Joint Palestinian - Israeli Public Opinion Poll, December 2004

FIRST SERIOUS SIGNS OF OPTIMISM SINCE THE START OF THE  INTIFADA

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between November 30 and December 6, 2004. 

The poll was designed to examine Palestinians’ pre-election attitudes and voting intentions and Israelis’ assessments of the Palestinian elections in the post Arafat era. 

Both publics were also asked about the Israeli disengagement plan and the possibility of resuming the Quartet’s roadmap process. 

This is the tenth joint poll in an ongoing research project on the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 in the wake of the Camp David summit. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, currently at the US Institute of Peace, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1319 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip andEast Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted December 1 - 5. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of the general Israeli public with 604 Israelis (sampling error of 4%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between November 30 and December 6. 

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-2964933 or email kshikaki@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr.Yaacov Shamir at tel. 202-429-3870 or email jshamir@usip.org.  

Summary of Results 

(1) Palestinian Elections

• The poll shows that if presidential elections were to be held today, the results would be close with Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) receiving 40% of the votes and Marwan Barghouti receiving 38%. Mustafa Barghouti would receive 6% while all the other candidates would receive a total of 3% for all of them combined. 13% have not decided yet. The poll shows Abbas winning in the Gaza Strip (48% vs. 34% for Marwan Barghouti), but Marwan Barghouti wins in the West Bank (40% vs. 35% for Mahmud Abbas). These results represent the voting intentions of those planning to participate in the vote on January 9, 2005. The findings show that the level of non participation is going to be low (10%).
• Mahmud Abbas is seen as the candidate most capable of reaching a peace agreement with Israel, improving the economic conditions, and enforcing law and order. Marwan Barghouti is viewed as the candidate most capable of protecting the right of return. The public evaluation of the ability of the two candidates to maintain national unity and prevent internal infighting is similar for both.
• If Hamas nominates Mahmud Zahhar as its candidate in the presidential elections, 28% say they would vote for him. And if the competition for the presidency is between Zahhar, Abbas, and Marwan Barghouti, 34% prefer Barghouti, 29% Abbas, and 24% Zahhar. The overwhelming majority (83%) of those who selected one of the three believe that the person they have chosen would be able to lead the Palestinian people under the current conditions.
• 30% want to see Marwan Barghouti becoming the head of Fateh, while 26% want to see Mahmud Abbas and 7% want Farouq Qaddoumi as head of the movement. In the Gaza Strip, support for Abbas as head of Fateh reaches 31% (compared to 22% in the West Bank) and for Barghouti 28% (compared to 31% in the West Bank), and for Qaddoumi 5% (compared to 9% in the West Bank).
• The poll shows a significant increase in the popularity of Fateh from 29% last September to 40% in this poll. The increase is higher in the Gaza Strip, from 24% to 38%. The popularity of Hamas in the West Bankand the Gaza Strip combined drops from 22% last September to 18% in this poll. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ popularity drops from 30% to 22%. The total level of support for all Islamists (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) drops in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 32% to 24% during the same period.

(2) Israelis’ Assessments of the Coming Palestinian Elections

·        The Israeli public is following the coming elections in the Palestinian Authority (PA) with much curiosity and interest. While aware of Marwan Barghouti’s popularity in the Palestinian race, only 24% of the Israelis think that Barghouti should be released from prison if a compromise solution with the Palestinians necessitates it. 72% of the Israelis oppose such a step.

·        Three quarters of the Israeli public believe that orderly elections in the Palestinian Authority will be beneficial for Israel while only 12% believe they will be detrimental. 70% of the Israelis will see orderly elections in the Palestinian Authority as a step forward toward democracy there and 72% believe that a democratic Palestinian regime will increase the chances for peace.

·        More generally 81% of the Israeli public believe that major political reforms and greater democracy in the Palestinian Authority are important or very important for making progress in the peace process. However Israelis’ expectations that a democratic system will eventually be established in the Palestinian Authority or a future Palestinian State are quite low. 57% believe that the chances for this to happen are very slim or slim, 32% give it a medium chance and only 10% think it is highly probable. As to the current situation, about three quarters of the Israeli public think that the current state of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority is bad or very bad.

(3) A Post Arafat Era

• Evaluating Arafat’s contribution to Palestinian society, over 80% of the Palestinians are satisfied with his contribution to promoting the status of the Palestinian cause, with his contribution to protecting Palestinian rights vis-à-vis Israel, and with his contribution in providing basic services such as health and education.  65% are satisfied with his contribution to democracy in the PA and with his contribution to instituting law and order. 54% are satisfied with his contribution to ending the Israeli occupation and 51% with his contribution to fighting corruption in the PA.
• In the post Arafat period, more Palestinians believe that the situation will be better rather than worse in the following areas: provision of basic services such as health and education, building public institutions able to enforce law and order, and building an Authority with democratic governance. More Palestinians believe that the situation will be worse rather than better after Arafat, when it comes to the areas of protecting Palestinian rights in negotiations with Israel, in promoting the international status of the Palestinian cause, and in fighting corruption in the PA. Palestinians are split half about the future being better or worse on the issue of ending the Israeli occupation.
• Half of the Palestinians expect Arafat’s death to weaken Fateh while one quarter expects it to strengthen Fateh.
• 72% believe that Arafat died of poison and most of those believing in this (64%) believe that Israel is the party responsible for the poisoning while 22% believe that a Palestinian party is responsible.

(4) Increased Realism and Cautious Hope among Israelis and Palestinians 

• ·        With Arafat’s departure from the scene and with the renewed political activity in the region, a sense of increased realism and cautious hope seems to settle in. 61% of the Israelis and 53% of the Palestinians believe that Arafat’s death increases the chances for reaching a political settlement in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, and only 7% of the Israelis and 23% of the Palestinians think the chances might decrease.
• ·         62% of the Israelis and 52% of the Palestinians believe that it is possible to negotiate now a compromise settlement with the other side’s current leadership. A majority in both publics (52% Israelis and 56% Palestinians) also believe that their current leadership is strong enough to convince its constituency to accept a compromise settlement. 68% of the Palestinians but only 30% of the Israelis believe that the other side’s leadership is strong enough to convince its own public. Israelis’ perceptions of the weakness of the current Palestinian leadership might explain the sharp increase in their willingness to negotiate also withHamas. 47% of the Israelis support negotiations also with Hamas if required to reach a compromise settlement, while 51% oppose it. This constitutes a sharp increase from March 2004 where only 20% thoughtIsrael should negotiate its withdrawal from the Gaza strip also with Hamas while 77% opposed it. Clearly, the recent decline in suicide bombings inside Israel, together with signs from Hamas that it may become a responsible political actor in the Palestinian Authority, are related to this significant change. Consistent with these accommodating positions, 89% of the Israelis and 80% of the Palestinians support a cease fire while 71% of the Israelis and 80% of the Palestinians support an immediate return to the negotiations table. 76% of Israelis and 83% of the Palestinians expect now negotiations to resume with or without some violence continuing, compared to 63% among Israelis and 72% among Palestinians who believed so in June 2004. This cautiously optimistic mood however is quite fragile and can easily collapse given the serious internal political challenges both leaderships face and the difficult issues they will soon have to face if negotiations resume.

(5) The Quartet’s Roadmap, Sharon’s Disengagement Plan and the Settlements

• ·        Support for the Quartet’s roadmap is basically stable with a slight increase since December 2002 soon after it has been made public. 63% of the Israelis and 59% of the Palestinians support it compared to 59% of Israelis and 54% of Palestinians who supported it in 2002. Moreover both sides have also become more optimistic about the ability to implement the roadmap after a period of increased doubts.  64% of the Israeli public and 48% of the Palestinian public now believe that the roadmap plan can still be implemented compared to only 43% Israelis and 28% Palestinians who believed so in June 2004.
• ·        Consistent with the support for the roadmap two thirds of the Israeli public also support the dismantling of most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, while 31% oppose such a step. These levels of support increased gradually since the beginning of the Intifada exceeding 60% since November 2002.
• ·         In the same vein, a majority of Israelis (62%) support Sharon’s disengagement plan, with 34% opposing it. Support for the plan has slightly decreased since June 2004 when it stood at 66%. The majority of Israelis (63%) also prefer to see the disengagement negotiated with the Palestinian Authority.
• ·        Once the disengagement takes place Israelis are split half about the Palestinian Authority’s capacity to control matters in the Gaza strip, but only 27% expect Palestinian internal fighting to happen in Gaza following the disengagement. Among Palestinians, 71% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Authority has a high or enough capacity to control matters in the Gaza Strip, but only 29% think it has high capacity and 59% are worried about internal Palestinian fighting after Israel’s disengagement.
• ·        The framing of intractable conflicts’ outcomes can play a part in their dynamics. It is thus important to track perceptions of such outcomes. Among Israelis, 42% see the disengagement plan as a Palestinian victory compared to 53% who reject this interpretation. Among Palestinians however 75% do see the disengagement plan as a Palestinian victory compared to only 23% who don’t see it as such. As to the ongoing conflict since the beginning of the Intifada, 55% of the Israelis and 44% of the Palestinians think that neither side came out a winner in the ongoing conflict and only smaller percentages think they won (35% Palestinians and 23% of the Israelis). Finally, 61% of the Israelis do not believe that the current Intifada has helped achieve Palestinian national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve, while 64% among Palestinians do believe that armed confrontations have helped them achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not.
• ·        Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel drops from 54% last September to 49% in this poll. Opposition to such attacks increases from 44% to 48%. A majority of 58% says that it would support and 38% say it would oppose taking measures by the PA to prevent armed attacks against Israelis if an agreement on a mutual cessation of violence is reached. 82% support such an agreement on mutual cessation of violence.
•  

(6) Expected American Policy in President Bush second term

• ·        42% of the Israelis and 32% of the Palestinians believe that the reelection of Bush as US president for another four years will increase the chances for a political settlement of the conflict. 48% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians believe it will have no impact and 13% of the Israelis and 34% of the Palestinians believe it will decrease those chances.
• ·        As to the American support for Israel, 76% of the Palestinians and 41% among Israelis think that the second Bush administration will be more supportive of Israel during the next four years, 39% of Israelis and 12% of Palestinians believe there will be no change, and 13% of Israelis and 9% of Palestinians believe American support for Israel will decrease.

10-12 December 2009   

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 10 and 12 December 2009. The poll was conducted after four major developments that affected public perception during the last four months since our last poll in the second week of August 2009: the decision by President Abbas early in this period to postpone a vote on the Goldstone Report and his subsequent decision to reverse it, Hamas’s decision in October not to sign the reconciliation agreement submitted by Egypt and signed by Fateh, the Hamas decision in late October to prevent the election commission from preparing for elections in the Gaza Strip, and finally, the decision by Abbas in November not to run in the next Palestinian presidential elections. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2009 show a limited improvement in the standing of president Mahmud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, but the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas remains as it was four months ago. Moreover, contrary to expectations, the majority of the public does not blame Hamas for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or for the failure to hold national elections. In fact, findings show that a majority of Palestinians blames both Fateh and Hamas together for the continued split and a majority supports Hamas’s decision not to hold elections before securing reconciliation. It is likely that the popularity of Fateh and Abbas has deteriorated considerably right after the eruption of the crisis over the Goldstone Report when a vote on the report was postponed by Abbas. But Hamas’s refusal to sign the proposed reconciliation agreement and its subsequent decision to prevent the election commission from conducting preparations for elections in the Gaza Strip redressed the imbalance caused by the Goldstone Report crisis.  It is also likely that the minor improvement in Abbas’s standing is the result of his decision not to run in the next elections as findings do not show an increase in satisfaction with his actual performance as president. The improvement in Fayyad’s standing might be the result of the increased public perception of safety and security in the West Bank as evidenced by the current findings.

Findings also show widespread support for the two-state solution, reaching about two thirds, while support for the one-state solution does not exceed fifth of the respondents. But the overwhelming majority believes the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non existent. Perhaps for this reason findings show two-thirds opposed to return to negotiations with Israel before the implementation of a comprehensive freeze on settlement construction including in East Jerusalem despite the fact that the overwhelming majority believes that Israel will never agree to this freeze. In the absence of negotiations, Palestinians are divided on the alternatives, with none receiving a consensus or even a majority support. But a plurality supports a return to armed intifada while smaller percentages select other alternatives such as the resort to non violent resistance, a unilateral declaration of statehood, or going to the UN Security Council.

