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28-30 March 2013

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 28-30 March 2013. The  period before the poll witnessed the formation of a new Israeli government and a visit by the US president to Israel and Palestine. The period also witnessed the development of a new form of popular resistance against settlements through the establishment of tent encampments in areas threatened by settlement expansion. Reconciliation efforts between Fatah and Hamas failed to make progress despite the fact that the election commission has completed its voter registration campaign in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This press release covers public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today. It also covers issues related to the peace process, Obama’s visit, and Palestinian options in the confrontation against occupation. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2013 indicate a return to pre Gaza war balance between Fatah and Hamas. The popularity of Hamas and Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minister of the dismissed government, drops and Fatah’s popularity and that of president Abbas rises. Last December, the Gaza war gave Hamas and Haniyeh greater credibility and popularity while decreasing that of Fatah and Abbas. Yet, positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip remains higher than positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank. Moreover, perception of safety and security remains higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government is much higher than the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government. Nonetheless, about half of Gazans say they would like to immigrate from the Strip while a little over a quarter of West Bankers say they wish to immigrate.

Findings also indicate a dramatic reversal in the level of optimism regarding the chances for reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Indeed, about half of the public believes that a successful reconciliation and reunification requires regime change in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or at least in one of the two areas. Furthermore, two-thirds to three-quarters believe that reconciliation is impossible under current conditions in which restrictions are imposed on the freedoms of supporters of Fatah or Hamas or in which no date is set for new elections.

Finally, findings indicate continued pessimism regarding the chances for reviving the peace process in the aftermath of the Obama visit. An overwhelming majority believes that president Obama will not succeed in pressing Israel to freeze settlement construction. Perhaps due to these conclusions, the percentage of those who say that their feelings toward president Obama have changed to the worse is four times higher than the percentage of those who say their feelings have changed to the better.  Given the promised US financial assistance to the PA, a clear majority believes that this support will not be sufficient to resolve the PA’s financial problem but a majority believes that such support might in fact deter the PA from fighting Israel in the international arena including at the International Criminal Court.

(1) Presidential, Legislative, and Local Elections:

• Abbas defeats Haniyeh in a presidential election by 52% to 41%
• Barghouti wins against Haniyeh, 60% to 33%
• In a three way presidential elections, Barghouti receives 38%, Haniyeh 31%, and Abbas 26%
• In a parliamentary election, Hamas wins 29% Fateh 41%, all others combined 11%, and 20% say they have not decided yet

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 52% and Haniyeh 41% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 62%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 45% and Haniyeh 48%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 44% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 52% and Haniyeh 39%. If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 60% and the latter would receive 33% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 69%. In our December poll Barghouti received 51% of the vote and Haniyeh 42%.

If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (38%) followed by Haniyeh (31%), and Abbas (26%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 73%. In our previous poll last September, Barghouti received 29%, Haniyeh 39%, and Abbas 27%.  

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 41% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 33% and in the West Bank at 27%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 42% and in the West Bank at 40%. These results indicate an increase in Fatah’s popularity compared to our December results when it stood at 36% (38% in the Gaza Strip and 34% in the West Bank). By contrast, Hamas’ popularity dropped six percentage points in the combined West Bank and the Gaza Strip.   

(2) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 32% and in the West Bank 29%
• Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 78% and belief that corruption exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip stands at 64%
• 21% believe that there is press freedom in the West Bank and 16% believe there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip
• Percentage of safety and security stands at 54% among West Bank residents and 67% among residents of the Gaza Strip
• 49% of Gazans and 27% of West Bankers want to immigrate to other countries
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 40% and the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government stands at 25%, and satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 49%

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 43% three months ago to 32% in this poll while 40% say conditions are bad or very bad. Similarly, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank drops from 35% three months ago to 29% in this poll while 44% say conditions are bad or very bad.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 78% in this poll compared to 74% three months ago. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 64% compared to 53% three months ago. 

21% say there is, and 44% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 16% say there is, and 35% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  Similarly, 33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 25% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These results indicate a decrease in the perception of freedom to criticize authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip compared to results obtained three months ago.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 54% and in the Gaza Strip at 67%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 70% in the Gaza Strip and 60% in the West Bank. Yet, despite the high level of safety perception in the Gaza Strip, findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 49%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 27%. Last December these percentages stood at 41% and 22% respectively. 

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government drops sharply from 56% three months ago to 40% in this poll and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government drops also from 34% to 25% during the same period. Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas drops from 54% three months ago to 49% in this poll. Dissatisfaction with the president performance stands today at 49% compared to 44% three months ago.  

(3)Reconciliation:

• Belief that unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be restored soon drops to 18%
• 37% say that ending the split requires regime change in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• About three quarters believe that reconciliation will not succeed under current conditions in which freedoms are restricted for Hamas members in the West Bank and Fatah members in the Gaza Strip

In the absence of visible progress in the Fateh-Hamas reconciliation dialogue, percentage of optimism about the chances for reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip drops sharply from 39% three months ago to 18% in this poll. Moreover, the belief that unity is impossible and that two separate entities will emerge increases from 18% to 33% during the same period. Gazans (34%) and West Bankers (33%) are similar in their expectations that unity will not return. That expectation however increases among men (39%) compared to women (27%), among those who oppose the peace process (46%) compared to those who support the peace process (27%), among supporters of third parties-- parties other than Fatah and Hamas (41%) compared to supporters of Fatah and Hamas (31% and 27% respectively), and among merchants, professionals, employees, and students (45%, 44%, 38%, and 36% respectively) compared to housewives and farmers (23% and 33% respectively).

Findings show that 37% say that ending the split requires regime change in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 12% say it requires regime change in the Gaza Strip only and an identical percentage believes that it requires regime change in the West Bank. Only 34% say that restoring unity does not require regime change in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. The belief than ending the split requires regime change in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is slightly higher among Gazans (39%) compared to West Bankers (36%). It is also higher among residents of refugee camps (48%) compared to residents of villages and cities (36% and 35% respectively), among those who identify themselves as somewhat religious (38%) compared to those who identify themselves as religious (34%), among those who oppose the peace process (44%) compared to those who support the peace process (34%), among supporters of third parties and those who do not support any of the parties (50% and 44% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah and Hamas (29% and 24% respectively), among men (39%) compared to women (34%), among refugees (40%) compared to non-refugees (34%), among professionals, retirees, employees, and students (48%, 41%, 39%, and 37% respectively) compared to farmers, housewives, and laborers (31%, 33%, and 34% respectively).

We asked respondents about conditions under which they believe reconciliation cannot succeed. About three quarters (74%) believes that reconciliation will not succeed without first ending the restrictions on freedoms enjoyed by supporters of Hamas in the West Bank and a similar percentage (72%) believes that it will not succeed without ending restrictions on freedoms enjoyed by supporters of Fatah in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 66% say it will not succeed without first agreeing on an election date; 61% say it will not succeed if Hamas continues to reject agreements signed by the PLO with Israel; 58% say it will not succeed if security coordination with Israel in the West Bank continues; another 58% say it will not succeed if the PA continues to recognize Israel and the Oslo agreements; and 49% say it will not succeed as along as Hamas insists on keeping its al Qassam armed wing in the Gaza Strip.

The belief that reconciliation cannot succeed if Hamas insists on keeping its armed wing in the Gaza Strip increases in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (43%), in refugee camps (63%) compared to cities and villages (49% and 41% respectively), among the somewhat religious (52%) compared to the religious (44%), among supporters of Fatah and those who support none of the parties (57% and 54% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (35% and 39% respectively), among men (52%) compared to women (47%), among the retirees, merchants, and laborers (64%, 58% and 56% respectively) compared to farmers, students and housewives (37%, 44%, and 46% respectively).

By contrast, the belief that reconciliation cannot succeed if security coordination with the Israeli security services continues increases among Gazans (63%) compared to West Bankers (55%), among residents of refugee camps and cities (62% and 59% respectively) compared to residents of villages (53%), among the religious (60%) compared to the somewhat religious (56%), among those who oppose the peace process (75%) compared to those who support the peace process (50%), among Hamas supporters, supporters of third parties, and those who support none of the parties (67%, 66%, and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (48%), among men (65%) compared to women (51%), among retirees, merchants, and professionals (71%, 68%, and 65% respectively) compared to housewives, farmers, and laborers (50%, 53%, and 58% respectively).

4) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% believe that the most vital Palestinian goal should be the ending of Israeli occupation and the building of a Palestinian state and 31% say it should be to obtain the right of return.
• 28% believe that the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment and 26% say it is the absence of national unity

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% of the public while 26% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 22% believe the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 7% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

5) The Peace Process:

• 55% support the two-state solution but 56% believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement construction
• 29% support a one-state solution and 70% oppose it
• 71% are worried that they or members of their family would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished and 59% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to expel Arabs from the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River
• 64% believe that the goal of the PA and the PLO is to recover all or part of the land occupied by Israel in 1967
• 63% support popular non-violent resistance, 40% support an armed intifada, and 40% support dissolving the PA

55% support and 44% oppose a two-state solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel. But 56% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion and 41% think that it remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel during the next five years are low or non-existent while 31% believe the chances are medium or high.  Nonetheless, only 29% support a one-state solution based on equality for Arabs and Jews and 70% oppose it. Moreover, 55% support the Saudi (Arab) Peace Initiative but only 42% support and 56% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.

Findings show that 71% are worried and 28% are not worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis or their land confiscated or homes demolished. Similarly, 59% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to expand its borders to include all territories between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel their Palestinian population, 21% believe that Israel’s aim is to annex all occupied territories while denying Palestinians their political rights. 18% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to withdraw from all or parts of the 1967-occupied territories after ensuring its security.  By contrast, when asked about the long term goal of the PLO and the PA, 64% said that it is to  recover all or some of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, 15% said it is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 territories, and 11% said it is to defeat Israel and destroy its Jewish population.  

63% support a resort to popular non-violent resistance and 71% believe, and 26% do not believe, that creating facts on the ground, such as the placement of tent encampments in area C, would be an effective means of confronting settlement expansion and protecting land threatened by settlers. By contrast, 40% support a return to an armed intifada and an identical percentage supports the dissolution of the PA.

6) Obama’s Visit:

• 55% believe that the Obama Administration will not succeed in reviving the peace process
• 29% say that their feelings toward president Obama have become worse after his last visit to the region and 8% say their feelings have become better
• 62% believe that the PA is unable to fight Israel in international forums as long as it dependent on the US financial support

In the aftermath of Obama’s visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories, a majority of 55% believes that the US administration will not succeed in reviving the peace process and bringing the two sides to the negotiating table. 42% believe it will succeed in that goal. Moreover, 70% believe that the American administration will not succeed in pressuring Israel to freeze settlement construction and 28% believe it will succeed in that.

The public is split regarding the preferred role for the US in the peace process: 45% want a stronger US role and 46% want to see the US out of the peace process. In June 2010, two thirds (66%) wanted a stronger US role and only 27% wanted the US out of the process. But in March 2011, after the US used its veto power to block a UN Security Council resolution condemning settlements, 69% said they opposed a larger US role in the peace process and only 27% said they supported a larger US role. Moreover, in the aftermath of Obama’s visit to Israel and Palestine, 29% say their feelings for president Obama have changed to the worse while only 8% say their feelings have turned to the better. 61% said their feelings did not change.

