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years: on both sides only a minority supported this item: on the Palestinian side 35% (29% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) and among the Israelis, 44% (42% among Israeli Jews and 57% among Israeli Arabs).

5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlements, which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements: a minority (37%) among the Palestinians (33% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip), and 50% among the Israelis supported it (among the Israeli Jews 48% supported it).

6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel: minorities on both sides (31%) among the Palestinians (34% in the Gaza Strip and 29% in the West Bank) and 47% of Israelis supported it. (The Israeli Jews were split: 45% supported it while 48% opposed it).

7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state: again, minorities – among the Palestinian 27% and among the Israelis 36% (29% among Israeli Jews and 76% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Western Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty: a minority (28%) among Palestinians and a similar minority (37%) among Israelis (33% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated: among the Palestinians, 52% (50% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) supported it and among the Israelis, 30% (20% among Israeli Jews and 81% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

It is worth noting that among Israeli Jews, support for the combined package among settlers stands at 16% compared to 42% among non-settlers. Support is much higher among Israeli Jews who define themselves as secular, standing at 61% compared to 34% among traditionalists (masortim), 9% among the religious, and 10% among the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox). Secular people make up the plurality of Israeli Jews, with roughly 45%; about one-third of Jews are traditional, and under one-quarter are religious (orthodox) or Haredi. Among Israelis, support also varies depending on where respondents place themselves on the right-left political continuum: Among Jews, 89% of the left, 47% of the center, and 18% of the right support the package.

Among the Palestinians, as we saw six months ago, support for the combined package is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. But it is worth pointing out however that the findings show no difference in support between refugees and non-refugees (43% and 42% respectively). Nonetheless, residents of refugee camps (estimated to be less than 60% of all refugees) are the least supportive of the combined package, standing at 38% compared to 42% among residents of cities and 49% in rural areas. Moreover, support for the package is higher among those who define themselves as “not religious” and “somewhat religious” (64% and 47%) compared to those who define themselves as religious (35%); and among Fatah voters (64%) compared to Hamas voters (21%).

Beyond this regular demographic and political differences that typically signify support or opposition to peace, background attitudes also affect support. Among Israelis who believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution, support for the combined package is higher than among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians opposes that solution (53% to 33%). These comparisons are closely similar to those found in our previous joint poll six months ago. As in the Israeli case, support for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians who believe that a majority of Israelis supports the two-state solution compared to those who believe that an Israeli majority is opposed to that solution (52% vs. 34%).

Peace Incentives: Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible.” For this end, we offered those who opposed the package various incentives in an attempt to understand the source of their opposition and the extent to which change was possible. Israeli Jews opposed to the package (56% of the total Jewish sample) were offered eight different incentives and Palestinians and Israeli Arabs opposed to the package (55% of all Palestinians, and 9% of the Israeli Arabs) were offered seven incentives in total. Only three of the incentives offered to the two sides were identical or almost identical. The remaining incentives sought to address either presumed Palestinian or Israeli concerns.  In this regard, it should be noted that Israeli Arabs were offered the same four distinct incentives offered to the Palestinian respondents. Below is a detailed breakdown of the responses to the various incentives:

Israeli Incentives (offered only to those Israeli Jews and Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):

1. And if the Jews who left their homes and property in the Arab countries when they had to leave following the 1948 War and the establishment of the state of Israel will be compensated for the lost assets left behind? 40% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

2. And if the Palestinians acknowledge the historic and religious links between Jews and historic Palestine? 34% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment. 

3. What if the agreement includes recognition by the Palestinian state of Israel as a Jewish state? 32% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

4. And if the agreement would include peace with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 30% of Israeli Jews and 13% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept package if it included this amendment.

5. And if free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was assured? 24% of Israeli Jews and 50% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

6. And if the agreement guarantees that Israelis are guaranteed free access to holy sites in Jerusalem and other places? 23% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

7. And if settlers are allowed to choose to stay in their homes after the Israeli withdrawal, to keep their Israeli citizenship and at the same time have their safety guaranteed by the Palestinian state? 21% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

8. And if the holy sites are not under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty but are placed under the custody of a multi-national committee made up of Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US? 10% of Israeli Jews and 31% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

In short, on the Israeli Jewish side a minority ranging between 10% and 40% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it were certain conditions to be met. On the Israeli Arab side, 13% to 50% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it based on the incentives offered to both Jews and Arab Israelis.  

Palestinian incentives in addition to the combined package (offered only to Palestinians/Israeli Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):  

• 1. And if Palestinian laborers can freely work in Israel after the establishment of the Palestinian state?  44% of Palestinians and 47% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

  2. And if the state of Israel acknowledges the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine?  44% of Palestinians and 38% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

  3. And if refugees in camps in the Palestinian state are compensated and provided with homes and land in which they can be settled and rehabilitated? 42% of Palestinians and 56% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

  4. And if free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was assured?  40% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

  5. And if the peace agreement between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel is based on a long term hudna between the two sides? 34% of Palestinians and 31% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment;.

  6. If Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty?  28% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

  7. And if the holy sites are not under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty but are placed under the custody of a multi-national committee made up of Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US?  19% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

  In short, on the Palestinian side, a minority ranging between 19% and 44% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it. On the Israeli Arab side, 31% to 56% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it.

