Within a four-week period, between the end of April and the end of May 2021, Hamas exchanged its former status as the leader of the “resistance’ and the representative of the interests of the Gaza Strip to the leader of the resistance and the representative of all interests of the Palestinian people in its relations with the Israeli occupation. It did not do that through elections or control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Palestinian Authority (PA). Instead, it did it by taking advantage of a leadership vacuum left by the PA and by winning the battle over the hearts and minds of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, i.e., under the Israeli occupation. In a rare moment in the history of the Palestinian people, the majority of those living under in these occupied areas declared that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people. It is certain that the public meant to convey a mandate to Hamas to take the initiative in responding to and addressing Israeli threats to the interests of the Palestinian people living under the occupation. It is also certain that the public did that because it believed that Hamas own something that the PA did not: capacity, political will, and the readiness to take the initiative and lead. This development, if sustained and consolidated, could represent a paradigm shift in internal relations and in Palestinian-Israeli relations. But the big question arises: can Hamas do that, even in the limited sense of representation and leadership and does it really wish to do that?

Has Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA) orchestrated and led the intifada since September 2000 in order to weaken and humiliate Israel and force it to accept exaggerated Palestinian demands for a political settlement? And have he and the PA, as a result, gained added legitimacy and popularity in the Palestinian street? Or was the intifada a spontaneous response, to a provocative Ariel Sharon’s visit to al Haram al Sharif, by an enraged but unorganized Palestinian street; a street that has additionally been disillusioned and disappointed by the failure of the peace process over a period of several years to produce an end to a thirty-three year old Israeli military occupation? While most Israelis, but specially members of the intelligence community, advocate the first thesis and explain every thing that happens in the intifada in light of it, the PA and most Palestinians subscribe to the second.

This article provides a third thesis. It argues that the intifada has been a clearly articulated and organized response by the Young Guard in the Palestinian national movement not only to Sharon’s visit to al Haram al Sharif and to the failure of the peace process to end Israeli occupation, but also to the failure of the PLO’s Old Guard to lead the Palestinian process of independence, state building, and governance. Through the intifada, and influenced by the Lebanese Hizbullah methods, the Young Guard sought to force Israel to unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to simultaneously weaken and eventually displace the Old Guard. In particular, the resort of the Young Guard to the use of arms, as means of national liberation, was conceived of as the means to help it achieve both objectives in a short period of time, not only in the face of a much superior Israeli army but also in the face of a much stronger PA armed forces and security services.

Fourteen months into the intifada, the Young Guard’s determination to do just that is unshakable. So far, it has managed to force Israel to seriously consider unilateral separation, and has succeeded in greatly weakening the Old Guard. Indeed, it has managed to assume a de facto control over most PA civil institutions, to penetrate PA security services, and to force Yasir Arafat to appease it and seek its blessings for fear of losing his own legitimacy or confront the specter of a Palestinian civil war. While developments in the Israeli-Palestinian relations will have serious consequences for the domestic dynamics, only a combination of a truly viable peace process and a serious PA commitment to good governance can begin to provide Israel and the PA with an exit strategy from their current predicament.

Two Intifada Dynamics

The intifada crystallized two highly significant dynamics within the Palestinian politics and society. The first relates to developments within the national movement and the other to the competition between the Islamists and the nationalists. The consequences of the first, entailing a split between an Old Guard and a Young Guard within the national movement, are immediate and far-reaching, greatly constraining the capacity of the PA leadership to manage the current crises and to engage in a viable political process with Israel. The consequence of the second dynamic, entailing a change in the domestic balance of power favoring the Islamists for the first time in seven years, takes a much longer time to be felt; but once entrenched, will be difficult to reverse since it brings with it ideological and social change. In the long run, the consequence of the second dynamic poses a serious challenge to the capacity of the national movement to continue to lead the Palestinian people. The failure of the peace process and the process of national reconstruction to meet the expectations of most or all Palestinians has already set the stage for these developments. This paper addresses the ramifications of the first dynamic for the PA and the peace process.

Failed Processes, Angry Street 

Upon signing the Oslo agreement in September 1993, two-thirds of the Palestinian public immediately gave it support. Palestinian expectations were very high: Oslo was supposed to usher in three processes: the end of occupation, the establishment of an open and democratic political system and national authority, and a quick improvement in economic and living conditions. The golden era of the peace process did not last long. The high point was the 1995-96 period following a disappointing year in 1994. Support for the peace process in 1996 peaked to 80% and support for violence against Israeli targets dropped to 20%. Just before the general elections of January 1996, support for Fateh, the mainstream nationalist movement, reached the unprecedented level of 55%, and Arafat’s popularity skyrocketed to 65%. The size of all opposition groups, Islamists and nationalist, receded to 20% in early 1996 compared to 40% two years earlier.

When the Palestinian political system came into existence after the elections of January 1996, it had the attributes of legitimacy. Seventy-five percent of eligible voters participated in the election despite the call by the opposition groups for a boycott. Arafat received the positive support of more than 70%, with about 22% casting blank ballots, and only 8% voting for his rival, Ms. Samiha Khalil. Fateh won an unbelievable 77% of the seats of the new Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).

Between 1993-01, with the sole exception of 1994, support for the Oslo agreement never dropped below 60% despite the right wing electoral victory in the Israeli elections in mid-1996. But Palestinian expectation from, and confidence in, the peace process began to erode as a result of the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s Prime Minister and the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Not too high to begin with, Palestinian expectation that the peace process will soon bring to an end the limited self-rule arrangement leading to a permanent settlement of statehood, dropped from 44% in 1996, when Shimon Peres led Israel, to 30%, in the same year, under Netanyahu. Four years later, with Ehud Barak leading Israel and Jewish settlement expansion continuing, expectation of a permanent settlement was still very low at 24%. Upon the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel’s Prime Minister, that expectation dropped by 55%, to a mere 11%.

The loss of confidence in the ability of the peace process to deliver a permanent agreement had a dramatic impact on the level of Palestinian public support for violence against Israelis. In July 2000, right after the Camp David Summit but just before the eruption of the second Palestinian intifada, support for violence has already reached 52%. One year later, and ten months into the intifada, it reached the unprecedented level of 86%.

A second casualty has been the popularity of Arafat and the support for Fateh. In July 2000, upon returning from Camp David, Arafat’s popularity, which has been dropping steadily since 1996, plummeted to 47%. Ten months into the second intifada, Arafat suffered his greatest loss in eight years with a popularity drop of 30% in a single year to 33%. Similarly, support for Fateh dropped to 37% in July 2000, a drop of about 33% in four years. One year later, Fateh lost an additional 22% of its support dropping to 29%. Surprisingly, the Islamists did not gain much support in the four years between 1996, when their support stood at 15%, and 2000 with a 17% support. Those who deserted the nationalists did not shift loyalty to the Islamists and instead chose to remain on the sideline. The intifada changed that: by July 2001, the Islamists have increased their support by 60%, rising 27%. The intifada brought about the first significant change in the domestic balance of power since 1995 with more and more people shifting loyalty from the natioto the Islamists. Indeed, in July 2001, and for the first time ever, support for Islamist and nationalist opposition groups, standing together at 31%, surpassed that of the mainstream Fateh and its allies, standing at 30%. ⁽²⁾

The diminishing support for Arafat and Fateh has been caused by other factors in addition to a collapsing peace process and deteriorating economic and living conditions. The street has been highly disappointed and disillusioned by the perceived failure of the process of national reconstruction and good governance. Street’s evaluation of the status of democracy, PA performance, and levels of corruption have moved from bad to worse during the past six years. In 1996, 43% positively evaluated the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights. By 2000-01, that percentage dropped by more than 50% to about 21%. Similarly positive evaluation of the performance of PA institutions dropped from 64% in 1996 to 44% in 2000 and to 40% in 2001. Worse yet, while in 1996 only 49% believed that there was corruption in the institutions of the PA, that percentage increased to 76% in 2000 and to 83% in 2001

The public’s ever-multiplying disappointments have been aggravated during the intifada leading to further erosion in its confidence in the peace process and in its willingness to extend legitimacy to the PA. The unrelenting Israeli siege, closure, and collective punishment measures have succeeded in practically halting Palestinian civil, social and economic life thereby devastating the economy and creating an environment of heightened perception of threat and coercion that breeds nothing but pessimism, blind hate, and the desire to kill. The expectation, in the aftermath of the collapsed Camp David Summit, that there would be no violence and that negotiation would soon resume, gave way to much deeper pessimism ten months into the intifada, dropping from 44% to 17%. While in July 2000 only 23% saw the failure at Camp David as indicating an end to the peace process, the percentage doubled in July 2001. Correspondingly, while in July 2000 only 31% believed that violence, if resorted to, would help the Palestinians achieve goals in ways that negotiations could not, that percentage increased to 59% one year later. Indeed, in July 2001, a clear majority of 71% believed that the intifada has already achieved that.

The perceived failure of the peace process, combined with a highly negative assessment of all issues related PA governance, the continued inability of the PA to deliver services to the bulk of the population at a time of extreme economic and social hardships, and, worse yet, a prevailing perception of Arafat’s inability to project leadership in the face of an uncertain future did significant damage to PA’s legitimacy allowing other sources of legitimacy to emerge and assert themselves in the face of weakened PA. One of those new sources has been a “revolutionary legitimacy” claimed by the Young Guard. Taking advantage of the great popular anger at Sharon’s visit to al Haram al Sharif and the subsequent death of tens of Palestinian civilians in few days of popular confrontations, the Young Guard was ready to seize the moment.

Young Guard Against Old Guard

Between 1967 and 1994 the leadership of the Palestinian national leadership lived in diaspora, moving from Jordan to Lebanon, and since 1983 to Tunisia. Local leadership in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip sought to assert itself from time to time only to be decapitated by the Israelis or to be discouraged by the PLO. The defeat of the PLO during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 lessened the centrality of the PLO in Palestinian politics and weakened its hold on Palestinians in the occupied territories. Indeed, the center for gravity in Palestinian politics began to shift from the outside to the inside, i.e., to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Despite the strong role played by the outside PLO leadership during the first Palestinian intifada, it was the newly emerging leadership in the occupied territories that had initiated and sustained that intifada.

In 1994, the PLO leadership returned home to the West Bank and Gaza to establish the Palestinian Authority (PA) in implementation of the Declaration of Principles negotiated by the PLO and Israel in Oslo in 1993. Since then, the relationship between the two leaderships, the old and the established on one hand and the young and emerging on the other, has not been an easy one. Efforts to co-opt and even accommodate the young leaders of the first intifada did not always succeed due to the authoritarian nature of the PLO leadership. Nonetheless, the euphoria accompanying the partial Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory, the holding of the first general national elections in 1996, and the establishment of the first Palestinian government in modern history produced an appearance of harmony between the two groups.

The established PLO leadership is a historic one. It is composed of the founding fathers of the Palestinian national movement along with the leaders of the different guerrilla organizations and the PLO bureaucracy. It has spent most of its life in the outside. Most members of this group tend to be old, over 50 years of age. It dominates all the institutions of the PLO: the Palestinian National Council, the Central Council, and the Executive Committee. It also dominates the highest decision making body of the largest faction of the PLO, the Fateh Central Committee, as well as the PA Cabinet. One third of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) comes from this group, even though elections for this body were held in the West Bank and Gaza only. Members of this group, such as Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) Ahmad Qurie (Abu Ala) and Nabil Sha’ath have led all negotiations with Israel. This essay calls this group the Old Guard.

