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PressRelease   Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU)  and the Government of Jappan.

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

● Support for the two-state solution declines from 46% among Palestinians and Israeli Jews six months ago to 43% for both sides today. This is the lowest level of support for this concept among the two publics during the past two years of the Pulse, the lowest in more than a decade, when a steady decline in support began, and the lowest in almost two decades of joint Palestinian-Israeli survey research.  Still, fewer people on both sides support three possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights, one state without rights, and expulsion or “transfer.”

● Half of the Palestinian and Israeli samples were presented with a peace package identical to the one we presented to them four times during the past two years. Only 37% of Palestinians (compared to 40% in December 2017) and 39% of Israeli Jews (compared to 35% six months ago) support a permanent peace agreement package, along with 82% of Israeli Arabs – typical of the high level support from Israeli Arabs in previous surveys. In total, 46% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims. Forty-eight percent of Israelis (54% of Israeli Jews) and 61% of Palestinians are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package.

● A modified package, similar in every respect to the original one described above, was presented to the other half of the sample. The modified version included three additional components that previous research showed to provide positive incentives to both sides: Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic; the bilateral agreement will be part of a regional agreement along the lines of the Arab Peace Initiative; and the US and major Arab countries will insure full implementation of the agreement by both sides.  In comparison with support for the original package, the modified one received greater support from both sides: 45% of Israeli Jews and 42% of Palestinians, a 6-point and a 5-point increase respectively. Among Israeli Arabs, support rose to 91%.  

●The current survey also tested the likely impact of previously tested zero-sum incentives on the level of support for the original and the modified packages. Drawing on eight such incentives, we paired measures that show reciprocal benefits/costs to each side. The impact of the pairs on the Palestinian side was much weaker than on the Israeli side, as most of them failed to increase support for the two packages while on the Israeli side, six of the eight pairs generated higher levels of support.

●The skepticism about the two packages appears closely related to serious doubts about feasibility. Palestinians and Israelis are both divided almost equally about whether a two-state solution is still possible, or whether settlements have expanded too much to make it viable. Among all Israelis, nearly half believes the solution is still viable (48%), while 45% think settlements have spread too much for it to be viable. While Israeli Arabs remain highly optimistic, with 64% thinking this solution remains viable, only 44% of Israeli Jews agree with this assessment.  Among Palestinians, 56% say the two-state solution is no longer viable (a four-point decrease), while 39% think it is. But fully 72% and 81% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, respectively, do not expect a Palestinian state to be established in the next five years.

●When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 41% of the Palestinians (47% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) 45% of Israeli Jews and 84% of Israeli Arabs choose “reach a peace agreement.” This represents a significant increase in support for a peace agreement among Palestinians compared to only 26% who chose this option in the aftermath of the Trump declaration on Jerusalem six months ago.  27% of Palestinians (compared to 38% six months ago) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 20% call for “a definitive war with the Palestinians.” 

The Palestinian sample size was 2150 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 25 June and 1 July, 2018. The number of interviewees in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 1403 and in the Gaza Strip 747. The margin of error is +/-2.5%. The Israeli sample includes 1600 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between 25 June and 8 July 2018. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 1200, 200 West Bank settlers, 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3%.  The Palestinian and Israeli samples were divided in half, an A and a B sample on each side. The A samples received the original peace plan, which we offered to the two public in the previous four polls during the past two years and the B samples received a modified plan offered in this poll for the first time. The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, with assistance from David Reis, together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.   

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provide the respective findings for these sub groups.  

Two-state solution: In the current survey, only 43% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews support the concept of the two-state solution; 54% of Palestinians and 48% of Israeli Jews are opposed. Six months ago, 46% on each side supported this solution and a year ago, 52% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews supported it. In all cases, only the general principle was provided. Among Israeli Arabs, support remains unchanged at 82%, bringing the total Israeli average to 49%. Support for this solution among Palestinians and Israeli Jews is the lowest during the past two years of the Pulse, the lowest in more than a decade, when a steady decline in support began, and the lowest in almost two decades of joint Palestinian-Israeli survey research. As seen in the graph below, among Jews, support for the two-state principle has seen an incremental but steady decline since June 2016, when it stood at 53%. Among Palestinians support has varied: it fell from June to December 2016, when 44% supported the basic two-state solution in principle, rose to 52% last June, then declined once again to 46% and continued to decline in the current poll. 

Similar to the December 2017 poll, support for the two-state solution among Palestinians, is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 46% and 40% respectively. Last December, 48% of West Bankers and 44% of Gazans supported it. Support is also high among those Palestinians who support third parties (other than Hamas and Fatah) and among Fatah supporters (61% and 57% respectively) and low among Hamas supporters (22%). The same pattern of support is observed when looking at levels of religiosity: 56% among those who are not religious, 49% among the somewhat religious, and only 35% among the religious.

Among Israelis, as in the past, the significant variations are found among demographic groups defined by religious observance and age. Secular Israeli Jews show a majority who support two states, 54%, compared to 15% among religious Jews. Among the youngest Jews, 18-34 years old, just 27% support it, and 45% among the 35-44 group – compared to a 51% majority among older Israeli Jews.

Perceptions of public support. When asked if they believe their own societies support the two-state solution, 23% of Israeli Jews believe the majority of Israelis support it, a decline from 27% six months ago, and 59% believe the majority opposes it; thus, perceptions of their society are inaccurately weighted towards rejection, rather than the reality of a divided opinions. Among Israeli Arabs, 25% think that most Israeli Jews support the principle of a two-state solution, a 7-points decrease when compared to the December 2017 findings.

Palestinian perception of their own side’s position has changed during the past year. Today 38%, compared to 48% last June and 42% last December, believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution and 53% think a majority opposes it.

Regarding perceived attitudes of the other side, the portion of Palestinians who think Israeli Jews support the two-state solution is declining: 36% of Palestinians, compared to 42% last June and 38% last December, think the majority of Jewish Israelis support this solution and 48%, think they oppose it. Among Israeli Jews, just 31% believe Palestinians support the two-state solution.

Declining support linked to low perceived feasibility. To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two-state solution. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 5% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years; 72% of Palestinians say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews a larger majority of 81% think the chances are low or very low, 62% of Israeli Arabs take this view, and the weighted average for all Israelis is 78% who do not believe a Palestinian state will be established in that time.  Further, the view that the two-state solution is no longer even feasible is widespread in general social and public discourse. We tested this belief directly, asking respondents on both sides whether settlements have expanded too much, making a two-state solution impossible, or whether settlements can still be dismantled or evacuated and therefore the solution is still viable. Among Palestinians, a majority of 56% believes the solution is no longer viable, a four-point decline compared to 60% last December, but a two-point rise compared to last June. The Israelis on the other hand are once again divided: 48% among all Israelis think the solution is still viable, and a smaller portion, 45% think it is not. But among Jews, attitudes have shifted from June: at present a plurality believes the two-state solution is not viable, 47%, while 44% think it is. A year earlier, the trend was reversed: 49% of Jews said it was still viable, and 43% said it was not. Among Arab Israeli respondents, 64%, compared to 74% six months ago, believe this solution is still viable.

Three competing alternatives to the two-state solution: One state with equal rights, one state without equal rights (apartheid), and expulsion or “transfer”

The joint poll sought to ascertain the breakdown of Palestinians and Israelis regarding various alternatives to the two-state solution. Three alternative options were offered: (1) one state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians was offered to all those who rejected the two-state solution (one democratic state); (2) one state solution in which one side or the other is denied equal rights (apartheid) was offered to those who rejected the two-state solution and the one democratic state;  (3) a single state in which the other side is “transferred” or expelled from the entire territory of historic or Mandatory Palestine (expulsion) was offered to those who have rejected all three above. For options two and three, Israeli Arabs were asked the same questions asked of Palestinians, i.e., in which rights of Jews are denied in the second option and expulsion is applied to Jews in the third option.

As the two pies below show, the largest constituency is the one that supports the two-state solution. Once those respondents are excluded from the sample and the remaining public is assigned one alternative after the other, the public splits between the three alternatives. The category called “other” refers to respondents who either rejected all options or responded “do not know.” The findings among the Palestinians are almost identical to those of December 2017 with the exception in the decline in support for the two-state solution, with those abandoning it moving to the “other.” The findings among Israeli Jews show different distribution to those who abandoned the two-state solution: support for the one democratic state increased from 14% to 19%; support for expulsion declined from 14% to 8% while support for apartheid increased from 11% to 15%.

On the Palestinian side, as indicated earlier, there is a difference between Gazans and West Bankers in their preferences for the two-state solution. As the chart below shows, gaps do also emerge between the two areas in their preferences for some of the alternatives: more Gazans than West Bankers show support for apartheid and expulsion. This Gaza-West Bank difference reflects a major difference between the two regions in the level of religiosity (55% of Gazans and 36% of West Bankers describe themselves are religious), a factor that contributes, as the chart below shows, to a reduced level of support for the two-state solution and a greater support for expulsion.

Gaps also emerge when looking at the Palestinian political affiliation or vote preferences, with supporters of Fatah and the third parties showing majority support for the two-state solution.  The highest support among Hamas voters goes to expulsion followed by the two-state solution, apartheid and one democratic state. It is worth noting that support for Fatah stands in this poll as 39%, Hamas at 32%, and third parties at 9%, and the unaffiliated at 20%.

A similar examination of the Israeli Jewish side shows that a majority support for the two-state solution is found only among secular Jews. At 37%, it is the one most supported by the traditional followed by the one democratic state. The religious support apartheid and one democratic state and gives expulsion the least support. The ultra-Orthodox support equally apartheid and a one democratic state.

When looking at the political spectrum, a majority support for the two-state solution is found among the left and the center but not the right. Yet, even among the “moderate right,” at 29%, support for the two-state solution is higher than support for any of the three alternatives. Those who define themselves as “right” support apartheid and the one democratic state more than any other. It is worth noting that the size of the moderate right category in this poll is 18%, the right 36%, the “center” 23%, the moderate left 8%, and the left 7% of the Jewish sample.

Finally, when looking at Israeli Arabs, as the pie below shows, support for the two-state solution, as indicated above, is overwhelming, followed by support for the one democratic state solution.

Confederation: For the fourth time, we tested an alternative to the traditional two-state solution in the form of a confederation between two states. The confederation alternative was described as follows:

“Some people recommend the following solution: the creation of two states, Palestine and Israel, which enter into a confederation whereby citizens of one country are allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of the other but each national group votes only in its state for elections. There would be freedom of movement for all, and Jerusalem is not divided but serves as the capital of two states. Israel and Palestine would deal jointly with security and the economy.  

Support for the confederation concept drops slightly to 31% among Israeli Jews compared to 33% last December. But it is still higher than the support we found last June and in December 2016 when it stood at 26% and 20% respectively. Opposition to the confederation among Israeli Jews stands at 54%. By contrast, Palestinian support rose slightly to 30%, a two-percentage point increase compared to last December. But the current level of support is lower than the 37% we found last June. Current opposition among the Palestinians is 63%. As is the case for the two-state solutions, support for the confederation idea is highest among Israeli Arabs, at 68%, with 29% opposed.

Peace and violence. Unlike our December findings which showed significant differences between Palestinians and Israeli Jews regarding what should happen next, the current survey shows similarities between the two sides comparable to those we saw a year ago. Six months ago, right after the announcement of the Trump Administration regarding the relocation of US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and the ensuing Palestinian-Israeli street confrontations in the West Bank, Palestinian preference for diplomacy and a peace agreement dropped sharply and the preference for “armed struggle” rose.  Palestinians have now moved back to preferring peace agreement over waging an armed struggle despite the rise in tension along the Israel borders with the Gaza Strip. A plurality of Israelis and Palestinians (45% and 41% respectively) support a peace agreement. Among West Bank Palestinians the preference for a peace agreement is even higher, standing at 47% compared to 29% in the Gaza Strip. When given four options for what should happen next, only 27% of Palestinians (22% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip, a reflection of the relative calm in the West Bank compared to the tension on the Gaza border with Israel), compared to 38% last June, chose armed struggle. Among the Israelis, 20% chose “a definitive war,” against Palestinians. Last December 19% opted for the war option.

Detailed packages for implementation  

As in all four previous surveys of the current series of joint polls, Palestinians and Israelis were asked in this survey to support or oppose a detailed combined peace package based on the two-state solution, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The package addressed all issues of the so-called permanent status negotiations, such as borders, security, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees, as well as mutual recognition and end of conflict. In addition to the original package presented in the past four surveys, the current study includes a modified version of the package and a new experiment designed to build on the findings of the previous surveys. For the last two years, incentives had been developed to try and convince respondents who opposed the detailed combined package to shift towards support; thus, the previous surveys tested whether opposition to the agreement is fixed or flexible. Over thirty such incentives were developed and tested: some were incentives for one side only, while others were shared incentives, meaning that identical items were offered to both sides. While many of the one-sided incentives were zero-sum in nature, as they would predictably increase support among those receiving them, they would reduce support among the other side, others were not. The current survey includes an experiment that aimed at testing the value of the previous research on incentives in two ways: (1) integrating some of the shared incentives in a modified version of the peace plan in order to test their impact on support for the new version; and (2) separately pairing some of the zero-sum incentives in order to determine their benefits as well as the harm they might inflict on the support for both the original and the modified peace packages.

From all the incentives tested in four surveys over the last two years, we identified three successful “shared” items, those asked of both Israelis and Palestinians who opposed the detailed original agreement at first. These are the items that convinced a large or reasonable number of those respondents who had rejected the comprehensive package to change their mind, and which were also identical for both Israelis and Palestinians. The three incentives were:

• The future Palestinian state will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures. The state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law.
• The agreement will include formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides.
• The agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative

For this final survey, these incentives were added to the original comprehensive package and tested as regular items of the detailed agreement, but only among half of the Israeli and Palestinian samples. The other half of each sample was given the original detailed package with the items that have been tested in all previous surveys in this project.

As indicated earlier, the sample size of Israelis and Palestinians was increased in the current survey, to ensure that each half was large enough to represent the demographic breakdown of each society. The larger sample also helped ensure that there were not significant pre-existing ideological or political differences to explain different outcomes.[1]

Palestinians and Israelis were asked to respond first to each item separately, as component parts; following nine such items in the original and the modified packages and three more items in the modified package, they were asked if they support or opposed the combined package, and given a short summary of the basic elements.

The results show the potential for raising support in favor of a detailed two-state solution if certain adjustments are made.  Among both Palestinians and Israelis, the modified package with the incentives added as additional items received higher support than the original detailed package.

• Among Palestinians, 42% of those who were asked about the new agreement said they would support it, five points higher than those who supported the original plan (37%).  A majority of 61% opposed the original package while 56% opposed the modified version.  As the chart below shows, the current level of support for the original package is the lowest in two years, reflecting the continued decline in support for the two-state solution as shown earlier; the highest level of support for the original plan stood at 43% in June 2017. Six months ago, 40% of Palestinians supported the original package and 57% opposed it.
• Among all Israelis, a majority of 53% supported the modified agreement, compared to 46% among all Israelis who supported the original package –seven points higher – as will be shown, among Jews only, the gap is six points, very close to the gap among Palestinians.  Among Jewish Israelis, 45% supported the modified plan, compared to 39% who supported the original package. Here too, Jewish support for the new package exceeds the Jewish support for the original package since the project began (the lowest support was 32%, in June 2017 and the highest was 41% in December 2016). The number also slightly surpasses total Jewish support for a general two-state solution in this survey (43%). Six months ago, 35% of Israeli Jews supported and 55% opposed the original package. Israeli Arab respondents also showed even stronger enthusiasm for the new plan, compared to their already-high support for the original comprehensive package in the past.  While 82% supported the original package, a relatively consistent finding over time, over 91% supported the modified version.

These findings indicate that there is still significant room to raise support should further incentive combinations be identified as effective and identical for both sides, so that they can be added to the comprehensive plan. That challenge is explored later in this report.

Among Israelis, the modified plan with the additional items received the highest support for a comprehensive agreement since the project began in 2016. It is also the first time support for the detailed agreement has reached a majority, and the first time support for the detailed agreement surpassed support for the general concept of a two state solution (50% among the half-sample that was asked about the modified agreement).

Items of an agreement. A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the original package follows (non-italicized questions were asked of Israeli Jews and if no other wording appears, also for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Italics refer to the questions worded separately for Palestinians; some of the Palestinian wordings were used for Israeli Arabs). The figures after each of the first 9 items indicate support of the entire expanded sample. The new components of the modified package are listed below at the end of the breakdown. As can be seen below, among both populations, the specific new items inserted into the modified plan received positive feedback when tested separately. The idea that the Palestinian state would be a democracy received the highest support of all items among the Israeli respondents. A democratic Palestinian state was also the most successful item of the modified package among Palestinian respondents. Among Jews, a majority supported the idea that the agreement would be part of a larger agreement with all Arab states.   

1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side. 62% of Israeli Jews support this item.

Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side. 43%, of Palestinians support mutual recognition and 85% of Israeli Arabs support mutual recognition.

2. The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry). Only 20% of Palestinians support this (14% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).  Among Israeli Jews, 59% support this item and among Israeli Arabs only 44% support it. 

3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Among Palestinians, 41% support this (37% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip). Israeli Jews support stands at 48% and Israeli Arab support at 73%.

4. The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. 31% of Palestinians support this (25% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip). Among Israeli Jews, 40% support this, and among Israeli Arabs 55% support it.

5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. 31% of Palestinians support this (26% among West Bankers and 40% among Gazans). 40% of Israeli Jews support this and 64% of Arabs support it.

6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel. Just a little over a quarter of Palestinians (26%) support the territorial exchange (21% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip). 36% of Israeli Jews support this, and 62% of Israeli Arabs.  

7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Less than a quarter (24%) of Jews support this item. 

East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of the Israel. 26% of Palestinians support this (23% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip).  63% of Israeli Arabs support this item.