Despite the US announcement that it will release US$500 million to the PA, a large majority of 71% does not believe such financial support will end the PA’s financial crisis. However, 62% believe that the PA will now be deterred from confronting Israel at the international arena, including at the International Criminal Court, since it has to rely so much on US financial support.  The perception that the PA will now be deterred from confronting Israel at international forums due to Palestinian high dependence on US financial support increases among West Bankers (66%) compared to Gazans (57%), among residents of cities and villages (63% and 62% respectively) compared to residents of refugee camps (55%), among the religious (66%) compared to the somewhat religious (61%), among those who oppose the peace process (69%) compared to those who support the peace process (59%), among Hamas supporters (72%) compared to Fatah supporters, supporters of third parties and supporters of the none of the parties (54%, 60%, and 61% respectively), among men (66%) compared to women (59%), among non-refugees (66%) compared to refugees (58%), and among farmers, merchants, and laborers (83%, 75%, and 69% respectively) compared to retirees and students (32% and 52% respectively). ...Full Report

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (37)

A confused and uncertain public: 

While the Majority Opposes Return to Negotiations Under the Shadow of Settlement Construction, and While the Majority Opposes Alternatives to Negotiations Such as Violence, the Dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, or the Adoption of a One-State Solution, and While the Majority Supports Alternatives Such as Going to the UNSC, a Unilateral Declaration of Statehood, and Resort to Non-Violent Resistance, the Overwhelming Majority has no Confidence in the Efficacy of any of the Alternatives it Supports

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 30 September and 2 October 2010. The poll was conducted right after the expiration of the Israeli partial settlement freeze and during Palestinian deliberations on the future of their direct negotiations with the Israeli government. Few weeks before the conduct of the poll, Hamas carried out an armed attack near Hebron that led to the death of four Israeli settlers. The poll covers issues related to direct negotiations, alternatives Palestinians have in case of pulling out of direct negotiations, Hamas's attack against settlers, and internal Palestinian matters such as the withdrawal of government cars from senior civil servants, current conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, elections, future of reconciliation, and others. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2010 show a clear majority, almost two thirds, demanding Palestinian pull out of direct negotiations as long as Israel returns to settlement construction. But the public is uncertain, indeed confused, about the best course of action for the Palestinian side. On the one hand, while strongly rejecting negotiations while settlement construction is underway, it opposes resort to violence, the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority (PA), or the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of a one state solution.  And despite the fact that the public supports alternatives such as going to the UN Security Council, the unilateral declaration of statehood, and non violent resistance, about three quarters have no confidence in the efficacy of any of these alternatives. It is worth noting however that despite the lack of support for a general return to violence, findings show a majority support for the Hamas attack on settlers near Hebron in the previous month. This attack took place on the eve of the inauguration of the direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Washington, DC. More puzzling is the finding that despite the majority opposition to violence, the overwhelming majority of respondents expressed opposition to the steps taken by the PA to crack down on Hamas's violence, steps that appear to be consistent in theory with the public view that does not see violence as a viable alternative, one that can help Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. It is also worth noting that half of the Palestinians believe that Hamas's attack on settlers aimed at derailing the peace process and the direct negotiations. 

It is also interesting to note that the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas has remained unchanged since the second quarter of 2010. In fact, the popularity of President Mahmud Abbas has risen during the current period compared to that of Ismail Haniyeh. The implication of this is that Hamas did not gain more popularity despite public support for its armed attack on settlers.

Moreover, Abbas and Fateh did not lose public support despite conceding to direct negotiations in the few weeks before the conduct of the poll, negotiations that did not receive public support, and despite the crackdown on Hamas after its armed attack, a crackdown opposed by the overwhelming majority of the public.

Findings also show that the public is not optimistic about the chances for reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas, despite the latest meeting in Damascus between representatives of the two sides, and that half of the public still believes that if Hamas wins the next elections, separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be consolidated while only a quarter of the public believes that a Fateh victory would consolidate separation. Finally, findings show that a clear majority is in favor of the Fayyad government decision to withdraw government cars from senior civil servants. 

(1) Domestic Conditions

• 70% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip and 34% describe conditions in the West Bank as bad or very bad.
• 58% believe there is, or there is to some extent, free press in the West Bank and 32% say there is, or there is to some extent, free press in the Gaza Strip.
• Perception of safety and security is identical in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: 60% say that these days they feel that their safety and security is assured.
• Positive evaluation of the performance of public institutions in the West Bank reaches 43% and in the Gaza Strip 30%.
• If new presidential elections were held today, Abbas would receive 57% and Ismail Haniyeh 36%, and if competition is betweenMarwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter 30%.
• If new legislative elections were held today, Fateh would receive 45%, Hamas 26%, all other electoral lists combined 12%, and 17% remain undecided.
• Despite the latest reconciliation meeting between Fateh and Hamas in Damascus, 30% say the separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is permanent, 51% say unity will be resumed but only after a long time, and only 14% say unity will be resumed soon.
• A Hamas victory in new elections will lead to the consolidation of separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the eyes of half of the public and to the tightening of the siege and blockade in the eyes of 86% of the public.
• 63% support the decision of the Fayyad government to withdraw government cars from senior civil servants and 32% oppose it.
• Acts of burning and destruction of summer camps and touristic installations in the Gaza Strip are committed by groups belonging to Hamas or extreme Islamist groups, or groups that have split from Hamas in the eyes of 48% of the public while only 5% put the blame for these acts on Fateh.

11% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 70% describe them as bad or very bad. By contrast, 33% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and only 34% describe them as bad or very bad. However, 70% say there is corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank while only 60% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip.

58% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 32% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. But only 36% describe conditions of democracy and human rights in the PA under President Mahmud Abbas as good or very good and 33% say they are bad or very bad.  Moreover, only 30% say people in the West Bank can criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear while 65% say people cannot do that without fear. By contrast, 42% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 43% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Moreover only 24% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear and 66% say people cannot do that without fear. 

Perceptions of safety and security are almost identical: in the Gaza Strip, 60% say they feel safe and secure in their homes these days and only 40% do not feel safe and secure. In the West Bank, 61% say they feel safe and secure and 39% say they do not.

Positive evaluation of the performance of the PA public institutions in the West Bank reaches 43% and negative evaluation reaches 26%. By contrast, positive evaluation of the performance of the public institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip reaches 30% and negative evaluation reaches 31%.  Moreover, 29% say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries. The percentage of those seeking immigration reaches 37% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank. Positive evaluation of the performance of the dismissed government of Ismail Haniyeh reaches 36% and negative evaluation reaches 27% while positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Salam Fayyad reaches 43% and negative evaluation reaches 25%. Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas reaches 51% and dissatisfaction reaches 45%. Satisfaction is higher in the West Bank (53%) than in the Gaza Strip (49%). 26% say the government of Haniyeh is the legitimate Palestinian government and 30% say the Fayyad government is the legitimate one. 30% say both governments are illegitimate and 9% say the two governments are legitimate. These results are almost identical to those obtained last June.

If new presidential elections were held today, and only two, Abbas and Haniyeh, were nominated, the former would receive the vote of 57% and the latter 36% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 61%. Last June Abbas received 54% and Haniyeh 39%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives today 59% and Haniyeh 37% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 55% and Haniyeh 35%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter would receive 30% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 70%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 67% and Haniyeh 32% and in the West Bank Barghouti receives 64% and Haniyeh 28%. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 30% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Salam Fayyad (13%) Mustafa Barghouti(11%), and Saeb Erekat (6%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 26% say they would vote for Hamas and 45% say they would vote for Fateh, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. These results are identical to those obtained in June. Vote for Hamas in the West Bank (27%) is higher than the vote it receives in the Gaza Strip (24%) and vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip (53%) is higher than it receives in the West Bank (41%). Percentage of the undecided in the West Bank reaches 19% and 14% in the Gaza Strip.

In light of the latest Damascus meeting between Fateh and Hamas, the public is not optimistic about the future of unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: 30% say the split is permanent, 51% say unity will return but only after a long time, and only 14% say unity will return soon.

Responsibility for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is placed on Hamas by 15% of the respondents and on Fateh by 11% and on both together by 66%. But when asked about the future of the unity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if Hamas wins new elections, 49% say such a win would consolidate the split. But if Fateh wins, only 25% say its win would consolidate the split. Only 17% say a Hamas electoral victory would consolidate unity while 34% say a Fateh electoral victory would consolidate unity. While the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are similar in believing that a Hamas victory would consolidate the split, a major difference between respondents in the two areas emerges regarding the future of the split in the case of a Fateh victory:  25% of West Bankers say such a victory would consolidate unity while 49% of Gazans think it would consolidate unity.

Moreover, findings show that a majority of 86% believes that if Hamas wins the next presidential and legislative elections such victory would lead to the consolidation of the siege and boycott on the Palestinian government or would keep things as they are today. But if Fateh wins the next elections, 37% believe this would lead to the tightening of the siege and blockade or would keep conditions as they are today. 56% believe that a Fateh victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott and only 9% believe a Hamas victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott.

In this regard, what worsens conditions for Hamas is the public belief that the two issues of national unity and ending the siege should be two of the most important Palestinian priorities. In an open question about the main problems confronting Palestinians which should be the top priorities of the PA, 26% mentioned the absence of national unity due to the split, while 15% mentioned the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings, 28% mentioned poverty and unemployment, 16% mentioned occupation and settlement activities, and 11% mentioned corruption in some public institutions.

63% support and 32% oppose the decision of the government of Salam Fayyad to withdraw government cars from senior civil servants. Support for the decision is higher in the West Bank (68%) than in the Gaza Strip (54%).

When asked who is behind the wave of burning and destruction of summer camps and tourist installations in the Gaza Strip, 19% said Hamas groups were the culprit, 11% said it was groups that had split from Hamas, 18% said it was radical Islamist groups from outside Hamas. Only 5% said Fateh groups were behind the wave of attacks while the rest said they do not know or selected other groups such as Israel (7%) or collaborators (5%).

(2) Peace Process

• 66% want the Palestinian side to pull out of the direct negotiations as long as settlement construction is underway, but 30% support continuation of negotiations despite the resumption of settlement construction.
• Despite opposition to negotiations, 64% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian side needs success in the negotiations more than the Israeli side.
• In the case of a pull out of negotiations or in case negotiations fail, the majority supports three alternative options: going to the UN Security Council, a unilateral declaration of statehood, and resort to non violent resistance.
• But the majority believes that these three alternatives will not be effective  in changing current Palestinian condition or in ending occupation or stopping settlement construction.
• A majority opposes return to armed intifada, the dissolution of the PA, or the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of a one-state solution.
• But Hamas's armed attack on settlers near Hebron receives the support of 51% of the public and the opposition of 44%. Moreover, more than three quarters of the public oppose measures taken by the PA against Hamas in the aftermath of that attack.
• More than three quarters of the public are worried that they or members of their families might be harmed by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished.
• A majority of 57% support the Arab Peace Initiative and 39% oppose it. But only 49% support and 48% oppose a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.

66% believe the Palestinian side should withdraw from the direct negotiations now that the Israeli settlement moratorium has ended and construction has been resumed while 30% believe it should not withdraw. Percentage of those demanding withdrawal from negotiations increases to 68% in the West Bank compared to 62% in the Gaza Strip. Even if the US succeeds in finding a compromise for the settlement issue, one that is partial or temporary, a majority of 56% would still oppose return to direct negotiations while only 39% would support a return. It seems that the opposition to negotiations while settlement construction continues is driven by extreme pessimism about their chances for success. If direct negotiations continue, the chances for success are low or very low in the view of 63%  and high or very high in the view of 6% and medium in the view of 29%. Indeed, 67% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent while 32% believe the chances are medium or high. The opposition to negotiation might also be driven by prevailing doubts about the legitimacy of any agreement that might come out of it given the fact that the term of the President and the legislative council has ended: even if it was possible to reach an agreement, 51% say such an agreement would be illegitimate while 43% say it will be legitimate.