The Young Guard refers to newly emerging local leaders as well as the former leaders of the first intifada. They tend to be young, below or around 40 years of age. Although some individuals from this group are members of the PA Cabinet and the PLC, and few are heads or senior members of security services, the group as a whole lacks cohesion, leadership, and de jure power. Indeed, to some Palestinians some of the leaders of the Young Guard seem more like gangsters and warlords. Warlords, such as Sami Abu Samhadaneh in Rafah and Aatif Ebiat in Bethlehem have been targeted for assassination by the Israeli army, the latter was killed in October 2001. Other leaders of the Young Guard, such as Marwan Barghouti in Ramallah and Husam Khader in Nablus have more respectability in their communities. While the Young Guard has little voice in the main PLO institutions, it has much more relative power in the different Fateh bodies, namely the Tanzim and Fateh’s High Committee and its Revolutionary Council.

The Old Guard derives legitimacy from the PLO legacy as well as the Oslo agreement and its outcome. Its power is also derived from its control over the financial resources of the PLO and the PA, the diplomatic recognition accorded it by the international community, and the control it exercises over the main bodies and institutions of the PLO and the PA, including the bureaucracy and the security services.

The Young Guard relies on a claim to pre-Oslo legitimacy. Its power is derived from its alliance with the Islamists, the overwhelming public dissatisfaction with the peace process and the process of national reconstruction, and the support the public gives to the use of arms against the Israeli occupation forces and settlers. This support for the Young Guard neutralizes the Old Guard’s tools of coercive force and, under certain conditions, renders them almost irrelevant. While the size of the armed wing of the Young Guard may not be large, it is sufficient to allow it to take control of many of the crumbling PA civil institutions and to deter any attempts by the PA security services for a quick cragainst it.

Despite the fact that many of the institutions controlled by the Old Guard are steadily losing relevance in the face of the reality on the ground, thYoung Guard has not sought to create new institutions to compete with the old ones. Instead, the Young Guard seems to hope to eventually control the existing national institutions. For this reason, while clearly opposed to some of the steps and decisions taken by these institutions, the Young Guard has refrained from opposing them or questioning their legitimacy.

The Old Guard has a clear leadership hierarchy, even if authoritarian. At the top sits Arafat; he does not need approval from the Old Guard, nor does he need to demonstrate credibility to it. Indeed, the Old Guard seeks his approval and derives its own legitimacy from him. Its survival as a group depends on Arafat’s continued presence and support. The Young Guard too recognizes Arafat’s leadership and legitimacy. It does not, however, derive its legitimacy from him; indeed, it is he who needs to demonstrate credibility to it. By allowing the Young Guard to seek an alliance with the Islamists and to engage in armed confrontations with the Israeli army, Arafat gains the acceptance and approval of the Young Guard. Indeed, after Israel began to target the regular PA police and security forces, and despite the risks involved, he allowed units from the Presidential Guard and the intelligence services to participate in occasional attacks on Israeli soldiers and settlers. Arafat’s alternative option to gain the approval of the Young Guard is to open the Palestinian political system to political participation and to encourage a true transition to democracy; something he has, thus far, sought to avoid.

The Young Guard wants more from Arafat. It demands transparency, accountability, a clean-up campaign against corruption, a comprehensive political reform, and a much greater role for security services in confrontations with Israel. Statements, issued by Fateh and the Nationalist-Islamist Committee for the Intifada, have highlighted the urgent need to fight corruption. Such a fight is seen as means of encouraging more popular participation in the intifada and of unseating all those members of the Old Guard accused of corruption. The Young Guard has also called for the establishment of a national unity government that would include, not only members from among its ranks, but also senior members of Islamists and other opposition groups. The Young Guard has strongly supported local and international demands for good governance including respect for the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, stronger role for the legislature, and much stronger and more efficient public institutions.

With regard to the peace process, the Young Guard shares with the Old Guard the same goals and aspirations for an independent state, to live in peace side by side with the state of Israel, with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital, and with a just solution to the refugee problem. In today’s highly inflamed environment, most members of the Young Guard tend to advocate hawkish position. But this is probably a reflection of the heightened threat perception generated by the daily bloodshed. Indeed, some members of the group, such as Sari Nusseibeh, the president of al Quds University and Arafat’s representative in East Jerusalem, advocate very moderate views and indeed oppose the resort by the Young Guard to arms.

For now however, the Young Guard is strongly opposed to any cease-fire agreement that would entail a crackdown on nationalist or Islamist activists. Indeed, it has expressed public opposition to both, the Mitchell Report and the Tenet Plan. In fact, it wants Arafat to “come out of the closet,” by publicly endorsing its intifada goals and methods and by ordering all PA security forces to join the armed confrontations. In its eyes, this would be the ultimate test of credibility. The Old Guard, on the other hand, is highly skeptical of the efficacy of violence. Indeed, it is greatly critical of the involvement of some of PA security forces in the confrontations. For now, many members of the Old Guard are convinced that Arafat can not seriously confront the Young Guard in the absence of a reasonable chance for a peace agreement with Israel. In fact, some accept the argument that the occasional participation of official security services in the fighting against Israel is essential for pragmatic considerations: when the time comes to put an end to the armed confrontations, only those in the security services with a credible record of fighting the Israelis will have the legitimacy and the resolve to confront and detain those who may wish to continue the fight.

Some non-PA members of the Old Guard have sought to distance themselves from the PA Old Guard and to establish a new forum for political mobilization and reform. In January 2001, the Speaker of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) called for the establishment of a “National Independence Organization,” and demanded that the PA fully addresses problems of corruption and the absence of the rule of law, put on trial those accused of corruption, respect and implement decisions of the courts, and call upon the cabinet to resign in order to form a new one and appoint a prime minister. The Young Guard was not quick to embrace the call of the PNC speaker as it suspected the motivation behind the call and sought to gain strength and assert itself, not through the open condemnation of the PA’s Old Guard, but through defeating the Israeli army through the use of arms.

The Young Guard differentiates itself from the Old Guard through the way it defines victory in its battle against occupation. The Old Guard seeks a negotiated settlement that meets the vital needs of the Palestinians. Such an outcome would not only end occupation, but would also allow the Old Guard to remain in power for years to come. The Young Guard on the other hand does not, for now, define victory in a negotiated outcome. An Israeli unilateral withdrawal or separation would fit perfectly well with the Young Guard’s definition of victory, as it can be viewed as comparable to the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon under the pressure of Hizbullah. Such an outcome would render the Old Guard’s leadership irrelevant and useless and would elevate the Young Guard to leadership position. The Young Guard cannot, however, oppose a negotiated settlement supported by the majority of the Palestinians if one becomes feasible. But it realizes that only the Old Guard can negotiate such a settlement. The Young Guard lacks the capacity to conduct serious negotiations with the Israelis: it is short of a unified national leadership and a well-articulated vision, as well as knowledge of, experience, and contacts with Israelis.

In the initial period of the intifada, the Old Guard welcomed the popular uprising hoping that it would strengthen its negotiating position in the face of Sharon’s provocation. Yet it had never been certain that once started, the Old Guard would have the capacity to bring it to a halt or even to publicly oppose it. The Young Guard on the other hand saw the intifada as the means to express opposition to the efforts of the Old Guard to bring about an end to occupation through negotiations. The failure at Camp David affirmed the Young Guard’s belief that only through popular and armed confrontation can the Palestinians bring about an end to occupation. Even though it does not publicly oppose it, the Young Guard has little or no confidence in the current diplomatic process. Instead, it hopes that by increasing the cost of occupation, it could force Israel to unilaterally withdraw its army from Palestinian areas, just as it did from South Lebanon.

In pursuing the intifada through armed confrontations, the Young Guard sought a second objective: to insure their dominance in the post-intifada/post-occupation era. In the meanwhile, by creating armed militias, the Young Guard was able to fill a power vacuum left by crumbling PA institutions. PA security services, armed but not part of the confrontation with Israel, could not challenhighly popular and armed militias engaged in confrontations with Israeli forces.

To increase the intifada’s pressure on Israel and to strengthen its doposition vis-à-vis the Old Guard, the Young Guard formed an alliance with the Islamists and other opposition forces. Despite the perceived long term Islamist threat, the Young Guard preferred to have the Islamists in its coalition and under its leadership recalling that in the first intifada, the Islamists created their own parallel leadership, institutions and strike forces.

Obviously the division along Young Guard vs. Old Guard is not the only consequential division in Palestinian politics and society. We have already referred to the nationalist-Islamist divide. There is still one more. Many influential members, in both the Young Guard and the Old Guard, continue to view the success of the Oslo peace process as a vital national interest. Young Guard members, particularly those already integrated into the PA and PLO institutions, such as Mohammad Dahlan, head of the Preventive Security service in the Gaza Strip and Jibril al Rojoub, head of the same security service in the West Bank (also others who have been influenced by the non-violent techniques of the first intifada, such as Sari Nusseibeh), are united with the majority of those in the Old Guard, in their opposition to the violent dimensions of the current one. However, under the current political stalemate and given the overwhelming support for armed confrontations in the Palestinian street, this group and the PA institutions and security services they control, remain marginal. But under certain scenarios, discussed in the following section, some of them can play a highly critical role in shaping Palestinian domestic outcomes.

Domestic Dynamics under Three Scenarios

One can view the future of Palestinian domestic dynamics in light of three possible scenarios: a continuation of the status quo, an Israeli unilateral separation, and a negotiated settlement. A continuation of the status quo assumes that violence will continue to be initiated by Israel, the Young Guard, as well the Islamists and other groups opposed to the PA, but that the PA, with or without Arafat at the helm, will remain largely reactive. It does not exclude the possibility of a serious violent escalation along the way. The continuation of the status quo serves well the interests of the Islamists. An Israeli unilateral separation, on the other hand, would benefit the Young Guard. This second scenario assumes an Israeli army withdrawal from certain parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the possibility that such a withdrawal would be accompanied by an evacuation of several isolated and sparsely populated settlements and outposts. The scenario assumes that Arafat remains in his current position, but it does not exclude the possibility that he may no longer be present. The third scenario assumes that a negotiated settlement of some sort has been reached with Arafat. The settlement might be a transitional or a permanent one. This last scenario would clearly serve the interests of the Old Guard.

The continuation of the status quo will most likely allow existing dynamics to proceed with little obstacles. In such a case, support among Palestinians for the peace process and the compromises entailed in it will continue to decrease while support for violence will remain high. The legitimacy of the PA will continue to diminish and along with it the popularity of Arafat. Within the national movement, conflict between the Young Guard and the Old Guard will continue to weaken the movement with the Young Guard gaining greater autonomy and weight while the voice of the Old Guard gradually disappearing.

In the absence of an alternative leadership, Arafat will probably assume full leadership of the Young Guard, but his room for maneuver will be extremely constrained. His absence from the scene can hasten the demise of the Old Guard and create greater opportunity for internal infighting within the Young Guard with many vying for leadership. Young guard leaders, currently integrated into the PA, such as Dahlan and Rojoub, will most probably join forces with other Young Guard members providing them with much needed foot-soldiers, added public support, and above all political respectability. In the meanwhile, with Arafat present or absent, the overall domestic balance of power will continue to shift towards the Islamists who will probably succeed in few years to become the mainstream with a majority of the Palestinian street supporting them. Indeed, current ideological and societal shifts toward conservatism and political Islam will probably intensify.