8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. 28% of Israeli Jews support the Old City arrangement.

In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian quarters and al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. Here again, just one-quarter of Palestinians support the division of the Old City (22% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip). 63% of Israeli Arabs support this.

9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.  48%of Palestinians support this (39% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip). This item receives the lowest support from Israeli Jews out of all the items tested: 21% support the arrangement on refugees, Israeli Arabs show the opposite trend: 84% support it.

10. Modified Version only: The future Palestinian state will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures. The state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law.  Among the Palestinians, support stands at 48% (44% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip).  62% of Israeli Jews and 91% of Israeli Arabs support it.

11. Modified Version only: The agreement will include formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides.  Among the Palestinians, support stands at 43% (36% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip).  46% of Israeli Jews and 67% of Israeli Arabs support it.

12. Modified Version only: The agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative. Among the Palestinians, support stands at 46% (40% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip).  51% of Israeli Jews and 85% of Israeli Arabs support it. 

Perception of social support for package. On both sides, respondents perceive their own society’s support for the original plan to be low. Moreover, the elevated support for the modified plan and the relatively high support for the additional constituent items did not have a significant impact on people’s perceptions of how their own society or the other side would react to it. Thus, when Palestinians were asked if most Palestinians would support the original plan, 32% stated that most would support it; slightly more, 36%, said a majority would support the modified plan, among respondents who had heard the new plan. Among Israelis, 22% and 25% said the majority of their fellow Israelis would support the original plan or the modified plan, respectively.

And when asked if they believe the other side would embrace the original or the modified peace package, exactly 36% of Palestinians believed a majority of Jews might support either the old or the new plan. In a mirror image, 33% and 35% of Israelis thought the majority of Palestinians would accept either the original or the modified plan, respectively. 

Regional and demographic trends. The internal breakdowns of each population show which sub-groups respond differently to the two options. Among Palestinians, there are variations in responses among different groups. Nearly all sub-groups reflect higher support for the modified plan, even among some hardline respondents.

• As in previous surveys, Gaza respondents are more supportive of the modified agreement (as they are also slightly more supportive of the original package than West Bankers). Half of all Gazans supported the new plan, seven points higher than their level of support for the old plan (43%). Among West Bank respondents, 37% supported the new plan, three points higher than for the old plan (34%). It is worth noting that while support for the two-state solution among Gazans in lower than it is among West Bankers, as indicated earlier, support in the Gaza Strip for the two packages is higher than it is in the West Bank. In fact, Gazans’ support for the concept of the two-state solution is less than the support they give to either detailed package while West Bankers’ support for the concept is larger than the support they give to either package. Part of the explanation for this surprising finding has to do with the difference in the impact of viability on two Palestinian groups: Gazans who think the two-state solution is no longer viable support that concept by almost half the support among the same group of West Bankers (17% vs. 33% respectively) but Gazans who think it remains viable support it by a higher percentage than West Bankers (72% vs. 66% respectively). Similarly, Gazans who think the two-state solution remains viable support the two packages by much higher percentages than like-minded West Bankers: 76% vs 48% for the original package and 78% vs. 59% for the modified package respectively.
• Among Fatah supporters, 57% support the modified plan, four points higher than support for the original plan (53%); Even Hamas supporters showed some flexibility: 21% supported the original plan and 24% supported the modified version – leading to the same level of support as among religious Jews showed for the new plan (24%, as cited below).
• Support for the two packages package is higher among those who are less religious, and lower among those who are more religious. Among Palestinians who define themselves as “not religious” a majority supports the two plans, the original and the modified. Support among the religious for the original plan stands at 29% rising to 36% for the modified one, a seven-point increase.
• Young Palestinians between 18 and 22 years of age, which in past surveys were associated with hardline views, show little or no age differences this time.

Among Israelis, as shown in the chart below, the internal breakdowns of the population show variations similar to those we saw among Palestinians. Like the Palestinians, almost all sub-groups reflect higher support for the modified plan, even among some hardline respondents.

• The lowest levels of support for the two packages is found among religious Jews; higher support is found among the ultra-Orthodox and traditional Jews while the majority among secular Jews support both packages. The findings reflect a very consistent religious-secular divide. When comparing the two versions of the package, a somewhat higher portion of secular Israeli Jews support the modified package, 59% compared to 53% for the original one, while among traditional Jews who are a key constituency, 31% support the original package and 37% support the new one. Although the sample size is limited, the survey also found a significant difference among religious Israeli Jews: just eight percent supported the original package, but three times more, 24%, responded that they would support the modified package with the additional incentives.
• Center and left-wing Israelis showed the greatest contrast between the two plans, while the right-wing responded with only minimal difference. Among left-wing Jews, 79% supported the modified agreement, 15 points higher than those who supported the original agreement (64% among left-wing Jews). Israeli Jews who identify as centrist show an important difference as well: from less than half who supported the original agreement (44%), a clear majority of 58% support the new agreement. Right-wing Israeli Jews showed less difference, with just below one-third supported either package: 31% supported the original agreement and 33% for the modified one. 
• Similarly, although young Jewish respondents are often more hard-line than older people, as seen earlier regarding the general two-state solution, in this survey youth support for the package, while somewhat relevant for the modified version, is not too different from other age groups of Jews for the original package.

Feasibility - doubts. Beyond demographic and political differences that typically characterize those who support or oppose the two-state solution and the detailed package, background attitudes are also clearly linked to support. In previous surveys, it has been clear that trust in the other side is a powerful factor, and the belief that the other side wants peace. It also became clear that the perception of viability is important.  Among Israeli Jews who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 51% support the original combined package and 61% support the modified package. Further, for Israeli Jews, support for the original and the modified agreements rises significantly in part on whether the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

Among the Palestinians who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 58% support the original combined package and 66% support the modified version. Further, support for the two versions of the agreement rises incrementally the more the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

INCENTIVE PAIRS

A second experiment considered a new mode of testing incentives. In previous surveys, as indicated earlier, some of the incentives proposed were developed specifically for one side or the other. To offset the possibility that an incentive for one side, such as the zero-sum measures, might alienate the other side, in the current survey we paired incentives to show reciprocal benefits to each side. The incentives were paired thematically, drawing on eight items, representing some of the top-ranked incentives from the last two years. Thus, each pair offered each side a favorable condition on a specific topic – usually related, but not identical to the benefit included to the other side.

Respondents were asked directly if these pairs – an incentive to their own side coupled with a benefit to the other side – raised or lowered their support for an agreement. By contrast to previous surveys, all respondents were asked these questions, not only those who rejected the agreement. The goal was to see whether in a real situation where people are likely to learn of all benefits/incentives offered to all sides, whether respondents of either disposition would switch: would supporters defect and oppose an agreement, would rejectionists possibly switch towards support? And for those who had not made up their mind, could the mutual incentives convince them to support an agreement, or push them to oppose it?

The following is the list of pairs tested. The only difference is the order of the items within each pair: for each side, the question began with the incentives geared at them (Palestinian versions are in italics).

The state of Palestine will recognize the Jewish religious and historic roots in the historic land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael) and Israel would recognize the Palestinian religious and historic roots in the historic land of Palestine.

Israel will recognize the Palestinian religious and historic roots in the historic land of Palestine and Palestine will recognize the Jewish religious and historic roots in the historic land of Palestine.

Palestine will acknowledge the Jewish character of the state of Israel and Israel will acknowledge the Arab and Islamic character of the state of Palestine.

Israel will acknowledge the Arab and Islamic character of the state of Palestine and Palestine will acknowledge the Jewish character of the state of Israel.

An agreed number of Israelis, including settlers, will be allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Palestine while maintaining their Israeli citizenship, as long as they are law abiding and an agreed number of Palestinians, including refugees, will be allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Israel while maintaining their Palestinian citizenship, as long as they are law abiding.

An agreed number of Palestinians, including refugees, will be allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Israel while maintaining their Palestinian citizenship, as long as they are law abiding and an agreed number of Israelis, including settlers, will be allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Palestine while maintaining their Israeli citizenship, as long as they are law abiding.

The Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation like today, including sharing intelligence with Israeli security forces, arresting terror suspects and preventing attacks and the Israeli government will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners when the peace agreement takes effect.

The Israeli government will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners when the peace agreement takes effect, and the Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation with Israel like today, including sharing intelligence with Israeli security forces, arresting terror suspects and preventing attacks. 

As a sign of reconciliation, Jews will be allowed to visit at the Temple Mount (al Haram al Sharif) and all other religious sites holy to Jews in the Palestinian state and Israel will allow Palestinians to visit Muslim and Christian holy sites in the state of Israel.

As a sign of reconciliation, Israel will allow Palestinians to visit Muslim and Christian holy sites in the state of Israel and Jews will be allowed to visit at the Temple Mount (al Haram al Sharif) and other sites holy to Jews in the Palestinian state.

Jews who left their homes and property in the Arab countries after the 1948 War and the establishment of the state of Israel will be compensated by the Arab countries for the lost homes and properties left behind and the state of Israel will recognize the Nakba and apologize for the suffering of the Palestinian refugees

The state of Israel will recognize the Nakba and apologize for the suffering of the Palestinian refugees and Jews who left their homes and property in the Arab countries after the 1948 War and the establishment of the state of Israel will be compensated by the Arab countries for the lost homes and properties left behind

The state of Palestine will agree to change school textbooks to remove incitement against Jews  and the state of Israel will agree to change school textbooks so that they not include incitement against Palestinians

The state of Israel will agree to change school textbooks so that they not include incitement against Palestinians and the state of Palestine will agree to change school textbooks to remove incitement against Jews

Palestinians formally end of the global boycott campaign against Israel, and Israel formally ends its opposition to Palestine joining all global organization and will support Palestinian membership in such bodies.

Israel formally ends its opposition to Palestine joining all global organization and will support Palestinian membership in such bodies and Palestinians formally end of the global boycott campaign against Israel.

Since all respondents received these questions, those who said the item raised their support but who already supported the initial agreement were set aside, and the same for those opposed. Focusing on those who switched sides, we then calculated new levels of predicted support following each pair.

It is worth noting that when compared to the incentives directed separately at the opposition in previous surveys, the pairs were predictably weaker particularly among the Palestinians. For the top ten incentives in past surveys tested among Israeli Jews who rejected the package, the average portion who said they would switch to support was 40%. Among Palestinians, the average portion of rejectionists who would switch based on the top ten from previous surveys is almost identical – 41%.

Comparing just those who opposed the plans (either the original comprehensive package or the new version explored above) in the current survey, the average responses for the paired, mutual incentives is as follows:

• On the Israeli side, those who rejected the original plan had an average of 36% who changed their mind – four points below the original incentives, and 28% of those who opposed the new plan changed their minds as an average of all eight mutual pairs. This is likely due to the fact that the new plan received considerably higher support among Israelis; therefore, a larger portion of those who rejected the new plan were more hardline views from the start (39% of those who opposed the original plan were firm right, while among those who opposed the new plan, 57% identified themselves as firm right).

•  

• Among Palestinians, the average portion of those who changed from rejection to support is just 14% for the new plan; and 18% for the original version, significantly lower than the 41% of rejectionists who changed to support when the incentives were tested in previous surveys. It is possible that unlike the Israelis, Palestinian respondents felt the trade-offs in most of the proposed pairs of incentives favored the other side; that they required less concession from the Israelis and more from the Palestinians. This perception of imbalance in the pairs might have been reinforced in this poll, at this particular time, due to the prevailing general frustration and lack of hope in light of the utter collapse of trust in US credibility and the so-called “Deal of the Century.” This might have also been responsible for the further decline, in this poll, in support for the concept of the two-state solution and the original detailed peace plan and increased doubts about the intentions of the other side.

On the Israeli side, the relative success of the pairs is seen in the fact that six of the eight pairs generated higher levels of support than the initial level for the original comprehensive plan, among Israeli Jews. Ending incitement on both sides caused the greatest level of favorable net shift, and brought support for the original plan up to 61%, from a baseline of 39% - this is consistent with the high rate of success this incentive received in previous surveys as well. Among those who heard the new version of the comprehensive plan, ending incitement was also the most successful pair, yielding a total net support of 58%, compared to 46% support in the initial responses.

For respondents of both halves of the Israeli Jewish sample, the idea that Palestinians would end the boycott, while Israel would allow Palestinians to join international organizations also generated majority support among Israeli Jews: 53% from among those who heard the new plan, and 55% from among those who heard the original comprehensive package.

Among Palestinians, the pairs were mostly not successful at raising total net support beyond original levels. For those who heard the original comprehensive package, two pairs generated supported slightly higher than the baseline of 37%: the prisoner release coupled with ongoing security cooperation with Israel attained a net support of 43%; If Israel were to allow Palestine to join international organizations while ending Palestinian boycott against Israel, enough people would shift to reach 40% support.

Among those who heard the new package, baseline support began at 42%, and none of the items reached net support that surpassed this. Once again, the top pair was the Palestinian prisoner release coupled with ongoing security cooperation, which achieved a new net support of 41%, alongside 56% opposition.

The range of new support following the pairs among those who received the new comprehensive plan was almost the same as the range among the first half of the Palestinian sample, who heard the original plan. However, because the initial support for the updated plan was higher, it was more of a challenge to raise support beyond that level.

Moreover, as we have seen through incentive testing in previous surveys, certain pairs have the opposite impact. This is the case for the release of Palestinian prisoners and ongoing security cooperation – which is among the strongest pairs raising support on the Palestinian side, but for Israelis generates lower support and higher opposition relative to responses to the original plan, and has the most negative effect of all other pairs.

However, one pair emerged as relatively successful on both sides. For Israelis, the idea that Palestine would end the international boycott against Israel while it would allow the new state to join international organizations was among the most successful pairs, and in both cases raised support above initial support for either plan. Among Palestinians, this pair ranked as the second most successful for both halves of the sample. This indicates that the incentive has potential to influence both sides favorably if made part of a future agreement.

Negotiation Framework and Third Parties: We sought to examine support for alternatives to the US-brokered negotiation processes that characterized the last two decades. In the last four surveys, we tested five models for a multi-lateral approach to negotiations: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led peace process; 3) an EU-led peace process; 4) a UN-led peace process; 5) and finally, a US-Russian-led peace process. Findings show that in all surveys, Palestinians are most receptive to the first, or Arab regional, approach (31% in December and June 2017, 27% in December 2017, and 22% in the current survey) followed by a UN and an EU approaches (19% and 14% respectively at present); 5% choose an American-Russian led peace process, and 4% selected a US-led multi-lateral process. It is worth noting that support for the preferred approach, the Arab regional, continues to decline and that the largest percentage of Palestinians (31%) chose “none of the above.”

Israeli Jews prefer practically the opposite approach, with a clear preference for US involvement: the plurality consistently chooses a US-led peace process, with 31% selecting it in the current survey, while 24% selected a US-Russian approach, and 17% selected a regional approach led by Arab states. A UN-led process was selected by just 6% of Israeli Jews and support for an EU-led process is just 3% - this reflects ongoing perceptions in Israeli society that both bodies are biased against Israel, a theme regularly repeated in public discourse. It is worth noting that only 8% of Israeli Jews selected “none of the above.” 

Among Israelis Arabs, an EU-led peace process is preferred by 20%, followed by a UN-led process (16%), and the Arab-led regional (15% each). 6% chose a US-led process and an identical percentage chose a US-Russian approach.  As in the Palestinian case, the largest percentage of Israeli Arabs (26%) selected “none of the above.”

We asked the two sides about perceptions of both the other, and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does, whether they trust and whether they fear the other side. We probed the extent of zero sum beliefs. The picture is mostly consistent with trends in our recent surveys, although assessment of each side of its own conditions, particularly among Palestinians in the West Bank, but not in the Gaza Strip, show significant improvement.

Does the other side want peace? Among Palestinians, 39% agree that most Israelis want peace, a slight increase from December 2017, when 37% of Palestinians gave this response, but a decline from June 2017 when 44% agreed with that statement. Among Israeli Jews 35% agree that Palestinians want peace, a five-point increase from December. In December 2016, 41% thought this way, then just 33% in June 2017. Among Israeli Arabs 81% agree that most Palestinians want peace, and 60% agree that Israeli Jews want peace.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: As in previous recent surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. Among Palestinians a solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy (89% - identical to December finding). The majority of Israeli Arabs feel the opposite regarding Israeli Jews: 61% agree that Israeli Jews can be trusted, and 32% disagree. On the Israeli Jewish side, 68% believe that Palestinians cannot be trusted, a drop from last December (when three quarters believed that) and June 2017 (when 77% believed that). A quarter in this poll indicated that they believe that Palestinians can be trusted.

Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 47% of Israeli Jews (compared to 51% in December), 64% of Israeli Arabs (compared to 53% in December), and 71% of Palestinians (compared to 72% in December) agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization.

Fear: More Palestinians fear Israeli soldiers and armed settlers more than they fear Israeli Jews. 52% agreed with the statement “I feel fear towards Israeli soldiers and armed settlers,” but 40% agreed with the statement made about Jews. This trend is nearly unchanged from December 2016. The current findings however, show a rise in Palestinian fear in both cases from 46% and 35% respectively.  When asked whether they agree with the statement that they fear soldiers and settlers but not civilians, only 41% agreed with that statement. There are significant differences between West Bank and Gaza respondents: 57% from the West Bank fear soldiers and settlers, while just 44% of Gazans do – this could reflect the fact that West Bankers have more significant daily contact with such figures. The Gaza percentage represents an 8-point increase, probably reflecting the high tension associated with March of Return and the resulting death of dozens of Gazans before and during the collection of data.  

Among Israeli Jews, a majority of 55% agree with the statement “I feel fear toward Palestinians,” a slight decline from December and June 2017 when 57% and 67% respectively felt that way. Among settlers 70% agree. Regarding Arab-Jewish relations among Israeli citizens, 44% of Jews agree that they fear Israeli Arabs, but only 16% of Israeli Arabs agree with a statement that they fear Israeli Jews.