As the findings detailed above indicate, of the three identical or almost identical incentives, a broader regional peace involving the Arab World and Israel is the least mutually opposed, as 30% of Israeli Jews and 28% of Palestinians who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept a package with this amendment. This incentive alone increases the level of support for it among Palestinians from the initial 42% to 57% and among Israeli Jews from the initial 41% to 58%. Of the distinct Palestinian incentives, three proved highly effective leading 42% to 44% of the opposition to change its view and accept the package: access to Israeli labor market for Palestinian laborers, an Israeli acknowledgement of the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine, and granting refugees homes and land in the Palestinian state.  On the Israeli side, the most effective incentive, reversing the attitude of 40% of the opposition, proved to be the compensation of Jews from Arab countries for the lost assets left behind. On both sides, gestures of symbolic recognition of their historical attachment, identity and experience are among the more powerful motivator for changing attitudes in support of the package.  

Bilateral vs. multilateral approaches: We explored issues related to the process of peacemaking, specifically the most effective or “most promising” approaches to reviving Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the role of outside actors. In selecting between two possible approaches, bilateral and multilateral, findings show that Palestinians and Israeli Arabs prefer the multilateral, while the Israeli Jews prefer bilateral between the Israeli government and the Palestinians.

Among the Palestinians (51%) and among the Israeli Arabs (52%) preferred a multilateral forum in which major powers sponsor the negotiations, while only 27% of the Israelis Jews preferred this approach. Only 29% of the Palestinians preferred bilateral negotiations while 61% of the Israeli Jews preferred this approach.

We also sought a deeper understanding of Israeli and Palestinian views of the multilateral approach. Five models of this approach were presented to the two publics: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led peace process; 3) an EU-led peace process; 4) a UN-led peace process; 5) and finally, a US-Russian-led peace process. Findings show that Palestinians are most receptive to the first, or Arab regional, approach (31%) followed by a UN and an EU approaches (14% and 13% respectively); 7% selected the US-Russian peace process. Only 4% preferred a US-led effort. Israeli Jews preferred a US-led peace process (32%) followed by the regional approach and a US-Russian approach (18% each). The two other approaches, a UN-led process and EU-led process were selected by 5% and 4% of the Israeli Jewish public, respectively. Among Israelis Arabs, equal support (17%) went to an EU-led process, a UN-led process, and a regional process.

The Trump Administration: Our findings show that two thirds of the Israeli Jews (69%) and more than three quarters of Palestinians (77%) believe that Donald Trump is pro-Israel; 18% of the Israeli Jews and 8% of the Palestinians think he is neutral.  We asked the two sides to tell us what they expect Trump to do about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Only 28% of Israeli Jews (still a plurality, with the highest score relative to other options offered) and 10% of Palestinians think the new US president will seek to renew peace negotiations and smaller percentages (16% of Israeli Jews and 8% of the Palestinians) think he will seek to impose a solution on both sides. But almost half of the Palestinians (47%) and a quarter of all Israelis (27%) think he will side with one side against the other while 19% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians think he will do nothing.

Role of Israeli Arabs in the peace process: In assessing the role of Israeli Arabs in the peace process, we asked the two sides to tell us how they view them: as Israelis or Palestinians, or both. While 63% of the Palestinians view them as Palestinians, only 23% of Israeli Jews view them as such. Among Israeli Arabs, 31% said they view themselves as Palestinians. Only 10% of Palestinians compared to 41% of Israeli Jews and 27% of Israeli Arabs view them as Israelis. About one quarter (24%) of the Palestinians and 34% of Israeli Jews, and 37% of Israeli Arabs view them as both (Palestinians and Israelis). We also asked both sides to speculate about the manner in which Israeli Arabs view the PLO and its role in the peace process: do Israeli Arabs see it as representing them and all other Palestinians or do they see it as representing other Palestinians only? About half the Palestinians (49%) think that Israeli Arabs view the PLO as their representative as well as the representative of all Palestinians with only 41% thinking that they view it as representing other Palestinians only. By contrast, about half of the Israeli Jews (49%) think that Israeli Arabs view the PLO as representing other Palestinians only; 32% of Israeli Jews think Israeli Arabs view the PLO as their representative. Israeli Arabs think the same as Israeli Jews: 63% believe that Israeli Arabs see the PLO as representing other Palestinians only; 21% believe that they see it as their representative.

Bottom-up peace efforts: We asked the two sides for their assessment of the effectiveness of grassroots movements and religious leaders in putting pressure on leaders to pursue peace. Over two-thirds of the Israeli Jewish respondents (69%) think that groups such as “Women Wage Peace” are not effective but 53% think religious leaders are. Israeli Arabs think differently when it comes to groups such as “Women Wage Peace”: 68% think they are effective. But they think the same as the Israeli Jews when it comes to religious leaders: 61% think they are effective. Among the Palestinians 49% think peace groups are not effective and 41% think they are; and 47% think men of religion are not effective and 46% think they are.