(1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• 57% support and 36% oppose Abbas’s decision not to run in the next elections, but 58% believe he will withdraw his decision and run
• 25% say Hamas is responsible for the failure to hold elections,11% blame Fateh, 30% blame Israel, and 9% blame the election commission
• 61% believe that Hamas and Fateh together are responsible for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 17% blame Hamas alone and 12% blame Fateh
• 61% see the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the top most important Palestinian goal, while 22% believe the continued quite with Israel and the opening of the Gaza crossings is the top goal, and 16% say the top goal is the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip
• If new presidential elections took place today, Abbas would receive 54% and Ismail Haniyeh 38%. But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 67% and the latter 28%.
• The most popular figures as possible vice presidents are Marwan Barghouti (30%), Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Mustapha Barghouti and Salam Fayyad (13% each), and Saeb Erekat (7%)
• If new parliamentary elections in which all factions participate were to take place today, Fateh receives 43%, Hamas 27%, all other lists combined 14%, and 17% say they are undecided
• 9% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good or very good while 31% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good
• Perception of personal and family safety and security increases in the West Bank to 63% and in the Gaza Strip to 65%
• Satisfaction with the performance of Haniyeh’s government reaches 34% and with Fayyad’s government 40%

57% support Abbas’s decision not to run in the next presidential elections and 36% oppose it. Findings show that the greater the desire to vote for Abbas in the next elections, the greater the opposition to his decision. About 70% of those who intend to vote for him if he nominates himself oppose his decision not to run in the next elections while 27% of them support it.  Moreover, support for Abbas’s decision increases among those opposed to the peace process (75%) compared to those who support the peace process (50%), among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fateh (30%). But differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are minor (58% and 55% respectively). A third of the public believes that Abbas’s decision not to run in the next elections is the result of Israel’s settlement policy and Abbas’s loss of confidence in the US administration. A quarter believes the decision reflected Abbas’s disillusionment with Arab support for him and his policies while 22% believe the decision was taken due to the criticism of Abbas’s handling of the Goldstone affair, and 12% believe it was due to Hamas’s refusal to sign the reconciliation agreement. A majority of 58% believes Abbas will withdraw his decision and will eventually run in the next elections, but 21% believe that he will insist on it and might in fact submit his resignation.

Findings show that a quarter of the public believes that Hamas is responsible for the failure to hold elections on time and 11% believe Fateh is the one responsible for that. But the largest percentage, 30%, blames Israel and 9% blame the election commission.  A majority of 58% supports Hamas’s position that national elections can only take place after reconciliation and 39% oppose it. Among those who oppose Hamas’s position, 54% support holding elections even if only in the West Bank and 34% oppose that. In any case, 57% believe that the president will lose his legitimacy in January 2010 and an identical percentage believes that the Palestinian Legislative Council will lose its legitimacy at that same time. Support for Hamas’s position that national elections can only take place after reconciliation increases in the West Bank (60%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among women (62%) compared to men (53%), among those who oppose the peace process (74%) compared to those who support the peace process (54%), among Hamas supporters (88%) compared to supporters of Fateh (32%).

Findings show that 61% of the public believe that Fateh and Hamas together are responsible for the continuation of the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 17% believe that Hamas is responsible for the split and 12% believe Fateh is responsible. The largest percentage (61%) views the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the top most important Palestinian priority  today, 22% believe the top priority is the maintenance of calm and the opening of border crossings, and 16% believe the top priority is the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip. In this regard, if Hamas wins the next elections, 48% believe this outcome would consolidate separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 19% believe it would strengthen unity. But if Fateh wins the next elections, only 27% believe this would consolidate separation and 34% believe it would strengthen unity. Moreover, if Hams wins the next elections 65% believe this would lead to the strengthening of the siege and international boycott while 11% only believe this would lead to the lifting of the siege and the ending of the boycott. In contrast, if Fateh wins the next elections 10% say this would lead to the strengthening of the siege and boycott while 55% believe it would lead to the lifting of the siege and the ending of the boycott.

If new presidential elections are held today, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% of the voters (compared to 52% last August) and Haniyeh would receive 38% (the same as in last August). Only 62% of eligible voters would participate in the presidential elections. Abbas’s popularity stands at 55% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip while Haniyeh’s popularity stands at 36% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas remains unchanged as it was four months ago (48%) and dissatisfaction stands at 49%. If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 67% (compared to 62% last August) and the latter would receive 28% (compared to 31% last August). Participation in presidential elections would be much higher, reaching 73%, if Barghouti and Haniyeh, rather than Abbas and Haniyeh, were the contenders. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice president are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 30% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad (13% each), and Saeb Erekat (7%). These findings indicate an improvement in the standing of Mustafa Barghouti, Fayyad, and Erekat compared to our findings four months ago.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 43% say they would vote for Fateh and 27% say they would vote for Hamas. These results are almost the same as those we found four months ago. Fateh’s popularity in the West Bank stands at 41% compared to 46% in the Gaza Strip and Hamas’s popularity stands at 23% in the West Bank compared to 34% in the Gaza Strip. All other factions and lists receive 14% of the vote and 17% remain undecided.

Findings show a gap in public perception of conditions in the West Bank compared to conditions in the Gaza Strip. Only 9% (9% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip) say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good or very good while 31% (28% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good. Moreover, in the West Bank, perception of personal and family safety and security continues to improve standing today at 63%, compared to 58% four months ago. In the Gaza Strip, perception of safety and security stands today at 65% compared to 63% four months ago. Despite this improvement, 21% of West Bankers and 34% of Gazans say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries.

Satisfaction with the performance of the Haniyeh government reaches 34% (30% in the West Bank and 42% in the Gaza Strip) and satisfaction with the performance of Salam Fayyad’s government stands at 40% (42% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip). 36% give a positive evaluation to the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank under Fayyad’s government and 25% give a positive evaluation to the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip under Haniyeh’s government. Moreover, 30% believe Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one while 26% believe that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one. Four months ago, Fayyad’s government was seen legitimate by 28% and Haniyeh’s by 28%.

(2) Peace Process   

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (44)

While the popularity of Fateh and President Abbas drops, and while Hamas' popularity improves, popular criticism of crackdown on freedoms increases and opposition to a two-state solution rises

21-23 June 2012

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 21-23 June 2012. This poll was conducted during a military escalation and exchange of rocket fire in the Gaza Strip. The period preceding the poll witnessed the ending of the prisoners' hunger strike and the announcement of the elementary results of the Egyptian presidential elections with reports of a victory of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate MohammadMorsi. The weeks before the conduct of the poll witnessed the signing of an agreement between Fateh and Hamas that allowed the Central Election Commission to begin voter registration in the Gaza Strip and the beginning of consultation to form a reconciliation agreement. It also witnessed the arrest of journalists and the blocking of internet sites by the PA in the West Bank. The journalists were released and sites opened before the conduct of the poll. Finally, this period witnessed the formation of a new government in the West Bank headed by Salam Fayyad. This press release covers Palestinian attitudes regarding the arrest of journalists and blocking of internet sites, reconciliation, prisoners' hunger strike, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The second quarter of 2012 shows clear improvement in the standing and popularity of Hamas and Ismail Haniyeh, especially in the Gaza Strip, and a decline in the popularity of Fateh and President Abbas. The increased Hamas popularity might be due to the fact that it has allowed the Palestinian election commission to begin voter registration in the Gaza Strip and might reflect optimism about future improvement in the conditions of the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate in the Egyptian presidential elections. The decline in the popularity of Fateh and president Abbas comes in light of widespread popular anger with the PA for the arrest of journalists and the blocking of internet sites. It might also reflect public perception of a reluctance on the part of Abbas to form a reconciliation government despite Hamas' decision to allow the election commission to operate in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, it is possible that Abbas' reluctance to go to the UN or take the initiative to break the deadlock in the relationship with Israel might in part explain the increase in public dissatisfaction with his performance and the decrease in the percentage of votes he might receive in a new presidential elections.  Findings also indicate that the overwhelming majority of the public opposes the arrest of journalists or the blocking of internet sites and view such measures as harming the Palestinian cause in international public opinion. A majority is also pessimistic about the chances to implement the reconciliation agreement and a very small minority is optimistic about the chances of forming a reconciliation government in days or weeks or organizing parliamentary and presidential elections before the end of the year.

Parallel to the decline in the popularity of president Abbas and Fateh, findings show a significant decline in the support for a two-state solution. Findings also show continued majority belief that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion while more than two thirds believe that the chances for establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years is slim or non-existent. Despite all this, a majority of about two-thirds opposes a one-state solution. Moreover, a clear majority opposes a unilateral Israeli plan aimed at strengthening the two-state dynamics through cessation of settlement construction in those areas to the east of the separation wall and encouraging settlers in those settlements to the East of the wall to evacuate those settlements.

(1) Arrest of Journalists and Blocking of Internet Sites:

• 88% oppose and 7% support the arrest of journalists and the blocking of internet sites for the views they express or articles they publish
• 86% believe that the PA's arrest of journalists and the blocking of websites harm the Palestinian cause
• 71% indicate that they felt angry when hearing about the PA's arrest of journalists and the blocking of internet sites
• 67% say that these days they feel they are living in a non democratic political system that crack down on freedoms

We asked the public about its views regarding the arrest of journalists and the blocking of internet sites by the PA, incidents that took place during the weeks that preceded the conduct of the poll: 88% oppose and 7% support the arrest of the journalists and the blocking of sites for the views or articles they publish or post. Moreover, 86% believe such measures as those taken by the PA in the West Bank in arresting journalists or blocking internet sites cause harm to the Palestinian cause in international public opinion. When asked how they felt when they first heard about these measures, 71% said they felt angry and 21% said they felt indifferent and 3% said they felt satisfied. Feeling of anger rises in the West Bank (75%) compared to the Gaza Strip (61%), in cities (73%) compared to refugee camps (55%), among women (75%) compared to men (66%), among those with BA degree (78%) compared to illiterates (59%), among those between the ages of 40 and 50 years old (78%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 (63%), and among supporter of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fateh (64%).

Findings also show that 67% feel as if they are living in an undemocratic system that cracks down on freedoms while only 29% say they feel they live in a democratic system that protects freedoms. 4% say they have no opinion. It is interesting to note that the feeling that one lives in an undemocratic system that cracks down on freedoms is higher in the West Bank (72%) than in the Gaza Strip (58%) despite the fact that a majority in both areas feel that it lives in such a system. The feeling of living in an undemocratic system rises also among non refugees (70%) compared to refugees (63%), among holders of BA degree (66%) compared to illiterates (51%), among those who do not intend to participate in future elections (76%) and those who do not know to whom they intend to vote (70%) and those who intend to vote for third parties, other than Fateh and Hamas, (69%) compared to those who intend to vote for Fateh and Hamas (59% and 61% respectively). When we separate Gaza findings from those of the West Bank, the feeling of living in an undemocratic system increases in the West Bank among those who do not intend to participate in new elections (76%) and among supporters of Hamas (45%) compared to supporters of Fateh (37%). In the Gaza Strip, feeling of living in an undemocratic system rises among supporters of Fateh (73%) and those who will not participate in new elections (51%) compared to supporters of Hamas (20%).

(2) Reconciliation: 

• 71% are dissatisfied with the fact that no parliamentary or presidential elections took place last may
• Only 35% believe that Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement and 57% believe they will not succeed
• Only 12% believe that a  reconciliation government will be formed in the coming days or weeks and 47% believe one will eventually be formed but after a long time
• Only 12% believe that presidential and parliamentary elections might take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during 2012 and 55% believe it might take place after a year or two or after several years

71% say they are dissatisfied with the fact that presidential and parliamentary elections did not take place last May as originally planned in the reconciliation agreement reached between Fateh and Hamas. 22% say they are satisfied that the elections did not take place. Findings show that 60% blame Fateh and Hamas together for the failure to hold elections last May while 13% blame Hamas, 10% blame Fateh, and 7% blame other parties. In light of the start of voter registration by the Central Election Commission in the Gaza Strip and the start of consultation to form a reconciliation government, only 35% believe that Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 57% say they will not succeed. In fact, 32% believe no reconciliation government will ever be formed, 47% believe it will be formed but only after a long time, and only 12% believe it will be formed in the next days or weeks.  Similarly, 20% expect that no election will ever be organized jointly in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the future while 24% believe it will be organized after many years, 31% say it will be organized after one or two years, and 12% say it might be organized this year. 

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands today at 22%  and in the West Bank at 30%
• Belief that there is corruption in public institutions in the Gaza Strip stands at 57% and in the PA institutions in the West Bank at 71%
• 34% say there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip and 21% say there is press freedom in the West Bank
• 25% say people in the Gaza Strip can these days criticize the authorities without fear and 29% say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear
• Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55% and in the Gaza Strip at 58%
• Positive evaluation of the performance of Ismail Haniyeh's government stands at 38% and Fayyad's at 36%
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 49%

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises to 22% while 56% say conditions are bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, only 13% said conditions in the Gaza Strip were good or very good and 70% said conditions were bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains stable at 30% while 37% say conditions are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stood at 31% three months ago.

71% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 57% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 21% say there is, and 41% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank while 34% say there is no press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 17% say there is, and 34% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 38% say there is no press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  Similarly, 29% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 25% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank reaches 55%  and in the Gaza Strip 58%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands today at 38% and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government stands at 36%. These figures are similar to those we obtained three months ago. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 42%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 27%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 45% and 22% respectively.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 49% while 49% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 55% and dissatisfaction at 43%. Satisfaction with the president's performance in this poll stands at 37% in the Gaza Strip and 56% in the West Bank. In our previous poll, three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 60% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip. The decline in the level of satisfaction with the president's performance might be due to public belief that conditions of freedoms have worsened, the lack of progress in the reconciliation process, and the lack of movement on the Palestinian UN statehood bid.

 (4) Presidency and Legislative Elections:

• In a new presidential election, Abbas receives 49% and Haniyeh 44% and if the contest is between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 60% and the latter 34%. If the competition was between all three, Barghouti receives 37%, Haniyeh 33%, and Abbas 25%.
• In a new parliamentary election, Hamas receives 29%, Fateh 40%, and all third parties combined 12%, and 19% have not decided yet to whom they will vote
• With a vote of 53%, Marwan Barghouti is the most preferred candidate for Fateh in a presidential elections in which Abbas does not run, and Saeb Erikat is the most favored, by 17%, if Abbas and Barghouti do not run

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 49% and Haniyeh 44% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 65%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 54% and Haniyeh 42%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 49% and Haniyeh 45% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 50% and Haniyeh 43%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 60% and the latter would receive 34% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 72%.  If the presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas,Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives the highest percentage (37%) followed by Haniyeh (33%), and Abbas (25%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 75%. This is the first time that we have asked about possible presidential elections with these three candidates. Support for Barghouti is equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (37% and 38% respectively), but support for Haniyeh is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank (35% and 32% respectively), and support for Abbas is slightly higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip (26% and 22% respectively). Support for Barghouti is higher among men (41%) compared to women (34%) while support for Haniyeh is higher among women (40%) compared to men (26%), and support for Abbas is higher among men (28%) compared to women (21%). Support for Barghouti is also higher among the youth, between the ages of 18 and 28 years old (40%) compared to those over 50 years of age (33%) while support for Haniyeh is higher among those over 50 years of age (38%) compared to those between 18 and 28 years of age (30%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 40% say they would vote for Fateh, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 31% and in the West Bank at 27%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% and in the West Bank at 41%. These results indicate a decline in Fateh's popularity in the Gaza Strip by seven percentage points and an increase in the popularity of Hamas in the Gaza Strip by 4 percentage points. When we asked the public about its expectations regarding the outcome of the parliamentary and presidential elections, 41% said they expect Fateh to win, 23% expected Hamas to win, 20% expected other parties to win, and 16% said they do not know.

In a question about the favored Fateh candidate to replace Abbas as a president, assuming Abbas would not run, a majority of 53% selectedMarwan Barghouti, followed by Saeb Erekat and Abu Mahir Ghnaim (3% each).  Mahmoud Aloul, Nasir al Qidwa, and Ahmad Qurie’ received 2% each, Azzam al Ahmad, Jibril al Rojoub, and Salim al Za'noun received 1% each. When we asked the public to select a candidate from a list that did not include Marwan Barghouti, a large part of the vote went to Saeb Erikat (17%) followed by Abu Mahir Ghnaim (9%), Mahmud alAloul and Nasir al Qidwa (8% each), Azzam al Ahmad (5%), Jibril al Rojoub and Ahmad Qurie' (4%), and finally Salim al Za'noun (2%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 47% select ending occupation and building a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as a capital is the most vital national priority and 30% say the most vital priority is to obtain the right of return
• Selected by 27%, continued occupation and settlement activities is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today followed by the spread of poverty and unemployment, selected by 26%, and the absence of national unity, selected by 24%

47% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 8% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 27% of the public while 26% believe the most serious problem is the spread of poverty and unemployment, 24% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 8% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

(6) The Peace Process:

• 49% support and 49% oppose the two-state solution and 55% believe such a solution is no longer practical due to continued settlement expansion. But 65% oppose a one-state solution.
• 35% believe that an Israeli unilateral plan to stop settlement construction in those settlements located to the east of the separation wall and in Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and to help settlers relocate outside those settlements is good for Palestinians and 59% believe it is bad for them. 69% believe that the chances for implementing this plan by the Netanyahu government is slim to non-existent.
• 51% support the Saudi peace initiative and 45% oppose it
• 43% support and 55% oppose recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people after reaching a peace agreement that resolves all issues of the conflict.

Findings show a significant decline in the level of support for the two-state solution from 57% in March 2010 to 49% in this poll. Opposition to this solution stands at 49% compared to 41% in the previous poll. Findings also show that a majority of 55% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to expanded settlement construction while only 39% believe the two state solution remains viable because settlements can be dismantled or evacuated once an agreement is reached. Despite the belief of the majority that the two-state solution is no longer practical, only 31% support the alternative solution known as the one-state solution, one in which Palestinians and Jews enjoy equality. Opposition to the one-state solution reaches 65% in this poll.

Opposition to the two-state solution increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (46%), among those who oppose the peace process (62%) compared to those who support the peace process (43%), among refugees (53%) compared to non refugees (46%), among holders of BA degree (56%) compared to illiterates (33%), among students (61%) compared to laborers, merchants, and retirees (40%, 40%, and 20% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (54%) compared to those who work in the private sector (42%), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (58%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (34%), among supporters of Hamas and those who do not wish to participate in future elections (62% and 56% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh, those who would vote for third parties and those who have not decided yet to whom they will vote (35%, 41%, and 46% respectively).

Support for the one-state solution is higher in the West Bank (36%) compared to the Gaza Strip (23%), in refugee camps (35%) compared to residents of cities (31%), among those who define themselves as somewhat religious (33%) compared to those who define themselves as religious (29%), among supporters of the peace process (34%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (23%), and among those who say they will not participate in new elections (36%) and supporters of Fateh (33%) compared to supporters of Hamas (26%).  

We asked the public about its views regarding an Israeli plan calling for unilateral steps that would stop construction in those settlements located to the east of the separation wall and in Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and encouraging settlers to evacuate those settlements while keeping the Israeli army in those areas. Findings show that 59% view the plan as bad for Palestinians while 35% view it as good for Palestinians. Yet, a big majority (70%) believe the chances that the Netanyahu government will implement such a plan are slim or non-existent. Perception that the plan is good for Palestinians increases in cities and villages (36% each) compared to refugee camps (27%), among supporters of the peace process (41%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (27%), among holders of BA degree (35%) compared to illiterates (27%), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (37%) compared those whose age is over 50 years (26%), among those who use the internet on daily basis (39%) compared to those who use the internet once a month (28%), and among supporters of Fateh (41%) compared to supporters of Hamas (25%).

Findings show that a majority of 51% supports and 45% oppose the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative which calls for Arab recognition of Israel and for normalization of relations with it in return for its withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. On the other hand, 55% oppose and 43% support recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people after all issues of the conflict have been resolved. Findings also show that 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years to be slim to non-existent while 30% believe the chances to be medium or high.  A majority of 54% believe that the inclusion of Kadima in the coalition government of Netanyahu means the government will be less willing to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians while only 12% believe that the government will be more willing to do so. 26% believe that the addition of Kadima to Netanyahu government will have no impact on its peace policies.

Findings also show that about three quarters (74%) of the Palestinian public are worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished. Moreover, the level of perceived threat regarding the aspirations of Israel in the long run is very high. 62% of Palestinians think that Israel’s long term goals is to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 19% think the goal is to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. Only 17% think Israel’s aspiration in the long run is to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967.

(7) Palestinian Options in the confrontation with Israeli occupation:

• Largest percentage (73%) supports going to the UN in order to obtain an international recognition of the Palestinian state and 58% support a unilateral declaration of statehood.
• 57% support a non violent popular resistance and only 37% support an armed intifada.
• 39% support and 55% oppose the dissolution of the PA.
• Half of the public is satisfied and the other half is dissatisfied with the performance of the PA leadership in its efforts to obtain an international recognition of Palestinian statehood.
• 56% believe that the Palestinian leadership is still trying to obtain an international recognition of Palestinian statehood and 39% believe that the leadership has abandoned that goal.

We asked the public about its views regarding six options that Palestinians have in their relations with Israel in the absence of negotiations. Findings show that the public supports three of these options and opposes the other three. The highest support (73%) goes to the option of turning to the UN for international recognition of Palestinian statehood followed by a unilateral declaration of statehood (58%), and a non violent popular resistance (57%). By contrast, only 37% supported going back to an armed intifada, 39% supported dissolving the PA, and 26% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

When asked about the performance of the Palestinian leadership in its efforts to obtain an international recognition of Palestinian statehood, half of the public indicated satisfaction with these efforts while the other half indicated dissatisfaction. When asked whether it thought the PA leadership has abandoned such efforts or is still seeking international recognition of Palestinian statehood, a majority of 56% indicated that it believes that the PA is still continuing its efforts while 39% indicated that it has abandoned them. Dissatisfaction with the performance of the leadership in its efforts to obtain international recognition of Palestinian statehood increases among those who oppose the peace process (61%) compared to those who support the peace process (41%), among holders of BA degree (55%) compared to illiterates (37%), among professionals (67%) and merchants (60%) compared to employees (50%) students (47%) housewives (45%), and laborers (37%), among those who work in the private sector (54%) compared to those who work in the public sector (45%), and among supporters of Hamas (60%) and those who do not intend to participate in future elections (55%) compared to supporters of Fateh (33%). Similarly, belief that the PA leadership is continuing its efforts to obtain international recognition of Palestinian statehood increases among supporters of the peace process (63%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (40%), among Fateh supporters (73%) compared to Hamas supporters (46%) and those who will not participate in new elections (47%).

(8) Other Topics: Prisoners' hunger strike, Visits to Jerusalem, Arab Spring, Salafis, and Egyptian Elections:

• 59% are satisfied and 40% dissatisfied with the size of public participation in solidarity activities with the prisoners in Israeli jails during their hunger strike and 42% believe conditions of prison will improve after the strike,
• 72% see benefits in Arab and Muslim visits to Jerusalem these days
• 49% believe that Arab revolutions will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause in the next year or two.
• 27% say that they would vote for a Salafi party and 63% say they would not vote for such a party.
• 40% believe that the results of the Egyptian presidential elections, and the victory of Mohammad Morsi, will serve the Palestinian cause while 33% believe it will not.

Prisoners' Hunger Strike: Findings show that 59% are satisfied and 40% are dissatisfied with the size of public participation in solidarity activities with the prisoners in Israeli jails during their hunger strike. When asked if they personally participated in solidarity activities, 35% said yes and 65% said no. When asked about their expectations, now after the hunger strike, regarding the future conditions of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, 42% said conditions of Palestinian prisoners will improve, 15% said conditions will worsen, and 41% said conditions will not change.

Visiting Jerusalem: In light of the recent talk about the benefits or harm that might be generated by visits to Jerusalem by Arabs and Muslims, we asked the public what it thought: 72% indicated that they believe it will benefit the Palestinians while 25% indicated the opposite.  

Arab Spring: Findings show that half of the public (49%) believes that Arab revolutions will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause in the next year or two and 23% believe they will have a negative impact while 25% say they will have no impact, positive or negative.

A Salafi Party in Palestine: Given the surprising size of the electoral victory of the Salfists in the Egyptian elections, with their Nour party receiving about 25% of the popular vote, we asked the Palestinian public about its possible electoral behavior if a Salafi party were to be established in Palestine: 27% said that it would vote for such a party if established and 63% said they would not vote for one. Willingness to vote for a Salafi party increases in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (22%), in cities (29%) compared to refugee camps (19%), among women (30%) compared to men (24%), among the religious (35%) compared to the somewhat religious (20%), among refugees (32%), compared to non refugees (22%), among those who use the internet only once a month (34%) compared to those who use it every day (26%), and among Hamas supporters (46%) compared to supporters of Fateh (20%).