General Conditions of the two sides: 62% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the Palestinian territories as bad or very bad (57% in the West Bank and 72% in the Gaza Strip) and 15% describe them as good or very good. These findings indicate a 15-point decrease in the negative assessment of conditions among West Bankers in December (when tension was high after the Trump statement on the relocation of US embassy to Jerusalem) and a 3-point increase in the Gaza Strip. Among Israeli Jews, only 16% described conditions in Israel as bad or very bad and 52% describe them as good or very good.  Among settlers, 57% give positive assessment and 16% give a negative one. Six months ago, 46% of Israeli Jews (and settlers) described conditions as good or very good.  Among Israeli Arabs, only 39% describe conditions as good or very good. Around 31% among all Israeli groups, and 23% of Palestinians, say conditions are “so-so.”

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Jews were asked about the values of: (1) a Jewish majority, (2) Greater Israel, (3) Democracy, (4) Peace. Among Israeli Jews, peace and a Jewish majority are seen as the most important values (28% and 27% respectively) though overall the percentage who chose peace has declined four points since the project began in June 2016, followed by democracy (21%) and greater Israel (18%). The portion who chose democracy rose five points since December, but has essentially remained consistent over the two years, with just a one-point rise overall from June 2016. However, there has been a notable shift in the priority placed on Jewish majority and Greater Israel: the former declined by eight points and the latter rose exactly by eight points as the total net change since June 2016; this most likely reflects the growing legitimization of the concept of annexation of portions of the West Bank in Israeli discourse, which entails the implicit acceptance of the outcome that there would not be a Jewish majority

Among the Palestinians, we asked about the following goals: (1) Israeli withdrawal and establishing a Palestinian state, (2) Obtaining right of return for refugees to ’48 Israel, (3) Establishing a democratic political system, (4) Building a pious or moral individual and religious society. For Palestinians, the ranking has been relatively stable, with little change over the course of the past two years. The top priority for Palestinian goals remains Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem (43% chose this compared to 48% last December and 43% last June), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (29%), building a democratic political system (14%, a 5-point increase from December), and building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (13%).

It is important to note that in general both societies contain a wide variety of attitudes among different subsections of the population. The overall findings regarding willingness to support a two-state solution, the detailed package, and the means of raising support are valuable – but we have also sought a deeper understanding of trends among the groups that present the greatest obstacles. These are the communities that need strategic attention in order to shift some portion to supporting a future agreement. In addition, there are groups that can be considered “swing” – they are not inherently ideologically opposed, but they are not as convinced as the top supporters. These are people who might be won over in greater numbers if their attitudes are followed closely over time. 

To this end, after five surveys over a two-year period, we are positioned to made broader statements about each key group. 

Examining the findings shows that the following groups are important to understand on the strategic levels described above: 

Israeli Jews:

• Religious
• Settlers
• Centrists
• Young (18-34)

Palestinians:

• Religious
• Hamas supporters
• Independent/undecided voters 

To be sure there is some overlap between these groups, but it is partial. For example: a high portion of settlers are religious Jews, but not all religious people are settlers. Further, note that the most supportive communities are not analyzed with this level of detail, due to the fact that they already support the principle of two states, the specific items and overall package at rates well above the other groups, and above the average for each society. These include: 

• Seculars and left-wing respondents among Israeli Jews, and Israeli Arabs/Palestinian citizens of Israel
• Fatah supporters and the somewhat religious/not religious in Palestine. Gazan respondents also show a somewhat higher level of support in general. 

The following is a brief account of how each group has responded overall to the two-state solution over time, the items of an agreement and the comprehensive package, as well as incentives to change their minds. The reciprocal pair exercise is not included as it forms the basis of this report in general. 

Israeli Jews: For this section, note that the average support for the general two state solution among Israeli Jews throughout this time is 48%, and the trend has been moving steadily downward in small increments. The average support over this time for the comprehensive agreements was 37% among Israeli Jews. The most popular item of the comprehensive accord was mutual recognition of the two states as the homeland of their respective peoples, with 63% average support among Israeli Jews; the greatest obstacle to the comprehensive two state agreement is the proposal on Palestinian right of return, with just 19% support as a two-year average among Jews. The top incentives for all Jewish Israelis who were opposed to the comprehensive package were the following:

• Jews would be guaranteed access to visit the Temple Mount (47% changed their mind leading to 61% total support)
• The Palestinians would commit to ongoing security cooperation like today (44% changed their mind, leading to 59% total support)
• Palestine officially recognizes Israel as a Jewish state (43% changed their mind, leading to a total of 59% support for the comprehensive agreement) 

Settlers. Throughout the two-year period, the average support for the two state solution in general is 23%, less than half the rate for Israeli Jews overall, but without a clear trend direction – this low level is relatively stable. Just 20% on average supported the comprehensive agreement, only slightly lower than those who supported it in principle. Mutual recognition is the most supported item in an agreement (42%), just like among Israeli Jews in general, and the two items tied for lowest support are the right of return clause, as well as the arrangement for division of the Old City (10% each). The top three incentives for raising support after changing the minds of those opposed to an overall agreement is the ability to visit the Temple Mount (54% in total would support an agreement in that case), regional peace with Arab states and a clause specifying no full right of return for Palestinians, only family reunification (each of these clauses caused 45% of settlers in total to support an agreement.) 

National Religious Jews. Throughout the two-year period, the average support for the two state solution in general is 18%. The average support for the comprehensive agreement was just 11%, significantly lower than among settlers. The main reason they reject the comprehensive agreement however is identical: Palestinian right of return and the Old City arrangement are tied for the last place, at just 7% support each; similarly, mutual recognition receives the highest support – 43%, almost identical to settlers. Like the settlers, the incentives tested in December 2017 were the most successful relative to earlier surveys: again, the ability to visit the Temple Mount is the top incentive, generating a total of 57% support among this group. 

Young Jews (18-34). Young people have been an increasingly hardline constituency in part due to demographics (a higher portion of this cohort is religious, which carries hardline political attitudes), and in part due to coming of age at a time of no experience with political progress. Throughout the two-year period, the average support for the two-state solution in general is 34%. Average support for the combined two-state package was nearly one third (32%), slightly lower than the Jewish average. They too were most supportive of mutual recognition, with a majority of 51% who support it (still lower than the Jewish average of 63%). Among young people a majority are willing to support the agreement following 16 different incentives tested over the two years (a total of nearly 30). The top such incentive was Palestinians acknowledge historic/religious links between Jews and historic Palestine, which led a total of 58% of young people to support an agreement following the shift of opinion among those opposed. Visiting the Temple Mount, ongoing security cooperation, and the reassurance that Palestinians would not have full right of return were close behind, causing 57%, 56% and 56% to support an agreement, respectively. 

Centrist Jews. In general, the center is a key constituency in Israeli society, for its powerful position within Israeli politics and the ability to join governing coalitions, combined with widespread support for the two-state ideas. About two-thirds of centrists supported the two-state solution in principle over the last two years, with mostly stable trends. However, an average of just 47% supported the detailed agreement, indicating a significant gap most likely caused by lack of detailed knowledge about the agreement. A near-consensus (78%) of this group agrees to mutual recognition, while the lowest item – as other groups – is the Palestinian right of return proposal (22% support this). However, they are among the most flexible groups in the survey: three different incentive items caused so many people to shift and support an agreement, that total support reached over 80%. By contrast to the groups above in which the successful items were those tested in December 2017, these incentives were all tested in the earlier part of the project, June 2016. The top incentives mentioned included a reassurance message on the right of return similar to the one mentioned above (88% total support following shifts), Palestine recognizing Israel as a Jewish state (84%), and the US signing a defense treaty to boost Israel’s security (81% total support).

Palestinians.

Total Palestinian support for the general principle of a two-state solution is not distinctly different from those of Israeli Jews: the average is 47%, and the trend has been slightly less even but a net decline from 51% in June 2016. The total average support for the two-state comprehensive agreement is 40%, a slightly smaller gap than among Israeli Jews. Only one item receives majority average support among Palestinians, the proposal for resolving the right of return: 51% over the two years; this leads by a large gap relative to the next most successful item – mutual recognition (43% average support). The most valuable incentives for changing Palestinians’ minds among those who opposed an agreement were as follows: 

• Freeing Palestinian prisoners (56% of those opposed changed their minds, leading to over three-quarters total who would support an agreement)
• Palestinian laborers would be allowed to work in Israel (44% change their mind, leading to two-thirds total support)
• Israel would acknowledge the historic and religious links between Palestine and its historic homeland (44% change their mind, leading to two-thirds total support) 

Religious. Among self-defined religious Palestinians, the average support for a two-state solution has been 42%. For the combined package, the average support over two years was 34%. The item which garners the most support is the proposal to resolve the right of return, with 49% support, very close to the general Palestinian average. Mutual recognition receives 38% support, while 37% support a multinational force. The items with the lowest support are demilitarization (18%) and the two Jerusalem proposals regarding the division of the city and the arrangement for the Old City (23% support for each item). Regarding incentives for those who were opposed, the most successful item was the release of prisoners: 56% of the religious Palestinians who did not support the package would move to support it if it included the release of all Palestinian prisoners, moving total support to nearly three-quarters. If Israel would recognize Palestine as an Islamic/Arab state, total support among religious Palestinians could reach over two thirds (68%). 

Hamas. General support for a two-state solution among Hamas supporters during the past two years has been 29% on average. Average support for a combined package stood at 24%, significantly lower than the 40% average among all Palestinians. As for the other groups, the proposal to resolve the Palestinian refugees issue is the most successful item and receives 41% support, while all other items lag behind. The second-highest item, mutual recognition, receives 27% support. The lowest-ranked items are demilitarization of the Palestinian state, with only 13% support, and the two Jerusalem items, with 16% support each. Over time, support for a multinational force has risen considerably: from 19% in June 2016 to 31% in June 2018. Similar to the religious group, the Palestinian prisoner release is the most successful incentive for Hamas supporters: 51% would change their mind to support an agreement if it included this item, bringing total support to 63%. Other incentives manage to push total support past the 50% mark: Israeli recognition of the Nakba and compensation for refugees (54%), Israeli recognition of Palestine as a Islamic/Arab state (54%), and an Israeli apology for the suffering caused to refugees (51%). It is important to note that the incentive item of ensuring that Palestine will be a democracy also raises total support up to 51% among Hamas supporters. 

Independents/undecided voters.  This group that does not belong to or support any of the existing Palestinian factions, such as Fatah, Hamas or third parties, and who are currently undecided about their vote, is a significant part of the population, averaging 23% of the likely voters during the past two years. Among this group, average general support for a two-state solution is 48%. Average support for a detailed package has been 39%. As with other groups, the item regarding Palestinian refugees and right to return receives the most support: 52%. Mutual recognition and the idea of a multinational force receive 39% support as a two-year average for each, while demilitarization receives only 19%. Among this group, there are several incentives which bring support up to around 70%. Israeli recognition of the historic and religious roots of Palestinians in historic Palestine, release of all Palestinian prisoners, and ensuring the freedom of Palestinian laborers to work in Israel increase total support to 69%, 72%, and 68% respectively. 

Summary conclusions regarding key constituencies: In the toughest constituencies who represent the most rejectionist attitudes on both sides, including Hamas supporters and religious Palestinians, as well as Israeli settlers, there is a minority in support of the comprehensive package, 11% in the case of religious Jews, but ranging from one-fifth to one-third among the other groups cited. 

Flexible, possible “swing” constituencies include the Israeli Jewish center, which is significantly more supportive than the hardline populations from the start, and displays both anxiety about the details of a plan, but high responsiveness to new incentive items. Palestinians who are independent or do not belong to any political faction, similar to the Israeli Jewish center, are more supportive than the hardliners, and those who initially oppose the agreement display high responsiveness to the new incentives. These populations could give a significant base of support to existing constituencies that favor a two-state solution and create a more widespread perception of public support beyond the predictable base.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (36)

In the aftermath of the Free Gaza flotilla incident, Turkey is the most popular regional country, but Hamas’s popularity remains unchanged while Salam Fayyad and his government gain greater public support, and while support for compromise increases, two thirds remain pessimistic about the future of the peace process and the majority does not believe in the efficacy of alternative options to negotiations such as popular resistance or unilateral declaration of statehood

10-13 June 2010  

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 10 and 13 June 2010. The poll was conducted few days after the Israeli raid on the Free Gaza flotilla. It is worth noting also that the PA government of Salam Fayyad announced the cancellation of the local elections during the conduct of the poll. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2010 indicate that despite the events associated with the Free Gaza flotilla and the Israeli attack on it, a significant improvement in the status of Salam Fayyad and his government has been registered. Moreover, findings also show no change in the popularity of Hamas compared to its standing in our previous poll last March. But it is worth mentioning that decision by Fayyad’s government to cancel local elections scheduled for next month came during the conduct of the poll. Our findings therefore do not necessarily reflect the views of the public in the aftermath of that decision. It is likely that the cancellation of elections will have a negative impact on the standing of Fayyad and his government and the standing of Abbas and Fateh. The public is likely to view the cancellation as an indication of a major failure in state and institution building,  a process led by Fayyad and his government, and an indication of fragmentation, panic and lack of leadership within Fateh. 

Findings show that the public views positively the outcome associated with the Israeli attack on the Free Gaza flotilla seeing it as a victory for Palestinians and the beginning of the end or the weakening of the Gaza siege. But perhaps the biggest winner is Turkey who emerges from this as the most popular regional country.  Findings also show that the decision to boycott settlements products is clearly supported by a majority of the Palestinians. But the decision to prevent Palestinian laborers from working in Israeli settlements is rejected by the majority. The opposition to preventing laborers from working in settlements is probably motivated by lack of confidence in the ability of the Palestinian Authority to find alternative jobs to settlement workers at a time when findings show that poverty and unemployment is one of the most important problems that deserve, in the eyes of the public, to be made the second top priority for the PA, right after the first priority, the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Findings also show an increase in support for a political settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters or the Geneva Initiative, but the mood remains decidedly pessimistic about the chances for success in the current negotiations or for establishing a Palestinian state along side Israel in the next five years. If negotiations fail, findings show that a majority of the public is in favor of a diplomatic initiative, such as turning to the UN Security Council or a unilateral declaration of statehood, or resort to non violent resistance while a majority opposes return to armed intifada, dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, or abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one state solution. What is most interesting however is the fact that the overwhelming majority does not believe in the efficacy of any of the measures it supports in ending occupation or halting settlement expansion. It is evident that the public is looking for a way out and so far it finds none.  

(1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• 9% believe conditions in the Gaza Strip today are good or very good while 35% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good. But similar percentages, reaching about 60% in both areas say they feel that today their personal safety and security and that of their families are assured.
•  Increase in support for the Fayyad government; similarly, there is an increase in the percentage of those who believe that the Fayyad government is the legitimate one. But positive evaluation of the Fayyad government decreases in two areas: political detention and right to demonstrate.
• Ismail Haniyeh’s government receives public support (57%) for banning rocket launching from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns but a majority (59%) opposes the taxes it imposes on cigarettes and other products.
• In presidential election, with Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh competing, the former receives 54% and the latter 39% of the votes. But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 65% and the latter 30% of the votes.
• If Salam Fayyad competes in the presidential race, he loses against Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Mustafa Barghouti. But he wins against Haniyeh.
• If parliamentary elections are to take place today, Fateh would receive 45% of the participants’ votes, Hamas 26%, all other election lists 12%, and 18% remain undecided.
• Dealing with the West Bank-Gaza Strip split is the top priority of the Palestinian public.
• A majority of 62% gives positive evaluation to the performance of the current local councils and 56% say they will participate in new elections in the West Bank even if boycotted by Hamas.

Findings show that only 9% believe conditions in the Gaza Strip today are good or very good while 35% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good. But 62% of the Gazans and 60% of the West Bankers say that today they feel that their personal safety and security and that of their family are assured. In our last poll in March 2010, the percentage of those who expressed similar feelings reached 70% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank. Despite the increased perception of safety and security, 44% say they are worried that they could be hurt in their daily life at the hands of someone from Fateh or Hamas. Worry levels reach 51% in the Gaza Strip compared to 40% in the West Bank.

Despite the drop in the perception of safety and security among Gazans, positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government remains unchanged since last March at 38%. But positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government increases from 42% last March to 48% in this poll. Moreover, satisfaction with Abbas’s performance increases slightly during the same period from 47% to 49%.

Perception that compared to the Haniyeh government, the Fayyad government is the legitimate one increases, with 27% indicating that the Haniyeh government is the legitimate one while 31% say the Fayyad government is the legitimate one; and 10% say both governments are legitimate and 27% say both are illegitimate. Last March, 28% said Haniyeh’s is the legitimate one and only 26% said Fayyad’s is the legitimate one. With regard to Abbas, now that his term as president has ended, 48% say he lost his legitimacy while 46% say he did not lose it.

The performance of the Fayyad government receives positive evaluation in the area of service delivery and negative evaluation in the area of freedoms. Three years after the establishment of the first Fayyad government, larger percentages believe conditions have become better in the areas of economy (47%), enforcement of law and order (57%), educational services (54%), and health services (56%) while much smaller percentages believe conditions in these same areas have become worse (27% for economic conditions, 19% for enforcement of law and order, 18% for education, and 14% for health services). But only 30% say conditions of corruption have improved compared to 31% who say these conditions have actually worsened. On the other hand, larger percentages believe conditions have become worse in the areas of political arrests (47%) and the right to demonstrate (44%) while only 19% say conditions regarding political arrests have become better and 27% say conditions regarding the right to demonstrate have become better. But if Fateh sought to replace Fayyad with one of its own members, the largest percentage (48%) would oppose that while 43% would support it. Similarly, if Fateh asked Fayyad to appoint one of its members as a minister of finance, only 44% would support that while 48% would oppose it.