Violence and countering violence: We asked Palestinians if they support or oppose attacks, such as stabbings, on Israeli civilians: 49% opposed such attacks and 47% supported them. Opposition to such attacks in the West Bank (60%) is twice as much as it is in the Gaza Strip (30%). Although the difference could be partly explained by the fact that West Bank residents experience Israeli retaliatory measures, Palestinians are likely to deny the effects. When Palestinian respondents were asked about the deterrent effect of the Israeli measures, such as home demolitions, used against the families of the attackers, more than three quarters (78%; 84% among West Bankers and 69% among Gazans) answered that such measures do not deter potential attackers. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view among the Palestinians regarding such attacks. Findings indicate that a majority on both sides (53% among the Palestinians and 52% among Israeli Jews) think a majority of Palestinians support them. We asked Israeli Jews if they support harsh policies (such as prolonged closures or curfews) against all residents of a village of town from which Palestinians attacked with knives or committed other violent acts against Israelis. A majority of Israeli Jews (58%) support such harsh measures and 38% oppose them.

We asked the two sides whether they have met or talked to each other and how they view the other. Issues raised included wanting peace, trust, fear, and how good or bad their current conditions are. But we also asked them how they view the nature of the conflict, in zero sum terms, or with some openness towards the other side. While the picture that emerges is discouraging, there are nonetheless, a few glimmers of hope.

Talking to each other:  Palestinians and Israelis were asked if they have talked with each other during the past few months: 12% of Palestinians said they have talked to Israelis, other than soldiers and settlers, and 23% of Israeli Jews and 78% of Israeli Arabs said that they have talked to Palestinians.  Among the Palestinians, 71% said the talk with the Israelis was pleasant and 95% of the Israeli Jews and the Israeli Arabs indicated the same.

Want Peace: 38% of the Palestinians and 41% of the Israeli Jews agree with a statement that the other side wants peace; 79% among Israeli Arabs agree that Palestinians want peace and 53% agree that Israeli Jews want peace.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: The most disturbing, but not surprising, finding relates to the question of trust. Among Palestinians a solid majority (86%) feel Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. On the Israeli Jewish side, a somewhat smaller majority (71%) also indicated that Palestinians cannot be trusted. Among Israeli Arabs, two-thirds (67%) indicated that Palestinians can be trusted. Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 51% of Israeli Jews, 48% of Israeli Arabs, and 68% of Palestinians agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization. As with various other questions in the survey, young Israeli Jews show higher levels of hardline thinking and distrust than other groups: among 18-34 year old Jews, 59% agree with the zero-sum statement, compared to 43% among Jews aged 35-54.

Fear: We asked Palestinians and Israeli Jews about fear of each other. Among Israeli Jews, 66% indicate they feel fear toward the Palestinians but among the Palestinians, only 43% indicate that they fear Israeli Jews. When asked about fear of Israeli soldiers and armed settlers 52% of Palestinians replied in the affirmative.   We also asked Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs about fear of each other: 48% of the Jews feel fear toward Israeli Arabs while 82% of Israeli Arabs do not feel fear toward Israeli Jews. Jews living as settlers in the West Bank are more fearful of both Palestinians and of Israeli Arabs, relative to Jews inside Israel – 72% of settlers are afraid of Palestinians, and 60% are afraid of Israeli Arabs.

General Conditions of the two sides: 54% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the Palestinian territories as bad or very bad while only 22% of Israeli Jews and 34% of Israeli Arabs describe conditions in Israel in general as bad or very bad.

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Among Israeli Jews, Jewish majority is seen as the most important value (34%), followed by democracy (27%), peace (23%), and Greater Israel (14%). Among the Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital was seen as the most important value (46%), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (30%), building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (13%) and building a democratic political system (11%).

PressRelease   Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU), the Netherland Representative Office in Ramallah, and the UNDP/PAPP on behalf of the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine..

PressRelease  

Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU), the Netherland Representative Office in Ramallah, and the UNDP/PAPP on behalf of the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine..

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

●  Support for the two-state solution stands at 46% among Palestinians and Israeli Jews.  In June 2017, 53% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews supported that solution. Among Israeli Arabs, support for the two-state solution stands today at 83%.

●  Still, fewer people on both sides support three possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights, one state without rights, and expulsion or “transfer.”

●  Only 40% of Palestinians (compared to 43% in June 2017) and 35% of Israeli Jews (a three-point increase from the June survey) support a permanent peace agreement package, along with 85% of Israeli Arabs – typical of the high level support from Israeli Arabs in previous surveys. In total, 43% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims. Forty-eight percent of Israelis (55% of Israeli Jews) and 57% of Palestinians are opposed to the two-state comprehensive package.

●  The skepticism about the package appears closely related to serious doubts about feasibility. Palestinians and Israelis are both divided almost equally about whether a two-state solution is still possible, or whether settlements have expanded too much to make it viable. Among all Israelis, nearly half believes the solution is still viable (48%), while 42% think settlements have spread too much for it to be viable, although among Jews more think it is not viable (46% compared to 42% who think it is). Among Palestinians, 60% say the two-state solution is no longer viable (an eight-point increase), while 37% think it is. But fully 75% and 73% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, respectively, do not expect a Palestinian state to be established in the next five years.

●  Despite the majority rejection of the two-state implementation package, their opposition can be shifted significantly based on added policy incentives. For example, 44% of Jews who are opposed would change their minds if the Palestinian government commits itself to ongoing security cooperation like today, including sharing intelligence with Israeli security forces, preventing attacks and arresting terror suspects – bringing total support to a 59% majority.  Among  Palestinians who are opposed to the package, 39% would change their minds to support the agreement if Israel recognized the Nakba and the suffering of refugees and provides compensation to the refugees. When the Palestinians who change their minds for this item are added to original supporters, 62% support the agreement.