Despite opposition to negotiations, 64% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian side is in more need for these negotiations to succeed than the Israelis while only 14% believe that Israel is in more need for success, and 20% believe that the two sides need success in negotiations equally. Percentage of those believing that Palestinians need success more than Israelis increases in the Gaza Strip (68%) compared to the West Bank (61%). Moreover, a majority of Palestinians (53%) believes that the Israelis too believe that the Palestinian side need success more than the Israelis. Here too, differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip emerge: 60% of Gazans but only 49% of West Bankers believe that Israelis think Palestinians need success more than Israelis.

In case of Palestinian pull out of the direct negotiations or in case negotiations fail, a majority of Palestinians (69%) supports going to the UN Security Councils to obtain a recognition of a Palestinian state while 54% support a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood and 51% support resort to non violent and non armed resistance. Support for a unilateral declaration of statehood increases in the West Bank, reaching 58%, compared to the Gaza Strip (47%). Similarly, support for non violent resistance is higher in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (47%). By contrast, a majority (71%) is opposed to the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of a one-state solution while 57% is opposed to return to armed intifada and an identical majority is opposed to the dissolution of the PA. Support for a return to armed intifada increases in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (35%). Similarly, support for PA dissolution increases in the Gaza Strip (44%) compared to the West Bank (37%).

Despite the support for going to the UN Security Council, 76% of the Palestinians believe that if the Palestinians do indeed do that, the US will use its veto power to prevent recognition of the Palestinian state. Moreover, if Palestinians unilaterally declare statehood, 75% are convinced that such a declaration would be meaningless, that it will not change Palestinian conditions or will change them to the worse. Similarly, despite the support for non violent resistance, 72% believe that such resistance will not succeed in ending occupation or stopping settlement construction.

On the other hand, if armed confrontations were to erupt between Palestinians and Israelis, only 41% of Palestinians believe such confrontations would help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not while 55% believe they would not help. Belief that armed confrontations, if erupted, would help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not increases in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (38%). But if such confrontations were indeed to erupt, 47% would support them and 49% would oppose them. Support increases in the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (42%). Nonetheless, a majority of 51% supported and only 44% opposed Hamas's latest armed attack near Hebron which led to the death of four settlers. A majority of the support for the attack came from the Gaza Strip, reaching 61%, while only 44% supported it in the West Bank. An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (76%) opposes the PA crackdown on Hamas, a crackdown that took place in the aftermath of the attack on settlers. Only 20% supported the crackdown. About half of the public (49%) believes that the main motive behind Hamas's attack on settlers was the impede the peace process and direct negotiations while 39% believe that the motivation was to resist occupation and settlements.

76% are worried that they or a member of their family might be hurt by Israelis or that their land might be confiscated or homes demolished while 24% say they are not worried. Moreover, about three quarters believe that Israel's long term goal is to expand so that it stretches between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River while expelling the Arab population and an additional 20% believe its goal is to annex the West Bank and deny the Palestinians political rights and 13% believe its goal is to withdraw from all or part of the occupied Arab land after insuring its security.

57% support and 39% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative. But if the US decides to pressure the Palestinians and the Israelis to accept and implement the initiative, 53% believe that the Palestinian side should accept such American intervention and 42% believe it should not. Moreover, 49% support and 48% oppose a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict have been resolved and after a Palestinian state has been established.

(3) Turkey Remains Popular:

• Turkey is the most popular among Palestinians followed by Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia

In an open question about the regional country most supportive of the Palestinians, Turkey was selected by 25% of the public, remaining the most popular among respondents, followed by Egypt with 17%, Syria with 8%, and Iran and Saudi Arabia with 7% each. These results indicate a reduction in the percentage of those who selected Turkey from 43% last June and an increase of those who selected Egypt from 13% during the same period. It is worth noting that Egypt came first in the Gaza Strip with 30% selecting it. ....Full Report

This joint survey was conducted with the support of  the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah

  5-7 June 2014

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5-7 June 2014. The period before the poll witnessed the success of the reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas and the formation of a reconciliation government headed by Rami al Hamdallah. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were suspended for more than two months before the conduct of the poll and the US efforts in this regard came to a halt. This press release covers public perception of the process of internal reconciliation, public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and others. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or emailpcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

Main Findings:

Findings also show that the public does not view the implementation of reconciliation as an impediment to negotiations with Israel. To the contrary, a majority wants the conciliation government to accept existing agreements with Israel and believes that the inclusion of Hamas into the PLO means the indirect acceptance by the Islamist faction of these agreements. In fact, support for the two-state solution has increased. Yet, in light of the suspension of peace talks with Israel, the overwhelming majority supports joining international organizations, including the International Criminal Court, and waging a non-violent resistance campaign against Israeli occupation. Nonetheless, a majority continues to reject a return to armed intifada, the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, or the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

(1) Conciliation government, the future of reconciliation and relations with Israel:

• Optimism about reconciliation: 62% think it will succeed, 61% think the Rafah crossing with Egypt will open, 53% think economic conditions will improve, 51% think conditions of freedoms and liberties will improve, and land 59% think elections will take place as scheduled.
• 52% want to deploy the Presidential Guard at the Rafah crossing with Egypt, but 66% agree that Hamas should continue to have control over police and security in the Gaza Strip.
• One third of the public is opposed to the dissolution of armed groups in the Gaza Strip while the rest support such dissolution under certain conditions.
• 42% believe that Hamas’ way is the best way to end occupation and establish a state while 39% believe Abbas’ way is the best way.

62% believe that reconciliation will succeed and the split will not return while 34% believe the opposite to be true. Optimism is higher in the Gaza Strip, reaching 74%, and lower in the West Bank, standing at 54%. Moreover, reconciliation restores some confidence in the PA: Half of the public believes that the PA is an accomplishment for the Palestinian people while 45% believe that it is a burden on the Palestinian people.  Three months ago, only 25% said that the PA, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, was an accomplishment. At that time an additional 15% said the PA in the West Bank only was an accomplishment while 13% said the PA in the Gaza Strip only was an accomplishment. Optimism is evident in the belief of 61% that the Rafah Crossing with Egypt will reopen, of 53% that economic conditions will improve soon, and of 51% that the status of public liberties will improve and that political detentions will soon be a thing of the past. Moreover, a majority of 59% believes that elections will take place as scheduled, six months from today, and 71% want Hamas to take part in the presidential elections in addition to the legislative and the Palestinian National Council elections.  The belief that reconciliation will succeed can also be seen in the high confidence (61%) the public has in the conciliation government, in the high level of satisfaction (66%) with the speed by which the reconciliation agreement is being implemented by both sides, and the belief of the majority (54%) that Arab States will fulfill their promises to financially support the PA.

A majority of 52% prefers to see the Presidential Guard in charge of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, while 29% prefer the continuation of the status quo. By contrast, 66% favor continued security control by Hamas in the Gaza Strip on temporary basis until the holding of elections in six months and 30% oppose it.  Support for deploying the Presidential Guard at the Rafah crossing is higher in the West Bank (55%) than in the Gaza Strip (48%), among women (55%) compared to men (50%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (76% and 63% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (32%), among the somewhat religious and the un-religious (59% and 60% respectively) compared to the religious (45%), and among supporters of the peace process (62%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (29%).

By contrast, support for continued Hamas control over police and security in the Gaza Strip until the elections is higher among Hamas supporters (90%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (55% and 54% respectively), among the religious (73%) compared to the somewhat religious and the un-religious (62% and 50% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (78%) compared to supporters of the peace process (65%), among holders of BA degree (69%) compared to illiterates (60%), and among the married (69%) compared to the unmarried (59%).

The largest percentage believes that Hamas and Fatah have made just the required concessions in order to facilitate reconciliation (45% and 42% respectively) but 28% believe that Hamas has made fewer concessions than required and 33% believe that Fatah has made fewer concessions than required. By contrast, only 14% believe that Hamas’ concessions were too many, and 11% believe that Fatah’s concessions were too many. It is interesting to note that 64% of Hamas’ likely voters believe that it has made just the required or less than the required concessions, while 71% of Fatah supporters believe the same about Fatah’s concessions. Most interesting, while one third of Hamas’ likely voters believes that it has made too many concessions, only 6% of Fatah’s likely voters believe that Fatah has made too many concessions.

One third of the public is opposed to the disbanding of armed groups in the Gaza Strip under any circumstances, while 19% say they support this measure now that a conciliation government has been formed; 12% say they would support such a measure but only after the upcoming elections; 16% say they support it but only after the ending of the Gaza siege and 15% say they support it but only after reaching a peace agreement with Israel. Support for disbanding armed groups in the Gaza Strip under any conditions increases among Gazans (35%) compared to West Bankers (32%), among men (36%) compared to women (29%), among supporters of Hamas (54%) compared to supporters of Fatah and supporters of third parties (24% and 27% respectively), among the religious (38%) compared to the somewhat religious and the un-religious (28% and 32% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (59%) compared to those who support the peace process (24%), among refugees (37%) compared to the non-refugees (29%), and among holders of BA degree (37%) compared to the illiterates (31%).

Belief that Hamas’ way is the best way to end the occupation and establish a Palestinian state stands at 42%, while belief that Abbas’ way is the best stands at 39%. Three months ago, these findings stood at 39% and 36% respectively.  Support for Hamas’ way is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among supporters of Hamas (88%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (13% and 41% respectively), among the religious (51%) compared to the somewhat religious and the un-religious (35% and 26% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (73%) compared to those who support the peace process (31%), among holders of BA degree (46%) compared to illiterates (33%), and among men (44%) compared to women (41%).

(2) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• In presidential elections, Mahmoud Abbas wins by 53% of the vote and Haniyeh receives 41% of the vote.
• If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives the support of 58% and the latter 38%.
• 52% support and 39% oppose a proposal to appoint a vice president. Among the prominent candidates: Marwan Barghouti followed by Rami al Hamdallah, Ismail Haniyeh, and Saeb Erikat.
• In new parliamentary elections, Fatah receives the support of 40% and Hamas 32%.

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive 53% and Haniyeh 41% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 67%. Three months ago, findings were identical except for the rate of participation which stood then at 60%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 52% and Haniyeh 46%, and in the West Bank Abbas receives 54% and Haniyeh 38%.  If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 58% and the latter would receive 38% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 71%. In our March 2014 poll Barghouti received 60% of the vote and Haniyeh 34%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (36%) followed by Haniyeh (33%), and Abbas (28%).  The rate of participation in this case would reach 75%.

52% support and 39% oppose the appointment of a vice president to Abbas. Among those who support appointing a vice president, Marwan Barghouti is the favorite, selected by 24% in an open question, followed by Rami al Hamdallah who was selected by 17%, Ismail Haniyeh by 16%, Saeb Erikat, Mohamad Dahlan, and Mustafa Barghouti (6% each), Salam Fayyad by 5%, and Khalid Misha’al and Azzam al Ahmad by 4% each.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 74% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 40% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 28% and for Fatah at 43%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 35% and in the West Bank at 30%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 42% and in the West Bank at 39%. These results indicate an increase in the vote for Hamas in the West Bank which stood at 23% last December.  Fatah, on the other hand, increased its popularity in the Gaza Strip by four percentage points while also losing six percentage points in the West Bank.     

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises to 24% and in the West Bank to 33%.
• 40% of Gazans and 27% of West Bankers expect economic conditions to improve in the next few years.
• Belief that corruption exists in the PA stands at 81%; 25% say there is freedom of press in the West Bank and 16% believe there is freedom of press in the Gaza Strip.
• Perception of personal safety and security stands at 64% among residents of the Gaza Strip and 51% among residents of the West Bank.
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas rises from 46% to 50%.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises to 24% in this poll compared, to 15% three months ago. 52% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank rises from 30% three months ago to 33% today.  Percentage of those who believe conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad deceases from 42% to 37% during the same period.