For Hamas’s government in the Gaza Strip, a majority of 57% support and 38% oppose its efforts to prevent the launching of rockets against Israeli towns. Support for these efforts reaches 49% among Gazans but increases to 62% among West Bankers. On the other hand, a majority of 59% believe the taxes imposed by the Hamas government on cigarettes and other products are not reasonable while only 34% view such taxes as reasonable. Belief that the taxes imposed by the Hamas government are reasonable reaches 31% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank.

In light of the failure of Fateh and Hamas to reconcile, only 16% believe that re-unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be achieved soon while 55% say it will be achieved but only after a long time and 26% say unity will not resume at all and two separate entities will emerge.

If new presidential elections are held today, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 39% of the vote of those participating while 7% say they are undecided. The rate of participation in such election would reach 61% with 39% saying they will not participate in elections in which Abbas and Haniyeh are the only candidates. Last March Abbas received 50% and Haniyeh 40%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter would receive 30% of the participants with non-participation rate dropping in this case to 28%.

If the competition over the presidency is between Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the former would receive 34% and the latter 19% while 3% say they are undecided and the remaining percentage (44%) say they will not vote for either candidate. But if the competition is between Fayyad and Marwan Barghouti, the former would receive the same percentage as in the previous case (19%) while the latter would receive 50% with 3% undecided and 28% voting for neither. If the competition was between Fayyad and Mustafa Barghouti (the head of al Mubadara), Fayyad’s vote would increase to 30% but Mustafa Barghouti would defeat him but with only 34% of the vote; 3% say they are undecided and 32% say they will vote for neither. Fayyad however would defeat Haniyeh in a presidential elections by 36% to 32%, with 3% undecided and 30% voting for neither. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 28% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (20%), Salam Fayyad (14%) Mustafa Barghouti (10%), and Saeb Erekat (6%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 45% say they would vote for Fateh and 26% say they would vote for Hamas, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip reaches 49% and in the West Bank 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip reaches 32% and in the West Bank 22%. Last March, Fateh received 42% and Hamas 28%, which means that Hamas has not benefited from Free Gaza flotilla incident which took place only few days before the conduct of the poll.

Hamas’s problem with the public remains unchanged as many believe it brings about siege and contribute to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while the public tends to believe that Fateh contributes to the lifting of the siege and the ending of the spilt. For example, findings show that if Hamas wins the next presidential and legislative elections, a majority of 62% believes this would lead to the consolidation of the siege and boycott on the Palestinian government while only 12% believe the opposite. But if Fateh wins the next elections, only 11% believe this would lead to the tightening of the siege and blockade while 56% believe the opposite. With regard to unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in case of a Hamas win, 47% believe it would lead to the consolidation of the spilt while only 23% say it would consolidate unity. By contrast, if Fateh wins, only 29% believe it would consolidate the split while 36% believe it would consolidate unity.

In this regard, what worsens conditions for Hamas is the public belief that the two issues of national unity and ending the siege should be two of the most important Palestinian priorities. In an open question about the main problems confronting Palestinians which should be the top priorities of the PA, the largest percentage (33%) mentioned the absence of national unity due to the split, while 24% mentioned poverty and unemployment, 18% mentioned the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings, and 11% mentioned corruption in some public institutions, and 10% mentioned occupation and settlement activities.

A majority of 62% gives a positive evaluation to the performance of their local councils during the past five years while only 35% give it a negative evaluation. If local elections do take place, as was planned before the cancellation of the elections by the Fayyad government, 56% say they would participate in those elections even if boycotted by Hamas while 41% say they will not participate. Moreover, a majority of 51% believe that these elections, if they were to take place as scheduled, would be fair and free while 37% say they would not be fair or free. A larger percentage (48%) believes that if local elections are to take place on time, Fateh would win while 12% believe leftists and independents would win, Finally, a majority of 51% believe that if election do take place with Hamas boycotting it, it will lead to the consolidation of the internal split while only 17% say it would make reconciliation easier and 27% say it would have no impact on reconciliation or split.

(2) Peace Process

• Increase in the percentage of support for compromise, as in the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative, but two thirds remain pessimistic about the chances for a peace settlement
• If peace talks fail, a majority supports turning to the UN Security Council, unilaterally declaring a state, or turning to non violent resistance. But a majority opposes return to armed intifada, dissolution of the PA, or abandonment of the two-state solution and adoption of the one state solution.
• Despite support for non violent resistance, the overwhelming majority does not believe its efficacy in ending occupation or halting settlement expansion.
• Moreover, despite support for unilateral declaration of statehood, only one quarter believes things will become better after the declaration while 73% believe things will become worse or remain unchanged.
• About 80% say the policy of the Obama Administration favors Israel while only 4% say it favors Palestinians.

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We address these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic activity of the US with regard to the conflict and the beginning of the proximity talks between the parties. The findings indicate an increase in support for the overall package. Palestinians are now split half between support and opposition to the overall package: 49% support and 49% oppose it. This level of support represents an increase in support of 11 percentage points from 2009.

Looking at the various items in the package, findings show a majority support for two out of the six:

 (1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 60% support or strongly support and 38% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in August 2009, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 49% and opposition at 50%.

(2) Refugees: 48% support and 49% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In August 2009, 37% agreed with an identical compromise while 61% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem: 37% support and 62% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In August 2009, an identical compromise obtained 31% support and 68% opposition.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State: 28% support and 70% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in August 2009, 24% support, and opposition reached 76%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

 (5) Security Arrangements: 41% support and 57% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In August 2009, 34% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 64% opposed it.

(6) End of Conflict: 63% support and 35% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in August 2009 were 55% support and 44% opposition.

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2010

If the US under the leadership of Obama pressures Israel and the Palestinians to accept and implement this package as a permanent settlement, 48% think Palestinians should accept it, and 47% believe that they should reject it.

Findings also show an increase in support for a mutual recognition of identity: 58% support and 39% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. A year ago in June 2009, 50% supported and 49% opposed this mutual recognition of identity. Moreover, two thirds support the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative and 30% oppose it. The Saudi initiative calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees’ problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our December 2009 poll 68% supported it in December and 30% opposed it.

60% of the Palestinians support yielding to American pressure to accept and implement the Arab (Saudi) Peace Initiative, while 35% oppose it. In August 2009, 58% thought Palestinians should accept such American pressure and 39% thought they should reject such pressure. As to their assessments of the other side’s response to such pressure: 53% of the Palestinians think Israel will reject and 42% think it will accept it. In the August 2009 poll, 49% of Palestinians thought that most Israelis would reject such pressure, 46% believed that most Israelis would accept it.

Despite the increased support for compromise, pessimism regarding the chances for the peace process remains very high: Two thirds of the Palestinians think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low; 32% believe the chances are medium or high. In June 2009, 69% thought that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low. Even if an agreement is reached in the current proximity talks mediated by George Mitchell, 55% of the Palestinians will not grant legitimacy to such agreement, while only 35% will. Needless to say, the fact that 48% of the public believe that the PA president has lost his legitimacy when his term as president  has expired, as mentioned above, contributes in a significant manner to this conclusion regarding an agreement negotiated by the president.  Belief in the legitimacy of the agreement increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (31%), among supporters of Fateh (57%) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%), and among those who work in the public sector (41%) compared to those who work in the private sector (33%). In any case, findings show that 57% are pessimistic about the outcome of these proximity talks, while 23% are optimistic.

In the backdrop of the opening of the proximity talks and the raid on the flotilla to Gaza, 31% of the Palestinians think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 23% of the Palestinians think that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop. 40% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue. Moreover, 74% are worried that they or a family member might be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. Last March, the percentage stood at 77%.

If the proximity talks fail, the option endorsed by most Palestinians is to ask the UN Security Council to recognize a Palestinian State (65%). The next most popular option (60% support) is to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state.  51% support the option to start a non-violent resistance. The other options asked about received only minority support: 44% support the resumption of the armed Intifada (54% oppose it); 39% support the dissolution of the PA if the talks fail (56% oppose it), and 27% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding instead a one-state solution (71% oppose it).

But findings show that support for non violent resistance does not indicate a belief in its efficacy. Despite the fact that it is supported by 51%, as mentioned above, only 27% believe that it can contribute to ending occupation or halting settlement construction while 71% believe it can not. Moreover, 44% believe that the boycott on products produced in settlements, a non violent resistance measure, will hurt the proximity talks, 28% believe it will benefit the talks and 25% believe it will have no impact. Similarly, support for a unilateral declaration of statehood does not indicate a belief that such a declaration would change Palestinian conditions for the better. Indeed, only one quarter believes that conditions would improve after such declaration while 32% say conditions will remain the same while the largest percentage (41%) believes conditions for Palestinians will become worse. Over and above all this, the overwhelming majority (80%) believes the US will not recognize the new unilaterally declared state while only 15% believe the US will recognize it. When asked about the policy of the Obama administration, 79% said it favored Israel, 4% said it favored the Palestinians, and 13% said it favored both sides.

(3) Attack on the Free Gaza flotilla incident

• 43% say Turkey is the regional country most supportive of the Palestinians
• 63% say the Palestinians came out winners in the aftermath of the Israeli attack on the Freedom Flotilla

In an open question about the regional country seen as the most supportive of the Palestinians and their cause, 43% mentioned Turkey while only 13% mentioned Egypt, followed by 6% for Iran, 5% for Saudi Arabia, 5% for Syria, 3% for Lebanon, and 2% for Jordan. Turkey is slightly more popular in the Gaza Strip (45%) than in the West Bank (41%). It is interesting to note that Egypt has been mentioned by 25% of Gazans compared to only 6% of West Bankers. Turkey’s popularity increases in refugee camps (54%) compared to cities (41%), among supporters of Hamas (52%) compared to supporters of Fateh (36%), and among students (53%) compared to laborers (38%).

A majority of 63% believe the Palestinian side is the one who came out the winner from the Free Gaza flotilla incident while 27% believe Israel came out the winner and 9% believe none of them came out a winner. Moreover, a majority of 60% believe that in the aftermath of the incident, the Gaza siege will be weakened or ended while only 18% believe it will be strengthened.

(4) Boycott of settlements’ products and work in settlements

• 72% support and 26% oppose boycott of settlements’ products
• But only 38% support and 60% oppose a ban on Palestinian labor in settlements 

While a majority of 72% support and 26% oppose a boycott of settlements’ products, only 38% support and 60% oppose preventing Palestinian laborers from working in settlements. While the Gaza Strip and the West Bank support the boycott of settlements’ products equally, support for preventing laborers from working in settlements is greater in the Gaza Strip, reaching 45%, than the West Bank (34%). Support for preventing Palestinian laborers from working in settlements is also greater in cities (40%) and refugee camps (38%) than in rural areas (30%), among supporters of Hamas (46%) compared to supporters of Fateh (40%), and among holders of BA degree (41%) compared to illiterates (33%)....Full Report

17-19 September 2015

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17 and 19 September 2015. The period before the poll witnessed the announcement that president Abbas has submitted his resignation from the PLO Executive Committee and called for convening a session for the Palestinian National Council. The session was later postponed by three months. The period also witnessed settlers’ terrorism in the village of Duma leading to the death of three members of the Dawabsha family. It witnessed a reconciliation government reshuffle introducing five new ministers; a step that deepened the rift between Hamas and Fatah, particularly given the reports of recent indirect Hamas negotiations with Israel over a long term truce. The period witnessed setting a date in November 2015 for convening Fatah’s seventh Congress. Finally, an escalation of tension in Jerusalem and al Haram al Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) characterized the days of data collection as Palestinians suspected an Israeli intention to change the status quo in the holy places in the city. This press release addresses many of those issues and covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reconciliation, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2015 indicate that two thirds of the public demand the resignation of president Abbas and two thirds do not believe his current resignation from the PLO Executive Committee is real. Moreover, findings show that the popularity of Abbas has dropped significantly in the West Bank while improving slightly in the Gaza Strip.

Fatah’s popularity has declined in both West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By contrast, the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh increased significantly in the West Bank and declined slightly in the Gaza Strip. The popularity of Hamas dropped significantly in the Gaza Strip and improved in the West Bank. If Abbas does not participate in the next presidential elections, the only viable candidates from Fatah to replace him are Marwan Barghouti followed, but with much less support, by Mohammad Dahlan and Saeb Erikat. Among Hamas candidates, Isamail Haniyeh and Khalid Mishaal are the most popular to replace Abbas and among the independents the most popular is Rami al Hamdallah followed by Salam Fayyad.

Two thirds of the public support Hamas-Israel indirect negotiations over a long term Hudna, or truce, in return for ending the siege over the Gaza Strip. But a majority believes that these negotiations will not succeed. A majority rejects the belief that such negotiations, even if they succeed, would harm the chances for reconciliation.

The public does not view the PLO or its Executive Committee positively and declines to give it a mandate to make important decisions on behalf of the Palestinians. Instead, the public prefers to give such a mandate to the PA even if the decisions in question relate to the permanent settlement with Israel. This however does not mean that the public has considerable trust in the PA; to the contrary, a majority believes that it has become a burden on the Palestinian people and for the first time since we started asking, a majority now demands the dissolution of that authority.

Findings show that two thirds of the public believe that protection of Palestinians against settler’s terrorism is the responsibility of the PA, not the Israeli army. But two thirds believe that the PA is not doing enough to protect the Palestinian citizens. To protect Palestinian towns and villages targeted by settlers, the largest percentage has selected, from among several options, the deployment of the Palestinian security forces in those areas. The public believes that if the PA formally establishes civil guard units made up of volunteers in such areas, it too would help provide protection. Indeed, half of West Bankers say that if such unarmed units were established, they would volunteer to join them. 

Findings indicate a decline in the level of support for the two-state solution. Additionally, two thirds of the public reject a return to unconditional negotiations if such a return does not mean a freeze on settlement construction and a majority rejects the so-called “French proposals.” By contrast, support for a return to an armed intifada rises sharply with a clear majority in favor.

Several factors might shed light on the drop in the popularity of Abbas and Fatah, the diminishing legitimacy of the PA and the PLO, the decline in support for the peace process, and the rise in support for armed struggle. Current tensions and confrontations in al Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, and the rest of the West Bank might be at the heart of these developments. Additionally, anger at the PA might have recently accumulated due to various factors: the belief that the PA prevents demonstrations against the Israeli occupation waged in solidarity with Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque, the belief that the PA is failing to protect Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism in the aftermath of the settlers’ burning of the Dawabsha family in the village of Duma, the PA manipulation of the rules to hold a quick session for the Palestine National Council including the submission of fake resignations from the PLO Executive Committee, and the recent leak of documents showing cases of financial corruption within the PA. Additionally, the developments indicated in this poll might have also been triggered by anger at the Arab World as the overwhelming majority believes that Arabs no longer care about the fate of the Palestinians, that Palestine is no longer the primary cause of the Arabs, and that Arab countries have in fact entered an alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation.

(1) Palestinian Elections:

• Two thirds want the resignation of president Abbas and the remaining third wants him to stay in office.
• Marwan Barghouti is the most preferred to replace Abbas followed by Ismail Haniyeh and then Rami al Hamdallah.
• In presidential elections in which Abbas and Haniyeh are the only nominees, the first wins 44% of the vote and the second 49%; if Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh are the only nominees, the first wins 55% and the second 39%.
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 35%, Fatah 35%, and all other third parties combined 11%.
• A majority is opposed to holding a West Bank-only or a Gaza Strip-only general elections.

65% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Demand for the resignation of the president is higher in the Gaza Strip (67%) than in the West Bank (63%), among the religious (70%) compared to the somewhat religious (61%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (82%) compared to those who support the peace process (55%), and among supporters of Hamas  and third parties (93% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (27%).

Two thirds believe the president’s recent resignation from the PLO Executive Committee is not real while 23% think it is real. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new elections, 32% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh, and 8% prefer Ramil al Hamdallah.  Khalid Mishal and Mohammad Dahlan follow with 6% each; 5% prefer Mustapha Barghouti, 4% prefer Saeb Erikat, and 3% prefer Salam Fayyad. In the Gaza Strip, the order is slightly different: Marwan Barghouti comes on top (28%), followed by Haniyeh (20%), Dahlan (10%), Mishal (9%), Rami al Hamdallah and Mustapha Barghouti (8% each), Erikat (6%), and Fayyad (4%). In the West Bank, Marwan Barghouti receives the largest percentage (35%), followed by Haniyeh (19%), Hamdalah (7%), Mishal (4%), Dahlan and Mustapha Barghouti (3% each), and Erikat and Fayyad (2% each). The popularity of Marwan Barghouti is higher in towns and villages (40%) compared to refugee camps and cities (33% and 30% respectively), among men (37%) compared to women (28%), among the somewhat religious (36%) compared to the religious (28%), among supporters of the peace process (38%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (22%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (53% and 42% respectively) compared to Hamas supporters (9%).

But if new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would win 49% (compared to 46% three months ago) and the latter 44% (compared to 47% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas and Haniyeh receive an equal number of votes (48% each) and in the West Bank Haniyeh wins with 49% compared to 42% for Abbas.  Moreover, the level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas drops from 44% three months ago to 38% in this poll. Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 50% in June 2014 in the aftermath of the Shati reconciliation declaration but before the latest Gaza war.  By contrast, if presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 55% and the latter would receive 39% of the participants’ votes. Three months ago, Barghouti received 58% and Haniyeh 36%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 24%, Barghouti 34% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 35% say they would vote for Hamas and 35% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 35% and Fatah at 39%. In June 2014, just before the Gaza war, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 34% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 44% three months ago). In the West Bank vote for Hamas stands at 35% (compared to 32% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 36% three months ago).

Findings show that even if the West Bank-Gaza Strip split continues throughout this year, 56% oppose and 41% support holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the West Bank only. Similarly, 62% oppose and 36% support holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the Gaza Strip only.

