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3-5 December 2008

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 3 and 5 December 2008. This period witnessed the collapse of the Egyptian efforts to bring Palestinian factions to reconciliation talks in Cairo due to Hamas’s decision to boycott these talks. It also witnessed serious deterioration in the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The poll examines the following topics: domestic issues such as the balance of power, the performance and legitimacy of two governments, that of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad, the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip, the peace process, and attitudes toward and expectations from the Obama administration. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults, 830 in the West Bank and 440 in the Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2008 indicate an end to the slow decline in Hamas’s popularity and continued stability in Fateh’s popularity despite Hamas’s boycott of the reconciliation talks scheduled to take place last month in Cairo. In fact, findings show that the gap between the popularity of President Abbas compared to that of Ismail Haniyeh has narrowed from 14 percentage points in the third quarter to 10 percentage points in the last quarter of 2008. The largest percentage blames both Hamas and Fateh for the collapse of the reconciliation efforts and the continuation of the divisions among Palestinians while smaller but similar percentages blame Fateh or Hamas alone. Positive evaluation of Palestinian conditions in the West Bank remains much higher than the positive evaluation of Palestinian conditions in the Gaza Strip. As we found in our previous poll, almost two thirds share Hamas’s belief that the term of President Abbas ends in the first month of January 2009 as Hamas claims and not in the first month of 2010 as Fateh and the presidency claim. Findings also show that about three quarters support the call by the president to organize new elections in early 2009 if reconciliation talks do not succeed. But we also found that the majority opposes holding elections in the West Bank only, to be followed later by elections in the Gaza Strip that would be organized once reconciliation is achieved.

Findings show stability in public support for the Saudi initiative reaching two thirds. But they indicate significant decline in support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Most interestingly, findings show a majority support for a strong role for the new Obama administration in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. However, a majority of Palestinians does not expect that to happen. Findings also show a majority of Palestinians supporting a strong American intervention to pressure the two sides to accept and implement the Saudi Initiative. They also show that the percentage of support for a similar American intervention to pressure the two sides to accept and implement a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative is higher than the percentage of Palestinian acceptance for that permanent settlement. This might indicate that one reason for Palestinian rejection of that settlement might have to do with lack of trust in the willingness of the other side to implement that settlement.

 (1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• Popularity of Hamas and Fateh remains unchanged despite Hamas’s boycott of the national dialogue in Cairo, Hamas receives 28% and Fateh 42%.

• Gap between Abbas and Haniyeh narrows: if new presidential elections are to take place today, Abbas receives 48%, Haniyeh 38%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 59% and the latter 32%.

• Largest percentage blames Fateh and Hamas together for failure of national dialogue

• 64% believe that Abbas’s term in office ends in January 2009.

• 73% support Abbas call for early and simultaneous presidential and legislative elections in early 2009.

• 88% of the Palestinians say that conditions in Gaza are bad and 40% say conditions in the West Bank are bad.

• Positive evaluation of Haniyeh’s government reaches 36%, positive evaluation of Fayyad’s government reaches 34%

• Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas reaches 46%

• Public is divided over the ability of the new Palestinian security deployment in Hebron: 45% expect the new deployment to lead to enforcement of law and order while 48% expect it will fail in enforcing law and order.

Findings show that Hamas’s popularity remain unchanged despite its boycott of the national dialogue scheduled to take place in Cairo. If new parliamentary elections were to take place today with the approval of all factions, the Change and Reform list of Hamas would receive 28% of the vote (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fateh’s list would received 42% (compared to 43% three months ago). The combined strength of all other factions and parties stands today at 10% (compared to 11% three months ago). The undecided stands today at 20%. In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas stands at 32% and for Fateh at 46%.  In the West Bank, support for Hamas stands at 25% and Fateh at 39%. If new presidential elections were held today and Abbas was nominated by Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh was nominated by Hamas, 48% would vote for Abbas and 38% for Haniyeh. Three months ago, support for Abbas stood at 53% and for Haniyeh at 39%. In other words, the gap between the two men has decreased from 14 percentage points to 10. In the Gaza Strip, support for Abbas stands at 46% (compared to 42% for Haniyeh), and in the West Bank, support for Abbas stands at 48% (compared to 36% for Haniyeh). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 59% to Haniyeh’s 32%. In the Gaza Strip, support for Barghouti stands at 54% (compared to 39% for Haniyeh), and in the West Bank support for Barghouti stands at 62% (compared to 28% for Haniyeh).

If reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas succeeds and early legislative and presidential elections were to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 39% believe that the main issue that will occupy people’s mind and affect their vote will be the ending of the boycott and blockade and the improvement of living conditions while 29% say the main issue will be the consolidation of the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the realization of national unity. Fighting corruption is believed to be the main issue by 12%, 8% believe the issue will be continuation of resistance to Israeli occupation, and another 8% believe it will be the continuation of the peace process.

The largest percentage (46%) believes that both Fateh and Hamas are responsible for the failure of national reconciliation efforts while only 23% blame Hamas alone and 20% blame Fateh alone. Similarly, only 19% blame Hamas for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 18% blame Fateh; but the majority (55%) blames the two sides together. Palestinians are divided over the main reason for Hamas’s boycott of the dialogue and reconciliation meetings in Cairo: 30% believe it was arrest of Hamas members in the West Bank, 26% believe it was external pressure on Hamas, 17% believe it was due to internal divisions within Hamas, and 10% believe it was due to Egypt’s siding with Fateh against Hamas.

A majority of 64% believe that the term of President Abbas ends in January 2009 while only 24% believe it ends one year later, in January 2010. When we asked those who believe the president’s term ends in January 2009 who should in that case be the president on that date, the overwhelming majority (72%) said new elections should take place on that date while only 15% said it should be the Speaker of the Palestinian parliament and 7% said that Abbas should stay in office after that date.  Similarly, 73% support the call by the president to organize presidential and parliamentary elections in early 2009 if the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas fails. But support drops considerably to 40% for elections that would take place in the West Bank only to be followed later by elections in the Gaza Strip after reconciliation is achieved.

Support for presidential and legislative elections in the West Bank now and in Gaza later increases in the West Bank (45%) compared to the Gaza Strip (32%), among those who identify themselves as somewhat religious (43%) compared to those who identify themselves as religious (38%), among supporters of the peace process (43%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (33%), among public sector employees (46%) compared to private sector employees (39%), among those who say they intend to vote for Fateh (48%) compared to those who say they intend to vote for Hamas (33%).

An overwhelming majority of 88% describes conditions of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip as bad or very bad while only 40% describe conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank as bad or very bad. Similarly, only 25% describe conditions of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, under Haniyeh’s government, as good or very good while 36% describe the same conditions in the West Bank, under Abbas, as good or very good. Despite this, 61% of the residents of the Gaza Strip, compared to only 48% of the residents of the West Bank, say they and their families feel these days that they are safe and secure. The percentage of those wishing to immigrate is much higher in the Gaza Strip (reaching 40%) than in the West Bank (standing at 25%).

Positive evaluation of the performance of Haniyeh’s government stands at 36% and positive evaluation of the performance of Fayyad’s government stands at 34%. These results are similar to those obtained in our last poll three months ago. In the Gaza Strip, positive evaluation of the performance of Haniyeh’s government stands today at 42% (compared to 32% in the West Bank), and in the West Bank, positive evaluation of the performance of Fayyad’s government stands today at 35% (compared to 33% in the Gaza Strip). 28% say that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one and 30% say Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one. 29% say both governments are not legitimate and 9% say both are legitimate. Three months ago, 33% said Fayyad’s government was the legitimate one while 27% said Haniyeh’s government was the legitimate one. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas decreases slightly from 48% three months ago to 46% in this poll. Satisfaction with Abbas reaches 47% in the West Bank compared to 43% in the Gaza Strip.

With the recent deployment of Palestinian security forces in Hebron, the public is divided over the issue of capacity: 45% believe the new deployment will succeed in enforcing law and order while 48% believe it will not succeed. Belief regarding the goal of the Hebron security forces’ deployment is also split with 31% believing that the goal is to enforce law and order while an identical percentage believes that the goal is to disarm the resistance forces. 23% say the goal is to achieve both while 9% say the goal is neither.

(2) Peace Process   

• 53% accept and 46% reject a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people; 48% think a majority of Palestinians support the mutual recognition while 38% think a majority of Israelis support it.

• 66% support and 30% oppose the Saudi Initiative that calls for an Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 1967 in return for an Arab recognition of Israel and normalization of relations with it.

• 72% would support reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement and establishing a Palestinian state recognized by Israel.

• 41% accept and 57% reject a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support varies for the various elements with the highest level (55%) going to end of conflict and the lowest (27%) going to the demilitarization of the Palestinian state so that it would not have an army. 45% think a majority of Palestinians would accept such a settlement and 40% think a majority of Israelis would accept it.

• 75% expect Palestinian-Israeli negotiations launched by the Annapolis process to fail and only 15% expect them to succeed.

• 70% believe that the chances for the creation of an independent Palestinian state along side Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 29% think chances are medium or high. 

• 32% expect the Likud to win the next Israeli elections, 18% expect Kadima to win, and 18% expect Labor to win.

• 47% expect the Israeli elections to have no impact on Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, 23% expect them to lead to cessation of negotiations, and 18% expect them to improve chances of success in the negotiations.

• 48% support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 49% oppose such attacks.   

• Three quarters (74%) support renewal of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip while 23% oppose the renewal.

Findings indicate that 53% support and 46% oppose a permanent settlement in which each side recognizes the national identity of the other with the Palestinians recognizing Israel as the state for the Jewish people and the Israelis recognizing the Palestinian state as the state for the Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict, including Jerusalem and refugees, have been resolved. Findings show that 48% think a majority of Palestinians support this recognition while 42% think a majority does not. 38% think a majority of Israelis support this mutual recognition and 49% think a majority of Israelis does not.

A majority of 66% support and 30% oppose the Saudi Initiative. The initiative calls for a full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the resolution of the refugee problem in an agreed and just manner based on UN resolution 194, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. In return, the initiative calls for a recognition of Israel and its right to live in secure borders by all Arab states and the establishment of normal relations with it. After a permanent settlement is reached and a Palestinian state is established along side Israel, 72% would support reconciliation between the two peoples and 26% would oppose such reconciliation. These percentages are similar to those obtained during the last six months.

But support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative drops from 47% last December to 41% in this poll. Opposition to the terms of this settlement stands today at 57%. Support for the various elements of the settlement varies from a high of 55% to the item related to end of conflict, followed by support for borders compromise (based on the 1967 borders with mutual and equal territorial exchange) receiving 54%, followed by the refugee solution (40%), Jerusalem as a capital for the Palestinian state after the annexation of its settlements to Israel as part of a territorial exchange (36%), followed by the terms of sovereignty and security arrangements (35%), and finally, the element related to the demilitarization of the Palestinian state so that it would not have an army (27%).

Public expectation for the chances of success of diplomacy is grim. Three quarters of the Palestinians expect the negotiations unleashed by the Annapolis process to fail and only 15% expect them to succeed. Similarly, 70% believe the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim to non-existent while only 29% think the chances are medium or high. The largest percentage (32%) expects the Likud to win the next Israeli elections. But 47% believe those elections will have no impact on Palestinian-Israeli negotiations while 23% expect them to lead to cessation of negotiations and 18% expect them to improve the chances for successful diplomacy.

Finally, findings show a decrease in the level of support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel from 55% last June to 48% in this poll. Support for armed attacks against Israelis increase in the Gaza Strip (60%) compared to the West Bank (41%), among those who identify themselves as religious (54%) compared to those who identify themselves as somewhat religious (42%), among those opposed to the peace process (68%) compared to those who support the peace process (43%), among those whose age is between 18-27 (51%) compared to those whose age is over 47 (45%), among those who have a BA degree (50%) compared to the illiterates (37%), among students (54%) compared to employees (44%), and among those who would vote for Hamas (74%) compared to those who would vote for Fateh (39%).  Despite the support for violence among about half of the respondents, three quarters (74%) support renewal of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip while 23% oppose the renewal. Last September 81% of the Palestinians supported the ceasefire and 15% opposed it.

(3) Expectations from and attitudes toward the Obama administration

• Only 29% expect a stronger American role in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict now that Obama has been elected the next US president. 59% expect no change in the current US role as a result of Obama’s election.

• 57% want a stronger American role under Obama in the peace process and 35% want the US not to intervene in that process.

• If the US under the leadership of Obama played a stronger role in the peace process, such intervention would lead to a successful outcome in the view of 49%, but 30% expect such an intervention to lead to failure in the peace process.

• 66% believe that if the US intervened strongly in the peace process, such intervention would benefit Israel more, 10% expect the Palestinians to benefit more, and 18% expect the two sides to benefit.

• 56% expect the election of Obama to lead to a stronger American military, economic, and political support for Israel while 28% expect no change in US position, and only 7% expect US support to weaken.

• If the Obama administration pressured the two sides to accept and implement the Saudi initiative, 56% think the Palestinian side should accept such an American intervention and 39% think the Palestinian side should reject it.

•  If the Obama administration pressured the two sides to accept and implement a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva initiative, 47% think the Palestinian side should accept such an American intervention and 49% think the Palestinian side should reject it.

Findings show that only 29% of the Palestinians expect a stoner role for the new Obama administration in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process while 59% expect to see no change in the current role of the US. 7% expect the US to play a weaker role. But findings indicate that most Palestinians (57%) want a stronger American role while 35% want a weaker role in the peace process. Only 4% want the new Obama administration to continue to play its current role. Support for a stronger American role in the peace process increases among women (60%) compared to men (54%), among the somewhat religious (61%) compared to the religious (54%), among supporters of the peace process (65%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (30%), among those whose age is over 47 (60%) compared to those between 18-27 years of age (53%), among illiterates (63%) compared to those who have a BA degree (56%), among housewives (61%) compared to students (53%), among Fateh voters (74%) compared to Hamas voters (38%), among those who are certain that such intervention would lead to a successful outcome (87%) compared to those who are certain it will lead to failure (25%), and among those who believe such intervention would benefit both sides (83%) compared to those who think Israel would benefit more (48).