We asked West Bank and Gaza publics about their expectations regarding economic conditions in their respective areas in the next few years: 27% of the West Bankers expected better conditions, and 40% expected worse conditions. In the Gaza Strip, 57% expected better conditions, and only 9% expected worse conditions. These findings indicate a widespread optimism, particularly in the Gaza Strip, that reconciliation will bring a better economic future; three months ago, only 19% of West Bankers and 28% of Gazans said that their economic conditions will be better in the next few years.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%.  Furthermore, 25% say there is, and 40% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 16% say there is, and 36% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  32% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 28% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. In our last poll, three months ago, only 22% said people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 51% and in the Gaza Strip at 64%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 51% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 41%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 24%. Last March these percentages stood at 44% and 22% respectively. 

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas increases from 46% three months ago to 50% in this poll.

(4) Peace Process:

• A majority of the public sees no contradiction between reconciliation and the peace process
• 59% believe that the conciliation government should accept existing agreements signed by the PLO with Israel
• Support for the two-state solution rises from 51% to 54% but 61% believe that it is no longer practical due to settlements’ expansion.
• 50% support and 46% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative; but only 40% support recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people
•  Now that negotiations have been suspended, 81% support joining additional international organizations and 69% support waging a non-violent campaign against Israeli occupation
• 55% oppose a UN Security Council resolution setting the borders of the Palestinian state and imposing it on the two sides and 52% oppose an international trusteeship over Palestine.
• 81% are worried of being hurt by the Israeli army or seeing their homes demolished or land confiscated.

Findings show that the Palestinian public does not see a contradiction between Fatah-Hamas reconciliation and the peace process; to the contrary, the public views reconciliation as a positive contribution to the peace process. For example, majority of 59% does not view the implementation of reconciliation as closing the door to negotiations with Israel, while 37% believe it puts an end to negotiations. Indeed, an identical percentage (59%) believes that the conciliation government should accept existing agreements signed by the PLO and Israel while 36% oppose that. Similarly, 53% believe that Hamas’ entry into the PLO means an indirect acceptance by the movement of the PLO program and the agreements signed with Israel; 42% reject that. 

The belief that the conciliation government should accept existing agreements with Israel increases in the West Bank (63%) compared to the Gaza Strip (52%), among women (61%) compared to men (57%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (78% and 50% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (38%), among the somewhat religious and the un-religious (64% and 68% respectively) compared to the religious (53%), among supporters of the peace process (70%) compared those who oppose the peace process (34%), and among those who work in the public sector (63%) compared to those who work in the private sector (57%).

Findings also show that reconciliation did not weaken popular support for the two-state solution; to the contrary, support for this solution increased from 51% in March to 54% in this poll. 46% oppose this solution and 61% say that it is no longer practical due to settlements’ expansion; 37% say it is still practical. Furthermore, 71% believe the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent and 28% say the chances are medium or high. Nonetheless, findings show that support for a one-state solution in which Palestinians and Jews enjoy equality does not exceed 31%; 68% oppose the one-state solution.

Support for the Arab Peace Initiative stands at 50% and opposition at 46%. A majority of 59% rejects and 40% accepts recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people.

Findings show that given the suspension of negotiations with Israel, an overwhelming majority of 81% supports joining international organizations and 69% support a popular non-violent resistance campaign against occupation. Findings also show that 58% oppose and 41% support a return to an armed intifada. 60% reject the dissolution of the PA while 38% support it.

In exploring the views on giving international organizations greater role in resolving the conflict with Israel, the poll shows that more than three quarters (76%) support joining the International Criminal Court even if such a step led to the imposition of American and Israeli financial sanctions on the PA. 22% oppose this step. Yet a majority of 55% is opposed to a proposal in which the UN Security Council would set and impose, on the two sides, the borders of the Palestinian state; a substantial minority of 42% supports the proposal. Similarly a majority of 52% opposes and 46% support the idea of placing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under a temporary UN trusteeship. A majority of 65% believes that the international community will not be ready to impose economic sanctions on Israel even if occupation lasts for a long time; 32% believe the international community will indeed impose such sanctions.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 77%. Indeed, a larger percentage (81%) believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and to expel their population or deny them their rights. On the other hand, when asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, almost two thirds (65%) believed that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% believe that end of occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state is the most vital Palestinian priority.
• 32% define unemployment and poverty as the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today; 26% view continuation of occupation as the most serious problem.

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. Three months ago, 42% said ending occupation and building a state was most vital goal, and 34% said the most vital goal was the right of return.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 32% of the public, while 26% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 23% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 15% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.....[Full Report]

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (50)

While half of the public favors negotiations with Israel, three quarters reject a permanent settlement if it includes a 10-year transitional phase during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley; and while fewer people believe that Hamas’ way is the best way to end occupation and build a state, satisfaction with the performance of Abbas and Hamdallah increases and more people believe that Abbas’ is the best way

19-22 December 2013

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 19-22 December 2013. The period before the poll witnessed continuation of the friction between Egypt and Hamas’ government in Gaza, the continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the release of more prisoners by Israel, an increase in violent incidents, release of reports on Arafat’s poisoning, and talk about the appointment of Marwan Barghouti as vice president to Abbas.  This press release covers public attitudes regarding the peace process, evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Rami al Hamdallah, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, reports on Arafat’s poisoning, and others. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2013 indicate that half of the public remains willing to give negotiations a chance but about 70% are pessimistic about the chances for success. On the other hand, most of the public supports the two-state solution and believes that if Abbas does reach a peace agreement with Netanyahu, a majority of the public will vote in favor of that agreement. The public however insists that the agreement be permanent and more than three quarters reject a permanent agreement that includes a 10-year transitional period during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley.

Findings also indicate a continued decline in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip, presumably as a result of the continued political conflict between Egypt and the Hamas government and the continued closure of tunnels and the Rafah crossing. This decline, which we first noticed in our September poll, is now affecting Hamas’ popularity in the Gaza Strip where it dropped significantly. It is worth mentioning however that Hamas’ popularity in the West Bank has not changed. Similarly, despite the continuation of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remained unchanged compared to the findings of September 2013.

By contrast, satisfaction with the performance of Abbas in the Gaza Strip has significantly increased and positive evaluation of the performance of Prime Minister Al Hamdallah increased in both areas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. More importantly, it seems that these changes have affected attitudes regarding whose way is the best to end occupation and build a Palestinian state. Current findings show a significant decrease in the percentage of those who believe that Hamas’ way is the best way and a significant increase in the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way.   It should be noted however that the percentage of those who believe that Hamas’ way is the best way remains higher than the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ is the best.

(1) Peace Process:

• 50% support the current negotiations but 69% expect them to fail; still, if Abbas succeeds in reaching a peace agreement with Israel, 57% believe that a majority of the public will vote in a referendum in favor of that agreement
• 53% support the two-state solution, but 56% believe that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement activities. Nonetheless, two thirds oppose a one-state solution.
• More than three quarters of the public reject a permanent agreement that includes a 10-year transitional period during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley
• A majority believes that settlement activities and the number of checkpoints have increased or remained as they were before the start of the current negotiations and that economic conditions have remained the same or have become worse
• 46% support and 53% oppose a package of compromises along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative, but 50% say they will vote in favor of such package if Abbas presented it in a referendum
• 43% support and 56% oppose a mutual recognition of national identity
• After reaching a peace agreement, 51% support and 47% oppose reconciliation between the two peoples
• A majority of 77% is worried that it might be hurt by Israelis in its daily life and 83% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex all Palestinian territories and expel its population or deny it its political rights 

Findings show that 50% of the public support and 47% oppose the president’s decision to resume direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But 69% expect these negotiations to fail in reaching a peace agreement and only 27% expect them to succeed. If negotiations do succeed and Abbas reaches a peace agreement with Israel, 57% believe that a majority of the Palestinian public will vote in a referendum in favor of the agreement; only 35% expect a majority to vote against it.

A majority of 53% supports the two-state solution and 46% oppose it. But 56% believe that that solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion and 68% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non-existent. Yet, 66% of the public oppose and 32% support the one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs enjoy equality in one state. Support for the two-state solution is higher in the West Bank (54%) than in the Gaza Strip (51%), in towns and villages (58%) compared to cities and refugee camps (53% and 43% respectively), among men (56%) compared to women (50%), among  those whose age is over 50 years (65%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (48%), among supporters of Fatah and third powers (74% and 54% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (30%), among the somewhat religious (59%) compared to the religious (45%), among supporters of the peace process (68%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (27%), among non-refugees (55%) compared to refugees (50%), and among farmers, retirees, merchants, and employees (69%, 62%, 61%, and 58% respectively) compared to students and laborers (47% and 46% respectively).

A majority of 76% opposes a permanent settlement if it includes a 10-year transitional period during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley; 21% support it. Opposition to this agreement is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (65%), among supporters of Hamas and third forces (92% and 81% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (62%), and among those who oppose the peace process (90%) compared to those who support the peace process (71%).

Only a small minority believes that conditions have improved since the start of peace talks while a majority believes that conditions have become worse or remained the same. Only 11% believe that economic conditions have improved; 49% believe they have become worse and 37% believe they have remained the same. Only 17% believe that restrictions and checkpoints have decreased; 46% believe they have increased and 32% believe they have remained the same. Only 4% believe that settlement construction has decreased; 78% believe that it has increased and 15% believe it has remained the same. 41% however believe that international support has increased, 19% believe it has decreased, and 35% believe it has remained the same.

Findings show that 46% support and 53% oppose a package of a permanent status agreement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for this package stood at 43% in December 2012. The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost fourteen years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) final borders and territorial exchange; (2) refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) a demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) security arrangements; and (6) end of conflict. We have been addressing these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic stalemate throughout 2012. 

Findings, as the summary table below shows, indicate that the public rejects three items in the package and accepts three. The following is a summary of the items and the attitudes to each:

 (1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 52% support or strongly support and 48% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2012, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 53% and opposition at 45%.

(2) Refugees: 46% support and 52% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2012, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 56% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem: 32% support and 68% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2012, an identical compromise obtained 29% support and 70% opposition.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State: 28% support and 71% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2012, 28% support, and opposition reached 71%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

(5) Security Arrangements: 52% support and 48% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2012, 46% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 53% opposed it.

(6) End of Conflict: 63% support and 36% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in December 2012 were 59% support and 39% opposition. 

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2013

If President Abbas presented this package for a vote in a referendum, 50% say they will vote in favor and 49% say they will vote against it. If the package includes an Israeli acknowledgement of responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem, about one quarter of those opposed to the package would change their mind and accept it. Moreover, if the package includes an Israeli acceptance of the Arab Peace Initiative, 18% of those opposed to the package would change their mind and accept it. But if the US Administration intervened in order to pressure the two sides, the Palestinians and the Israelis, to accept and implement this package, a majority of 60% believes that the Palestinian side should reject this American intervention while 37% believe that the Palestinian side should accept the American intervention.  A majority of 65% believes that most Palestinians would reject such American intervention but a similar majority (63%) believes that a majority of Israelis would accept the American intervention.

After reaching a peace agreement, 51% would support reconciliation between the two peoples and 47% would oppose it. But 68% believe that reconciliation will not be possible or that it will be possible only after few generations.  Support for reconciliation between the two peoples is higher in the West Bank (55%) than in the Gaza Strip (44%), among residents of villages and towns (62%) compared to residents of cities and refugee camps (50% and 44% respectively), among supporters of Fatah and third forces (72% and 55% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%), among the somewhat religious (56%) compared to the religious (45%), and among supporters of the peace process (66%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (24%).