If Fatah succeeds in holing its seventh congress on time before the end of the year, 53% believe the movement will nonetheless remain weak regardless of whether it will or will not elect a new leadership. 32% believe Fatah will remain or will become stronger after holding its seventh congress 

(2) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 12% and in the West Bank at 31%.
• Perception of security in the West Bank is higher than it is in the Gaza Strip (49% compared to 40%),
• Belief that corruption exists in the PA stands at 79%.
• 23% believe that there is press freedom in the West Bank and 19% believe it exists in the Gaza Strip.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 12% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%.  Similarly, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 40%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 49%. Moreover, findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 52%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 24%.

Al Jazeera viewership is the highest, standing at 22%; Al Arabiyya stands at 9%. Viewership of PA’s Palestine TV stands at 20% and Hamas’ al Aqsa TV at 15%.   Maan-Mix viewership stands at 18%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%.  Moreover, only 23% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 19% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  In fact, only 31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. 29% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Finally, 50% believe that the latest reconciliation government reshuffle will not make the government more able to deliver services to the public but 42% believe that it will indeed become more able to do that

(3) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza:

• Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 34% only; dissatisfaction stands at 60%.
• 35% say the PA and president Abbas are responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government and 12% put the blame on the prime minister. Only 22% blame Hamas.
• Three quarters of the public believe that the reconciliation government should pay the salaries of the civil public sector that worked for the Hamas government before the establishment of the reconciliation government.
• 61% want the reconciliation government to supervise police and security personnel in the Gaza Strip and 75% want to unify the police in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip so that it would come under the control of the reconciliation government.
• 53% say the PA is now a burden on the Palestinian people; only 40% say it is an asset.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 40% and pessimism at 56%. Three months ago optimism stood at 38% and pessimism at 59%. Fifteen months after its establishment, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 34%; dissatisfaction stands at 60%.  Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 35%. It is worth mentioning that right after its establishment, 61% had confidence in the reconciliation government. Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 22% while 35% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 12% blame the head of the reconciliation government.

51% (56% in the Gaza Strip) want to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 34% (28% in the Gaza Strip) prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. The same applies to the crossings with Israel with 54% (59% in the Gaza Strip) wishing to place them under the control of the reconciliation government. 48% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and 30% want it placed in the hands of Hamas.

74% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salary of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (71%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salary of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government. 61% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; 33% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  Moreover, 75% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the pervious Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 23% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

We asked the public for its assessment of the likely impact of a successful Hamas negotiations with Israel, the convening of the Palestine National Council, and the reshuffling of the reconciliation government on the chances for reconciliation. Findings show that only 28% agree that a successful Hamas-Israel negotiations for a long term hudna, or truce, would have a negative impact on the chances for reconciliation. By contrast, 34% believe such a success would have a positive impact on reconciliation and 32% believe it would have no impact. Similarly, only 23% agree that the convening of the PLO National Council would have a negative impact on reconciliation. By contrast, 33% believe it would have a positive impact and 36% believe it would have no impact. On the other hand, 52% believe that recent reconciliation government reshuffle will have a negative impact on reconciliation while 32% believe it will have a positive impact.

Finally, findings show that a majority of 53% believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 40% believe it is an accomplishment. Three months ago, 48% said the PA was a burden and 46% said it was an accomplishment.

(4) Hamas, Hudna negotiations, and the Gaza War:

• Two thirds support and one third oppose Hamas negotiations with Israel for a long term hudna or truce.
• 59% say that Hamas came out a winner in the last Gaza war, but satisfaction with war achievements does not exceed 38% and dissatisfaction stands at 60%.

65% support indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel to reach a long term hudna, or tuce, in the Gaza Strip in return for lifting the siege and 32% oppose such negotiations. But only 41% believe that the chances for success in the Hamas-Israel negotiations are high or medium while 56% believe the chances are slim or non-existent.

Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War stands at 59%; 26% believe the two sides were losers. In the Gaza Strip, only 42% say Hamas came out a winner while in the West Bank 69% believe Hamas came out a winner. A year ago, 69% of the public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip said Hamas came out a winner. But the percentage of satisfaction with war achievements, compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip, stands at 38% and dissatisfaction at 60%.  Despite that, a majority of 67% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.

(5) The Palestinian National Council (PNC):

• A majority of the public views the PLO as an institution inferior to the PA.
• 52% say the PA, not the PLO, has the mandate to decide on holding new presidential and parliamentary elections.
• Similarly, 50% say the PA has the mandate to stop security coordination with Israel; only 19% say the PLO has the mandate to do so.
• 48% say the PA has the mandate to appoint a deputy president for the PA; only 22% say the PLO has the mandate to do so.
• 45% say the PA has the mandate to make decisions regarding resumptions of negotiations with Israel; 25% say the PLO has the mandate to do so.

A majority of 52% believes the PLO will remain weak even if the Palestine National Council (PNC) elects a new leadership while 36% believe the PLO will remain strong, or will become stronger, after the convening of the PNC. Under current conditions of West Bank-Gaza Strip split, the absence of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and the failure to hold new elections, we asked the public to identify the Palestinian actor that has the legitimate authority and mandate to make decisions regarding eight major issues. In all eight issues, the largest percentage selected the Palestinian Authority and its reconciliation government rather than the PLO and its Executive Committee. For example:

•  52% selected the PA to make decisions regarding the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections while only 20% selected the PLO.
• Similarly, 50% selected the PA to make decisions regarding cessation of security or civil coordination with Israel while only 19% selected the PLO.
• 48% selected the PA to make decisions regarding the appointment of a PA deputy president while 22% selected the PLO.
• Even with regard to return to negotiations with Israel, 45% selected the PA and only 25% selected the PLO.
• Similarly, 43% selected the PA to make decisions regarding accepting or rejecting a UN Security Council resolution that outlines the terms for permanent peace with Israel. Only 27% selected the PLO to make that decision.
• Answers where similar to other issues such as decisions to dissolve the PA or to find a temporary replacement to PA president in case of his resignation.
• The only issue in which the public divided responsibility more equally was regarding the replacement of the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee in case of his resignation. In this case, 37% said the PA should make the decision while 36% said the PLO should make that decision.
• In all issues, a small minority ranging between 10% and 14%, depending on the issue, selected Hamas as the actor with the mandate to decide while 5% to 9% selected Fatah.

(6) Settlers’ terrorism and the absence of security for Palestinians:

• Two thirds of the public believe that the PA does not do all it can to protect Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism.
• 68% believe that the PA is responsible for providing security for Palestinians targeted by settlers.
• 43% believe that the deployment of Palestinian security forces in areas targeted by settlers is the best way to protect those areas; 28% believe an armed intifada is the best means of protecting those areas.
• A majority of 60% believe that the formation of an unarmed civil guard contributes to the security of Palestinian areas targeted by settlers. 

A majority of 67% say the PA does not do all it can to protect Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism while 31% say it does. Moreover, a majority of 68% believes that the PA should be responsible for protecting Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism while 18% believe that Palestinian citizens should protect themselves. 11% believe it is the responsibility of the Israeli army to protect Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism. The belief that the PA is responsible for protecting Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism is higher in the Gaza Strip (71%) compared to the West Bank (66%), in refugee camps (75%) compared to villages and cities (70% and 66% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (73%) compared to those who support the peace process (64%), among refugees (71%) compared to non-refugees (66%), among supporters of Hamas and Fatah (69% and 67%) compared to supporters of third parties (52%). Findings show that the largest percentage (43%) believes that deployment of Palestinian security forces in villages and towns targeted by settlers’ violence is the best means of delivering security for Palestinians while 28% believe that a return to an armed intifada is the most effective means to deliver security. 27% believe that towns and villages should form their own unarmed local defense committees.

If the PA officially forms unarmed civil guard units made up of volunteers to protect areas targeted by settlers’ violence, such a step would contribute to Palestinian security in those areas according to 60% of the public. 39% believe such a step would not do that.  If such civil guard units are established by the PA, 48% of respondents in the West Bank say they would volunteer to join them while 49% said they would not.

(7) Peace Process and Israel’s long term aspirations:

• In the absence of a viable peace process, 57% support a return to an armed intifada.
• 60% oppose and 37% support the French proposal for a UN Security Council resolution.
• Two thirds oppose resumption of negotiations without a settlement freeze.
• 48% support and 51% oppose the two-state solution.
• 42% believe that armed action is the most effective means to establish a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel; 29% believe in the efficacy of negotiations.
• 81% are worried that they would be hurt at the hands of Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished.
• An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) is in grave danger due to Israeli intentions to change the status quo.

In the absence of a peace negotiation, 83% support joining more international organizations; 63% support a popular non-violent resistance; 51% support the dissolution of the PA; and 57% support a return to an armed intifada. Three months ago, only 46% supported the dissolution of the PA and only 49% supported return to armed intifada. Findings also show that an overwhelming majority of 88% demands that the PA take Israel to the International Criminal Court for building settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. Support for an armed intifada increases in the Gaza Strip (61%) compared to the West Bank (54%), in cities (58%) compared to camps and villages (52% each), among men (60%) compared to women (53%), among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious (52%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (76%) compared to supporters of the peace process (46%), among the illiterates (62%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (55%), and among Hamas supporters (75%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (40% and 51% respectively).

A majority of 60% rejects and 37% accept a French proposal that would request the UN Security Council to issue a resolution affirming the establishment of a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967 with territorial swaps, making Jerusalem a joint capital for Palestine and Israel, setting a timetable for ending Israeli occupation, and holding an international peace conference. Furthermore, a majority of 66% rejects and 32% accept return to unconditional negotiations with Israel if that means no cessation of settlement activities. Acceptance of the French proposal is higher in the West Bank (38%) compared to the Gaza Strip (34%), among men (40%) compared to women (34%), among the somewhat religious (42%) compared to the religious (30%), among supporters of the peace process (45%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (21%), among the illiterates (56%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (34%), among laborers (43%) compared to students (32%), among those whose age is over 50 years (38%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (33%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (56% and 48% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (20%).

Only 48% support and 51% oppose the two-state solution. Three months ago, 51% supported and 48% opposed this solution. Moreover, findings also show that 45% support the Arab Peace Initiative and 49% oppose it. Similarly, only 40% support a mutual recognition of national identity of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people and 58% oppose it. Findings show that Palestinian views on the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel vary: 42% think that armed action is the most effective, 29% think negotiations is the most effective, and 24% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, only 36% said that armed action was the most effective and 32% said negotiations was the most effective. Belief that armed action is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel is higher in the Gaza Strip (44%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in cities and refugee camps (45% and 38% respectively) compared to villages and towns (27%), among men (47%) compared to women (36%), among the religious (50%) compared to the somewhat religious (33%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (66%) compared to those who support the peace process (29%), among students (57%) compared to farmers, housewives, and laborers (26%, 36%, and 39% respectively), among the unmarried (47%) compared to the married (40%), and among Hamas supporters (67%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (20% and 25% respectively).

A majority of 65% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion while 32% say it is still practical. Three months ago, only 55% said the two-state solution was no longer practical. Despite this, only 30% support, and 69% oppose, a one-state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equal rights. Three months ago, 34% supported the one-state solution. Furthermore, 78% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 21% believe the chances are high or medium.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 81%. 19% are not worried. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of 85% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population or deny them their rights. 15% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967. When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 64% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967 while 26% said it was to conquer the state of Israel or conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.

An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 50% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 21% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 10% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 12% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.  One half of the public believes that Israel will indeed succeed in implementing its plans for al Haram al Sharif and 48% believe it will not succeed.

(8) Israel and the Arab World, Hamas and Iran, and ISIS:

• 80% believe that the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns.
• 58% believe that there is today an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued occupation.
• 91% reject ISIS and 83% support the war against it.

80% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. 18% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. Indeed, 58% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 31% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state. The belief that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran is higher in the West Bank (62%) compared to the Gaza Strip (52%), among men (60%) compared to women (56%), among the illiterates (73%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (58%), and among supporters of Hamas (62%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (54% and 47% respectively).

The nuclear agreement with Iran is an accomplishment for the US in the eyes of 26% of the public; an accomplishment for Iran in the eyes of 23%; and an accomplishment for both sides in the eyes of 34%. In the context of the recent visit to Saudi Arabia by Hamas leaders, 40% of the public believe that Hamas will improve relations with that country while maintaining good relations with Iran; 27% believe that Hamas will remain close to Iran and its relations with Saudi Arabia will not improve; and 16% believe that Hamas will join the Saudi anti-Iran axis.

An overwhelming majority of 91% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 6% believe it does represent true Islam. 3% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 9% (compared to 4% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.  83% support and 13% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 48% consider the establishment of a Palestinian state and ending Israeli occupation to be the most vital goal of the Palestinian people while 30% consider the right of return to be the most vital need; 13% consider the building of pious individual and a religious society to be the most vital goal.
• 28% say the top most important problem confronting Palestinians today is the continuation of the Israeli occupation; 26% say it is poverty and unemployment and 24% say it is corruption. 

48% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 28% of the pubic; 26% say it is poverty and unemployment; 24% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; 16% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 5% say it is the split and the absence of national unity.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 11-14 December 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the announcement by the Palestinian Election Commission and President Abbas that all factions have agreed to the holding of legislative elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But no decree was issued by Abbas during the period of the data collection. The period also witnessed a debate among Palestinians over the decision of the PA Attorney General to ask the court to block public access to more than 50 Palestinian media websites. Hamas allowed the construction of an American field hospital on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Israel. Power was cut by the Israeli Electric Corporation to central West Bank for two hours every day in many locations served by the Jerusalem District Electricity Company due to unpaid bills. On the Israeli side, prime minister Netanyahu was indicted for corruption and Israeli political parties failed to form a government coalition leading to a decision to hold a third parliamentary election in a single year. The US government declared a new position regarding Israeli settlements in which it disputed the illegality of these settlements from an international law standpoint. In the meanwhile, the US Congress started an on-going effort to impeach president Trump for the use of the presidency to attain personal gains.  This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2019 show a small majority indicating optimism about the holding of legislative elections in the near future. Moreover, the poll shows that majority is in favor of holding these elections even if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem; in case of Israeli opposition, the public says that East Jerusalemites should vote wherever they can, in Jerusalem and outside it. The bad news however, is that half of the public believes that these upcoming elections will not be free or fair. Furthermore, only half of the public trusts the ability of the Palestinian Election Commission (PEC) to manage the election process with integrity and less than half has confidence in the ability of the police, whether in West Bank and the PA or in the Gaza Strip under Hamas, to provide protection to the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Indeed, a majority believes that Hamas will not be able to conduct its election campaign in the West Bank, and Fatah in the Gaza Strip, without restrictions and interference. These findings indicate a diminished public trust in the entire election process, due probably in part to a distrust in PEC, as indeed supported by the findings, and in the PA public institutions in both areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Worst of all, a large majority believes that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah, in the West Bank, will not accept the outcome and if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas, in the Gaza Strip, will not accept the outcome. This finding demonstrates beyond any doubt the absence of public confidence in the democratic credentials of the two major political parties, Fatah and Hamas, and raise a big question about the extent of the damage and political corruption that have been generated by the absence of democratic life and by the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 2007.

On the ability of a newly elected legitimate government to dissolve the armed groups in the Gaza Strip and collect their arms, a large majority indicates opposition to such measure. Indeed, the majority believes that protecting or keeping the arms of the armed groups has greater legitimacy than that of the electoral legitimacy of the government. These findings reveal that the public does not take the election and its legitimacy seriously (which might be an outcome of the problems identified above) and that in the absence of a viable peace process, the public puts its trust, first and foremost, in armed struggle. 

Findings show that if elections take place today, Fatah would receive the biggest share of the vote, followed by Hamas, existing third parties, newly created third parties, and finally an electoral list loyal to Mohammad Dahlan. With this range of options, only a small percentage of participating votes remains undecided. Needless to say, the formation of an electoral list loyal to Dahlan will significantly weaken the size of Fatah’s share of the vote and might threaten its ability to emerge as the biggest party. This problem, unique to Fatah, can be exacerbated by its persistent lack of discipline, as demonstrated by the elections of 1996 and 2006, if, for example, other unofficial Fatah lists were formed by disgruntled senior party members who fail to make it to a realistic spot in the party’s election list. This means that Fatah might find itself competing against itself thereby ending up with greater fragmentation and great many lost votes. But the greatest threat to a Fatah electoral victory would be its failure to integrate Marwan Barghouti and his supporters in its electoral list. In such a case, as temporarily happened in the 2006 elections, he might form his own electoral list thereby splitting Fatah’s vote and insuring that Hamas would receive the greatest share of the vote.   

On other domestic political issues, findings indicate that a plurality in the West Bank thinks that Hamas should have participated in the recent exchange of rocket fire between Israel and Islamic Jihad. But the situation in the Gaza Strip is different as a greater plurality thinks that Hamas’ decision of refraining from participation has been the correct decision. We also found a large majority views the decision of the PA Attorney General to seek court authorization to block Palestinian media websites as an attack on freedom of speech and therefore he should not stay in his office because he apparently does not believe in free speech. We also found an overwhelming majority supporting the PA government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years.

Two thirds of the public view the US decision recognizing the legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as destructive the two-state solution. A majority views the decision as destructive also to the one-state solution and that one of its outcomes will be to push Israel to annex parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley. This American position led to a significant increase in the percentage of Palestinians, standing today at three quarters, who demand that the Palestinian leadership reject the American peace plan, or the Deal of the Century, out of hand, without even looking at its substance while 70% indicate opposition to a restoration of PA dialogue with the Trump Administration.

Finally, findings show that a majority is opposed to the two-state solution, but support for it remains higher than the support for the one-state solution. They also indicate a slight increase in support for armed struggle or a return to armed intifada. It is noticeable however that a majority of the public thinks that the indictment of Israeli prime minister Netanyahu will soon lead to his removal from power. Similarly, a majority is optimistic about the ability of the US Congress to impeach President Trump and a similar majority is optimistic that he will lose the upcoming US presidential elections. This public betting on the dynamics of domestic Israeli politics and on the workings of the US Congress might be one of the reasons why we still find more public support for the two-state solution compared to other alternative solutions to the conflict with Israel.