An Israeli unilateral separation fits perfectly well with the Young Guard’s definition of victory. In the absence of a negotiated outcome, the search in Israel for an alternative to the status quo will continue. The policy of unilateral separation might seem attractive to some Israelis because it does not require a partner on the other side. As more and more Israelis reach the conclusion that the Palestinians cannot or will not accept the compromise offered by their governments, they become convinced that separation is the way out as the means to reduce Israel’s vulnerabilities. Building a wall of separation is supported by a majority of Israelis today. The extent of support depends on the size of Israeli army withdrawal from Palestinian areas and the number of settlements that would have to be evacuated. The larger the withdrawal and the evacuation are, the more lukewarm the support becomes. Nonetheless, sufficient support among most or all groups across the political spectrum provides a realistic basis for this scenario.

Forcing Israel to withdraw its forces from Palestinian areas will be compared by the Young Guard to the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon. The PA is likely to behave in the same manner as the Lebanese government did, while the Young Guard is likely to behave like Hizbullah. In other words, the PA is not likely to assume control over the newly evacuated territory and settlements. The Young Guard and the Islamists will most likely declare these areas liberated and use them as bases from which to continue the war against the Israeli army in the zones remaining occupied. The alliance between the Young Guard and the Islamists is likely to be strengthened.

The ability of the Old Guard to use the occasion of the Israeli withdrawal as an opportunity to restart the negotiations is likely to be scuttled by the Young Guard. Indeed, the Young Guard will most likely utilize the circumstances of its “victory” as an occasion to openly defy and perhaps even displace the Old Guard, and thus consolidate its leadership of the national movement. Arafat will remain the only viable leader for the Young Guard until such a time as an alternative leadership, with national rather than local credential, emerges. His absence would hasten the search for new national leaders from among the Young Guard, but it may not necessarily engender greater infighting among the Young Guard. This would be particularly true if, as expected, senior Young Guard members, currently integrated into the PA, would join forces with the Young Guard. This “bandwagon” process may involve not only security chiefs referred to earlier, but also members of the Young Guard currently in senior bureaucratic positions. Interpreted as a clear victory for the Young Guard, Israeli unilateral withdrawal will dramatically increase public support for the national movement and thus impede efforts by the Islamists to secure hegemony.

A negotiated outcome can be arrived at only with the Old Guard. For the Old Guard, such an outcome could be a lifeline. The Young Guard cannot arrive at a negotiated settlement, even if it wanted one; it is leaderless, lack a clear overall vision, and has no previous dealings with the Israelis. In any case, it would be almost unimaginable for the Young Guard, who has been very critical of the Old Guard’s handling of negotiations with the Israel, to agree to something that the Old Guard could not accept at Camp David and later at Taba.

In thiscenario, the Old Guard reasserts its leadership reaching an agreement that finds support among the majority of the Palestinian stre. The Young Guard, in an alliance with the Islamists, will probably seek to torpedo any negotiated efforts, but public support for an agreement would most likely render futile attempts by the Young Guard to oppose it. More significantly, PA-integrated Young Guard security chiefs are likely to give their support, in this scenario, to the Old Guard thus tipping the scales against any violent dissent by the Young Guard. A negotiated deal with Israel, particularly if accompanied by a process of domestic political reform, can extend the life of the leadership of Old Guard. It can also open the way for more peaceful and perhaps fruitful efforts to reintegrate the two branches of the national movement in a way that can unify the two and thereby weaken the appeal of the Islamists.

What Negotiated Outcome?

But is a negotiated outcome possible? Three options are available: a comprehensive agreement, a stabilization package, and a mid-term transitional arrangement. None seems likely today. But with some American and European vision and leadership, certainly Arafat, but even Sharon, might be convinced to accept a stabilization package along the lines described below.

A Comprehensive Agreement

A comprehensive agreement would solve all the issues of conflict, including Jerusalem and refugees, thereby put an end to the conflict. As demonstrated by various Palestinian-Israeli rounds of negotiations since Camp David, a comprehensive agreement is feasible. If and when the two sides return to serious negotiation, it will most likely seek to complete the work started with the Clinton ideas in December 2000 and built on at Taba in January 2001.

For this option to become a reality, three conditions need to be met. None exists today. These are: a change of government in Israel that would bring about a leadership and a coalition less wedded to greater Israel ideology, a determined and devoted US leadership that is committed to make the process succeed, and a unity of purpose between the Old Guard and the Young Guard in the Palestinian community and leadership. This last condition could be met through domestic political reform that seeks to open the political system and to create a viable partnership between the two groups.

Furthermore, Israeli and Palestinian publics are highly skeptical of the ability of the two sides to reach such an agreement. Indeed, neither public is willing, under the present conditions of heightened threat perception, to support the painful compromises required for a successful process of full reconciliation. This should not lead to despair; but rather to the conclusion that only a strong leadership, one with a strong perception of legitimacy, can have the courage to take this path. Once reached, the two publics will most likely support such compromises, but not a day before.

On the Palestinian side, a comprehensive agreement can only be reached with the Old Guard leading the process but with the acquiescence of the emerging leaders of the Young Guard. Under the present conditions, in which political reform is absent, this is an unlikely outcome. On the Israeli side, such an agreement can be reached with a government that views Israeli democracy, combined with a Jewish character of the state, as preferable to a control over the land of “greater Israel” even if through continued occupation. With the current governmental coalition in Israel, such a development is highly unlikely.

Stabilization

A stabilization package can only serve as a stop-gap measure aiming at creating the necessary conditions for reducing mutually perceived threats, restoring public confidence in the peace process, and facilitating a return to a more promising final status negotiations. Such a package would include the following elements: a cessation of all forms of violence, a return to the pre intifada military deployment, a freeze on settlement building, an implementation of existing interim commitments most notably a credible Israeli redeployment from area “C” accompanied by PA implementation of its own interim commitments, and a return to final status negotiations. The publics on both sides are willing to support such a stabilization package as it can be rightly described and packaged as a more constructive way of implementing existing agreements.

For a successful conclusion of a stabilization package, the current Israeli government could be made a partner, as it does not require it to fully renounce its “Greater Israel” leanings. There would be a need for a more active role for the international community, including the US, something that has been made easier since 11 September 2001. On the Palestinian side, a full integration of the Young Guard into the political system and its decision-making bodies would be essential for a successful implementation of a stabilization package. In the absence of such integration, the Old Guard would be required to enforce an unpopular cease-fire against a potentially strong and violent resistance by the Young Guard in the nationalist movement and the armed wings of the Islamist and national opposition groups. In all cases, some minor violence is likely to linger threatening to poison the environment and eventually destroy the process of stabilization unless efforts to bring about a comprehensive agreement succeed first.

Stabilization requires multinational monitoring as a confidence building measure. Monitoring makes it difficult for the Young Guard to openly engage in initiated attacks against Israeli targets without openly defying and embarrassing Arafat. Therefore, the deployment of monitors increases the cost of cease-fire violation and increases the chances that the cease-fire will be self-enforced. Indeed, by placing responsibility for failure on those who ignore the terms of agreement, monitoring deters violation and insures compliance by both sides. It also helps each side verify the intentions of the other when monitors are given access to areas and information. Finally, monitoring can provide independent means of triggering the implementation of the different phases of the agreement and thereby provide an incentive for each side to fully comply with terms applying to it.

Monitoring, however, cannot solve the problem of “impasse,” as the two sides may have legitimate grievances that cannot be addressed through good intentions alone. Those grievances may lead either or both sides to freeze the implementation of their commitments or even to act in ways contrary to the explicit articles of the agreement. To provide means to partially address the issue of impasse, one may seek to upgrade the monitoring function by adding a political role to it, whereby senior officials from the countries involved in the monitoring process, may meet regularly to assess the whole process of implementation and negotiations.

On the Palestinian side, like in the first option, only the Old Guard can lead the process of negotiations toward stabilization. The Young Guard, however, would most likely seek to impede the process of stabilization if they perceive it as a means to reestablish and consolidate the control of the Old Guard. Needless to say, the Young Guard has already succeeded in imposing a de facto control over many or most of the PA civil institutions, and along with the Islamist, has greatly penetrated the PA security services.

On the Israeli side, stabilization will require steps that will most likely have an impact on the Jewish settlement enterprise. A complete freeze on settlement building will pose a serious threat to the viability of that enterprise, as it will impede settlers’ efforts to create facts on the ground and, thereby, keep alive the option of “greater Israel” and prevent the advancement toward a permanent settlement. The settlement enterprise will also suffer a serious setback when the Israeli army carries out, under this option, a third redeployment from area “C” in the West Bank. Indeed, a full and credible third redeployment would require the evacuation of many small and isolatsettlements and outposts, most built or inhabited since the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993. Such an eis likely to be opposed by the settlers and their right wing supporters in the current governmental coalition. While this may not necessarily bring down the Sharon government, it will clearly weaken the right wing support for Sharon.

A Mid-Term Transition Arrangement

The stabilization option can be upgraded to serve as a mid-term transition arrangement. Sharon may want to call this option a “long term interim agreement.” Arafat may prefer to call it a new and improved mechanism for the implementation of the existing Interim Agreement. Under an appropriate packaging, an upgraded stabilization package can be sold to both Israeli and Palestinian publics.

Under this option, four additional components would be added to those already listed above. These would include: an Israeli evacuation of the whole Gaza Strip including the removal of all settlements in the strip, an added Israeli redeployment measures in the West Bank that would insure full Palestinian territorial contiguity, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and extending the mandate of the international monitors to include the supervision of Israeli force deployment and Palestinian control over international border crossings. Israeli Foreign Minister has already advocated most of these components. Sharon has reportedly been willing to discuss the Gaza evacuation since his first visit to the US as a Prime Minister. He has repeatedly declared his willingness to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state that has contiguous territory.

Conclusion

The dramatic events of September 11 had a significant but temporary impact on domestic Palestinian conditions. International outrage and disgust with terrorism and the determination shown by the US and other Western countries to form a world alliance to combat it created certain fears and provided opportunities for the Palestinians. Arafat was determined to avoid any association with terror against civilians and eager to show solidarity with the US. Most Palestinians, including the Young Guard, were fearful that Israel would take advantage of the human tragedy and launch a devastating attack against the PA-controlled areas. In addition, Palestinian Islamists feared association, whether organizational or in goals and methods, with the terrorist group responsible for the attacks against the US. Such an association would have made them an immediate target for US retaliation. Therefore, for them, the immediate aftermath of the attack was not the appropriate time to engage in suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. For the Young Guard, the alliance it had with the Islamists threatened to become a liability, while Arafat’s and the Old Guard’s international credentials became an asset and a cover to be sought after. For Arafat, the cost of continued appeasement of the Young Guard had just increased many folds; with international attention focused elsewhere, he feared for his own survival.

Furthermore, the need for an Arab and Islamic support for the US war against terror provided opportunities. It was only in the aftermath of similar conditions, in the Gulf war of 1990-91, that an American administration exerted sufficient pressure on the then right wing Israeli government of Yitzhak Shamir to go to the Madrid international peace conference. Arafat and the Old Guard hoped for something similar this time. They effectively employed pressure and persuasion against the Young Guard who were disposed to accept a temporary calm. Even the Islamists were willing to go along. In addition to wanting to deny Sharon the opportunity to strike at them with impunity, the two allied groups were skeptical about the chances for a political breakthrough and convinced that Sharon was not going to play along an American tune in the same way Shamir did.