Findings show that three quarters of the public (77%) are worried and 23% are not worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis or their land confiscated or homes demolished. Moreover, 83% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to expand its borders to include all territories between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel their Palestinian population or deny them their political rights. When asked about the long term goal of the PLO and the PA, 66% said that it is to recover all or some of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and 26% said it is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 territories or defeat Israel and destroy its Jewish population.

(2) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 52% and Haniyeh 42%.
• If the presidential contest was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 61% and the latter 34%.
• If the contest was between Barghouti, Haniyeh, and Abbas, the first receives 40%, the second 31%, and the third 26%.
• 73% support and 20% oppose the appointment of Marwan Barghouti as vice president
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 40%, Hamas 29%, all other electoral lists combined 8%, and 23% are undecided.

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If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 52% and Haniyeh 42% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 62%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 51% and Haniyeh 42%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 50% and Haniyeh 48% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 39%.  If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter would receive 34% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 70%. In our September 2013 poll Barghouti received 58% of the vote and Haniyeh 35%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (40%) followed by Haniyeh (31%), and Abbas (26%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 74%. In our previous poll last September, Barghouti received 35%, Haniyeh 33%, and Abbas 27%. 

73% support and 20% oppose the appointment of Marwan Barghouti as a vice president to Abbas. Support for this appointment stands at 79% in the Gaza Strip and 69% in the West Bank. Support for Barghouti as vice president increases in the Gaza Strip (79%) compared the West Bank (69%), among Fatah supporters and supporters of third forces (91% and 71% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (63%), and among supporters of the peace process (80%) compared those who oppose the peace process (58%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 40% say they would vote for Fatah, 8% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 33% and in the West Bank at 26%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% and in the West Bank at 41%. These results indicate a sharp decrease in support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip from the 39% it had last September. In the West Bank however Hamas’ popularity increased by one percentage point during the same period. Fatah, on the other hand, increased its popularity in the West Bank by two percentage points and in the Gaza Strip by one percentage point during the same period.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops further to 16% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged at 30%
• 77% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank and 68% believe it exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip
• Only 30% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear and only 24% believe people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the dismissed Hamas government in the Gaza Strip without fear.
• Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55%  and in the Gaza Strip at 62%
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 37% and positive evaluation of the performance of Al Hamdallah government stands at 39%
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas rises to 53% 
• 59% believe that Israel is responsible for poisoning Arafat

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Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip continues to drop reaching 16% in this poll compared to 21% three months ago and 36% six months ago. 65% say conditions in the Gaza Stip are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged compared to three months ago standing today at 30%. But the percentage of those who believe conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad decreases from 44% to 36% during the same period.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 77% in this poll. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 68%.  22% say there is, and 46% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 17% say there is, and 38% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  30% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 24% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55% and in the Gaza Strip at 62%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 55% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 27%. Last September these percentages stood at 45% and 26% respectively. 

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 37%.Three months ago it stood at 36%. Positive evaluation of the government of Rami al Hamdallah in the West Bank increases from 29% three months ago to 39% today.  Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas rises from 49% three months ago to 53% in this poll. Dissatisfaction with Abbas’ performance stands today at 45%. 

59% believe that Israel is responsible for poisoning former president Yasser Arafat and 21% believe that a Palestinian party or group or a joint Palestinian-Israeli party or group is responsible for Arafat’s death by poisoning. Belief that Israel has poisoned Arafat increases in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (57%), among supporters of Fatah and third forces (69% and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (50%), and among supporters of the peace process (60%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (52%).

(4) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the chances for reconciliation and reunification stands today stands at 16%
• 48% support and 49% oppose holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if separation continues for a long time
• 25% believe that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one and 31% believe that the government of Abbas-Hamdallah is the legitimate one
• 39% believe that Hamas’ way is the best for ending occupation and building a state and 36% believe that Abbas’ way is the best

Given the continued deterioration in relations between Hamas and the Egyptian government and the ups and downs in the Fateh-Hamas reconciliation dialogue, percentage of optimism about the chances for the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip remains low reaching 16%. The belief that unity is impossible and that two separate entities will emerge drops from 41% three months ago to 37% in this poll. 43% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time.

The largest percentage (38%) believes that the PA, with its parts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 26% believe that it is an accomplishment for the Palestinian people. Furthermore, 15% believe that the PA in the West Bank is an accomplishment while the PA in the Gaza Strip is a burden. By contrast, a similar percentage (14%) believes that the PA in the Gaza Strip is an accomplishment while the PA in the West Bank is a burden.

25% believe that the Haniyeh government in the Gaza Strip is the legitimate Palestinian government while 31% believe that the Abbas-Hamdallah government in the West Bank is the legitimate one; 11% believe that the two governments are legitimate. 27% believe that both governments are illegitimate. These findings indicate a drop in the percentage of those who believe that the two governments are illegitimate compared to the situation three years ago when in December 2010 that percentage stood at 34%. Other findings remained unchanged: 23% said at that time that Haniyeh’s government was the legitimate one, 29% said the Abbas-Fayyad government was the legitimate one, and 10% said the two governments were legitimate. But the public is split over the necessity of holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if the current disunity continued for a long time: 48% believe it to be necessary to hold such separate elections and 49% believe it to be unnecessary. 

Compared to the situation a year ago, findings show a drop in the percentage of those who believe that Hamas’ way is the best way to end occupation and build a Palestinian state and an increase in the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way. In December 2012, in the aftermath of the Gaza war and the entry of Khalid Mishaal into the Gaza Strip, 60% believed that Hamas’ way and that of the resistance groups was the best to achieve the vital goals of the Palestinians while only 28% said Abbas’ was the best. Today, in the aftermath of the recent developments in Egypt and their ramifications to the Gaza Strip and in the aftermath of the return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and the release of some prisoners, the percentage of those who believe Hamas’ was is the best way drops to 39% while the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way rises to 36%. The current findings show that 25% (compared to 13% a year ago) believe that other ways are better or do not know which way is the best way. It is worth mentioning that the 2012 question refer to “Hamas’ and the resistance groups’ way” while the current question refers to “Hamas’ way.”  Belief that Hamas’ way is the best is higher in the Gaza Strip (42%) compared to the West Bank (36%), in refugee camps and cities (41% and 40% respectively) compared to villages and towns (30%), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 (42%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (36%), among Hamas supporters (92%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third forces (14% and 22% respectively), among the religious (49%) compared to the somewhat religious (31%), and among those opposed to the peace process (67%) compared to supporters of the peace process (27%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be the most vital Palestinian goal and 33% believe that obtaining of the right of return should be the most vital goal.
• 27% view the spread of poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 25% view the continued occupation and settlement construction as the most serious problem.

42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. Three months ago, 45% said ending occupation and building a state was most vital goal and 29% said the most vital goal was the right of return.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27% of the public while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 22% believe the most serious problem is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 10% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings..... Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 1-4 May 2025. The period prior to the poll witnessed the continuation of the war on the Gaza Strip and the failure of all attempts to reach a new ceasefire after the collapse of the three-phase agreement reached on January 15, 2025, which lasted for a little more than two months after Israel refused to enter into negotiations to implement its second phase. During that period, the US president proposed the idea of displacing the residents of the Gaza Strip to Egypt and Jordan under the pretext of facilitating the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, a proposal that was rejected by all concerned parties except Israel, which began to develop plans to carry out such displacement. Israel has also demanded the disarmament of Hamas as one of the conditions for stopping the war on the Gaza Strip. In a speech to the PLO's Central Council, the PA president called on Hamas to release the Israeli hostages and give up arms in order to deny Israel the pretext of continuing the war on Gaza. Meanwhile, the Israeli military incursion into the Jenin and Tulkarm areas in the West Bank continued, interrupted by clashes between the Israeli army and Palestinian armed groups in the northern West Bank. The Israeli army evacuated tens of thousands of people from the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps and demolished dozens of buildings in those camps. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank also continued and entrances to most towns and villages were closed by the Israeli army in order to prevent residents from accessing main roads. Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages in unprotected areas in areas B and C also continued.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted with residents in areas that did not witness armed clashes and whose residents have not been displaced or returned after being displaced, especially after the recent ceasefire during the first three months of this year. This poll covers all of the above issues as well as other issues such as domestic condition and the internal balance of power, the peace process and the alternatives available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

This survey was conducted face-to-face in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip using tablets or phones. When each interview is completed, it is automatically sent directly to our server where only our researchers can access. There is no way for anyone to intercept or manipulate the collected data.

The sample size of this survey was 1270 people, of whom 830 were interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank (in 83 residential locations) and 440 in the Gaza Strip (in 44 locations).  The margin of error stands at +/-3.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Methodology of data collection in the Gaza Strip:

The interviews for this poll included 44 census “counting areas” in all areas of the Gaza Strip, with the exception of some areas whose residents were displaced in the Rafah governorate and some other specific areas of Gaza City, Khan Younis, and the northern Gaza Strip, so that the number of areas that were not accessible stood at 13 counting areas (five in the Rafah governorate, five in Gaza Governorate, two in Khan the Yunis governorate, and one in the northern Gaza Strip). Residents of these 13 displaced counting areas were interviewed in shelters and refugee camps in the same governorate from which they were displaced. These were randomly selected from an updated list of shelters and refugee camps located in their governorates, with the exception of the Rafah governorate, whose residents were displaced to areas in the Khan Younis governorate.

As in our previous four polls since October 7, most of the questions in this poll, covering the first four months of 2025, revolve around the events of that day and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war and the Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, the unprecedented human suffering of the Gaza Strip's residents, the debate regarding the future of the Gaza Strip after the war, public satisfaction with the performance of the various parties during the war, and West Bankers’ fears of the probability of the war spilling over from Gaza to the West Bank. The current poll, as in the previous three polls, covers the consequences of the war on the internal balance of power, support for the Palestinian leadership, Palestinian-Israeli relations, and the political process.

Only half of the Palestinians in the current poll view Hamas’ decision to carry out the October 7 attack as “correct.” In the Gaza Strip, is less than that. The fears of the war finally reaching the West Bank, the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip, with declining hopes for a quick ceasefire might have contributed to this and similar findings in this poll, many of which were evident in our previous poll seven months ago.

Despite the declining favorability of October 7, most of the public continue to believe the attack and the following war have placed the Palestinian issue at the center of global attention. Unlike previous polls, today’s findings show that the majority of the public does not believe Hamas will win the current war. Still, a plurality of the public believes that Hamas will continue to control the Gaza Strip after the war. Gazans are split in the middle regarding the anti-Hamas demonstrations in the Gaza Strip even though most Gazans think these demonstrations are driven by outsiders. Gazans are also split regarding emigrating from the Gaza Strip after the war ends. On the domestic balance of power, Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular Palestinian leader. Demand for Abbas' resignation remains overwhelming even as it drops slightly. Hamas’ popularity drops a little while Fatah’s remain unchanged. Findings show support for the two-state solution remaining unchanged. Support for armed struggle declines and support for negotiations rises.

Humanitarian conditions: We start with the humanitarian and living conditions in the Gaza Strip. There has been a significant decline in the percentage of Gazans who have access to food and more than half say they have lost a family member during the war. The majority of Gazans blame Israel and the US first for their suffering and only a small minority blames Hamas first.

Support for the attack on October 7: Once again, findings show decline in the overall support for the October 7 Hamas offensive. The decline is seen in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is important to note that support for this attack does not necessarily mean support for Hamas and does not mean support for any killings or atrocities committed against civilians. Indeed, almost 90% of the public believes Hamas men did not commit the atrocities depicted in videos taken on that day.