(1) A new legislative election?

• The majority supports holding elections even if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem
• Only half of the public has confidence in the ability of the Palestinian Election Commission to manage the election process successfully
• Only about half trusts the police force in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip to protect to the election process with integrity and neutrality
• About two-thirds believe that opposition parties are unable to conduct election campaigns without restrictions and interferences
• Only 42% believe the upcoming elections will be fair and free
• 40% expect Fatah to win and 25% expect Hamas to win the upcoming elections
• But a large majority expects the losing party to reject the outcome of the elections
• The majority believes that the legitimately-elected government has no right to dissolve the armed groups currently in the Gaza Strip and about two thirds do not support such a decision if one is made
• The top priority for the elections, in the eyes of more than a third, is to unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

A majority of 52% of the public expects general elections to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 37% believe no elections will take place. Three months ago, only 38% expected that elections will take place soon.  44% support the holding of simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose a separation between the two, while 23% say they support the holding of parliamentary elections to be followed few months later by presidential elections, and 22% want simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections but do not oppose separating them by few months. Moreover, a majority of 56% (65% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) says that if Israel prevented Palestinian legislative elections in East Jerusalem, voting should be made possible for the residents in any polling station in the West Bank; 35% disagree and say that no election should take place if Israel prevents it in East Jerusalem. Opposition for holding elections if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem’s post offices is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (27%), among those who work in the public sector (45%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (34%), among those who oppose the peace process (52%) compared to those who support the peace process (25%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (60% and 44% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (25%).

On the other hand, only 50% trust and 44% do not trust the integrity and capacity of the Palestinian Election Commission to successfully manage the election process. Trust in the integrity and capacity of the election commission is higher in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (49%), in refugee camps (56%) compared to cities and villages/towns (50% and 49% respectively), among men (54%) compared to women (46%), among those whose age is over 49 years (53%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (46%), and among those who support Fatah, Hamas, and third parties (62%, 54%, and 54% respectively) compared to those who do not intend to participate in the elections (36%).

Moreover, only 48% trust, and 46% do not trust, the ability of the West Bank Palestinian police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Similarly, only 47% trust, and 41% do not trust, the ability of the Gaza Strip police force to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias.  Trust in the integrity and neutrality of the police force deployed in the West Bank is higher in that same area, i.e., the West Bank (56%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), in villages/towns (58%) compared to cities and refugee camps (47% and 45% respectively), among men (51%) compared to women (46%), among those whose age is over 49 years (50%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (40%), among the married (50%) compared to the unmarried (45%), among those whose income is much higher than the average income (58%) compared to those whose income is much lower than the average (39%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (55% and 51% respectively) compared to the religious (43%),  among those who support the peace process (56%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (33%), and among supporters of Fatah (75%) compared to those who support Hamas and third parties and those who will not participate in the elections (27%, 41%, and 40% respectively

Trust in the integrity and neutrality of the police force deployed in the Gaza Strip is higher in that same area, i.e., the Gaza Strip (60%) compared to the West Bank (39%), in refugee camps and cities (55% and 48% respectively) compared to villages/towns (42%), among men (50%) compared to women (44%), among those whose age is over 49 years (52%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (38%), among those who work in the public sector (54%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (46%), among the married (48%) compared to the unmarried (39%), among those whose income is much less than the average income (61%) compared to those whose income is much higher than the average income (42%), among the religious (54%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (44% and 43% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (56%) compared to those who support the peace process (43%), and among supporters of Hamas (75% compared to supporters of third parties, Fatah, and those who will not participate in the election (29%, 39%, and 39% respectively). 

A majority of 64% say that it will not be possible, and 29% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Hamas’, to conduct their election campaigns in the West Bank without restrictions or interference from the Palestinian security services. Similarly, a majority of 56% says that it will not be possible, and 37% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Fatah’s, to conduct their election campaigns in the Gaza Strip without restrictions or interference from the Gaza security services. On top of that, only 42% believe, and 50% do not believe, that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair.  The belief that the elections will be fair and free is higher in the West Bank (45%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among men (45%) compared to women (39%), among those who work in the public sector (45%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (40%), among supporters of the peace process (46%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (36%), among supporters of Fatah (56%) compared to those who will not participate in the elections and the supporters of third parties and supporters of Hamas (27%, 36%, and 44% respectively). 

The public is divided into two equal halves (43% each) in calling for taking away the jurisdiction of Palestinian courts, especially the Constitutional Court, in annulling the outcome of the legislative elections because of the fear that these courts might do so if the opposition to Abbas and Fatah were to win the elections.

We asked the public about its expectations regarding the outcome of the upcoming elections: 40% (47% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip) expect Fatah to win the upcoming legislative elections while only 25% (19% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) expect Hamas to win. We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 40% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 29% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 41% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 31% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 24% (compared to 20% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 43% three months ago). It should be noted that among Fatah voters, as we see in another question, some are loyalists to Mohammad Dahlan, a former senior Fatah official.  If these Dahlan loyalists are removed from Fatah’s share, it would drop to 35%.

We asked again about the voting intentions, but this time with the assumption that other newly created electoral lists, ones that have not participated in the previous elections in 2006, added to the list of candidates.  In this case, the participation rate would increase from 68% to 72% and the share of the undecided would drop from 20% to only 6%; Fatah share would rise from 40% to 44% (including Dahlan loyalists); Hamas share (32%) would remain unchanged; share of third parties (10%) would also remain unchanged; and 8% would vote for the newly created electoral lists. If Dahlan loyalists are removed from Fatah’s share, it would drop to 39%.

More than two thirds (68%) believe that if Hamas wins the upcoming elections, Fatah will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 25% think Fatah will indeed allow Hamas to do so. Similarly, 59% believe that if Fatah wins the upcoming elections, Hamas will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 34% think Hamas will indeed allow Fatah to do so.  It is worth mentioning that among those who intend to vote for Fatah, only 38% think that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah would accept the results while 58% think that Fatah will not accept the results and will not allow Hamas to form a government with jurisdiction in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Among Hamas voters, only 20% think that Fatah will accept the result in case Hamas wins. By contrast, a large percentage of 69% of Hamas voters believe that if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will accept the results while only 25% believe Hamas will not accept the results in this case. Among Fatah supporters however, only 26% believe Hamas will accept the result if Fatah wins the election.     

A majority of 59% say that after the upcoming elections and the formation of a new government, such a government does not have the right to dissolve existing armed groups in the Gaza Strip and collect their arms because maintain the arms of these groups is more important than electoral legitimacy; 33% say that the newly elected government does indeed have the legitimacy to do so.  Regardless of the policy of a newly elected government on the armed groups, two-thirds (67%) say that it would be wrong, and 26% say it would correct, to dissolve Gaza’s armed groups and collect their arms.  The belief that a new legitimate government can dissolve the Gazan armed groups is higher in the West Bank (34%) compared to the Gaza Strip (31%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (45% and 34% respectively) compared the religious (28%), among supporters of the peace process (38%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (26%), among supporters of Fatah (47%) compared to supporters of Hamas, third parties, and those who will not participate in the elections (24%, 28%, and 31% respectively).  

If new parties or movements were to be created to take part in the upcoming elections, 13% of the participants say that while they have not yet made up their mind, they will be willing to consider supporting a new party or movement. Also, 12% of committed voters are willing to shift support to a new party or movement. Nonetheless, the largest percentage of participating voters says they will not shift vote to a new party or movement. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority (79%) encourages, and 18% discourage, the participation of independent youth lists in the upcoming elections.

The top priority that should be the aim of the upcoming elections is the unification the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the eyes of 36% of the public while 18% think it is the improvement of economic conditions, 17% say the ending of Gazan blockade and siege, 13% say fighting corruption, 7% say creating a democratic political system, and 6% say strengthening the resistance to occupation and settlements.  The largest percentage (32%) believes that Fatah is the most able of all factions to succeed in realizing the top priority it has selected; 24% say Hamas is the most able, and 20% believe that none of the existing or newly created factions will be able to succeed in achieving the top priority they have selected.

(2) Presidential elections:

• 61% want Abbas to resign and only 37% are satisfied with his performance  
• Only 31% believe Abbas is the right presidential candidate for Fatah
• In a presidential election, Abbas receives 49% of the vote and Haniyyeh receives 44%
• Marwan Barghouti is the most popular: he receives 62% compared to Haniyyeh’s 34% of the popular vote

61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 49% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 59%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip). Only 31% think president Abbas is the best Fatah candidate for the presidency while 41% think that Fatah has better candidates; 29% say they do not know or have no opinion on the matter.  The belief that Abbas is the best Fatah candidate is higher in the West Bank (34%) c0mpared to the Gaza Strip (27%), among supporters of the peace process (40%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (18%), among supporters of Fatah (65%) compared to supporters of Hamas, third parties, and those who will not participate in the elections (7%, 21%, and 24% respectively).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 49% and the latter 44% of the vote (compared to 48% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 37% of the vote (compared to 39% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 57% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 58% (compared to 56% three months ago) and Haniyeh 34% (compared to 36% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 62% and Haniyeh 34%.  We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 21% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (2% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 5%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 4% each. 

(3) Blocking websites, the justice system, the electricity crisis, the American field hospital, the Shtayyeh government, and other domestic conditions:

• 60% of the public reject the decision of the Palestinian Attorney General to block some media website and 53% demand his resignation
• 54% say they are not likely to receive a fair trial in a Palestinian court and 55% think the Palestinian judiciary rules in accordance with whims and interests
• 61% are in favor of exempting refugee camps from paying the electricity bills and want the PA to cover the cost
• 36% support the building of the American field hospital along the Gaza borders with Israel
• 31% are interested in emigrating from the Gaza Strip and 20% from the West Bank
• The overwhelming majority supports the government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years

A majority of 60% of the public views the decision by the attorney general to ask the court to block access to more than 50 Palestinian media websites as an imposition of restrictions on free speech, a right guaranteed by the Basic Law; but 33% think the decision to do so is correct as it seeks to implement the law. In light of his decision to block more than 50 media websites, 53% think the attorney general should not stay in his position because he apparently does not believe in free speech. But 38% think that he should stay in his position because he simply implemented the law.  The belief that blocking access to the sites is an imposition of restrictions on free speech is higher in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (58%), among men (64%) compared to women (56%), among the youth, between 18 and 22 years (65%) compared to those whose age is over 49 years (61%), among those who work in the public sector (63%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (57%), among the unmarried (66%) compared to the married (59%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (73%) compared to those who support the peace process (51%), among supporters of Hamas, third parties, and those who will not participate in the elections (67%, 63%, and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (47%).

A majority of 54% (59% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 39% (34% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial. A majority of 55% (60% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary is rules according to whims and interests; 42% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law.

In light of the current electricity crisis in central West Bank, 61% think that refugee camps should be exempted from paying their electricity bill and the PA should cover the cost; 35% disagree and think that refugee camps should pay their bills like everybody else. If refugee camps are indeed exempted from paying for their electricity, 89% want the PA to cover the cost while only 5% think that other paying customers should cover the cost.

The largest percentage (36%) says that it supports, and 32% say they oppose, the construction of the American field hospital on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Israel; 28% say they have not heard about it. Support for the construction of the hospital is higher in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (26%), in refugee camps and cities (46% and 40% respectively) compared to villages/towns (13%), among men (41%) compared to women (31%), among those  whose income is much lower the average income (43%) compared to those whose income is much higher the average income (33%), among the religious (40%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (34% each), among those who are opposed to the peace process (51%) compared to those who support the peace process (30%), among supporters of Hamas (67%) compared to supporters of Fatah, third parties, and those who will not participate in the election (23%, 34%, and 28% respectively).

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 60%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 63% and in the West Bank at 52%. 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 31% and declines in the West Bank to 20%.

Only 35% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 62% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 51% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 46% say they cannot. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 67%. The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 50% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 45% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

With more than eight months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (49%), the economy (39%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (53%), the preparation to hold general elections (47%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (51%). But a percentage ranging between 24% and 45% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 12% and 24% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a slight improvement in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings three months ago.  Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 58% expects failure; only 33% expects success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a plurality of 48% expects failure and 44% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 55% expects failure and 37% expects success.

An overwhelming majority of 77% supports, and 22% oppose, the government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years. 

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Al Aqsa TV (15%), Palestine TV and Maan TV (13% each), Palestine Today TV (9%), al Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (4% each).  

(4) Reconciliation, Hamas and Islamic Jihad: 

• 59% are pessimistic about the prospects for reconciliation but 44% think the holding of new elections might contribute to reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• 46% believe that chances for a Hamas-Israel long term cessation of violence or hudna is medium or high
• 39% believe that Hamas should have participated in the rocket exchange against Israel in the latest wave of violence in the Gaza Strip

36% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at only 30%.  44% are optimistic, and 51% are not optimistic, that the upcoming legislative elections will contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  An overwhelming majority (78%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 20% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government.

A majority of 52% (down to 44% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 10% believe the chances are high.  Given Hamas’ position during the latest round of fire exchange in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Islamic Jihad, the largest percentage, standing at 39%, believes that Hamas should have participated in the exchange of rocket fire against Israel while 32% think Hamas made the correct decision by not participating, and 16% think that Hamas did in fact participate. The percentage of those who think Hamas’ decision was the right one is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (23%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to villages/towns and cities (21% and 33% respectively), among those youth whose 18 and 22 years (39%) compared to those whose age is over 49 years (30%), among those who work in the public sector (42%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (29%), among those whose income is much lower than the average income (50%) compared to those whose income is much higher than the average income (27%), among the religious (38%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (29% and 30% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (44%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (27%), and among supporters of Hamas (56%) compared to supporters of Fatah, third parties, and those who will not participate in the elections (22%, 29%, and 28% respectively).

 (5) US declaration of settlements’ legality, the Trump peace plan, and Trump impeachment:

• Two thirds believe the US decision declaring Israeli settlements legal under international law will destroy the two-state solution and three quarters believe it will lead to an Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories
• 85% believe the Trump peace plan will not end the Israeli occupation and allows the annexation of Palestinian territories
• About three quarters reject the Trump peace plan regardless of its content
• 69% oppose the resumption of Palestinian-American dialogue and 60% expect Trump to lose the upcoming American presidential elections

66% view the US declaration of the legality of Israeli settlements according to international law as destructive to the two-state solution while 18% think it will have no impact and 10% think that it will in fact strengthen the two-state solution.  Similarly, 57% view the same decision as have a weakening impact on the one-state solution while 23% think it will have no impact and 9% think it will in fact strengthen the one-state solution.

Almost three quarters (74%) think the US decision will lead to an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley, while 20% think it will have no such impact

We asked the public if Palestinian acceptance of the Trump peace plan would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 85% say no; only 10% say yes it would.  When asked if the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 75% of the public says it does and only 21% say it does not.  We asked the public what should the Palestinian leadership do about the US peace plan: 74% indicate that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 16% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 6% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo. Three months ago, 69% said the PA should reject the plan out of hand. 

A majority of 69% is opposed and 19% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. A majority of 60% expects US president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 53% expect the US Congress to succeed in impeaching him.

(6) The peace process:

• 42% support the two-state solution but 61% view it as unfeasible due to Israeli settlement expansion
• To end the occupation, 47% view armed struggle as the most effective means, but 26% select negotiations and 20% select non-violent resistance

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 42% and opposition at 55%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 42%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 54% believe that the majority opposes it. A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 35% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 75% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 24% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 29% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 15% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 32% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 37% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the largest group (47%) chose armed struggle, 26% negotiations, and 20% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 60% support popular non-violent resistance; 52% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 28% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 40% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.

A majority of 58% expects the indictment of Netanyahu in corruption charges to his ouster from leadership in Israel soon while 34% expect him to succeed in staying in power despite the indictment.

(7) Arab uprisings, Turkish incursion into Syria, and visit of Saudi football team:

• The majority looks positively as the uprisings in the Arab world today but the majority is opposed to spreading it to Palestine
• 63% encourage Arab visits, such as the visit of the Saudi football team to Palestine

57% of the public are in favor and 37% are not in favor of the current uprisings in the Arab world, in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.  Moreover, 63% reject, and 26% accept, Hizbollah’s position which is opposed to the Lebanese uprising. But 65% do not expect, and only 31% expect, these uprisings to spread to Palestine. Similarly, 65% do not wish to see these uprisings spreading to the West Bank and a little more (70%) do not wish to see them spreading to the Gaza Strip.  Support for the spread of the uprisings to the areas of the West Bank is higher in the Gaza Strip (45%) compared to West Bank (22%), in refugee camps and cities (40% and 33% respectively) compared to villages/towns (19%), among men (34%) compared to women (28%), among the youth whose age is between 18 and 22 years (33%) compared to those whose age is over 49 years (28%), among those whose income is much lower than the average income (39%) compared to those whose income is much higher than the average income (32%), among the religious (35%) compared to the somewhat religious (28%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (44%) compared to those who support the peace process (26%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (43% and 35% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah and those who will not participate in the elections (25% and 26% respectively).

On the other hand, support for the spread of the Arab uprisings to the Gaza Strip is higher among Gazans (32%) compared to West Bankers (22%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to villages/towns and cities (16% and 27% respectively), among men (29%) compared to women (23%), among those who work in the private  and the non-governmental sectors (30%) compared to those who work in the public sector (25%), among the unmarried (32%) compared to the married (26%), and among supporters of Fatah (32%) compared to supporters of Hamas, third parties, and those who will not participate in the elections (20%, 26%, and 23% respectively).

A majority of 51% (60% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) views the Turkish incursion into the northern border area of Syria as unacceptable aggression while 40% (31% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) view it as a legitimate temporary incursion.