Egyptian elections: After the initial announcement of the Egyptian election results, 40% believe that these results will serve the Palestinian cause while 33% believe it will not. 22% said they do not know. When asked to tell us who they think won the Egyptian elections, 64% said it was the Muslim Brothers' candidate Mohammad Morsi while 20% thought it was General Shafiq and 15% said they did not know...Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-19 March 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the announcement of a presidential decree to hold parliamentary elections on 22 May and presidential elections on 31 July 2021. It also witnessed a significant rise in number of coronavirus deaths and infections. The coronavirus vaccine was not made available in large numbers by the PA government during the period before the conduct of the poll. A limited vaccination process did however start using a small quantity that was made available to the PA. The process however was marred by accusations of favoritism and lack of transparency. The ICC issued a statement affirming jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories. Joe Biden assumed his position as the new US president during this period. Israel announced the holding of new parliamentary elections to take place on 23 March. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The focus of our poll for the first quarter of 2021 has been placed on the expected election process. Findings show that the overwhelming majority is still in favor of holding these elections and that the public is much more optimistic that these elections will indeed take place soon. This realization seems to have impacted attitudes and voting intentions, which are now probably more serious and calculated. The poll sought to explore public priorities and expectations in these elections. In particular, we sought to examine the likely consequences of the election results, particularly if Hamas wins and forms a government. The poll sought also to understand the implications of the emergence of rivals to Fatah, from within its own ranks, to the movement’s performance in the elections.

Findings show that the top priorities in these elections for the voters are four: the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, improving economic conditions, combating corruption, and the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip. The largest percentage believes that a Hamas electoral victory would most likely have a negative impact on all these priorities except combating corruption where no negative impact is expected. These expectations might have affected voting intentions as the findings indicate a rise in the vote for Fatah and a decline in the willingness to vote for Hamas compared to our findings three months ago.

Fatah does have its own problems, particularly in the Gaza Strip, because of the probable competition over the likely Fatah’s votes from two independent electoral lists of Mohammad Dahlan and Naser al Qidwah. More seriously, if Marwan Barghouti decides to have his own electoral list, Fatah’s vote would split into two equivalent shares. As for other third parties outside Fatah and Hamas, such as those of the left, Salam Fayyad’s, Hasan Khraishah’s, and others, it is probably too early to reach definitive conclusions at this stage regarding the likelihood that most of these lists would pass the 1.5% electoral threshold.  The findings do show that al Mubadarah, led by Mustafa Barghouti, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine would probably succeed in passing that threshold. For the presidency, the findings indicate a limited increase in public demand for Abbas’ resignation despite the fact that he is doing better than he did three months ago in a competition with Hamas’ leader Ismael Haniyyeh. The findings make it clear however that the public prefers to see Marwan Barghouti as the next president of the PA as he is preferred over all other potential candidates including Fatah’s Abbas and Hamas’ Haniyyeh.

In other domestic issues, public attitudes seem stable compared to three months ago. This applies to the perceptions of safety and security as well as corruption within the PA. There is however a limited rise in optimism regarding reconciliation and in the perception that people can criticize the PA without fear.  Slightly less than what we found three months ago, a large segment of the public, almost half, is still reluctant or unwilling to be vaccinated.

On the peace process, findings show that support for the two-state solution remains unchanged. Similarly, public preference for armed struggle vs. negotiations remains almost unchanged. But findings do show that a majority is opposed to a return to an unconditional bi-lateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiation despite the optimism generated by the election of the new Biden Administration. On the other hand, despite its recent decision to assert jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories, the public is not optimistic about the ability of the International Criminal Court, to restrict Israeli behavior in the occupied territories. In fact, a large majority thinks that no Israeli official will ever be prosecuted by the court.   

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• Great increase in public expectations that elections will take place soon from 32% to 61%
• But only 42% expect the elections to be free and fair
• In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the largest percentage wants Fatah to form the next government
• IF Marwan Barghouti forms a separate electoral list, Fatah would split into two equivalent parts and if Dahlan and Qidwah form their own separate electoral lists, Fatah would be weakened
• 57% support the formation of a joint Fatah-Hamas list
• In new legislative elections, Fatah receives 43% of the vote and Hamas 30%; and in an election in which Dahlan and Qidwah participate with two electoral lists, Fatah receives only 32% of the vote
• Top priorities of the voters are four: the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, improving economic conditions, combating corruption, and removing the siege on the Gaza Strip
• Hamas is seen less able to remove the siege and improve economic conditions and Fatah is seen as less able to combat corruption
• Most respondents want Marwan Barghouti president of the PA and in a trilateral election between Marwan Barghouti, Mahmoud Abbas, and Ismail Haniyyeh, the first receives 48% of the vote, the second 29% and the third 19% 

76% demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections and 61% expect parliamentary elections to take place soon. Three months ago, only 32% expected the holding of Palestinian elections soon. If Israel refuses to allow elections to take place in the occupied City of East Jerusalem, 65% believe elections should nonetheless take place and that East Jerusalemites should be allowed to vote in places in the Jerusalem district just outside the city limits; 27% oppose that and demand the cancelation of elections if Israel does not allow East Jerusalemites to vote in their city. Three months ago, only 56% supported, and 39% opposed, the holding general elections if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem.  But only 42% believe the elections will be free and fair and 48% think they will not be free and fair. Moreover, 69% believe that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah will not accept the results and 60% say that if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will not accept that outcome. 

Legislative Elections:

In an open-ended question, we asked the public to name the party or faction it nominates to lead the next PA government: 38% (40% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) nominated Fatah; 22% (15% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) nominated Hamas, 5% nominated an independent list, 2% nominated the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 4% nominated other groups, and 29% did not nominate any party of faction. When asked about its expectations for the winner, 45% expected Fatah to win, 23% Hamas, 18% third or newly created parties.

The poll sought to assess the role played by three prominent individuals associated with Fatah on the likely consequences for the movement if the three decide to run with their own independent lists:

A majority of 57% say they support and 38% say they oppose the formation of a joint Fatah-Hamas list to compete in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Support for a joint Fatah-Hamas list is higher in the West Bank (62%) than in the Gaza Strip (49%), in villages/towns and refugee camps (67% and 64% respectively) compared to cities (54%), among those who finished elementary school only (75%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (49%), among women (59%) compared to men (54%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (53%), among the married (58%) compared to the unmarried (51%), among those with the least income (53%) compared to those with the highest income (42%), among the religious (61%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (39% and 55% respectively), and among supporters of third parties and Hamas (65% and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (49%).    

We asked the public which electoral list it will vote for in the upcoming elections. We sought to ascertain how respondents will vote in four different scenarios: (1) when the electoral lists are identical to those of 2006 elections, (2) when a joint Fatah-Hamas list is formed and Marwan Barghouti forms his own list, (3) when no joint list is created but Marwan Barghouti forms his own independent list, and (4) when no joint list is created and a Naser al Qidwah’s list replaces that of Marwan Barghouti’s. Here are the findings among those who say they intend to vote:

The largest percentage (28%) says that the top priority for Palestinian elections should be to restore unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 23% say it is improving economic conditions; 17% say it is to combat corruption; 12% say it is the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip; 11% say it is the strengthening of resistance to occupation, 4% say it is to increase the prospects for peace, and 2% say it is to create a democratic political system. When asked who is the most able to deliver the top priority selected by the respondents, 31% selected Fatah, 22% Hamas, and 9% third parties. 15% say all the competing parties and factions can equally deliver on their priorities while 19% say none can deliver.  

We asked the public to speculate about the likely consequences of a Hamas victory on six issues: (1) the siege over the Gaza Strip, (2) Gaza-West Bank unity, (3) economic conditions, (4) corruption in the PA, (5) Hamas’s response to the Quartet conditions, and (6) Israel’s response to Hamas’ victory. These are the findings:

Similarly, we asked the public about the consequences of a Fatah victory for two issues: (1) corruption, and (2) West Bank-Gaza Strip unity. These are the findings: 

	Corruption: 16% say corruption in the PA will decrease and 36% think it will increase.
	Unity: 33% think separation will be consolidated while 22% think unity will be consolidated.

Presidential elections:

In an open-ended question, we asked the public to state the name of the person it wants to be the next president of the PA. The largest percentage (22%) says Marwan Barghouti, 14% Ismail Haniyyeh, 9% Mahmoud Abbas, 7% Dahlan, 3% Khalid Mishal, 2% Mohammad Shtayyeh, 2% Mustafa Barghouti, 1% Yahya Sinwar, 6% selected various different names, and a third of the public did not know or declined to mention a name.

If Fatah nominates Abbas as its candidate for the presidential elections, a majority of 57% of the public would view him as the wrong choice believing Fatah has better candidates; only 23% of the public think Abbas is the best Fatah candidate. When asked to name a better candidate, 49% named Marwan Barghouti, 12% Mohammad Dahlan, 5% Mohammad Shtayyeh, and 4% Nasir al Qidwah.  We asked, in a closed-ended question, about potential Abbas’ successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new presidential election, 40% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal and Mustafa Barghouti by 5% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%. 

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% and the latter 46% of the votes (compared to 50% for Haniyeh and 43% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the votes (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 64% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% three months ago). IF the competition was between Abbas, Haniyyeh, and Marwan Barghouti, the first receives 19% of the vote, the second 29%, and the third 48%. In this three-sided competition, the vote for Marwan Barghouti is higher in the West Bank (55%) than in the Gaza Strip (40%), in the districts of Jericho, Bethlehem, Salfit, Nablus, Qalqilia, Tulkarm, Hebron, and Khanyounis (83%, 76%, 73%, 71%, 65%, 64%, 54%, and 53% respectively) compared to the districts of Gaza City, Ramallah, Tobas, and Jenin (22%, 33%, 39%, and 44% respectively), among those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (54%) compared to those whose age is over 40 years (43%), among women (51%) compared to men (45%), among  the somewhat religious (58%) compared to the religious (35%), among supporters of Fatah (60%) compared to supporters of Hamas (14%), and among those who think peace negotiations is the best means to end the occupation (62%) compared to those who prefer armed struggle (35%). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 63% and Haniyeh 33%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% and the latter 44%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 47% and Haniyyeh 47%. 

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 35% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. These figures are similar to those obtained three months ago. 68% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 26% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 66% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 64% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip. 

(2) The Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• 43% do not wish to take the coronavirus vaccine
• 62% think there is a lack of fairness and transparency in the distribution of the vaccine
• 55% are dissatisfied with the government’s efforts to secure the vaccine 

A majority of 55% (65% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank) says that it is willing to take the vaccine when available or has already received it; 43% (35% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank) say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available.

A majority of 62% believes that the vaccination process in the West Bank has so far been lacking in transparency and justice while 33% believe the process has been transparent and just.  55% (36% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank) are dissatisfied with the efforts made by the PA to obtain the vaccine and 43% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 30% in the West Bank) are satisfied. Half of the public (50%) are dissatisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 47% are satisfied. Dissatisfaction in the West Bank stands at 61% and in the Gaza Strip at 34%.  The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 60% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 56% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister stands at 45%. 

(3) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 68% in the Gaza Strip and 64% in the West Bank. But the demand for emigration stands at 40% in the Gaza Strip and 23% in the West Bank
• 84% think there is corruption in PA institutions and 70% think there is corruption in the institutions run by Hamas
• 51% view the PA as a burden and 44% as an asset
• Only 34% are optimistic about reconciliation
• The majority does not think the Shtayyeh government will succeed in securing reconciliation, reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or improving economic conditions 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 68% and in the West Bank at 64%. On the other hand, 30% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 40% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 24% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and only 25% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 70% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. 43% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 53% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 58% think they cannot.

The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a slight majority of 51% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 41% viewed the PA as a burden.  34% are optimistic and 61% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.

A majority of 58% oppose and 37% support making payments to the families of martyrs and prisoners based on need assessment and number of family members rather than on the act committed by the martyr or the number of years in jail.

About two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 61% expect failure; only 32% expect success. These results reflect a little increase in public expectations compared to three months ago when only 28% expected success. But when asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, half of the public expects success and 44% expects failure. Three months ago, 61% expected failure in holding elections. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 60% expects failure and 32% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Palestine TV viewership has become the highest standing at 19%, followed by Al Jazeera TV, at 16%, followed by Maan, Al Aqsa TV, and Palestine Today TV at 11% each,  Al Arabiya at 5%, al Manar at 3% and finally al Mayadeen at 1%. 

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process, Israeli elections, and the implications of the recent ICC decision:

• 40% support and 57% oppose the concept of the two-state solution; and 55% think this solution is no longer practical due to settlements’ expansion
• The best means of ending occupation is armed struggle according to 37% of the public while 36% think it is negotiations.
• Support for the one-state solution stands at 33%
• Two thirds do not expect any restraints on the Israeli policy in the occupied Palestinian territories as a result of the ICC decision on jurisdiction over Palestine and the overwhelming majority does not think the court will prosecute any Israeli officials  

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 57%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  A majority of 55% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 38% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 36% of the public while 26% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 21% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 38% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 29% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 37% chose armed struggle, 36% negotiations, and 20% popular resistance. Three months ago, 39% chose armed struggle and 35% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 58% opposes and 28% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But only 51% think the PA should not return to peace negotiations with Israel under the sponsorship of the Quartet, made up of the US, Russia, the EU, and the UN; 43% support such return to negotiations.