Ceasefire and who comes out the winner: A little over half of the Palestinians expect Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement soon. As we did in the previous two polls, we asked in the current one about the side that would emerge victorious in this war. A plurality thinks it will be Hamas but the percentage is much smaller in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.

Who will control Gaza after the war: A plurality expects Hamas to remain in control over the Gaza Strip after the war. That percentage is smaller in Gaza standing at a little over one quarter. When we asked about support for the return of the PA to control the Gaza Strip after a ceasefire, 40% expressed support. Support for the PA return is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. The idea of an Arab security deployment in Gaza to assist the PA security forces is opposed by almost two-thirds of the public.

Anti-Hamas demonstrations in the Gaza Strip: Gazans are split almost in the middle for and against the recent anti-Hamas demonstrations in the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, most Gazans think the demonstrations are driven and motivated by outside hands.

Demands for the release of the hostages and the disarmament of Hamas:  The overwhelming majority of Palestinians believes that the war will not end and Israel will not withdraw from the Gaza Strip if Hamas agrees to disarm. Similarly, the overwhelming majority disagree with the view that if Hamas releases the hostages, Israel will end the war and withdraw from the Gaza Strip. Perhaps this is why the overwhelming majority is opposed to a Hamas disarmament or the departure of its military leadership from the Gaza Strip.

Trump’s and Israeli calls for displacing Gazans: While the majority says it does not want to leave the Gaza Strip after the war ends, a large minority wants to do that. Similarly, about half of Gazans are willing to apply to Israel to help them emigrate to other countries via Israeli ports and airports.

Satisfaction with the performance of various parties during the war:  As we did in our previous polls, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with Hamas' performance continues to drop but it is higher than satisfaction with the PA, Fatah, and President Abbas. As for satisfaction with Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate continues to go to the Houthis in Yemen. followed by Qatar and Hezbollah. Satisfaction with Iran comes last as the majority views negatively Iran’s role since October 7. For the international actors, China received the highest satisfaction followed by Russia and the US receives the lowest level of satisfaction.

What should the PA do now? When asked about the measures the PA leadership should take today to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip, "the formation of a national unity government to negotiate with Israel and the international community to end the war and rebuild the Gaza Strip in the future," came first.

Fear in the West Bank of the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank: Three quarters of West Bankers say they fear the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank. If the Gaza war comes to the West Bank, the overwhelming majority says it will not leave home to go to Jordan.

Support for Palestinian factions: support for Hamas declines by 4-points while support for Fatah remains unchanged. The decline in support for Hamas came from the West Bank. Support for Fatah is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and support for Hamas is also higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. In both areas, support for Hamas is higher than the support for Fatah.

Support for Palestinian leaders: If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, Barghouti would receive 50% of the vote, followed by Khalid Mishal and Abbas.

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas: About 1 in 5 Palestinians are satisfied with the performance of President Abbas and 81% want him to resign.

The new government of Mohammad Mustafa: An overwhelming majority (69%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to carryout. In all of the reform items we asked about, we found that Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but a majority there too does not believe that the government will succeed in any of the reforms agenda items.

Support for the two-state solution:  Support for the concept of the two-state solution remains stable, with 4 out of 10 Palestinians supporting it. Support for a Palestinian state rises to more than 60% when it is not linked to the “two-state solution” and when the borders of the state are identified as those of 1967. We asked about the public support for three possible solutions to the conflict: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the solution of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel, and a one-state solution in which the Jews and Palestinians live with equality, The biggest support went to the two-state solution, slightly less than half, followed by the confederation and the one-state solution.

Support for Armed struggle: We presented the public with three ways to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective one: 4 out of 10 supported armed struggle, one third supported negotiations; and one fifth supported popular peaceful resistance. The findings indicate a significant decrease in support for armed struggle.

• For the fifth time since October 7, we asked respondents from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip what they thought of Hamas' decision to launch the October 7 attack, whether it was correct or incorrect: 50%, compared to 54% seven months ago, in September 2024, and 71% 14 months ago, in March 2024, said it was the right decision. The decrease in this percentage came from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where it stands today at 59% in the West Bank, a decrease of 5 percentage points, and 38% in the Gaza Strip, compared to 39% seven months ago.

• Parallel to 4-point drop in the perception that the October 7 attack was correct, the belief that the war on Gaza since October 7 has "revived international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that it may lead to increased recognition of the Palestinian state" drops by 4-points standing today at 64%, and only 34 said they did not believe so.

• 53% of Gazans say they have enough food for a day or two; 48% say they don't have enough food for a day or two. These results show a deterioration over the results we obtained seven months ago when 69% said they had enough food for a day or two.
• 52% of Gazans say that one or more members of their family were killed during the current war, and in a separate question, 66% say that one or more members of their family were injured during this war. When combining the answers to the two questions and omitting the overlap, the results show that 75% report that one or more of their family members have been killed or injured.

• We asked residents of the Gaza Strip how often they had to move from one shelter to another since the war began on October 7, 2023: 47% said it ranged from two to three times, 34% said it ranged from four to six times, 4% said it ranged between 7 and 10 times, and 6% said it was once.
• A majority of 51% (compared to 56% seven months ago) blames Israel for the current suffering of Gazans while 28% (compared to 22% seven months ago) blame the US; only 12% (compared to 12% seven months ago) blame Hamas; and only 7% (compared to 8% seven months ago) blame the PA. It is worth noting that the percentage of Gazans blaming Hamas stood at 18% in the current poll compared to 23% seven months ago.

• When asked if Hamas had committed the atrocities seen in the videos shown by international media displaying acts or atrocities committed by Hamas members against Israeli civilians, such as killing women and children in their homes. The overwhelming majority (87%) said it did not commit such atrocities, and only 9% said it did.

• A majority of 56% (65% in the West Bank 42% in the Gaza Strip expect Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement in a few days while 41% do not expect that.
• As we did in our previous four polls since the war, we asked in the current poll about the party that will emerge victorious in this war: 43% of the public expects Hamas to win, compared to 50% seven months ago and 67% 10 months ago. It is worth noting, as the figure below shows, that fewer Gazans, at just 23% today, expect Hamas to win compared to the results 7 and 10 months ago, when those percentages stood at 28%, 48%, and 56%, respectively. Hamas's expectation of victory has also dropped in the West Bank, where today it stands at only 56% compared to 65% seven months ago and 79% ten months ago. It is also worth noting that while 6% in the West Bank expect Israel to win the current war, 29% of Gazans expect Israel to win.

• We asked respondents to speculate about the future of the Gaza Strip the day after the end of the current war. The largest percentage (42%) says it will come under Hamas’ control. As we found in the previous poll, there are significant differences between West Bankers and Gazans, with only 28% of Gazans saying Hamas will actually control that area, compared to a much higher percentage (51%) in the West Bank. Seven months ago, 37% of Gazans said Hamas will control the Gaza Strip after the war. In the Gaza Strip, 21% expect the Israeli army to control the Gaza Strip; 19% believe that the PA will return to control the Gaza Strip; and 24% believe it will come under international control.
• If an agreement is reached to end the war on the Gaza Strip, 40% (46% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) support the return of the PA to managing the affairs of the Gaza Strip and providing for the requirements of daily life and responsibility for reconstruction and 56% do not support it. Last September, 70% said they oppose the return of President Abbas and the PA to the Gaza Strip and control of the Rafah crossing after a ceasefire is reached, and 27% supported it at the time, with support in the Gaza Strip at that time standing at 42% compared to only 17% in the West Bank.
• If the PA resumes its administration of the affairs of the Gaza Strip, only 31% (38% in the Gaza Strip and 25% in the West Bank) support asking for Arab forces from Jordan and Egypt to enable it to maintain security and 65% oppose that. In September 2024, support for the deployment of an Arab security force from Egypt and Jordan in the Gaza Strip to assist the Palestinian security forces stood at 32% and opposition at 66%.  In June 2024, support stood at 23% and opposition at 75%.

• 48% of Gazans compared to only 14% in the West Bank say they support the demonstrations that took place over the past two months in the Gaza Strip demanding that Hamas abandon control over that Strip while some demanded the departure of some of its military leaders out of Gaza. Support for these demonstrations stands at 28% in the combined West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 67% say they oppose them. Opposition to demonstrations stands at 77% in the West Bank but only 50% in the Gaza Strip.
• However, when asked about their opinion on the nature of these anti-Hamas demonstrations, whether they express a genuine opinion of a segment of the population or artificial and driven by external hands, a majority of 59% said they were artificial and driven by external hands while only 20% said they express the real opinion of the population. Even though almost half of the residents of the Gaza Strip support these demonstrations, 54% of them believe that these demonstrations are motivated by external hands and 20% believe that they are both, i.e. that they express a genuine opinion of the residents and are at the same time motivated by external forces.
• A majority of 57% (70% in the West Bank and only 38% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the steadfastness of the residents of the Gaza Strip despite heavy human losses and massive destruction is due to their deep belief in God, fate and destiny while 25% (40% in the Gaza Strip and 15% in the West Bank) believe they have no other option, and 15% (22% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) believe it is due to their belief in their Palestinian national identity.

• An overwhelming majority of residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (88% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the war on the Gaza Strip will not end and Israel will not withdraw from the Gaza Strip if Hamas agrees to disarm as demanded by Israel and regional and Palestinian parties; only 17% believe that the war will indeed end and Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip in that case.
• 73% (82% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip) disagree with the statement that if Hamas releases Israeli detainees, the war will end and Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and 24% (39% in the Gaza Strip and 14% in the West Bank) agree with this view.

• When asked whether it supports or opposes the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to stop the war on the Gaza Strip, an overwhelming majority (85% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip) said it is opposed to that; only 18% support it.
• When asked whether it supports or opposed the eviction of some Hamas military leaders from the Gaza Strip if that was a condition for stopping the war, 65% said they oppose it and 31% support it. Support for this step stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and only 20% in the West Bank.

• When asked whether it supports or opposes the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to stop the war on the Gaza Strip, an overwhelming majority (85% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip) said it is opposed to that; only 18% support it.
• When asked whether it supports or opposed the eviction of some Hamas military leaders from the Gaza Strip if that was a condition for stopping the war, 65% said they oppose it and 31% support it. Support for this step stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and only 20% in the West Bank.

• We asked the residents of the Gaza Strip about US President Trump's statements about the need to displace them in order to rebuild it and whether they are ready to emigrate from the Strip after the end of the war. A majority of 56% said they are not willing to emigrate but a large minority of 43% say they are willing to emigrate from the Gaza Strip after the end of the war.
• When asked whether they would be willing to apply to Israel to help them emigrate to other countries through its airports and seaports, 49% said they would do so and 50% said they would not do so.
• Despite Egypt and Jordan's rejection of the US president's request to accept the expusion of Gazans, a large minority of 43% believes that these two countries would bow to US pressure and accept the emigration of residents of the Gaza Strip while a majority of 53% believes they will not succumb to US pressure.
• If Israel were to occupy the Gaza Strip, 47% of the public believe that it would force Gazans to emigrate through its ports and airports to other countries in the world, but 49% (51% in the Gaza Strip and 47% in the West Bank) do not believe Israel will do so.

• As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:

1. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with Hamas' performance drops to 57% (67% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Fateh (24%; 19% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip), the PA (23%; 28% in the Gaza Strip and 19% in the West Bank), president Abbas (15%; 13% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip).

• We asked the public for the second time what political measures the PA leadership should take today to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip. We presented the public with three options: reconciliation, the formation of a national unity government, and the provision of humanitarian services. First came "the formation of a national unity government to negotiate with Israel and the international community to end the war and rebuild the Gaza Strip in the future," with 46% opting for it, compared to 42% seven months ago. Second was "achieving immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" with 34% selecting it.  The third option, chosen by only 16%, was for the PA to "lead a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the residents of Gaza in cooperation with Egypt and the international community." It is worth noting that support for the formation of a national unity government stands at 52% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank.