●  When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 26% of the Palestinians and 38% of Israeli Jews choose “reach a peace agreement.” However, in a departure from previous attitudes 38% of Palestinians (compared to just over one-fifth last June) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 18% (compared to 12% last June) called for “a definitive war with the Palestinians.”

The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 7-10 December, 2017. The number of interviewees in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 830 and in the Gaza Strip 440. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between 29 November to 14 December, 2017. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 650, West Bank settlers100, and Israeli Arabs 150. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is 3%.  It should be noted that the entire Palestinian survey was conducted immediately after the announcement by President Donald Trump that the US recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and during a period of limited Palestinian-Israeli confrontations. Most of the Israeli data was collected prior to the declaration, and about 20% of the sample responded immediately following. The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provide the respective findings for these sub groups. 

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Two-state solution: In the current survey, less than half of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, (46% each), support the two-state solution. Last June, 52% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews supported this solution, when described as a general principle, without details.  Fifty-one percent of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews are opposed; the remainder declined to give an answer. Among Israeli Arabs, support remains solid at 83%, bringing the total Israeli average to 52%. Among Israeli settlers, support stands today at 20% and 79% are opposed. As seen in the graph below, among Jews, support for the two-state principles has seen an incremental but steady decline since June 2016, when it stood at 53%. Among Palestinians support has varied: it fell from June to December 2016, when 44% supported the basic two-state solution in principle, rose to 52% last June, then declined once again. Unlike previous findings, support for the two-state solution among Palestinians is higher in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (44%). Last June 61% of Gazans came out in favor of a two-state solution compared to 48% among West Bankers.

Among Israelis, as in the past, the significant variations are found among demographic groups defined by religious observance and age. Secular Israeli Jews show a majority who support two states, 63%, compared to less than one-quarter of religious Jews (23%). Among Jewish Israelis, support is lowest among the youngest group, and rises with age – thus among the youngest Jews, 18-24 years old, just 27% support this, and just 37% among the 25-34 group – compared to a 54% majority among those whose age is 55 years or over.

Perceptions of public support. When asked if they believe their own societies support the two-state solution, 27% of Israeli Jews believe the majority of Israelis support it, almost unchanged from June, and 57% believe the majority opposes it; thus perceptions of their society are inaccurately weighted towards rejection, rather than the reality of evenly divided opinions. Among Israeli Arabs, 32% think that most Israeli Jews support the principle of a two-state solution, a 19-points decrease when compared to the June findings.

Palestinian perception of their own side’s position has changed during the past six months. Today 42%, compared to 48% last June, believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution and 52%, compared to 45% last June, think a majority opposes it.

Regarding attitudes towards the other side, the portion of Palestinians who think Israeli Jews support the two-state solution is declining: 39% of Palestinians, compared to 42% last June, think the majority of Jewish Israelis support this solution and 50%, compared to 45% last June, think they oppose it. Among Israeli Jews, just one-third believe Palestinians support the two-state solution.

Declining support linked to low perceived feasibility. To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two-state solution. These findings help to explain why large portions are skeptical and Palestinian attitudes have shifted in this poll. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 4% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years. Fully 75% of Palestinians, compared to 71% last June, say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews a similarly large majority of 73% think the chances are low or very low, 53% of Israeli Arabs take this view, and the weighted average for all Israelis is 70% who do not believe a Palestinian state will be established in that time. The remainder, fewer than one-fifth of Israelis and Palestinians, say the chances are “medium.”

Further, the view that the two-state solution is no longer even feasible is increasingly widespread in general social and public discourse. We tested this belief directly, asking respondents on both sides whether settlements have expanded too much, making a two-state solution impossible, or whether settlements can still be dismantled or evacuated and therefore the solution is still viable. Among Palestinians, a majority of 60% believes the solution is no longer viable, an eight-point rise compared to 52% last June. The rate is higher in the West Bank, 62%, compared to 56% of Gaza residents. The increased pessimism among Palestinians regarding the viability of the two-state solution is probably linked to the announcement by President Trump in which he recognized Jerusalem as the capital of the state on Israel. The Israelis on the other hand are once again divided: 48% among all Israelis think the solution is still viable, and a smaller portion, 42% think it is not. But among Jews, attitudes have shifted from June: at present a plurality believe the two-state solution is not viable, 46%, while 42% think it is. Six months earlier, the trend was reversed: 49% of Jews said it was still viable, and 43% said it was not. Among Arab Israeli respondents, three quarters believe this solution is still viable (74%).

            Peace and violence. Unlike our June findings which showed remarkable similarities between Palestinians and Israeli Jews regarding what should happen next, the current survey shows the Palestinians moving away from their preference for a peace agreement, to growing support for waging an armed struggle. This is also likely the result of President Trump’s statement regarding Jerusalem. While a plurality of Israelis continues to support a peace agreement, findings show a slight decrease in support for peace and a similar increase in preference for violence. As indicated earlier, part of the Israeli fieldwork took place after the Trump announcement and during a period of rising tensions and confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis. When given four options for what should happen next, only 26% of Palestinians, compared to 45% last June, said there should be a peace agreement, while 38%, compared to 21% in the previous survey, chose armed struggle. Among the Israelis, the plurality (38%) chose peace (still a decline compared to 45% last June) compared to 19% who chose “a definitive war,” against Palestinians. Last June only 12% opted for the war option.