So far, they have been proven right. Committed to a thesis that sees Arafat’s deliberate and calculated hand behind every violent incident, Sharon and senior members of the Israeli army and intelligence community seem to have already reached the conclusion that Arafat was no longer a partner. Indeed, they may have been engaged in a steady but piecemeal process of de-legitimation and liquidation of his authority. They have understood that the relative calm was temporary. More importantly, they have assumed that the post September 11 international diplomacy may provide him a lifeline, and they were determined to make it difficult from him to get away with it. The Israeli policy of assassination and incursions into Area A continued despite the fact that Arafat had succeeded in reducing the level of violence by more that 80% in a short period of time. In the end, the vicious cycle of violence found a way to circumvent the opportunity provided by the events of September 11. International diplomacy, unable to force Arafat to make a full commitment to the cease-fire or to check Sharon’s continued provocations, was not up to the challenge.

Arafat and the Old Guard will remain for now incapable of making a full commitment to the cease-fire. They lack the capacity to enforce one. Indeed, since the eruption of the second intifada, they have to walk a delicate tightrope: the PA no longer enjoys a monopoly over the use of force, its legitimacy is questioned by the street, the public is also very supportive of violence and highly opposed to any clampdown on the Islamists or the Young Guard, and no viable political process is looming over the horizon. If Arafat acts now against the Islamists and the Young Guard, he risks, if successful, being seen by the Palestinians as an Israeli lackey, or even a “Sa’d Haddad,” the Lebanese commander of the South Lebanon army created by Israel in the late 1970s to provide security for Northern Israel. If unsuccessful, he faces the prospects of civil war. His choices are therefore limited. Under a changed political environment, one in which Arafat obtains legitimacy and public support, he can move to enforce a cease-fire. A viable political process, initiated and led by the US and supported by the international community, can help trigger the required change. September 11^th notwithstanding, the chances today for such an international effort are slim.

If the current situation is bad, imagine how it will be without Arafat. Today, his leadership is the glue that keeps together the Old Guard and the Young Guard preventing a full and immediate take-over by the former. Despite his poor communication skills, Arafat continues to give the Palestinian public a sense of stability preventing large-scale violations of law and order. His presence deters the Islamists from posing an immediate threat to the shaky dominance of the nationalists. In his absence, all hell could break lose. Arafat and the PA have an alternative to this bleak future: instead of waiting for an American-international peace plan, they can embark, now, on a process of political reform. By doing so, Arafat and the national movement can regain the support of most Palestinians and at the same time integrate the Young Guard into the PA. Indeed, for Arafat, Old Guard, and all Palestinians, the message is clear: reform or perish.

Introduction:

In mid-January 2021, president Abbas issued a decree calling for holding parliamentary elections on 22 May. It is not certain that any elections will take place in the near future and the goal of holding such elections, if they do take place, is almost certainly not the reform of the political system. Indeed, the goal most emphasized by Palestinian leaders, from Fatah and Hamas alike, is “the unification of the Palestinians people.” Nonetheless, it is essential to explore the implications of the revival of a parliamentary life, in the form of an elected PLC, on the prospects for reform even if elections do not take place soon. Once a Palestinian parliament is created, the political system will find it impossible to continue its current slide to authoritarianism.

The paper outlines the main target areas of reform which the council should focus on from the first day of its existence. Doing so is critical to the success of the parliament in making itself a strong and effective public institution, one capable of representing the public that elected it and delivering on its promises to that public. The paper outlines the expected challenges that will confront the parliament as it sets its own agenda. If not addressed, these challenges can impede the parliament’s efforts to accomplish its mission in bringing accountability back into the Palestinian political system. Based on that review, the paper proposes a list of reform priorities that are relevant to parliament’s own role and function but can also have a multiplying effect on the entire political system. Despite their importance, this policy paper does not directly address highly relevant domestic issues, such as those dynamics that led to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, how to reform the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), what to do about the Palestinian regional problems or how to improve relations with Israel. Instead, it is restricted to those political issues that are directly related to the reform of the political system and particularly those that require parliamentary intervention. Moreover, in outlining the challenges and impediments to reform, the paper is focused essentially on the functioning of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and does not directly address the Hamas’ practices in the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that these practices have been more determinantal to the future of accountability in the political system.  

Challenges: evidence of authoritarianism in the Palestinian Political System, 2007-2021:

In the past several years, the PA in the West Bank has taken several measures that have severely undermined good governance. Four areas have been damaged: the separation of power, the independence of the judiciary, the independence and pluralism of civil society and its organizations, and the media and freedom of expression. These areas should constitute the reform agenda of a newly elected PLC.

Without general elections since 2006, the impact of the four measures on PA institution building and governance has been destructive: rule of law has been sacrificed, the judiciary has been weakened and its independence damaged, media freedoms have been highly curtailed, and the space for civil society has significantly shrunk as its organizations lost much of its independence from the government. The behavior of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip has not been better, indeed worse; it was more ruthless and much less bothered by constitutional principles and norms or even rule of law.

Diminished Accountability and Oversight:

The suspension of the activities of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in the West Bank in 2007, in the immediate aftermath of the Hamas violent takeover of the Gaza Strip, has been one of the most damaging governance measures taken by the PA since its creation.  But the clearest evidence of the slide to authoritarianism has been the decision taken by the party that lost the 2006 elections, Fatah, to dissolve the PLC in 2018. The inevitable outcome of the suspension of the PLC meetings has been the transfer of its legislative and oversight functions to the executive authority represented by the president. Since 2007, president Abbas issued more laws by decree than those ever issued by the PLC during its entire life since the first election in 1996. Most of these laws were not urgent, as required by the Basic Law, and many of them violated the terms of that law. In the absence of a parliament, the president gave himself the power to rule by decree without accountability or oversight, with the exception of the little opposition expressed occasionally by the judiciary, the media, and civil society before they too came under the heavy hand of authoritarianism.   Without a parliament able to defend its members, the president gave himself the power to annul the immunity of the PLC members, to suspend the payment of their salaries, to send them to court, and to close their offices ending eventually in his decision in December 2018 to dissolve the entire PLC utilizing for that mission the services of a body he created for that purpose, the constitutional court.[1]

Without a parliament during the period between 2007 and 2021, the Palestinian public has been denied the ability to influence legislation directly affecting their life; the political system become devoid of any formal accountability. If the PLC comes back to life soon, it will be up to it to accept or reject all those laws decreed by the president. The new parliament should also determine its own priorities in strengthening and fortifying legislative texts that the executive has managed to undermine in order to grant the president powers he did not have, such as the ability to issue normal laws by decrees during the period in which the parliament was not in session or the ability of the president and the institutions he created, such as the constitutional court, to commit grave constitutional violations.

The Diminished Independence of the Judiciary:

The need to ensure regime security in the West Bank in the aftermath of Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip provided the initial impetus to the drive to weaken the independence of the judiciary. The PA crackdown on Hamas’ military, financial, religious and political infrastructure in the West Bank aimed at destroying or weakening its organization but lacked legal justification and entailed significant violations of human rights and rule of law. The PA wanted to prevent a Hamas takeover of the West Bank, one similar to what that movement did in the Gaza Strip. When the judiciary intervened in order to impose restraint, the PA security services, which carried out most of the crackdown, simply ignored its rulings, and it got away with it.  While the Palestinian Basic Law defines failure to implement court decisions by PA officials and security services as a “crime punishable by imprisonment and dismissal,” rulings by the highest court, the High Court of Justice, demanding the release of detainees, were routinely ignored by the security services. In fact, between 2007 and 2009, the PA formed military courts to try civilians. Only in early 2011, right after the eruption of the Arab Spring, did the PA stop the practice of sending civilians to military courts and began to show a little more attention to court rulings.

The attacks on the judiciary however became much more serious during the past five years. In the conflict between president Abbas and Mohammad Dahlan, the former head of the Preventive Security apparatus, the president sought a judgement from the courts accusing the latter of corruption. In order to force Dahlan, a member of the PLC, to face the court, Abbas, gave himself the right to annul the immunity of a members of the parliament. When the high court objected, deeming such a step unconstitutional, the president turned his attention in October 2016 to the judiciary, dismissing the Chief Justice and appointing a new one. In doing so, he explicitly violated the Basic Law and the Law of the Judiciary. Seeking a stamp of approval that would legalize his actions, the president amended the constitutional court law that then allowed him to form a court to his own liking[2].  In November 2016, the newly established body, the Constitutional Court, did what was expected: rubber stamped all decisions taken by Abbas regarding Dahlan and the judiciary. Abbas went further: in December of that year, the president annulled the immunity of four other pro-Dahlan members of the PLC, all from his own Fatah party.

Despite Abbas’ failure in mid-2017, under pressure from civil society, to amend the law of the judiciary in a manner that would have given him effective control over that institution, he did impose his control in violation of that law. Moreover, in 2019 he dismissed the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and appointed a transitional council in a clear violation of the Basic Law and the law of the judiciary. This was followed in January 2021 by a presidential decree that did finally amend that law in  such a manner that provided him all the control he needed over the appointment of the Chief Justice, head of the high court and the head of the SJC. The amendment allowed the dismissal of the judges and forcing them into retirement.[3]

All measures taken by the president regarding the judiciary and PLC members, including the establishment of the Constitutional Court, were condemned by all mainstream civil society groups, including all human rights groups and the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), expressing shock at the manner in which the president acted and labeling his measures unconstitutional. It goes without saying that an executive control over the judiciary could dimmish the ability of the PLC to reform the Palestinian political system. Therefore, defending the judiciary by rejecting the amendments decreed by the president must be a top priority for the newly elected parliament. The PLC must also reject all changes made by the president on the constitutional court law and work closely with the judiciary and the executive to ensure the full independence of that court by disbanding the current court and establishing a new one made up by judges and professor of law with a record of integrity and independence.

Weakening the independence and pluralism of civil society:

After the first wave of attacks on civil society, which targeted Hamas’ infrastructure between the years 2007 and 2009, a second wave started in 2015, this time targeting the larger civil society. The PA’s new campaign started with the confiscation of funds belonging to an NGO established two years earlier by former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. This was followed by government decision to amend existing regulations governing the funding of Palestinian NGOs established under the non-profit companies (NPC) laws. The amended regulation instructed all NPCs to obtain “prior approval” from the cabinet before they could conduct any activities or receive any funding from local or foreign donors for their projects. In one government decision, the PA asserted its control over about 300 such civil society institutions and deprived them the ability to work without an approval from the executive despite the fact that they were operating under the terms of the law that led to their establishment. None of the existing laws in the PA grant the executive such overriding jurisdiction over civil society. The new regulation was clearly illegal and in violation of the Basic Law. Instead of serving the interests of the public they serve, the government wanted these NGOs to follow its own instructions by controlling their activities and funding. They could only function if the government approves their plans and donors. All banks operating in Palestine were instructed to reject any fund transfers to the accounts of these NGOs without a written permission form the cabinet.