2. As for satisfaction with Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate went to Houthis in Yemen, as we found in our previous polls, today at 74% (84% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Qatar (45%), Hezbollah (43%), and Iran (31%).  The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction in the current and previous polls in the West Bank and Gaza. The findings show that a rise in satisfaction with Yemen and Qatar.

We asked the public about its assessment of Iran's role in Palestine in light of what has been happening since October the 7th, is it a useful role or harmful to the Palestinian cause? A majority of 54% believes Iran's role is harmful while only 32% believe it is beneficial.

3. For the international actors, China received the highest satisfaction (26%), followed by Russia (21%), and the United States (3%).

• 75% of West Bankers say they fear the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank while 23% do not fear such a war. 65% of West Bankers believe that if the war spreads to the West Bank, Israel will succeed in destroying most of its cities, as it did in the Gaza Strip.
• Despite this, 55% believe that Israel will not win a war in the West Bank if it moves there from the Gaza Strip, but 40% believe it will win it. When West Bankers are asked what they would do if the war moved to the West Bank, would they move with their families to Jordan or stay in the West Bank, 88% of West Bankers say they will remain in the West Bank while 9% say they will go to Jordan.

• If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, turnout would be 64%. Vote for Marwan Barghouti among the participants in the elections stands at 50%, followed by Khalid Mishal (35%) and Abbas (11). Seven months ago, support for Marwan Barghouti among voters stood at 46%, Hamas’ candidate at 44%, and Abbas at 9%.

• If only two candidates were in the competition for the presidency, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah and Khalid Mishal of Hamas, turnout would drop to 47%. In this case, among the actual voters Mishal stands at 68% and Abbas at 25%. Seven months ago, only 24% among the actual voters chose Abbas and 74% chose Hamas’s candidate.

• If the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti of Fatah and Mishal of Hamas, turnout would rise to 62%. In this case, the vote for Barghouti among the participants in the elections would be 58% and for Mishal 39%. These results indicate a 6-point rise in the percentage of votes for Barghouti and an 8-point drop in the vote for the Hamas candidate.

• In a closed question, we asked the public to choose the person it deems appropriate as President Abbas's successor from a predetermined list of options. The largest percentage (39%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti, 21% said they prefer Khalid Mishal, 12% chose Mohammed Dahlan, 6% chose Mustafa Barghouti, and 19% said they do not know or chose someone other than those listed.
• Satisfaction with President Abbas' performance stands at 19% and dissatisfaction at 79%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 13% in the West Bank (compared to 11% seven months ago) and in the Gaza Strip at 29% (compared to 27% seven months ago).
• 81% want President Abbas to resign while 18% want him to remain in office. Seven months ago, 84% said they want the president to resign. Today, 85% of the demand for the president's resignation comes from the West Bank and 74% comes from the Gaza Strip.

• When asked which political party or movement they support, the largest percentage (32%) said they prefer Hamas, followed by Fatah (21%), 12% selected third parties, and 34% said they do not support any of them or do not know. Seven months ago, 36% said they support Hamas and 21% said they support Fatah. These results mean that support for Hamas over the past seven months has decreased by 4 percentage points, while support for Fatah has remained unchanged during the same period. Support for Hamas today stands at 29% in the West Bank (compared to 37% seven months ago) and for Fatah at 18% (compared to 18% seven months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas stands at 37% (compared to 35% seven months ago) and support for Fatah at 25% (compared to 26% seven months ago).

• But if new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, 62% say they will participate in them, and among the participants in the elections 43% say they will vote for Hamas, 28% for Fatah, 8% for third parties, and 19% have not yet decided. Compared to the results we obtained seven months ago, the current results among voters actually participating in the elections indicate a decrease of 2 percentage points for Hamas and a rise of one percentage point for Fatah. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Hamas among voters participating in the elections stands at 49% (compared to 42% seven months ago), and vote for Fatah among voters participating in the elections stands at 30% (compared to 33% seven months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 38% (compared to 48% seven months ago) and Fatah among voters participating in elections stands at 27% (compared to 23% seven months ago).

• 40% (compared to 43% seven months ago) believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 19% (compared to 19% seven months ago) believe that Fatah led by president Abbas is the most deserving. More than a third, (35%) compared to 32% seven months ago, believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership.

• An overwhelming majority (69%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to carry out. By contrast, 23% believe it will succeed in doing so. Seven months ago, 69% said the new government would not succeed in carrying out reforms.
• We also asked the public about its expectations for the new government, such as carrying out specific reforms announced by this government or meeting the priorities of the public:

1. 76% believe that the government will not succeed in pushing for reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip It is important to note, as the following figure shows, that in all of these measures, Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but the majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of these reforms.
2. 75% believe it will not succeed in improving economic conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
3. 73% believe it will not succeed in holding legislative and presidential elections
4. 74% say it will not succeed in providing relief for the Gaza Strip and reconstruction in the future

It is important to note, as the following figure shows, that in all of these measures, Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but the majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of these reforms.

• Al Jazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine as 60% selecting it as the one they watched the most during the past two months. Due to the current war conditions, residents of the West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to watch Aljazeera, 72% and 43% respectively. The second most popular stations is Palestine Today (3%), followed by Palestine TV and Al-Arabiya (2% each), and finally Ma'an and Al-Mayadeen TV (1% each).
• A majority of 60% (compared to 66% seven months ago) believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 35% (compared to 30% seven months ago) believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people.
• We asked the public in the West Bank about its personal and family safety and security. The findings show that only 11% feel safe and secure while 88% feel unsafe and unsecure. Seven months ago, the perception of safety stood at 9% and 19 months ago at 48%.
• 71% say they are dissatisfied and 28% say they are satisfied with the current levels of popular solidarity in the West Bank with the people of the Gaza Strip in the war Israel is waging against them.
• Moreover, 71% are dissatisfied and 27% are dissatisfied with the current levels of popular solidarity in the West Bank with the displaced residents of the northern refugee camps.

• 41% (52% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip) believe Israel benefits the most from the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, 39% believe it is the Syrian people, 9% believe it is Turkey, and 5% believe it is the Palestinian cause.
• We asked the public what they thought of the United States’ war against the Houthis and whether it could succeed in defeating them and end their pro-Palestinian stand. 66% believe that the US will not succeed in its war against the Houthis while 28% believe it will. Belief that the US will succeed in defeating the Houthis rises in the Gaza Strip to 46% compared to only 15% in the West Bank.

• 40% support and 57% oppose the concept of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details. Last September, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 39%.

• But when asked about support or opposition to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied in 1967, i.e. defining the borders of the state and without linking it to the two-state solution, support rises to 61% (66% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip), while 36% do not support the establishment of such a state.
• Support for a two-state solution is usually linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for a Palestinian state. Today, 64% (compared to 57% seven months ago) believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion, but 33% (compared to 39% seven months ago) believe it remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent and 31% believe the chances are medium or high.
• When asked about the public's support or opposition to specific political measures to break the deadlock, 68% supported joining more international organizations, 50% supported resorting to unarmed popular resistance, 46% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 42% supported the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, and 26% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Seven months ago, 51% supported a return to confrontations and an armed intifada, 45% supported unarmed popular resistance, 49% supported the dissolution of the PA, and 22% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We asked about the public support for three possible solutions to the conflict: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the solution of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel, and a one-state solution in which the Jews and Palestinians live with equality, 47% (46% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, while 15% (9% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip) prefer a confederation between two states. 14% (12% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the establishment of a single state with equality between the two sides. 24% said they did not know or did not want to answer.
• Only 23% say they have heard and 72% say they have not heard about the “Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution” launched by Saudi Arabia with Arab and international cooperation.
• We presented the public with three ways to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective one: 41% (48% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) chose "armed struggle"; 33% (29% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) chose negotiations; and 20% (15% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip) chose popular peaceful resistance. As shown in the figure below, these results indicate a decrease of 9-percentage points in support for armed struggle, a 3-percentage point increase in support for negotiations, and a 5-point increase in support for peaceful resistance.

• We asked the public about their view of the Israeli intentions behind destroying homes in some refugee camps in the northern West Bank and the displacement of the residents of these camps. Respondents could choose one of three possibilities that proceeded from the least to the most extreme: The largest percentage (44%) choose the most extreme intention, that Israel's aspiration is to eliminate armed groups, destroy refugee camps, and expel their residents to Jordan; 35% believe it is to eliminate armed groups and eliminate the West Bank refugee camps as Israel does in the Gaza Strip, and 18% believe it is just to eliminate armed groups in the northern West Bank.
• A majority of 64% believes that criticism of the war in Israel and the signing of petitions demanding its cessation will not succeed in forcing Netanyahu to stop the war while only 32% believe that such protests will succeed in stopping the war.
• We asked the public about the most effective means to confront settler terrorism: relying on the Israeli army to prevent such attacks, deploying Palestinian police forces in areas subject to attack, forming armed groups from the residents of those areas, or forming unarmed groups from those areas. The results were as follows:  
• A third of the public said that forming armed groups is the most effective option  
• The option to deploy Palestinian police forces in these areas came in second place with 27% support.  
• Reliance on the Israeli army came in third place with 23%.  
• The option of forming unarmed groups came last with only 12% opting for it. 
• When asked about the role of the Israeli army in preventing or stopping settler attacks, a majority of 75% say the army supports settler attacks
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (93%) say that the Palestinian security services do not enter the areas that are attacked by settlers, whether during or after the attacks. 
• We asked respondents whether the security conditions in their area of residence and the restrictions imposed by the occupation were pushing their neighbors to leave the area: 8% believe this is true and 88% say it is not true

• 41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages; 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; and 12% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (43%; 57% in the Gaza Strip and 34% in the West Bank) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; 30% said it is the Israeli occupation; 9% said it is corruption; 6% said it is unemployment; and 9% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Seven months ago, 38% said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; and 30% said it is the Israeli occupation.

This survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah. 

20-22 March 2014

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 20-22 March 2014. The period before the poll witnessed continued Palestinian-Israeli negotiations but with significant instances of sharp disagreements over the contents of the American proposed Framework document.  It also witnessed the release by Israel of another group of Palestinian prisoners. Several deadly confrontations between Palestinians and the Israeli army led a growing number of Palestinian martyrs.  Talks continued regarding the appointment of a vice president and conflict and acrimony between Abbas and Mohammad Dahlan were evident to the public to see. This press release covers the peace process, public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Rami al Hamdallah, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and others. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2014 show Palestinian flexibility regarding the extension of negotiations with Israel if Israel agrees in return to release more Palestinian prisoners or freeze settlement construction in some settlements. Similarly, more than two thirds of the public support postponing joining more international organizations in return for an Israeli release of more prisoners. Findings also show that the public believes that Abbas will accept the Framework document when presented by John Kerry and that Abbas will also agree to extend negotiations to the end of 2014. Similarly, the largest percentage believes that Netanyahu too will accept the Framework document. But a majority of Palestinians indicates that it would reject the Framework document if it includes a request to recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people even if the document states that the 1967 lines are the basis of negotiations and that East Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine.

In domestic matters, findings indicate a limited increase in Fatah’s popularity while at the same time indicating a significant decrease in the level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas. Surprisingly, the percentage of those voting for Abbas in presidential elections did not decease; in fact it increased slightly. Findings also show an almost equal split among the public regarding the idea of appointing a vice president and if one is appointed, Marwan Barghouti emerges as the most acceptable. The public is also split on its position regarding instances of strikes in the public sector, which recently increased significantly, with a little over half looking at the strikes negatively and a little less than half viewing them positively.