Three competing alternatives to the two-state solution: One state with equal rights, one state without equal rights (apartheid), and expulsion or “transfer”

The joint poll sought to ascertain the breakdown of Palestinians and Israelis regarding various alternatives to the two-state solution. Three alternative options were offered: (1) one state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians (one state), (2) one state solution in which one side or the other is denied equal rights (apartheid),  (3) a single state in which the other side is “transferred” or expelled from the entire territory of historic or Mandatory Palestine (expulsion). For options two and three, Israeli Arabs were asked the same questions asked of Palestinians, i.e., in which rights of Jews are denied in the second option and expulsion is applied to Jews in the third option.

The findings show a high level of overlap: in other words, a single respondent often supported more than one of the three alternative options. In the following analysis we sought to identify a “core constituency” for each alternative option: i.e., the greatest number of respondents who would support the most desirable response – for the purposes of this analysis, the two-state solution – even if they support other responses, since policymakers can count on their support for two states. We then quantified the greatest number who supported the second-best option, but who would not support the two-state solution, and so on for the third and least desirable options.

To explain how this was done - in the first stage of the analysis, respondents who support a two-state solution are removed from the constituencies that support any of the other alternatives. In a second stage, those who support a one-state solution are removed from the constituencies that support either or both of the remaining two alternatives, apartheid and expulsion. In the final stage, we separate the remaining two groups by removing those who support apartheid from the constituency that supports expulsion. 

As the two pies below show, the largest constituency is the one that supports the two-state solution. Once those respondents are excluded from the sample and the remaining public is assigned one alternative at a time, the public splits almost equally on each side, between the three alternatives without any one emerging as the most preferred. The category called “other” refers to respondents who either rejected all options or responded “do not know.” These findings are similar to those of June with two main differences: (1) those Palestinians who abandoned the two-state solution (46% support it at present, compared to 53% in June), shifted to the “other’ category, which increased from 11% to 18%. (2) On the Israelis side, support for the “apartheid” option decreased by 4 points from 15% to 11%.

On the Palestinian side, there is minimal difference between Gazans and West Bankers in their preferences for the two-state solution and its three alternatives. But gaps do emerge when looking at the political affiliation or vote preferences, with supporters of Fatah emerging as the only group that has a majority support for the two-state solution followed by the unaffiliated with about half supporting it.  Surprisingly, as in the previous survey, support among Hamas voters for the two-state solution emerges as the largest group, followed by expulsion.

A similar examination of the Israeli Jewish side shows that support for the two-state solution is highest only among secular and traditional Jews, but not among the religious. The latter prefer one equal state over all other and prefer the two-state and the expulsion options equally) and the Ultra-Orthodox (who also prefer the one equal state solution over all other followed by the two-state). But when looking at the political spectrum, support for the two-state solution is higher than all others among almost all groups, including those who define themselves as “moderate right.” Only among those who self-define as simply “right,” which can be considered firm right-wingers, two states and one equal state constituencies are tied with 20% each, while the expulsion group is largest. (The size of firm right category is 29% of the Jewish sample.)

Finally, when looking at Israeli Arabs, as the pie below shows, support for the two-state solution, as indicated above, is overwhelming, followed by support for the one state solution. This means that, as in the case of Israeli Jews and Palestinians, once the overlap in the Israeli Arab sample is removed, little support remains for the other two alternatives. There are no Israeli Arabs who support expulsion or apartheid, who do not also support a more moderate option.

Confederation: For the third time, we tested an alternative to the traditional two-state solution in the form of a confederation between two states. The confederation alternative was described as follows:

“Some people recommend the following solution: the creation of two states, Palestine and Israel, which enter into a confederation whereby citizens of one country are allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of the other but each national group votes only in its state for elections. There would be freedom of movement for all, and Jerusalem is not divided but serves as the capital of two states. Israel and Palestine would deal jointly with security and the economy..  

Support for the confederation concept is higher this time than it was in June 2017 and in December 2016, with 33% of Israeli Jews, a 7-point increase from June and 13-point increase from last December.

By contrast, Palestinian attitudes towards the confederation idea declined nine points, from 37% to 28% in six months, with 64% opposition – reflecting the general decline in supportive attitudes among Palestinians in the current survey. As is the case for the two-state solutions, support for the confederation idea is highest among Israeli Arabs, at 70%, with 25% opposed.

Separately we also tested one specific element that characterizes confederation or a semi-separation approach. The survey asked Israelis and Palestinians if they support each side being allowed “to live in the other state as permanent residents, if they are law abiding, and they will only vote in their own national parliament.” Among Palestinians, 38% are in favor (40% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) and 58% are opposed. Among Israeli Jews, findings are similar, with 40% in favor and 50% opposed (with one-quarter, 26%, of Jewish settlers supporting this). But Israeli Arabs show an overwhelming support (84%) for the idea, bringing the total average Israeli support to 47%.