The inevitable result of the government regulation has been the destruction of pluralism in Palestinian civil society. By making all non-profit companies subject to direct PA control using the threat of possible denial of approval as a tool of intimidation, the PA diminished the independence of these institutions making them less able to represent their constituencies. All Palestinian civil society and human rights organizations, without exception, opposed the new regulation, considering it a violation of the law and an attempt by the PA to restrict the ability of NGOs to operate outside the boundaries set for it by the government thereby shrinking the space for civil society.[4] 

Civil society constitutes an important institution that supports and supplements the oversight responsibility of the parliament. In weakening it, the PA weakens the PLC’s role in bringing the government to accountability. In the absence of a parliament between 2007 and 2021, civil society organizations served an important role in setting limits on the PA slide to authoritarianism. It should be one of the priorities of the newly elected parliament to ensure the annulment of regulations that violate the law and restrict the ability of civil society organizations to play their role in strengthening other public institutions while ensuring an independent and pluralistic civil society. One of those regulations should be the one introduced in July 2015 that requires a prior government approval of the activities and the funding of non-profit companies.

Targeting the Media and free speech:

In the years immediately following Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip, dozens of journalists were arrested in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for expressing their views and many more were beaten while covering demonstrations and other expressions of protest against the PA or the Hamas government.  The PA has gone further in 2017: with little or no consultation, the president issued a cybercrime law. The law regulates online activities, media websites, and social networks, imposing jail time and fines on those violating public order or inciting hatred. Journalists and normal citizens paid a price for expressing their own views as more arrests followed the publication of the law. Responding to a huge public outcry, the president and the government introduced various amendments and re-introduced the law again in 2018. Despite positive changes in the new law, it still continued to “criminalize acts and writings that should come under free speech.”[5]  It continued to use open-ended terms, such as those used in article 39: “national security or public order or public administration” when providing justification for closing or blocking access to websites. In implementation of this article, the PA blocked access on October 2019 to 59 sites, added to another 30 that were blocked in 2017.

The newly elected parliament should strive to protect liberties and ensure the rights of the opposition, the media, and normal citizens by amending the 2018 cybercrime law by removing all these open-ended terms and by restricting the jurisdiction of the executive in blocking access to websites. It should ensure the privacy of users of the internet and social media.

Sources of Palestinian Authoritarianism

Before embarking on any serious reform effort pertaining to the previous four reform agenda, the PLC should ask itself how we arrived at this point of slide to authoritarianism: how did the PA manage to undo much of the progress it built in the first half of its existence? Without a full understanding of the forces and dynamics that brought us to where we are today, the PLC will not be able to realize and appreciate the impediments it will confront in the first day of its existence. On that day, it will have to decide whether it too wants to respect and implement the rules set by the Basic Law or put them aside as the executive authority did since 2007 claiming various justifications, such as the need to confront the consequences of the split triggered by Hamas’ violent take over of the Gaza Strip. Some of the forces and circumstances behind the Palestinian grave failure to respect the legacy of those who preceded us are obvious and have already been mentioned while others are not so obvious. The following is a list of four sources that brought us to where we are today.

The Split: The first and most obvious source of authoritarianism goes back to mid-2007, in the form of measure put in place in response to Hamas’ use of force in the Gaza Strip against forces loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas. This armed coup against the PA president, and the decisions made by Abbas immediately after the coup, led to the current political split that added further agony to the existing geographic separation between the two Palestinian regions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In response to Hamas’ coup, Abbas dismissed the National Unity Government, which was led at that time by Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh, formed a new government led by Salam Fayyad, and prevented the PLC from holding its meetings in the West Bank. This led to the creation of two governments, one in the Gaza Strip, the dismissed or caretaker government led by Haniyeh, and one in the West Bank, led by Fayyad. Fayyad’s government never obtained a parliamentary vote of confidence as required by the Basic Law. The absence of a parliamentary approval for the Fayyad government provided the Haniyeh government with the legal justification to remain in office for the entire period between 2007 and 2014, when it finally resigned in the aftermath of the formation of the “reconciliation government” led by Rami Al Hamdallah. In late 2018, the failure of the reconciliation government to unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip played a role in heightening tensions between Fatah and Hamas leading Fatah’s Revolutionary Council (the elite of the party that lost the 2006 elections) to demand from the PLO Central Council (an unelected body) the dissolution of the elected PLC, a clear indication of the extent to which the split has destroyed Palestinian political norms. 

Intra-Fatah rivalry: In the last five years however, the slide to authoritarianism has received a greater impetus from a second source: the heightening of internal power struggle inside Fatah, particularly the conflict between President Abbas and Mohammad Dahlan. Between 2011 and 2014, this internal power struggle led, under Abbas’ instructions, to the expulsion of Dahlan and several other senior Fatah leaders from the Fatah movement, mostly from the Gaza Strip. However, during the period between 2015-19, the conflict spilled into the larger arena of the PA and its political system. The impact has been huge: PLC members were intimidated and their ability to criticize the executive significantly curtailed; the judiciary was brought under control and further stripped of its independence; civil society was weekend and forced to play by rules set by the executive; and the media, including social media, was brought under severe restrictions and forced to exercise self-censorship.  Because of that and given prevailing apathy in the street, as people were busy struggling to make a living or respond to greater repression from the Israeli occupation and its settlers, the PA became much bolder in ignoring the Basic Law and rule of law and more open in strengthening the institution of the presidency and the executive as a whole while weakening all opposition including that of civil society.  

The nature of the Palestinian ruling elite: The third source of authoritarianism came from the Palestinian political elite, particularly those staffing the executive. There is no doubt that many of the elite (particularly among the Islamist one) are anti-democratic. Nonetheless, most are simply non-democratic. The real problem lies in the fact that only few of the members of the secular nationalist elite and almost none of the Islamist elite are truly democratic. Without the breaks normally found among democratic elites, the senior Palestinian bureaucracy in the executive branch found itself free of any meaningful oversight. Without restrictions on its ability to rule as it saw fit, members of the PA cabinets, find it easier to rule without being bothered by courts, civil society, or the media.

The task of the current PA elite is made easier by the absence of an effective opposition from within and outside Fatah. The replacement of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad with al Hamdallah in 2013 accelerated this process and played a significant role in facilitating the slide to authoritarianism. The opposition to the Fayyad government from within Fatah imposed constraints on its ability to work without accountability and many of its own members, including the prime minister, built a barrier that contributed to slowing down the rush to authoritarianism. On top of its own authoritarian instinct, the Hamdallah cabinet seemed unwilling to question measures instituted by Abbas and the PA security services to undermine rule of law or weaken civil society and indeed to restructure the entire political system. Instead of correcting the PA direction, Fatah’s own political elite, not only in its Central Committee, but also in its Revolutionary Council, became apologists for the slide to authoritarianism justifying it on grounds of the split or a preoccupation with standing up to the Israeli occupation. This elite behavior demonstrated how empty and fake the calls for democracy that Fatah and other nationalist and Islamist movement pretended to embrace. This does not mean that these movement are essentially anti-democratic. But it means that the political leaderships and elite members of these movements, unlike their own base, find it easier and more natural to be authoritarian in the absence of accountability and oversight.

The diminishing role of the international community: With little or no attention from the international community, the PA has over the last decade, particularly since the Arab Spring, become bolder in ignoring its own Basic Law and rule of law while seeking to strengthen the power of the presidency and the executive as a whole and to weaken all opposition, including that of civil society. The international community seems much less interested in Palestinian good governance. American and European diplomats stationed in the Palestinian territories argued that due to rise of Islamism, civil wars, terrorism, and sectarianism in the post-Arab Spring environment, a focus on stability is replacing the traditional agenda of democracy and good governance. Moreover, given the failure of the international community to take a strong stand or concrete measures against Israeli settlement policy, the major international actors are reluctant to press the PA—which remains committed to the two-state solution-- on domestic issues. One should also keep in mind that having reduced its own financial support to the PA by almost half during the past decade, the international community has lost considerable leverage. It is not surprising that this loss of leverage has been accompanied by a gradual detachment from Palestinian governance. Rule of law and good governance is no longer a priority for any of the major donor countries.

Conclusions:

This policy brief started with a skeptical view regarding the prospect of holding Palestinian legislative elections any time soon. However, the skepticism did not stop it from looking for ways in which elections, if they were held, can be capitalized on to serve the interests of Palestinian society, particularly in the area of political reforms. The previous analysis described the various indications of the slide to authoritarianism in the Palestinian political system and the four drivers of this slide. This analysis gave implicit support to the skeptical view by raising various indications questioning the seriousness of the PA leadership and the main Palestinian political parties in holding elections.

For the Palestinian political system to exit the current slide to authoritarianism and to be able to stand on a solid ground for a transition to good governance, it will be essential for all public institutions to work in harmony, including the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, civil society, and the media. The discussion in this paper has been restricted to the role of the PLC, once elected, because it will represent the aspiration of the Palestinian people and its civil society to build a political system characterized by accountability and rule of law.

During the years of the split, Palestinians discovered that they are not different from the rest of the Arab peoples, leaders, and political parties despite their own unique experience of living under occupation and in exile. Moreover, they discovered that they too are not much different than other Arab masses that tolerated oppression and authoritarianism for decades before the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011. The Arab Barometer’s fifth round, conducted in Palestine around the end of 2018, found that only one third of the Palestinians trust their own government, that the majority does not believe that it has guarantees of freedom of expression, and 83% said there is corruption in the PA public institutions. Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority agrees that “democracy, despite its problems, is the best system there is,” about three quarters describe the status of democracy in Palestine as bad or very bad. Yet, no more than one third indicate that they participate in some kind of opposition activities.[6] 

The holding of legislative (and presidential, at a latter stage) could provide the Palestinian public with the ability to make a difference and institute the change they have always aspired for through a widespread participation in these elections. Once a parliament is elected, it will have the mandate required for reforms thereby providing a solid ground for the PLC to take up the four areas of reform agenda covered in this paper. In order to succeed in its efforts to reform the PA, the PLC will have three effective tools in its arsenal: amending the Basic Law, reviewing, amending or rejecting selected laws issued by presidential decrees, and forcing a newly established government to amend or cancel anti-democratic regulations adopted by previous governments.

• Amending the Basic Law: This measure will be the most difficult because it is not clear that the PLC will have the majority needed to approve the proposed amendments. Nonetheless, it will be valuable for the parliament to open a debate on the need to transform the Palestinian political system into a parliamentary one or at least to take steps to decrease the powers of the office of the president so as to remove any ambiguity about the ability of a president to issue legislation during the absence of the parliament and put in place greater protection for the immunity of its members. It should ensure that the president does not have the capacity to make top senior appointments in the public sector without explicit parliamentary approval, that the executive cannot take away jurisdiction belonging to the judiciary, that free speech is guaranteed, and that the space available to civil society is not shrunk and their activities curtailed or controlled. The amendments and clarifications must make it clear, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that a government that does not receive a parliamentary vote of confidence is illegitimate and its decisions invalid.
• Rule by decrees: The Palestinian political system should not tolerate rule by decree. The PLC should review, amend, or reject in its first session all those laws issued by decree that have caused great damage to the principle of separation of powers or violated the terms of the Basic Law, including those affecting the judiciary, the constitutional court, the cybercrime law, and others.
• Illegal governmental regulations: The PLC should also reject all those decisions and orders issued by the various PA governments since 2007 that violated the separation of powers and represented an attack on the jurisdiction of the parliament, such as the amendment introduced in 2015 to the regulations governing the functioning of the non-profit companies.