When asked about support for specific policy choices, 66% supported joining more international organizations; 59% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 43% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 42% supported dissolving the PA; and 33% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis.

In the upcoming Israeli elections, scheduled to take place today, 49% expect the Likud (under the leadership of Netanyahu) and its allies among the extreme right and the religious parties to win the elections while 23% expected victory to go to a coalition of right wing, center and leftist parties under the leadership of Saar, Gantz, Lapid, and others; 28% do not know.

Two thirds (66%) of the public do not expect the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) confirming its jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories to lead to restrictions on Israeli behavior in these territories while a quarter (25%) expects it to impose at least some restrictions.  Similarly, a large majority of 73% believes that there will be no trials at the ICC for any Israeli officials; 21% think one or more Israeli officials might be prosecuted by that court. 

(5) Expectations from the Biden Administration and attitudes regarding resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under its leadership:

• Half of the public expects the return of US economic aid but 51% think the Palestinian-Israeli peace policy of the new US administration will not be different from that of its predecessor
• But 44% support a return to peace talks with Israel under US sponsorship; 48% oppose such a return 

Now that Biden has won the US presidential elections, 50% expect, and 41% do not expect, the US to resume financial support to the PA. But a slight majority of 51% does not expect Biden’s policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be more balanced and less biased in favor of Israel; 41% expect it to be more balanced and less biased compared to the previous US administration. While 48% are opposed to a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the US leadership. 44% are supportive of such return. Support for a return to negotiations under US leadership is higher in the West Bank (45%) than in the Gaza Strip (42%), in cities and refugee camps (45% each) compared to villages/towns (34%), among businessmen and employees (61% and 50% respectively) compared to farmers and professionals (13% and 40% respectively), among the married (44%) compared to the unmarried (39%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (56% and 49% respectively) compared to the religious (36%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (57% and 55% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%), and among those whose age is over 50 years (46%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (42%).   

(6) Ten years after the Arab Spring:

• About two-thirds recall that they felt sympathy with the demonstrators of the Arab Spring when the revolutions were first launched ten years ago, but most think the Arab Spring left a negative impact on Palestinian conditions
• One third of the public thinks the Arab Spring revolutions sought freedom, 28% think they sought a way out of poverty and unemployment, and 20% think they sought to combat corruption 

Ten years after the Arab Spring, 73% say they felt sympathy at the time with the Arab demonstrators while 18% say they did not feel sympathy. The public is divided into three groups in its evaluation of what the Arab demonstrators wanted: 33% say they wanted freedom from regime oppression, 28% say they wanted a way out of poverty and unemployment, and 20% say they wanted to combat corruption. Only 5% say they wanted to replace the existing regimes with Islamists and another 5% say they wanted to express opposition to pro-Western policies of their regimes.

37% believe the Arab Spring has left a negative impact on Palestinian conditions while 18% think it left a positive impact and 37% say it had neither negative nor positive impact.  A majority of 56% indicates that it did not feel at the time that there was a need for similar demonstrations in Palestine while 36% say they felt such need at that time. 

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• The top most vital goal should be the creation of a Palestinian state after ending the occupation according to 43% of the public
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment according to 30% of the public followed by corruption and the continuation of occupation  

Findings show that 43% of the public believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings. Moreover, the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 30%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%,  the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 6%.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll

IN THE POST ARAFAT ERA, PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS ARE MORE WILLING TO COMPROMISE: FOR THE FIRST TIME MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR CLINTON’S PERMANENT STATUS SETTLEMENT PACKAGE

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem 

Total Palestinian sample size is 1319 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between December 30 and 31, 2004.The margin of error is 3%.The Israeli sample includes 501 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between January 9 and 10 2005. The margin of error is 4.5%.

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, Truman Fellow and professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, currently at the US Institute of Peace, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR.

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa, at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 202-429-3870 or email jshamir@usip.org.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: 

The joint poll aimed at examining possible changes in Palestinian and Israeli public attitudes in the post Arafat era regarding six basic elements of Israeli-Palestinian permanent status negotiations: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange, (2) Refugees, (3) Jerusalem, (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state, (5) Security arrangements, and (6) End of conflict. Questions regarding similar and identical elements were asked in December 2003. While the 2003 elements were presented as constituting the main components of the Geneva Initiative, this poll made no mention of the Geneva initiative and the elements were presented as constituting a possible permanent status agreement. The poll also sought to revisit a question asked in June 2003 regarding public willingness to accept a settlement that would contain a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. The findings indicate a significant increase toward more dovish views among both Israelis the Palestinians compared to the situation 12 and 18 months ago. Here are the main findings:

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange 

Among Palestinians 63% support or strongly support and 35% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2003. At that time, support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 57% and opposition at 41%.

Among Israelis 55% support and 43% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. The Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2003, 47% of the Israelis supported this component while 50% opposed it.

(2) Refugees 

Among Palestinians, 46% support and 50% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries likeAustralia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2003, only 25% agreed with an identical compromise while 72% opposed it.

Among Israelis 44% support such an arrangement compared to 35% who supported it in December 2003.

(3) Jerusalem 

In the Palestinian public 44% support and 54% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2003, an identical compromise had a similar reception with 46% supporting it and 52% opposing it.

Among Israelis however, only 39% agree and 60% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2003 41% supported this arrangement and 57% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian state 

Among Palestinians 27% support and 61% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise that contained all these elements with the exception of the part on the deployment of a multinational force received in December 2003 the support of 36% and the opposition of 63%.

Among Israelis 68% agree and 30% disagree to this arrangement compared to 61% who agreed and 38% who disagreed to it a year ago in December 2003.

(5) Security Arrangements 

In the Palestinian public 53% support and 45% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel will have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2003, a similar compromise that contained these same elements with the exception of the part on the multinational force received the support of 23% and the opposition of 76%.

In the Israeli public 61% support and 37% oppose this arrangement compared to 50% who supported it and 46% who opposed it a year ago in December 2003.

(6) End of Conflict 

In the Palestinian public 69% support and 29% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2003 the support of 42% and the opposition of 55%.

In the Israeli public 76% support and 23% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2003, 66% of the Israelis supported it while 33% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 54% support and 44% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2003, 39% supported and 58% opposed an identical overall combined package presented in the context of the Geneva Initiative.

Among Israelis 64% support and 33% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. A year ago only 47% of the Israelis supported and 49% opposed a similar overall package presented in the context of the Geneva initiative. 

The main difference between the December 2003 and the December 2004 versions presented to both Israelis and Palestinians is that while the first version stated that the package was that of the Geneva initiative, the second did not. In addition, in presenting the elements of the compromise in December 2004, we merged the parts dealing with the multinational force (presented in 2003 as a separate element) into the two elements of the demilitarized state and the security arrangements.

Mutual Recognition of Identity

Among Palestinians 63% support and 35% oppose the proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there would be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. In June 2003, only 52% of the Palestinians supported this proposal and 46% opposed it.

Among Israelis 70% support and 16% oppose the mutual recognition of identity proposal. In June 2003, 65% of the Israelis supported it and 33% opposed it. 

It should be emphasized that these figures have been obtained after a prolonged period of reduced violence between the two sides and during the Palestinian election campaign. In addition as mentioned above the current survey has been detached from the Geneva initiative context within which the December 2003 questions were asked.

SUMMARY TABLE OF THE FINDINGS

Results of Pre Elections Poll

Joint Israeli-Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, June 2005

WHILE ISRAELI SUPPORT FOR THE DISENGAGEMENT DROPS, ISRAELIS SEE DECLINING PROSPECTS FOR THE SETTLEMENT PROJECT IN THE WEST BANK, WHEREAS PALESTINIANS EXPECT IT TO GROW

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between June 6 and 11 , 2005.* 

The poll was designed to examine Israelis and Israeli settlers’ attitudes on the disengagement plan, Palestinians’ attitudes on the forthcoming legislative council elections, and both publics’ assessments of future developments. 

This is the 12^th joint poll in an ongoing research project on the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 in the wake of the Camp David summit. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, currently a senior fellow at the US Institute of Peace, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1320 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted June 9-11. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of the general Israeli public with 526 Israelis and a representative sample of 501 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and the Gaza strip (sampling error of 4.5%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between June 6 and 9. 

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-2964933 or email kshikaki@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 202-429-3870 or email jshamir@usip.org.  

Summary of Results 

(1) Disengagement and the future of the settlement project

• Israeli support for the disengagement plan has declined in our current poll. 53% of Israelis support now Sharon’s disengagement plan and 39% oppose it. In our previous survey in March this year 65% supported the plan. Surprisingly however also 25% in the settlers sample support the disengagement.
• 45% of the Israelis and 72% of the Palestinians see Sharon's plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, compared to 52% among Israelis and 26%  among Palestinians who don’t see it as such. In addition, 51% of the Israelis and 66%  of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Intifada and armed confrontation has helped Palestinians achieve national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve. Israeli settlers are closer to the Palestinians in their perceptions. 72% of the settlers think the disengagement is a victory for the Palestinians and 77% believe the Intifada has helped them achieve political goals.
• Nevertheless, 65% of the Israeli public and 46% of the settlers believe that the disengagement will eventually take place despite being postponed to mid-August. 29% of the Israelis and 46% of the settlers do not believe it will materialize. Moreover, 52% of the general public and 69% of the settlers believe that Sharon is planning to expand the disengagement in the future and evacuate more settlements in the West Bank.
• As to the future of the settlements in the longer run, 58% of the general Israeli public and 42% of the Israeli settlers believe that in the coming years, the number of settlements in the West Bank will decrease. 18% of the general Israeli public, and 34% of the settlers expect the number of settlements to increase in the future. In contrast, a majority of the Palestinians (52%) fear that the number of settlements will increase in the future and 33% think it will decline.
• Consistent with their expectations, 62% of the Israelis support dismantling most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians. This figure represents a slight decline compared to 67% obtained last March. A surprising 30% of the settlers support dismantling most settlements for peace with the Palestinians. The Israeli public is divided as to the contribution of the settlements to Israel’s national security. 39% of the Israelis believe that the settlements hurt Israel’s national security while 37% believe they contribute to it with 19% who think that settlements neither contribute nor hurt. Among settlers 73% believe that they contribute to Israel’s security.

(2) Past and Future Resistance to the Disengagement

• In our survey we attempted to get an account of the scale of protest to be expected at the time of the disengagement and the means that seem justified to be used in such a protest. Both settlers and our general Israeli public sample were asked how one should respond to the disengagement decision. In the general public over 80% believe that the decision should be obeyed (40%) or resisted by legal means (45%). A similar majority among settlers believes in abiding by the law, although 61% support resistance by legal means and only 21% think the decision should be obeyed. However a significant minority in both samples - 15% of the settlers and 14% of the general public - believe the disengagement should be resisted by all means. Two years ago, in June 2003, we asked the same question about a future possible evacuation decision, and obtained virtually the same results.
• As to perceptions of violence that might take place during the disengagement, apparently the settlers succeeded to intimidate the Israeli public. While 15% of the settlers think that the proper response is to resist the decision by all means, 38% of Israelis think that the majority of the settlers will do so.
• When inquiring more specifically about the means justified to use in such a struggle, 71% of the settlers and 46% of the general public believe that it is justified to bring down the government, 17% among the settlers and 11% in the general public say that it is justified to endanger oneself and one's family, and 9% of the settlers and 7% of the general public believe it is justified to endanger other citizens in such a struggle. Compared to two years ago, the major change in the settlement community has been an increase in support for the political route, that of bringing down the government (from 54% to 71%). The support for the radical and violent-prone means has not increased significantly.
• As to actual intentions to participate in protest activities at the time of the disengagement, 18% of the settlers and 3% of the general public claim they will definitely participate in such a protest in person. 11% of the settlers and 2% of the general Israeli sample also definitely plan to be in person in the Gaza Strip at the time of the evacuation and take an active part in the resistance to the disengagement.
• In order to help us translate these protest intentions into actual behavior, we further inquired about our respondents’ participation in anti-disengagement protest activities in the past. 37% of the settlers in the territories reported that they participated in at least one such activity. 26% participated in demonstrations, marches or assemblies against the disengagement in the Gaza strip, 30% participated in such activities that were held within the 1967 borders, 20% participated in persuasion activities such as discussion groups, house calls, distribution of fliers or picketing on road intersections and 5% participated in person in active resistance to IDF evacuation of an outpost or settlement. Among the general population 8% participated in at least one protest activity in the past. Of those, 4% participated in demonstrations, marches or assemblies against the disengagement in the Gaza strip, 5% participated in such activities within the 1967 borders, 3% participated in persuasion activities such as discussion groups, house calls, distribution of fliers or picketing on road intersections, and only one respondent said he participated in person in active resistance to IDF evacuation of an outpost or settlement. Extrapolating from these reported protest patterns it seems that only few Israelis living within the green line may participate in active resistance to the evacuation, but more are likely to rally and demonstrate against it. As to settlers, they are obviously much more mobilized and motivated. Judging by the percent who reported participating in active resistance to IDF evacuation in the past, we might expect large numbers of settlers attempting to arrive to the Gaza strip to get actively involved in disrupting the disengagement.
• It is important to note the low degree of legitimacy that settlers afford to Israel’s democratic institutions. Less than half of the settlers in our survey consider the government and the Knesset to have legitimate authority to decide on evacuation of settlements. (49% and 48% respectively). 52% accept the Knesset authority but only by a Jewish majority. 63% accept the authority of a referendum. 26% accept rabbinical authority, of those 5% consider only rabbinical authority as legitimate. Compared to June 2003, all of these bodies have lost in legitimacy among settlers. Today, 8% consider none of these bodies as legitimate; together with the 5% of settlers who accept only rabbinical authority, these are the two groups of settlers providing the most radical and violent-prone responses in our survey.