Half of the Palestinians (49%) believe that if the US intervened strongly in the peace process, the process would succeed while 30% expect it to fail. 16% expect American intervention to have no impact. But findings show that two thirds of the Palestinians (66%) believe Israel will benefit more from the American intervention while 18% expect the two sides to benefit, and only 10% expect the Palestinians to benefit. In this regard, 56% expect US military, economic and political support for Israel to increase after Obama’s elections while 28% expect no change in US support for Israel and 7% expect a decrease in US support.

If the Obama administration decided to pressure the Palestinian and Israeli sides to accept and implement the Saudi Initiative, 56% believe the Palestinians should accept such intervention and 39% believe they should not. Half of the Palestinians (49%) expect a majority of Israelis to accept this American pressure while 43% expect a majority of Israelis to reject it. If the Obama administration decided to pressure the two sides to accept and implement a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative, Palestinian acceptance of American pressure would decrease to 47% while 49% would reject it. 56% of the Palestinians believe a majority of Israelis would accept such American pressure and 36% believe a majority of Israelis would reject it.

Support for accepting American pressure on both sides to accept and implement a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative increases in cities (50%) compared to refugee camps (37%), among men (53%) compared to women (41%), among those who are somewhat religious (51%) compared to those who are religious (43%), among supporters of the peace process (50%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (35%), among those whose age is over 47 (52%) compared to those whose age is between 18-27 (42%), among non refugees (49%) compared to refugees (44%), among those who have a BA degree (54%) compared to illiterates (40%), and among Fateh voters (60%) compared to Hamas voters (31%).....Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 25 June and 1 July 2018. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed important developments including the convening of the Palestinian National Council in Ramallah, the launch of the Return March in the Gaza Strip, the relocation of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, rising concerns about economic and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip and the potential impact of a reconciliation failure on these conditions. Weeks before the conduct of the poll, President Abbas entered a hospital in Ramallah for treatment fueling concerns about his health and a potential succession crisis. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as general conditions in the Palestinian territories and the various future directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 2150 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 2.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In light of the hospitalization of president Abbas, about two-thirds of the public express concern that domestic conditions may deteriorate in the absence of the president as long as no clarity or agreement exists on the succession process that should be followed. The public has a clear preference: it wants a full compliance with the relevant articles in the Basic Law even if this means that Aziz Duwaik from Hamas (being the current Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council) would become a temporary president for 60 days. However, a majority would also be happy if Hamas shows flexibility and allows a non-Hamas, non-Fatah speaker to be elected by the parliament thereby allowing a smoother process of succession and the holding of elections after 60 days.

Findings for the second quarter of 2018 also show that Abbas’ standing has improved somewhat. This might be due to his hospitalization. But it could also mean that the public is showing an appreciation for his strong rejection of Trump’s “Deal of the Century.” It is worth mentioning that Fatah’s popularity improved slightly as well. Yet despite this, more than 60% of the public demand Abbas’ resignation and the public stands decisively against Abbas’ domestic policies. An overwhelming majority demands the immediate halt to all measures taken by Abbas against the Gaza Strip and opposes the crackdown on demonstrations demanding an ending to these measures. Moreover, a two-third majority opposes Abbas’ demand for disarming armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip. A majority is also opposed to Abbas’ demand that Hamas hand over the entire responsibility over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including ministries, the security sector, and the “arms.”

The public expresses disappointment over some of the outcomes of the most recent meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) which was held two months ago in Ramallah and indeed, an overwhelming majority indicates that it did not follow the proceedings of the meeting.  Despite the fact that the largest percentage believes that the PNC represents the Palestinians, this percentage is less than half of the public. Perhaps one reason for this is the perception that the PNC’s proceedings and decisions are irrelevant to policy making. Indeed, about 70% believe that president Abbas and his government will not implement the PNC decisions. Moreover, about two thirds of the public are dissatisfied with the way members of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were elected by the Council and 70% expressed dissatisfaction with ability of these members to represent Palestinians at home and in the diaspora. Yet, despite all of this, a majority still views the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

In light of the collapse of Palestinian-Israeli peace process, support for alternatives to negotiations varies. About three quarters continue to support PA efforts to internationalize the conflict and join various UN organizations. Moreover, about two thirds support popular non-violent resistance, a large minority supports return to an armed intifada, a similar percentage supports the dissolution of the PA, and a little less than a third  supports abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. These findings indicate a decline in support for an armed intifada and in the demand for dissolving the PA and point to a rise in support for popular resistance. It is worth mentioning that support for armed action and the dissolution of the PA is much higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank while support for popular resistance is high in both areas.

Nonetheless, confidence in the effectiveness of popular resistance is not high. This lack of confidence is demonstrated in public assessment of the effectiveness of the March of Return in the Gaza Strip. Despite popular support for the March in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, about three quarters of the public (80% in the West Bank and two thirds in the Gaza Strip) believe that the March has failed to achieve its goals or achieved very little. It is worth mentioning that the public is evenly divided in its assessment of the main party behind the March between those who think it is Hamas and those who think it is civil society organizations. Gazans however show no hesitancy on this as they strongly believe that it is indeed Hamas that stands behind the initiation and organization of the March of Return. 

(1) Abbas succession and presidential and parliamentary elections:

• A large majority (64%) is worried that internal conditions might deteriorate or destabilize during the post-Abbas succession process due to lack of clarity and absence of agreement on the means of selecting the next PA president; 32% say they are not worried.
• A majority (60%) says that in the case of Abbas’ absence, the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Aziz al Duwaik form Hamas, must become president for two months in implementation of the Basic Law; 29% say they are opposed to such implementation.
• Similarly, a majority of 62% indicates that it would welcome a Hamas initiative to allow the election of a non-Hamas/non-Fatah Speaker in order to facilitate the post Abbas succession process; 29% say they are opposed to such initiative.
• Almost half (48%) believes that the in the post Abbas period, Palestinian factions will succeed in reaching an agreement on a process that would allow for the holding of presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to elect a successor to Abbas; 41% believe the factions will not succeed.
• 61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 33% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 68% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 54% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 62% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip.
• If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 30% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 23% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip). Similarly, Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 6%, Mustafa Barghouti and Khalid Mishal  by 3% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 59%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 33% (40% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 46% and the latter 47% of the vote (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 41% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 40% of the vote (compared to 35% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 53% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 45% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 31% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 32% three months ago) and for Fatah at 34% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 43% (compared to 38% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Only 35% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 60% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 17%. In an open-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening of conditions in the Gaza Strip: the largest percentage (34%) blames Israel; 26% blame the PA and president Abbas and 20% blame Hamas. As we found in the previous poll, responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 38% of West Bankers compared to only 28% of Gazans blame Israel; 19% of West Bankers compared to 36% of Gazans blame the PA and Abbas, and 17% of West Bankers compared to 24% of Gazans blame Hamas.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 51%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 52%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 54% and in the West Bank at 53%.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Maan TV and Palestine TV (15% each), Al Aqsa TV and Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (12% each), Al Arabiya and al Quds TV (5% each), and al Mayadeen (4%).
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%.
• Half of the public (49%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 45% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

• Now that it has taken control of the border crossings and the headquarters of the ministries and other public agencies, 30% are satisfied and 60% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 26%.
• 30%, compared to 26% three months ago, are optimistic and 65% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. These are the same percentages we obtained three months ago.
• A majority (71%) supports the unification of all PA institutions throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including the police force, under the control of the reconciliation government while 23% prefer to keep control over the police force in the Gaza Strip as it is now.
• But the public is divided over the future of the police officers currently serving in the Gaza Strip: 32% want to keep all of them in place, 30% want to replace some of them by new ones while keeping the others, and 27% prefer to replace all of them with new recruits.
• The public is also divided in its attitude regarding the demand made by Abbas requesting Hamas to fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” a large minority of 40% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 53% disagrees.
• When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, almost two-thirds (65%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 26% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip.
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (79%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 17% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 83% in the West Bank but only 72% in the Gaza Strip. 
• The overwhelming majority (81%) opposes the action taken by the PA security services to quell the demonstrations in the West Bank that demand lifting the measures taken by the PA against the Gaza Strip and only 15% support the crackdown on such demonstrations. Similarly, 81% oppose the measures taken by the Hamas police in the Gaza Strip against similar demonstrations while 13% support them.
• Finally, we asked the public about the narrative it believes to be accurate regarding the responsibility of Fatah and Hamas over the Gaza explosion that targeted prime minister Hamdallah convoy several months ago: 26% say they believe in the accuracy of Hamas’ narrative (that the PA intelligence Department had a role in the explosion) and 16% believe in the accuracy of Fatah’s narrative regarding Hamas’ role in that explosion. But the largest percentage (45%) indicates that neither narrative is accurate. It is worth mentioning that those who see Hamas’ narrative or that of the PA as accurate are much higher in the Gaza Strip, with 38% believing in Hamas’ and 27% believing in the PA’s. The percentage of Gazans who believe that neither side is accurate declines to only 28%.

(4) The meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC):  

• The overwhelming majority (83%) says that it either did not follow the proceedings or the decisions of the PNC meeting during its most recent session in Ramallah (55%) or followed only little (28%); only 13% say that they did follow all or most of them.
• Yet, 46% agree that the PNC represents them or represents the Palestinian people at home and in the diaspora and 35% say that it does not represent them or the Palestinian people. About a fifth (19%) expressed no opinion on the matter.
• However, when asked about the PLO, a majority (58%) agreed that the current organization, with its existing institutions and current leadership, remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; only 30% disagree with that. It is worth mentioning that our findings in June 2006, exactly 12 years ago, a larger majority of 69% viewed the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
• Almost two thirds (65%) are dissatisfied with the manner in which the PNC selected, without allowing nomination and direct personal elections, the members of the PLO Executive Committee; only 23% are satisfied with the PNC selection process.
• Similarly, a large majority of 71% does not believe that the newly elected members are capable of representing the homeland and the diaspora given their average age and the fact that most came from the West Bank; only 20% say they are satisfied that the new members have that ability.
• Moreover a large majority (69%) says that it has no confidence in the commitment of president Abbas and the PA government to implement the PNC decision; only 20% indicate that  has such confidence.

(5) The March of Return, the relocation of the US embassy, and future directions in the absence of the peace process:  

• 38% of the public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip say that civil society organizations are behind the initiation and organization of the March of Return in the Gaza Strip. A similar percentage (37%) says that Hamas is responsible for the March, and 14% say that factions other than Hamas are responsible for its initiation and organization. It is worth mentioning that among Gazans, 61% believe that Hamas stands behind the marches.
• A slim majority (51%) of Gazans supports the participation of family members and friends in the March of Return and 54% of West Bankers indicate their support for this form of resistance. Nonetheless, only a small minority (21%) believes the marches have achieved their goals or most of their goals and 74% believe they have not achieved their goals or achieved a little.
• A majority (55%) believes that the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem serves to weaken Palestinian position that East Jerusalem should be the capital of the Palestinian state; 16% think the relocation of the embassy strengthens Palestinian position and 25% believes the relocation has no impact.
• 73% of East Jerusalem residents, who carry Blue Israeli IDs, indicate that they do not intend to participate, or have not considered participation, in the Israeli municipal elections in the city but 22% indicate that they are indeed intending to vote or considering voting.
• A large minority of 39% thinks that negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while a third (34%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means and 21% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 35% indicated that armed resistance is the answer and only 31% sided with negotiation.
• 58% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 21% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 19% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 75% support joining more international organizations; 67% support popular non-violence resistance; 43% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 30% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 27% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; 21% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 2% say it is the absence of national unity.

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

Strong Preference among Palestinians and Israelis for a Comprehensive Settlement over an Interim Political Track 

11-16 December 2006

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between December 11 and 16, 2006. 

The joint poll examined a range of optional tracks for the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian political process including the Roadmap, the Arab League (Saudi) plan, and an interim plan postponing the settlement of the refugees issue to the future. We also examined the Israeli leadership's degrees of freedom to begin negotiations with various configurations of a Palestinian government. 

The findings indicate strong preference in both publics for the comprehensive settlement option with 58% of the Israelis and 81% of the Palestinians supporting this track compared to only 30% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians supporting an interim track. 

The joint poll further examined Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding a permanent settlement (along the lines of the Geneva Initiative and President Clinton’s package for a Palestinian-Israeli final status settlement) against the backdrop of the Israeli- Palestinian cease fire in Gaza. The results document a continuing decrease in support for that permanent status package and its parameters among Israelis throughout 2006, and overall stability among Palestinians. Despite the declining trend, among Israelis there is still a majority of 52% who support these parameters as a combined overall package. Among Palestinians, 48% support the package now, compared to 44% in June 2006 and 46% in December 2005 (see summary table below).  