The developments of the past 13 months in Palestinian-Israeli relations generated contradictory outcomes impacting these relations. On the one hand, the interest in resolving the conflict, once and for all, is certainly greater today than it was immediately before these developments. On the other hand, the war has generated highly destructive outcomes at the societal and psychological levels of Palestinians and Israelis. The level of pain and suffering, hate, anger, distrust, and dehumanization is unprecedented. The speed of the decline in support for the two-state solution among Israeli Jews in just two years is also unprecedented. It is true that more Palestinians today, compared to two years earlier, favor that solution. Yet, the majority remains opposed to that solution and an even greater majority of Palestinians believe that the Israeli short-term and long-term goals are either genocide or expulsion. Leaders from both sides, who see that they have no domestic constituency for peace, are unlikely to embark on any serious negotiations to make peace based on that solution. Outside actors, including the US and other external regional and international actors are likely to be deterred from pushing for such a solution knowing the reluctance of such leaders and the strong opposition of the two publics.

Is there a way in which these leaders can be convinced that their publics will indeed support them if they decide to take the risk and engage in serious negotiations in the hope and expectation that the current war would be the last? This Policy Brief shows that despite the tremendous negative developments since October 7, recent evidence from joint Palestinian-Israeli surveys shows that the two publics are not an impediment to peace based on the two-state solution. The two peoples are certainly not a force for peace; but evidence-based research shows that if leaders embark today on serious negotiations to end the conflict, based on that solution, the willingness of the majority of the two publics to support them and to support the outcome of their negotiations is evidently clear.   

Background:

The collapse of the US-led peace negotiations in 2014 can be viewed as the turning point after which support among Palestinians and Israeli Jews for the two-state solution begins to gradually decline.  By the end of 2017, the majority among both publics expressed opposition to that solution. The main driver for the decline at that time was the belief, shared by both sides, that the two-state solution was no longer practical or feasible given the changes on the ground, such as settlement expansion, and other socio-political developments including the rising support for the right wing in Israel and the weakening of the PA and the continued division among the Palestinians.

The Palestinian constituency most opposed to the two-state solution includes supporters of Hamas and the youth. The opposition of the Hamas supporters is based on ideology and religious values, but the opposition of the youth is based neither on religion nor on ideology. Instead, it seems to be based on consideration of feasibility and views regarding domestic Palestinian politics and the prospects for democracy. The Palestinian youth tend to be the least religious and most liberal than any other age group in society. As it abandoned support for the two-state solution, the youth showed greater support for a democratic one-state solution with equal rights to Israeli Jews and Palestinians.  Nonetheless, among the public as a whole, support for the two-state solution, was higher than the support given by the Palestinians to any other alternative.

Opposition to the two-state solution is higher among Israeli Jews compared to Israeli Arabs. It is also higher among the religious groups, both the ultra-Orthodox and the national religious communities. Similarly, opposition is relatively high among the group that identifies itself as “traditional.” These groups are the most likely to vote for right wing parties, such as the Likud, the extreme right, and the religious parties. Secular Jews show the lowest rates of opposition to that solution. Opposition to that solution is also higher among the youth with the gap in attitudes widening the most between those who are less than 35 years of age and those above 50 years of age. Given Israel’s demographic distribution, Israeli Jewish youth tend to come from those religious, national religious, and traditional backgrounds. For this reason, while Palestinian youth tend to favor a democratic one-state solution, the Israeli Jewish youth tend to favor a non-democratic one-state solution, whereby Palestinians are denied equal rights.

One year before October 7, 2023, a little over one third of Palestinians, one third of Israeli Jews and 60% of Israeli Arabs supported the two-state solution. At the time, these results reflected a significant drop in support compared to the findings of the joint survey two year earlier, in 2020, and represented the lowest level of support for all three groups, Palestinians, Israeli Jews, and Israeli Arabs in all joint Palestinian-Israeli surveys since 2000. In 2020, 43% of the Palestinians and 42% of Israeli Jews supported this solution. Still, in 2022 fewer Palestinians and Israeli Arabs supported the two possible alternatives indicated above, the one state with equality and the one undemocratic state. For Israeli Jews, however, support for one undemocratic state, for the first time since joint Palestinian-Israeli polls were conducted, was greater than the support for the two-state solution.

One year before October 7, we also found that support by Palestinians and Israeli Jews for a a detailed comprehensive peace package based on the concept of the two-state solution was the lowest compared to all previous rounds of the joint poll, staring in 2016. A little over a quarter of the Palestinians and a little less than a third of Israeli Jews supported the detailed package while support among Israeli Arabs was higher than 60%. Fifty four percent of all Israelis, 62% of Israeli Jews, and 72% of Palestinians were opposed to this two-state comprehensive package. The peace package outlined the following components that address all the main elements of the two-state solution:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic, the bilateral agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states, the US and major Arab countries will ensure full implementation of the agreement by both sides, and the end of the conflict and claims.

The unseen psychosocial damage inflicted on the two societies since October the 7th:

The events of the past 13 months inflicted dramatic negative psychosocial damage on the two societies. The trauma associated with the ongoing conflict continues to exact a price from normal people making them anything but normal. Findings from the most recent joint Palestinian-Israeli survey, conducted in July 2024, show the extent of the damage. On both sides, among other things, people are unwilling to accept the humanity of the other side, distrust it beyond all previous levels, and view its own victimhood as greater than any other.

Vast majorities Palestinians and Israeli Jews justify the violence committed by its own side, Hamas on October the 7^th and the Israeli government and military since that time, against the other by what the other had done. Israeli siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip are seen by the Palestinians as justifying what Hamas did. The Hamas attack on October 7 is seen by Israeli Jews as justifying what the Israeli military is doing in the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, close to 90% of Palestinians believe that the short-term goals of Israel in the current war is to commit genocide or conquer the land and expel the Palestinians from their homeland. In a mirror image, more than 90% of Israeli Jews believe that Hamas’ goal on October 7 was to commit genocide or conquer the land and expel the population from their homeland.  Perception of the long-term aspiration of the other side is also grim with similar vast majorities on both sides believing that the other side wants to conquer the land, kill the population, expel them, or deny them political rights.

These destructive perceptions are amplified by strong perception of victimization on both sides. The overwhelming majority of Palestinians and Israeli Jews tend to view their own suffering as the worst compared to all other peoples who suffered from persecution and injustice. Three quarters on both sides view the conflict with the other sides in zero-sum terms, when one gains, the other loses; anything good for one side must, by definition, be bad for the other. The current level of distrust, about 90% or higher, is the highest ever recorded in the joint surveys since 2016 when the question was first systematically asked. It is not surprising under these conditions to find that while each side is readily able to humanize its own people by almost identical scores, close to 90 points on average, only 6 Palestinians and 14 Israeli Jews out of a hundred, on average, are willing to do the same for the other side. This wartime sweeping dehumanization of the other should be seen not only in terms of one’s perception of inherent qualities of the other but also as a statement regarding its behavior on October the 7^th, for the Israeli public, and throughout the current war in Gaza, for the Palestinians.

These psychosocial outcomes seem to generate two important political implications, one impacting perception of land ownership and the other impacting perception of the way out of the conflict. The belief that the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river, or historic Palestine, belongs to one’s own side, and not the other, has always been evident in our previous joint polls. But the intensity of this belief, particularly among Israeli Jews, has increased in the aftermath of October 7 and the ongoing war. Today, more than 90% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews believe that the land belongs entirely to their group. Moreover, the vast majority on both sides, but particularly among the Palestinians, deny that the land also belongs to the other side.

Finally, the war impacted attitudes regarding a way out of the conflict between a diplomatic and a military solution. Surprisingly, the findings of the joint poll show different public responses to this question among Palestinians and Israeli Jews. While a majority on both sides believes they have a military way out of the conflict, by defeating the other side, the Palestinians are more optimistic than Israeli Jews, 48% and 38% respectively, that diplomacy provides a viable route to ending the conflict.

Divergent views on the peace process:

As we saw in the preference for diplomatic vs. military way out, in which the Palestinians come out of the ongoing traumatic conditions more optimistic than Israeli Jews about the prospects of diplomacy, findings of the 2024 joint poll show additional divergent views between the two sides. The joint poll findings show differing political responses in other areas of political attitudes regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations, most importantly the two-state solution. While the Israeli Jewish support for the concept of the two-state solution declines in less than two years from one third (34%) to a little over a fifth (21%), a 13-point drop, Palestinian support for the same concept rises by 7 points from 33% in 2022 to 40% in 2024. Support for the same concept increases also among Israeli Arabs, from 60% to 72% during the same period. Among Israeli Jews, the current support for the two-state solution is the lowest since the peace process started more than 30 years ago.

The hardening of the Israeli Jewish attitudes after October the 7^th can also be seen when exploring changing attitudes regarding alternatives to the two-state solution. The findings show an increased support for the “annexation of the West Bank without granting equal rights to Palestinians.” Support among Israeli Jews for this unequal and non-democratic one-state solution stands today at 42%, the highest ever recorded in the joint polls. In 2022, Israeli Jewish support for this annexation without equal rights to Palestinians stood at 37%. Among Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, support today for a one-state solution without equal rights for Israeli Jews stands at 33% and 17% respectively. In 2022, Palestinian support for this unequal, and non-democratic one-state solution stood at 30%. A second alternative to the two-state solution is a democratic and equal one-state. In July 2024, 25% of Palestinians and 14% of Israeli Jews supported it compared to 23% among Palestinians and 20% among Israeli Jews two years earlier. The support for these three solutions, the two-state, the democratic one-state, and the non-democratic one-state was measured in three separate questions. A review of the attitudes of those who support the democratic one-state solution shows that most of them also support the two-state solution and that some of the supporters of the non-democratic state also support the two-state solution.

Indeed, when one measures the total net support for the three solutions, while giving the priority to the two-state solution, that is without the overlapping support to other solutions, the total comes out to much less than one hundred percentage points. In fact, the 2024 findings show that 44% of all Palestinians and 34% of all Israeli Jews do not support any solution at all. In 2022, the size of this group, which one can call the “undecided,” stood at 47% among the Palestinians and 27% among Israeli Jews. This finding might be good news to supporters of the two-state solution. Indeed, almost half of the total increase in the Palestinian support for the two-state solution (3 percentage points) came from this group and half of the decrease (7 percentage points) in Israeli Jewish support for the two-state solution moved to this group rather than embraced a clearly defined alternative. In other words, the “undecided” might be the easiest group to convert back to the two-state solution

A further exploration of the 2024 findings adds further evidence demonstrating the divergent attitudes in the post October 7 and the Gaza War environment. When Palestinians and Israelis were presented with a detailed 11-point peace package, based on the two-state solution (as described above in the last paragraph of the background section of this Brief), identical to the one presented to them in three previous joint polls between 2018 and 2022, findings show a drop in Israeli Jewish support by 6 percentage points and a rise in Palestinian support by 7 points compared to the 2022 findings. Today’s support for this detailed peace package stands at 69% among Israeli Arabs, 34% among Palestinians and 25% among Israeli Jews. The opposition to the peace package stands at 65% of Israeli Jews, 63% of Palestinians, and 13% of Israeli Arabs. It is worth noting that while the support of the Palestinians for the detailed peace package is a 6-point lower than their support for the undefined concept of the two-state solution, the support of the Israeli Jews for the detailed package is actually a 4-point higher than their support for the concept of the two-state solution. This Israeli Jewish finding is contrary to all other joint poll results during all previous joint polls, where respondents were more willing to support the concept but reject its detailed description.