(1) Peace Process:

• 56% of the public believe that Abbas will accept the Framework document and 32% think he will reject it.
• 62% reject the Framework document if it includes a recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people.
• 76% believe that Abbas will extend negotiations, but 55% say they are opposed to such extension.
• A majority of 65% supports extending negotiations in return for an Israeli release of Palestinian prisoners.
• 60% support seeking Palestinian membership in new international organizations but 68% say they would agree to postpone such a step in return for the release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel.
• 56% believe that a majority of Palestinians will vote in favor of a peace agreement that Abbas might reach with Israeli leaders.
• 77% oppose and 21% support allowing settlers to remain under Palestinian sovereignty in the permanent settlement.
• A majority supports the two-state solution but 74% of the public believe that a Palestinian state will not be established in the next five years.
• 64%  say they participate in the boycott of Israeli products that have non-Israeli alternatives.

​

A majority of 56% believes that president Abbas will accept the Framework document that will be presented by John Kerry while 32% believe he will reject it; similarly, the largest percentage (47%) believes that Netanyahu too will accept the Framework document while 41% believe that he will reject it. A majority of 62% rejects and 32% accept the framework document if it includes a request to recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people. The percentage of rejection is almost equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (62% and 63% respectively). But rejection is greater in refugee camps (68%) compared to cities and villages (62% and 61% respectively), among men (65%) compared to women (59%), among those who oppose the peace process (80%) compared to those who support the peace process (54%), among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (52% and 57% respectively), and among those who hold a BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (54%).

An overwhelming majority (76%) believes that president Abbas will agree to extend negotiations with Israel to the end of the year and only 14% believe he will not agree to that. Yet, a majority of 55% of the public is opposed to extending negotiations to the end of the year; 42% support such an extension. Opposition to extending negotiations is higher in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (52%), in refugee camps and cities (63% and 57% respectively) compared to villages and towns (43%), among men (62%) compared to women (48%), among those who oppose the peace process (86%) compared to supporters of the peace process (38%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 66% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (28%), and among holders of BA degree (66%) compared to the illiterates (43%). Support for extending negotiations increases to 51% if Israel agreed to freeze settlement construction in some settlements; support increases sharply to 65% if Israel agrees to release more Palestinian prisoners.

An overwhelming majority (75%) believes that president Abbas will go to international organizations after the end of the current round of negotiations while 17% believe that he will not do that. A majority supports this policy: 60% support joining more international organizations even if this leads to the imposition of financial sanctions on the PA; 34% oppose this step. But  more than two-thirds (68%) agree to postpone joining more international organizations in return for release of more Palestinian prisoners by Israel; 28% disagree with that. Furthermore, a majority of 56% believes that a majority of the Palestinians will vote in favor of a peace agreement reached between Abbas and Israel in the current negotiations and 34% believe a majority of Palestinians will vote against it.

An overwhelming majority of 77% opposes and 21% support continued presence of settlers under Palestinian sovereignty in a Palestinian state after reaching a peace agreement.  Opposition to continued presence of settlers in Palestine is equal in the West Bank (77%) and the Gaza Strip (76%). It increases among supporters of Hamas (84%) compared to supporters of Fatah (73%), among those who oppose the peace process (84%) compared to supporters of the peace process (73%), among the religious (79%) compared to the somewhat religious (75%), and among women (80%) compared to men (74%).

A majority of 51% supports the two-state solution but 57% believe that such a solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion and 74% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent; only 24% believe the chances are high or medium. Yet, the overwhelming majority (72%) is opposed to a one-state solution and only 26% support such a solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equality.

A majority of 64% says that it participates in the boycott of Israeli products that have non-Israeli equivalents.  Boycott level is higher in the West Bank (66%) compared to the Gaza Strip (59%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (70%) compared to supporters of the peace process (62%), among residents of cities (65%) compared to residents of villages and refugee camps (60% and 61% respectively), and among the religious (67%) compared to the somewhat religious (62%). 

(2) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 41%.
• If the presidential contest was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 60% and the latter 34%.
• If the contest was between Barghouti, Abbas, and Haniyeh, the first receives 36%, the second 30%, and the third 29%.
• 45% support and 44% oppose the idea of appointing a deputy to president Abbas.
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 43%, Hamas 28%, all other electoral lists combined 12%, and 17% are undecided.

​

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 53% and Haniyeh 41% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 60%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 52% and Haniyeh 42%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 52% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 57% and Haniyeh 34%.  If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 60% and the latter would receive 34% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 68%. In our December 2013 poll Barghouti received 61% of the vote and Haniyeh 34%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (36%) followed by Abbas (30%), and Haniyeh (29%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 74%. In our previous poll last December, Barghouti received 40%, Haniyeh 31%, and Abbas 26%. 

45% support and 44% oppose the appointment of a vice president to Abbas. Among those who support appointing a vice president, Marwan Barghouti is the favorite, selected by 32% in an open question, followed by Rami al Hamdallah who was selected by 13%, Ismail Haniyeh by 8%, Saeb Erikat by 7%, Mohammad Dahlan by 7%, Mustapha Barghouti by 6%, and Azzam al Ahmad by 3%.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 28% say they would vote for Hamas and 43% say they would vote for Fatah, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 37% and in the West Bank at 23%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 38% and in the West Bank at 45%. These results indicate an increase in the vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip which stood at 33% last December.  Fatah, on the other hand, increased its popularity in the West Bank by four percentage points and lost one percentage point in the Gaza Strip during the same period.     

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 15% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains unchanged at 30%
• 80% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank and 64% believe it exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip
• Only 31% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear and only 22% believe people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the dismissed Hamas government in the Gaza Strip without fear.
• Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 51%  and in the Gaza Strip at 56%
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 37% and positive evaluation of the performance of Al Hamdallah government stands at 41%
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas drops from 53% three months ago to 46% in this poll.
• 51% find public sector strikes acceptable and 48% find them unacceptable.
• An overwhelming majority of 78% supports stiffening sentences against killers of women in the so-called honor killings.
• 54% believe that drug abuse among Palestinian youth is on the rise and 7% believe it is declining.
• In light of the recent mutual personal accusations, 57% say they do not believe Abbas or Dahlan. 
• The public is pessimistic regarding economic conditions in the next few years.

​

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stabilizes at 15% in this poll compared to 16% three months ago. 62% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are bad or very bad.  Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains unchanged compared to three months ago standing today at 30%. But the percentage of those who believe conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad increased from 36% to 42% during the same period.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 80% in this poll. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 64%.  19% say there is, and 41% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 18% say there is, and 33% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 22% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 51% and in the Gaza Strip at 56%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 55% in the West Bank and 62% in the Gaza Strip. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 44%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Last December these percentages stood at 45% and 27% respectively. 

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 37%. Positive evaluation of the government of Rami al Hamdallah in the West Bank stands at 41%.  Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas drops from 53% three months ago to 46% in this poll.

We asked the public about its views regarding the recent increase in the cases of public sector strikes: a majority of 51% said it sees these strikes as unacceptable while 48% saw them as acceptable.

We also asked the public about the increase in the cases of the so-called honor killing: an overwhelming majority of 78% supported and 20% opposed the imposition of stiffer sentences against the killers.

We asked the public about the increased talk about the spread of drug abuse among the youth in their communities: a majority of 54% indicated that it detected an increase in this practice among the youth while only 7% said it detected a decrease. The belief that drug abuse is on the rise increases in the West Bank (58%) while decreasing to 47% in the Gaza Strip.

We asked the public about the personal accusations made by President Abbas against Mohammad Dahlan and about Dahlan’s denial: a majority of 26% said it believed Abbas’ accusations to be true; 7% said it believed Dahlan’s denial; and 57% believed none of them.

We asked West Bank and Gaza publics about their expectation regarding economic conditions in their respective areas in the next few years: 19% of the West Bankers expected better conditions and 52% expected worse conditions. In the Gaza Strip, 28% expected better conditions and 34% expected worse conditions.

(4) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the chances for reconciliation and reunification stands today stands at 15%
• 52% support and 45% oppose holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if separation continues for a long time
• 24% believe that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one and 30% believe that the government of Abbas-Hamdallah is the legitimate one
• 39% believe that Hamas’ way is the best for ending occupation and building a state and 36% believe that Abbas’ way is the best

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Given the existing status quo between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Hamas and Fatah, percentage of optimism about the chances for reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip remains low, standing at 15%. The belief that unity is impossible and that two separate entities will emerge stands at 39%. 42% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time. These findings are similar to those we obtained in our last poll in December.  For the first time since the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% see a necessity for holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if the current disunity continued for a long time; 45% believe it to be unnecessary. 

The largest percentage (41%) believes that the PA, with its two parts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 25% believe that it is an accomplishment for the Palestinian people. Furthermore, 15% believe that the PA in the West Bank is an accomplishment while the PA in the Gaza Strip is a burden. By contrast, a similar percentage (13%) believes that the PA in the Gaza Strip is an accomplishment while the PA in the West Bank is a burden.

24% believe that the Haniyeh government in the Gaza Strip is the legitimate Palestinian government while 30% believe that the Abbas-Hamdallah government in the West Bank is the legitimate one; 9% believe that the two governments are legitimate. 31% believe that both governments are illegitimate. These findings indicate a rise of four points in the percentage of those who believe that the two governments are illegitimate compared to December findings.

The percentage of those who believe Hamas’ way is the best way to end occupation and build a Palestinian state stands at 39% while the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way stands at 36%. The current findings are identical to those of December 2013.  Support for Hamas’ way is higher in the Gaza Strip (45%) compared to the West Bank (35%), among the religious (46%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among those who oppose the peace process (67%) compared to supporters of the peace process (27%), among supporters of Hamas (95%) compared to supporters of third parties, the undecided, and Fatah (43%, 35%, and 10% respectively), and among holders of BA degree (49%) compared to those who have elementary education or illiterate (28% and 40% respectively).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be the most vital Palestinian goal and 34% believe that obtaining of the right of return should be the most vital goal.
• 27% view the spread of poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 25% view the continued occupation and settlement construction as the most serious problem. 

42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 16% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. Three months ago, 42% said ending occupation and building a state was most vital goal and 33% said the most vital goal was the right of return.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27% of the public while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 21% believe the most serious problem is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 10% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings. 

(6) Electricity Crisis:

• 70% of West Bankers and 30% of Gazans believe that residents in their areas pay their electricity bills.
• About half of the West Bankers and a little over a quarter of Gazans support cutting off electricity for those who do not pay their bills.
• 82% of West Bankers and 59% of Gazans support the imposition of a prison sentence on those who steal electricity.

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70% of West Bankers and 30% of Gazans believe that residents in their communities pay all their electricity bills. While a third of the West Bankers believes that failure to pay electricity bills in justified, almost two-thirds of Gazans say the same.  Around half of the West Bankers and a quarter of Gazans believe that the electricity company in their area should deny electricity to those who fail to pay. Yet, when the question involves other options, 56% of the West Bankers and 75% of Gazans believe that the PA should pay the debt of the electricity companies. In this question, support for denying electricity to those who do not pay drops to 32% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip. Only 4% believe the electricity companies should raise prices in order to address the problem of debt and non-payment.

In order to strengthen the capacity of the electricity companies to fight electricity theft, 82% of the West Bankers and 59% of Gazans support imposing fines and jail sentences against those who steel electricity. Also, 75% of West Bankers and 56% of Gazans support sending police escorts with electricity workers to help them cut off electricity from the homes of electricity thieves. 76% of West Bankers and 45% of Gazans support forming special courts to try electricity thieves. Finally, 29% of West Bankers and 22% of Gazans support cutting off electricity on whole neighborhoods in which electricity theft is widespread.

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