Total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 14 and 16, 2006. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 602 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between December 11 and 14, 2006. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Cease Fire Agreement 

• 59% of the Israelis and 85% of the Palestinians support the recent cease fire agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza. 85% of the Palestinians support and 14% oppose extending the agreement to theWest Bank.
• The Palestinian public is split half with regard to the effects of launching rockets from the Gaza strip at Israeli towns. 48% believe it was beneficial to Palestinian interests while 48% believe it was harmful to their interests.
• 52% of the Israelis believe that neither side came out the winner in the current round of the conflict, 28% believe that the Palestinians won, 5% believe that Israel won and 13% believe that both won. Among Palestinians, 24% believe they won, 27% think Israel won, 29% believe neither won, and 18% believe that both sides won.
• 33% of the Palestinians also believe that they will gain more from the recent cease fire while 29% believe Israel will gain more, 25% believe both will gain and 11% think neither side will gain. As to Israelis, 40% believe Palestinians will gain more from the cease fire, 7% believe Israel will gain more 35% think both sides will gain and 16% think neither side will gain.
• As to the impact of the cease fire on the power struggle in the PA, 21% of the Palestinians think that Abu-Mazin and Fateh will gain more politically from the cease fire, 15% think Haniyeh and Hamas, 34%  think both will gain, and 24% think neither side will gain more politically from the cease fire. Among Israelis, 29% believe the cease fire works more to the advantage of Haniyeh and Hamas, 23% believe Abu-Mazin and Fateh will gain more from it, 20% think both will gain, and 17% think neither side will gain more.
• Following the Gaza cease fire agreement, both sides’ expectations with regard to its longevity are rather low. 6% of the Israelis and 19% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop, 40% of the Israelis and 38% of the Palestinians expect negotiations to resume but some armed attacks will continue, 52% of the Israelis and 37% of the Palestinians believe that confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 

(B) Clinton/Geneva Parameters 

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials exactly six years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative was first made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues in the past, in December 2003, December 2004, December 2005 and June 2006. In the current poll we revisited these crucial issues for the first time after the second war in Lebanon. In December 2003, respondents were explicitly told that the parameters were those of the Geneva Initiative. However, in the subsequent polls, respondents were not told that these were possible compromises in a final status settlement without explicitly naming the packages as those of Clinton or Geneva.

The findings indicate a slight decrease in support among Israelis and some increase in support among Palestinians compared to six months ago. Among Israelis, a majority of 52% support these parameters as a combined overall package, compared to 55% who supported them in June 2006. These results corroborate the declining support for the Clinton package among Israelis throughout 2006, whereas in January and December 2005 the level of support was 64%. Among Palestinians the level of support fluctuated in 2006 between 44% and 48% in the current poll marking a pattern of stability in Palestinians attitudes in this regard in 2006, down from 54% in December 2004.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange 

Among Palestinians 61% support or strongly support and 37% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in June 2006, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 54% and opposition at 44%.

Among Israelis 44% support and 54% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of “Judea, Samaria” and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel.Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In June 2006, 47% of the Israelis supported this component while 47% opposed it.

(2) Refugees 

Among Palestinians, 41% support and 54% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries likeAustralia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In June 2006, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 55% opposed it.

Among Israelis 38% support such an arrangement and 60% oppose it. In June 2006 43% supported it and 53% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem 

In the Palestinian public 39% support and 59% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In June 2006, an identical compromise obtained similar results with 35% supporting it and 63% opposing it.

Among Israelis, 38% agree and 60% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In June 2006, 37% supported this arrangement and 60% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State 

Among Palestinians 28% support and 70% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in June 2006 25% support and opposition reached 74%.

Among Israelis 62% support and 36% oppose this arrangement compared to similar levels of 63% support and 36% opposition obtained in June 2006.

(5) Security Arrangements 

In the Palestinian public 42% support and 55% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In June 2006, 40% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 57% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 51% support and 47% oppose this arrangement compared to 52% who supported it and 44% who opposed it in June 2006.

(6) End of Conflict   

In the Palestinian public 62% support and 34% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in June the support of 58% and the opposition of 40%.

In the Israeli public 68% support and 30% oppose this component in the final status framework. In June 2006, 70% of the Israelis supported it while 27% opposed it.

The Whole Package 

Among Palestinians 48% support and 49% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In June 2006, 44% supported and 52% opposed such a package.

This four percentage point increase in the level of support for the package among Palestinians deserves attention given the official and publicly endorsed Hamas government position toward a permanent peace agreement withIsrael. In this regard it is also important to stress the four percentage point increase in the “end of conflict” component which stands in open contradiction to Hamas refusal to such a clause and its willingness to grant Israel only a long range Hudna.

Among Israelis 52% support and 46% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. This constitutes a noticeable decline in support for the Clinton final status settlement package compared to six months ago when support stood at 55% support with 40% opposition.

36% of the Israelis assume that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package; 53% believe that the majority opposes it. Among Palestinians 46% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 38% believe that the majority opposes it.

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement Framework (2003-2006)

(C) Other Optional tracks for the resumption of a political process

In addition to the Clinton parameters for a final status settlement, we examined in the poll a range of other optional tracks for the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian political process including the Roadmap, the Arab League (Saudi) plan, and an interim plan postponing the settlement of the refugees issue to future negotiations. In addition we examined the degrees of freedom of the Israeli leadership to begin negotiations with various configurations of a Palestinian government.

• 60% of the Israelis and 49% of the Palestinians support the international Quartet’s Roadmap plan. These figures mark a consistent trend of decline in support for this plan in both publics from a peak of 65% support among Israelis and 60% support among Palestinians a year ago in December 2005. While the Roadmap remained the cornerstone of the Israeli government policy with regard to the resumption of a political process, and it still garners majority support among Israelis, it is losing support in the two publics, presumably because of the stalemate it caused in the process.
• As to the Arab League (Arab Saudi) plan, both publics seem to be quite ignorant about it. 47% of the Israelis and 44% of the Palestinians claimed they have never heard of the plan. Only 22% of the Israelis and 25% of the Palestinians said they know some or most of its details. After briefing our respondents on its essential elements, 29% of the Israelis and 59% of the Palestinians support the plan compared to 69% and 38% respectively who oppose it. This sizeable difference in support can be explained by the vague reference in the plan to the refugees issue and UN resolution 194, which is often interpreted by Israelis as allowing return of refugees to proper Israel and compensation.
• Another option examined in the current poll was to conduct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on an interim settlement whereby a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This option was juxtaposed against negotiations over a comprehensive settlement that would lead to permanent peace and end of conflict, with all issues, including refugees, resolved. The results indicate a strong preference in both publics for the comprehensive settlement with 58% of the Israelis and 81% of the Palestinians supporting this track compared to only 30% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians supporting the interim track. Despite the clear preference among Palestinians for a permanent settlement, a majority of 58% would support and 37% would oppose an agreement that would establish a Palestinian state over 80% to 90% of the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip to be followed by negotiations between the state of Israel and the state of Palestine to resolve all the other issues such as permanent borders, refugees, holy places in Jerusalem, and others. 
• If in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians, Israel will have to release Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiate with him, 43% of the Israelis support such a step compared to 53% who oppose it.
• 68% of the Israelis support negotiations between Israel and Abu Mazin over a final status settlement. Despite these levels of support only 46% of the Israelis believe that it is possible to reach nowadays a compromise settlement between Abu Mazin and Olmert.
• 66% of the Israelis support negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which includes Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement.
• Even when a Hamas-led government is concerned, 54% of the Israelis support and 45% oppose talks with it if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. Among Palestinians, 62% support such talks while 34% oppose them.

(D) Other Conflict Resolution Issues 

• A majority of 58% among Palestinians and 63% of the Israelis agrees with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict, there would be mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. 40% and 34% respectively disagree to this step. 52% of the Palestinians and 55% of the Israelis believe that a majority in their public supports such a proposal, and 36% and 33% respectively think the majority opposes it. However both publics are only partly aware of the majority support for such a step in the other side. Only 44% of the Palestinians and 42% of the Israelis think the other side public supports this step.
• Both Israelis and Palestinians are split half with regard to their assessments of the achievements of the Palestinian Intifada. 49% of the Palestinians agree and 49% disagree with the claim that the intifada so far has achieved national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve. Among Israelis too, 48% agree and 51% disagree with this claim.
• As to Palestinians' general outlook regarding the prospects of a peace process with Israel, 21% believe that the peace process is not successful in ending the occupation and should be stopped in favor of resorting to armed action; 36% think the peace process should not be stopped because it still might succeed, 27% think the peace process has not failed and should be given more time and in the meanwhile armed action should be stopped, 11% believe that armed action is responsible for the stagnation of the peace process and if it is stopped the peace process would make progress.

(E) Palestinian Domestic Balance of Power

• A majority of 61% supports the holding of early presidential and parliamentary elections and 37% oppose that. If early parliamentary elections are held today, Hamas would receive 36% of the vote and Fateh would receive 42%. 12% would go to other lists and 10% remain undecided.
• If early presidential elections are held today and only two, Mahmud Abbas for Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh for Hamas, were to compete, Abbas would receive 46% of the vote and Haniyeh would receive 45%. 9% remain undecided. But if the presidential race was between Marwan Barghouti, representing Fateh, and Khalid Mish’al, representing Hamas, Marwan Barghouti would receive 57% of the vote and Khalid Mish’al would receive 36%. 7% remain undecided.

28-30 August 2008

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 28 and 30 August 2008. This period witnessed a relative consolidation of the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip and the release by Israel of about 200 Palestinian prisoners as a gesture to President Mahmud Abbas. The poll examines the following topics: the domestic balance of power, the performance and legitimacy of two governments, that of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad, the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip, and the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

 Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2008 indicate continued slow decline in Hamas’s popularity while Fateh’s popularity remains stable as it was during the second quarter. Similarly, findings show a slightly wider gap between the popularity of President Abbas compared to that of Ismail Haniyeh in favor of the former. Positive evaluation of the conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank remains higher than that of conditions in the Gaza Strip. This applies to overall conditions as well as those of democracy and human rights. Findings show also significant opposition to Hamas’s military entry into Shijaiah in the Gaza Strip in early August. They also show widespread belief that the term of President Abbas ends in the first month of January 2009, as Hamas claims, and not in the first month of 2010, as the presidency claims. Findings also indicate an overwhelming support for the continuation of the current ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip despite recognition of many that it will not lead to the opening of the Rafah Crossing with Egypt. Despite the support for the ceasefire, about two thirds also support kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in order to exchange them with Palestinian prisoners.

It was expected that the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel would lead to improvement in Hamas’s standing among the public. But the fact that Hamas continues to lose public support might be due to strong opposition to its behavior in dealing with Shijaiah incident which led to several deaths and the escape of several members of the Hillis family to Israel. Moreover, the fact that the Rafah crossing remained closed since the ceasefire and that the other crossings were only partially opened might have weakened Hamas’s appeal. On the other hand, findings show an improvement in the perception of security and safety in the West Bank which might have been responsible in part for the improvement in Abbas’s standing. Moreover, Israel’s release of about 200 Palestinian prisoners at the end of August might have also played in Abbas’s favor.  

1)Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• If new presidential elections are held today, and the only two candidates were Abbas and Haniyeh, the former would receive the support of 53% and the latter 39%.  If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% to Haniyeh’s 34%.
• If new parliamentary elections are to take place today, Hamas would receive 29% and Fateh would receive 43%. Percentage of those who would vote for other factions and parties stands today at 11% and the undecided at 16%.  
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Salam Fayyad stands at 34%; similarly, positive evaluation of Haniyeh’s government stands today at 34%. 33% say Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one while 27% say Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one.
• Perception of personal and family security and safety stands at 43% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip.
• An overwhelming majority (69%) opposes Hamas’s armed entry into the Shijaiah neighborhood in the Gaza Strip and 20% support it.
• 63% believe that Abbas term as president ends in January 2009, not in January 2010.

The Gap between the standing of PA President Mahmud Abbas and Hamas’s Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh has increased to 14 percentage points in favor of Abbas. If new presidential elections are held today, and the only two candidates were Abbas and Haniyeh, the former would receive the support of 53% and the latter 39%. This finding represents a slight increase in the popularity of Abbas which stood at 52% last June compared to 40% for Haniyeh. Haniyeh’s popularity reached its peak last March, in the aftermath of the breaching of the Rafah border, when it stood at 47% compared to 46% for Abbas. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% to Haniyeh’s 34%. Level of non-participation in the presidential elections would reach 37% if the competition was between Abbas and Haniyeh and 27% if the competition was between Barghouti and Haniyeh. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas increases slightly from 46% last June to 48% in this poll. Level of dissatisfaction reaches 47% today.

 Moreover, the gap between Fateh and Hamas increases from 12 percentage points last June to 14 percentage points in this poll. If new parliamentary elections are to take place today, Hamas would receive 29% (compared to 31% last June) and Fateh would receive 43% (same as in June). Percentage of those who would vote for other factions and parties stands today at 11% and the undecided at 16%.  

Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Salam Fayyad remains as it was last June standing at 34% and the negative evaluation at 34%. Similarly, positive evaluation of Haniyeh’s government stands today at 34% and negative evaluation at 39%. Last June, positive evaluation of Haniyeh’s government stood at 37% and negative evaluation at 35%. Today, 33% say Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one while 27% say Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one. Last June, belief in the legitimacy of the Fayyad government reached 31% compared to 29% for Haniyeh’s. Last March, Haniyeh’s government was perceived as legitimate by 34%.  

Perception of personal and family security and safety increases in the West Bank from 40% last June to 43% in this poll. But the percentage of personal and family security and safety in the Gaza Strip is higher than in the West Bank as it reaches 54% (compared to 49% in Gaza last June).  By contrast, positive evaluation of the overall conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank is higher than in the Gaza Strip, with only 8% describing conditions on the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 27% describing the same conditions in the West Bank and good or very good.  Last June, positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stood at 5% compared to 25% in the West Bank.  Similarly, 34% give a positive evaluation of the status of democracy in the West Bank while only 24% describe the same conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good.

An overwhelming majority (69%) opposes Hamas’s armed entry into the Shijaiah neighborhood in the Gaza Strip (an event that led to several deaths and the escape of several members of Hillis family to Israel) while only 20% support it. Support for Hamas’s action increases in the Gaza Strip, reaching 35% compared to 12% in the West Bank. The wide gap in support between the two areas might reflect a greater Hamas media influence in Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank. Indeed, our findings show that 21% in the Gaza Strip watch Hamas’s satellite TV station, al Aqsa, compared to only 6% in the West Bank. Moreover, support for Hamas’s action in Shijaiah increases in refugee camps (27%) compared to villages and towns (16%), among men (25%) compared to women (16%), among those who identify themselves as religious (23%) compared to those who identify themselves as somewhat religious (17%), among those opposed to the peace process (41%) compared to supporters of the peace process (16%), among supporters of Hamas (53%) compared to supporters of Fateh (5%), among refugees (25%) compared to non refugees (16%), among those who hold a BA degree (24%) compared to those how hold a preparatory certificate (13%), among those with the least income (25%) compared to those with the highest income (15%), and among those whose age is between 18-22 years old (26%) compared to those whose age is over 52 years (17%).