(3) Facilitating the Disengagement

• Given the heightened level of rage among the settlers in the settlements to be evacuated, we asked both the settlers’ sample and the general Israeli public sample to rank the most important step which can facilitate the emotional frenzy among the settlers. The most important such step in the eyes of both the general public and the settlers is more generous financial or economic compensation. 41% of the public and 32% of the settlers rank this step as most important. Next for the settlers is political compensation by expanding the settlement project: 29% rank it first in importance. Third is emotional compensation through empathy and understanding, and perceived as least important is ideological compensation by strengthening the Jewish identity of the state through legislation and social arrangements.
• We further asked our samples what would be the right arrangement for the settlements included in the disengagement plan, if the disengagement were part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians. 56% of the settlers would prefer the current arrangement of compensation and free choice of where to live. 14% would prefer to allow settlers to continue to live in the territories under Palestinian rule, 11% would prefer the government to settle them in an alternate settlement in the territories, and only 4% would prefer the government to settle them in an alternate community within the green line.

(4) Palestinians and Israelis’ expectations for future developments.

• Both publics were asked to assess the coming developments following the postponement of the disengagement and Abu-Mazin’s visit to the US. 23% of the Palestinians and 9% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will completely stop. 52%  of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue, and 18% of the Palestinians and 27% of the Israelis think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations.
• Assessing the longer range prospects for a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians , 46% of the Palestinians and 36% of the Israelis believe that a political settlement is not possible ever, 29% of the Palestinians and  31% of the Israelis think that it will be achieved only in many generations to come or in the next generation, 19% of the Palestinians and 27% of the Israelis think it will be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years.
• 40% of the Palestinians and 15% of the Israelis believe that Hamas’ readiness to participate in the upcoming Palestinian parliamentary elections indicates more willingness to accept the peace process; 20% of the Palestinians and 17% of the Israelis think it indicates less willingness to do so, and 34% of the Palestinians and 62% of the Israelis believe that it indicates no change in Hamas position regarding the peace process. If Hamas wins the majority of seats in the next elections, 39% of the Palestinians and 53% of the Israelis believe that the peace process will slow down or stop while 30% of the Palestinians and 8% of the Israelis believe that the peace process will accelerate and 24% of the Palestinians and 32% of the Israelis believe that the peace process will not be affected.

(5) Palestinian Legislative Council Elections and Other Palestinian internal Affairs

• 38% of Palestinians support and 60% oppose the collection of arms from armed Palestinian groups and factions. But 77% support and 22% oppose the current ceasefire between Palestinians and Israelis.
• If elections are held today, Fateh would win 44% of the seats of the Palestinian Legislative Council and 33% would go to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Only 3% would go to leftist forces and 8% to independents. 12% are undecided.
• With regard to current negotiations between Israel and the PA, the Palestinian public organizes its short term priorities as follows: release of prisoners would come first, stop building the separation barrier would come second, return of laborers to work inside Israel would come third, freezing settlement construction would come fourth, and removal of checkpoints would come fifth.

Joint Israeli-Palestinian Public Opinion Poll

PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS DISAGREE ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS  

8-13 March, 2005

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between March 8 and 13 , 2005. 

The poll was designed to examine the preferences of Palestinians and Israelis on how to proceed with the peace process, their attitudes towards the disengagement plan, and their attitudes towards reconciliation after Arafat’s death. 

This is the eleventh joint poll in an ongoing research project on the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 in the wake of the Camp David summit. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, currently a senior fellow at the US Institute of Peace, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1319 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted March 10-12. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of the general Israeli public with 602 Israelis (sampling error of 4%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between March 8 and 13. 

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-2964933 or email kshikaki@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr.Yaacov Shamir at tel. 202-429-3870 or email jshamir@usip.org. 

Summary of Results 

(1) How to proceed with the peace process 

• The poll examined Israeli and Palestinian preferences concerning the next steps that should be taken in the course of the peace process. 84% of the Palestinians and 85% of the Israelis support a return to negotiations on a comprehensive settlement. However the two publics differ greatly on how to proceed with the peace process. 59% of the Palestinians prefer immediate return to final status negotiations on all issues in dispute at once, and 31% prefer a gradual step by step approach. Among Israelis, 57% prefer a gradual a step by step approach and 34% prefer a final status solution of all issues at once.
•  Despite these preferences, 53% of the Israelis and 51% of the Palestinians say they will support their leadership decision to proceed in the peace process with the approach they prefer less, while 37% of the Israelis and 41% of the Palestinians will not support their leadership decision in such a case.
• In the same context, 59% of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis support the Quartet’s Roadmap plan compared to 35% among Palestinians and 36% among Israelis who oppose it.
• 70% of the Israelis and 59% of the Palestinians believe that it is possible to reach a compromise settlement with the other side’s current leadership.  27% among Israelis and 41% among Palestinians don’t think it is possible. 61% among Israelis and 62% among Palestinians believe their own leadership is strong enough to convince its constituency to accept such an agreement. 65% of the Palestinians but only 38% of the Israelis believe that the other side’s leadership is strong enough to convince its public to accept such a compromise.
•   48% of the Israelis believe that Israel should negotiate also with the Hamas if it is necessary in order to reach a compromise agreement; 47% oppose it. Among Palestinians, 79% support the participation of theHamas in the negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel compared to 19% who oppose it.

(2) Assessments of previous peace initiatives

• Israelis and Palestinians were further asked to assess the reasons for the Oslo process and the Camp David summit failures. Both sides put the blame on the other side. 63% of the Israelis believe that the main reason for why the Oslo process failed was because the Palestinians were not forthcoming enough and maintained the use of violence, but only 5% of the Palestinian think so. Palestinians (54%) put the blame mainly on Israel not being forthcoming enough and continuing to build settlements. Only 20% of the Israeli public think this is the major reason. 10% of Israelis and 33% of Palestinians blame the step by step procedure for the failure.
•  As to the Camp David summit, 70% of the Israelis but only 5% of the Palestinians believe that it failed because Arafat did not seriously intend to reach a final and comprehensive settlement with Israel. On the other hand, 50% of the Palestinians but only 11% of the Israelis believe it failed because Barak yielded much less than he claimed he did. 13% of Israelis and 36% of Palestinians think the problems were too numerous and the differences too big to be solved all at once.

(3) Sharon’s Disengagement Plan and Settlements

•   52% of the Israelis support and 44% oppose a referendum on Sharon’s disengagement plan. If a referendum on Sharon’s disengagement plan were held today, 65% of the Israeli public would support it compared to 29% who would oppose it. 49% among Israelis support the participation of Israeli Arabs in such a referendum, compared to 48% who oppose it. 67% of the Israelis support and 30% oppose the dismantling of most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
•  75% of the Palestinians see Sharon’s plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, while 23% do not see it as such. Among Israelis, 44% seeSharon’s plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, while 50% don’t think it is a Palestinian victory.
•  30% of the Palestinians and only 9% of the Israelis believe that the Palestinian Authority has high capacity to control matters in the Gaza Strip after Israel’s disengagement, 43% of the Palestinians and 34% of the Israelis think it has reasonable capacity and 23% among Palestinians and 51% among Israelis think it has low or no capacity.
•  36% of the Israelis believe that if Israel disengages fully in the Gaza Strip Palestinian armed attacks against Israeli targets outside the Gaza Strip will decrease, 27% think they will not change and 31% think they will increase. 29% of the Palestinians in turn support and 68% oppose the continuation of armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip after full Israeli disengagement.

(4) Palestinian Democratization and Expected American Policy

•  80% of the Palestinians and 66% of the Israelis believe that the successful Palestinian elections for presidency could be seen as a step forward towards democracy in the Palestinian authority, while 17% of the Palestinians and 30% of the Israelis don’t see the elections as such. 35% of the Palestinians and 43% of the Israelis think there are slim chances that a democratic system will be established in the Palestinian Authority or a future Palestinian State. 44% among Palestinians and 35% among Israelis think there are medium chances for that, and 19% of the Palestinians and 20% of the Israelis give it high chances.
•  35% of the Palestinians and 6% of the Israelis evaluate the current state of democracy in the Palestinian Authority as good or very good, 34% of the Palestinians and 28% of the Israelis think it is fair and 29% of the Palestinians and 61% of the Israelis think democracy is in bad or very bad condition.
•  55% among Israelis and 79% among Palestinians believe that the US should increase its involvement in trying to solve the Israeli Palestinian conflict, while 37% of the Israelis and 15% of the Palestinians say it should decrease its involvement. 
   

(5) Reconciliation

•  With Arafat’s departure from the scene and with the renewed political activity, expectations and support for reconciliation following a comprehensive solution increased in a meaningful way for the first time.
•   41% of the Israelis expect now full reconciliation to be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years compared to only 32% who thought so in June 2004. 24% of the Palestinians expect full reconciliation to be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years compared to 15% last June.
•  General support for reconciliation among Israelis has also increased and stands now at 84 percent compared to 80% in June 2004. 81% of the Palestinians support reconciliation today compared to 67% last June. More important however is the consistent across the board increase in support for a list of specific reconciliation steps, varying in the level of commitment they pose to both publics.
•  55% of the Israelis and 89% of the Palestinians will support open borders to free movement of people and goods after a comprehensive settlement is reached, compared to 44% of the Israelis and 82% of the Palestinians who said so last June.
•  70% of the Israelis and 73% of the Palestinians support joint economic institutions and ventures compared to 66% and 66% respectively last June.
• ·        43% of the Israelis and 40% of the Palestinians will support joint political institutions designed eventually to lead to a confederate system given a comprehensive settlement compared to 35% of the Israelis and 26% of the Palestinians who said so last June.
• ·        66% of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians support taking legal measures against incitement directed towards the other side compared to 61% of the Israelis and 35% of the Palestinians who said so in June 2004.
• ·        51% of the Israelis and 13% of the Palestinians will support adoption of a school curriculum that recognizes the sovereignty of the other state and educates against irredentist aspirations. In June 2004 41% of the Israelis and 4% of the Palestinians thought so.

5-7 March 2009

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5 and 7 March 2009. The poll was conducted several weeks after the Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip. The poll period witnessed return of Palestinian factions to reconciliation talks sponsored by Egypt. The poll examines the following topics: domestic issues such as the balance of power, the performance and legitimacy of two governments, that of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad, the peace process, and the Israeli elections. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2009 indicate a significant increase in the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh and Hamas and decease in the popularity of president Mahmud Abbas and Fateh. They also indicate a significant decline in the status and legitimacy of Salam Fayyad. Despite these findings, Fateh’s popularity remains higher than that of Hamas. The two most important factors shaping public attitudes regarding these issues seem to be the Israeli offensive against Gaza, particularly the performance of Abbas and the government of Fayyad during the war, and public perceptions of the end of Abbas’s term in office and hence the loss of legitimacy suffered by the Fayyad’s government.   

Findings also indicate a negative shift in Palestinian public attitudes regarding the peace process as the percentage of those willing to compromise goes down and the percentage of those supporting violence goes up. The public takes a hardline view regarding resumption of negotiations before Israel freezes settlement construction.

All this comes within a highly pessimistic context with a rise in the belief that a Palestinian state is not going to be established within the next five years and the majority expecting the electoral victory of the right wing in Israel to lead to the failure of the peace process and to an increase in settlement expansion.