A majority of 63% say that visits from Arab countries, such as that of the Saudi football team, should be encouraged while 34% say such visits should not be encouraged.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that that the top Palestinian goal should be ending the 1967 occupation and building a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• The continuation of the Israeli occupation is seen by 28% as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment and the spread of corruption in public institutions (26% each); 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

14-17 March 2004

These are the results of poll # 11 conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between March 14 and 17, 2004 (before the Israeli assassination of Ahmad Yasin). The poll deals with the Sharon plan for a unilateral evacuation of settlements, the separation wall and military checkpoints, the peace process and armed attacks, and internal Palestinian matters. Total size of the sample is 1320 adults (825 in the West Bank and 495 in the Gaza Strip) interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa, at Tel 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings

(1) Gaza Withdrawal Plan

• About three quarters of the Palestinians welcome Sharon's plan to evacuate 17 settlements in the Gaza Strip and few more in the West Bank and two thirds believe it represents a victory for the armed struggle against occupation, but only one third believes Sharon is serious and will indeed withdraw and 61% believe he is not serious and will notwithdraw.
• A majority of 58% prefers to see the PA negotiate with Israel Sharon's withdrawal plan, and 38% prefer to see the withdrawal being carried out unilaterally.
• 41% support and 54% oppose Israeli-Hamas negotiation of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
• Withdrawal from Gaza will increase the chances for a peace settlement in the view of 32% and will decrease the chances for peace in the view of 24%.
• In the view of the Palestinians, Sharon's intentions are: first, to push the Palestinians toward internal infighting; second, to consolidate control over the West Bank; third, to frighten the Palestinian leadership of its opposition; and fourth, to maintain a Jewish majority in Israel.
• Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip will lead to a decrease in armed attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip in the view of 41% and will lead to an increase in such attacks in the view of 30%. In the Gaza Strip, 49% believe it will lead to a decrease in the attacks.
• After the withdrawal and the evacuation of settlements, 54% propose to give homes in settlements to those whose homes have been demolished by Israel, 22% want to give them to refugees, and 13% would like to demolish them.

The polls shows that 73% of the Palestinians welcome Sharon's plan to evacuate 17 settlements in the Gaza Strip and few more in the West Bank. Gazans are more welcoming of the plan (82%) than West Bankers (68%). Yet, the percentage of those who believe that the plan will increase the chances for a political settlement with Israel does not exceed 32%, with 24% believing that it will decease such chances and 39% believing that it will have no effect on the peace process. The reason for the pessimistic assessment of the potential effect of the Sharon plan is derived from the publics negative estimate of Sharon's intentions. In the view of 37%, Sharon's first goal is to push the Palestinians toward internal infighting; 33% believe his second goal is to consolidate Israeli control over the West Bank, and 28% believe his third goal is to intimidate the Palestinian leadership with loss of power to opposition parties. The percentage of those believing that his first goal is to maintain Israel's Jewish majority does not exceed 22%.

Despite belief in Sharon's malicious intent, two thirds of the Palestinian public see in his plan a victory for Palestinian armed struggle while only one third believes it is not a victory. Moreover, 68% believe that a majority of Palestinians sees the plan as a victory for armed struggle. Given the actual results, the assessment of the respondents is highly accurate which indicates that this is indeed the normative attitude prevailing among Palestinians. But the percentage of those believing that a majority of Israelis sees the plan as a victory for the Palestinians is 44%, with 48% believing that most Israelis do not see it as a victory for Palestinians. The belief that the plan is a victory for Palestinian armed struggle increases in the Gaza Strip (72%) compared to the West Bank (62%), in refugee camps (72%) compared to cities (61%), among men (70%) compared to women (62%), and among supporters ofHamas and Fateh (70% and 69% respectively) compared to the unaffiliated (59%).

Despite the welcome of the Sharon plan and the belief that it represents a victory for Palestinian armed struggle, only one third believes that Sharon is serious and will indeed withdraw from the Gaza Strip, while 61% believe he will not. This could be the reason why a majority of 58% prefers to see the PA negotiate the Gaza withdrawal with Israel and only 38% prefer to see Israel withdrawing unilaterally. In other words, what the majority of the Palestinians sees as victory is not the unilateral aspect of the Sharon plan but the evacuation of settlements. In this regard, the public prefers the evacuation and withdrawal to be the result of negotiations, but it still sees victory in both cases.

The survey sought to examine public perception of the legitimacy of a Hamas-Israel negotiation. When asked if they think Israel should negotiate its withdrawal from Gaza also withHamas, 41% responded positively while 54% said it should not. Similarly, when asked if Hamas should accept to negotiate with Israel, 43% said it should and 50% said it should not. Yet only 36% of the respondents believe a majority of the Palestinians approves Hamas-Israel negotiations and 53% believe that most Palestinians do not approve such negotiations on the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. If Hamas accepts to negotiate with Israel, this would mean a change in the principled positions of the movement toward Israel and the recognition of Israel in the view of 55% of the respondents. The finding showing such support for Hamas-Israel negotiations indicates that a large section of the Palestinian public is dissatisfied with PA performance and wishes to introduce another Palestinian actor into the negotiations process.

If Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip, the level of armed attacks against Israelis from the Strip would decline according to 41% of the public, while 30% of the public believe it would increase the number of such attacks, and 24% believe it will have no impact. The percentage of those believing that withdrawal will lead to a decrease in attacks from Gazaincreases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (36%). It also increases among men (44%) compared to women (38%), among the oldest (45%) compared to the youngest (36%), among professionals, the retired, and farmers (60%, 56%, and 48% respectively) compared to students (33%), among those working in the public sector (51%) compared to those working in the private sector (44%), among the married (43%) compared to the unmarried (36%), and among Fateh supporters (45%) compared to supporters ofHamas and Islamic Jihad (40% and 38% respectively).

After the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, a majority of 54% thinks that homes in the evacuated settlements should be given to those Palestinians whose homes have been demolished by Israel. But 22% think they should go to refugees and 13% think they should be demolished.

(2) Separation Wall and Checkpoints

• 55% believe the building of the separation wall will lead to an increase in armed attacks against Israel. 40% believe the best means for the Palestinians to fight it is by armed confrontations and bombing attacks inside Israel; 27% believe in a ceasefire agreement and return to the peace process; 10% prefer popular non violent demonstrations; and 11% believe going to the international court of Justice is the best means of fighting the wall.
• A majority of 61% believes that the International Court of Justice will be biased in favor of Israel and only 26% believe it will be neutral.
• 41% believe that the best means of fighting Israeli military checkpoints is through reaching a ceasefire and returning to the peace process and 28% believe armed confrontations and bombing attacks are the best means, while 9% have confidence in popular non-violent demonstration.

A majority of 55% believes that the separation wall will lead to more armed attacks against Israel, 18% believe it will lead to less attacks, and 25% believe it will have no impact on attacks. But more than two thirds (68%) believe that a majority of Israelis does believe that the wall will reduce armed attacks. The best way to fight the wall in the view of 40% of the public is by the continuation of armed confrontations and bombing attacks inside Israel while 27% believe the best way is to reach a ceasefire agreement and return to the peace process. The percentage of those who believe non-violent demonstrations are the best means to fight the wall does not exceed 10%, and a similar percentage (11%) believes in the effectiveness of complaining to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). One reason why the level of confidence in the ICJ is so low is the surprising finding that 61% of the public believe the Court will be biased in favor of Israel, with only 8% believing it will be biased in favor of the Palestinians and only 26% believing it would be neutral.

During the last three months, 48% of the Palestinians traveled through Israeli military checkpoints. The reasons for travel varied with 35% visiting family, 30% going to work, 23% seeking medical treatment, and 9% going to schools and universities. The frequency of travel varied too with 27% traveling once a month, 26% twice or three time monthly, 21% twice or three times weekly, and 17% daily. The extent of hardship encountered while crossing the checkpoints have been described as very large or large by 82% while 14% described it as medium and 3% as little. More than one third of the respondents said that family members had to locate to other areas because of the suffering at the checkpoints or because of their inability to cross them. The best way to fight the checkpoints according to 41% of the respondents is a ceasefire agreement and a return to the peace process, but 28% said it is the continuation of armed confrontations and bombings inside Israel. Only 9% said the best way to fight checkpoint is by non-violent demonstrations and 12% by complaining to international human rights organizations. Belief in the utility of armed confrontations and bombings inside Israel increases in the Gaza Strip (31%) compared to the West Bank (26%), among men (30%) compared to women (25%), among holders of BA degree (33%) compared to illiterates (26%), and among supporters of Hamas (38%) compared to supporters of Fateh (26%).

(3) Peace Process, Reconciliation, Armed Attacks, Hizballah Prisoners' Deal, and the Arab Summit

• 66% believe the Roadmap has collapsed. Last December, 58% believed it had collapsed; and last October the percentage was 68%.
• Wide support for armed attacks: 87% support attacks against Israeli soldiers, 86% support attacks against settlers, and 53% support attacks against Israeli civilians.
• Despite that, 84% support mutual cessation of violence and 70% support a Hudna.
• 67% believe that armed confrontations have helped the Palestinians achieve national rights in a way that negotiations could not.
• After reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, 74% would support reconciliation between the two peoples, but 42% are convinced that such reconciliation is not possible ever.
• 80% believe that Hizballah came out a winner from the prisoners' exchange with Israel.
• In the occasion of the Arab Summit in Tunis, 86% of the Palestinians believe that they cannot count on Arab States to support them in regaining their rights.

The findings show little optimism about the prospect for a return to negotiations and cessation of violence. Only 15% believe that violence will stop soon and the two sides will return to negotiations and 45% believe some armed confrontations will continue but the parties will be able to return to negotiations. More than one third, compared to less than one quarter last December, believes that violence will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. Two thirds, compared to 58% last December and 68% last October, believe that the Roadmap has collapsed.

Support for armed attacks against Israeli soldiers remains very high at 87% and against settlers at 86%, and against civilians at 53%. These figures are similar to those obtained during the last six months except for the support of violence against civilians which stood at 48% last December and 59% last October. Two thirds (67%) of the public believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Last December, this percentage stood at 64%.

Despite the wide support for armed attacks, a large majority of 84% support mutual cessation of violence and 70% support a hudna in which the Palestinians stop using arms against the Israelis and the Israelis stop using arms against the Palestinians. If such agreement if reached, 57% of the public would support the PA in taking measures to prevent armed attacks against Israeli targets.

The findings show that a majority of the public does not blame Palestinian opposition groups for the failure to reach a ceasefire agreement as only 11% do so, another 17% blame the PA for this failure, and 37% blame both sides. The rest of the public blames others, mostly Israel. The percentage of those blaming the opposition groups more than the PA increases among supporters of Fateh (9% blame the PA and 18% blame the opposition) compared to supporters of Hamas (26% blame the PA and 8% blame the opposition).

After reaching a peace agreement between the two sides and the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel, 74% would support reconciliation between the two peoples. Despite this finding, 42% believe reconciliation is not possible ever, while 18% believe it will be possible only after several generations, 8% believes it to be possible in the next generation, 7% during the next 10 years, and 16% during the next few years. Regarding the modalities of reconciliation after reaching a peace agreement, 86% would support open borders between the two states, 65% would support joint economic institutions and ventures, 29% would support the creation of joint political institutions toward a confederation, 39% would support the enacting of laws that prohibit incitement against Israel, and only 7% would support the adoption of a school curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians.

An overwhelming majority of 80% views the Israel-Hezbollah prisoners exchange as a victory for Hezbollah, 9% view it as a victory for Israel, and 7% believe the two sides came out victorious.

On the occasion of the Arab summit, originally scheduled for the end of March in Tunisia, PSR asked respondents whether they can count on support from Arab states in regaining their rights. Only 14% responded in the affirmative and 86% said Palestinians can not count on support of Arab states.

(4) Domestic Issues

• Only 20% to 25% believe that Prime Minister Abu Ala' has been able to achieve his four stated objectives of putting an end to internal anarchy, prepare for elections, carry out political reforms, and return to negotiations. Despite the low evaluation, only 39% believe that he should resign and 47% believe he should not.
• 63% believe Israeli occupation is responsible for the chaos in the Palestinian areas and 25% put the blame on the Palestinian security services and the Palestinian leadership.
• 70% want to have Palestinian legislative and presidential elections after Israel ends its occupation of Palestinian cities and towns, but 27% support holding them now.
• 91% support internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms in the PA.
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy does not exceed 23%, with 84% believing that corruption exists in the PA, and 94% believing that one can not find a job without awasta.
• Arafat's popularity stands at 38% as the case was last December.
• For the office of a vice president, Marwan Barghouti remains at the top with 16%, followed by Abdul Aziz Rantisi with 14%, and Saeb Erikat with 8%.
• Fateh's popularity stands at 27% and Hamas at 20%. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas has the support of 27% compared to 23% for Fateh. The popularity of the Islamists combined (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) stands at 29% and the percentage of the non-affiliated stands at 40%.

The findings show little positive evaluation of the performance of the Abu Ala's government. When asked whether the Prime Minister has been able to deliver on what he promised regarding the elimination of internal anarchy, preparation for elections, political reforms, and return to the peace process with Israel, only 20% to 25% said he was able to deliver for each item while 65% to 75% said he was not. Despite this grim assessment, only 39% said the Prime Minister and his government should resign and 47% said they should not. One reason for this could be the finding that 63% of the public blame the Israeli occupation for the anarchy and lack of security while only 25% blame it on the failure of the Palestinian security services and leadership.

Demand for Abu Ala's resignation increases in the Gaza Strip (43%) compared to the West Bank (37%), in refugee camps (44%) compared to towns and villages (35%), among men (45%) compared to women (33%), among the youngest, between the ages of 18-22 years (45%) compared to the oldest, over 52 years old (33%), among holders of BA degree (41%) compared to illiterates (29%), among professionals, laborers, employees, and students (60%, 51%, 48%, and 46% respectively) compared to housewives and the retired (32% and 22% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (49%) compared to supporters of Fateh (34%).

Less than one quarter (23%) gives Palestinian democracy a positive evaluation. But 50% believe people can criticize the PA without fear, and 49% believe that there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Palestinian territories. Belief in the existence of corruption in PA institutions reaches 84%, and from among those 70% believe that this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future. More than three quarters (77%) believe that to a large extent jobs in the PA are obtainable through wasta, with an additional 17% believing that wasta is used sometimes. Only 2% believe employment is done without wasta. The percentage of those who say that conditions in the Palestinians areas forces them to seek permanent emigration reaches 15%.

Support for internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms reaches 91% in this poll. Support for holding general political elections after an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities reaches 70% with an additional 27% supporting the holding of elections today, under the current conditions of occupation.

Arafat's popularity remains unchanged as it was last December (38%). Regarding support for a vice president, Marwan Barghouti's popularity remains highest (16%) followed by that of Abdulaziz al Ranatisi (14%), Sa'eb Erikat (8%), Haidar Abdul Shafi (6%), Ahmad Yasin and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), Farouq Qaddoumi (4%), Ahamd Quari'-Abu Ala' (3%), Mohammad Dahlan (2%), and Mahmoud Abbas-Abu Mazin (1%). In the Gaza Strip, Rantisi's popularity inceases to 17% compared to 12% in the West Bank. Similarly, Dahlan'spopularity increases in the Gaza Strip to 5% compared to less than 1% in the West Bank. Fateh is the most popular faction with 27% followed by Hamas with 20%. Hamas' popularity is the largest in the Gaza Strip (27%) followed by Fateh (23%). The combined Islamists popularity (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and independent Islamists) reaches 29% and the percentage of the non-affiliated stands at 40%..... Full Report

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (40) 

Palestinians want Abbas’ and PLO’s policy to be the platform of the reconciliation government and Fayyad to be its prime minister; an overwhelming majority wants a real state in September, one that exercises sovereignty in area C and at the international crossings with Jordan; and a majority wants to participate in big peaceful demonstrations that would breach checkpoints and block roads of Israeli settlers and army

16-18 June 2011    

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16-18 June 2011. The poll was conducted after the signing of the reconciliation agreement between Fateh and Hamas and during the continued turmoil and revolt in the Arab World including the popular uprisings in Syria, Yemen and Libya. This period witnessed increased PA official statements indicating insistence on going to the UN for recognition of a Palestinian state in September. This press release covers Palestinian domestic conditions, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the future of the reconciliation agreement, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the most serious problems confronting Palestinians today. It also covers issues related to the peace process and the expected September process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2011 show that the reconciliation agreement between Fateh and Hamas has triggered important changes in public attitudes and perceptions. Indeed, the agreement has removed, almost completely, the issue of the split between West Bank and the Gaza Strip from the list of critical problems in the minds of the public. But the fading of the problem of the split led to the emergence of a new problem: the concern that the agreement, once implemented, and a majority believes that it will indeed be implemented, it will bring back international political and financial sanctions and boycott. For this reason, and while findings show that Hamas has benefited considerably from signing the agreement, a clear majority of the public wants the new Palestinian government of specialists, once formed, to implement the president’s and the PLO’s peace program and policy rather than that of Hamas. Most importantly, the largest percentage wants Salam Fayyad, Fateh’s candidate, to be the next prime minister. Indeed, only a small minority wants Jamal Khodari, Hamas’ candidate, to be the next prime minister. Perhaps the public believes that if Fayyad stays as prime minister and if he continues to implement Abbas’ peace agenda and policies, the threat of boycott and sanctions would diminish or disappear.

Findings show a split in public attitude regarding the Obama proposal for terms of reference for the peace process on borders and the national identity of Israel and Palestine, both supported by half of the public. But three quarters of the public oppose Obama’s suggestion that the Palestinian state should be non-militarized and about two thirds reject the US position that going to the UN in September to seek recognition of a Palestinian state would be a mistake.  Findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians support an exercise of sovereignty over the so-called area (C) including the deployment of Palestinian security forces in those areas in the context of the UN recognition of Palestinian statehood. Similarly, three quarters support exercise of Palestinian sovereignty over the Allenby international crossing with Jordan even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing. Findings indicate that a majority wants to participate in big popular peaceful demonstrations that would seek to breach checkpoints and to block roads used by Israeli settlers and army.