23% believe that Fateh is responsible for the Gaza explosion that led to the death of five Hamas members last June while 43% believe it was not responsible; 33% say they do not know.

A majority of 63% believes that Abbas term as president ends in January 2009, as Hamas claims (i.e., four years after he was elected), while only 23% believe that his term extends to five years ending in January 2010, as the presidency claims.  Belief that the president’s term ends in January 2009 increases among those who oppose the peace process (74%) compared to those who support the peace process (59%), among supporters of Hamas (79%) compared to supporters of Fateh (52%), among those who hold a BA degree (69%) compared to illiterates (40%), among students (71%) compared to employees (56%), and among those whose age is between 18-22 years old (67%) compared to those whose age is over 52 years (56%).

2)Ceasefire and Prisoners’ Exchange  

• 81% support and 15% oppose the continuation of the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip
• 49% believe that if the ceasefire continues, it will lead to the opening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt and 42% believe it will not
• 60% describe Hamas’s performance in the ceasefire negotiations with Israel as good or very good and 28% describe it as bad or very bad
• 75% view the prisoners’ exchange deal between Hezbollah and Israel as a victory for Hezbollah and 7% view it as a victory for Israel
• If an agreement is reached on a prisoners’ exchange between Hamas and Israel, 46% expect the deal to be a victory for Hamas and 26% expect it to be a victory for Israel
• 59% believe that the best way to free Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails is by reaching a peace agreement that would include release of prisoners, but 39% believe the best way is by kidnapping Israeli soldiers and exchanging them with Palestinian prisoners
• But given the experience of the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, 74% support and 21% oppose kidnapping of soldiers to exchange them with Palestinian and Arab prisoners

Findings show that 81% of the Palestinians support and 15% oppose the continuation of the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.  It is worth noting that our June 2008 poll found that 78% supported and 21% opposed a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel. But we also found at that time that support was very low (23%) to a ceasefire that was restricted to the Gaza Strip and did not include the West Bank. Support was even lower (20%) for an agreement that did not allow for the opening of the crossings, particularly the Rafah crossing. Findings of the current poll indicate that 49% of the Palestinians believe that if the ceasefire continues, it will lead to the opening of the Rafah crossing and 42% believe it will not. Despite the fact that the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel was restricted to the Gaza Strip and did not allow for a normal functioning of the Rafah crossing, a majority of 60% describes Hamas’s performance in the ceasefire negotiations as good or very good while only 28% view it as bad or very bad.

Findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians believe that the prisoners’ exchange agreement between Hezbollah and Israel was a victory for Hezbollah while only 7% view it as a victory for Israel. But the percentage of those who believe that a prisoners’ exchange agreement between Hamas and Israel will be a victory for Hamas does not exceed 46% and 26% believe it will be a victory for Israel.

A majority of 59% believes that the best way to free Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails is by reaching a peace agreement that includes their release while 39% believe the best way is by kidnapping Israeli soldiers and exchanging them with Palestinian prisoners. But when asked about the lessons learned from the experience of the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, the overwhelming majority (74%) says it supports and only 21% say it opposes kidnapping of soldiers to exchange them with Palestinian and Arab prisoners. In other words, despite the preference for diplomacy, the majority shows little confidence in its viability and opts instead for non-diplomatic means.

Belief that the best way to release Palestinian prisoners is by reaching a peace agreement increases in villages and towns (62%) compared to refugee camps (53%), among women (64%) compared to men (53%), among supporters of the peace process (68%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (21%), among supporters of Fateh (77%) compared to supporters of Hamas (32%), among holders of preparatory certificate (68%) compared to holders of BA degree (48%), among farmers (71%)  and housewives (66%) compared to students (52%), and among private sector employees (59%) compared to public sector employees (47%).

3)Peace Process   

• 57% support and 41% oppose a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of the conflict
• 68% support and 30% oppose the Saudi Initiative
• 70% support and 28% oppose reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement between the two sides
• But 43% believe that reconciliation between the two peoples is not possible ever
• Moreover, 69% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are low or non existent while 28% believe the chances are medium or high
• 12% believe that negotiations unleashed by the Annapolis Conference will succeed in ending Israeli occupation while 76% believe it will fail
• Similarly, 74% believe that it is impossible to reach a permanent settlement with the current Olmert government and 64% say that Abbas-Olmert meetings are not beneficial and should be stopped.

Findings show that a Palestinian majority (57%) supports a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of the conflict. Opposition to this mutual recognition stands at 41%. These figures are almost identical to those obtained last June. Findings also show that two thirds (68%) of the public support and 30% oppose the Saudi Initiative. The Initiative calls for an Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state and for reaching a just and agreed upon solution to the refugee problem based on UN resolution number 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders and will sign peace treaties and establish normal diplomatic relations with it. These findings are almost identical to those obtained last June.

Findings also show that a large majority of 70% supports reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement between the two sides and after the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel. Opposition to reconciliation stands at 28%. In this context, support for open borders and free movement of individuals and goods between the two states reaches 84%. Support for the establishment of joint economic institutions and ventures reaches 71%. Support for the establishment of joint political institutions, such as a parliament, with the ultimate goal of creating a confederation between the two states reaches 41%. Support for taking legal measures against incitement against Israel reaches 36%, and support for adopting a school curriculum that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians reaches 13%. In the context of reconciliation, 32% say that they would invite an Israeli colleague to their homes and an identical percentage says it would accept an invitation from an Israeli colleague to visit his or her home.

Despite support for reconciliation, a large percentage of 43% believes that reconciliation is not possible ever. Moreover, 69% believe that chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the next five years are low or non existent while only 28% say the chances are high or medium. More than three quarters (76%) believe that the negotiations unleashed by the Annapolis conference will fail in ending Israeli occupation while only 12% believe it will succeed. In the same context, 74% believe that it is impossible to reach a compromise permanent agreement with the government of Ehud Olmert and 64% say that Olmert-Abbas meetings are not beneficial and should be stopped..... Full Report

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (42)

While Hamas wins greater public confidence and appreciation in the aftermath of the prisoner exchange deal, likely vote for the group remains unchanged and while the public opposes return to negotiations without terms of reference and a settlement freeze, support for a permanent status compromise increases

15-17 December 2011   

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 15-17 December 2011. Several important developments preceded this poll: a Hamas-Israel prisoner exchange deal, an increase in settlers’ violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, Palestinian submission of a request to join the United Nations, admission of Palestine as a member state at UNESCO, and Abbas-Mish’al meeting and the renewal of Fateh-Hamas reconciliation efforts including the setting of May 2012 as a date for new elections. The poll covers Palestinian attitudes regarding the prisoner exchange deal, reconciliation, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the final quarter of 2011 show that Hamas has won the confidence and respect of the public in the aftermath of the prisoner exchange deal with Israel. About three quarters believe that Hamas came out winning from the deal more than Israel. Moreover 37% say their support for Hamas has increased as a result of the deal while only 10% say their support has decreased. As importantly, confidence in Hamas is expressed in the acceptance of a majority of the public of Hamas’ decision in the deal to concede to Israeli conditions regarding two important issues: the exclusion from the deal of major political figures and the deportation of many released prisoners. Confidence in Hamas is also reflected in the increase in the positive evaluation of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip and in the increased popularity of Ismail Haniyeh, its potential candidate to the presidential elections.  Despite all this however, the percentage of likely vote for Hamas in parliamentary elections, if one is held today, remains unchanged compared to the situation before the exchange deal.

Findings also show a limited decline in the popularity of president Mahmud Abbas and reveal a problem Fateh is likely to face in selecting a candidate for the presidency, if Abbas continues to insist on not running. The most popular alternative is Marwan Barghouti. He is also the one most able to win similar levels of support from both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. All other potential Fateh candidates receive very small percentages of support, not exceeding 7%. Moreover, most potential candidates have highly different levels of support in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip.

Findings also show that despite the continued public opposition to return to negotiations with Israel before it accepts terms of reference based on the 1967 borders and agrees to a settlement freeze, the public shows more willingness than any time during the past six years to accept a permanent settlement compromise based on the Geneva Initiative and the Clinton Parameters. In the meanwhile, the public strongly supports going to the UN and launching a popular non violent resistance and opposes the dissolution of the PA, a return to an armed intifada, or the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution.

 (1) Domestic Conditions, Elections, and Reconciliation:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank (47%) is higher than positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip (26%).
• Similarly, perception that press freedom exists in the West Bank is higher, standing at 67%, than perception that it exists in the Gaza Strip, standing at 52%. Perception that people can criticize the West Bank PA without fear stands at 35% while perception that people can criticize the Gaza Hamas government stands at 24%. 
• But belief that corruption exists in the West Bank PA institutions stands at 70% while belief that corruption exists in the institutions of the Gaza dismissed government stands at 60%.
• Moreover, perception of safety and security is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 69%, than in the West Bank, standing at 59%.
• Increase in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government and a decrease in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas rises from 52% to 60% in three months.
• If new presidential elections are to be held today, Abbas would receive 55% and Haniyeh 37%.
• If new legislative elections are to be held today, Hamas would receive 29%, Fateh 43%, all other electoral lists 11%, and 17% remain undecided.
• The strongest alternative Fateh candidate to Abbas is Marwan Barghouti (54%) followed by Saeb Erikat (7%).
• Half of the public is optimistic about the chances for reconciliation and 43% believe that new elections will indeed take place in May or a little after that, but only 21% believe that a reconciliation government will be formed any time soon.
• The largest percentage (47%) opposes the exclusion of Fayyad as possible prime minister of a reconciliation government while 44% agree with the exclusion.
• 72% believe that the US and Israel will suspend financial assistance and transfer of custom funds to the PA after the formation of the reconciliation government.
•  71% believe that the PA should accept American financial assistance while 27% believe it should reject it; 64% believe that alternative sources of financial assistance do exist.

26% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 47% describe them as bad or very bad. By contrast, 36% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 30% describe them as bad or very bad. 67% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 28% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 52% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 36% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 35% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 24% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

However, while 70% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank, only 60% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. Moreover, perception of safety and security stands at 59% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip. These findings show an improvement in the Gaza conditions, probably reflecting perception after the prisoner exchange deal while showing deterioration of conditions in the West Bank, probably in response to an increase in settlers’ violence against West Bankers.

Findings show an increase in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government and a decrease in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government. Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 41% and Salam Fayyad’s at 44%. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 34% and 53% respectively. But findings show also that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 43%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 24%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 49% and 28% respectively.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 60% while 38% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. These figures stood at 52% and 44% respectively. The increase in the satisfaction with the performance of Abbas is probably reflecting public appreciation for his UN speech about three months ago. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands today at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 55% and Haniyeh 37% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 64%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 54% and Haniyeh 42% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 56% and Haniyeh 33%. These results indicate a decrease in Abbas’ popularity and an increase in Haniyeh’s compared to the situation three months ago when Abbas received the support of 59% and Haniyeh 34%.  If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter would receive 30% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 71%. If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 73% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 43% say they would vote for Fateh, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. These results indicate a decrease of two percentage points in Fateh’s popularity compared to the situation three months ago. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip in this poll stands at 35% and in the West Bank 25%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands at 43% and in the West Bank 44%.

In an open question, one without a list to choose from, respondents were asked to propose a candidate for Fateh in the next presidential elections--assuming president Abbas would not run. The largest percentage (40%) favored Marwan Barghouti while 8% favored Salam Fayyad, 5% favored Saeb Erekat, 3% favored Mohammad Dahlan, 2% favored Azzam al Ahmad, and another 2% favored Mustapha Barghouti.  When respondents were asked to select a favored candidate from a list of names, 54% selected Marwan Barghouti, followed by Erekat (7%), Mahmud Al Aloul (4%), and Azzam al Ahmad (3%). 2% went to each of the following names: Abu Mahir Ghnaim, Nasir al Qidwa, Jibril al Rojoub, and Ahmad Qurie’.

Now, after the meeting between president Mahmud Abbas and Khalid Mish’al, 50% believe Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 46% believe they will not succeed. Optimism is higher in the West Bank (53%) than in the Gaza Strip (46%), among those who would vote for Hamas and Fateh (58% and 52% respectively) compared to those who do not wish to participate in new elections or those who would vote for third parties (42% and 44% respectively), among illiterates and those with primary education (66% and 58% respectively) compared to those who carry a BA degree (40%), among those who use the internet once a month or those who do not use it at all (60%) compared to those who use it on daily basis (46%).

Despite the optimism expressed by half of the public, only 21% expect to see the formation of a reconciliation government or a government of experts within days or weeks. 46% expect one to be formed after a long time and 27% believe one will never be formed. Percentage of those who believe a reconciliation government will be formed in few days or weeks increases in the Gaza Strip (24%) compared to the West Bank (19%), among those who describe themselves as religious (24%) compared to those who describe themselves as somewhat religious (17%), among those who would vote for Hamas and Fateh (25% and 22% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in elections (16%), among the illiterates (34%) compared to those who carry a BA degree (17%), and among those who use the internet on daily basis (23%) compared to those who use it once a month or not at all (13%).

With regard to presidential and parliamentary elections, now proposed for May 2012, 43% expect them to be held on time or a little after that while 47% believe elections will not be held around that time. 47% oppose the exclusion of Salam Fayyad from leading the government of reconciliation or experts while 44% agree to his exclusion as Hamas wishes. Percentage of opposition to the exclusion of Fayyad increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (46%), among supporters of the peace process (53%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (31%), among those who would vote for Fateh (64%) compared to those who would vote for Hamas (27%), among holders of BA degree (52%) compared to illiterates (44%), and among those who work in the public sector (56%) compared to those who work in the private sector (47%). 