Detailed package for implementation  

Palestinians and Israelis were then asked to support or oppose a detailed combined package of a permanent settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. They responded first to each item separately, as component parts; following nine such items they were asked if they support or opposed the combined package, and given a short summary of the basic elements. Among Palestinians, reflecting the decline in support for the general concept of the two-state solution, we found that support for the overall package declines from 43% in June to 40% today. Support among West Bankers increased slightly to from 40% to 42% while in the Gaza Strip, support plummeted considerably from half in June to 35% in the current poll. Among all Israelis, 43% support this package: 35% among Israeli Jews and 85% among Israeli Arabs. Six months ago, 32% of Israeli Jews and 83% of Israeli Arabs supported the package – at that time, the Israeli average was 41% support, thus the current survey shows little change.  

In the current survey, 54% of Jews inside the Green Line and 77% of settlers oppose this package (55% for all Israeli Jews, compared to 61% six months ago). 57% of Palestinians, compared to 54% six months ago, oppose the combined package.

Items of an agreement. A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the package follows (non-italicized questions were asked of Israeli Jews and if no other wording appears, also for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Italics refer to the questions worded separately for Palestinians; some of the Palestinian wordings were used for Israeli Arabs):

1.    Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side. 59% of Israeli Jews support this, including 40% of West Bank settlers.

Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side. 41%, of Palestinians support mutual recognition, 45% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip. 85% of Israeli Arabs support mutual recognition.

2.     The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry). Only 20% of Palestinians support this, and more than three-quarters (77%) oppose the demilitarized state. Among Israeli Jews, 56% support this item; a nearly-identical percentage of Israeli Arabs (55%) support it. 

3.     A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Among Palestinians, 36% support this. Israeli Jews were divided, with 48% for and 45% against this item; among Israeli Arabs, 69% supported it.

4.     The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. 30% of Palestinians support this (40% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank). Among Israeli Jews, 38% support this, and among Israeli Arabs 56% support it.

5.     The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. 34% of Palestinians support this, 39% among Gazans and 31% among West Bankers. 37% of Israeli Jews support this and just 12% of settlers (85% are opposed). 71% of Arabs support this item.

6.     The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel. Just a little over a quarter of Palestinians (27%) support the territorial exchange. 35% of Israeli Jews support this, and 68% of Israeli Arabs, with settlers showing nearly the same breakdown as the previous item.

7.     West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Less than a quarter (23%) of Jews support this item, and only 5% among West Bank settlers. 

East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of the Israel. 26% of Palestinians support this, with very little distinction between West Bank and Gazan respondents. 71% of Israeli Arabs support this item.

8.     In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. 28% of Israeli Jews support the Old City arrangement, with 66% opposed.

In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian quarters and al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. Here again, just over one-quarter (26%) of Palestinians support the division of the Old City, with only small differences between Gaza and the West Bank. 71%of Palestinians are opposed to this item. Almost two-thirds of Israeli Arabs support this (65%).

9.     Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.  A majority of Palestinians support this, 52%, and 45% are opposed. This item shows some difference between Gazans – with 57% support – and West Bankers, with 50% support. This item receives the lowest support from Israeli Jews out of all the items tested: 19% support the arrangement on refugees, while 74% are opposed, and 92% - essentially a consensus among West Bank settlers. Israeli Arabs show the opposite trend: 85% support it, with 13% opposed.

Perception of social support for package. On both sides, respondents also perceive their own society’s support for the plan to be low. Palestinians are more likely to say that among other Palestinians the majority supports the plan – 37% believe this, compared to 40% of Palestinians who actually support it – a slight difference. Over half (56%) of Palestinians believe the majority of Palestinians oppose it – close to the reality of 57%. Among Israeli Jews, however, a high portion accurately believe the majority rejects the agreement: 62%. Although 35% of Israeli Jews support the plan, only 19% believe that the majority supports it.

It is interesting to note that among Israeli Jews, a higher portion think Palestinians would accept the combined package, than those who think the majority of Jews support it: 29% say that the majority of Palestinians support the package. Among the Palestinians 37% think the majority of Israelis support the package – the same percentage who believe their own side has majority support.

Regional and demographic trends. Unlike all three previous surveys that asked about this package, support in Gaza is lower than that in the West Bank (35% to 42% respectively) – in the past support has been higher in Gaza. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that only minor differences exist between refugees and non-refugees (38% and 41% respectively). Support for the package drops to 34% among Palestinians between the ages of 18 and 22 years compared to all other age groups where support ranges between 40%-41%. Although young Jewish respondents are often more hard-line than older people, as seen earlier regarding the general two-state solution, in this survey support for the package varies only minimally by age among Jews.

Among Palestinians and Israelis, support for the package is higher among those who are less religious, and lower among those who are more religious. Among Palestinians who define themselves as “not religious” and “somewhat religious” nearly half (47% and 46%, respectively) support the package compared to those who define themselves as religious (32%). Fatah voters support the package with a large majority (58%) compared to only 28% among Hamas voters and 35% among supporters of other factions or third parties.

Just 21% of Israeli settlers support the full package, the same as among religious Jews. Slightly higher support is found among traditional Jews (27%) and the ultra-Orthodox (33%). The findings reflect a very consistent religious-secular divide, with 44% of secular Jews in favor of the full package. (A second demographic divide is found between younger and older Jews: 30% of the 18-22 year old Jews support the package, compared to 35%-36% among older age groups.) 