Still, joint findings show that public opinion is not an impediment to peace based on the two-state solution:

The first post October 7 joint poll sought to assess the willingness of the two publics to show flexibility under various scenarios and conditions of negative and positive incentives. The negative incentives are those scenarios generated by fear of war expansion into the West Bank, Lebanon, and the region, with the participation of Iran. The positive incentives are those that seek to address the vital needs of the two sides, with or without granting a similar concession to the other side. Findings show that fear of war can serve as a driver for peace and can illicit greater willingness to compromise. Moreover, incentives remain highly effective in reversing hardline views and bringing about a majority support among the two publics for the detailed peace package described above.

Fear of regional war: Most of the Palestinians and Israelis expect the current on-going war to expand into the West Bank and expect it to eventually expand into a regional war with the direct participation of Iran. This is the view expressed by 53% of the Palestinians and 62% of Israeli Jews. When asked who might win such an expanded war, a small majority of Palestinians (53%) expressed the view that the winner will be the forces opposed to Israel while only 20% expected Israel to win.  Among Israeli Jews, 79% expect Israel to win and only 8% expect the other side to win.

Support for the US vision for peace: The joint poll explored support for the peace vision outlined by the Biden Administration in the aftermath of the October 7 attack and the subsequent war in Gaza. The vision was described as having four components that begin with a ceasefire agreement and release of hostages and prisoners, a revitalized PA, a two-state solution with irreversible steps in that direction, and regional peace and Saudi-Israeli normalization. A slim majority on both sides expressed opposition: 51% of Palestinians and 54% of Israeli Jews; only 17% of Israeli Arabs expressed opposition. Support stood at 83% among Israeli Arabs, 46% among Israeli Jews, and 45% among Palestinians. Clearly, the widening of the circle of peace to include the entire region and the linkage created by the US vision between the ceasefire, the two-state solution, the strengthening of the PA, and the regional peace were highly effective in increasing the support for two-state solution among both publics from the original levels (40% among the Palestinians and 21% among Israeli Jews) to more than doubling it among Israeli Jews and increasing it by 6 points among the Palestinians.

Forcing a choice between bi-lateral and regional peace and regional war:  When the question to the respondents became blunt, a forced choice between the two possibilities mentioned above, the expansion of the war or the embrace of the two-state solution and regional peace, the two publics made yet another enormous leap.  Almost two-thirds of the Palestinians (65%), 55% of Israeli Jews, and 89% of Israeli Arabs preferred peace; the opposition among the Palestinians stood at 29% and among Israeli Jews at 45%.

Incentives work: Incentives are policy measures that leaders can negotiate with the other side in order to garner greater public support among their constituencies. Since June 2016, in eight experiments, the joint poll tested dozens of such incentives in order to assess their effectiveness in doing exactly that, making the detailed two-state package more attractive. These experiments produced a successful set of one-sided incentives that were later paired to produce meaningful two-sided incentives in which one side receives an important concession from the other side and in return agrees to grant an important incentive to the other side.  Yet, given the considerable psychosocial damage inflicted on the two societies since October 7, it would be reasonable to question the continued utility of incentives that might have proven effective under very different conditions in the past. The 2024 joint poll sets out to test the continued utility of these incentives, The findings show that they are as effective today as they were in the past or even more so.

Six one-sided incentives aiming at raising support for the detailed two-state solution package were offered to each side. These included measures such as security cooperation, ending mutual incitement, allowing Palestinian laborers to continue to work in Israel, allowing Israeli factories to continue to operate in the future Palestinian state, acknowledgement of historic and religious links and recognition of national identity, easing the absorption of refugees by providing them with homes and lands, and release of Palestinian prisoners, can each produce a majority support on both sides, increasing it, among the Palestinians up to 55%. The results among Israeli Jews were even better, give the lower baseline of support, showing one-sided incentives leading to a majority support for the peace package, increasing it up to 60%.

When these incentives were paired, according to which each side receives an incentive but must grant an incentive to the other, they were obviously expected, as we saw in all previous experiments, to be less successful than the one-sided measures. But here too the findings were also promising. Five out of the six pairs increased Israeli Jewish support and one (fighting incitement in textbooks on both sides) produced a majority Jewish support for the package, increasing it from 25% to 61%. The results on the Palestinian side were almost as successful: four pairs increased support and one increased it from 34% to 54% (allowing Palestinian laborers to continue to work inside Israel in return for the continued operation of the current Israeli West Bank factories in the future Palestinian state).

Conclusion

More than a year of brutal war has hardened public opinion among Palestinians and Israelis and poisoned mutual perception of each other. Although similar developments have been seen before during previous wars, the current development is unprecedented in its intensity. However, as we saw in previous wars, such intensity normally weakens within months after the end of the violence. Moreover, survey research among the peoples of the two societies shows no evidence that the current change is the product of ideological or religious transformation. Instead, the change reflects greater fear and pain that can be reduced by calculated policy change by the leaders of the two sides. Fear can also be positive: fear of war can be capitalized on to generate greater public support for peace. This conclusion however only emphasizes the necessity for strong, legitimate, and courageous leaderships committed to the goal of peace that neither side now has.

Under the right conditions, with a strong leadership in place, policy measures in the form of incentives specifically designed as unpaired (one-sided benefits) or paired (two-sided, providing benefits and imposing costs), continue to play a critical role in reducing the hardening of attitudes leading to a significant reversal of hardline attitudes and producing majority support for permanent peace and end of conflict on both sides.

These conclusions lead to two policy implications:

(1) Public opinion today is clearly not a force for peace; but evidence shows that it is also not an impediment to peace.

(2) While societal forces are important in leading societies toward peace, only strong, legitimate, and credible leadership can produce the desired change that can transform the environment to one conducive to peacemaking.

The September 2021 UN speech of Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the careful language it used, indicate that he appreciates the severity of the crisis in which that leadership finds itself today and the limited options it has. For one, it seems almost certain that the current domestic conditions will continue to deteriorate given the dim prospects for holding elections, reaching a reconciliation deal, or bringing about significant economic growth. Similarly, Palestinian-Israeli stalemate will most likely persist for some time to come even after the handover of the premiership from Naftali Bennett to Yair Lapid. It is almost certain that the current Israeli governmental coalition, or any one that is likely to come after it in the near future, will not be able to enter into a serious negotiating process with the PA.  Thirdly, the international community, including the U.S., seems to lack the vision and the political will to go beyond the current goal of managing the conflict, to prevent an explosion or a dramatic change in the current Palestinian-Israeli relations. A glance at the regional landscape points to the dismal setting of PA alignment; indeed, the collapsed Arab consensus on the Palestinian question provides the evidence, if any is needed, of the constrained environment in which the Palestinian leadership operates.

Does this pessimistic assessment allow the PA, in its search for political alternatives, to reach beyond the goal of maintaining the status quo? If the answer is positive, what are these alternatives? For example, can the concept of the so-called “shrinking the conflict,” an approach advocated by some of the leaders of the current Israeli coalition, provide a working framework for organizing Palestinian-Israeli relations in the short run despite the freeze in the political process? This brief explores the current Palestinian policy, especially as outlined by president Abbas in his 2021 UN speech. It concludes that while options do indeed exist, it is unlikely that the PA will be able to capitalize on any of them given the decisions already made by its leadership during the last few years, and particularly those made during the past six months. At best, it can aspire to maintain the status quo during the next year or two. But it also concludes that it would be dangerous for the PA and the international community to be drawn into the Israeli right-wing approach of “shrinking the conflict” given the likely destructive impact it could have on the future viability of the two-state solution.    

Abbas’ declared policy:

In his 2021 UN speech Abbas asserted his conviction that the “policies of the international community and the UN organizations have so far all failed” in resolving the conflict or forcing Israel to abide by international law. Yet, in an obvious contradiction with this assertion, which is fully endorsed by an internal Palestinian consensus, the president stated that he intends to seek support from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) “to issue a decision on the legality of the occupation of the territories of the state of Palestine and the responsibilities of the UN and its member states in this regard.” He further added his belief that “all sides must abide by the resolution that will be issued by the ICJ because colonization and apartheid are banned by international law and they are crimes that must be confronted and dismantled.”[1] It is certain that the president fully understands the contradiction in his declared policy. This contradiction fades if we realize that the actual policy of the PA is not to rely on the international community and the UN to end the Israeli occupation and that it only seeks their support in managing the conflict and preventing further deterioration in the status quo.

The president and the rest of the PA’s political elite, no doubt realize that the best they can expect from ICJ is a moral victory, one that can be added to the one that was achieved back in 2004 when the court issued its advisory opinion regarding the separation wall or barrier. At that time, the court asserted that “Israel must put an immediate end to the violation of its international obligations by ceasing the works of construction of the wall and dismantling those parts of that structure situated within Occupied Palestinian Territory” and, most importantly, added that the Fourth Geneva Convention is “applicable in those Palestinian territories which, before the armed conflict of 1967, lay to the east of the 1949 Armistice demarcation line (or “Green Line”) and were occupied by Israel during that conflict.”[2] Israel did not stop the construction of the wall and continued to ignore its obligations under that convention. The PA’s complaint to the same court against the U.S. regarding its decision to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem, which was submitted in September 2018, has not yet been addressed more than three years later. Other international organizations, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), have been looking into other Palestinian complaints, all of which contribute to the PA’s efforts to wage a diplomatic campaign against Israel. One should not however measure PA success in these efforts by criteria other than protecting the status quo. It cannot force Israel to end its occupation, halt settlement activities, or even stop demolition of Palestinian homes. It cannot force Israel to sit down at the negotiating table.

In his UN speech, president Abbas returned to a topic he addressed many times before during the past decade, asking Israel to choose between the two-state and the one-state solutions. But this time, he did not threaten to abandon the two-state solution; to the contrary, he reiterated his commitment to that solution. In the meanwhile, playing the role of a political analyst to convey his message to Israel, he described the current conditions as “the embodiment of a one apartheid state” and that “our people and the entire world will not accept that outcome and the data and developments on the ground will impose full and equal rights to all in the historic land of Palestine in a single state.”  The president realizes that political analysis is no substitute for policy and that a continued adoption of the two-state solution by the Palestinian side, at a time in which he himself asserts that it has no future, is essentially an abandonment of his leadership role in policy making. The PA cannot continue to promote the two-state solution unless it sees in the one-state solution a threat to its vital interests. But the president’s analysis indicated the opposite and presented a one-state with equal rights as a vital Palestinian interest just as the two-state solution. It is clear that the aim of the president’s public statement is to maintain the status quo, to remain committed to the two-state solution, despite its lack of viability, while simultaneously threatening an adoption of the one-state solution; in other words, a continuation of the diplomatic offensive against Israel in the hope of slowing down the process of the one-state reality.

Finally, the president hinted that he might change PLO’s Israel’s recognition formula by wondering: “why should the recognition of Israel remain in place on the basis of the 1967 boundaries?” Earlier in his speech, the president pointed to the possibility of a Palestinian return “to a solution based on the Partition Resolution number 181 for the year 1947, one that gives the Palestinian state 44% of the land, which is twice the size of the land based on the 1967 boundaries.” Nothing in this formula indicates a threat to withdraw the PLO recognition of the state of Israel contained in the 1993 PLO-Israel exchanged letters of mutual recognition. If the president does officially inform Israel of his decision to revise the recognition letter, so that it would be restricted to Israel’s partition resolution boundaries, unlikely as that might be, he would be escalating the diplomatic campaign, but it would not affect the current relations between the two sides including the ongoing security and civil coordination.