If a government of reconciliation or experts is formed soon, 72% expect the US government to punish the PA by suspending financial support. A larger percentage (80%) believes Israel too would most likely suspend transfer of custom money to the PA. But a smaller percentage (52%) expects the EU to suspend financial support when a government of reconciliation or experts is formed.  Findings also show that a large majority (71%) believes that under the present conditions the PA should accept American financial assistance while 27% believe it should reject it. In case the PA rejected American assistance or if the assistance stopped for some other reason, 64% believe the PA will find alternative sources in the Arab World and friendly countries while 33% believe it will not find alternative sources. The percentage of those who believe the PA should accept American assistance increases among those who describe themselves as somewhat religious (74%) compared to those who describe themselves as religious (66%), among supporters of the peace process (75%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (61%), and among those who would vote for Fateh (80%) compared to those who would vote for Hamas (60%). The belief that the PA will find alternative sources of assistance to that of the US increases in the Gaza Strip (68%) compared to the West Bank (61%), among those opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to those who support the peace process (62%), and among holders of BA degree (67%) compared to illiterates (41%).

(2) Hamas-Israel Prisoner Exchange Deal:

• About three quarters believe that Hamas came out winning more than Israel in the prisoner exchange deal and 37% say that their support for Hamas has increased after the deal.
• A majority agrees that Hamas was right to agree to Israel’s tough conditions in the prisoner exchange deal such as those that stipulated that top political leaders would not be released or that some would be deported.

About three quarters of the public believe Hamas came out winning more than Israel in the prisoner exchange deal while only 22% believe Israel won more out of the deal. Moreover, 37% say their support for Hamas has increased after the exchange deal while 50% say their support did not change and only 10% say their support decreased. Percentage of those who say their support for Hamas has increased rises in the West Bank (41%) compared to the Gaza Strip (32%), among those who describe themselves as religious (45%) compared to those who describe themselves as somewhat religious (32%), among those who oppose the peace process (54%) compared to those who support the peace process (33%), among those who would vote for Hamas (76%) compared to those who would vote for Fateh, third parties, those who have not decided yet to whom they would vote, and those who will not participate in new elections (21%, 32%, 26%, and 33% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (36%) compared to those who work in the public sector (30%), and among those who use the internet once a month or not at all (39%) compared to those who use it on daily basis (30%).

A majority of 55% believe that Hamas was right to agree to Israel’s condition that stipulated that top leaders like Ahmad Sa’dat, Ibrahim Hamid, and Marwan Barghouti would be excluded from the exchange deal while 40% believe that Hamas should not have agreed to this condition.  Similarly, a majority of 53% believe that Hamas was right to agree to Israel’s condition that a number of released prisoners would be deported while 43% believe that Hamas should not have agreed to this condition. Percentage of those who believe that Hamas should have accepted the condition that no top political leaders should be released increases in the West Bank (57%) compared to the Gaza Strip (52%), among those who describe themselves as religious (60%) compared to those who describe themselves as somewhat religious (53%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (71%) compared to supporters of the peace process (51%), among those who would vote for Hamas (76%) compared to those who vote for Fateh and third parties (44% and 47% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (60%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (53%), among the illiterates (60%) compared to holders of BA degree (52%), and among those who use the internet once a month or do not use it at all (62%) compared to those who use it on daily basis (53%).

(3) Peace Process

• Rise in support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative from 40% a year ago to 50% in this poll. A majority supports compromises related to borders and territorial exchange and end of conflict (63% each), half supports proposed security arrangements, but only a minority supports compromises related to refugees (45%), Jerusalem (40%), and the establishment of a state without an army (32%).
• 59% support and 39% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative.
• 63% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non existent and 36% believe the chances are medium or high.

Findings show that 50% support and 49% oppose a package of a permanent status agreement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for this package stood at 40% in December 2010. The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) final borders and territorial exchange; (2) refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) a demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) security arrangements; and (6) end of conflict. We have been addressing these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic stalemate throughout 2011. 

Findings, as the summary table below shows, indicate that the public rejects three items in the package and accept the other three. The following is a summary of the items and the attitudes to each:

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 63% support or strongly support and 36% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2010, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 49% and opposition at 50%.

(2) Refugees: 45% support and 53% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2010, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 57% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem: 40% support and 59% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2010, an identical compromise obtained 36% support and 63% opposition.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State: 32% support and 67% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2010, 24% support, and opposition reached 74%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

(5) Security Arrangements: 50% support and 49% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2010, 38% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 61% opposed it.

(6) End of Conflict: 63% support and 35% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in December 2010 were 58% support and 41% opposition.

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2011

Support for the package is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 53%, than in the West Bank, standing at 47%, among supporters of the peace process (54%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (37%), among those who would vote for Fateh, third parties, and those who will not participate in new elections (62%, 54%, and 47% respectively) compared to those who would vote for Hamas or those who are undecided regarding whom they will vote for (36% and 43% respectively), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (54%) compared to those who are over 50 years of age (44%), and among those who use the internet on daily basis (59%) compared to those who use it once a month or never (38%).  

Findings also show that 51% of the public believe that a majority among Palestinians supports a settlement along these lines while 41% believe a majority opposes it and 8% say it does not know the position of the majority. Yet, only 30% believe that a majority among Israelis support such a package while 61% believe a majority of Israelis opposes it. Perhaps for this reason, and others, only 37% believe that it is possible these days to reach a permanent settlement with Israel while 62% believe that it is impossible to reach such a settlement. Moreover, 63% of the public is pessimistic about the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years: 63% believe chances to be slim or non existent and 36% believe them to be medium or high.

(4) Alternatives to Negotiations and Going to the UN:

• 78% support and 20% oppose President Abbas’ position which views as useless any negotiations with Israel without a prior agreement on terms of reference and a settlement freeze and that therefore, Palestinians need to go to the UN to obtain international recognition of their state.
• In the absence of negotiations, 78% supports going to the UN Security Council to obtain membership, 61% supports resort to popular non violent resistance, and 58% supports a unilateral declaration of statehood; but only 28% support abandoning the two state solution in favor of one state solution, 34% support the dissolution of the PA, and 41% support return to armed intifada and confrontations.
• A mere declaration of statehood will not change any thing on the ground or make things worse in the eyes of 72% of the public, therefore, when declaring a state, two thirds say the PA should impose its sovereignty even if such a step leads to a clash with occupation and settlers.
• When declaring a state or after UN General Assembly vote recognizing Palestine as a state, 71% want the PA to assert control over the Allenby Bridge crossing with Jordan even if such a step leads to suspension of travel across the bridge.
• Only 36% believe that popular non violent resistance will be able to end occupation or stop settlement construction, but 52% believe that large scale peaceful demonstrations would contribute to speeding up the end of occupation.
• 68% believe that there is a practical benefit for Palestinians in winning state membership in UNESCO and 28% do not believe that.
• 63% believe the Palestinian side should seek recognition of Palestine as an observer state from the UN General Assembly and 31% do not believe that.
• 77% believe that Israel will suspend transfer of customs’ funds to the PA if the UN General Assembly recognized Palestine as a state and 20% do not believe that.
• After a UN General Assembly recognition of Palestine as a state, the public is split into three groups on the best means of forcing Israel to end its occupation of Palestinian territories: 32% for negotiations, 31% for massive peaceful demonstrations, and 30% for armed attacks

Findings show an overwhelming support for the position advanced by PA president seeing no point in returning to negotiations with Israel without a prior Israeli acceptance of a specific term of reference (i.e., acceptance of the 1967 borders with swap) and settlement freeze and that in the meanwhile the PA should go to the UN seeking an international recognition of a Palestinian state. This position is supported by 78% and opposed by 20%. Support increases in the West Bank to 83% and decreases in the Gaza Strip to 70%. We proposed six different options for Palestinians as alternatives to negotiations: a majority supported three, going to the UN Security Council, resort to popular non violent resistance, and unilateral declaration of statehood, while opposing the other three, dissolution of the PA, abandoning the two state solution, and return to armed intifada. The biggest level of support (78%) went to going to the UN Security Council to obtain membership while 22% expressed opposition. A majority of 61% also supported resort to popular non violent resistance while 38% opposed it. 58% supported a unilateral declaration of statehood while 41% opposed it. By contrast, only 28% supported abandoning the two state solution in favor of a one state solution while 71% opposed it. Moreover, only 34% supported the option of dissolving the PA and 65% opposed it. Finally, 41% supported and 58% opposed return to armed intifada.

Findings show that a large majority (72%) believes that a mere declaration of statehood will not change any thing on the ground or that it will make things worse; therefore, when declaring a state, two thirds of the public want the PA to exercise sovereignty throughout the entire West Bank even if such a measure leads to a confrontation between the PA and the Israeli army and settlers. Moreover, an international recognition of Palestine as a state, requires in the eyes of 71% of the public a Palestinian assertion of sovereignty over the Allenby crossing with Jordan even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing.  Findings also show that while 61% do not believe that popular non violent resistance by itself is capable of ending occupation or stopping settlement construction, 52% believe that large scale peaceful demonstrations can contribute to speeding up the ending of occupation.

Findings also show that a majority (63%) is in favor of going to the UN General Assembly today to obtain recognition of Palestine as an observer state while 31% oppose this step. An overwhelming majority of 77% believes that Israel will suspend transfer of custom funds to the PA if the UN General Assembly recognized Palestine as a state. After such recognition, findings show Palestinians divided into three groups over the best means of forcing Israel to end its occupation: 32% want to return to negotiations, 31% want large scale popular non violent demonstrations, and 30% want a return to armed attacks.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 48% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation and build a state and 30% believe it should be to obtain the right of return
• 28% believe the first problem confronting Palestinians today is the continuation of Israeli occupation while 32% believe it is poverty and unemployment

48% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. Three months ago, at the peak of Palestinian UN statehood bid 59% viewed statehood within the 1967 borders as the most vital goal. It is likely that the stalemate in the UN drive to gain statehood and membership has somewhat reduced public interest in it compared to the situation three months ago.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is the spread of poverty and unemployment, selected by 32% of the public, while 28% believe that it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities. Among Gazans, the top three problems are: the continuation of occupation, selected by 30%, followed by the continuation of the siege on the Gaza Strip and poverty and unemployment (26% for each). Among West Bankers, the top three problems are: poverty and unemployment, with 36% selecting it, followed by continuation of occupation, selected by 27%, and corruption, selected by (27%).

(6) Regional Issues: Egypt and Iran

• Despite the expected electoral victory of Islamists in Egypt, 60% expect the continuation of the implementation of the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel while 39% expect the treaty to be annulled
• 48% expect and 48% do not expect Israel to carry out a military strike against Iran in the coming months
• After an Israeli military strike against Iran, 56% expect a combined Iranian-Hizballah military response and 23% expect an Iranian response only

Findings show that a majority of the Palestinian public (60%) does not believe that an expected Islamist electoral victory will lead to a meaningful change in the relationship between Egypt and Israel, particularly regarding the peace treaty between the two sides, while 39% believe it will lead to a big change including the annulment of the peace treaty.

Findings also show that in light of the talk about the Iranian nuclear developments, the public is divided into two halves regarding the chances of an Israeli military strike to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities. If indeed Israel does carry out such a strike, 56% believe that Iran and Hizballah together will respond by carrying out a military retaliation against Israel, 23% believe that Iran alone will retaliate against Israel, 9% believe that Hizballah alone will retaliate, and 9% believe that neither Iran nor Hizballah will retaliate. Findings also show that 48% of the public believe that Hamas and Islamic Jihad should retaliate against Israel if it carries out a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-16 September 2017. The popular confrontations with the Israeli police in Jerusalem in protest over the installment of metal detectors at the entrance to al Haram al Sharif gates were the most important event during the period in question. During the confrontations, President Abbas announced the suspension of contacts with the Israeli side, including security coordination. Internally, the split and disunity characterized the Palestinian political scene, except during the last two days of data collection when delegates from Hamas and Fatah were called to Cairo for Egyptian sponsored talks.  During this period, President Abbas issued a decree in the form of a Cybercrime Law that was severely criticized by human rights organizations, media outlets, and other civil society organizations. Several journalists were arrested in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It should be pointed out that data collection was completed just one day before Hamas announced the dissolution of its “Administrative Committee” that has served until then as the de facto government in the Gaza Strip. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, and the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2017 show that an overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public is worried about the future of liberties in Palestine. This prevailing perception seems to be driven by the recent increase in the incidents in which journalists and activists have been arrested, by the recently announced presidential decree enacting a cybercrime law, and by the government proposed amendments to the Law of the Judiciary. A large majority believes that Palestinians cannot criticize the PA without fear. In fact, half of the public believes that the PA has now become a burden on the Palestinian people.  

This worry about the future of liberties, along with the concerns about the steps taken by the PA against the Gaza Strip, might be responsible for the increase in the demand for the resignation of President Abbas and the decline in his popularity compared to that of Hamas’ presidential candidate, Ismael Haniyeh. Indeed, if presidential elections are held today, Haniyeh would win against Abbas. Findings also indicate a decline in support for Fatah, particularly in the Gaza Strip where Hamas is more popular. In the West Bank however, Fatah remains more popular than Hamas.

Perhaps the most alarming result of this poll is the fundamental shift in the attitudes of Gazans. This shift was first noticed early this year but accelerated during the past nine months. It is probable that the change came as a response to the punitive steps taken by President Abbas against the Gaza Strip. The split that rested essentially on the power struggle between two large political parties in the entire Palestinian territories is in the process of transformation to one between West Bankers and Gazans, a split that did not exist during the first nine years of Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip. Gazans are moving away from Fatah and the Palestinian leadership in an unprecedented way and without a parallel or similar process among West Bankers. President Abbas might have hoped that the sanctions he imposed on the Gaza Strip would force Gazans to reject Hamas and its policies forcing Hamas to dismantle its “Administrative Committee” that has served as a de facto government for the Gaza Strip. Despite the limited decline in Hamas’ popularity in this poll, it is plainly clear that Gazans are directing their greatest anger at Abbas and Fatah, rather than Hamas. Today, 80% of Gazans want Abbas’ resignation, satisfaction with the performance of the president is about 20%, and it is certain that he would lose any presidential elections in the Gaza Strip to Hamas’ Ismael Haniyeh. Moreover, Fatah is fast losing its popularity in the Gaza Strip, standing at 28% today compared to 40% only nine months ago.  Those who still support Fatah in the Gaza Strip are shifting loyalty to Mohammad Dahlan whose popularity among Gazans has more than doubled during the past nine months, from 9% to 23% today, while his popularity among West Bankers did not change, remaining hardly at 1%.