(1) The future of the reconciliation agreement:

• A majority of 59% is optimistic about the chances that the reconciliation agreement will be implemented, but a similar majority (55%) expects the return of international financial sanctions after the establishment of a reconciliation government
• A plurality prefers Fayyad as prime minister and a majority wants the new government to follow the policies of the PA president and the PLO rather than the policy of Hamas
• The public is divided over the factors that led to the reconciliation agreement and half believes that both Fateh and Hamas emerged winners from the agreement

A majority of 59% believes that Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement and in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 37% believe they will fail. But a majority of 55% expects the return of international boycott and financial sanctions after the formation of a new reconciliation government and 37% do not expect that. Perhaps to reduce the probability of such a development, a plurality prefers Abbas’ candidate for the prime minister position over Hamas’ candidate: In a choice between Salam Fayyad and Jamal Khodari, 45% of the public favors the former and only 22% favor the latter. 12% favor other candidates and 21% remain undecided. Perhaps for the same reason, a majority of 61% wants the new government of reconciliation to follow the peace policies and agendas of President Abbas and the PLO rather than Hamas’. Only 18% want the new government to follow the peace policy and agenda of Hamas.

Belief that the new government should follow the policies of Abbas and the PLO increases among supporters of the peace process (69%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (38%), among those who are “somewhat religious” (65%) compared to those who are “religious” (54%), among supporters of Fateh (89%) compared to supporters of Hamas (27%). Preference for Fayyad as the prime minister of the reconciliation government increases among men (49%) compared to women (41%), among the “somewhat religious” (50%) compared the “religious” (39%), among supporters of the peace process (45%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (17%), among supporters of Fateh (80%) compared to supporters of Hamas (10%) and supporters of third parties and those who remain undecided (51% each), and among holders of preparatory certificate and illiterates (48%) compared to college and university graduates (42%).  Half of the public (50%) says that both Fateh and Hamas came out winners from the reconciliation agreement, 12% say Hamas came out the winner, 11% say Fateh came out the winner, and 20% say neither came out a winner. 29% believe that the reason a reconciliation agreement was signed has to do with the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt while 27% believe it was the youth demonstrations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that was responsible for forcing the two sides to sign the agreement. Moreover, 21% believe the reason was the failure of negotiations with Israel while 12% believe it was the eruption of youth demonstrations against the Syrian regime.

(2) Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, performance of the governments of Fayyad and Haniyeh, and presidential and legislative elections

• Increase in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but positive evaluation of West Bank condition remains higher than that of the Gaza Strip
• Positive evaluation of freedom of the press in the West Bank is higher than it is in the Gaza Strip and the same is true in regard to ability of citizens to criticize the government without fear
• But perception of personal safety and security is higher among residents of the Gaza Strip than among residents of the West Bank
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas increases from 46% to 52%
• If new presidential elections where to take place today, Abbas would receive 54% of the popular vote and Haniyeh 38%; but if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter 33%
• If new legislative elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 28% of the participants’ vote and Fateh 42%. All third parties combined would receive 10% and the undecided stands at 19%
• Three quarters support Abbas’ decision annulling articles in the penal code whereby those accused of “family honor” killings are given light sentences
• 70% support Fateh’s decision to expel Dahlan from its ranks

25% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 47% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, in March 2011, 21% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 56% said they were bad or very bad. It is worth noting that a year ago, in June 2010, only 9% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good. Today, 37% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 29% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 33% and 33% respectively. As can be seen in the following table, a year ago, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stood at 35%.

Table (1): Positive evaluation (good or very good) of conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

71% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 60% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. But 61% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 34% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 47% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 41% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 31% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 25% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These findings reflect an improvement in the situation in the Gaza Strip and a slight decline in the West Bank compared to where things stood three months ago. Since the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in June 2007, these percentages have witnessed gradual and significant decrease. As the table below shows, belief that people can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear stood at 56% while 52% believed that people can criticize the authorities without fear in the Gaza Strip. This is the first time since the split that we have seen an increase in the percentage of those who believe that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities there without fear. The change may be due to changing perceptions of Hamas’ behavior in the Gaza Strip after the signing of the reconciliation agreement.

Table (2): belief that people can criticize authorities in the West Bank or Gaza Strip without fear since the split between the two areas

Perception of safety and security stands at 56% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. This finding indicates a large increase in the perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip compared to March 2011 when it stood at 67%. The difference may reflect a perception change in light of the reconciliation agreement. Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 39% and Salam Fayyad’s at 43%. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 31% and 39% respectively. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries stands at 40%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 26%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 37% and 21% respectively, which means that the signing of the reconciliation agreement, despite the public support, has nonetheless brought back concerns about international sanctions and boycott.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 52% while 45% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. These percentages reflect an increase in the level of satisfaction with the performance of the president, which stood at 46% three months ago while the level of dissatisfaction stood at 51%. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank. The increase in the percentage of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas may be an outcome of the signing of the reconciliation agreement.  If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 38% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 60%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives in this poll 51% and Haniyeh 44% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 56% and Haniyeh 34%. These results are similar to those obtained in our pervious poll three months ago. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter would receive 33% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 67%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 56% and Haniyeh 40% and in the West Bank Barghouti receives 64% and Haniyeh 29%. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago.  Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 27% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (22%), Salam Fayyad (17%) Mustafa Barghouti (9%) and Saeb Erekat (4%).  

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 28% say they would vote for Hamas and 42% say they would vote for Fateh, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. These results indicate an increase of two percentage points to each of Fateh and Hamas compared to our results three months ago. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip in this poll stands at 36 % and in the West Bank 24%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip is 43% and in the West Bank 42%.

Findings show that an overwhelming majority of 75% supports and 19% oppose PA president decision annulling articles in the penal code whereby those accused of “family honor” killings are given light sentences. 70% support and 21% oppose the decision by Fateh’s Central Committee to expel Mohammad Dahlan from Fateh and transferring his file to the Attorney General’s office. Support for the decision is similar in the West Bank (71%) and the Gaza Strip (68%) but opposition to the decision increases to 28% in the Gaza Strip and drops to 17% in the West Bank. Moreover, support for the decision is higher among supporters of Hamas (90%) compared to supporters of Fateh (58%). 61% believe that differences of opinion within Fateh regarding Dahlan reflect big and serious disagreement within the movement while 33% believe they reflect a minor disagreement.  Differences of opinion that erupted within Hamas after the signing of the reconciliation agreement reflect big and serious disagreement within the movement in the views of 42% of the public while 48% believe that they reflect minor disagreements.  

(3) Palestinian attitudes and expectations towards September

• 65% support going to the UN to seek recognition of Palestinian statehood despite American warning not to do so
• If Palestinians go to the UN General Assembly, 57% believe they will obtain recognition of their state from two thirds of the members, but 76% believe the US will use its veto power in the Security Council
• 48% believe that Palestine will become a UN member in September and 44% do not believe so
• Two thirds expect Israeli occupation to become harsher in response to the UN vote
• The public is split over the best means of forcing Israel to end its occupation: about a third believes in armed attacks, another third believes in peaceful resistance, and 26% believe negotiation is the answer
• 76% want the PA to exercise sovereignty in September including the opening of highways, an airport, and the deployment of security forces in area (C) and 75% want Palestinian sovereignty over the Allenby crossing with Jordan even if such step leads to the closure of the crossing
• 52% say they will participate in peaceful demonstrations that would seek to breach checkpoints and block roads after the UN recognition of the state of Palestine
• A majority of 58% believes that most of the European countries will recognize the Palestinian state in September; despite this, a similar percentage believes that the position of the EU member states is closer to the Israeli position

President Obama stated that it would be a mistake for the Palestinians to go to the UN in September to obtain recognition for their state. Despite the Obama statement, 65% of the Palestinians believe the PA should go to the UN in September and 31% believe it should not. Support for going to the UN despite the American warning is higher among supporters of the peace process (71%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (51%), among supporters of Fateh (75%) compared to supporters of Hamas (61%), and among university and college graduates (70%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (58%).

A majority of 57% of the Palestinians believes that if the Palestinians turn to the UN General Assembly for recognition of a Palestinian state, they will succeed in obtaining a two thirds majority; 36% of the Palestinians believe they will not succeed. A majority of Palestinians also believes that the US will use its veto power in the UN Security Council in order to prevent the UN from admitting the state of Palestine as a UN member. 76% of the Palestinians think so, while 18% think that the US will not use its veto power. Palestinians are split with regard to the question whether a state of Palestine will become a UN member in September: 48% of the Palestinians think this will happen while 44% do not believe so.

Two thirds believe that if the UN recognizes the state of Palestine, Israel will respond by making the occupation worse and by increasing settlement building while 18% think Israel will do nothing and the status quo will prevail. 13% of the Palestinians think conditions in the occupied territories will become a little better.  We asked Palestinians how they think Palestinians can force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories if the UN recognizes the Palestinian state. Palestinians are split: 34% think armed attacks on army and settlers, 32% think peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw, and 26% of the Palestinians think negotiations with Israel can bring it to withdraw.

The preference for peaceful resistance increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (28%). But support for armed resistance is also higher in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (32%). In the West Bank, support for negotiations stands at 30% while in the Gaza Strip it stands at 17%. Support for peaceful resistance increases among men (36%) compared to women (29%), among supporters of third parties (42%) the undecided (38%) and supporters of Fateh (33%) compared to supporters of Hamas (24%). Among supporters of Hamas, preference for armed resistance is high, standing at 55%, while this percentage stands at 27% among supporters of Fateh, 23% among supporters of third parties, and 21% among the undecided. Support for peaceful resistance increases among students (40%) compared to housewives (25%), and among users of the internet (36%) compared to those who do not use the internet (29%).

We asked Palestinians what they think the PA should do after the UN recognizes the Palestinian state in September. 76% think the PA president and government should enforce Palestinian sovereignty over all the territories of the West Bank, for example by opening roads in area C, start building an airport in  the Jordan valley, and deploy Palestinian security forces in area C even if this leads to confrontations with the Israeli army and settlers. 20% think the PA should not do that. Similarly, 75% think the PA should insist on assuming control over the Allenby Bridge terminal from the Israeli side even if this leads to the closure of the terminal. 20% think the PA should not do that. Support for the exercise of sovereignty at the Allenby Bridge crossing even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing is almost identical in the West Bank (75%) and the Gaza Strip (76%). Similarly, support for the exercise of sovereignty in area (C), including the opening of roads and the deployment of security forces, is almost identical in the West Bank (75%) and the Gaza Strip (77%).

A majority of 58% of the Palestinians think that most European countries will recognize the Palestinian state in September, while 37% think that most European countries will not recognize it. A majority of Palestinians (56%) thinks the position of the EU countries regarding the peace process is closer to the Israeli position.

After the UN recognition of a Palestinian state, if large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in order to break through check points and close Israeli army and settlers' roads, 52% of the Palestinians say they think they will participate in them and 46% say they think they will not. Willingness to participate in peaceful demonstrations increases among residents of villages and towns in the West Bank (62%) and refugee camps (55%) compared to cities (48%), among men (59%) compared to women (45%), among supporters of third parties (71%) and supporters of Hamas (63%) compared to supporters of Fateh (58%) and the undecided (54%), among those who intend to participate in future elections (60%) compared to those who do not intend to participate in future elections (36%). It also increases among students (60%) compared to housewives (42%), among college and university graduates (59%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (48%), and among those who use the internet (57%) compared to those who do not use it (48%).

A majority of 51% of the Palestinians thinks that if such large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, they would contribute to speeding the process of ending Israeli occupation. But a majority of Palestinians (64%) does not think that if a peaceful popular revolt, like in Egypt or Tunisia, were to erupt against the Israeli occupation in the West Bank it would be capable of ending occupation; 34% of Palestinians think it would be capable of ending occupation. It is worth mentioning that an overwhelming majority of 89% of the Palestinians sympathizes with the demonstrators against the Assad regime in Syria and 90% sympathize with the demonstrators against the regime in Yemen.

(4) The Peace Process

• 50% support and 46% oppose the Obama proposal to consider the 1967 borders with mutually agreed swaps to be the basis for setting borders of Palestine, but two thirds oppose Obama’s proposal to the have the state non militarized
• 51% support and 47% oppose Obama’s proposal calling for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as a Palestinian state
• A majority of 61% opposes Obama’s call for the Palestinians to return to direct negotiations without a settlement freeze or an Israeli acceptance of the principle of the 1967 borders with swaps
• 88% believe the US position as outlined in the Obama speech is closer to the Israeli position while 8% see it closer to the Palestinian position
• 63% believe that it is Israel that determines US policy regarding the peace process and 32% believe it is the US that determines the Israeli position
• 58% support and 38% oppose the Saudi Initiative
• 62% believe the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years to be low or non existence and 37% believe it to be high or medium
• Perception of threat among Palestinians is very high: 81% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to annex the West Bank and expel its inhabitants or deny them their political rights. Moreover, 70% are worried that they or members of their family would be hurt by Israelis

A majority of 50% of Palestinians supports President Obama’s call for a Palestinian state within the 1967 lines with territorial swaps; 46% oppose it. With regard to the security issues, Palestinians oppose Obama’s proposal that the Palestinian state will be demilitarized, it will have no airplanes, tanks, missiles, or any other heavy armaments, and the Israeli army would carry out a full and phased withdrawal from the Palestinian state. 66% of the Palestinians disagree with this principle, and only 31% support it.  President Obama also said that a permanent peace should be based on the principle of two states for two peoples, the state of Israel as a Jewish state and a homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people, each would have the right to self determination, mutual recognition, and peace. 51% of the Palestinians support this principle, while 47% oppose it.

Support for Obama’s call for the 1967 borders with swaps to be the terms of reference for setting the borders of the Palestinian state increases in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (45%), among city residents (53%) compared to residents of villages and towns (40%), among men (52%) compared to women (48%), among the “somewhat religious” (52%) compared to the “religious” (47%), among supporters of the peace process (55%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (34%), among supporters of Fateh (63%) compared to supporters of Hamas (39%), and among those whose age is 40 or higher (53%) compared to those whose age is between 18-28 (49%).

President Obama also called upon the Palestinians to return to negotiations with the Netanyahu government, even though Prime Minister Netanyahu declared during his stay in Washington DC that Israel will not freeze settlement construction and refuses to accept the principle of returning to the lines of 1967 with swaps. 61% of the Palestinians think they should not accept the call to return to negotiations.  In light of President Obama’s speech, a majority of 88% of the Palestinians thinks the US position is closer to the Israeli position, while only 8% think it is closer to the Palestinian position.  Considering the two speeches by Obama and Netanyahu during Netanyahu's visit to the US, we asked Palestinians whom they think decide what the other should do regarding the peace process. 63% said Israel decides what the US should do and 32% said the US decides what Israel should do. 2% said neither decides what the other should do.

58% of the Palestinians support the Saudi initiative and 38% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. Inreturn, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our March 2011 poll there was a similar level of support for the plan.

A majority of 62% of Palestinians regards the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years as non-existent or low, 30% regard these chances as medium, and only 6% regard these chances as high. Moreover, 70% are worried and 30% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.  The level of perceived threat regarding the aspirations of Israel in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 21% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital is the most vital Palestinian goal in the eyes of 48% of the public while 26% believe that the most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return
• The primary problem confronting Palestinians today is unemployment and poverty followed by the continuation of the Israeli occupation and settlement construction, corruption, and the continued siege over the Gaza Strip

The largest percentage (48%) believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 26% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The largest percentage (40%) believes that the second most vital Palestinian goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages. 25% believe that the second goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, 19% believe that the second goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 16% believe the second most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 36% of the public while 30% believe that it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 18% believe it to be the corruption in some public institutions, and 11% believe it to be the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings. Only 2% mentioned the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split which was mentioned by 28% in our previous poll in March 2011. It is clear that the signing of the reconciliation agreement and the belief of the majority that the agreement will indeed be implemented has removed this issue from among the list of main problems as perceived by the public......Full Report

 (A) Reactions to the Israeli operation in Gaza and the recognition by the UN of the Palestinian state as a non-member state

• If the US under the leadership of Obama pressures Israel and the Palestinians to accept and implement this package as a permanent settlement, 40% of Israelis think Israel should accept it, and 47% believe it should reject it. Among Palestinians 48% think they should accept it, and 47% believe that they should reject it.

 (D) Conflict management and threat perceptions

• 49% of the Israelis support and 47% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In our June 2009 poll, 50% supported and 48% opposed such talks. However 61% think that the majority of the Israeli public opposes such negotiations and only 23% think a majority supports it.
• Neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider it likely that an independent Palestinian State will be established next to the State of Israel in the next five years. Two thirds in both publics think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low; 29% of Israelis and 32% of Palestinians believe the chances are medium or high. In June 2009, 69% of the Palestinians and 61% among Israelis thought that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low.
• In addition to our systematic assessment of the two sides’ support of the Clinton parameters we also examine periodically Israelis’ and Palestinians’ readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 60% of the Israelis support and 32% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. Among Palestinians, 58% support and 39% oppose this step. A year ago in June 2009, 52% of the Israelis supported and 41% opposed this mutual recognition of identity and among the Palestinians support stood at 50% and opposition at 49%.
• Given the failure of the Fatah and Hamas dialogue, neither Palestinians nor Israelis believe that unity of Gaza and the West Bank will be resumed soon: only 16% of Palestinians and 10% of Israelis think so. 55% of Palestinians and 26% of Israelis think that unity will be resumed only after a long time. 26% of Palestinians and 48% of Israelis believe that Gaza and the West Bank will stay two separate entities.
• Among Israelis, 58% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 52% in our March poll. Among Palestinians 74%  are worried that they or a family member might be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. Last March, the percentage among Palestinians stood at 77%.