Among all Israelis, with Jews and Arabs combined, support varies most of all depending on where respondents place themselves on the right-left political continuum: over two-thirds, 68%, of those who consider themselves left-wing support the full package, a majority of centrists (55%), and 23% of right-wingers.

Feasibility - doubts. Beyond demographic and political differences that typically characterize those who support or oppose the two-state solution and the detailed package, background attitudes are also clearly linked to support. In previous surveys, it has been clear that trust in the other side is a powerful factor, and the belief that the other side wants peace. It also became clear that the perception of viability was important, therefore in the current survey we offer deeper analysis of this factor.

Among Israeli Jews who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 50% support the combined package. Further, for Israeli Jews, support for the agreement rises in part on whether the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

Among the Palestinians who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 58% support the combined package. Further, support for the agreement rises incrementally the more the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

Peace Incentives: Changing minds

Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible,” that is, whether additional policy items can act as incentives to change their minds in favor. To this end, we developed a series of policies that could be added to an agreement, and proposed them to respondents who originally said they opposed the full, detailed package. As noted above, this included 55% of Israeli Jews and 57% of Palestinians.

Each side was offered seven incentives. Some of the incentives were similar, reflecting either the same policy or a parallel item. Three items tested the same policy: making the Israeli-Palestinian agreement part of the Arab Peace Initiative, insuring that the Palestinian state would have a democratic and clean political system, and the creation of a joint commission made of the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to provide formal guarantees to ensure proper implementation of the agreement on both sides.  The other four items were designed to be specifically favorable to one side: for example, for Israelis – allowing Jews to visit at the Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif or allow Israelis, including settlers, to live in the Palestinian state as permanent residents as long as they are law-abiding, and for the Palestinians, an Israeli recognition of the Nakba and the suffering of refugees, and providing compensation to refugees, and allowing Palestinians, including refugees, to live as permanent residents inside the state of Israel while maintaining their Palestinian citizenship, as long as they are law abiding.

The items were tested as follows (italics indicates questions asked of Palestinians). Once again these questions were asked only among those who opposed the full package of the detailed two-state agreement.

1.     And if the agreement is part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 37% of Israeli Jews who opposed the agreement at first, said that they would now support it. Added to those who already support the agreement, a total of 55% of Israeli Jews would support it with this item.

If in addition to the above items of the permanent settlement package, Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty? 24% of Palestinians who did not support the initial package said they would support it if this case.  Added to those who already support the agreement, a total of 54% of Palestinians would support it with this item.

2.    And if the agreement states that the state of Palestine will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures? 40% of Israeli Jews said this would make them support the agreement.

37% of Palestinians said they would support the agreement with this item.

3.     And what if the agreement includes formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides? 39% of Jewish Israelis who initially opposed the agreement said they would support if it this item was included.

More than one quarter (27%) of Palestinians opposed would support the agreement if it included this item.

4.     What if the agreement states that Israeli Jews, including settlers, are allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Palestine while maintaining their Israeli citizenship, as long as they are law abiding? 35% of Israeli Jews would support the agreement with this item.

And if agreement states that Palestinians, including refugees, are allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Israel while maintaining their Palestinian citizenship, as long as they are law abiding? Among those opposed, 25% said they would change their minds and support an agreement if it includes this item.

5.     And if the Palestinians return to a Palestinian state, and the agreement states that they do not have the collective right to return to Israel proper, with exceptions only for family reunification? 31 of Jewish Israelis would support the agreement in this case.

And if the agreement states that the state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law?  21% of Palestinians said this would make them change their minds and support an agreement.

6.    And if the Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation like today, including sharing intelligence with Israeli security forces, arresting terror suspects and preventing attacks? For this item, 44% of Israeli Jews said they would change their minds from opposing to supporting the agreement. When added to the original number of supporters of the original agreement, 59% of Israeli Jews in total would support the package if it includes this incentive.

And if the agreement allows the current Palestinian National Security Force to become an army with light weapons but without heavy weapons? 16% of Palestinians, said they would change their minds and support the original agreement based on this addition.

7.     And if the agreement allows Jews to visit at the Temple Mount? 47% of Israeli Jews said they would support the agreement in that case. Added to those who already support the agreement, about 61% of Israeli Jews would support it with this item.

And if the agreement states that Israel recognizes the Nakba and the suffering of refugees, and provides compensation to refugees? 39% of Palestinians said they would support the package in that case. Added to those who already support the agreement, about 62% of Palestinians would support it with this item.

The results above are shown in the following graphs:

In all, between 31% to 47% of Jews who were opposed to an agreement said they would change their minds and support it based on one of these incentives. Among Palestinians, from 16% to 39% of those who rejected the agreement could change their minds. With added support, several of the incentives could convince enough respondents to reach a majority, or even a strong majority. This indicates significant flexibility and openness of attitudes; it also implies that rejection of the two-state implementation package is not entirely ideological, but can be changed with the right policies. A democratic state of Palestine is a powerful incentive for both parties – while for Palestinians, Israeli recognition of the Nakba is the most powerful; for the Israelis, allowing visits to the Temple Mount/Al Haram al Sharif is the most powerful.