“Shrinking the conflict:” the policy of the current Israeli coalition

The current Israeli policy towards the Palestinians indicates a continuation of the previous right-wing policy with small adjustments. The policy is comprised of three elements that form what seems to be the maximum understandings binding the current ruling coalition. They address the position on the two-state solution and the political process or negotiations, the modalities of progress in the settlement enterprise, and the search for confidence building measures. In the Gaza Strip, there does not seem to be any significant differences with the policy of the former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu which sought to keep the siege the blockade in place, promote a continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and ensuring a situation in which Hamas poses no real military threat to Israel but without threatening a humanitarian disaster or the collapse of the Hamas role or its ability to keep security and civil conditions under control.

Under U.S. pressure, Netanyahu, in his Bar Ilan University speech in 2009, declared verbally his acceptance of the two-state solution. The current prime minister publicly rejects that solution and reiterates continuously to his base and right-wing allies that he is more hardline line than Netanyahu. Similarly, despite the fact that the former government entered, between 2013 and 2014, into substantive negotiations with Abbas in a U.S. sponsored process, the current government refuses to sit down to a negotiating table with the Palestinians.

On settlements, the current ruling coalition seems able to proceed, albeit slowly, on a number of highly visible and charged settlement projects that are capable when completed to erase any prospects for a negotiated outcome on the basis of a two-state solution. For example, the Israeli Civil Administration started early this month to hear objections to planned construction in the area designated E-1, located between occupied East Jerusalem and Jericho, a critical phase among the last steps in the planning process before issuing final approval and invite tenders.[3] When established, this settlement divides the West Bank into two isolated parts, south and north, and isolates East Jerusalem from the West Bank, and makes it impossible for East Jerusalem to become the capital of the Palestinian state.

Similarly, during the past two months Israel started preparation for the planning phase of a large settlement to the north of East Jerusalem containing nine thousand housing units to be located in what is currently the Qalandia airport, between Ramallah and East Jerusalem.[4] Moreover, in mid-October, an Israeli committee approved plans to advance the building of thousands of housing units in Givat Hamatos settlement, a settlement designed to isolate East Jerusalem from Beth Lehem in the south, as it will be built on lands confiscated from Sharafat and Beit Safafa. Back in November 2020, the Israeli government gave the green light to issue tenders to begin construction in that area.[5]

Inside occupied East Jerusalem, plans have been advanced to build a new settlement dubbed the “Silicon Valley,” which will be build over an area extending 250 thousand square meters in the heart of Wadi al Joz. The settlement, intended to be a high tech park, leads to demolishing some 200 East Jerusalem establishments owned by Palestinian residents who have already received eviction orders back in mid-2020.[6] Similarly, Palestinian home owners in al Shaikh Jarrah are still threatened with eviction as their case is still under examination in Israeli courts without a final resolution while awaiting a compromise deal, proposed by the court, to allow the Palestinian residents to stay in an agreement with Israeli settlers but only if the home owners admit that they are not the rightful owners of the homes. Finally, the decision by an Israeli court early this month to allow “silent prayer” of Israeli Jews at al Haram al Sharif indicates an unprecedented and critical change in Palestinian-Israeli relations in this holy place since East Jerusalem was occupied in 1967. The Jerusalem district court that reversed that decision two days after the first decision was issued does not mitigate the gradual damage done to the “status quo” in the holy places by this and many other measures in recent years. The “status quo” arrangement has helped to maintain a fragile stability in Palestinian-Jewish relations in that location sensitive to both Jews and Muslims, without which the holy places could become once again the spark for the next explosion.[7]

Finally, while it was not feasible for Palestinians and Israelis during the past decade to explore means of addressing Israeli-imposed measures that negatively affect socio, economic, and daily life conditions of Palestinians, the current Israeli prime minister announced that Israel and the PA have a joint interest in improving living conditions of the Palestinians. Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz met with the Palestinian president in August in order to offer confidence building measures that aim at strengthening the Palestinian economy, as the minister announced[8], and begin to resolve thousands of cases of Palestinian family members who have been denied valid identity cards or passports, and provide the PA with access to about half a billion Shekels of advanced Palestinian custom clearance funds. Progress has also been reported on a formula that would allow Palestinian telecommunication companies access to 4-G technology, increasing the number of laborers allowed to work in Israel, and granting building permits for a number of units in area C. These measures seem to stem from a conceptual framework labeled “shrinking the conflict,”[9] one that Israel sees as an alternative to conflict resolution based on ending the occupation and building permanent peace based on the two-state solution. The Israeli prime minster described this vision of managing the conflict with the Palestinians during his first visit to the U.S. and his meeting with the U.S. president in August, as the U.S. was attempting to explore possible measures to revive political dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis.[10]

A new equation

A new equation emerges from the discussion so far: a temporary Palestinian interest in maintaining the status quo confronted by a more hardline Israeli government lacking any serious interest in reviving the political process but showing greater openness to engage in confidence building measures.  It is clear that the Israeli policy is not satisfactory to the PA or the international community, but no one is questioning the shrinking of the conflict. Rather, the opposition to the idea is centered on the making it a substitute to a viable political process. Since the U.S. and most players in the international community share the view that the prevailing conditions are not ripe for a resumption of negotiations, there is no real resistance to the Israeli policy.  The U.S. has positively viewed the Israeli confidence building measures and encouraged the two sides to engage in further mutual steps in the same direction. Similarly, the Palestinian side too has shown interest in the Israeli measures seeing them helpful in shoring up support for the weak PA. In fact, a majority of the Palestinian public itself (56%) expressed support for the such measures that aim at improving daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including such steps as family unifications or providing the PA with additional financial resources; only 35% expressed viewed them negatively.[11]  

Can the Palestinian realization that maintaining the status quo is the best that can be expected and the Israeli willingness to engage in policies consistent with “shrinking the conflict” create a less volatile Palestinian-Israeli relation, one in which the next year or two see more stability compared to that of the last two years? What would the cost of such a short-term stability be for the longer run?

The answer to the short-term question is not necessarily negative despite the clear obstacles. Palestinian domestic push and pull and those necessitated by the Israeli coalition needs might produce a short-term stability. For example, on the one hand, the heightened competition between the Fatah-controlled PA and Hamas is a clear source of tension and polarization in Palestinian politics and society, especially in the aftermath of the fourth Hamas-Israel war of May 2021. PA weakness and lack of electoral legitimacy provide it with the incentive to strive to compensate for its failures by winning points against Hamas, either by delivering on some of the public needs, even if that comes as crumbs from the Israeli side, or by waging a widespread diplomatic campaign against Israel. Most likely the PA will find itself forced to pursue both channels simultaneously: diplomatic warfare and confidence building measures. This outcome will most likely be the product of the two other elements of the Israeli policy, the rejection of negotiations and the two-state solution and the pursuant of the most devastating settlement projects that can, if implemented, decide once and for all the destiny of the two-state solution.

Unfortunately, given its current policies, the PA will not be able to articulate an effective means of challenging the status quo. For example, if it wanted to capitalize on the “shrinking the conflict” approach by exploiting the process of Arab normalization with Israel to broaden and consolidate the confidence building measures, it will not have the capacity or the political will to use that process to push forward its own plans. These plans could encompass the strengthen of PA presence in East Jerusalem, or investing in area C, or even persuading the Israeli government to abandon or slow down its current settlement offensive. But the cost is too high. Any PA readiness to deal positively with Arab normalization will open a flood gate of normalization, with Saudi Arabia among the first to enter. Such a development could engender further dynamics of Palestinian marginalization and increase PA domestic isolation by widening the current gap with the Palestinian public and provide Hamas with a greater opportunity to affirm its leadership of the Palestinian people as an alternative to the national movement.

By contrast, if the PA wanted to strengthen its diplomatic confrontation with Israel by adding more effective non-violent means of resistance, for example, by channeling public anger and frustration toward massive civilian participation in that resistance, it will find itself unable to do so due to the current distrust expressed by the public toward the PA. On top of that, the PA security establishment will probably see such massive civilian participation a prelude to the “militarization” of the resistance and a threat to its current control over the street; indeed, it might fear that such popular mobilization and participation might get out of control and turn against the PA itself.

On the Israeli side, the right-wing government will be under great pressure to respond firmly against any important hostile PA diplomatic measures. Abbas’ UN speech has already given Israel a full year without embarking on such measures. Yet even if he embarks on such measures now, the Israeli leadership will probably understand the pressure he is under. To appease the right wing base, Israel’s response might focus on speeding up the settlement construction process rather than halting the implementation of the confidence building measures. On the other hand, if Abbas sought to capitalize on the normalization process, unlikely as it might seem, Israel might find itself having to deal positively with such PA initiatives or risk having to explain to the Arab normalizers why their willingness to abandon Arab consensus is not being reciprocated.

Conclusion: shrinking or expanding the conflict?

Needless to say, the only means of shrinking the conflict is by shrinking the occupation and the settlement enterprise. But the Israeli government’s understanding of the approach can only produce the opposite outcome. Major settlement plans will advance and along with them the consolidation and deepening of the occupation. Would the PA, given its interest in self-preservation, be content with modest diplomatic measures while engaging in confidence building measures in which it accepts what crumbs the Israeli government, given its interest in maintaining the cohesion of its parliamentary coalition, might be willing to offer?  

This might indeed be the short-term policy of the PA. Given its inability to formulate a unified Palestinian position without reconciliation, elections, or deep reforms in its political system, the PA will be seen by all concerned as weak and incapable of taking the initiative or even responding to one. It will not earn international respect. Under these conditions, none of the major international players will use leverage against Israel to initiate a process capable of containing the current Israeli settlement activities, accept the two-state solution, or enter into a political process for a permanent settlement. The capitulation of the PA and the international community to the resilient status quo will inevitably bring Palestinian-Israeli relations to a point of no return, one in which all sides come to the conclusion that the two-state solution is no longer viable.

This is an inescapable conclusion. The belief that the PA, that has already tied its own hands by the decisions it has previously taken, remains capable of developing more effective options is wishful thinking. Similarly, the belief that the Palestinian public cannot be forced to swallow this outcome without resistance is a miscalculation. The public is leaderless and none of its movements and political parties are capable or willing, under current conditions, to forge ahead, influence the Palestinian masses, and earn its trust to the point at which it can provide a viable alternative path to that offered by the current Palestinian leadership.  This conclusion applies to those who are capable, such as Hamas and the forces that support Marwan Barghouti, and those who are not, such as the leftist forces, the newly created electoral lists, or supporters of Mohammad Dahlan.

Finally, the international community will not move in any substantive manner if it believes the prospects of success are limited. But it might be willing to move in response to a new explosion in Palestinian-Israeli relations, an unexpected development at this time if it was not for Hamas’ propensity to take high risks that allows it to accumulate greater gains at the expense of the PA. Similarly, in the absence of a stronger and unified PA, one that enjoys electoral legitimacy and the trust of its people, accountable public institutions, and vibrant pluralistic civil society and free press, all currently lacking, the international community will have little incentives to take a stronger stand against the current Israeli policy.