 (1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• If new presidential elections were held today and the two candidates were Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmud Abbas, the former receives 47% of the vote and the later 45%.
• But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former wins with 61% of the vote compared to 34% for Haniyeh.
• Popularity of Hamas increases from 28% in our December 2008 poll to 33% in this poll while the popularity of Fateh drops from 42% to 40% during the same period.
• Decline in the popularity of Abbas and Fateh reflects a decline in the percentage of popular satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas from 46% three months ago to 40% in this poll. Moreover, positive evaluation of the performance of Salam Fayyad’s government declines from 34% to 32% during the same period while positive evaluation of the performance of Haniyeh’s government increases significantly from 36% to 43%.
• Despite the visible increase in the popularity of Hamas and Haniyeh, the overwhelming majority (71%) says that given the outcome of the Israeli war on Gaza, conditions of the Palestinians today are worse off than they were before the war, while only 11% say conditions today are better off than they were before the war. 17% say conditions have not changed.
• Similarly, Hamas’s call for the establishment of a new representative body that can serve as an umbrella for the resistance groups receives the support of only one third of the Palestinians while 57% say that the PLO should be maintained.
• The largest percentage (46%) believe that the most important priority for Palestinians today should be  the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 28% say it should be the return to quite and the opening of Gaza crossings and 25% say the top priority should be the reconstruction in the Gaza Strip.  
• If Hamas wins new presidential and legislative elections, 63% of the public believe that such an outcome would lead to the tightening of the siege and boycott while an additional 19% say current conditions of boycott would remain the same and only 12% say a Hamas electoral victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott.
• Similarly, if Hamas wins new presidential and legislative elections, 47% of the public believe that such an outcome would lead to the consolidation of the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and an additional 23% say current conditions would remain the same but only 24% say a Hamas victory would lead to the consolidation of West Bank-Gaza Strip unity.

If new presidential elections were held today and the two candidates were Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmud Abbas, the former receives 47% of the vote and the later 45%. Three months ago, Abbas received 48% and Haniyeh 38%. But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former wins with 61% of the vote compared to 34% for Haniyeh. Three months ago, Barghouti received 59% and Haniyeh 32%. Decline in the popularity of Abbas and Fateh reflects a decline in the percentage of popular satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas from 46% three months ago to 40% in this poll. Moreover, it seems that public perception of the ending of Abbas’s term in office is leading 27% to believe that the legitimate president today is the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and 24% to believe that there is no legitimate president today, while only 39% believe that the legitimate president today is Abbas.

 Findings indicate that the popularity of Haniyeh is higher in the West Bank (50%) than in the Gaza Strip (44%). The opposite is true for Abbas; he is more popular in the Gaza Strip (50%) than in the West Bank (41%). Haniyeh is more popular among women (53%) compared to men (41%) while Abbas is more popular among men (51%) than women (40%). Haniyeh is also more popular among those who describe themselves as “religious” (57%) and less popular among those who define themselves are “somewhat religious” (38%). Abbas on the other hand is more popular among the “somewhat religious” (55%) and less popular among the “religious” (35%).

Haniyeh is more popular among those opposed to the peace process (82%) and less popular among those supporting the peace process (35%). Abbas is more popular among supporters of the peace process (5%) and less popular among those opposed to the peace process (14%). Haniyeh is more popular among those over 47 years of age (55%) and less popular among those between the ages of 18-27 years (46%). On the other hand, Abbas is less popular among those over 47 years of age (35%) and more popular among all those younger than that, for example, reaching 50% among those whose age is between 38-47 years. Haniyeh is more popular among the illiterates (56%) and less popular among those with a BA degree (43%). Abbas is more popular among those who have a BA degree (50%) and less popular among the illiterates (34%). It is noticeable that Abbas popularity increases considerably among those employed in the public sector (72%) while Haniyeh’s popularity is very low among this group declining to 23%. Finally, as expected, Haniyeh is very popular among Hamas supporters (96%) while Abbas is very popular among Fateh supporters (90%). Among those voting for other parties, Abbas receives 51% while Haniyeh receives 36%. Among the undecided, Abbas receives 27% and Haniyeh 37%.

Popularity of Hamas increases from 28% in our December 2008 poll to 33% in this poll while the popularity of Fateh drops from 42% to 40% during the same period. The gap between Fateh and Hamas reaches 12 percentage points in favor of Fateh in the Gaza Strip but reaches only 3 percentage points in the West Bank, also in favor of Fateh.

Moreover, positive evaluation of the performance of Salam Fayyad’s government declines from 34% to 32% during the same period while positive evaluation of the performance of Haniyeh’s government increases significantly from 36% to 43%. In the competition over legitimacy between the governments of Haniyeh and Fayyad, 35% say Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one while only 24% say Fayyad’s is the legitimate one. Thee months ago, 28% said Haniyeh’s government was the legitimate one and 30% said Fayyad’s government was the legitimate one.

Despite the visible increase in the popularity of Hamas and Haniyeh, the overwhelming majority (71%) says that given the outcome of the Israeli war on Gaza, conditions of the Palestinians today are worse off than they were before the war, while only 11% say conditions today are better off than they were before the war. 17% say conditions have not changed. In the Gaza Strip, the percentage of those who believe that Palestinians are worse off today reaches 79%.

Moreover, despite the decline in the popularity and status of Abbas and Fayyad, 25% say conditions in the West Bank are good while only 7% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good.

Similarly, Hamas’s call for the establishment of a new representative body that can serve as an umbrella for the resistance groups receives the support of only one third of the Palestinians while 57% say that the PLO should be maintained.

The largest percentage (46%) believe that the most important priority for Palestinians today should be  the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 28% say it should be the return to quite and the opening of Gaza crossings and 25% say the top priority should be the reconstruction in the Gaza Strip.  In the Gaza Strip, belief that Gaza reconstruction should be the top priority stand at 21% only compared to 27% in the West Bank.

Findings show that the belief that the top Palestinian priority today should be the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But is more widespread among men (51%) than women (42%), among the “somewhat religious” (53%) compared to the “religious” (40%), among those holding a BA degree (51%) compared to the illiterates (33%), among employees (56%) compared to housewives (40%), and among Fateh voters (54%) compared to Hamas’s (40%).

Finally, Fateh’s greater popularity compared to Hamas’s reflects public perceptions regarding possible implications of election outcome on two major issues that seem to influence electoral behavior more than any other issue as we saw in our last poll in December. These two issues are the ending of siege and blockade and the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Current findings indicate the following:

-         if Hamas wins new presidential and legislative elections, 63% of the public believe that such an outcome would lead to the tightening of the siege and boycott while an additional 19% say current conditions of boycott would remain the same and only 12% say a Hamas electoral victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott. By contrast, if Fateh wins new presidential and legislative elections, only 11% say that such outcome would lead to the tightening of the siege and boycott and an additional 24% say current conditions would remain the same, but the majority (61%) says a Fateh electoral victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott. It is worth noting that the belief that a Fateh electoral victory would lead to the lifting of the siege increases significantly in the Gaza Strip reaching 76% and decreases to 52% in the West Bank.

-         Similarly, if Hamas wins new presidential and legislative elections, 47% of the public believe that such an outcome would lead to the consolidation of the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and an additional 23% say current conditions would remain the same but only 24% say a Hamas victory would lead to the consolidation of West Bank-Gaza Strip unity. By contrast, if Fateh wins new presidential and legislative elections only 31% say that such an outcome would lead to the consolidation of the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and an additional 26% say current conditions would remain the same, but 37% say such a Fateh electoral victory would lead to the consolidation of West Bank-Gaza Strip unity.   It is worth noting that the belief that a Hamas electoral victory lead to the consolidation of West Bank-Gaza Strip split increases considerably in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank (56% compared to 42%) while the belief that a Fateh electoral victory would lead to the consolidation of West Bank-Gaza Strip unity increases significantly in the Gaza Strip reaching 47%% and decreases to 31% in the West Bank. Belief that Hamas’s victory in the next elections would consolidate separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is stronger in the Gaza Strip (56%) compared to the West Bank (42%), among residents of refugee camps (54%) compared to residents of cities (44%), among men (49%) compared to women (46%), among the “somewhat religious” (54%) compared the “religious” (40%), among those whose age is between 18-27 years (51%) compared to those whose age is over 47 years (42%), among refugees (53%) compared to non-refugees (42%), among those holding a BA degree (50%) compared to illiterates (35%), among employees and students (55% each) compared to farmers and laborers (28% and 38% respectively), among those working in the public sector (59%) compared to those working in the private sector (46%), and among Fateh voters (67%) compared to Hamas voters (32%).

(2) Peace Process   

• 50% of the Palestinians agree and 48% disagree that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. Support for this mutual recognition stood at 53% and opposition at 46% three months ago.
• 73% of the Palestinians think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel in the next five years are non-existent or low 
• 58% support the Saudi Plan and 39% oppose it; in December 2008, 66% supported the plan and 30% opposed it.
• 54% of the Palestinians support and 42% oppose armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel. Three months ago, support for such attacks stood at 48% and opposition at 49%.
• 38% of the Palestinians support and 58% oppose return to Palestinian-Israeli final status negotiations before an Israeli freeze on settlement activity.

Findings indicate a decline in public support for the peace process. For example, support for the Saudi initiative (which calls for full Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab land and the establishment of a Palestinian state in return for a peace agreement with Israel and a normalization of relations between Israel and all Arab countries) drops from 77% three months ago to 58% in this poll. Opposition to the plan stands today at 39% compared to 30% in our last poll in December 2008. Moreover, willingness to accept mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all problems of the conflict drops from 53% three months ago to 50% in this poll.

Findings also indicate that the overwhelming majority (73%) believe that the chances for the creation of an independent Palestinian state next to Israel during the next five years are slim to non-existent while only 24% of the Palestinians believe the chances are medium or high. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 70% and 29% respectively, indicating an increase in the level of pessimism.

Findings also indicate an increase in public support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel from 48% in December 2008 to 54% in this poll. Opposition to armed attacks today stands at 43% compared to 49% three months ago. Support for armed attacks against Israeli targets increases in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (47%), among the “religious” (59%) compared to the “somewhat religious” (49%), among those whose age is between 18-27 years (61%) compared to those whose age is over 47 years (53%), among those holding a BA degree (59%) compared to illiterates (52%), among students and employees (67% and 63% respectively) compared to merchants and housewives (37% and 51% respectively), and among Hamas voters (70%) compared to Fateh voters (45%).

Finally, Findings show that a majority opposes return to Palestinian-Israeli negations before Israel freezes settlement construction while 37% support return to negotiations despite continued Israeli settlement construction.Opposition to return to negotiations before freezing settlement construction increases in the West Bank (61%) compared to the Gaza Strip(53%), among men (66%) compared to women (50%), among those holding a BA degree (66%) compared to illiterates (48%), among employees and students (66% and 61% respectively) compared to laborers and housewives (53% and 51% respectively), and among Hamas voters (69%) compared to Fateh voters (47%).  

(3) Israeli Elections

• 70% of the Palestinians think that there is no difference between Israeli right-wing parties and parties of the center and left; 26% think that there are differences between them.
• Only 7% expect that negotiations with the new Israeli government will be more successful in ending settlement expansion and bringing peace, and 62% expect settlements to continue to expand and peace efforts to fail. In this regard, Findings show

Findings show that a majority of Palestinians (70%) believe that there is no difference between the various Israeli parties of the right, center and left when it comes to the peace process while 26% say there is a difference. They also show a widespread pessimism regarding the chances of the peace process after the electoral victory of the right in the latest Israeli elections with 62% saying that the outcome of the elections will lead to increased settlement activities and a failure for peace efforts. 28% expect current conditions to remain unchanged and only 7% expect negotiations to succeed in ending settlement construction and achieving peace. 

Belief that differences exist between the various right wing, center, and left wing Israeli parties increases among women (30%) compared to men (23%), among supporters of the peace process (30%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (16%), among those whose age is between 18-27 years (35%) compared to those whose age is over 47 years (20%), among illiterates (29%) compared to those holding BA degree (21%), among students (37%) compared to employees (23%), and among Fateh voters (33%) compared to Hamas voters (21%). Full Report

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (35)

While a majority of Palestinians supports holding local elections and while a majority supports the two-state solution, an overwhelming majority opposes the proximity talks in the absence of a settlement freeze in East Jerusalem and the popularity and legitimacy of the president weaken in light of corruption reports and in light of the ending of his electoral term

4-6 March 2010   

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 4 and 6 March 2010. The poll was conducted after the PA announcement regarding the holding of local elections in July 2010, the leveling of corruption charges against senior PA officials by a former Palestinian intelligence official, publication of reports about the Egyptian construction of an underground iron barrier along the Egyptian borders with Rafah, and reports of an American proposal to conduct proximity talks between Israel and the Palestinians.  Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2010 show a limited setback for president Abbas and his Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and a limited improvement in the standing of Ismail Haniyeh and Hamas. The change might have been caused by the end of the electoral term of the president and by press reports that revealed cases of corruption and scandals inside the PA. These reports have been seen, and most importantly have been seen as credible, by a majority of Palestinians. Despite this setback for the PA and Abbas, a majority of Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank, supports the holding of local elections even before reconciliation and even if Hamas boycotts the elections. Findings also show that the top most important Palestinian priority today is the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This finding serves Fateh’s interests very well as a large percentage of Palestinians believe that while a Fateh electoral victory would strengthen the chances for reunifications, a large percentage believes that a Hamas victory would consolidate separation.