(2) Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Negotiation Framework and Third Parties: We sought to examine support for alternatives to the US-brokered negotiation processes that characterized the last two decades. In the last three surveys, we tested five models for a multi-lateral approach to negotiations: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led peace process; 3) an EU-led peace process; 4) a UN-led peace process; 5) and finally, a US-Russian-led peace process. Findings show that in all surveys, Palestinians are most receptive to the first, or Arab regional, approach (31% in December and June 2017 and 27% in the current survey) followed by an EU and a UN approaches (15% and 13% respectively at present); 4% choose an American-Russian led peace process, and 3% selected a US-led multi-lateral process.

Israeli Jews prefer practically the opposite approach, with a clear preference for US involvement: the plurality consistently chooses a US-led peace process, with 28% selecting it in the current survey, while 21% selected a US-Russian approach, and 16% selected a regional approach led by Arab states.

The deep polarization over the role of the US fulfills the finding from the December 2016 survey. At that time, large majorities of both Israeli Jews (69%) and Palestinians (77%) expected the incoming Trump administration to be pro-Israeli, and just a minority on both sides expected him to be neutral (or pro-Palestinian).

A UN-led process was selected by just 7% of Israeli Jews and support for an EU-led process is just 2% - this reflects ongoing perceptions in Israeli society that both bodies are biased against Israel, a theme regularly repeated in public discourse. 

Among Israelis Arabs, the Arab-led regional and UN-led approaches had the highest support (18% each). 16% chose an EU process, 13% chose the US-Russian approach, and only 6% preferred a US-led process.

(3) How Israelis and Palestinians View Each Other:

We asked the two sides about perceptions of both the other, and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does, whether they trust and whether they fear the other side. We probed the extent of zero sum beliefs. The picture is mostly consistent with trends in our recent surveys, although assessment of each side of its own conditions, particularly among Palestinians in the West Bank, show significant decline.

Does the other side want peace? Among Palestinians, 37% agree that most Israelis want peace, a decline from June 2017, when 44% of Palestinians gave this response, but consistent with December 2016 when 38% thought Israelis want peace. Less than one-third (29%) of Israeli Jews think most Palestinians want peace; this is a steady decline from one year ago, when 41% thought this way, then just 33% in June 2017. Among Israeli Arabs 85% agree that most Palestinians want peace, and 57% agree that Israeli Jews want peace.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: As in previous recent surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. Among Palestinians a solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy (89% - almost unchanged from 87% in June). The majority of Israeli Arabs feel the opposite regarding Israeli Jews: 61% agree that Israeli Jews can be trusted, and 30% disagree.

On the Israeli Jewish side, three-quarters believe that Palestinians cannot be trusted, almost unchanged from 77% in June, and just 19% agreed with the statement that they can be trusted. Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 51% of Israeli Jews (compared to 53% in June), 53% of Israeli Arabs, and 72% of Palestinians (unchanged from June) agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization.

Fear: More Palestinians fear Israeli soldiers and armed settlers more than they fear Israeli Jews. 46% agreed with the statement “I feel fear towards Israeli soldiers and armed settlers,” but 35% agreed with the statement made about Jews. This trend is nearly unchanged from December. There are significant differences between West Bank and Gaza respondents: 53% from the West Bank fear soldiers and settlers, while just 36% of Gazans do – this could reflect the fact that West Bankers have more significant daily contact with such figures.

Among Israeli Jews, a majority of 57% agree with the statement “I feel fear toward Palestinians,” a decline from June 2017 and December 2016 when two-thirds felt that way (in both previous surveys). Among settlers 79% agree. Regarding Arab-Jewish relations among Israeli citizens, 51% of Jews agree that they fear Israeli Arabs, but only 7% of Israeli Arabs agree with a statement that they fear Israeli Jews; 90% disagree.

General Conditions of the two sides: 71% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the Palestinian territories as bad or very bad (72% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip). These finding is fully 26-points higher than the negative assessment of conditions among West Bankers in June (46%), and reflects the rising tensions in the West Bank in the aftermath of the Trump statement on Jerusalem. Assessment of conditions in the Gaza Strip remains almost unchanged. Among Israeli Jews 46% are satisfied, with settlers indicating the same level of satisfaction as other Jews. Six months ago, 54% of Israeli Jews (and 64% of settlers) described conditions as good or very good.  Among Israeli Arabs, only 27% describe conditions as good or very good. Around 37% among all Israeli groups, and 18% of Palestinians, say conditions are “so-so.”

(4) Values and Goals

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Jews were asked about the values of: (1) a Jewish majority, (2) Greater Israel, (3) Democracy, (4) Peace. Among Israeli Jews, peace and a Jewish majority are seen as the most important values (29% and 28% respectively), followed by greater Israel (19%) and democracy (16%). The portion who chose greater Israel rose between June 2016 (10%) and December 2017 (14%), to 17% last June, to 19% in the current poll.  Democracy however decreased between June and December 2017 by 3 points.

Among the Palestinians, we asked about the following goals: (1) Israeli withdrawal and establishing a Palestinian state, (2) Obtaining right of return for refugees to ’48 Israel, (3) Establishing a democratic political system, (4) Building a pious or moral individual and religious society. For Palestinians, the ranking has been relatively stable, with almost no change over the course of the year. The top priority for Palestinian goals remains Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem (48% chose this compared to 43% last June), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (28%), building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (14%) and building a democratic political system (9%, a decrease of 4 points from the previous survey in June).