Despite the fact that positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip remains very low, the poll found some positive indicators: the desire to migrate has declined somewhat and the perception of personal and family safety and security has increased. It is also interesting to note the large increase in support for the Hamas-Dahlan deal and the optimism of the majority of Gazans who believe that the deal will be successfully implemented.

It is also worth noting the increase in public confidence in popular non-violent resistance in the aftermath of the success in removing the metal detectors installed by the Israeli police in front of the gates of al Haram al Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary). Support for this model of resistance now reaches two thirds. It should be noted however that the findings also show a rise in support for violence despite the fact that a majority remains opposed to it. One reason for the rise in support for violent and non-violent resistance might be the lack of trust in diplomacy. Findings show that about three quarters believe that the Trump Administration is not serious about Palestinian-Israeli peace making and an even higher percentage believes that the Administration is not an honest broker and that it is biased in favor of Israel.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 67% want president Abbas to resign and only 31% are satisfied with his performance.
• In presidential elections between Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former receives 50% and the latter 42%.
• In presidential elections between Ismail Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti, the former receives 36% and the latter 59%.
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 36% of the vote, Hamas 29%, and third parties combined 10%.

67% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 27% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 60% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago demand for Abbas resignation stood at 55% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip. Demand for Abbas’ resignation is higher in cities and refugee camps (70% and 69% respectively) compared to villages and towns (52%), among the religious (73%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (63% and 52% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (84%) compared to those who support the peace process (56%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (94% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (34%), among those between the ages of 18 and 22 (69%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (59%), among the refugees (73%) compared to non-refugees (62%), among holder of BA degree (68%) compared to illiterates (48%), and among students (73%) compared to the retirees (55%). If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 21% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 9% (1% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip); Mustapha Barghouti (5%); and Khalid Mishal and Rami al Hamdallah (4% each). Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 34% (39% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 50% and the latter 42%of the vote (compared to  45% each three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the vote (compared to 39% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 55% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 45% (compared to 50% three months ago) and Haniyeh 42% (compared to 40% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 20%, Barghouti 43% and Haniyeh 33%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 63% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 25% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 29% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 31% (compared to 35% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 36% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 24% three months ago) and Fatah at 42% (compared to 40% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• 58% of those who are aware of the debate on the Cybercrime Law believe that it imposes restrictions on liberties and among those who are aware of the debate on the proposed amendments to the Law of the Judiciary, 55% believe the amendments are a threat to the independence of the judiciary.
• 80% are worried about the future of liberties in Palestine.
• 50% believe the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people.
• Perception of personal safety and security stands at 49% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank.
• 73% support Abbas’ decision to suspend contacts and security coordination with Israel but two-thirds believe that the PA does not in fact implement that decision. 

Half of the public is not aware of the debate among the Palestinians surrounding the Cybercrime Law. Among those who are aware of the debate, 58% express the view that the law imposes restrictions on liberties and 39% believe it does not. The belief among those who are aware of the debate that the Law restrict liberties is higher in cities and refugee camps (59% and 58% respectively) compared to villages and towns (48%), among women (60%) compared to men (56%), among supporters of Hamas and the third parties (62% and 57% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (50%), among the holders of BA degree (54%) compared to the illiterates (43%), and among students (59%) compared to farmers and professionals (41% and 47% respectively).

Similarly, 60% are not aware of the debate surrounding the proposed amendments to the Law of the Judiciary. Among those who are aware of the debate, 55% express the view that the proposed amendments pose a threat to the independence of the judiciary and 38% think the amendments will improve the performance of the judiciary.  In light of the increase in the incidents of the detention of journalist and activists in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 80% are worried about the future of liberties in Palestine. The level of worry is higher in the West Bank, standing at 85%, than in the Gaza Strip, standing at 71%; 17% are not worried.  81% believe that the PA does not have the right to arrest activists, such as Issa Amro from Hebron, just because they criticize the behavior of the PA; 14% belief the PA has the right to arrest its critics. Worry about the future of liberties in Palestine is higher among supporters of Hamas (85%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (72% and 69% respectively).

Only 38% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 59% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.  Half of the pubic (50%) view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 44% view it as an asset. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 21%. Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 49%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 50%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 43% and in the West Bank at 53%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 43%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago, 47% of Gazans and 23% of West Bankers indicated that they seek to immigrate.

In light of the recent incident in which an armed man, who was attempting to cross the Rafah border with Egypt, exploded a bomb that killed him and a Hamas policeman, 73% indicate that they are worried about the spread of Daesh (ISIS) among the youth in the Gaza Strip and 24% are not worried. Worry is higher in the Gaza Strip (78%) than in the West Bank (70%).

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Maan TV (14%), al Aqsa TV (13%), Palestine TV (12%), Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (11%), Al Arabiya (6%) al Quds TV (4%), and al Mayadeen (3%).  

73% support and 23% oppose Abbas’ decision to suspend contacts and security coordination with Israel but two thirds (66%) believe that the PA and its security services did not implement that decision. The belief that the PA and its security services have not implemented Abbas decision is higher in the West Bank (68%) compared to the Gaza Strip (63%), among men (69%) compared to women (63%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (80%) compared to supporters of the peace process (59%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (84% and 71% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (46%), and among students (69%) compared to employees (61%).

(3) Reconciliation, the reconciliation government, and the Hamas-Dahlan agreement:  

• Only 31% are optimistic and 61% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation.
• 23% are satisfied and 64% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• Only 15% say Hamas is responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government and 48% believe the responsibility for that goes to the PA, president Abbas, and the prime minister.
• 56% support the Hamas-Dahlan agreement and 47% think it will succeed.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 31% and pessimism at 61%. Three months ago optimism stood at 27% and pessimism at 64%. 23% say they are satisfied and 64% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 77% and in the West Bank at 56%. Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 15% (9% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip) while 33% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 15% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

47% believe that the Hamas-Dahlan agreement will fail and 43% think it will succeed. In the Gaza Strip, 57% think it will succeed and 39% think it will fail.  56% support the Hamas-Dahlan agreement and 35% oppose it. In the Gaza Strip, support for the agreement stands at 73% and opposition at 25%. Three months ago, only 40% supported the agreement and 48% opposed it and support for it in the Gaza Strip stood at 61%. Support for the agreement is higher in cities and refugee camps (58% and 57% respectively) compared to villages and towns (44%), among women (61%) compared to men (50%), among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (52% and 38% respectively), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (66% and 61%) compared to supporters of Fatah (48%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (58%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (49%), among refugees (64%) compared to non-refugees (49%), among holders of BA degree (64%) compared to the illiterates (44%), among employees and students (63% and 60% respectively) compared to the retirees, farmers, and professionals (29%, 37%, and 45% respectively), and among those who work in the public sector (59%) compared to those who work in the private sector (50%).

(4) Confrontations at the gates of al Haram al Sharif  

• 73% believe it was the residents of Jerusalem who forced Israel to remove the metal detectors.
• 63% view popular peaceful confrontations as an effective means of resistance.

An overwhelming majority of 73% believe that the Jerusalem residents who took part in the confrontations that made it possible to force Israel to uninstall the metal detectors played the greatest role in the success of the confrontations. Only 10% attribute the success to the Waqf men; 7% to King Abdullah; 6% to president Abbas, and 1% to King Salman of Saudi Arabia. 63% believe that the approach adopted in the confrontations at the gates of al Haram al Sharif provide a successful model to emulate in confrontations with the Israeli occupation; 34% think the model is not effective.

(5) Convening the Palestinian National Council (PNC)

• 60% want an elected National Council and 61% condition convening it to the participation of Hamas and Islamic Jehad.
• 50% support holding the PNC in Ramallah and 35% support holding it in Amman or Cairo.

60% condition the convening of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) to the prior election of its members while 25% want to convene the meeting with the current membership.  Furthermore, 61% condition the convening of the PNC to the participation of Hamas and Islamic Jehad while 28% think it can be convened without them.  Conditioning the holding of the PNC session to the participation of Hamas and Islamic Jehad is higher in the West Bank (68%) compared to the Gaza Strip (49%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to supporters of the peace process (55%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (89% and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (41%), among non-refugees (65%) compared to refugees (56%), and among those who work in the private sector (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (55%).

50% support holding the meeting of the PNC in Ramallah while 35% support holding it in Cairo or Amman.  Support for holding the meeting in Ramallah is higher in the West Bank (55%) compared to the Gaza Strip (43%), in villages and towns (58%) compared to cities and refugee camps (50% and 43% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (40%), among Fatah supporters (63%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (34% and 46% respectively), and among holders of BA degree (51%) compared to the illiterates (44%);.

(6) The peace process:  

• 74% say President Donald Trump is not serious about the peace process.
• 83% believe that Trump Administration is biased in favor of Israel.
• 52% support and 47% oppose the two-state solution
• But 57% think the two-state solution is no longer practical.
• 71% support joining more international organizations, 67% support popular non-violent resistance, 45% support a return to an armed intifada, and 47% support the dissolution of the PA.
• 31% support and 67% oppose the one-state solution.

74% believe the US Administration under Donald Trump is not serious in its efforts to reach a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement; 22% think it is serious.  The belief that Trump is not serious is higher in the West Bank (83%) compared to the Gaza Strip (59%), in refugee camps and villages and towns (80% each) compared to cities (72%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (82%) compared to supporters of the peace process (69%), among supporters of Hamas (84%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (60% and 67% respectively), and among non-refugees (78%) compared to refugees (69%).

55% believe that if the Trump Administration invited the Palestinian leadership to return to negotiations with Israel, it should not accept the invitation; 41% think it should accept it.  If negotiations are resumed under US sponsorship, the Trump Administration will be biased in favor of Israel according to 83% of the public; 10% think it will be an honest broker and 2% think it will be biased in favor of the Palestinian side.

52% support and 47% oppose the two-state solution, the state of Palestine next to the state of Israel. Support in the Gaza Strip stands at 56% and in the West Bank at 49%.  But 57% think the two-state solution is no longer viable or practical due to settlement expansion while 40% think it remains feasible.  Similarly, 70% think the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 28% think the chances are medium or high.

35% think that the most effective means of creating a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel is armed action, 33% think negotiation is the most effective, and 26% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective.  In the absence of peace negotiations, 71% support joining more international organizations, 67% support non-violent popular resistance, 45% support a return to an armed intifada, and 47% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 39% and 54% supported popular non-violent resistance. Support for the one-state solution stands at 31% while 67% are opposed to this solution.

Furthermore, a majority of 58% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 25% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 16% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 78%.

77% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 22% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.  64% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 25% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 40% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be the end of occupation and the establishment of a state
• The most serious problem today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 26% of the public.

40% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 26% of the public while 25% believe it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 23% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 20% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

Joint Israeli- Palestinian Public Opinion Poll 

THREATENED ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS DISENCHANTED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS AND SUPPORT FURTHER VIOLENCE

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between March 12 and 17, 2008. 

The weeks preceding the poll were characterized by increased violence between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, with Hamas intensifying its rocket shelling on Israeli civilian communities; an Israeli incursion  into Gaza that left more than 130 Palestinians dead; and a shooting attack in West Jerusalem that led to the death of 8 Israeli religious students. 

The joint poll examined Israelis and Palestinians’ assessments of the negotiations launched by the Annapolis conference and are currently going on between Olmert and Abu Mazin. It further examined Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding a permanent settlement along the lines of the Saudi (Arab league) plan and Israelis’ attitudes towards a full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria. 

The findings indicate that both Israelis and Palestinians do not hold high hopes for the Abu Mazin–Olmert talks,  don’t see them as beneficial and believe they should be stopped. With regard to the Saudi plan, Israelis oppose it while Palestinians support it. A majority of Israelis also oppose the evacuation of the Golan for peace with Syria. At the same time there is considerable support for launching rockets and suicide attacks among Palestinians, and support for retaliatory operations in Gaza among Israelis. This combination looks explosive and may perpetuate further escalation in violence between the two sides. 

The Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between March 13 and 15, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 597 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between March 12 and 17, 2008. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il. 

*This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah. 

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Peace Process:

• 57% of the Israelis oppose and 40% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. Among Palestinians, 66% support the plan and 32% oppose it
• 44% of the Israelis support and 54% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. However a sizeable Israeli majority (62%) support and only 34% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished.
• Similarly, 45% of the Israelis support and 51% oppose the release of Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiation with him, if needed to reach such an agreement.
• 67% of the Israelis support and 29% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement. Among Palestinians, 55% support and 44% oppose this step.
• 53% of the Israelis believe that the meetings between Mahmud Abbas and Ehud Olmert are not beneficial and should be stopped while 39% believe they should continue. Palestinians show greater disappointment with these talks. Among Palestinians a sizeable majority of 75% believe the talks should come to a halt while only 21% believe they are beneficial and should be continued.
• 66% among Israelis and 68% of the Palestinians believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state during the next five years are non-existent or weak. Only 31% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians believe chances are fair or high.
• 59% of Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria, and 25% support it.

(B) Threat perceptions and support of violence 

• Following the renewed wave of violence, both Israelis and Palestinians’ threat levels increased significantly compared to our December 2007 poll.
• Among Israelis, 74% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 64% in our December 2007 poll -- an increase of 10 percentage points. Among Palestinians 63% fear that their security and safety and that of their family is not assured compared to 53% three months ago, a similar 10 percentage points increase.
• 13% of the Israelis also fear that Hezbollah will react to the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh by resuming the bombing and shooting of IDF forces along the border, 21% fear that it will retaliate by resuming the rocket launches on Israeli towns, 42% believe it will perform terrorists attacks against Jews and Israelis around the world and only 13% believe it will restrain itself and will not respond. 