Findings also indicate widespread opposition to the American proposal to conduct Palestinian-Israeli proximity talks with US mediation but without a freeze on settlement construction in East Jerusalem. But the opposition to the resumption of peace talks does not mean an opposition to a peace settlement based on a two-state solution. A majority does indeed support the Arab Peace Initiative and prefers the two-state solution over other solutions such as a one state solution or one based on a Palestinian-Israeli confederation. Moreover, half of the public supports mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. But findings show a strong pessimistic tendency with regard to the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel during the next five years. Moreover, the overwhelming majority believes that Israel’s long term goal is to annex the occupied Palestinian territories and to expel its Palestinian population or deny them their political rights. A similar large majority expresses worry that it or family members would be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished. Increased Palestinian perception of threat leads in this poll to an increase in the support for armed attacks against Israelis despite the fact that a majority is still opposed to it.

(1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

•  A majority of 54% supports the holding of local elections in the West Bank even without reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas and even if Hamas decides to boycott the elections.
• A majority believes that recent reports about corruption are accurate and 50% do not trust the committee established by PA president to investigate the case of an alleged corruption and a video tape involving the director of his office and the role allegedly played by the Palestinian Intelligence Department in the matter; three quarters do not want to see a PA security service involved in such activity. 
• If new presidential elections took place today, Abbas would receive 50% and Ismail Haniyeh 40%. But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 63% and the latter 32%.
• If new parliamentary elections in which all factions participate were to take place today, Fateh receives 42%, Hamas 28%, all other lists combined 11%, and 19% say they are undecided
• 11% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good or very good while 31% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good; but perception of personal and family safety and security stands at 70% in the Gaza Strip compared to 55% in the West Bank
• Performance of the Haniyeh’s government is seen as good or very good by 39% and performance of Fayyad’s government is seen as good or very good by 42%; 47% are satisfied with the performance of Abbas and 50% are not satisfied
• The top priority for Palestinians is the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip followed by ending Gaza siege and opening its crossings
• 15% believe that unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will soon be restored, 31% believe separation is permanent and 47% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time

Findings show readiness in the West Bank for the resumption of the electoral process while the Gaza Strip remains opposed to elections: 54% support and 41% oppose the holding of local elections in the West Bank next July even if reconciliation talks have not succeeded by then to unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Support for holding local elections is higher in the West Bank, reaching 60%, and lower in the Gaza Strip, standing at 46%. If local elections were held in the West Bank on the stated date of July 2010, a majority of the West Bankers (53%) would participate even if Hamas boycotts the elections and even if reconciliation was not achieved by that date. 43% of the West Bankers say they will not participate in the local elections.  Respondents in Gaza were not asked about participation in the local elections.

Support for holding local elections increases in rural areas (63%) compared to cities (53%) and refugee camps (52%). It also increases among men (56%) compared to women (52%), among the somewhat religious (59%) compared to the religious (48%), among supporters of the peace process (60%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (36%), among holders of BA degree (57%) compared to illiterates (43%), among employees (61%) compared to housewives (51%), among those working in the public sector (72%) compared to those working in the private sector (53%), among those who intend to vote for Fateh (78%) and the undecided (59%) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas (31%) and for third parties (48%), and among those less than 40 years of age (58%) compared to those over 40 (48%).

But if support for holding elections is an indication of PA legitimacy, findings show an indicator in the opposite direction: corruption. Findings show that 72% have heard about reports of scandals and charges of corruption in the Palestinian Authority or saw a video tape mentioned in those reports and more than two thirds of them (69%) believe those reports and charges to be accurate while 24% do not. In this regard, only 41% have confidence and 50% do not have confidence in the investigation committee established by the PA president to examine these reports of scandals and charges of corruption. Moreover, 50% say they believe and 38% say they do not believe that the PA Intelligence Department was behind the filming of the video tape mentioned in the reports and charges of corruption. About three quarters (74%) reject or strongly reject allowing PA security services to photograph or film Palestinians in embarrassing situations, as the case may have been in the video tape mentioned in the reports and 22% accept such a role for the security services.

The percentage of those who reject or strongly reject allowing PA security services to engage in such activity increases in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (73%), among women (77%) compared to men (71%), among supporters of the peace process (77%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (64%), among those working in the public sector (80%) compared to those working in the private sector (72%), and among supporters of Fateh (82%) and third parties (84%) compared to supporters of Hamas (66%).

If new presidential elections are held today, Abbas would receive the vote of 50% of the voters (compared to 54% last December) and Haniyeh would receive 40% (compared to 38% last December). But if the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 63% (compared to 67% last December) and the latter would receive 32% (compared to 28% last December). Most popular figures selected by the public as a possible vice president are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 30% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (19%), Salam Fayyad (14%) Mustafa Barghouti (11%), and Saeb Erekat (5%).  If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 42% say they would vote for Fateh and 28% say they would vote for Hamas, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago Fateh received 43%, Hamas 27%, third parties combined 14%, and the undecided stood at 17%.

11% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good or very good and 73% say conditions are bad or very bad. By contrast, 31% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good and 36% say they are bad or very bad. Similarly, 30% say conditions of democracy and human rights under the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip are good or very good. By contrast, 37% say these conditions in the PA under president Abbas are good or very good. 61% say their security and safety and that of their families are assured. In the West Bank, perception of personal and family safety and security stands at 55% and in the Gaza Strip, perception of safety and security stands today at 70%. Despite the difference in the evaluation of condition in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, evaluation of the performance of the governments of Haniyeh and Fayyad does not seem to reflect it. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government reaches 39% and positive evaluation of the performance of Salam Fayyad’s government stands at 42%. In the Gaza Strip, 44% say the performance of Haniyeh’s government is good or very good while only 36% of West Bankers say the same. Positive evaluation of the Fayyad government reaches 40% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank. 47% are satisfied with the performance of president Abbas and 50% are not satisfied. Moreover, 28% believe that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one and only 26% say that Abu Mazin’s and Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one, and 31% say both governments are illegitimate. Three months ago, 26% said Haniyeh’s government was the legitimate one and 30% said Fayyad’s government was the legitimate one. Moreover, 53% say PA president Abbas has lost his legitimacy when his term ended and 41% disagree with that. Similarly, 53% say the Palestinian Legislative Council has lost its legitimacy after its term ended and 39% disagree with that.

The largest percentage (59%) views the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the top most important Palestinian priority today, 24% believe the top priority is the opening of border crossings, and 17% believe the top priority is the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip. In this regard, if Hamas wins the next elections, 61% say such outcome would lead to the consolidation of the siege and international boycott while 12% say it would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott. But if Fateh wins the next elections, only 9% say such outcome would lead to the consolidation of the siege while 57% say it would lead to the lifting of the siege. Moreover, if Hamas wins the next elections, such outcome would lead to the consolidation of the separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the eyes of 46% of the public while only 19% believe it would lead to consolidation of unity. But if Fateh wins the next elections, only 27% believe this would consolidate separation and 32% believe it would strengthen unity.

31% say unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will not be restored and two separate entities will develop while only 15% say unity will be reestablished soon. But the largest percentage (47%) says unity will eventually be restored but after a long time. In this regard, only 14% say Hams is responsible for the split and 12% say Fateh is responsible. Almost two thirds (64%) say both are responsible for the continued split. Moreover, findings show that 24% of the public believes that Hamas is responsible for the failure to hold elections on time and 12% believe Fateh is the one responsible for that. But the largest percentage, 31%, blames Israel. 

(2) Iron underground wall on borders with Egypt

• 35% believe that Egypt’s goal from building its underground iron wall on its borders with Rafah is to pressure Hamas to sign the reconciliation paper while 28% believe the goal to be the protection of Egypt’s security against smugglers; but 31% believe the goal is to contribute to the siege on the Gaza Strip
• Gazans are less  likely than West Bankers to suspect the motivation of Egypt in building the underground wall

The Gaza Strip differs from the West Bank in its evaluation of the function of the underground iron barrier being built by Egypt on its Rafah borders. Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to show understanding of Egypt’s goals. Findings show that the public is split on its views regarding Egypt’s goal: 35% believe the aim is to pressure Hamas to sign the reconciliation declaration (43% in the Gaza Strip and 30% in the West Bank), 31% believe the aim is to contribute to the siege of the Gaza Strip (25% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank), and 28% believe the aim is to protect the security of Egypt from smugglers (29% in the Gaza Strip and 27% in the West Bank).

Percentage of those who believe the goal behind the underground barrier is to contribute to the siege increases among men (33%) compared to women (29%), among the religious (35%) compared to the somewhat religious (27%), among those opposed to the peace process (46%) compared to supporters of the peace process (26%), among the illiterates (33%) compared to the holders of BA degree (24%), among those who work in the private sector (35%) compared to those who work in the public sector (26%), among those whose age is over 50 years (43%) compared to those whose age is between 18-22 years (32%), and among supporters of Hamas (40%) and third parties (39%) compared to supporters of Fateh (20%).

(3) Peace Process   

• In the absence of an Israeli freeze on settlement construction in East Jerusalem, only 26% support, and 73% oppose, Palestinian participation in the US proposed proximity talks
• 60% support and 37% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative
• 57% prefer a two-state solution while 29% prefer a one state solution and 26% prefer a Palestinian-Israeli confederation
• 50% support and 49% oppose a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after a peace agreement has been reached
• But 71% believe that chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non existent and 28% believe the chances are medium or high
• Palestinians have no confidence in Israel’s long term aspirations: 63% believe it seeks to annex the occupied territories and expel its population; 18% believe it seeks to annex the occupied territories while denying its population their political rights; 16% believe it seeks to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories or part of it after guaranteeing its security
• 77% are worried or very worried that they or a family member might be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished
• Support for armed attacks against Israelis stands at 47% and opposition at 50%

Findings show widespread opposition, reaching 73%, to return to negotiations with Israel as long as settlement construction continues in East Jerusalem, even if talks are indirect as the US proposed proximity talks. Support for the proximity talks in the absence of a settlement freeze in East Jerusalem stands at 26%. Opposition for the proximity talks increases among those opposed to the peace process (91%) compared to those who support the peace process (66%), among those whose age is over 40% (75%) compared to those whose age is between 18-22 years (66%), among supporters of Hamas (87%) compared to supporters ofFateh (59%).

Opposition to the proximity talks does not mean an opposition to a peace settlement based on a two-state solution. Findings show that 60% support and 37% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative calling for a two-state solution and for normalization of relations between Israel and all Arab countries after the Israeli withdrawal to the lines of June 1967. Moreover, a majority prefers the two-state solution over other solutions such as the one state solution or the one based on a Palestinian-Israeli confederation. Support for the two state solution stands at 57% while support for the one state solution stands at 29% and support for a Palestinian-Israeli confederation stands at 26%. Findings also show that 50% support and 49% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the settlement of all issues of the conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Preference for the two-state solution is higher in the West Bank (59%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among men (60%) compared to women (55%), among the somewhat religious (60%) compared to the religious (53%), among supporters of the peace process (66%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (33%), among employees (65%) and merchants (67%) compared to students (40%), among those who work in the public sector (67%) compared to those who work in the private sector (59%), among those over 50 years old (68%) compared to those between 18-22 years of age (44%), and among supporters of Fateh (73%) and third parties (62%) compared to supporters of Hamas (38%).

Despite the majority support for the two-state solution, the overwhelming majority (71%) believes the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non existent while 28% believe the chances are medium or high. Moreover, the overwhelming majority (81%) believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex Palestinian territories and expel the Palestinian population (as 63% believe) or annex the territories to Israel and deny Palestinians their political rights (as 18% believe). Percentage of those who believe that Israel’s aspiration is to annex the Palestinian territories and expel the population or deny them their rights stood at 76% in our last poll three months ago. The percentage of those who believe that Israel seeks to guarantee its security and withdraw from the territories or from part of it stands at 16%. Furthermore, findings show that the overwhelming majority (77%) is worried or very worried that it or members of its family might be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land might be confiscated or home demolished by Israel. Only 23% say they are not worried or not worried at all.

Finally, findings show a noticeable increase in the percentage of those who support armed attacks against Israelis inside Israel, standing today at 47% compared to 43% in our previous poll conducted about three months ago.... Full Report