Consistent with the gloomy expectations from the peace process and the heightened threat feelings, Palestinians support of violent acts against Israel is staggering while Israeli support for military action in Gaza remains stable.

• An overwhelming majority of 84% support and 13% oppose the shooting attack that took place in a religious school in West Jerusalem. Support for this attack is greater in the Gaza Strip (91%) compared to theWest Bank (79%).
• 64% support and 33% oppose launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities such as Sderot and Ashkelon.
• Among Israelis only 27% believe that if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues, Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps, 29% of the Israelis suggest that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there and 41% think that Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out. Surprisingly these figures did not change from three months ago.

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, October 2010

PALESTINIANS BELIEVE THEY ARE OF GREATER NEED OF SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ISRAELIS THINK BOTH SIDES NEED IT EQUALLY, BUT BOTH PUBLICS ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THEIR SUCCESS

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between September 30 to October 7. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Jerusalem and Ramallah. 

64% of the Palestinians believe that they and not Israel are of greater need of success in the direct negotiations; 51% among Israelis believe that both sides are of equal need of success. Nevertheless both publics are skeptical about the success of the talks, Israelis overwhelmingly support their continuation while Palestinians oppose it.

If the peace talks fail, the option endorsed by most Palestinians is to ask the UN Security Council to recognize a Palestinian State. The second most popular option is to declare unilaterally the establishment of a Palestinian state. The options to resort to resistance are less popular. However Israelis misperceive these preferences, and fear that Palestinians will resume the Intifada. 

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between September 30 and October 2, 2010. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 610 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between October 3 and 7, 2010. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Palestinian Israeli talks 

• Regarding the construction freeze in the settlements 29% of the Israelis support  a full construction freeze in all settlements 36% support construction only in settlement blocks which will remain under Israeli rule in a future agreement and 28% support unlimited construction in all settlements.
• Now after more than a month since the beginning of the direct negotiations 78% of the Israelis support their continuation while only 30% among Palestinians support it.
• Nevertheless 64% of the Palestinians believe that they and not Israel are of greater need of success in the direct negotiations while 51% among Israelis believe that both sides are of equal need of success.
• Neither Palestinians nor Israelis think that the negotiations will succeed and yield an agreement. Only 6% of the Palestinians and 5% of the Israelis think that there are high or very high chances for that.
• If Palestinians withdraw from the negotiations, 30% of the Israelis suggest that Israel should change its policy which instigated the withdrawal, 23% suggest to leave the problem to the Americans to take care of, 31% believe that Israel should respond by similar threats to Palestinian counterproductive steps.
• If the peace talks fail, the option endorsed by most Palestinians is to ask the UN Security Council to recognize a Palestinian State (69%). The next most popular option (54% support) is to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state.  51% support the option to start a non-violent resistance. The other options asked about received only minority support: 41% support the resumption of the armed Intifada (57% oppose it); 40% support the dissolution of the PA if the talks fail (57% oppose it), and 27% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding instead a one-state solution (71% oppose it).
• We also asked Israelis’ assessment as to Palestinian preferred  response to a failure of the talks. Israelis perceive quite accurately Palestinians’ preferences to act in the international arena, but they misperceive their preferences on resistance. While Palestinians prefer popular non-violent resistance over armed resistance (51% vs. 41%), 63% of the Israelis  fear the Palestinians will resume the intifada and only 42% estimate that they will start a non-violent resistance.

(B) The Saudi Plan 

• 56% of the Israelis oppose and 33% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our June 2010 poll 59% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 35% supported it. Among Palestinians, 57% support the plan and 39% oppose it; 67% supported it in June and 30% opposed it.
• 35% of the Israelis support yielding to American pressure to accept and implement the Arab (Saudi) Peace Initiative, while 55% oppose it. Among Palestinians 53% accept such pressure while 42% will reject it. In June 2010, 31% of Israelis thought Israel should accept such American pressure and 60% thought it should reject such pressure. Among Palestinians 60% believed they should accept American pressure to adopt and implement the Saudi Plan, 36% said they should reject such pressure.
• As to their assessments of the other side’s response to such pressure: 26% of the Israelis believe Palestinians will reject and 60% think they will accept it, while 53% of the Palestinians think Israel will reject and 40% think it will accept it.

 (C) Conflict management and threat perceptions 

• 52% of the Israelis support and 44% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In our June 2010 poll, 49% supported and 49% opposed such talks. However 63% think that the majority of the Israeli public opposes such negotiations and only 22% think a majority supports it.
• Neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider it likely that an independent Palestinian State will be established next to the State of Israel in the next five years. Two thirds of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low; 35% of Israelis and 32% of Palestinians believe the chances are medium or high. In June 2010, two thirds in both publics thought that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low.
• In our poll we also examine periodically Israelis’ and Palestinians’ readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 64% of the Israelis support and 24% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. Among Palestinians, 49% support and 48% oppose this step. In June 2010, 60% of the Israelis supported and 32% opposed this mutual recognition of identity and among the Palestinians support stood at 58% and opposition at 39%.
• Despite the recent return to dialogue between Fateh and Hamas to reach a reconciliation agreement, neither Palestinians nor Israelis believe that unity of Gaza and the West Bank will be resumed soon: only 14% of Palestinians and 6% of Israelis think so. 51% of Palestinians and 29% of Israelis think that unity will be resumed only after a long time. 30% of Palestinians and 47% of Israelis believe that Gaza and the West Bank will stay two separate entities.
• Among Israelis, 54% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 58% in our June poll. Among Palestinians 76%  (compared to 74% in June) are worried that they or a family member might be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8 and 11 March 2017. Internally, the period before the poll witnessed the setting of a May 2017 date for holding local elections and Hamas announced its intentions to boycott them. A novel by a Palestinian writer was banned by the PA and the license for the Palestinian Telecommunication Company was renewed without opening the market to competition. The Israeli government announced big plans for more settlement construction and the Palestinian president threatened to suspend security coordination in response to these announcements. Internationally, the Trump Administration took office in January. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, and reconciliation. It also covers the peace process and the 50^th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2017 show a high level of dissatisfaction with the performance of President Abbas; in fact, two-thirds demand his resignation. Nonetheless, if new presidential elections take place today, he would receive the same level of support as that of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ candidate.  Findings also show a decline in the level of support for Fatah compared to our findings three months ago when Fatah’s popularity rose a little in light of its successful holding of its 7^th Convention.

On other domestic issues, the public is divided into two halves regarding the banning of a Palestinian novel which the PA claims to contain indecent language. Two-thirds disagree with the renewal of the license of the Palestinian Telecommunication Company (PALTEL) without the opening of the market to competition. We also found that a little over one fifth of the public goes to private, rather than governmental, hospitals because they think that the chances for a medical error in such hospitals are lower. A large minority indicates that they personally or a member of their family and friends had an experience involving a medical error.

On the 50^th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, more than half of the public is optimistic about its end soon or within the next five to ten years; but one third believes that it will last another 50 years. The public places the blame for the continuation of the occupation equally on its leadership and on the Palestinian factions and political parties, but it also places the responsibility on itself. A majority thinks the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was fifty years ago and also worse than it was ten years ago. But despite the belief of the public that most Arab and European countries do not stand with the Palestinian people, an overwhelming majority believes that God stands with the Palestinians.

Findings show a slight increase in the level of support for the two-state solution compared to our findings three months ago, but it is still just below the 50% mark. Strong correlation exists between the belief in the viability of the two-state solution and its support: the more viable the solution, the higher the support. Today, most Palestinians believe that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement construction. Still, most Palestinians have not shifted to supporting the one-state solution; two-thirds continue to oppose it.

The overwhelming majority of the public is dissatisfied with the response of the Palestinian leadership to the new Israeli plans for settlement construction. In this context, a similarly large majority believes that Abbas is not serious about suspending security coordination with Israel. Abbas announced that if settlement construction continues, he would be forced to suspend security coordination. The public believes that the most suitable response to the new Israeli settlement plans should be the suspending of security coordination and the formal submission of a complaint against Israel to the International Criminal Court.

(1) 50^th anniversary of Israeli occupation:

• 32% believe that the occupation will last for another 50 years
• Only 25% say the Palestinian leadership is doing all it can to end the occupation
• 44% say that the place and status of Palestine today is worse than it was 50 years ago
• 72% believe that Netanyahu does not attach importance to Palestinian reaction to his policies
• Two thirds believe that most of the Arab counties do not stand with the Palestinian people, but 94% believe that God stands with them.

On the 50th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the public is divided on the future directions: 32% believe the occupation will last for another 50 years, 24% believe it will end soon, and 29% believe it will end after five to ten years or more. The belief that the occupation will end soon or within five to ten years is greater in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (45%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (66% and 65% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (49%), among residents of refugee camps and cities (57% and 55% respectively) compared to residents of villages and towns (39%), among the religious (59%) compared to the somewhat religious (47%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (67%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (45%), among refugees (59%) compared to non-refugees (48%), among holders of BA degree (55%) compared to the illiterates (46%), among farmers, students, and employees (68%, 61%, and 56% respectively) compared to the retired and laborers (43% and 46% respectively).

We asked the public to assess the strength of the role played by four different Palestinian actors in the struggle to end the Israeli occupation: (1) the Palestinian leadership, (2) most political parties and factions, (3) most of the public, and (4) the respondent himself or herself.  Respondents were given three options to choose from: do their best, inadequate, and negligent role. Only 25% said the leadership is doing its best; 41% said its role is inadequate; and 32% said it is negligent. Similarly, 26% said most factions are doing their best; 49% said their role in inadequate; and 23% said they are negligent. On the other hand, 39% said the public is doing its best; 44% said its role is inadequate; and 16% said it is negligent. Finally, 29% assessed their own personal role as doing their best; 40% as inadequate; and 28% said they are negligent.

The belief that the leadership is doing all it can is higher in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (20%), among supporters of Fatah (42%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (17% and 28% respectively), in refugee camps (43%) compared to villages and cities (20% and 24% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (32%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (17%), among the illiterates (32%) compared to holders of BA degree (27%), and among the public sector employees (30%) compared to those employed in the private sector (23%).

The belief that the respondent himself or herself is doing all he or she can do is also higher in the Gaza Strip (38%) compared to the West Bank (23%), among men (31%) compared to women (26%), among the religious (33%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (22% and 25% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (32%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (28%), among the refugees (31%) compared to the non-refugees (27%), among holders of BA degree (33%) compared to the illiterates (28%), among employees (38%) compared to students (26%), and among those employed in the public sector (40%) compared to private sector employees (32%).

44% of the public believe that the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 50 years ago. By contrast, 39% believe it is better than it was 50 years ago.  Moreover, 43% believe that the place or standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 10 years ago and 36% believe it is better than it was 10 years ago. The belief that the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 50 years ago is higher in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (47% and 41% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (37%), among residents of cities and refugee camps (48% and 40% respectively) compared to residents of villages and towns  (34%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (53%) compared to supporters of the peace process (40%), and among refugees (46%) compared to non-refugees (43%).

A large majority (72%) believes that the Netanyahu government does not take into consideration or attach importance to Palestinian reaction to its policies or actions while 26% believe it does take into consideration Palestinian reaction. Moreover, two thirds (65%) of the public believe that most Arab counties do not stand often enough with the Palestinian people. A similar majority (66%) believes that most European countries do not stand most of the time with the Palestinian people. But 51% believe that most of the Muslim countries do stand most of the time with the Palestinian people and 56% believe that most of the peoples of the world do stand most of the time with the Palestinians.   On the other hand, an overwhelming majority of 94% believes that God stands with the Palestinian people.  Although this figure reflects a consensus, it is worth noting few differences that seem to reflect level of religiosity and political affiliation: while 97% of the religious believe that God stand with the Palestinians, the percentage drops slightly to 94% among the somewhat religious and 77% among the unreligious; similarly, it rises among supporters of Hamas, reaching 99% and drops slightly to 94% among Fatah supporters and 85% among supporters of third parties.

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 64% want President Abbas to resign
• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 47%; and if the two candidates are Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 59% and the latter 36%
• In new parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 36% and Hamas 30%

64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 61% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 7%; Khalid Mishal, Rami al Hamdallah and Mustapha Barghouti (5% each); Salam Fayyad 3%, and Saeb Erekat 2%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 41% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 47% (compared to 49% three months ago) and the latter 47% (compared to 45% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 46% of the vote (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 50% (compared to 51% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh 45% (compared to 47% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 26%, Barghouti 40% and Haniyeh 33%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 30% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 41%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 40% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 36% (compared to 41% three months ago).

(3) Local elections:

• Only 45% say they will participate in the upcoming local elections
• Only 31% believe that Hamas is right to boycott the upcoming local elections

Only 45% (46% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) say they will participate in the local elections which are scheduled to take place in May. 35% say they will not participate and 15% are not sure. 35% believe that the holding of local elections in May will serve the interests of reconciliation while 22% believe it will not serve it and 34% believe it will have no impact on it.  About half (49%) of the public believes that Hamas is making a mistake in its decision to boycott local elections while 31% believe it is not making a mistake.  The belief that Hamas is right in boycotting the local elections is higher in the Gaza Strip (38%) compared to the West Bank (28%), in refugee camps and cities (35% and 32% respectively) compared to villages and towns (27%), among women (33%) compared to men (30%), among the religious (39%) compared to the somewhat religious and the unreligious (26% and 19% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (47%) compared to supporters of the peace process (23%), among holders of BA degree (34%) compared to illiterates (7%), among those employed in the private sector (35%) compared to those employed in the public sector (27%), and among supporters of Hamas (62%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (16% and 31% respectively).

(4) Domestic conditions: security, Gaza electricity, banned novel, PALTEL, medical errors, and others:

• Only 11% think conditions in the Gaza strip are good; 25% think conditions in the West Bank are good
• 46% of Gazans and 23% of West Bankers say they wish to emigrate
• Gazans place the responsibility for the electricity crisis equally on Fatah and Hamas
• 47% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people
• 46% support and 44% oppose the ban on a Palestinian novel
• Two thirds disapprove the renewal of the license of the telecommunication company PALTEL without opening the market to competition
• 38% say that they or a family member have experienced a medical error in Palestinian hospitals 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 11% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Moreover, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 38%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 50%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 47% and in the West Bank at 56%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to migrate to other countries stands at 46%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 23%. Three months ago 46% of Gazans and 24% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate.

In the West Bank, the largest percentage (44%) places responsibility for the electricity crisis in the Gaza Strip on Israel, 18% place it on the PA and president Abbas; only 13% place it on Hamas’ shoulders. By contrast, Gazans place the responsibility for the crisis on the PA and Hamas equally (31% on the PA and 30% on Hamas); only 20% place it on Israel. 

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Maan TV viewership is the highest, standing at 16%, followed by al Jazeera TV (at 15%), Palestine TV (at 14%), al Aqsa TV (at 13%), Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) at 12 %, Al Arabiya at 7%, and al Quds TV and al Mayadeen at 4% each.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.  Only 38% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear.  47% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 48% view it as an asset.

The public is almost evenly divided concerning the banning by the PA of a Palestinian novel charging that it contains indecent language: 46% approve the ban and 44% do not. Disapproval of the ban is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (43%), among supporters of third parties (62%) compared to supporters of Fatah and Hamas (41% and 47% respectively), among residents of refugee camps (61%) compared to residents of villages and cities (41% and 42% respectively), among women (46%) compared to men (42%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 (55%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (39%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (49%) compared to supporters of the peace process (42%), among refugees (47%) compared to non-refugees (42%), among holders of BA degree (44%) compared to the illiterates (17%), and among students (51%) compared to farmers and housewives (34% and 41% respectively).

Two thirds do not agree with the PA decision to renew the license of the Palestinian Telecommunication Company (PALTEL) without a competitive bidding; only 24% agree with the PA decision.  Disagreement with the PA decision is higher in the West Bank (73%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (70% and 68% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (56%), among residents of villages and cities (70% and 68% respectively) compared to residents of refugee camps (59%), among men (71%) compared to women (63%), among the somewhat religious (71%) compared to the religious (63%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (78%) compared to supporters of the peace process (61%), and among non-refugees (69%) compared to the refugees (63%).

38% say that they personally, or one of their family members or friends, had experienced a case of medical error and 61% say they did not. While 36% believe that such medical errors occur equally in private and governmental hospitals, 22% indicate that they go to private hospitals because they think errors are less likely in them and 23% indicate that despite the danger of medical errors they still go to governmental hospitals because of the cheaper costs.  

(5) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

• 27% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about reconciliation
• Only 26% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government
• Only 18% put the blame on Hamas for the poor performance of the reconciliation government

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 27% and pessimism at 67%. Three months ago optimism stood at 35% and pessimism at 61%. 26% say they are satisfied and 63% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 56%.  Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 18% (9% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) while 34% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 14% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government. 

(6) New Israeli settlement plans and the peace process:

• Palestinians think the response to Israel’s settlement policy should be the termination of security coordination and the submission of a formal complaint to the ICC
• 77% are dissatisfied with the response of the Palestinian leadership to the new Israeli settlement plans
• 47% support and 51% oppose the two-state solution
• 60% say the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement construction
• 67% think that the Paris peace conference did not contribute to improving the chances for peace
• Only 9% think the Trump Administration will renew the peace process

We asked the public about the most effective means of responding to the recent Israeli settlement plans: 25% think it is the suspension of security coordination with Israel; 22% think it is the submission of a formal complaint to the International Criminal Court; 19% think it is the resumption of armed attacks; 19% think it is a strong international condemnation of Israel, and 14% think it is the organization of popular non-violent protests.  An overwhelming majority of 77% are dissatisfied, and only 18% are satisfied, with Abbas’ response to the recent Israeli announcement of plans for 6,000 new settlement units. In fact, a large majority of 72% believes that President Abbas is not serious in his threat to suspend security coordination with Israel if settlement construction continues; only 21% believe he is serious.   The belief that President Abbas is serious is higher in the Gaza Strip (24%) compared to the West Bank (19%), in refugee camps and cities (23% and 22% respectively) compared to villages and towns (17%), among supporters of the peace process (29%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (8%), among the illiterates (30%) compared to holders of BA degree (17%), and among Fatah supporters (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (6% and 21% respectively).

On the two-state solution, the public is divided: 47% support and 51% oppose it. Three months ago, 44% supported it. Palestinians are divided into three groups on the most effective means of building a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 34% believe that negotiation is the most effective; 37% think armed action is the most effective; and 24% think non-violent popular resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 37% said armed action is the most effective means.

A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement expansion while 37% believe that it is still viable.  A minority of 32% supports a one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs enjoy equal rights; 67% oppose the one-state solution. Three months ago, support for the one-state solution stood at 36%.  70% believe that the chances for creating an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or non-existent while 29% believe the chances are medium or high.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 71%; 29% are not worried. Furthermore, a majority of 52% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 32% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 14% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  50% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 17% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places. Only 10% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 77% support joining more international organizations, 67% support non-violent popular resistance, 51% support a return to an armed intifada, and 49% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 53%.  Few months after the holding of the Paris peace conference, two thirds (67%) of the public believe that it did not contribute to improving the chances for Palestinian-Israeli peace; only 21% believe it did.  With Trump in the White House, 38% believe that the new American administration will aggravate Palestinian-Israeli tensions leading to escalation in popular and violent confrontations due to the expected settlement build-up; 33% believe conditions will remain as they are now; 11% believe the new administration will provoke diplomatic confrontation; only 9% believe it will lead to a renewal of the peace process.  If the Trump Administration called upon the two side to resume negotiations without  any preconditions, a majority of 58% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the call; only 31% believe it should accept it.

(7) The Arab World, ISIS:

• 76% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own problems and 59% believe that today there is a Sunni Arab alliance with Israel against Iran
• 92% believe that ISIS does not represent true Islam and 80% support the war against it

76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 23% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principal cause.  59% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 29% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

An overwhelming majority of 92% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 4% believe it does represent true Islam. 4% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 5% (compared to 4% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 80% support and 16% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 43% say the most vital Palestinian goal should be the establishment of a state along the 1967 lines and 34% say it should be the attainment of the right of return
• Poverty and unemployment is the main problem confronting Palestinians in the eyes of 27%

43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27% of the pubic; an identical percentage believes it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 24% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

Joint Israeli- Palestinian Public Opinion Poll 

Skeptical Israelis and Palestinians are Split Half in Support for a Final Status Package along the Clinton Parameters 

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between December 11 and 19, 2007. 

The joint poll examined Israelis and Palestinians’ assessments of the Annapolis conference and their expectations regarding its outcomes. 

The findings indicate considerable disappointment with the Annapolis conference. There is much skepticism both among Israelis and among Palestinians regarding their leaders’ ability to implement their commitments and to stand by their declared time frame. 

The joint poll further examined Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding a permanent settlement along the lines of President Clinton’s package for a Palestinian-Israeli final status settlement and the Geneva Initiative against the backdrop of the resumption of the political process by the Palestinian and Israeli governments. 

The results document overall stability among Palestinians and a decline in support for that permanent status package and its parameters among Israelis since 2005.. Despite the declining trend among Israelis there is still a majority of 53% who support these parameters as a combined overall package. Among Palestinians, 47% support the package now (see summary table below). 

Total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 11 and 16, 2007. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 564 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between December 11 and 19, 2007. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) The Annapolis Conference 

• Only 16% of the Israelis and 11% of the Palestinians deem the Annapolis conference a success in pushing the peace process forward, while 74% and 59% respectively see it as a failure.
• Both sides’ expectations with regard to the conference potential to moderate the conflict are rather low. 3% of the Israelis and 18% of the Palestinians believe that in the aftermath of Annapolis, negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop, 39% of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians expect negotiations to resume but some armed attacks will continue, 55% of the Israelis and 32% of the Palestinians believe that confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations.
• Both publics are also skeptical about their leaders’ ability to implement the commitments they made in the conference’s joint statement. In the statement both leaders stated that the two sides will seek to conclude the permanent status negotiations before the end of 2008. However only 23% of the Palestinians and 8% of the Israelis believe they will indeed succeed in achieving that in the period indicated. 72% and 89% respectively believe they will not succeed.
• In the joint statement, the two leaders also commit to immediately implement their respective obligations under the Quartet’s Roadmap, however only 18% of the Palestinians and 21% of the Israelis believe that the other side’s leadership will indeed implement their roadmap obligations while 79% and 77% respectively do not believe these obligations will be implemented. On the other hand 67% of the Palestinians and 59% of the Israelis think that their own leadership will implement these obligations if the other side implements them.

(B) Clinton/Geneva Parameters  

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials seven years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues several times in the past since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the Annapolis conference and the resumption of the peace talks between the parties. The findings indicate stability in support of the overall package among Israelis compared to 2006, with a slight majority supporting the package (53%). This is a significant decline from close to two thirds support in December 2004 and December 2005. Among Palestinians there is similar stability in the level of support since December 2005, with a minority of 47% supporting the overall package. Since we have been tracking these issues in 2003, there was only once majority support for this package on both sides, in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat which was followed by a surge of optimism and considerable moderation in both publics. Among Israelis there is consistent majority support for the Clinton package since 2004, but this majority has been shrinking. Palestinian support for this permanent status framework package seems to have been affected more by the disengagement and the disappointment from it, than by Hamas' rise to power. Israeli support only fell following the Palestinian political turnabout, and does not seem to have been affected by the disengagement. Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange 

Among Palestinians 56% support or strongly support and 42% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2006, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 61% and opposition at 37%. 

Among Israelis 46% support and 50% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel.Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2006, 44% of the Israelis supported this component while 54% opposed it.

(2) Refugees 

Among Palestinians, 39% support and 57% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries likeAustralia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2006, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 54% opposed it. 

Among Israelis 44% support such an arrangement and 52% oppose it. In December 2006 38% supported it and 60% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem 

In the Palestinian public 36% support and 63% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2006, an identical compromise obtained 39% support and 59% opposition. 

Among Israelis, 36% agree and 63% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2006, 38% supported this arrangement and 60% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State 

Among Palestinians 23% support and 76% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2006 28% support, and opposition reached 70%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement. 

Among Israelis 61% support and 38% oppose this arrangement compared to similar levels of 62% support and 36% opposition obtained in December 2006.

(5) Security Arrangements 

In the Palestinian public 51% support and 47% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2006, 42% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 55% opposed it. 

In the Israeli public 53% support and 44% oppose this arrangement compared to 51% who supported it and 47% who opposed it in December 2006.

(6) End of Conflict 

In the Palestinian public 66% support and 32% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2006 the support of 62% and the opposition of 34%. 

In the Israeli public 67% support and 30% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2006, 68% of the Israelis supported it while 30% opposed it. 

The Whole Package 

Among Palestinians 47% support and 49% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. This level of support is similar to that obtained in December 2006, when 48% supported and 49% opposed such a package.

This stability in the level of support for the package among Palestinians deserves attention given the official and publicly endorsed Hamas position toward a permanent peace agreement with Israel. In this regard it is also important to stress the four percentage point increase in the “end of conflict” component which stands in open contradiction to Hamas refusal to such a clause and its willingness to grant Israel only a long-range Hudna. 

Among Israelis 53% support and 43% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In December 2006, 52% supported and 46% opposed such a package. 

It is important to see that the pattern of support for the overall package is more than the sum of its parts, suggesting that people’s calculus is compensatory and trade-offs are considered. Despite strong reservations regarding some of the components, the overall package always receives greater support in both publics, where the desirable components and the chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the undesirable parts. 

37% of the Israelis estimate that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package. 51% believe that the majority opposes it. These perceptions tap the normative facet of public opinion and indicate that despite the consistent support in the package over time, it has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 45% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 46% believe that the majority opposes it. In addition a majority among Palestinians incorrectly assumes that the majority of Israelis opposes the package while Israelis accurately estimate that a Palestinian majority opposes the parameters. 

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement Framework  (2003-2007)

(C) Other Conflict and Conflict Resolution Issues 

• 66% of the Israelis support negotiations between Israel and Abu Mazin over a final status settlement. Despite these levels of support only 41% of the Israelis believe that it is possible and 57% think it is impossible to reach nowadays a compromise settlement between Abu Mazin and Olmert. Among Palestinians 32% believe that it is possible and 63% think it is impossible these days to reach a permanent status agreement with Olmerts’ government.
• 58% of the Israelis support negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which includes Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement.
• Even when a Hamas-led government is concerned, 46% of the Israelis support and 52% oppose talks with it if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians.
• 65% of the Israelis and 49% among Palestinians agree with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict, there would be mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. 32% and 49% respectively disagree to this step. This is the first time since June 2003 that this step fails to obtain majority support among Palestinians. Presumably this is a reaction to the Palestinian leaders’ public statements against the recognition of Israel’s Jewish identity which came in response to Israelis’ attempts to raise this issue as a precondition to the resumption of the peace talks. 43% of the Palestinians and 52% of the Israelis believe that a majority of their domestic public supports such a proposal, and 48% and 34% respectively think the majority opposes it.
• 52% of the Israelis estimate that a Palestinian majority opposes this step, and 35% believe that a majority supports it. Among Palestinians, 48% incorrectly believe that the Israeli majority opposes this step, and 40% think the majority supports it.
• 69% of the Palestinians and 74% of the Israelis will support the efforts to reach full reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinian state if a peace agreement is reached, and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel.
• If the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues, 30% of the Israelis think that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there, 40% think Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out, and 25% believe Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps.