Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. The war increases Hamas’ popularity and greatly weakens the standing of the PA and its leadership; nonetheless, the majority of the Palestinians remains unsupportive of Hamas. Support for armed struggle rises, particularly in the West Bank and in response to settlers’ violence, but support for the two-state solution rises somewhat. The overwhelming majority condemns the positions taken by the US and the main European powers during the war and express the belief that they have lost their moral compass 
22 November-2 December 2023

 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 November and 2 December 2023. The period leading up to the poll witnessed the launch of Hamas’ October the 7th offensive against Israeli towns and military bases bordering the Gaza Strip and the Israeli launch of the current ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. Video images circulating in the international and Israeli media show that some Hamas fighters have committed attacks against Israeli civilians, including women and children, and took many of them hostages. International and Palestinian reports reported that thousands of Palestinians, mostly women and children, were killed by Israeli arial and tank bombardment. Israeli attacks targeted Palestinian hospitals, public buildings, and most other civilian infrastructure including tens of thousands of homes, with many neighborhoods leveled completely to the ground. In the meanwhile, in the West Bank, the Israeli army blocked or restricted Palestinian access to main roads while settler attacks increased against vulnerable towns and villages in various parts of the B and C areas.

To ensure the safety of our field researchers in the Gaza Strip, interviews with the residents were conducted during the ceasefire, which saw Palestinian women and children released from Israeli prisons in exchange for women and children held by Hamas.

The sample size of this poll is 1231 adults, of whom 750 were interviewed face to face in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip in 121 randomly selected locations. The sample is representative of the residents of the two areas. Due to the war in the Gaza Strip, we conducted interviews in the central and southern regions inside the selected sample homes, with the exception of one displaced area, where residents were interviewed in the shelter area where they had taken refuge. As for the northern Gaza Strip, residents were interviewed in 24 shelter locations, of which 20 belonged to UNRWA and 4 to governmental institutions. A total of 250 interviews were conducted in these shelters, and another 21 were conducted in the homes of relatives and friends of displaced people from the north. Despite the large representative sample, the margin of error for this poll is +/-4. The increase in the margin of error is due to the lack of precision regarding the number of residents who stayed in their homes, or in shelters, in the northern parts of the Gaza Strip which we did not sample.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

Most of the questions asked in this last quarter of 2023 revolved around the October 7 offensive and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war and ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. It also covered the debate about the future of the Gaza Strip after the war and the Palestinian perception of the positions of the various relevant countries and actors. Findings indicate that a majority of the respondents believe that Hamas' decision to carry out the offensive is correct, and believe that the attack came in response to “settler attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque and West Bank residents, and for the release of Palestinian prisoners.” It is worth noting that there are significant differences between the attitudes of the residents of the West Bank compared to those of the Gaza Strip, in terms of the “correctness” of the Hamas' decision (and other matters), as the attitudes of Gazans tend to show a greater degree of skepticism about that decision. It is clear from the findings that believing in the “correctness” of Hamas' decision does not mean support for all acts that might have been committed by Hamas fighters on October 7. The overwhelming majority of respondents say that they have not seen videos from international or social media showing atrocities committed by Hamas members against Israeli civilians that day, such as the killing of women and children in their homes. Indeed, more than 90% believe that Hamas fighters did not commit the atrocities contained in these videos. When asked what is or is not allowed in war, under international humanitarian law, the findings indicate that the vast majority believes that attacking or killing civilians in their homes is not permissible. The majority (except in the Gaza Strip) also believe that taking civilians as hostages or prisoners of war is also not permissible.

The findings also indicate that the majority believes that Israel will not succeed in eradicating Hamas, or in causing a second Palestinian Nakba, or in expelling the residents of the Gaza Strip. Indeed, a large majority believes that Hamas will emerge victorious from this war. A majority also says Hamas will resume control over the Gaza Strip after the war. The findings also indicate significant opposition to the deployment of an Arab security force in the Gaza Strip, even if its purpose is to provide support to the Palestinian Authority.  The majority also opposes a role for Arab states in delivering services to the Gaza Strip, but this majority is far less than the majority that opposes an Arab security presence.

The findings indicate that the Palestinians are questioning the moral commitment of the US, and other West European countries, to the ethical values embodied in the international humanitarian law. They show widespread conviction that the positions of the United States and the major Western powers show total disregard to international humanitarian law and that their talk of a two-state solution is not serious. All or most Palestinians say they are dissatisfied with the positions of the United States, Germany, Britain, France, the United Nations, and even Russia in this war. Also, the overwhelming majority is dissatisfied with the performance of Arab or regional countries or parties such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Jordan, while the percentage of satisfaction with the performance of Turkey and Iran is somewhat high, and a majority says that it is satisfied with the performance of Yemen, Qatar and Hezbollah. Dissatisfaction with Palestinian actors increases significantly when asked about the PA prime minister, the PA president, the PA, and Fatah. A majority of the public is satisfied only with the performance of Hamas, Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyyah.

Findings indicate that the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip has had a significant impact on a range of internal Palestinian issues and on Palestinian-Israeli relations. The most important of these effects can be summarized in the following changes:

  • Support for Hamas has more than tripled in the West Bank compared to three months ago. In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas increased but not significantly. Despite the increase in its popularity, the majority in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip does not support Hamas. It is worth noting that support for Hamas usually rises temporarily during or immediately after a war and then returns to the previous level several months after the end of the war.
  • Support for President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fateh party drops significantly. The same is true for the trust in the PA as a whole, as demand for its dissolution rises to nearly 60%, the highest percentage ever recorded in PSR polls. Demand for Abbas's resignation is rising to around 90 percent, and even higher in the West Bank. Despite the decline in support for Fatah and Abbas, the most popular Palestinian figure remains Marwan Barghouti, a Fatah leader. Barghouti is still able to beat Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh or any other.
  • Support for armed struggle rises ten percentage points compared to three months ago, with more than 60% saying it is the best means of ending the Israeli occupation; in the West Bank, the percentage rises further to close to 70%. Moreover, a majority in the West Bank believes that the formation of armed groups in communities subject to settler attacks is the most effective means of combating settler terrorism against towns and villages in the West Bank.
  • Despite the above-mentioned reference to the lack of confidence in the seriousness of US and European talk about reviving the two-state solution and despite the increase in support for armed struggle, support for the two-state solution has not dropped in this poll. To the contrary, support for this solution has increased slightly in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This increase seems to come especially from those who believe that the US and European talk about the two-state solution is indeed serious.
     (1) October the 7th and the War in Gaza:

     

    • 72% of the public believe that Hamas' decision to launch the October 7 attack was correct
    • A majority of 53% believes that Israel's war objective is to destroy the Gaza Strip and kill or expel its residents, and 42% believe it is to take revenge on Hamas and the resistance and destroy them. But a majority believes that Israel will fail to achieve these goals.
    • 56% have no food and water to sustain them for a day or two, and 64% say a family member was killed or wounded during the war. 
    • 85% have not seen videos showing atrocities committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians on October 7, and only 7% say Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians.
    • 70% of West Bankers and half of Gazans expect Hamas to emerge victorious
    • 75% of West Bankers and 38% of Gazans prefer Hamas to remain in control of the Gaza Strip after the war. 
    • Expression of satisfaction with Palestinian, Arab, and international actors during the war shows dissatisfaction, or very little satisfaction, towards the Palestinian Authority and its leadership, towards Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and towards the United States, Germany, Britain, France and the United Nations.

    1. Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7th offensive:

    We asked respondents to speculate about Hamas’ reasons for waging its October the 7th offensive: a response to attacks on al Aqsa and to release prisoners as Hamas claimed or an Iranian plot to thwart Arab normalization with Israel. The overwhelming majority (81%; 89% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip) said it was a “response to settler attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque and on Palestinian citizens and for the release of prisoners from Israeli prisons;” while only 14% (5% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip) thought it was an Iranian plot. 

    We asked the respondents what they thought of Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7th offensive given its outcome so far, a vast majority (72%) said it was a correct decision and 22% (12% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) said it was incorrect. The belief that Hamas' decision was right is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%), among men (75%) compared to women (69%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (76% and 71% respectively) compared to the non-religious (42%). It also increases among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fateh and other forces (55% and 45% respectively).

    2. The Israeli objectives in the Gaza war:

    Asked about its assessment of Israel’s objectives in the current war, the majority (53%) says it is to destroy the Gaza Strip and kill or expel its population; 42% (50% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) think the goal is to exact revenge against Hamas and the resistance and destroy them completely.  When asked if Israel will succeed in causing a second Nakba for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, as some Israeli minister called for, 73% (83% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip) said it will not and 24% (14% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) said it will succeed.   But the vast majority (70%) thinks Israel will fail in achieving its goal in eradicating Hamas and the resistance while only 8% think it will succeed, and 21% think it will only weaken Hamas and the resistance. West Bankers are more certain than Gazans that Israel will fail, 87% and 44% respectively. Moreover, only 1% of West Bankers think Israeli will succeed in eradicating Hamas compared to 17% in the Gaza Strip.  Similarly, the overwhelming majority (85%; 96% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that Israel will not succeed in expelling Gazans out of the Strip; Only 13% (3% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) think it will succeed.

    3. Humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip:

    Only 44% of Gazans say they have enough food and water for a day or two and 56% say they do not.  When they need food or water, only one third of Gazans say they can reach a place where they can have access to assistance while two thirds say they cannot.  Almost two thirds (64%) of Gazan respondents say a member of their family have been killed or injured during the current war in Gaza; 36% say none of their family members have been killed or injured.

    A majority (52%) blames Israel for the current suffering of Gazans in the current war while 26% place the blame on the US; only 11% (6% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) place the blame on Hamas; and 9% blame the PA.

    We asked the respondents whether they support or oppose the release, now before the end of the war, of the detained Israeli women and children among the civilians in the hands of the resistance groups, in return for the release of Palestinian women and children in the Israeli prisons. The overwhelming majority (85%; 92% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip) supported the exchange while only 13% (7% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip) opposed it.

    A majority of 71% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe Gazans who left their homes during the war to safer areas will be able to return to these homes once the war stops. West Bankers are much more optimistic than Gazans, 83% and 53% respectively.

    4. War crimes and atrocities:

    We offered the public a list of acts or measures and asked respondents whether they are permitted under international law. The majority (84%) said it allows taking soldiers prisoners. But the vast majority (78%) said it does not allow attacks on or the killing of civilians women and children in their homes; 77% said it does not allow the bombing of hospitals; 76% said it does not allow cutting electricity and water from the civilian population; and 52% said it does not allow taking civilians as prisoners of war.  The belief that international law does not allow the killing of civilians, women and children, in their homes is higher in the West Bank (84%) compared to the Gaza Strip (68%), and among supporters of Hamas (80%) compared to supporters of Fateh and other forces (75% and 74% respectively).

     

    While 95% think Israel has committed war crimes during the current war, only 10% think Hamas also committed such crimes; 4% think Israel has not committed such crimes and 89% think Hamas did not commit war crimes during the current war.  85% say they did not see videos, shown by international news outlets, showing acts committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, such as the killing of women and children in their homes; only 14% saw these videos.  The percentage of those who say they have seen these videos is higher in the Gaza Strip (25%) compared to the West Bank (7%), among the non-religious (31%) compared to the religious (15%), and among supporters of other forces and supporters of Fateh (21% and 20% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (12%).

    When asked if Hamas did commit these atrocities, the overwhelming majority said no, it did not and only 7% said it did. Those who say that Hamas did not commit the atrocities seen in the videos are higher in the West Bank (97%) compared to the Gaza Strip (83%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (91% and 92% respectively), compared to the non-religious (75%) and among supporters of Hamas (97%) compared to supporters of Fateh and other forces (85% and 81% respectively). Belief that Hamas fighters have committed atrocities against civilians is also higher among those who did watch videos showing such atrocities (31%) compared to those who did not (3%). In the Gaza Strip, 41% of those who watched the videos believe that Hamas did commit these atrocities while only 8% of those who did not watch these videos believe that Hamas committed atrocities.

    5. When will the war stop and who will win?

    Half of the public (45% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) expect to see a ceasefire in Gaza in the upcoming weeks while a quarter (21% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) expect the war to continue for weeks and months. One fifth (28% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip) expect Israel to “unilaterally end the war and begin to withdraw under the pressure from the resistance.” Only 2% expect that “Hamas and other resistance forces in Gaza will stop the fighting and withdraw to safer areas in the Gaza Strip.”

    While the vast majority of West Bankers (70%) thinks Hamas will emerge victorious in this war, only half of Gazans think the same. Similarly, while only 1% in the West Bank think Israel will emerge victorious, almost one third of Gazans (31%) think that; 14% (12% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip) think neither one will emerge victorious. Belief that Hamas will emerge victorious from this war is also higher among the religious and the somewhat religious (72% and 70% respectively) compared to the non-religious (40%), and among supporters of Hamas (91%) compared to supporters of Fateh and other forces (50% and 41% respectively).

    6. Who will rule Gaza after the war?

    Almost two-thirds (64%) are opposed to the participation of the PA in meetings with the US, with the involvement of Arab countries such as Jordan and Egypt, in order to discuss the future of the Gaza Strip after the war stops. Only 33% (28% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) support PA participation in such meetings.  We asked the respondents to speculate about the party that will be in control of the Gaza Strip in the day after the end of the current war. Almost two thirds (64%; 73% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip) said it will be Hamas; 11% selected a PA national unity government but without President Abbas; 7% selected the PA with Abbas; 4% selected Israel; 3% selected one or more Arab country; 2% selected a national unity government under Abbas leadership; and 1% selected the UN.

    When asked about their own preferences for the party that should be in control in the Gaza Strip after the war, 60% selected Hamas; 16% selected a PA national unity government without President Abbas; 7% selected the PA with Abbas; 3% selected one or more Arab countries; 3% selected a national unity government under Abbas, and 2% selected the Israeli army.  The percentage of those who prefer Hamas to remain in control of the Gaza Strip after the war increases in the West Bank (75%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), among men (64%) compared to women (57%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (61% and 62% respectively) compared to the non-religious (32%), and among supporters of Hamas (87%) compared to supporters of Fatah and other forces (32% and 26% respectively).

    72% (80% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip) think Hamas will succeed in returning to rule over the Gaza Strip after the war despite Israel’s declared objective of eradicating that organization; 23% (15% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) do not think Hamas will succeed in resuming control over the Gaza Strip.  After the end of the war, and in the event that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are unified under the control of the Palestinian Authority, only 28% (20% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) would support and 70% (77% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip) would oppose the deployment of an Arab security contingent, from countries like Egypt or Jordan, in order to provide support for the PA and help it to maintain security. But in the event that this Arab presence, after the end of the war, is to provide basic, administrative, and health services to the Palestinian residents in support of the PA, support would increase to 45% (43% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) but 53% (54% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip) would still oppose that presence.

    7. Satisfaction with relevant actors:

    The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (87%) thinks that the response of the US and other major Western powers, such as the UK, France, and Germany, to the Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip indicates show disregard to international humanitarian law; only 10% (4% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) say the response indicates they are committed to that law.  The vast majority (70%) thinks the recent talk about two-state solution in the US and other Western countries is not serious; 27% think it is.

    We asked about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:

    1. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with the role of Hamas (72%; 85% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) was the highest followed by the role played by Yehia Sinwar (69%; 81% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip), Ismail Haniyyeh (51%; 57% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip), Fatah (22%; 23% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip), the PA (14%; 10% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip), Mahmoud Abbas (11%; 7% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip), and Mohammad Shtayyeh (10%; 6% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Satisfaction with Yahya Sinwar is higher in the West Bank (81%) compared to the Gaza Strip (52%), among men (74%) compared to women (64%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (76% and 67% respectively) compared to the non-religious (42%), and among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (53% and 40% respectively).

    1. For the Arab/regional actors, the highest level of satisfaction went to Yemen (80%; 89% in the West Bank and 68% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Qatar (56%), Hizballah (49%), Iran (35%), Turkey (34%), Jordan (24%), Egypt (23%), UAE (8), and finally Saudi Arabia (5%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

    1. For the non-regional international actors, the highest level of satisfaction went to Russia (22%, 17% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip), followed by China (20%), Germany (7%), UN (6%), France (5%), UK (4%), and the US (1%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

       (2) Legislative and presidential elections:

       

      • In elections between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 51% and the latter 45%
      • 92% of West Bankers and 81% of Gazans want Abbas to resign
      • Support for Hamas increases in the West Bank from 12% three months ago to 44%; in the Gaza Strip support for Hamas rises from 38% three months ago to 42% today. Support for Fateh decreases in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to 17% compared to 26% three months ago.
      • 54% believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people and only 13% believe that Fateh, led by Mahmoud Abbas, is the most deserving.

      If new presidential elections were held today and only two candidates, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the voter turnout would be only 53%, and among those who would participate, Abbas would receive 16% of the vote and Haniyeh 78% (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 37% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, the vote for Abbas stands at 24% and for Haniyeh at 71%, while in the West Bank Abbas receives 10% and Haniyeh 82%.

      • If the presidential competition is between three, Marwan Barghouti, Abbas, and Haniyeh, participation would rise to 71% and among those voting, Barghouti receives 47%, Haniyeh 43%, and Abbas 7%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti stood at 49% and Haniyeh at 36%, and Abbas at 13%.

      • If the presidential competition is between two, Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, participation would rise to 69% and among those voting, Barghouti receives 51% and Haniyeh 45%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti stood at 60% and Haniyeh at 37%.

      • In a closed question, we asked the public to select the person they prefer to see as President Abbas's successor. The largest percentage (36%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti; 19% preferred Ismail Haniyeh; 16% chose Yahya al Sinwar; 4% preferred Mohammed Dahlan, 3% preferred Khaled Meshaal, 2% chose Muhammad Shtayyeh, and 1% chose Hussein al-Sheikh; 18% said they did not know or chose someone else.
      • Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 14% and dissatisfaction at 85%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 10% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip.  Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 22% and dissatisfaction at 76%.
      • 88% want Abbas to resign while 12% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 78% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas' resignation stands at 92% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip.

       

      • When asked which political party or political trend they support, the largest percentage selected Hamas (43%), followed by Fatah (17%), while 12% selected other or third-party groups, and 28% said none of them or did not know. Three months ago, support for Hamas stood at 22% and Fatah at 26%. In the West Bank, support for Hamas today stands at 44% (compared to 12% three months ago), and for Fatah at 16% (compared to 26% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas today stands at 42% (compared to 38% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 18% (compared to 25% three months ago).

      • However, if new parliamentary elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, only 69% say they would participate in them, and among these participants, Fateh receives 19%, Hamas' Change and Reform 51%, all other lists combined 4%, and 25% say they have not yet decided whom they will vote for. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 52% (compared to 44% three months ago) and for Fateh at 21% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 50% (compared to 24% three months ago) and Fatah at 18% (compared to 40% three months ago).
      • 54% believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 13% believe that Fateh under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving; 26% believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership. Three months ago, 27% said Hamas is the most deserving, 24% said Fateh led by Abbas is the most deserving, and 44% said both are unworthy of representation and leadership.

        (3) Domestic conditions:

         

         

          • Only 14% of West Bankers feel safe and secure compared to 48% three months ago
          • 68% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 28% say it is an achievement

          The question about personal safety and security was asked in the West Bank only. The findings show that only 14% feel safe and secure while 86% feel unsafe and unsecure. Three months ago, the perception of safety stood at 48%.

          A majority of 68% believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 28% believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 62% said the PA is a burden and 35% said it was an achievement.

          (4) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

           

           

          • Support for the two-state solution rises from 32% three months ago to 34%
          • Support for armed struggle in the West Bank rises from 54% three months ago to 68% today
          • Support for the formation of armed groups in communities targeted by settlers rises from 47% three months ago to 56% today

          34% support and 64% oppose the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details of the solution. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 32%.

          • Support for the two-state solution is linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Today, 65% believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion but 32% believe it is still practical. Moreover, 66% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or nonextant, and 32% believe the chances are medium or high. Three months ago, 71% said that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion.
          • When asked about public support and opposition to specific policy measures to break the stalemate: 55% supported joining more international organizations; 39% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 69% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 58% supported dissolving the PA; and 29% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 58% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 53% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 52% supported the dissolution of the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of one state.

          When asked about the best way to end occupation and establish an independent state, the public was divided into three groups: a majority of 63% (68% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) said it was armed struggle; 20% said it was negotiations; and 13% said it was popular non-violent resistance. Three months ago, 53% said armed struggle was the best way, 24% said popular non-violent resistance, and 20% said negotiation was the best way. As shown in figure (X) below, West Bankers’ support for resort to arms increased 19 percentage points since the formation of the current far right Israel government and increased another 14 points during the past three months. 

          • In light of the increase in settler terrorist attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, we again asked West Bankers what means are most effective in combating this terrorism that are also the most feasible. The majority (56%, compared to 47% three months ago) chose the formation of armed groups by residents of the targeted areas in order to protect their areas; 15% (compared to 30% three months ago) chose to deploy Palestinian police forces in the targeted areas; 16% (compared to 10% three months ago) chose the demand that the Israeli army take measures to prevent settler terrorism; and only 8% (compared to 8% three months ago) chose to form unarmed groups of residents of the targeted areas to protect their areas.

          Figure (7) below, show the extent of the public distrust in the West Bank in the role of the Israeli army in protecting the vulnerable communities and that the trust of the public in the Palestinian police is much less than the trust it places in the armed groups and that trust in the PA police has declined in three months by half to reach the current 15%. It also show that a majority now supports the formation of armed groups as the most effective means of combating settler terror.

          (5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the most pressing problems confronting Palestinians today:

           

          • the areas occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state
          • A majority of 51% believes the most urgent problem today is the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip and 32% believe it is Israeli occupation.

          43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 36% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 7% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

          When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (51%, 42% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 7% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 5% said it is unemployment, and 4% said it is corruption.

           

                ______________________________________

                This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

                IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SHARON DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, WIDE SUPPORT FOR THE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE AND FOR VARIOUS FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE, BUT ENDING ARMED ATTACKS FROM THE GAZA STRIP IS CONTINGENT ON A FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM IT

                 

                24-27 June 2004

                These are the results of poll # 12 conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between June 24 and 27, 2004. The poll deals with withdrawal from Gaza, winning the intifada, armed attacks, reconciliation, local and national elections, reform, democracy, corruption, and the popularity of Yasir Arafat, Marwan Barghouti, and the various political factions. Total size of the sample is 1320 adults (835 in the West Bank and 485 in the Gaza Strip) interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

                For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa, at Tel 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org 

                 

                MAIN FINDINGS

                This poll focused on issues related to the Israeli unilateral disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip covering issues like the Egyptian initiative, international presence, and continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip.  Poll findings show significant public support for the Egyptian initiative. But support is not uniform with regard to all components of the initiative. Support is not very high for sending Egyptian security officials to the Gaza Strip. The reason for this reserved attitude may have to do with public concerns regarding an Egyptian security presence exactly at a time when the Israeli security presence begins to disappear. It is worth remembering that the Gaza Strip was under an Egyptian military administration prior to the 1967 war. Moreover, it is highly likely that many people think that the Egyptian presence might impose constraints impeding the ability of militant factions from continuing to resort to arms against the departing Israeli forces, especially if the Israeli withdrawal is incomplete.

                Findings also show that most Palestinians, almost equally in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, would oppose the continuation of armed attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip if the Israeli withdrawal was full. However, if the withdrawal was partial, similar majorities in Gaza and the West Bank would support continuation of armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Strip.

                It is interesting to observe two areas of difference in the attitudes of Gazans compared to West Bankers. The first has to do with perception of victory in the current armed confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians. While a majority of Gazans think Palestinians have won, less than one third of West Bankers think so. Gazans, more than West Bankers, seem to view the Israeli unilateral disengagement as victory for Palestinians. The second area of difference has to do with homes in the settlements. While a majority of West Bankers support keeping homes in evacuated settlements intact, Gazans preferred to see them destroyed. One reason for this could be the concern of Gazans about a possible return of settlers and soldiers to the Strip after the withdrawal, particularly since this withdrawal is unilateral. Perhaps it is this concern about a possible return of the Israeli army that that leads most Palestinians, as poll findings show, to support various forms of international presence in the Gaza Strip, including the deployment of international armed forces.

                 

                (1) Withdrawal from Gaza

                • Little less than two-thirds of the Palestinians (64%) support the Egyptian initiative and 32% oppose it, but only 53% support the deployment of Egyptian military advisers and security officials in the Gaza Strip
                • High levels of support for various forms of international presence in the context of the Sharon disengagement plan with 60% for the deployment of an armed international or multilateral force in the Gaza Strip that would be responsible for security in the Rafah international border crossing and the Egyptian-Palestinian border
                • Support for the modified Sharon disengagement plan as approved by the Israeli government does not exceed 34% and only one quarter believes the plan will actually be implemented
                • A majority of 59% would oppose armed attacks from the Gaza Strip if the withdrawal from the Strip was complete
                • An almost even split on the future of the homes in the settlements with 49% wanting to keep them intact and 48% wanting them destroyed
                • An overwhelming majority (90%) supports Hamas’ participation in the administration of the Gaza Strip after the Israel withdrawal

                Poll findings show that little less than two-thirds of the Palestinians (64%) support the Egyptian initiative and 32% oppose it. But support for its different components varies: 81% for unification of the security services under the control of the cabinet, 87% for the appointment of a strong minister of interior, but only 53% for the deployment of Egyptian military advisers and security officials in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, the poll finds high levels of support for various forms of international presence in the context of the Sharon disengagement plan: 60% for the deployment of an armed international or multilateral force in the Gaza Strip that would be responsible for security in the Rafah international border crossing and the Egyptian-Palestinian border; 61% for the deployment of such forces in the settlements in order to take custody of them and maintain control until an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on their future is reached; 64% for an international presence aimed at rebuilding PA security services; 70% for an international presence aimed at rebuilding PA civil institutions and ministries; and 78% for an international presence aimed at rebuilding the Palestinian economy and infrastructure.

                Support for the Egyptian initiative increases among illiterates (69%) compared to those holding a BA degree (54%), among the retired and laborers (76% and 72% respectively) compared to students (56%), and among supporters of Fateh (76%) compared to supporters of Hamas (56%).

                Sharon’s modified disengagement plan does not receive the same level of support as the original plan. Poll findings indicate that support for the modified Sharon disengagement plan as approved by the Israeli government does not exceed 34% and only one quarter believes the plan will actually be implemented. In March 2004, 73% welcomed the original plan when it was first announced and only 24% believed that Sharon was serious about implementing it.

                Findings also show that the key to Israeli security is related to the size of withdrawal from Gaza: full or partial. As long as the withdrawal from Gaza is not complete, a majority of 55% would support continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after the withdrawal, but a majority of 59% would oppose such attacks if the withdrawal from the Strip was complete.

                Opposition to armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after a full Israeli withdrawal increases among the oldest (65%) compared to the youngest (51%) among the retired (71%) compared to the students (50%), among the married (61%) compared to the unmarried (52%), and among supporters of Fateh (69%) compared to supporters of Hamas (49%)

                The poll finds an almost even split on the future of the homes in the settlements with 49% wanting to keep them intact and 48% wanting them destroyed. Support for the destruction of the settlements’ homes increases among Gazans reaching 58%. The desire of Gazans to see settlements’ homes destroyed might be due to their fear that the Israeli army and settlers might come back to these settlements, just as the army returned to cities and areas vacated in 1994-96 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the current intifada.

                A slight majority of 50% believes the Bush letter to Sharon on borders and refugees is important in shaping a permanent agreement with the Israelis and 45% believe it is not important.

                With regard to domestic matters related to the Gaza withdrawal, the poll shows alarming concerns: 59% are worried about possible Palestinian infighting after the Israeli withdrawal form Gaza, only 30% believe the PA has high capacity to control matters after the withdrawal, and only 31% believe life in Gaza will fully resume in an orderly manner. Nonetheless, 59% believe the PA will be the body that will assume control over the Gaza Strip after the withdrawal and only 26% believe it will fall into the hands of factions and armed groups.

                An overwhelming majority (90%) supports Hamas’ participation in the administration of the Gaza Strip after the Israel withdrawal. In terms of the preferred percentage for Hamas’ role in decision making, the median was 50% (and the mean 51%) for those supporting the participation of Hamas. The median for the whole sample was 50% and the mean 45%.

                 

                (2) Peace Process: Intifada, Victory, Armed attacks, and Reconciliation

                • only 40% believe the Palestinians came out winners so far in the ongoing armed conflict that has started in September 2000 and 37% believe no one won. Belief in Palestinian victory is much higher in Gaza (54%) than in the West Bank (32%)
                • A majority of 59% supports continued suicide bombings inside Israel if an opportunity arises. Despite this, support for mutual cessation of violence remains very high (79%)
                • 77% feel that their safety and that of their families are not assured these days
                • support for reconciliation between the two peoples remains very high (72%) even though 43% believe such reconciliation is not possible ever

                Findings show that despite the fact that 69% believe that armed attacks have helped achieve national rights that negotiations could not achieve, only 40% believe the Palestinians came out winners so far in the ongoing armed conflict that has started in September 2000 and 37% believe no one won while 16% believe Israel is the winner. On the other hand, 48% believe the majority of the Palestinians think that the Palestinians are the winners, and 51% believe the majority of Israelis think Israel is the winners.

                 Belief that the Palestinians have been the winners in the current armed confrontations increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (32%), in refugee camps (56%) compared to towns and villages (32%), among those who pray five times daily in the mosque (50%) compared to those who never pray in the mosque (24%), and among supporters of Hamas (51%) compared to supporters of Fateh (39%).

                A majority of 59% supports continued suicide bombings inside Israel if an opportunity arises. Despite this, support for mutual cessation of violence remains very high (79%) and if such cessation is obtained, a majority of 55% would support, and 41% would oppose, taking measures by the PA to prevent further armed attacks on Israeli targets.

                Pessimism prevails: two thirds believe the Roadmap has collapsed; only 20% believe the two sides will soon return to negotiations and violence will stop; and 77% feel that their safety and that of their families are not assured these days. Nonetheless, support for reconciliation between the two peoples remains very high (72%) even though 43% believe such reconciliation is not possible ever. 

                 

                (3) Local and National Elections

                • Opposition to holding local elections in stages is greater than support (49% to 45%) as more people want to hold these elections in all cities, towns and villages simultaneously
                • In local elections: 28% will vote for Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates, 26% for Fateh’s, 17% for independents, and 9% for family candidates
                • A solid majority of 70% supports the participation of refugee camp residents in the municipal council elections within which these camps are located
                • Almost three quarters support giving women a quota in the general political elections
                • A majority of 88% encourages the participation of Hamas in the general legislative and presidential elections if they take place soon

                Findings show considerable opposition among the public for the holding of local elections in stages. Opposition to holding local elections in stages is greater than support (49% to 45%) as more people want to hold these elections in all cities, towns and villages simultaneously. If elections do take place now, a majority of 52% believe it will not be fair and only 38% believe it will be fair. In any case, only 44% believe the PA is serious about holding local elections in September 2004.

                Findings show that if local elections were held soon and were fair, 34% of the respondents think Fateh candidates would win, 27% think Hamas candidates would win, 18% think independents would win, and only 9% think family candidates would win. As to how the respondents themselves would behave, 28% said they will vote for Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates, 26% for Fateh’s, 17% for independents, and 9% for family candidates. In the Gaza Strip, 32% will vote for Hamas and Islamic Jihad candidates, 23% for Fateh’s, 18% for independents, and 7% for family candidates. These results indicate that the prevailing perception among the public is that Fateh has more popularity than the Islamists. Reality however is different, as the findings show that the Islamists are in fact supported by more people than Fateh.

                Support for Islamist candidates in the local elections increases in the Gaza Strip (32%) compared to the West Bank (26%), in the governorates of Deir al Balah, Qalqilia, Rafah, Gaza City, Hebron, and Ramallah (41%, 39%,33%, 32%, 31%, and 30% respectively ) compared to Jericho, Tulkarm, Bethlehem, Nablus, and Jerusalem (9%, 18%, 21%, 25%, and 27% respectively), in refugee camps (33%) compared to towns and villages (26%), among women (34%) compared to men (23%), among the youngest (35%) compared to the oldest (21%), among housewives and students (34% and 33% respectively) compared to farmers (11%), and among those who pray five times daily in the mosque (39%) compared to those who never pray in the mosque (5%).

                A solid majority of 70% supports the participation of refugee camp residents in the municipal council elections within which these camps are located, 23% support holding separate elections for these camps to elect local committees for the camps, and only 5% oppose the participation of refugee camps in the local elections. On the other hand, two thirds oppose the proposed amendments to local election law calling for the election of the head of the local council by the elected members of the council and not directly by the voters.

                With regard to the general political elections, almost three quarters support giving women a quota. The median for the preferred percentage of the quota for those supporting such a quota was 30% and the mean 35%.The median for the whole sample was 20% and the mean 25%. Findings also show that a majority of 88% encourages the participation of Hamas in the general legislative and presidential elections if they take place soon.

                 

                (4) Reform, Democracy, and Corruption

                • An overwhelming majority (92%) supports inside and outside calls for fundamental political reforms in the PA
                • Positive evaluation of the status of democracy in the Palestinian areas does not exceed 25% and 50% believe that people can criticize the PA without fear
                • 87% believe that corruption exists in the institutions of the PA and two thirds believe that officials and others involved in or accused of corruption are often not charged or brought to account

                Poll findings show tremendous support for reform measures but also great doubts about their implementation. An overwhelming majority (92%) supports inside and outside calls for fundamental political reforms in the PA. But only 40% of the public believe the PA is actually carrying out such reform. With regard to the status of democracy in the Palestinian areas, the poll finds that positive evaluation does not exceed 25%, while only 20% believe that freedom of the press exist in PA areas (37% believe it exists to some extent). Despite this, 50% believe that people can criticize the PA without fear.

                Findings also show that 87% believe that corruption exists in the institutions of the PA, and among those more than two thirds believe that this corruption will remain the same or increase in the future. Moreover, two thirds believe that officials and others involved in or accused of corruption are often not charged or brought to account.

                Belief that corrupt officials are never charged or brought to account increases in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (63%), in refugee camps (73%) compared to towns and villages (65%), among men (73%) compared to women (63%), among the refugees (72%) compared to non-refugees (65%), among holders of BA degree (80%) compared to illiterates (44%), among employees and students (78% and 73% respectively) compared to housewives (61%), among those praying five times daily in the mosques (76%) compared to those who never pray in the mosque (57%), and among supporters of Hamas (76%) compared to supporters of Fateh (59%).   

                 

                 (5) Popularity of Yasir Arafat, Marwan Barghouti, and Political Factions 

                • In an open question regarding the election of the PA president, a majority of 54% votes for Yasir Arafat. No one else received 2% or more of the vote with the exception of Marwan Barghouti and Mahmud Zahhar. But in a closed question Arafat received 49%
                • In another open question, this time regarding the election of a vice president, Ahmad Qurai (Abu Ala’) received 9%, followed by Marwan Barghouti (8%), but in a closed question Barghouti came first with 25%
                • The popularity of Fateh has remained unchanged from last March (28%) but that of Hamas increased from 20% to 24%.
                • Combined Islamist strength (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) increased from 29% last March to 35%

                In an open question (without a list of names presented to respondents) regarding the election of the PA president, a majority of 54% votes for Yasir Arafat. No one else received 2% or more of the vote with the exception of Marwan Barghouti and Mahmud Zahhar (2% for each). But in a closed question (with a list of only two names presented to respondents) Arafat received 49% and Haidar Abdul Shafi 10%. Since 1994, the name of former Hamas leader Ahmad Yasin was presented. As of the next poll, Mahmud Zahhar’s name (and that of Marwan Barghouti) will also be in the list along with Arafat. Since he received less than 2% in the open question, Abdul Shafi’s name will not be in the list of candidates for the office of the president.

                In another open question, this time regarding the election of a vice president, Ahmad Qurai (Abu Ala’) received 9%, followed by Marwan Barghouti (8%), Saeb Erikat (6%), Mohammad Dahlan, Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin), and Mahmud Zahhar (3% each), and Haidar Abdul Shafi (2%). But in a closed question (with a list not containing Zahhar or any other Hamas leader, as the names of Rantisi and Yasin were dropped) Barghouti came first with 25%, followed by Erikat (9%), Ahamd Qurai’ and Haidar Abdul Shafi (6%), Hanan Ashrawi (5%), Mohammad Dahlan and Farouq Qaddoumi (4% each), and Mahmud Abbas (3%). It is worth noting that Barghouti received more votes in the Gaza Strip (27%) than in the West Bank (24%), and that Dahlan managed to strengthen his support in Gaza (to 8%) while receiving only 1% in the West Bank. Last March, Barghouti received the support of 16%. The results show that the trial of Barghouti has positively affected his popularity as 67% of the public said the trial has made him more qualified to be a Palestinian leader.

                The popularity of Marwan Barghouti increases in the governorates of Dier al Balah, Rafah, Jenin, Bethlehem, Nablus, and Ramallah (44%, 33%, 33%, 32%, 30%, and 29% respectively) compared to the governorates of Tulkarm, Jerusalem, Jericho, Khanyounis, Hebron, and Qalqilia (15%, 17%, 18%, 19%, 21%, and 21% respectively), among the youngest (37%) compared to the oldest (18%), among students (35%) compared to professionals and farmers (8% and 11% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh (30%) compared to those who do not belong to any of the known factions and parties (19%).

                The popularity of Fateh has remained unchanged from last March (28%) but that of Hamas increased from 20% to 24% during the same period. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ support reached 29% compared to 27% for Fateh.  Combined Islamist strength (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) increased from 29% last March to 35% (38% in the Gaza Strip) in this poll. This is the highest level of support for the Islamists since 1995. Surprisingly, 39% of the respondents said that they thought that the assassination of Hamas leaders (Yasin and Rantisi) has weakened the movement while only 36% said it has strengthened it..... Full Report

                SPSS Data File: 

                With only one third of Palestinians satisfied with the Gaza War accomplishments and only one third satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government, half of Gazans say they are thinking about emigrating and the largest percentage believes that Israel came out a winner in the battle at FIFA. Nonetheless, Ismail Haniyeh and Hamas would win the elections in Gaza Strip while Abbas and Fatah would win in the West Bank.

                 4-6 June 2015

                 

                These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 4 and 6 June 2015. The period before the poll witnessed the failure of the reconciliation government efforts to reunify the institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a debate among Palestinians over the decision to drop the demand for expelling Israel from FIFA, the formation of a right wing government in Israel under prime minister Netanyahu, the publication of the corruption court decision asserting as unconstitutional Abbas decision to lift the immunity of  Mohammad Dahlan and the publication of news reports indicating that Hamas and Israel have indirectly been negotiating a long term ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. This press release covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reconciliation, the Gaza war, the peace process, FIFA, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

                For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

                 

                Main Findings:

                Findings of the second quarter of 2015 indicate a high level of frustration among Gazans, with half of the respondents stating that they are considering emigration from the Gaza Strip. This is the highest percentage ever recorded in our polls. Findings also show an additional decline (particularly in the Gaza Strip) in satisfaction with the achievements of the latest Gaza war. Despite this, Hamas does better than Fatah in hypothetical elections in the Gaza Strip and Ismail Haniyeh wins against Abbas in a presidential election in the Strip. In the West Bank Abbas and Fatah are more popular than Haniyeh and Hamas.  It is worth mentioning that the public is divided equally on the significance of the electionvictory of Hamas’ student bloc at Birzeit University. Half of the respondents believes that the outcome of this election reflects the trend among the overall public while the other half believes that it reflects the trend among students only.

                Given the internal dispute within Fatah regarding Mohammad Dahlan, our findings show that his popularity in the Gaza Strip is relatively high, coming in third place after Ismail Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti in hypothetical elections in which Abbas does not participate. Dahlan’s popularity in the West Bank however is much lower, almost non-existent. In this context, we found that Abbas’ decision to lift Dahlan’s immunity and bring him to trial for corruption finds significant support in the West Bank while opposition to the decision is widespread in the Gaza Strip.

                Findings show that the public is unhappy with the outcome of the FIFA battle over Israel’s membership. The largest percentage, around one third, believes that Israel came out a winner while a little over a fifth believes that the Palestinian side came out a winner in that battle.

                Finally, findings show that a slight majority continues to support the two-state solution but that no more than a third believes that a Palestinian state alongside Israel can be established through negotiations. Instead, an overwhelming majority supports submitting a complaint against Israel to the ICC and joining more international organizations. Two thirds believe that a popular non-violent resistance is the most effective means of changing the status quo.

                 

                (1) Palestinian Elections:                                  

                • In presidential elections, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 46%.
                • Satisfaction with Abbas rises from 40% to 44%.
                • In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 39%, Hamas 35%, third parties combined 11%, and 16% are undecided.
                • 66% want legislative and presidential elections in few to six months.
                • 47% think that the victory of Hamas’ student bloc at Birzeit University reflects the general trend among the Palestinian public.

                 

                If new presidential elections are held today and only two candidates were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% (compared to 48% three months ago) and the latter 46% (compared to 47% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 46% and Haniyeh 50%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 44%. Meanwhile, the level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbasrises to 44% (compared to 40% three months ago). Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 50% in June 2014 in the aftermath of the Shati reconciliation declaration but before the Gaza war.  Satisfaction with Abbas increases in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (34%), in villages and towns (59%) compared to refugee camps and cities (39% and 41% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (54%) compared to those between 18 and 28 years old (43%), among non-refugees (48%) compared to refugees (38%), among the illiterates (55%) compared to holders of BA degree (41%), andamong supporters of Fatah (77%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (13% and 41% respectively).

                If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 58% and the latter would receive 36% of the participants’ votes. Three months ago, Barghouti received 58% and Haniyeh 38%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 25%, Barghouti 38%, and Haniyeh 34%. In an open question, 26% said they prefer to see Marwan Barghouti president after Abbas and 20% said they prefer to see Ismail Haniyeh, 4% said they prefer Dahlan, 3% said they prefer Rami al Hamdallah, another 3% selected Mustapha Barghouti, and 2% said they prefer Khalid Misha’al.

                If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 35% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 16% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 39%. In June 2014, just before the Gaza war, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 44% (compared to 36% three months ago). In the West Bank vote for Hamas stands at 32% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 36% (compared to 41% three months ago). A majority of 66% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 10% want them to take place after a year or more, and 21% do not want elections.

                47% believe that the outcome of the latest student elections at Birzeit University, in which Hamas’ student bloc won, only reflects the trend among university students, while an identical percentage believes that it reflects a trend among the general public. In explaining the outcome of those elections at Birzeit University, 14% said Fatah’s student bloc lost because Fatah, the movement, lacks credibility and is rife with corruption. 23% said the loss was due to internal disputes within Fatah’s student body or due to its mismanagement of its internal affairs or bad performance inside the university. 12% said it was due to rising Hamas popularity due to the war on Gaza or because the performance of Hamas’ student body was satisfactory. The belief that the outcome of Birzeit elections reflects a trend among the general public is higher in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (45%), among those between the ages of 18 and 28 (50%) compared to those over 50 years of age (42%), among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (31%), among the religious (52%) compared to the somewhat religious and non-religious (45% and 24% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (78%) compared to supporters of Fatah (26%).

                 

                (2) Domestic Conditions, salary payment crisis, and ISIS:

                • Positive evaluation of West Bank conditions stands at 30% and Gaza Strip conditions at 14%; perception of security stands at 54% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip.
                • 50% of Gazans and 25% of West Bankers say they seek immigration.
                • Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions stands at 79%.
                • Belief that there is press freedom in the West Bank stands at 23% and belief that there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip stands at 18%.
                • 39% support the decision of the Corruption Court to refuse to try Dahlan for corruption but 46% support the decision of president Abbas to lift his immunity and try him.
                • 84% see ISIS as a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 10% believe it does represent true Islam.

                 

                Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 14% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 30%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 46%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 54%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 50%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 25%. Desire to emigrate is higher in refugee camps and cities (35% each) compared to villages and towns (26%), among those between the ages of 18 and 28 (45%) compared to those over 50 years (13%), among holders of BA degree (41%) compared to illiterates (17%), and among students (52%) compared to merchants and farmers (17% and 18% respectively). Desire to emigrate is specially high among Gazan youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (60%), Gazan students (66%), and among unmarried Gazans (68%).

                Al Jazeera viewership is the highest, standing at 23%; Al Arabiyya stands at 8%. Viewership of PA’s Palestine TV stands at 20% and Hamas’al Aqsa TV at 12%. Maan-Mix viewership stands at 18%.

                Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%.  Furthermore, only 23% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 18% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip. 32% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. 30% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

                In light of the recent decision of the Corruption Court to reject the decision of PA president Abbas to lift the immunity of Mohammad Dahlan and to try him for corruption, 39% said they support the court’s decision and 46% said they support the decision of the president to lift the immunity. When asked about the corruption charges against Dahlan, 58% said they thought the charges were true and 19% said they were untrue. 23% said they do not know. Support for the court’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (36%), among men (44%) compared to women (35%), among those whose age is over 50 (41%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 (37%), and among supporters of Hamas (45%) compared to supporters of Fatah (33%).

                An overwhelming majority of 84% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 10% believe it does represent true Islam. 6% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 14% (compared to 8% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.

                 

                (3) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza:

                • Pessimism about the chances for a successful reconciliation continues to rise reaching today 59%; optimism stands at 38%.
                • Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 35% and dissatisfaction at 59%.
                • 52% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip but only 24% believe that Hamas is responsible for the weak performance of the reconciliation government.
                • More than 70% say that the reconciliation government should pay the salaries of the civil and security sectors that worked for the previous Hamas government.
                • 65% say that the reconciliation government, not Hamas, should be in charge of the security and police sector in the Gaza Strip and 76% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the full command of the reconciliation government.

                 

                Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 38% and pessimism at 59%. Three months ago optimism stood at 42% and pessimism at 54%.Moreover, satisfaction with the implementation of the reconciliation agreement stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Similarly, a year after its establishment, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 35%; dissatisfaction stands at 59%.Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 28%. It is worth mentioning thata year ago, right after its establishment, 61% had confidence in the reconciliation government.

                47% (56% in the Gaza Strip) want to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 36% (26% in the Gaza Strip) prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. The same applies to the crossings with Israel with 48% (56% in the Gaza Strip) wishing to place them under the control of the reconciliation government. 43% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and 33% want it placed in the hands of Hamas.

                52% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip and 35% reject this claim. But the belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 24% while 32% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 13% blame the head of the reconciliation government. When asked who was responsible for the return of the ministers of the reconciliation government from the Gaza Strip without being able to assume their responsibilities over their ministries, 46% said it was the reconciliation government and the president and 35% said it was Hamas.

                75% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salary of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (72%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salary of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government.65% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; 28% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  76% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the previous Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 20% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

                48% believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 46% believe it is an achievement. A year ago, right after the formation of the reconciliation government, 50% said the PA was an achievement and 45% said it was a burden. The drop in the level of optimism regarding the future of reconciliation is probably one of the reasons for the drop in the belief that the PA is a Palestinian achievement.

                 

                (4) Gaza War:

                • 63% support Hamas’ indirect negotiations with Israel for a long term hudna.
                • 59% believe that Hamas has won the last Gaza War but satisfaction of the war achievements drops to 35%.
                • 63% support continued rocket launch for Gaza if the siege and blockade continue.

                 

                63% support indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel to reach a long term hudna, or truce, in the Gaza Strip in return for lifting the siege and 32% oppose such negotiations. Support for such negotiations rises in the Gaza Strip (68%) compared to the West Bank (61%), and among supporters of Hamas (74%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (57% each).

                Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War stands at 59%; 25% believe the two sides were losers. Among Gazans, only 47% say Hamas came out a winner.Nine months ago, 69% of all Palestinians said Hamas came out a winner. By contrast, the percentage of satisfaction with war achievements compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip does not exceed 35% and dissatisfaction at 63%.Despite that, a majority of 63% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.

                 

                (5) The peace process

                • 51% support the two-state solution and 48% oppose it.
                • 34% support the one-state solution and 64% oppose it.
                • 54% oppose and 44% support a mutual recognition of national identity of the states of Israel and Palestine.
                • 86% support submitting a complaint against Israel to the International Criminal Court.
                • 67% support popular non-violent resistance and 49% support return to an armed intifada.

                 

                Findings show that a slight majority of 51% supports and 48% oppose the two-state solution. A larger majority of 55% believes that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion. Similarly, 72% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent. Despite this, only 34% support, and 64% oppose, a one-state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equal rights. Findings also show that 52% support the Arab Peace Initiative and 44% oppose it. But a majority of 54% opposes a mutual recognition of national identity of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people; 44% support it.

                Palestinian views on the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state vary: 36% think that armed action is the most effective, 32% think negotiations is the most effective, and 26% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective.

                In the absence of a peace negotiation, 82% support joining more international organizations. 86% support the submission of a complaint against Israel to the International Criminal Court. Moreover, two thirds (67%) support a popular non-violent resistance. A slight majority of 52% opposes, and 46% support, the dissolution of the PA. 51% opposes and 49% support a return to an armed intifada.

                The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 78%. 21% are not worried. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of 81% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population or deny them their rights. When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 69% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967 while 23% said it was to conquer the state of Israel or conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.

                An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 50% believe that Israel intends to destroy al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 18% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 9% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 13% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.  More than half of the public (52%) believes that Israel will indeed succeed in implementing its plans for al Haram al Sharif and 44% believe it will not succeed.

                 

                (6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

                • 45% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state is the first most vital Palestinian goal and 30% believe the first goal is to obtain the right of return for the refugees.
                • 29% say that the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and an identical percentage says that it is poverty and unemployment.

                 

                45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end the Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of the occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 29% of the pubic; an identical percentage believes it is poverty and unemployment. 22% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; and 15% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

                 

                (7) Other issues: FIFA, boycott, Israeli right wing government, and the nuclear agreement with Iran

                • Israel won more than the Palestinians in the FIFA battle.
                • An overwhelming majority supports the campaign to boycott Israel.
                • After the formation of right wing government in Israel, 79% are pessimistic about the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
                • The nuclear deal with Iran is good for Israel but bad for the Arabs.

                 

                FIFA: in the FIFA battle over Israeli membership in the international football federation, 33% believe that Israel came out as the winner and 22% believe the Palestinian side came out as the winner. 10% believe both sides were winners, 4% believe both sides were losers, 15% believe neither side won or lost, and 17% did not know or did not express an opinion.

                Boycott of Israeli products: 86% support the campaign to boycott Israel and impose sanctions on it and 88% say they have stopped buying Israeli products, such as those manufactured by Tnuva or Strauss, and 64% believe that the boycott of Israeli products will be effective in helping to end the Israeli occupation.

                Israeli right wing government: in the wake of the formation of a new right wing government led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, 79% of the public feel pessimistic about the future of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

                Nuclear agreement with Iran: 36% of the public believe that the framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, signed between the US and Iran, is a bad agreement for the Arabs and 25% believe it is a good agreement for the Arabs. 25% believe it is neither good nor bad. When asked if the agreement is good or bad for Israel, 50% said it was good and 24% said it was bad; 12% said it was neither good nor bad.

                While less than a third of the public views the Palestinian Authority as an accomplishment, and while half describes their leadership as a failed one, and while 80% thinks the West Bank-Gaza Strip split is permanent or long term, support for a confederation with Jordan rises; and while the public rejects Kerry’s ideas for return to negotiations without pre-conditions, a large majority supports going to the International Criminal Court in order to stop settlement expansion even if such a step leads to PA collapse 

                13-15 June 2013

                 This survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah.

                These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-15 June 2013. The period before the poll witnessed the resignation of the government of Salam Fayyad and the appointment of a new government headed by Rami Al Hamdallah, President of Al Najah University. The period also witnessed US Secretary of State John Kerry’s shuttle diplomacy in the hope of renewing Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Earlier, Khalid Mishaal was elected as head of Hamas’s political bureau for a new term, the formation of a Palestinian reconciliation government was postponed by three months, and President Abbas signed an agreement with King Abdullah of Jordan regarding the king’s custodianship of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. This press release covers public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the government of Ismail Haniyeh, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today in addition to Kerry’s efforts and the custodianship agreement. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. 

                For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 Fax:02-2964934  or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

                Main Findings:

                Findings of the second quarter of 2013 show a widespread state of frustration and pessimism. 80% believe that the West Bank-Gaza Strip split is either permanent or long term. Less than one third of the public views the PA, in its two incarnations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as an accomplishment for the Palestinian people. Moreover, less than a third believes that a Palestinian state will be established in the next five years. In fact, a majority, while continuing to support the two-state solution, believes that it has become impractical due to settlement expansion. Perhaps for these reasons half of the public believes that its leadership from the beginnings has been a failed one.  

                Furthermore, findings of this poll indicate a significant decrease, about 10 percentage points, in the opposition to a confederation with Jordan compared to the situation several years ago. A larger percentage supports the confederation today than in 2007 and 2008. But they also make it clear that Palestinians oppose the establishment of confederation now before the end of Israeli occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Despite that, findings do indicate that a majority supports the holy places agreement signed last March between President Mahmud Abbas and King Abdullah of Jordan in which the Palestinian side acknowledged the custodianship of the king over al Haram al Sharif in Jerusalem. 

                Findings also indicate public opposition to ideas brought by US Secretary of State John Kerry for restarting peace negotiations: without preconditions, with an economic package, and with focus on security and borders. The public is also opposed to several alternatives to negotiations such as return to an armed intifada, dissolution of the PA, and abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of one-state solution. But the public supports going to international organizations, especially to the International Criminal Court (ICC), despite its fears that such a step would bring about financial sanctions and the perhaps the collapse of the PA.

                Full Report PDF: 

                With humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip worsening, support for Hamas declines in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and as support for armed struggle drops in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, support for the two-state solution rises in the Gaza Strip only. Nonetheless, wide popular support for October the 7th offensive remains unchanged and the standing of the Palestinian Authority and its leadership remains extremely weak 
                5 -10 March 2024

                These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5-10 March 2024. The period leading up to the poll witnessed the continuation and expansion of the war on the Gaza Strip to include a ground offensive in the center and south of the Gaza Strip, with few exceptions. This development led to an worsening of the humanitarian suffering, the displacement of hundreds of thousands more, the killing of some thirty thousand, mostly women and children, and the arrival of signs of famine in the northern Gaza Strip, which has received little food aid delivery. There were also fears of the magnitude of the catastrophe that may befall the Rafah area if the ground war spreads to it. South Africa has filed a complaint against Israel at the International Court of Justice accusing it of genocide against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip. Efforts to reach a ceasefire before the start of Ramadan have failed during this period, although these efforts led by Qatar, Egypt and the United States have continued. Talk of the day after the war continued with little progress. But talk of the need to revitalize the Palestinian Authority (PA) led to the resignation of Mohammad Shtayyeh's government and talk of possible alternatives. Meanwhile, restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank continued, as the entrances to most towns and villages were blocked by the Israeli army in order to prevent residents from accessing the main roads. Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages in certain vulnerable parts of areas B and C also continued.

                This poll covers all these issues, in addition to others such as the peace process and the alternatives options available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

                To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, we have restricted the interviews with residents and displaced persons to specific areas where there was no on-going daily fighting. These areas included the Rafah area, parts of the Khanyounis area, the central Gaza Strip, and all shelters in these areas.  Our data collectors were not deployed in the besieged northern Gaza area nor in parts in the central Gaza Strip and parts in the Khanyounis area that saw daily fighting or Israeli army deployment.

                The data collection dates where selected carefully in the hope that the interviews would be conducted under two different conditions: continued war and a ceasefire. We hoped (1) to be able to document and measure the change that might be generated by the ceasefire, which we expected to take place on the first day of the month of Ramadan, and (2) to be able compare the findings under the two conditions. Therefore, half of the interviews were completed during the first three days of data collection. At that point, on the fourth day, 8 March, we suspended data collection in order to assess the prospects for a ceasefire. On that day, we concluded that no ceasefire would take place as we originally expected. Therefore, we resumed data collection on the fifth day and continued until 10 March.

                The sample size of this poll is 1580 adults, of whom 830 were interviewed face to face in the West Bank (in 83 locations) and 750 in the Gaza Strip (in 75 locations). Given the uncertainty about the population distribution in the Gaza Strip, we almost doubled the size of the sample in that area in order to lower the margin of error, which stands at +/-3%. The combined West Bank-Gaza Strip data file was reweighted to reflect the actual proportionate size of the population in the two Palestinian areas. Therefore, the sample is representative of the residents of the two areas.

                For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

                Summary of the Main Findings:

                As in our previous poll, conducted three months ago, most of the questions asked in the first quarter of 2024 revolved around October the 7th offensive and the subsequent Israeli war and ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, the unprecedented humanitarian suffering of the population, the horrors and atrocities of the war, the debate about the future of the Gaza Strip after the war, the likely repercussions of an Israeli ground offensive in Rafah, the South African case before the International Court of Justice, and public satisfaction with the performance of the various relevant actors during the war. One of the surprising developments documented in this poll is that the differences between the attitudes of West Bankers compared to Gazans have narrowed on most of these issues. One reason for this might have been the fact that the data in the West Bank, for the pervious poll, was collected during the release by Israel of West Bank prisoners as part of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire agreement. Other than the ceasefire, no equivalent development was unfolding in the Gaza Strip at that time. This poll also examined the impact of the war on the internal balance of power, support for the Palestinian leadership, and the Palestinian-Israeli relations and the peace process.

                We begin with the humanitarian and living conditions. Conditions in the Gaza Strip continue to worsen. The poll shows that the majority of Gazans are still unable to find food, that the shelters where they now live lack most of the basic needs, and that efforts to have access to some of the basic needs involve great difficulties and risks. It is also worth noting that there are significant complaints of discrimination, on political grounds, in the distribution of humanitarian aid.  But perhaps the most disturbing is that fact that almost 80% of Gazans report that at least one of their family members have been killed or injured. Three months ago, only 64% reported the same. Indeed, 60% report today that at least one family member has been killed. Almost two-thirds blame Israel for their suffering and most of the others blame the US; in the Gaza Strip, only 9%, a 10-point drop from our previous poll, blame Hamas.

                While support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th remains as high as it was three months ago, Palestinian support in the West Bank has in fact dropped by 11 points while, surprisingly, support in the Gaza Strip has increased by 14 points. It is clear from the findings however, that support for the offensive does not mean support for Hamas. Instead, the findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians believe that the offensive has put the Palestinian-Israeli issue at the center of attention after years of neglect at the regional and international levels.

                As we have found in the previous poll, almost all Palestinians think Israel is committing war crimes while almost all believe Hamas is not committing war crimes in the current war. Moreover, more than 90% believe that Hamas did not commit any atrocities against Israel civilians during its October the 7th offensive. Only one in five Palestinians has seen videos showing atrocities committed by Hamas. Only one fifth of those who did not see the videos had access to such videos but decided not to see them; the rest report that the media they watched did not show these videos. The findings show that those who have seen the videos are almost 10 times more likely to think that Hamas men have committed atrocities on October 7.

                We explored possible ramifications of an Israeli ground offensive in Rafah. The findings show that only one quarter of Gazans think an Israeli ground operation in Rafah would lead to a mass rush to the border with Egypt. Indeed, 70% of Gazans say that even if the Rafah-Egypt barrier is to collapse they would not seek safety in Egypt. Perhaps one reason for the reluctance to cross the border is the fact that almost 70% of Gazans think the Egyptian army and police will shoot at those crossing the borders.

                The vast majority is satisfied with the South African efforts to take Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing it of genocide. But two thirds of the public express dissatisfaction with the court’s decision that did not ask Israel to abide by a ceasefire. Moreover, less than 40% think the ICJ will eventually convict Israel of genocide. But even if convicted, more than 70% of the Palestinians think Israel will not reassess its continued occupation of the Palestinian territories. 

                The findings show that while half of the West Bankers are optimistic about a ceasefire soon, only a little over a quarter of Gazans express the same expectation. Indeed, the largest percentage of Gazans (38%) expects the war to continue. Surprisingly however, while less West Bankers expect Hamas to win, compared to our findings three months ago, more Gazans express that expectation today. Indeed, Gazans’ expectation that Israel will win the war has dropped by one third.

                Furthermore, while less West Bankers think today, compared to three months ago, that Hamas will remain in control of the Gaza Strip in the future, more Gazans now think Hamas will be in control. Indeed, almost 60% of Gazans think that. When asked about their own preference, Gazans’ support for continued Hamas control over the Gaza Strip has increased to more than 50%, a 14-point rise. Indeed, given the magnitude of the suffering in the Gaza Strip, this seems to be the most counter intuitive finding of the entire poll. Nonetheless, it is consistent with the increase in the percentage of Gazans who think Hamas will win the current war. This is particularly interesting because the opposite happened in the West Bank, with the preference for Hamas staying in control dropping significantly while West Bankers’ expectations that Hamas will win dropped by 14 points.

                As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors. The findings show similar results, with the satisfaction with Hamas and Yahya Sinwar remaining very high. By contrast, satisfaction with Fatah and president Abbas remains very low. At the regional level, satisfaction with Yemen and Qatar increases while satisfaction with Iran, Jordan, and Egypt remains low. Indeed, satisfaction with Egypt in particular has drops by half in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. None of the international players, including Russai, receive high satisfaction. The findings continue to show almost zero satisfaction with the US.

                We explored the impact of the war on the internal Palestinian balance of power. The current poll indicates a significant change compared to the previous one. In total, only one third of the Palestinians support Hamas today, an 11-point drop. The drop has been almost equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, Fatah does not benefit from the drop in support for Hamas as its own support remains unchanged compared to our findings three months ago. It is worth remembering that our previous poll was conducted during the release of Palestinian women and children as part of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire agreement. Undoubtedly, Hamas’ popularity benefited greatly as a result of that deal.  

                At the leadership level, the current poll also shows significant change. The most important change is the rise in support for Marwan Barghouti. In presidential elections against current president Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas’ leader Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti wins the majority of those participating in the elections. In a two-way competition between Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former wins by more than 60% of the participating voters. These findings indicate an 11-point rise in the vote for Barghouti among voters and an 8-point drop in the vote for Haniyeh.  By contrast, in the two-way competition is between Haniyeh and Abbas, the former wins 70% of the participating voters.  Indeed, the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, while declining a little in the Gaza Strip, has increased slightly in the West Bank.

                Also domestically, the resignation of the Shtayyeh government is not seen as a sign of reform and the vast majority rejects the appointment of Mohammad Mustafa as prime minister. More than 60% of the public want a government that is neither under the control of a political party nor under the control of president Abbas. Two thirds continue to express the belief that the PA is now a burden on the Palestinian people and the majority favors its dissolution.  Finally, perception of personal and family safety and security in the West Bank keep dropping, as 9 out of 10 West Bankers say they do not feel safe or secure.

                On Palestinian-Israeli relations, the findings are also different than those reported in our previous poll three months ago. Two findings are worth noting: support for the two-state solution has increased significantly and support for armed struggle has dropped significantly. However, the increased support for the two-state solution, while dramatic, came only from the Gaza Strip, a 27-point increase, while remaining stable in the West Bank. Given three choices for ending the Israeli occupation, the current findings indicate a 17-point decrease in support for armed struggle; a 5-point rise in support for negotiations; and a 5-point rise in support for non-violence.  The drop in three months in support for armed struggle comes equally from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

                1) October the 7th and the War in Gaza:

                1. Support for Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7th offensive remains unchanged:

                • As we did in our previous poll three months ago, we asked the respondents in this poll what they thought of Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7th offensive. A vast majority of 71%, compared to 72% in December 2023, say it was correct. However, despite the stability of the total response, the findings do show significant change when looking at the two areas separately. As the figure below shows, the perception that the decision of the offensive was correct drops in the West Bank by 11 points and increases in the Gaza Strip by 14 points.

                • The continued and consistent support for Hamas’ offensive despite significant changes in public attitudes during the past three months, including a significant decline in Hamas’ popularity in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as we will see later in this report, can be partially explained by the findings regarding a question about the diplomatic fallout from that offensive and the Israeli response to it. We asked the public if it thinks that “the war on Gaza since October 7 has revived international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that it could lead to increased recognition of Palestinian statehood.” Three quarters say “yes”; only 22% say “no.”  

                2. Humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip:

                • Only 44% of Gazans say they have enough food for a day or two and 55% say they do not. These are almost identical to the same findings we obtained three months ago. It is worth remembering that we did not conduct any interviews in the besieged northern parts of the Gaza Strip.
                • When they need food or water, only 19% of Gazans say they can reach a place where they can have access to assistance; another 77% say they can but with a great difficulty or risk, and 4% say they cannot.
                • Sixty percent of all Gazans say a member of their family has been killed during the current war. In a separate question, 68% say a member of their family has been injured. When combining the two questions, the findings show that 78% say a member of their family has been either killed or injured; only 22% of Gazans say none of their family members have been killed or injured. Three months ago, 64% of Gazans said a member of their family had been killed or injured during the current war.

                • We asked Gazans about the availability of essential needs: water, food, electricity, tents, covers, clothing, medical care, and toilets.  Those who said “Yes, available” ranged between 10% for tents and 33% for water. But the largest percent said these needs are available but with great difficulty and risk. This was particularly the case for medical care, tents, food, water, and electricity. The needs that seem unavailable at all for the largest percentage of Gazans are tents, clothing, and covers.

                We asked those in shelters about the identity of the organizers in charge. The majority of the respondents (62%) said it was UNRWA, 15% said it was government, 13% local Palestinian group, and 8% said other international organization.

                • We asked respondents to assess, based on their personal experience, the fairness of aid distribution to displaced residents currently in shelters. The vast majority (70%) said it was discriminatory while only 27% said it was fair. When we crosstabulated these responses based on the identity of the shelters’ organizers, it becomes clear, as shown in the following figure, that greatest complaint (90%) comes from those in shelters organized by local Palestinian groups, followed by those organized by UNRWA, other international organizations, and the government.

                • A majority of 64% (compared to 52% three months ago) blames Israel for the current suffering of Gazans in the current war while 20% (compared to 26% three months ago) place the blame on the US; only 7% (compared to 11% three months ago) place the blame on Hamas, and 6% (compared to 9% three months ago) blame the PA. It is worth noting that the percentage of Gazans who place the blame on Hamas has dropped from 19% to 9%.

                3. War crimes and atrocities:

                • As we found in the previous poll, almost all Palestinians (94% think Israel has committed war crimes during the current war. By contrast, only 5% (compared to 10% three months ago) think Hamas also committed such crimes; 4% think Israel has not committed such crimes and 91% think Hamas did not commit war crimes during the current war.
                • 80% (compared to 85% in December 2023) say they did not see videos, shown by international news outlets, showing acts committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, such as the killing of women and children in their homes; only 19% (11% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip) saw these videos.
                • We asked those who did not see the videos to tell us the reasons they have not seen them: 60% said that the media they watched did not show them while 20% (14% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) said that they did not want to watch them.
                • When asked if Hamas did commit these atrocities that are seen in these videos, the overwhelming majority (93%) said no, it did not, and only 5% said it did. As shown in the figure below, the belief that Hamas fighters have committed atrocities against civilians is higher among those who did watch videos showing such atrocities (17%) compared to those who did not (2%).

                4. Possible ramifications of an Israeli ground invasion of Rafah:

                We explored three possible ramifications of an Israeli invasion of Rafah: people rushing to cross the border with Egypt, perception of likely Egyptian police and army response to such development, and the likely behavior of the residents and displaced person when they see people crossing the border toward Egypt:

                • We asked the public to speculate about the likely behavior of Rafah residents and displaced persons in the event of an Israeli invasion of that city: would these people in this case rush to safety on the Egyptian side? While half of the West Bankers expect them to do so, only 24% of Gazans say residents and displaced person would rush towards the border and cross to safety in Egypt. In total, 40% said they think they would and 51% said they think they would not.
                • We then examined public perception of the likely behavior of the Egyptian army and police, on the other side of the border, when seeing masses of people rushing and crossing the border into Egypt. Findings show a majority of 61% thinks the Egyptian army and police would indeed shoot at those crossing the borders. Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to think so, 68% and 55% respectively.

                • We asked Gazans about their own behavior if they see people rushing toward the Egyptian border and seeing the separation barrier between Egypt and Rafah falling, would they leave home or shelter in search of safety and cross the borders with the others? Almost 70% said no, they would not; only 25% said yes, they would.

                5. South Africa and the case of genocide at the International Court of Justice

                • We asked the public about its satisfaction or dissatisfaction with South Africa for bringing the case of genocide against Israel to the international Court of Justice (ICJ). The vast majority (78%) expressed satisfaction; only 19% expressed dissatisfaction. But almost two thirds of the public (65%) expressed dissatisfaction with the court’s decision that did not ask Israel to abide by a ceasefire; only 31% expressed satisfaction with the court’s decision. Moreover, only 37% expressed the belief that the ICJ would indeed eventually convict Israel of genocide. A majority of 59% said it did not expect the ICJ to issue such a conviction.
                • Finally, when asked if such conviction, if it happens, would contribute to force Israel to consider ending its occupation of the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 72% said no; only 23% said yes. It is noticeable that Gazans, as shown below, show a little more satisfaction with the court’s decision and optimism regarding the likely court decision and the impact of such a decision on the larger question of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.  

                6. Expectations regarding the ceasefire and who will win the war

                • We asked the public about its expectations for the following weeks and months regarding the war and the prospects for a ceasefire. The largest percentage (40%) expect Israel and Hamas to reach a permanent ceasefire while 27% expect the continuation of the war and 25% expect the expansion of the war to include other regional and non-regional states and actors. The expectations of a ceasefire is much higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 50% and 27% respectively. The largest percentage of Gazans (38%) expects the war to continue while only 20% of West Bankers expect that.

                • As we did in December 2023, we asked in the current poll “who will win” this war. Today, the majority expects Hamas to win. But it is a little smaller majority than we found three months ago, 64% and 70% respectively. It is worth noting, as indicated in the figure below, that today, more Gazans expect Hamas to win than three months ago, 56% and 50% respectively. By contrast, today, less West Bankers expect Hamas to win than three months ago, 69% and 83% respectively. It is worth noting also that while almost no one in the West Bank expect Israel to win the current war, almost one fifth (19%) of Gazans expect Israel to win. The current percent of those Gazans who expect Israel to win is more than a third less than the case three months ago, 19% and 31% respectively.

                7. “The Day After:” Who will rule Gaza after the war?

                • We asked the respondents to speculate about the party that will be in control of the Gaza Strip in the day after the end of the current war. Gazans and West Bankers agree by 59%, for each side, that it will be Hamas. This represents a drop of 5 points compared to our findings three months ago. The drop came from the West Bank, declining by 14 points while in the Gaza Strip the percentage of those who thought Hamas will be in control increased by 8 points. Only 5% think the Israeli army will be in control; 9% selected a PA under president Abbas, and another 9% selected the PA without Abbas; 2% selected one or more Arab country; and 2% selected the UN.
                • When asked about their own preferences for the party that should be in control in the Gaza Strip after the war, 59% (64% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) selected Hamas; 13% selected the PA without President Abbas; 11% selected the PA with Abbas; 3% selected one or more Arab country;1% selected the UN, and 1% selected the Israeli army. Three months ago, we asked an identical question, but with a slightly different set of options to choose from. At that time, a similar percentage (60% in total; 75% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) selected Hamas as the party preferred by the respondents to control the Gaza Strip after the war. The change in the preferences of the Gazans, with a 14-point increase among them selecting Hamas today, is one of the most intriguing findings of the current poll. But it is consistent with the increase, indicated above, in the percentage of Gazans who think Hamas will win the current war. This is particularly interesting because the opposite happened in the West Bank, with the preference for Hamas dropping significantly by 11 points.  Yet, this West Bank finding is consistent with the significant decrease by 14 points, also indicated above, in the percentage of West Bankers who think Hamas will win the war.

                • In another question involving speculation about the most likely scenario for the day after the war, the results were almost identical, to the question asked above, as 59% said Hamas will return to control the Gaza Strip. But unlike the first question above, 63% of the West Banker and only 52% in the Gazans expected that. The reason for the change has to do with the available set of scenarios we provided in which we omitted the option of a return of the PA without president Abbas and provided new possibilities, such as the establishment by Israel of local authorities, tribal and family control, the emergence of multiple armed groups.  The return of the PA under Abbas was expected by 11%, 6% expected Israel to establish local authorities, another 6% expected the Israeli army to assume control, 4% expected control by tribes and families, and another 4% expected the establishment of multiple armed groups. 
                • Here too we asked about preferences regarding these scenarios. Given the new choices, the most important change, compared to the earlier question, about preferences in the day after the war, has been the rise in the percentage that selected Hamas. As shown in the figure below, the return of Hamas reaches 63%, with a 7-point increase in the Gaza Strip compared to only 2-point increase in the West Bank. Gazans were also more likely to increase their support for the return of the PA, even if under Abbas’ control, with a 14-point rise. West Bankers increased their support for a PA under Abbas by only 3 points.

                • Our previous poll in December 2023 asked about the deployment of an Arab security contingent from Egypt and Jordan in the Gaza Strip. At that time, three months ago, we found a 70% opposition to the idea even if the forces were deployed to assist the PA security forces. In this poll, we asked about support for the “immediate deployment of an international force under the UN flag to temporarily police the Gaza Strip in order to end the current war and bring about an Israeli withdrawal.” Only one third supported this option and 63% opposed it. Support for it was higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip (43% to 17% respectively). 

                • We also asked the respondents to speculate about attitudes of Gazans toward a possible deployment of Turkish forces in the Gaza Strip. But this scenario stated that such deployment would take place with Hamas’ approval and international cover and funding. The findings show the majority thinks Gazans would reject the idea. The assessment of Gazans however shows a split with 51% believing Gazans would welcome the deployment and 48% believing they would reject it.

                • Finally, we asked the public about if it is for or against an idea of a long-term vision for the day after in which the US and an Arab coalition comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan would develop a plan that would strengthen the PA, restore negotiations based on the two-state solution, and bring about an Arab-Israeli peace and normalization. Almost three quarters (73%) said it stands against the idea and only 23% said it stands for it. It is worth noting that the support for the idea among Gazans is much higher than it is among West Bankers, 36% and 14% respectively.+

                8. Satisfaction with relevant Palestinian, regional, and international actors:

                • The vast majority (83%) thinks the US administration repeated declarations about the reaching a two-state solution are not serious; only 15% (9% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip) think they are serious.  
                • As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:
                1. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with the role of Hamas remains stable at 70% (75% in the West Bank and 62% in the Gaza Strip) was the highest followed by the role played by Yehia Sinwar (61%; 68% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip), Fatah (27%; 24% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip), and president Abbas (14%; 8% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip). As the figure below indicates, support for Hamas, while indeed stable for the total, has in fact dropped in the West Bank by 10 points, from 85% three months ago to 75% today. The opposite happened in the Gaza Strip: satisfaction with Hamas increased by 10 points. Satisfaction with Sinwar remains stable in the Gaza Strip and drops 13 points in the West Bank. Satisfaction with Fatah increases by 5 points for the total, 1 point in the West Bank and 11 points in the Gaza Strip. Finally, satisfaction with Abbas increases by 3 points, 1 point in the West Bank and 5 points in the Gaza Strip.

                1. For the Arab/regional actors, as in our previous poll, the highest level of satisfaction goes to Yemen (83%; 88% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Qatar (56%), Hizballah (48%), Iran (30%), Jordan (22%), and Egypt (12%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction in the two polls over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the Gaza Strip, the figure shows  a significant rise in satisfaction with Yemen and Qatar and a decrease in satisfaction with Hezbollah and Egypt. In the West Bank, the figure shows a rise in satisfaction with Hezbollah and a decrease in satisfaction with Qatar, Iran, Jordan, and Egypt. The regional Arab country that has lost satisfaction in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is Egypt, cut down by half to 12% for the total, 5% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip.

                1. For the non-regional international actors, the highest level of satisfaction goes to Russia (19%, 21% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Canada and the UN (7% each), and the US (1%). The following figure shows a drop of 3 points in satisfaction with Russia for the total sample. The drop came from the Gaza Strip (12 points) while satisfaction with Russia in the West Bank increased by 4 points. Satisfaction with the US performance remains non-existent.  

                9. What should the Palestinian Authority do? 

                • We asked about the policy measures that the PA leadership should take today to help address the current war in the Gaza Strip. Three policy options were provided. The largest percentage (42%) opted for bringing about an immediate reconciliation and reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Secondly, selected by 37%, came the formation of a national unity government to negotiate with Israel and the international community the end of the war and the future reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The third, selected by 14%, was for the PA to “lead the humanitarian service delivery to Gazans in cooperation with Egypt and the international community.”  It is worth noting that for Gazans, the formation of a national unity government has been the most preferred measure, while for West Bankers, it has been reconciliation and reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. When compared to these two measures, both sides, West Bankers and Gazans, almost equally, viewed the humanitarian role as the least important.  

                (2) Parliamentary and presidential elections and the domestic balance of power:

                If a presidential competition is to take place between three, Marwan Barghouti from Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, also from Fatah, and Ismael Haniyeh from Hamas, participation in the election would stand at 72%; vote for Marwan Barghouti would stand at 40%, the highest rate in the last three hypothetical elections since September 2023, followed by Haniyeh at 23%, and Abbas at 8%. Among the voters, Barghouti receives 56%, Haniyeh 32%, and Abbas 11%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti among the voters stood at 47% and Haniyeh at 43%, and Abbas at 7%. These findings show Barghouti’s vote increasing by 9 points while vote for Haniyeh drops by 11 points.

                • However, if the new presidential elections were held with only two candidates, Mahmoud Abbas from Fatah and Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas, competing, the voter turnout would drop to 52%; vote for Haniyeh would stand at 37% and Abbas at 11%. Among the voters, Haniyeh would receive 70% and Abbas 22%. Three months ago, the vote for Abbas among the voters stood at 16% and vote for Haniyeh stood at 78%.

                • But if the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti from Fatah and Haniyeh from Hamas, participation would rise to 69%; 42% would vote for Barghouti and 26% for Haniyeh. Among the voters, Barghouti would receive 62% and Haniyeh 37%. These findings indicate a rise in the vote for Barghouti among voters by 11 points and a drop in the vote for Haniyeh by 8 points.  

                • If the two presidential candidates were Haniyeh from Hamas and a different Fatah candidate, prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh, participation would drop to 53%; 13% would vote for Shtayyeh and 38% for Haniyeh. Among the voters, Shtayyeh receives 24% and Haniyeh 72%.

                • Finally, if the two presidential candidates were Haniyeh from Hamas and a non-Fatah candidate, Mustafa Barghouti, the leader of al Mubadara and a former presidential candidate, the voter turnout rises slightly to 56%; Mustafa Barghouti receives 23% and Haniyyeh 31%. Among the voters, Mustafa Barghouti receives 40% of the vote and Haniyyeh 56%.

                • In a closed question, we asked the public to select the person they prefer to see as President Abbas's successor. The largest percentage (40%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti; 19% preferred Ismail Haniyeh; 10% chose Yahya al Sinwar; 6% chose Hussein al-Sheikh; 4% preferred Mohammed Dahlan, 2% preferred Khaled Meshaal, 1% chose Muhammad Shtayyeh, and 18% said they did not know or chose someone else. It is worth noting that the preference for Dahlan, al-Sheikh, and Shtayyeh comes almost only from the Gaza Strip.
                • Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 16% and dissatisfaction at 81%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 8% in the West Bank (compared to 10% three months ago) and 27% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 19% three months ago).  Six months ago, before the October 7 war, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 22% and dissatisfaction at 76%.
                • 84% want Abbas to resign while 14% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 88% said they want Abbas to resign. Six months ago, 78% wanted him to resign. Demand for Abbas' resignation today stands at 93% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip.

                • When asked which political party or political trend they support, the largest percentage selected Hamas (34%), followed by Fatah (17%), while 11% selected other or third-party groups, and 37% said none of them or did not know. Three months ago, 43% supported Hamas and 17% selected Fatah. Six months ago, before the current war, support for Hamas stood at 22% and support for Fatah stood at 26%.This means that support for Hamas during the past three months has witnessed an 11-point drop while support for Fatah remained unchanged during the same period. In the West Bank, support for Hamas today stands at 35% (compared to 44% three months ago), and for Fatah at 12% (compared to 16% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas today stands at 34% (compared to 42% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 25% (compared to 18% three months ago).

                • However, if new parliamentary elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, only 64% say they would participate in them, 30% would vote for Hamas, 14% for Fatah, 6% for third parties, and 15% remain undecided. Among the voters, support for Hamas stands at 47%, Fatah 22%, third parties 9%, and the undecided at 24%. Compared to our findings three months ago, the current results among the voters indicate a 4-point drop by for Hamas and a 3-point rise by Fatah. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Hamas among the voters stands today at 45% (compared to 52% three months ago and 44% six months ago) and vote for Fatah among the voters stands today at 26% (compared to 21% three months ago and 32% six months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas among the voters stands today at 48% (compared to 50% three months ago and 24% six months ago) and vote for Fatah among the voters stands today at 16% (compared to 18% three months ago and 40% six months ago).

                • 49% (compared to 54% three months ago) believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 17% (compared to 13% three months ago) believe that Fateh under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving; 29% (compared to 26% three months ago) believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership. Six months ago, 27% said Hamas is the most deserving, 24% said Fateh led by Abbas is the most deserving, and 44% said both are unworthy of representation and leadership.

                (3) Domestic conditions, the resignation of Shtayyeh, and perception of safety and security:

                • We asked the public about the meaning of the resignation of the government of prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh: is it, in its view, a step toward reforming the PA? A majority of 62% said it is not and only 30% said it is. Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to view the resignation as a step toward reform, 41% and 23% respectively.  
                • In the aftermath of the resignation of prime minister Shtayyeh, two candidates emerged as the most likely successors: Mohammad Mustafa (reportedly favored by Abbas) and Salam Fayyad (reportedly favored by some regional and international donors). We asked the public, which of the two it favors: 55% said none of them; 22% favored Fayyad and 10% favored Mustafa. Eventually, after the completion of data collection, Mustafa was appointed by Abbas as his next prime minister.
                • We asked the public about the make-up and source of authority for the new government: a national unity government that would come under the control of a political party, control of president Abbas, or one that does not come under the control of Abbas or a political party. As the figure below shoes, 62% opted for the third choice while only a quarter selected the two other choices combined. It is worth noting that Gazans are less likely than West Bankers to go for the third choice.

                • A majority of 65% (compared to 68% three months ago) believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 27% (compared to 28% three months ago) believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people. Six months ago, 62% said the PA is a burden and 35% said it was an achievement.
                • We asked the public in the West Bank about its personal and family safety and security. The findings show that only 11% feel safe and secure while 89% feel unsafe and unsecure. Three months ago, the perception of safety stood at 14% and six months ago at 48%.
                • Aljazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine with 61% selecting it as the one they watched the most during the past two months. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to watch Aljazeera as 45% of Gazans (compared to 10% in the West Bank) say they do not watch or have no access to TV these days. The second most popular TV station is Palestine Today (4%), followed by Alarabiyya and al Mayadeen (3% each), Palestine TV (2%), Alaqsa and Ma’an (1% each).

                (4) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

                • 45% support and 52% oppose the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details of the solution. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 34% and six months ago support stood at 32%. In the current poll, support for this solution came from Gaza Strip, a 27-point increase while remaining stable in the West Bank at 34%.

                • Support for the two-state solution is usually linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Today, 61% (compared to 65% three months ago) believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion but 37% (compared to 32% three months ago) believe it is still practical. Six months ago, 71% said that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or nonextant, and 27% believe the chances are medium or high.
                • When asked about public support and opposition to specific policy measures to break the stalemate: 62% supported joining more international organizations; 45% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 55% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 58% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 69% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 39% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 58% supported the dissolution of the PA; and 29% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of one state. Six months ago, before the current war, 58% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 53% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 52% supported the dissolution of the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of one state.
                • We offered the public three methods to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent state and asked it to select the most effective. 46% (51% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) selected “armed struggle;” 25% (27% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip) selected negotiations; and 18% (12% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip) selected popular non-violent resistance. As shown in the figure below, these findings indicate a 17-point drop in support for armed struggle; a 5-point rise in support for negotiations; and a 5-point rise in support for non-violence.  The drop in three months in support for armed struggle comes equally from both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

                • Support and opposition to negotiations is seen in the results to a question about attitudes regarding “a return to Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations in order to achieve a two-state solution under international and Arab auspice.” Support for such return to negotiations received the support of 38% (46% in the Gaza Strip and 33% in the West Bank) of the public.

                • We asked the public about its willingness to compromise for the sake of peace: “if during negotiations, Israel agrees to make painful concessions to the Palestinian side, would you be willing in this case to support a similar Palestinian position in offering similar concessions to Israel?” A majority of 63% (70% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) said “no,” while only one third (33%; 46% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank) said “yes.”
                • We asked the public to tell us what kind of role it thinks the international community can play in address the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The poll provided five different roles. The most popular role, receiving 39% support, was the one involving humanitarian assistance in providing basic needs of refugees and displaced persons; the second, receiving 29% support, was “mediation to bring the two sides to the negotiation table,” the third, receiving 11% support, was the provision of financial and socio-economic assistance to the Palestinian Authority; the fourth, with 8% support was the use of sanctions to force the parties to observe international law; and the fifth, with only 6% support, was building Palestinian public institutions.

                • When asked to select the Western country trusted the most in helping Palestine and Israel make peace, two thirds selected “none of the above.” The list provided included four countries: the US, Canada, France, and Germany. From among the four Canada came second, after the US, with 8% favoring it. France came third and Germany fourth.

                • We asked the public about its assessment of the potential impact of withholding financial support from UNRWA by some countries “because some of its staff have been accused of participating in Hamas’ October 7 offensive.” We asked the public to tell us if it thinks withholding support from UNRWA would contribute to increasing or decreasing the prospects for Palestinian-Israeli peace. The overwhelming majority thought the withholding of support would decrease the prospects for peace while only 5% thought it would do the opposite and increase the prospects for peace.

                • In light of the increase in settler terrorist attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, we asked West Bankers what means are most effective in combating this terrorism that are also the most feasible.
                • The largest percentage (41%) chose the formation of armed groups by residents of the targeted areas in order to protect their areas; 23% chose to deploy Palestinian police forces in the targeted areas; another 23% chose the demand that the Israeli army take measures to prevent settler terrorism; and only 8% chose the formation, by residents of the targeted areas, of unarmed groups to protect their areas. As the figure below indicates, these results show significant change compared to out findings three months ago. The most important change is a 15-point drop-in support for the formation of armed groups, an 8-point increase in the demand for protection by the PA police; and a 7-point increase in the demand for an Israeli army measures to stop the settlers.

                  (5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the most pressing problems confronting Palestinians today:

                  • 42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages; 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; and 11% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
                  • When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (56%; 66% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; (23%) said it is the Israeli occupation; 8% said it is corruption;  6% said it is unemployment; and 5% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, (51%, 42% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; and 32% said it is the Israeli occupation.

                  13 December 2023 

                  Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. The war increases Hamas’ popularity and greatly weakens the standing of the PA and its leadership; nonetheless, the majority of the Palestinians remains unsupportive of Hamas. Support for armed struggle rises, particularly in the West Bank and in response to settlers’ violence, but support for the two-state solution rises somewhat. The overwhelming majority condemns the positions taken by the US and the main European powers during the war and express the belief that they have lost their moral compass 
                  22 November-2 December 2023

                  This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

                      These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 November and 2 December 2023. The period leading up to the poll witnessed the launch of Hamas’ October the 7th offensive against Israeli towns and military bases bordering the Gaza Strip and the Israeli launch of the current ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. Video images circulating in the international and Israeli media show that some Hamas fighters have committed attacks against Israeli civilians, including women and children, and took many of them hostages. International and Palestinian reports reported that thousands of Palestinians, mostly women and children, were killed by Israeli arial and tank bombardment. Israeli attacks targeted Palestinian hospitals, public buildings, and most other civilian infrastructure including tens of thousands of homes, with many neighborhoods leveled completely to the ground. In the meanwhile, in the West Bank, the Israeli army blocked or restricted Palestinian access to main roads while settler attacks increased against vulnerable towns and villages in various parts of the B and C areas.

                      To ensure the safety of our field researchers in the Gaza Strip, interviews with the residents were conducted during the ceasefire, which saw Palestinian women and children released from Israeli prisons in exchange for women and children held by Hamas.

                      The sample size of this poll is 1231 adults, of whom 750 were interviewed face to face in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip in 121 randomly selected locations. The sample is representative of the residents of the two areas. Due to the war in the Gaza Strip, we conducted interviews in the central and southern regions inside the selected sample homes, with the exception of one displaced area, where residents were interviewed in the shelter area where they had taken refuge. As for the northern Gaza Strip, residents were interviewed in 24 shelter locations, of which 20 belonged to UNRWA and 4 to governmental institutions. A total of 250 interviews were conducted in these shelters, and another 21 were conducted in the homes of relatives and friends of displaced people from the north. Despite the large representative sample, the margin of error for this poll is +/-4. The increase in the margin of error is due to the lack of precision regarding the number of residents who stayed in their homes, or in shelters, in the northern parts of the Gaza Strip which we did not sample.

                      For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

                      Main Findings:

                      Most of the questions asked in this last quarter of 2023 revolved around the October 7 offensive and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war and ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. It also covered the debate about the future of the Gaza Strip after the war and the Palestinian perception of the positions of the various relevant countries and actors. Findings indicate that a majority of the respondents believe that Hamas' decision to carry out the offensive is correct, and believe that the attack came in response to “settler attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque and West Bank residents, and for the release of Palestinian prisoners.” It is worth noting that there are significant differences between the attitudes of the residents of the West Bank compared to those of the Gaza Strip, in terms of the “correctness” of the Hamas' decision (and other matters), as the attitudes of Gazans tend to show a greater degree of skepticism about that decision. It is clear from the findings that believing in the “correctness” of Hamas' decision does not mean support for all acts that might have been committed by Hamas fighters on October 7. The overwhelming majority of respondents say that they have not seen videos from international or social media showing atrocities committed by Hamas members against Israeli civilians that day, such as the killing of women and children in their homes. Indeed, more than 90% believe that Hamas fighters did not commit the atrocities contained in these videos. When asked what is or is not allowed in war, under international humanitarian law, the findings indicate that the vast majority believes that attacking or killing civilians in their homes is not permissible. The majority (except in the Gaza Strip) also believe that taking civilians as hostages or prisoners of war is also not permissible.

                      The findings also indicate that the majority believes that Israel will not succeed in eradicating Hamas, or in causing a second Palestinian Nakba, or in expelling the residents of the Gaza Strip. Indeed, a large majority believes that Hamas will emerge victorious from this war. A majority also says Hamas will resume control over the Gaza Strip after the war. The findings also indicate significant opposition to the deployment of an Arab security force in the Gaza Strip, even if its purpose is to provide support to the Palestinian Authority.  The majority also opposes a role for Arab states in delivering services to the Gaza Strip, but this majority is far less than the majority that opposes an Arab security presence.

                      The findings indicate that the Palestinians are questioning the moral commitment of the US, and other West European countries, to the ethical values embodied in the international humanitarian law. They show widespread conviction that the positions of the United States and the major Western powers show total disregard to international humanitarian law and that their talk of a two-state solution is not serious. All or most Palestinians say they are dissatisfied with the positions of the United States, Germany, Britain, France, the United Nations, and even Russia in this war. Also, the overwhelming majority is dissatisfied with the performance of Arab or regional countries or parties such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Jordan, while the percentage of satisfaction with the performance of Turkey and Iran is somewhat high, and a majority says that it is satisfied with the performance of Yemen, Qatar and Hezbollah. Dissatisfaction with Palestinian actors increases significantly when asked about the PA prime minister, the PA president, the PA, and Fatah. A majority of the public is satisfied only with the performance of Hamas, Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyyah.

                      Findings indicate that the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip has had a significant impact on a range of internal Palestinian issues and on Palestinian-Israeli relations. The most important of these effects can be summarized in the following changes:

                      • Support for Hamas has more than tripled in the West Bank compared to three months ago. In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas increased but not significantly. Despite the increase in its popularity, the majority in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip does not support Hamas. It is worth noting that support for Hamas usually rises temporarily during or immediately after a war and then returns to the previous level several months after the end of the war.
                      • Support for President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fateh party drops significantly. The same is true for the trust in the PA as a whole, as demand for its dissolution rises to nearly 60%, the highest percentage ever recorded in PSR polls. Demand for Abbas's resignation is rising to around 90 percent, and even higher in the West Bank. Despite the decline in support for Fatah and Abbas, the most popular Palestinian figure remains Marwan Barghouti, a Fatah leader. Barghouti is still able to beat Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh or any other.
                      • Support for armed struggle rises ten percentage points compared to three months ago, with more than 60% saying it is the best means of ending the Israeli occupation; in the West Bank, the percentage rises further to close to 70%. Moreover, a majority in the West Bank believes that the formation of armed groups in communities subject to settler attacks is the most effective means of combating settler terrorism against towns and villages in the West Bank.
                      • Despite the above-mentioned reference to the lack of confidence in the seriousness of US and European talk about reviving the two-state solution and despite the increase in support for armed struggle, support for the two-state solution has not dropped in this poll. To the contrary, support for this solution has increased slightly in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This increase seems to come especially from those who believe that the US and European talk about the two-state solution is indeed serious.
                         (1) October the 7th and the War in Gaza:

                         

                        1. Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7th offensive:

                        • We asked respondents to speculate about Hamas’ reasons for waging its October the 7th offensive: a response to attacks on al Aqsa and to release prisoners as Hamas claimed or an Iranian plot to thwart Arab normalization with Israel. The overwhelming majority (81%; 89% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip) said it was a “response to settler attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque and on Palestinian citizens and for the release of prisoners from Israeli prisons;” while only 14% (5% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip) thought it was an Iranian plot. 
                        • We asked the respondents what they thought of Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7th offensive given its outcome so far, a vast majority (72%; 82% in the West Bank and 57% in the Gaza Strip) said it was a correct decision and 22% (12% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) said it was incorrect.

                        2. The Israeli objectives in the Gaza war:

                        • Asked about its assessment of Israel’s objectives in the current war, the majority (53%) says it is to destroy the Gaza Strip and kill or expel its population; 42% (50% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) think the goal is to exact revenge against Hamas and the resistance and destroy them completely.
                        • When asked if Israel will succeed in causing a second Nakba for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, as some Israeli minister called for, 73% (83% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip) said it will not and 24% (14% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) said it will succeed. 
                        • But the vast majority (70%) thinks Israel will fail in achieving its goal in eradicating Hamas and the resistance while only 8% think it will succeed, and 21% think it will only weaken Hamas and the resistance. West Bankers are more certain than Gazans that Israel will fail, 87% and 44% respectively. Moreover, only 1% of West Bankers think Israeli will succeed in eradicating Hamas compared to 17% in the Gaza Strip.
                        • Similarly, the overwhelming majority (85%; 96% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that Israel will not succeed in expelling Gazans out of the Strip; Only 13% (3% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) think it will succeed.

                        3. Humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip:

                        • Only 44% of Gazans say they have enough food and water for a day or two and 56% say they do not.
                        • When they need food or water, only one third of Gazans say they can reach a place where they can have access to assistance while two thirds say they cannot.
                        • Almost two thirds (64%) of Gazan respondents say a member of their family have been killed or injured during the current war in Gaza; 36% say none of their family members have been killed or injured.

                        • A majority (52%) blames Israel for the current suffering of Gazans in the current war while 26% place the blame on the US; only 11% (6% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) place the blame on Hamas; and 9% blame the PA.
                        • We asked the respondents whether they support or oppose the release, now before the end of the war, of the detained Israeli women and children among the civilians in the hands of the resistance groups, in return for the release of Palestinian women and children in the Israeli prisons. The overwhelming majority (85%; 92% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip) supported the exchange while only 13% (7% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip) opposed it.
                        • A majority of 71% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe Gazans who left their homes during the war to safer areas will be able to return to these homes once the war stops. West Bankers are much more optimistic than Gazans, 83% and 53% respectively.

                        4. War crimes and atrocities:

                        • We offered the public a list of acts or measures and asked respondents whether they are permitted under international law. The majority (84%) said it allows taking soldiers prisoners. But the vast majority (78%) said it does not allow attacks on or the killing of civilians women and children in their homes; 77% said it does not allow the bombing of hospitals; 76% said it does not allow cutting electricity and water from the civilian population; and 52% said it does not allow taking civilians as prisoners of war.

                        • While 95% think Israel has committed war crimes during the current war, only 10% think Hamas also committed such crimes; 4% think Israel has not committed such crimes and 89% think Hamas did not commit war crimes during the current war.
                        • 85% say they did not see videos, shown by international news outlets, showing acts committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, such as the killing of women and children in their homes; only 14% (7% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip) saw these videos.
                        • When asked if Hamas did commit these atrocities, the overwhelming majority said no, it did not and only 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) said it did.

                        5. When will the war stop and who will win?

                        • Half of the public (45% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) expect to see a ceasefire in Gaza in the upcoming weeks while a quarter (21% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) expect the war to continue for weeks and months. One fifth (28% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip) expect Israel to “unilaterally end the war and begin to withdraw under the pressure from the resistance.” Only 2% expect that “Hamas and other resistance forces in Gaza will stop the fighting and withdraw to safer areas in the Gaza Strip.”
                        • While the vast majority of West Bankers (70%) thinks Hamas will emerge victorious in this war, only half of Gazans think the same. Similarly, while only 1% in the West Bank think Israel will emerge victorious, almost one third of Gazans (31%) think that; 14% (12% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip) think neither one will emerge victorious.

                        6. Who will rule Gaza after the war?

                        • Almost two-thirds (64%) are opposed to the participation of the PA in meetings with the US, with the involvement of Arab countries such as Jordan and Egypt, in order to discuss the future of the Gaza Strip after the war stops. Only 33% (28% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) support PA participation in such meetings.
                        • We asked the respondents to speculate about the party that will be in control of the Gaza Strip in the day after the end of the current war. Almost two thirds (64%; 73% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip) said it will be Hamas; 11% selected a PA national unity government but without President Abbas; 7% selected the PA with Abbas; 4% selected Israel; 3% selected one or more Arab country; 2% selected a national unity government under Abbas leadership; and 1% selected the UN.
                        • When asked about their own preferences for the party that should be in control in the Gaza Strip after the war, 60% (75% in the West Bank but only 38% in the Gaza Strip) selected Hamas; 16% selected a PA national unity government without President Abbas; 7% selected the PA with Abbas; 3% selected one or more Arab countries; 3% selected a national unity government under Abbas, and 2% selected the Israeli army.

                        • 72% (80% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip) think Hamas will succeed in returning to rule over the Gaza Strip after the war despite Israel’s declared objective of eradicating that organization; 23% (15% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) do not think Hamas will succeed in resuming control over the Gaza Strip.
                        • After the end of the war, and in the event that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are unified under the control of the Palestinian Authority, only 28% (20% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) would support and 70% (77% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip) would oppose the deployment of an Arab security contingent, from countries like Egypt or Jordan, in order to provide support for the PA and help it to maintain security.
                        • But in the event that this Arab presence, after the end of the war, is to provide basic, administrative, and health services to the Palestinian residents in support of the PA, support would increase to 45% (43% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) but 53% (54% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip) would still oppose that presence.

                        7. Satisfaction with relevant actors:

                        • The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (87%) thinks that the response of the US and other major Western powers, such as the UK, France, and Germany, to the Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip indicates show disregard to international humanitarian law; only 10% (4% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) say the response indicates they are committed to that law.
                        • The vast majority (70%) thinks the recent talk about two-state solution in the US and other Western countries is not serious; 27% think it is.
                        • We asked about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:
                        1. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with the role of Hamas (72%; 85% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) was the highest followed by the role played by Yehia Sinwar (69%; 81% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip), Ismail Haniyyeh (51%; 57% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip), Fatah (22%; 23% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip), the PA (14%; 10% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip), Mahmoud Abbas (11%; 7% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip), and Mohammad Shtayyeh (10%; 6% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip).

                        1. For the Arab/regional actors, the highest level of satisfaction went to Yemen (80%; 89% in the West Bank and 68% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Qatar (56%), Hizballah (49%), Iran (35%), Turkey (34%), Jordan (24%), Egypt (23%), UAE (8), and finally Saudi Arabia (5%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

                        1. For the non-regional international actors, the highest level of satisfaction went to Russia (22%, 17% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip), followed by China (20%), Germany (7%), UN (6%), France (5%), UK (4%), and the US (1%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

                           (2) Legislative and presidential elections:

                           

                          • If new presidential elections were held today and only two candidates, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the voter turnout would be only 53%, and among those who would participate, Abbas would receive 16% of the vote and Haniyeh 78% (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 37% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, the vote for Abbas stands at 24% and for Haniyeh at 71%, while in the West Bank Abbas receives 10% and Haniyeh 82%.

                          • If the presidential competition is between three, Marwan Barghouti, Abbas, and Haniyeh, participation would rise to 71% and among those voting, Barghouti receives 47%, Haniyeh 43%, and Abbas 7%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti stood at 49% and Haniyeh at 36%, and Abbas at 13%.

                          • If the presidential competition is between two, Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, participation would rise to 69% and among those voting, Barghouti receives 51% and Haniyeh 45%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti stood at 60% and Haniyeh at 37%.

                          • In a closed question, we asked the public to select the person they prefer to see as President Abbas's successor. The largest percentage (36%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti; 19% preferred Ismail Haniyeh; 16% chose Yahya al Sinwar; 4% preferred Mohammed Dahlan, 3% preferred Khaled Meshaal, 2% chose Muhammad Shtayyeh, and 1% chose Hussein al-Sheikh; 18% said they did not know or chose someone else.
                          • Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 14% and dissatisfaction at 85%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 10% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip.  Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 22% and dissatisfaction at 76%.
                          • 88% want Abbas to resign while 12% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 78% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas' resignation stands at 92% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip.
                          •  

                            When asked which political party or political trend they support, the largest percentage selected Hamas (43%), followed by Fatah (17%), while 12% selected other or third-party groups, and 28% said none of them or did not know. Three months ago, support for Hamas stood at 22% and Fatah at 26%. In the West Bank, support for Hamas today stands at 44% (compared to 12% three months ago), and for Fatah at 16% (compared to 26% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas today stands at 42% (compared to 38% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 18% (compared to 25% three months ago).

                          • However, if new parliamentary elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, only 69% say they would participate in them, and among these participants, Fateh receives 19%, Hamas' Change and Reform 51%, all other lists combined 4%, and 25% say they have not yet decided whom they will vote for. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 52% (compared to 44% three months ago) and for Fateh at 21% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 50% (compared to 24% three months ago) and Fatah at 18% (compared to 40% three months ago).
                          • 54% believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 13% believe that Fateh under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving; 26% believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership. Three months ago, 27% said Hamas is the most deserving, 24% said Fateh led by Abbas is the most deserving, and 44% said both are unworthy of representation and leadership.

                            (3) Domestic conditions:

                             

                             

                              • The question about personal safety and security was asked in the West Bank only. The findings show that only 14% feel safe and secure while 86% feel unsafe and unsecure. Three months ago, the perception of safety stood at 48%.
                              • A majority of 68% believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 28% believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 62% said the PA is a burden and 35% said it was an achievement.

                                  (4) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

                                   

                                   

                                  • 34% support and 64% oppose the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details of the solution. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 32%.

                                  • Support for the two-state solution is linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Today, 65% believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion but 32% believe it is still practical. Moreover, 66% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or nonextant, and 32% believe the chances are medium or high. Three months ago, 71% said that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion.
                                  • When asked about public support and opposition to specific policy measures to break the stalemate: 55% supported joining more international organizations; 39% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 69% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 58% supported dissolving the PA; and 29% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 58% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 53% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 52% supported the dissolution of the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of one state.

                                  When asked about the best way to end occupation and establish an independent state, the public was divided into three groups: a majority of 63% (68% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) said it was armed struggle; 20% said it was negotiations; and 13% said it was popular non-violent resistance. Three months ago, 53% said armed struggle was the best way, 24% said popular non-violent resistance, and 20% said negotiation was the best way. As shown in figure (16) below, West Bankers’ support for resort to arms increased 19 percentage points since the formation of the current far right Israel government and increased another 14 points during the past three months. 

                                  • In light of the increase in settler terrorist attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, we again asked West Bankers what means are most effective in combating this terrorism that are also the most feasible. The majority (56%, compared to 47% three months ago) chose the formation of armed groups by residents of the targeted areas in order to protect their areas; 15% (compared to 30% three months ago) chose to deploy Palestinian police forces in the targeted areas; 16% (compared to 10% three months ago) chose the demand that the Israeli army take measures to prevent settler terrorism; and only 8% (compared to 8% three months ago) chose to form unarmed groups of residents of the targeted areas to protect their areas.

                                  Figure (17) below, show the extent of the public distrust in the West Bank in the role of the Israeli army in protecting the vulnerable communities and that the trust of the public in the Palestinian police is much less than the trust it places in the armed groups and that trust in the PA police has declined in three months by half to reach the current 15%. It also show that a majority now supports the formation of armed groups as the most effective means of combating settler terror.

                                  (5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the most pressing problems confronting Palestinians today:

                                   

                                   

                                  • 43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 36% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 7% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
                                  • When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (51%, 42% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 7% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 5% said it is unemployment, and 4% said it is corruption.

                                   

                                        June 2021 

                                        Mapping Sources of Mutual Distrust in Palestinian and Israeli Societies and Politics: role of education, daily life experiences, and exposure to violence

                                         Palestinians and Israelis distrust and fear each other. Evidence from joint Palestinian-Israeli survey research indicates that distrust and fear are detrimental to peace-making. It is suspected that school education, daily life experiences-- including economic costs related to the continuation of the status quo-- and exposure to mutual violence are critical sources that contribute to the very high levels of distrust and fear. 

                                        The overall objective of this research is to map out, identify, and explain how and why each of these sources impede the efforts toward a successful peace process and what must be done, by both sides, to dry up or neutralize them. 

                                        Specifically, we seek to:

                                        (1) identify and map out the top three critical socio-political and economic elements the feed existing distrust thereby contributing to widespread misperception, unwillingness to compromise, and a stagnation in the peace process;

                                        (2) empirically demonstrate a direct or indirect relationship between these sources and the high levels of mutual distrust and fear; and,

                                        (3) building on our research findings, as well as experiences of other conflict areas in Europe and other places-- in which critical policy decisions related to school education, daily life experiences, such as movement, access, and economic opportunity, and modes of resistance were made—outline evidence-based policy recommendations that can potentially reduce mutual distrust/fear.

                                         

                                        Table of Contents

                                        1) Press Release

                                        2) Research Activities

                                        3) Role to Education

                                        4) Survey Research Experiments

                                        5) Case Studies

                                        6) Surveys of Attitudes

                                        7) Lessons Learned from Europe and elsewhere

                                        8) Publications

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                        1) PRESS RELEASE

                                        Palestinian-Israeli Joint Poll on Sources of Mutual Distrust: Mutual Palestinian-Israeli distrust, found at the core of peace failure, is generated by socio-psychological forces heightened by daily life hardships, exposure to violence, and widespread negative perceptions about the other side’s educational system

                                         

                                        September 15, 2021 --------- Palestinian and Israeli public support for peace stands at the lowest point since the beginning of the peace process 28 years ago.  Just completed joint Palestinian-Israeli research reveals an unequivocal finding: extremely low level of mutual trust among the two publics is the most important explanation for the declining support of the peace process. The joint research sought to map out the sources of distrust and recommend policy measures to address the problem of the continually declining mutual trust.

                                        The research was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) and the Macro Center for Political Economics during the past three years with funding from the European Union (EU). One of the surveys conducted for the project was funded by the Netherland Representative Office in Ramallah and the Japan Representative Office to Palestine through the UNDP/PAPP.

                                        The joint research relied on surveys conducted in the second half of 2020 among representative samples of the two publics, survey experiments among those hardest-hit by the prolonged conflict and military occupation, educational and classroom experiments among students, all complemented with more than a dozen focus groups with students and those paying the highest cost of the conflict. The research was supplemented by case studies, review of textbook, the development of “objective” textbook passages, and a review of the recent history of peace education in Europe and elsewhere. The report on the historical review focused on the lessons learned from previous international examples and was discussed in a workshop for Palestinian, Israeli, and international professionals who spent years exploring this sensitive topic.

                                        The Joint polls were conducted between August and November 2020 among representative samples of the two publics. Survey research experiments were conducted in January and February 2021 with focus groups soon after. A poll in the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse series, was conducted in August 2020 among a Palestinian sample of 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations and the margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample included 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Midgam in Hebrew and Arabic The margin of error is +/-3.34%. 

                                        The joint poll on trust and the peace process was conducted among a Palestinian sample size of 1560 adults, including 592 youth, interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample included 1201 adults, of which 272 were youth, interviewed through the internet by Rafi Smith in Hebrew and Arabic. The combined Israeli and Palestinian data files have been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of the various groups and ages in the Palestinian and Israeli societies, and to reflect, for Israeli Jews, current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error for the Israeli poll is +/-3.34%. 

                                        Our survey research and experiments among the general public, residents of hard-hit areas, and students indicate the following (for project reports and documents, visit PSR and Macro’s websites):

                                        • The contexts of the two societies, the Israeli and the Palestinian, are very different, leading to different results. The findings of the Israeli surveys show that trust is mostly determined by the psychological repertoire of beliefs, attitudes and emotions that are imparted and shaped in the political, educational and social culture that can be viewed as a culture of conflict. Israelis are less affected by the difficulties of daily life and violent events because their lives take place in a very different context and they lead routinized life – a normal life in the conflict
                                        • Findings among the Palestinians show a correlation between the widespread mutual distrust on the one hand and the daily life hardships, exposure to violence, and negative perceptions of the educational system on the other side on the other hand.
                                        • The research unveils other roots of distrust: socio-psychological variables representing the repertoire that both side are carrying,  such as ethos of conflict and negative stereotyping relating to historic experiences and narratives. These variables indicate that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative stereotypes he or she holds regarding Palestinians or Israeli Jews, the more he/she finds the other side worthy of trust and therefore supports the peace process.
                                        • The youth are more likely to hold hardline views, to indicate less trust, and to adhere to beliefs of ethos of conflict and hold stronger negative stereotype of the other.
                                        • When linking support for peace with trust level, strong positive correlation emerges: the higher the trust, the higher the support for peace and the lower the trust, the lower the support for peace. Here is an example from our August 2020 joint poll: Palestinian support for the two-state solution stood at 60% among those who trust Israeli Jews and only 41% among those who distrust them; Israeli equivalent stood at 81% among those who trust Palestinians and only 34% among those who distrust them.  
                                        • A dozen Educational and classroom experiments indicated that students are more likely to trust the other side and to have a more positive attitude toward peace when the classroom text presented by the teachers were “objective” or presented the other side in a positive light.
                                        • Six survey research experiments found residents in areas of great hardships are more likely to distrust the other and to oppose the peace process.
                                        • A dozen focus groups among students and residents of areas of great hardships confirmed the project findings and helped to articulate the link between trust and peace and the role played by the sources of distrust.

                                        Recommendations: It goes without saying that only the ending of occupation and the building of permanent peace can bring about a real restoration of trust and begin the process of reconciliation. Yet as our research demonstrates, progress toward peace is linked to the restoration of trust and hope. A major societal change is needed to change the state of mind that is supporting distrust. It should be accompanied by change in the information provided by leaders, mass-media, schools, ceremonies, memorial days, the imparted collective memory and existing dominant political ideologies.  Additional interim measures are needed: change the reality on the ground, stop incitements and minimize negative language and phrasing, increase contact between People, deliberately use mass media to inform and enlighten, use the school system with the goal of changing the collective psychological repertoire of society; and encourage joint projects in less sensitive areas such as health, science, and agriculture.  

                                         

                                        For more information or interviews: contact Khalil Shikaki, PSR director, at kshikaki@pcpsr.org or 02-296 4933, and.Roby Nathanson, General Director, MACRO at roby@macro.org.il or 03-5251057

                                         

                                             2) RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

                                         

                                         

                                        (1) Review selections of textbook material to be used in classroom experiments, the organization of at least a dozen classroom experiments on each side, the Palestinian and the Israeli, involving selected material and students, and the organization of at least a dozen focus groups with each side with teachers and students in various school types, religious, governmental, private, etc.;

                                        (2) two major surveys on each side among representative samples, with added samples for youth, to measure overall public and youth exposure to violence, hardships, as well as personal tragedies and examine the ramifications of the findings with focus groups, particularly the youth;

                                        (3) specially designed survey research experiments and case studies in which respondents under different levels of stress and hardship are observed and interviewed and compared to similar respondents who are exposed to no or less suffering and hardships;

                                        (4) evaluate experiences and review lessons learned from other conflict areas, particularly in Europe through background research and meetings and workshops with experts and historians; 

                                        (5) prepare, publish and disseminate reports of findings of research and recommendations to the public and various beneficiaries, including the publication of proposed textbook material that can be used by both sides to supplement existing textbooks; and

                                        (6) workshops with and briefings for various local and international policy making bodies, particularly among the final beneficiaries.

                                         

                                         3)  ROLE OF EDUCATION

                                         

                                         

                                        1) Educational Experiments and Textbook Passages for Sustainable Peace Education: 

                                        Two rounds of educational experiments were conducted during the period of the project. Each round included three experiments with students from the three selected classes in the three types of schools. The goal of the experiments was to explore the impact of school curriculum, in three varieties, “nonpositive,” meaning one that focused on pain, suffering, and costs of conflict to one’s own side, “positive,” meaning one that focused on the benefits of peace and diplomacy and the need to reach out to the other side and understand its fears, and “objective” passages, meaning one that focused on the two sides of the coin, the positive and the negative in a balanced manner. The project sought to document the impact of these types of texts on the students’ perception of the other side and on the attitudes regarding the question of peace and the two-state solution.

                                        Each experiment involved the following:

                                        1) Student participation: between 12 and 24 students, males and females, participated in each experiment in the three levels or grades. The consent of the students and their parents was secured before the sessions were held.

                                        2) A selected text was presented by a teacher in a classroom setting. In the first round, three experiments are conducted, with students from the three types of schools. the passages used, (positive and nonpositive) are those selected from the existing textbooks. In the second round, three experiments are conducted with the same students from the three types of schools. The passages used by the teachers in the second round were those designed by PSR’s team and labelled “objective.” Each experiment of the first round was divided into two sessions. The nonpositive text was used in the first session and the positive text was used and in the second session. In the second round of experiments, the teachers used the “objective” texts drafted by PSR’s team. Only one session was conducted in the second round.

                                        3) Teachers and locations: for the two rounds, PSR asked the teacher of each subject to teach the chapter to his or her class in the same way it is normally thought. However, while some of the sessions were held at the schools (government, private, and Islamic), others were held at PSR. The purpose of each session was explained to the teacher of each subject.

                                        4) Questionnaire: students participating in all the sessions in the two rounds were asked to fill out a questionnaire that aimed at measuring student perception of the other (the Israelis), level of trust, and attitudes regarding the peace process and the two-state solution.  The data was entered and analyzed in order to compare findings in the two rounds and in the two sessions in the first round.

                                        Description of the experiments:

                                        Each educational experiment has 18-24 student. Each educational experiment started with an introduction by the teacher. Then, each teacher presented and explained two lessons of the selected (one positive/one nonpositive) text book to his/her students. After each lesson, the students filled a questionnaire. 

                                        Three experiments were conducted in the first round: :

                                        1. The first experiment involved 22 students (males and females) from a government school and was held in two sessions. The first session was held on 17 September 2020 at PSR. The positive text used was on fulfilling commitments from a religion textbook for the 9th grade. The nonpositive text used in the second session of the first experiment was on the grandfather’s memory from an Arabic textbook for the 9th graders.

                                        2. The second experiment was conducted inside the classroom with 18 female students from an Islamic school, the Islamic Society School in Ramallah. The students came from two grades, the 10th and the 11th and the session was held on 4 October 2020. The positive text addressed the issue of traditional life in Palestine from the Arabic subject for the 9th grade. The nonpositive text address the killing of Palestinians by an Israeli sniper; the subject is also Arabic.

                                        3. The third experiment was conducted with students from a private school, the American School, with a total of 24 male and female students. The positive text dealt with personal hygiene from the Arabic subject for the 9th grade. The nonpositive text addressed the issue of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, also from the Arabic subject for the 9th grade. 

                                        Three additional educational experiments and three new focus groups were conducted in the second round of the educational experiments.

                                        1. In the first experiment, 15 students from a governmental school participated in a session at PSR on 18 January 2021. The objective passage addressed in this session reviewed the recent history of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

                                        2. In the second experiment, 14 female students form an Islamic school participated in a session at the school for students from the 10th and 11th grades. The session was held on 27 January 2021. The topic from the subject of religion addressed the common elements in the three Abrahamic religions.

                                        3. In the third experiment, 12 students from a private school, the same American school used in the first round, participated in a session held on 9 February 2021. The objective text in civics address the issue of historic narratives of Palestinians and Israelis.

                                        Findings:

                                        Findings of the first round showed clearly that students attitudes and perceptions regarding trusting the other side changed based on the text presented to them. The positive text produced greater trust in the other side compared to the level trust when the nonpositive text was produced.  Findings showed that 78% of the students had a low trust level and 19% had a medium trust level and only 3% had a high trust level when discussing the nonpositive text. The distrust level went down considerably from 78% to 23%, the medium trust went up from 19% to 56% and the high trust went up from 3% to 20% when discussing the positive text. Other findings confirmed this trend: the belief that the best means of ending the Israeli occupation is reaching a peace agreement stood at 53% among those who have a high level of trust on the other side declining to 17% among those with low level of trust. 

                                        Finding of round 2 reflected the fact that the only texts that were presented to the students were “objective” and were designed by the project team based on the lessons learned from the findings of round 1 and the other work that was generated by that time from other project activities, such as the work on lessons learned from the previous experiences in Europe and elsewhere in peace education.  These texts focused on what the research team labeled “facts” and reflected views that are shared by many Palestinians and Israelis. The findings of the survey that was conducted among the students in this round showed that 54% of the students continued to have a low level of trust in the other side while 21% showed high level of trust; a little over a quarter (26%) expressed a medium level of trust.  As we found in the first round, the increase in the level of trust led to a parallel increase in the acceptance of peace agreements as the best means of ending the conflict. For example, half of those with a high trust level endorsed peace agreements while the equivalent percentage stood at 11% among those with a low level of trust. The following table show the impact of text on the level of trust in the two rounds.

                                         

                                        Text

                                        Low trust

                                        Medium trust

                                        High trust

                                        Nonpositive

                                        78%

                                        19%

                                        3%

                                        Positive

                                        23%

                                        56%

                                        20%

                                        objective

                                        54%

                                        26%

                                        21%

                                         

                                         In the second round of the educational experiments, three experiments were conducted with the same schools and classes of the first round between December 2020 – February 2021, 10-15 students each, at PSR in Ramallah except the Islamic school that took place at the school premises in Ramallah. In this round the teachers presented and explained a short (alternative) passages of textbooks material that were designed by PSR’s researchers. And as in the first round, one questionnaire was filled out by the students after presenting the designed textbooks material.

                                        In the first year, after reviewing existing textbook material for the various grades between the 6th and the 12th, PSR’s team identified areas where vacuum exists. Initial draft covering three subjects, history, religion, and civics, were prepared. During the second year of the project, the team revised the initial drafts in consultation with students, school teachers, and administrators. Along with other beneficiaries, the team  came to the conclusion that these passages must be perceived at “objective,” reflecting the reality of conflict while aspiring to serve as texts useful for peace education. Emphasis was therefore placed on ensuring that the students are exposed to perspectives of the two sides, the costs of war and the benefits of peace, the cup half full and the cup half empty. Various drafts were tested on small groups of students. Semi-final draft were prepared by the end of the second year.

                                        During the third year, further adjustments were made based on the findings of the first round of the educational experiments and the report on lessons learned from the European and other experiences. Three passages were finalized and used in the second round of the educational experiments.  Copies were exchanged with the body in the Palestinian Authorities responsible for the development of curriculum. Copies were also shared with the UNRWA leadership.

                                        These are the titles of the three passages:

                                           Looking at the Other’s Viewpoint: Historical Narratives of Palestinians and Israelis Sustainable Peace Education 

                                        Palestinians and Israelis use their different historical narratives to prove their rights or the basis of their presence in this country. Each party claims that it has proven the truth concerning its connection to this land, the land of historical Palestine. At the same time, this raises controversy and clashes between successive generations on both sides.

                                          The Oslo Agreement: The Difficult Road to Palestinian-Israeli Peace  Sustainable Peace Education

                                        The peace process faced many obstacles on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. The Israeli government did not commit to transferring powers in accordance with the deadlines stipulated in the agreement, and continued to sponsor settlement activity in the Palestinian territories. The process also faced strong opposition from internal Palestinian parties, where some expressed their opposition by boycotting elections or refusing to participate in the PA authority. Others carried out bombing attacks against Israeli targets.

                                          Guidance and Light: The Doctrine of Monotheism in Revealed Religions Brings People Together and does not Divide Them Sustainable Peace Education

                                        The basic idea in the three religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is centered on the doctrine of monotheism. This doctrine is derived from our prophet Ibrahim Al–Khalil, father of the prophets. The doctrine of monotheism is based on an established religious belief in one God with no second god and no partner. 

                                        Focus groups:

                                        Focus groups were used extensively in this project, particularly in our efforts to understand the impact of various educational texts on students’ perceptions of the other side. In addition to educational experiments, focus groups were used in our research into the impact of daily living conditions on perception of the other.

                                        Focus groups for Educational Experiments, Round 1: The focus group for the first educational experiment in round (1) was conducted with the same students who participated in that experiment. It was held on 18 September. The purpose of the focus group session, which was held at PSR, was to discuss the findings of the questionnaire that the students had filled out during the experiment. The focus group of the second experiment was held with the same students who took part in that experiment. It took place on 5 October 2020. The focus group of the third experiment was held with the same students who took part in that experiment. It was held on 13 October 2020.

                                        Round 2 of the educational focus groups: For round two, the focus group for the first experiment was held at PSR on 19 January 2021. The focus group of the second experiment was held on 28 January with the same students who took part in that experiment. The focus group of the third experiment was held with the same students who took part in that experiment. It was held on 10 February 2021.

                                        Findings:

                                        As indicated earlier, three types of schools participated in the focus groups. The finding of the focus group sessions in all of them were similar. When discussing the nonpositive text and the findings based on the answers of the students after that session, it was clear that the ideological tendencies among the students were compounded by the emotional responses generated by  the text contributed to the greater tendency to distrust the other: “they do not want peace; they want to demolish our homes, take away our land, expel us from our homeland, wage wars against us, and imprison and torture us.”

                                        However, when reviewing the findings after the positive text, the emotional outbursts of the students were rare and the students were much more willing to engage in a more reasoned debate. In this environment, it was possible for the students to accept the concept of peace with the other. Students emphasized the importance of peace as the means to ensure security. Their demands now focused on the need for an honest implementation of agreements. When offered various scenarios to test willingness of the students to treat the other as a fellow human being the students showed remarkable openness and willingness to empathize and to emphasize the universal nature of human rights. 

                                        Following the second round of the educational experiments, three focus groups were conducted with the the same schools and classes between January-February 2021. Each focus group has 10-15 student.

                                        The focus groups in the second round discussed the significance of “objective” texts and the findings of the surveys that were conducted after each experiment. The findings confirmed what we saw when reviewing the impact of the positive texts> students were more considerate of other views and more open to new ideas. Students were more willing to emphasize the benefits of peace: “leads to restoration of rights and provides security to both sides.” But some were also interested in exploring the impact of peace failure: “what if it gave us a failed state? Will the settlers be removed? Will the state be truly sovereign and independent?” When discussing the importance of understanding the narrative of the other side, students distinguished between knowing and accepting  the other’s view of history: “while knowing the narrative of the other helps to reduce distrust, accepting the narrative of the other side is unacceptable because it means rejecting our own right to our land or accepting to be the scapegoats that pay the price for the oppression of the Jews throughout history.”

                                         

                                        4)  SURVEY RESEARCH EXPERIMENTS

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                        Survey Research Experiments and Case Studies The survey research experiments aimed at exploring the impact of daily living conditions, the hardships and suffering and exposure to violence, under a prolonged conflict. In order to select the areas, groups, and topis that would be the focus of the experiments, the Palestinian research team examined existing literature on life under occupation. Moreover, the team gained additional insights from the findings of the optional survey. Three areas/topics were selected: the H2 area in Hebron for their suffering from settlers’ attacks; the areas directly impacted by the location of the separation barrier; and those Palestinians residing in area C and denied building permits or see their homes and properties destroyed.

                                        PSR has selected 243 participants for its three survey experiments in the following manner:

                                        1)  80 people were selected for each area or experiment. Before the interviews were conducted, the respondents gave an oral consent. Respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their responses and were assured that they could stop the interview at any time and could refuse to answer any of the questions. The interviews were conducted between 25 January – 3 February 2021.

                                        2) In the selected areas/topics, three localities were selected in which two were areas in which our optional and comprehensive surveys have shown significant hardships and one in which it indicated little or no significant hardships.  3) 27 individuals were selected in each locality.

                                        3) Half of the sample comprised young respondents between the ages of 18- and 29-year-olds.

                                        4) In areas of hardships, the coordinators have surveyed the area and asked local people before determining the plan for the selection of the respondents. After setting the plan, interviewers selected the homes, explained the purpose of the research to the selected adult respondents, asked if the criteria of hardships apply to the selected respondents. Once criteria confirmed, the interview was conducted with that person after obtaining his or her consent.  Once completed, the interviewers proceeded to the next home determined randomly by the plan. All respondents were asked to identify other areas in their neighbourhoods with similar level of hardships.

                                        5) In areas where people were not expected to suffer from significant hardships, respondents were not asked to identify other potential areas with a similar low level of hardships. The selection of the homes was done randomly based on existing maps

                                        6) Respondents were asked to identify themselves for two reasons: they compensated in the amount of NIS 50 per respondent (respondents have had to sign a receipt for that amount) and because they might be potentially selected for the focus group discussion and therefore, they needed to provide a phone number so that they can be called later to arrange for the focus group.  

                                        Findings:

                                        The survey experiments demonstrate the validity of our hypothesis on the Palestinian side: the greater the hardships, the greater the level of distrust and the opposition to the peace process.  The areas selected did indeed show greater hardships with 78% to 100% of the respondents in those areas indicating extreme hardships and or exposure to violence, particularly when compared to those living in area A, where the level of hardships diminished to only 40%. 

                                        Findings show that the level of distrust in Israelis stood at 86% in areas of high hardships declining  to  77% in areas of low hardships. And 82% in areas of medium hardships. High support for the peace process among those with low level of trust stood at 3% and medium support at 21%. By contrast the equivalent percentages were 35% and 29% respectively among those with a medium level of trust. For those expressing a high level of trust, support for the peace process stood at 100%.  Findings have also shown that high support for the peace process stood at 13% among those with the highest level of hardships, 21% among those with the medium level of hardships, and only 7% among those with the highest level of hardships. 

                                        Two focus groups were conducted   at PSR, both on 1 March 2021 with 12 participants in each group from among those who participated in the survey research experiments. Participants’ difficulties were the result of the building of settlement, the building of the separation barrier in the West Bank, and those residing in the H2 area of Hebron or area C. We also invited people with much less exposure to such difficulties and violence, such as those living in area A of the West Bank.

                                        Findings of these focus groups showed significant lack of trust in Israelis among those with the highest level of difficulties. Similarly, those with the highest level of distrust showed little confidence in and support for the peace process. While some of the attitudes expressed by participants reflected ideological predispositions, others reflected the experiences of living through daily hardships or being witnesses to violence and hardships.

                                        One participant expressed anger and hate: “My own land was confiscated to allow for the building of the separation barrier; I saw my own land, the one that has been in my family for generations, being taken away from me and my children without justification. On top of that, I was then arrested and thrown in jail. How can I not distrust and hate?” One participant from area A expressed the view that such Israeli practices must stop if peace is to prevail. One participant from expressed the view that “settlers’ violence, checkpoints, and army attacks make life a living hell, ensures there will never be peace. This comes from our own daily life experiences; we see violence every day. We therefore do not trust the state of Israel.” One of the participants whose land is located behind the separation barrier described daily life in the following terms: “Every day, I spend at least one hour of my time waiting at the gate each way. How can I trust Israelis and be convinced they want peace?”   

                                         

                                        5) CASE STUDIES

                                         

                                         

                                        Three case studies were written based on the findings of the survery experiments, focus groups, and other projects surveys. The purpose of the case studies is to use specific examples and dynamics generated by the prolonged conflict that can illustrate and demonstrate the correlation between exposure to hardships and violence on one hand and diminished trust in the other on the other hand. The case studies are selected with that goal in mind. The evidence they rely on are based on various tools utilized in the project: surveys, survey research experiments, focus groups, and interviews with victims, activists, and policy makers. In describing the hardships, these case studies rely not only on the findings demonstrated by these tools, but also on existing evidence gathered by local and international agencies. Here below is a description of the six Palestinian and Israeli case studies.

                                         Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Life in areas adjacent to the separation wall as a case study 

                                        This case study focused on studying one of the areas where suffering is high, those directly impacted by the construction of the Israeli separation wall, with the consequent barriers and restrictions on the residents, and how this affected the attitudes and perceptions of the people residing in the area towards the Israelis and the peace process.

                                        The paper is intended to be a policy paper, discussing ways to alleviate the difficulties of life experienced by citizens in the areas adjacent to the wall, in an attempt to present a set of recommendations to the Palestinian government, Palestinian civil society, the international community, and the Israeli government that can be built upon in an attempt to enhance trust between the two parties if they want to move forward, in a serious peace process that ends all outstanding issues.

                                        The paper utilized the findings of two public opinion polls conducted in the second half of 2020 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) on trust in the other side as well as  three survey experiments conducted in January 2021 among a sample of 243 individuals, including 162 who live in areas of severe hardships due to the wall and other hardships of daily life under occupation, and 81 individuals from areas of less suffering that are more remote from areas of friction. One of the three survey experiments was conducted om the residents directly affected by the separation wall or barrier. We also held two focus groups to discuss the results of the two surveys and the survey experiments to explore perceptions of individuals directly affected by daily life difficulties in the selected hardships areas. The paper also relied on many interviews with decision-makers, specialists, and citizens, and on several press reports that dealt with the subject, in addition to reports issued by Palestinian and international institutions.

                                        The findings of this case studies provide evidence confirming the basic hypothesis of the project. Here is one example from the case under investigation. The results of the surveys and experiments conducted among the residents of those areas adjacent to the wall indicate that the greater the difficulties, the less the trust in the Israelis and the less support for the peace process. For example, 86% of those who suffer from high difficulties say they have low trust in Israeli Jews, only 1% of them have high trust, and 13% have medium trust. Trust increases slightly among those who suffer from fewer difficulties, as 23% of them have medium trust and 77% have low trust. This is also reflected in support for the peace process. While 73% of those who suffer from high difficulties have low support for the peace process, 58% and 61%, respectively, of those who have moderate or little difficulties have low support for the peace process. 

                                         Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Settlers’ attacks in H-2 areas of Hebron as a case study  

                                        This case study aimed at studying the difficulties caused by the settlers’ attacks on Palestinian residents of H2 area in the city of Hebron, which is one of the areas in which daily suffering and life difficulties increases dramatically as a result of the prolonged occupation and the settlers’ attacks in particular, and how this affects the attitudes and perceptions of the people of the area towards the Israelis and the peace process. As in the other two cases, this one too shows that the difficulties of daily life and the exposure to violence resulting from the conflict play an important role in reducing trust and increasing opposition to the peace process.

                                        Also, like the other two, this case study relied on the findings of the surveys and experiments conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) on trust in the other party. The survey experiment specific to this paper was conducted in January 2021. The paper also relied on the findings of two focus groups that were organized by PSR to discuss the results of the attitudinal surveys and the survey experiments. Moreover, interviews with decision - makers, specialists, and citizens were conducted for a better understanding of the underlying forces at play in areas of increased suffering and hardships. We also relied on a set of press and documentary reports that dealt with the subject in addition to reports issued by Palestinian and international institutions.

                                        Most of the residents of H2 are more likely than others to be subjected to violence by settlers and the occupation. The results obtained from a survey conducted for the residents of those areas indicate that the greater the difficulties, the less trust in the Israelis and the less support for a peace process between the two sides. The results of surveys among young people (18-29) also showed that there is a close relationship between difficulties and trust. The greater the difficulty, the lower the trust. The same applies to the elderly (30 and over), but to a lesser degree. Findings also show higher levels of distrust among those who have been exposed to more violence at the hands of the Israelis, reaching 87% among those who have been exposed to the highest levels and declining to 82% among those who have been subjected to a lower degree of violence.

                                         Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Home demolition and denial of building permits as a case study  

                                        This case study examined the impact of the Israeli policies in denying Palestinian’s housing improvement. It aims to examine the impact of the difficulties in obtaining building permits and the policy of house demolition in Area C on the level of Palestinians’ trust in the Israeli side, and the extent of its impact on the level of support for the peace process with the Israelis.  The paper relied on the same data as the other two case studies. One of the survey experiments was carried out among residents living in areas suffering the most from house demolitions and denial of building permits. Focus groups and interviews helped to shed greater light on the relationship between hardships and distrust.

                                        It is worth pointing out that the results of the survey experiment conducted by PSR, unlike the findings in the other case studies, indicate that there are no significant differences in the levels of trust in the Israelis among Palestinians who were refused a building permit or had their homes demolished compared to Palestinians who were not. However, about 78% of those who were refused building permits or had their homes demolished say that they have experienced high difficulties, compared to 40% of those who live in areas that do not experience difficulties in obtaining building permits from the Israeli authorities or demolishing homes. 

                                         

                                        6) SURVEYS OF ATTITUDES

                                         

                                         

                                        Joint Palestinian-Israeli public opinion polls on trust

                                        Two surveys were conducted for this project: 

                                        After finalizing the questionnaire, PSR conducted four training sessions for its fieldworkers: three trainings sessions in the west bank (north, middle and south), and one training session in Gaza. The Palestinian sample size was 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 12-26 August, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Midgam in Hebrew and Arabic 12 August and 3 September 2020. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3.34%.  The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, Dr. Nimrod Rosler from Tel Aviv University and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin.

                                        Here are some of the relevant findings of the first survey:

                                        • Levels of trust in the other side are very low: 90% of Palestinians and 79% of Israeli Jews think the other side is not trust worthy. When asked about the role of leadership in fostering distrust: 40% of Israeli Jews, 44% of Israeli Arabs, and 34% of the Palestinians expressed the view that their side’s leadership diminishes trust with the other side. By contrast, two thirds of Israeli Jews, 38% of Israeli Arabs, and 78% of Palestinians think the leadership on the other side diminishes trust.
                                        • When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 34% of the Palestinians (49% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip) 41% of Israeli Jews choose “reach a peace agreement.” This represents a decrease in support for a peace agreement among Palestinians and Israeli Jews compared to only 41% and 45% respectively who chose this option in 2018.  37% of Palestinians (compared to 27% two years ago) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 19% call for “a definitive war with the Palestinians” compared to 20% in 2018.
                                        • Support for the two-state solution remains relatively stable at 43% among Palestinians and among Israeli Jews declines just slightly from 43% in mid-2018 to 42%. Among all Israelis, Jews and Arabs, 44% in total support the two-state solution. This is the lowest level of support for this concept among Israeli Jews, and all Israelis, since the beginning of the Pulse, in June 2016. Still, fewer people on both sides support two possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights and one state without rights.
                                        •  Palestinians and Israelis were presented with a peace package identical to the one we presented to them in mid-2018 and representing a modified version of the package we presented to both sides five times during the past four years. Findings show significant drop in support among the two publics. Only 27% of Palestinians (compared to 42% in mid-2018, a 15-point drop) and 36% of Israeli Jews (compared to 45% two years ago, a 9-point drop) support a permanent peace agreement package, along with 49% of Israeli Arabs. In total, 38% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic, the bilateral agreement will be part of a regional agreement along the lines of the Arab Peace Initiative, the US and major Arab countries will ensure full implementation of the agreement by both sides, and the end of the conflict and claims. Fifty one percent of all Israelis (56% of Israeli Jews) and 70% of Palestinians are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package.
                                        • The survey also tested the likely impact of previously tested zero-sum incentives on the level of support for the peace package. Drawing on six such incentives, we paired measures that show reciprocal benefits but also costs for each side. This is the second time that we have conducted this experiment. In this experiment, which was conducted among half the sample, we changed the pairs that were tested as the goal has been to pair incentives that received similar levels of success in previous test. Findings in the previous experiment, in mid-2018, showed significant success among Israeli Jews but very little success among the Palestinians. The current findings show significant potential for success among both publics, but the success among Israeli Jews remains greater: six of the six pairs generated higher levels of support for the peace package among Israeli Jews while on the Palestinian side only four generated higher levels of support. As a result, three pairs caused a majority of Jewish Israelis to say they were more likely to support the package while none of the paired incentives convinced a majority of Palestinians to say they were more likely to support the detailed two-state package.
                                        • Moreover, the current joint poll conducted a second experiment among the other half of the sample. In this one, we sought to understand the hierarchy of priorities for the two publics: what were their most important demands and what concessions were the most difficult for them to make versus those that were less difficult. Broadly, for Israelis the top priority for demands involved symbolic recognition of the Jewish connection to the land, and the demand that Palestinians imprison those involved in violence. However, a plurality did not believe Israel should have to make concessions in return for its own demands, indicating that Israeli demands should be unconditional. Similarly, on the Palestinian side, a majority declined to choose a specific concession Palestinians should make in return for its negotiators’ demands. Yet the top demand Palestinians prioritized was the release of Palestinian prisoners; the main concession they accepted – those who chose one – was removing incitement from textbooks.
                                        • A second peace package was tested in this poll: Trump’s peace plan, or the deal of the century. Like the peace package we have tested over the years, this one was broken into its most important components. The public was asked about each one and the package as a whole. Findings are dramatic: 93% of the Palestinians opposed the plan and 5% accepted it. Among Israelis, a majority of Israeli Jews (51%) accepted it, 30% rejected it, and 19% did not know or were uncertain. A large majority of Palestinians (69%) thought that Israeli Jews would accept the plan. On the Israeli side, two thirds thought the Palestinians would reject the plan.  

                                        Second Survey:

                                        PSR and its new partner, MACRO, reviewed the comprehensive survey questionnaire that was prepared by PSR during the first and the second year of the project and agreed on major modifications. Before the end of the third year, the two teams agreed on a final version.  Before conducting the survey, four training sessions were conducted by PSR in October 2020 to PSR’s fieldworkers: three training sessions in the West Banks (North, Middle and South), and one training session in Gaza.

                                        The Palestinian sample size was 1560 adults, including 592 youth, interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between 29 October to 1 November, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 1201 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Rafi Smith in Hebrew and Arabic on 00 November 2020. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli and Palestinian data files have been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of the various groups and ages in the Palestinian and Israeli societies, and to reflect, for Israeli Jews, current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error for the Israeli poll is +/-3.34%. 

                                        Findings:

                                        Here are some of the main findings of the joint comprehensive survey:

                                        Israeli and Palestinian Support for Peace: Our most unequivocal finding shows that trust is the most important predictor of support in the peace process among respondents from both sides.

                                        On the Israelis side, we found additional socio-psychological variables such as ethos and stereotyping, which indicated that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative stereotypes he holds regarding Palestinians, the more he/she supports the peace process.

                                        Among the Palestinians, we asked about support for the concept and details of the two-state solution. But peace has also been defined in term of support and opposition to an agreement based on many associated compromises as well as expression of attitudes consistent with that solution. For example, we examined attitudes regarding related topics: violence vs. diplomacy and perceptions of the other and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does. We also probed the extent of zero-sum beliefs. These and other relevant questions informed our peace indicator building. The indicator of peace, has three levels: high, medium, and low. The peace indicators’ building exercise showed that support for peace is predominantly low in the two joint polls, but most significantly in the October poll, when an expanded set of 13 questions were used to build this peace indicator while only four were used to build the August indicator.

                                        Israeli and Palestinian Distrust: On the Israeli side, the results indicate a low level of trust towards Palestinians, expressed by the Jewish samples. However, Israeli Arabs expressed somewhat a higher level of trust towards Palestinians. Both groups did not differentiate significantly in trust towards Palestinians in general and towards their leaders. The results of the Jewish sample in the survey study 2 show that most of the Jewish respondents (34.1%) attributed their lack of trust to the “Palestinian education system, which incites against Jews”.

                                        Among the Palestinians, findings of our two joint surveys indicate that the levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. A solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. For trust, the building of the indicator went through three steps: the first step was to build an indicator based on measuring direct questions about willingness to trust the other side. The second step was based on a set of indirect questions about trust. In the third step, we combined the two indicators into one. Findings show mostly low levels of trust for all three trust indicators, but more so in October and in trust indicator #3 (the combined trust indicator). A large set of questions (15 direct and indirect questions) was used to build the October trust indicator while only five direct and indirect questions were used to build the August indicator.

                                        Conclusions: The present study unveils the roots of distrust in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study shows that although exposure to violence related to the conflict, experience of violence and hardships, and negative perceptions of the educational system of the other side have some effect on trust, particularly among the Palestinians who live under the harsh reality of military occupation, the primary determinants, particularly among the Israelis, are the socio-psychological variables representing the repertoire that Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs are carrying. This repertoire includes beliefs, attitudes and emotions. Among Israeli Jews, these beliefs and attitudes of the conflict take the form of stereotypes, ethos of conflict, concerns about antisemitism and holocaust and political orientation. They lead also to cognitive closure, reflected in refusal to acquire information from a Palestinian. This socio-psychological repertoire influences what information receives attention and the way in which it is mentally coded and organized. Next, it functions as an interpretive framework, influencing evaluations, judgments, predictions and conclusions drawn by Israelis. This repertoire is the key determinant of trust. For example, Israeli Jews, who negatively stereotype Palestinians and even delegitimize them, while adhering to ethos of conflict as their ideology, show distrust towards Palestinians.

                                        What should be of great concern is the well-established findings showing that this repertoire is acquired at the very early age. This is unavoidable, as children learn this repertoire from all agents of socialization, including parents, leaders, television, literature, teachers, social media and schoolbooks. The beliefs and attitudes regarding the conflict learned by children at an early age remain in their socio-psychological repertoire and may have latent influence later on. These contents serve as fertile ground for the later development of conflict attitudes. They may constitute a part of children’s general worldviews which remains relatively constant across time. Eventually, these will pose a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution.

                                        Recommendations

                                        Living under military occupation, Palestinians experience hardships and exposure to violence on daily basis. We suggest that these are some of the reasons for such strong distrust of Israeli Jews. On the Israeli Jewish side, some of these reasons also lies in the cultural-societal-political climate of the Israeli society, as reflected in the information provided by leaders, mass-media, schools, ceremonies, memorial days, the imparted collective memory and existing dominant political ideologies. On the Palestinian side, changing the reality on the ground and restoring hope for peace and the two-state solution is essential for restoring some level of trust. On the Israeli Jewish side, a major societal change is needed to change the state of mind that is supporting distrust. On both sides, conflict supporting narratives need to be addressed before any trust can be restored.

                                        1. Change the new reality on the ground: For Palestinians, the reality on the ground worsen by the day as land is confiscated, homes demolished, movement and access restricted, and settlers’ violence increases. The siege and blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip and the frequent eruption of massive violence and destruction of civilian infrastructure make the Strip a big prison for the two million Palestinians living in it. Israelis too, but particularly those who live in the south suffer the occasional barrages of rockets from the Gaza Strip while settlers who live in the occupied West Bank, face occasional violence and rock throwing. Although Palestinian and Israeli authorities coordinate with each other on essential civil and security matters, no dialogue takes place on how to ease daily living conditions, stop the building of settlements, or eradicate violence. To be effective in reducing distrust and hate, coordination between the two sides need to cover all these additional areas of daily friction and difficulties and search for ways to deliver security to both sides. It goes without saying that only the ending of occupation and the building of permanent peace can bring about a real restoration of trust and begin the process of reconciliation.
                                        2. Stop incitements and minimize negative language and phrasing: Various formal and informal sources in Israel, present the Palestinian school textbooks, teachers, mass media and the leaders as inciting against Israel, Zionism (Jewish Nationalism) and as being anti-Semitic. This practice can be found also on the Palestinian side. It is exaggerated and augmented serving the struggle between the two contradicting and rival narratives.
                                        3. Contact between People:  Contact between members of the two societies is one of the most researched methods to change beliefs, attitudes, and emotions in order to improve the relations between them.
                                        4. Use of mass media: Mass media is one of the most powerful agents that provides information and shapes public opinion. Mass media should stop presenting the other side in negative way and develop peace journalism.  It can supply major information about the other group; it can supply major information about the culture of the other- with films, theatrical plays, or entertainment programs; it can enlighten in a balance way, the eruption of the conflict, its major events and costs that have been paid for continuation of the conflict.    
                                        5. Education: In the long run, education constitutes one of the most important methods for eradicating distrust. This method involves using the school system since this system is often the only institution of which the society can make wide scope use to change the psychological repertoire of society members. Education for building trust must begin at an early age and continue through the years of schooling. Also, it is possible to a establish joint Israeli-Palestinian committee to examine existing textbooks and curricula to eliminate any derogative expressions.  
                                        6. Joint Projects: Joint projects of various kinds, but particularly those that are less sensitive, can serve as a method for building trust. They can be in different areas such as health, agriculture, or science. Joint projects can foster links between members of the two groups at different levels of society, such as elites, professionals, as well as grass roots. This method provides opportunities for personal encounters in which past opponents can form personal relations.

                                        The following material represent the publications of our joint research.

                                         Questionnaire of the first joint poll 

                                        Questionnaire of the second joint poll

                                        Table of findings of the first joint poll

                                        Table of findings of the second joint poll coming soon

                                        Summary Report of findings of the joint polls 

                                        Combined Report of findings of the joint polls

                                        Palestinian Report of findings of the joint polls

                                        Israeli Report of findings of the joint polls

                                         

                                        7)  LESSONS LEARNED FROM EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE 

                                         

                                         

                                        Sustainable Peace Education: Report on lessons learned from Europe and elsewhere

                                        This report studies the practice of peace education. It offers an introduction into the way peace education has developed over time and how it is addressed academically. It draws from concrete examples mainly from Europe, while considering lessons from successful experiences for Israel/Palestine. 

                                        PSR and Macro commissioned Prof. Dr. Stephan Stetter, from the Bundeswehr University Munich, to prepare a report on lessons learned and evaluate experiences from other conflict areas, particularly in Europe. Stephan Stetter holds the Chair in International Politics and Conflict Studies at the Universität der Bundeswehr in Munich. He has studied political science, sociology and history at the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, the Hebrew University of Jersualem and the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) where he has received his MSc (with distinction). He holds a PhD from the LSE (2004) and has written his dissertation on EU Foreign and Interior Policies at the LSE and the European University Institute in Florence. From 2003 until 2006 he was a researcher at the Institute for World Society Studies at Bielefeld Universität Bielefeld. From 2007 until 2008 he was a temporary Professor for Political Science at Bielefeld University. He received his Habilitation from the Faculty of Sociology at Bielefeld University in January 2008 with a work on "World Society and the Middle East". Since October 2008 he holds the Chair in International Politics and Conflict Studies at the Universität der Bundeswehr München. Stephan Stetter's main areas of expertise are Middle East politics (with a special focus on Israel/Palestine), theories of world politics, conflicts and globalisation/world society as well as EU foreign policies, in particular Euro-Mediterranean relations. He is the author of "World Society and the Middle East: Reconstructions in Regional Politics (Palgrave, 2008) and "EU Foreign and Interior Policies : Cross-Pillar Politics and the Social Construction of Sovereignty"(Routledge, 2007). He has published widely in leading peer-reviewed academic journals such as International Organization, Review of International Studies, Mediterranean Politics and Journal of European Public Policy. He is editor of several books such as "Territorial Conflicts in World Society" (Routledge, 2007), "The European Union and Border Conflicts" (Cambridge University Press, 2008, with Thomas Diez and Mathias Albert) and "Der Nahe Osten im Umbruch" (VS-Verlag 2009, with Martin Beck, Cilja Harders and Annette Jünemann). Since 2003 Stephan Stetter is EU-coordinator of the Israeli-European Policy Network (IEPN). In that capacity he has published jointly with Roby Nathanson four books on EU-Israeli relations and is also editor of the IEPN Working Paper Series.

                                        PSR has asked Prof. Stetter to conclude his report with specific recommendations regarding the range of issues covered in the research: 1) how to design an educational system that promotes greater reconciliation, 2) how to remove or mitigate the consequences of hardships inflicted on individuals, groups and communities by the conflict, and (3) how to reverse the consequences of exposure to violence, particularly on the youth.

                                        After reviewing the first draft of Prof. Stetter report by PSR and MACRO, Prof. Stetter revised his report and has prepared a semi-final version of the report that was discussed with experts form Palestine, Israel and Europe in a virtual workshop (due to COVID 19) on 25 January 2021, see below.

                                        The report studied the practice of peace education. It offered an introduction into the way peace education has developed over time and how it is addressed academically. It drew from concrete examples mainly from Europe, while considering lessons from successful experiences for Israel/Palestine. In section 2 of the report, core concepts were presented that are of key importance when dealing with peace education, namely the concepts of “peace education”, “conflict” and “peace” as well as the notions of “(local) peace-building” and “(post-) conflict societies”. Section 3 looked at peace education in detail. It is divided in three sub-sections. It, firstly, offered an overview on how peace education is defined today in key policy documents, mainly from the international level where this concept has become mainstreamed. It secondly provided for an overview on the history of the practice of peace education, a history that dates back to the 19th century and attempts in that period for pedagogical reforms, on the one hand, and peaceful political relations between nations, on the other. Thirdly, by looking at contemporary practical experiences mainly in Europe this section discussed achievements but also pitfalls of peace education. Special attention was given here to the cases of Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the process of European integration under the umbrella of the EU. Section 4 looked at two specific intervening contexts of relevance to peace education. On the one hand, the role of everyday dynamics and concrete life experience of people in conflict-settings were addressed and how they are fostering or hampering peace education. On the other hand, the impact exposures to violence have on peace education. What was emphasized here is the central role of violence in rendering mutual distrust a fundament of social relations, but also the strategic use of violence that works against peace education. Throughout sections 3 and 4 reference to the Israel/Palestine case was made in order to highlight similarities and differences with European experiences. The paper closed with a summary of successful examples from Europe and policy recommendations for Israel and Palestine.

                                         

                                         

                                        8) PUBLICATIONS

                                        Here are the links to the publications in English:

                                        1) Three Palestinian short passages of textbook material:
                                           Looking at the Other’s Viewpoint: Historical Narratives of Palestinians and Israelis Sustainable Peace Education 

                                        What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

                                          The Oslo Agreement: The Difficult Road to Palestinian-Israeli Peace  Sustainable Peace Education

                                        What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

                                          Guidance and Light: The Doctrine of Monotheism in Revealed Religions Brings People Together and does not Divide Them Sustainable Peace Education

                                        What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

                                         

                                        2) One report on lessons gained from other experiences:

                                        What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

                                         

                                        3) Three Palestinian case studies:  

                                         Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Life in areas adjacent to the separation wall as a case study:

                                        What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

                                         Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Settlers’ attacks in H-2 areas of Hebron as a case study:

                                        PSR case studies_H2 area_English.pdf (pcpsr.org)

                                         Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Home demolition and denial of building permits as a case study:

                                        PSR case studies_building permits_English.pdf (pcpsr.org)

                                         

                                        4) A joint Palestinian-Israeli report on the findings of the survey research and the survey research experiments on both sides.

                                        Combined Report of findings of the joint polls:

                                        Microsoft Word - Combined Report of Palestinian-Israeli Joint Polls.docx (pcpsr.org)

                                        Summary Report of findings of the joint polls:

                                        Summary Report of Joint Palestinian-Israeli Polls (pcpsr.org)

                                        Palestinian Report of findings of the joint polls:

                                        Microsoft Word - Palestinian Report of Joint Palestinian-Israeli Polls.docx (pcpsr.org)

                                        Israeli Report of findings of the joint polls:

                                        Microsoft Word - Israeli Report of Joint Palestinian-Israeli Polls.docx (pcpsr.org)

                                        Questionnaire of the first joint poll:

                                        Joint Poll Questionnaire English_August 2020.pdf (pcpsr.org)

                                         

                                        Table of findings of the first joint poll:

                                        Microsoft Word - Table of findings_english Joint Poll 6 June 2020.docx (pcpsr.org)

                                        Questionnaire of the second joint poll:

                                        1 (pcpsr.org)

                                         

                                         

                                         

                                        This Palestinian-Israeli joint project on “Mapping Sources of Mutual Distrust in Palestinian-Israeli Relations” is funded by the European Union (EU)The joint surveys were funded by the European Union (EU), with additional funding from the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and  the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP. The content does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and its member states or the other donors.

                                         

                                        15 September 2021

                                        Palestinian-Israeli Joint Poll on Sources of Mutual Distrust: Mutual Palestinian-Israeli distrust, found at the core of peace failure, is generated by socio-psychological forces heightened by daily life hardships, exposure to violence, and widespread negative perceptions about the other side’s educational system

                                        September 15, 2021 --------- Palestinian and Israeli public support for peace stands at the lowest point since the beginning of the peace process 28 years ago.  Just completed joint Palestinian-Israeli research reveals an unequivocal finding: extremely low level of mutual trust among the two publics is the most important explanation for the declining support of the peace process. The joint research sought to map out the sources of distrust and recommend policy measures to address the problem of the continually declining mutual trust.

                                        The research was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) and the Macro Center for Political Economics during the past three years with funding from the European Union (EU). One of the surveys conducted for the project was funded by the Netherland Representative Office in Ramallah and the Japan Representative Office to Palestine through the UNDP/PAPP.

                                        The joint research relied on surveys conducted in the second half of 2020 among representative samples of the two publics, survey experiments among those hardest-hit by the prolonged conflict and military occupation, educational and classroom experiments among students, all complemented with more than a dozen focus groups with students and those paying the highest cost of the conflict. The research was supplemented by case studies, review of textbook, the development of “objective” textbook passages, and a review of the recent history of peace education in Europe and elsewhere. The report on the historical review focused on the lessons learned from previous international examples and was discussed in a workshop for Palestinian, Israeli, and international professionals who spent years exploring this sensitive topic.

                                        The Joint polls were conducted between August and November 2020 among representative samples of the two publics. Survey research experiments were conducted in January and February 2021 with focus groups soon after. A poll in the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse series, was conducted in August 2020 among a Palestinian sample of 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations and the margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample included 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Midgam in Hebrew and Arabic The margin of error is +/-3.34%. 

                                        The joint poll on trust and the peace process was conducted among a Palestinian sample size of 1560 adults, including 592 youth, interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample included 1201 adults, of which 272 were youth, interviewed through the internet by Rafi Smith in Hebrew and Arabic. The combined Israeli and Palestinian data files have been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of the various groups and ages in the Palestinian and Israeli societies, and to reflect, for Israeli Jews, current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error for the Israeli poll is +/-3.34%. 

                                        Our survey research and experiments among the general public, residents of hard-hit areas, and students indicate the following (for project reports and documents, visit PSR and Macro’s websites):

                                        • The contexts of the two societies, the Israeli and the Palestinian, are very different, leading to different results. The findings of the Israeli surveys show that trust is mostly determined by the psychological repertoire of beliefs, attitudes and emotions that are imparted and shaped in the political, educational and social culture that can be viewed as a culture of conflict. Israelis are less affected by the difficulties of daily life and violent events because their lives take place in a very different context and they lead routinized life – a normal life in the conflict
                                        • Findings among the Palestinians show a correlation between the widespread mutual distrust on the one hand and the daily life hardships, exposure to violence, and negative perceptions of the educational system on the other side on the other hand.
                                        • The research unveils other roots of distrust: socio-psychological variables representing the repertoire that both side are carrying,  such as ethos of conflict and negative stereotyping relating to historic experiences and narratives. These variables indicate that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative stereotypes he or she holds regarding Palestinians or Israeli Jews, the more he/she finds the other side worthy of trust and therefore supports the peace process.
                                        • The youth are more likely to hold hardline views, to indicate less trust, and to adhere to beliefs of ethos of conflict and hold stronger negative stereotype of the other.
                                        • When linking support for peace with trust level, strong positive correlation emerges: the higher the trust, the higher the support for peace and the lower the trust, the lower the support for peace. Here is an example from our August 2020 joint poll: Palestinian support for the two-state solution stood at 60% among those who trust Israeli Jews and only 41% among those who distrust them; Israeli equivalent stood at 81% among those who trust Palestinians and only 34% among those who distrust them.  
                                        • A dozen Educational and classroom experiments indicated that students are more likely to trust the other side and to have a more positive attitude toward peace when the classroom text presented by the teachers were “objective” or presented the other side in a positive light.
                                        • Six survey research experiments found residents in areas of great hardships are more likely to distrust the other and to oppose the peace process.
                                        • A dozen focus groups among students and residents of areas of great hardships confirmed the project findings and helped to articulate the link between trust and peace and the role played by the sources of distrust.

                                        Recommendations: It goes without saying that only the ending of occupation and the building of permanent peace can bring about a real restoration of trust and begin the process of reconciliation. Yet as our research demonstrates, progress toward peace is linked to the restoration of trust and hope. A major societal change is needed to change the state of mind that is supporting distrust. It should be accompanied by change in the information provided by leaders, mass-media, schools, ceremonies, memorial days, the imparted collective memory and existing dominant political ideologies.  Additional interim measures are needed: change the reality on the ground, stop incitements and minimize negative language and phrasing, increase contact between People, deliberately use mass media to inform and enlighten, use the school system with the goal of changing the collective psychological repertoire of society; and encourage joint projects in less sensitive areas such as health, science, and agriculture.  

                                         

                                         

                                        For more information or interviews: contact Khalil Shikaki, PSR director, at kshikaki@pcpsr.org or 02-296 4933, and.Roby Nathanson, General Director, MACRO at roby@macro.org.il or 03-5251057

                                         

                                         

                                        This press release describes a joint Palestinian-Israeli project on “Mapping Sources of Mutual Distrust in Palestinian-Israeli Relations” funded by the European Union (EU)The joint surveys were funded by the European Union (EU), with additional funding from the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and  the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP. The content does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and its member states or the other donors.

                                        13  July 2017  

                                        Widespread public rejection of two PA’s decisions: to reduce salary payments to its Gazan employees, and to suspend payment to cover the cost of Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip; in the meanwhile, an almost total consensus rejects pressure on the PA to terminate payments to Palestinian security prisoners, and the largest percentage rejects any Hamas-Dahlan deal to jointly run the Gaza Strip seeing it as leading to total split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but the findings point to clear differences on this matter between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

                                        29 June-1 July 2017

                                        These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 29 June and 1 July 2017. Internally, the period before the poll witnessed various important developments: the PA instituted a partial deduction, about 30% of the salary, on payments to its public sector in the Gaza Strip; the PA partially stopped covering the cost of Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip; Hamas elected Ismail Haniyeh as the head of its Political Bureau and Yahya Sinwar as head of the movement in the Gaza Strip; Hamas engaged in negotiations with the group led by Mohammad Dahlan in an effort to ease conditions in the Gaza Strip; and Hamas also issued a new document reflecting its current principles and positions. Moreover, Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails carried out a hunger strike. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, and national reconciliation. It also covers some aspects of the peace process and intra Arab relations. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

                                        For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

                                        Main Findings:

                                        Findings of the second quarter of 2017 show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public rejects the recent PA measures to deduct part of the salaries of its public sector in the Gaza Strip and to stop covering the cost of Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip. The largest percentage view these measures as aiming at imposing economic hardships on the population in order to force it to reject Hamas’ rule. Very few people think the PA has taken these measures due to the financial problems it currently faces. Findings also show a semi consensus against the termination of the PA payments to the security prisoners in Israeli jails; 

                                        but half of the public believes that the PA will indeed acquiesce to the external pressure and suspend the payments.

                                        The largest percentage of the public is opposed to any Hamas-Dahlan agreement that would lead the two sides to share the administration of the Gaza Strip, fearing that such an agreement would lead to the complete separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting however, that a majority of Gazans would support such an agreement, if one is indeed reached.

                                        After the Trump’s visit to Palestine and Israel, most of the public remain pessimistic about the future of Palestinian-Israeli relation and the Palestinian-American relation. But it is worth noting that the level of support for a return to an armed intifada has declined significantly during the past three months. Perhaps the decline is due to public perception of the negligible outcome of such attacks, such as knifings and shooting, on the Israeli side. In other words, the public might view them as ineffective and counterproductive given the fact that the last attack has led to the denial of access to Jerusalem and holy places during the month of Ramadan.

                                        Finally, findings show that the overwhelming majority believes that the Arab World has turned away from the Palestine cause and has become an ally of Israel against Iran. On intra-Arab matters, the public stands with Qatar against the measures taken by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE against it.

                                         

                                        (1) The Crisis of electricity in Gaza and the reduction in the salaries of PA employees in the Gaza Strip:

                                        • 84% oppose PA measure to stop covering costs of electricity to Gaza
                                        • 88% oppose the reduction of salary payments to PA employees in the Gaza Strip
                                        • Most of the public believe that the aim of the PA is to pressure the Gazans and punish Hamas

                                        An overwhelming majority of 84% are opposed to the measure taken by the PA to stop covering the Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip; only 10% support that measure. Opposition to the measure increases in the West Bank (87%) compared to the Gaza Strip (80%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (93% and 90% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (73%), among the illiterates (87%) compared to those who hold BA degree (83%), and among students (87%) compared to employees (77%).

                                        Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 88% are opposed to the step taken by the PA, reducing the amount of salary payments to its employees in the Gaza Strip; only 8% support the step. 40% believe that the step has been taken by the PA in order to impose economic pressure on the Gazans in order to force them to reject Hamas’ rule; 37% believe the PA aimed at punishing Hamas in order to force it to accept its conditions for reconciliation, and 16% believe that the PA has taken the step due to the difficult financial conditions it faces. The belief that the PA seeks to impose economic difficulties on Gazans is higher in the Gaza Strip (44%) compared to the West Bank (37%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (47% each) compared to supporters of Fatah (32%), among the married (41% compared to the unmarried (37%), and among the holders of BA degree (46%) compared to those who finished elementary school only (34%).

                                         

                                        (2) Hamas-Dahlan meetings, the election of Haniyeh and Sinwar, reconciliation, and the reconciliation government:

                                        • 50% believe that a Hamas-Dahlan agreement would lead to the total separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
                                        • 48% oppose and 40% support a Hamas-Dahlan agreement
                                        • 78% believe that the PA pressure on Gaza and Hamas will not succeed in achieving PA goals
                                        • 47% want and 38% do not want Hamas to accept PA and Abbas’ conditions for reconciliation
                                        • 64% are pessimistic about the chances for reconciliation
                                        • 61% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government

                                        50% believe that a Hamas-Dahlan agreement to create a joint administration for the Gaza Strip, if true, would lead to the total separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 38% believe that such an agreement would not lead to the total separation between the two areas. The belief that it will lead to the total separation between the two areas stands at 51% in the West Bank and 50% in the Gaza Strip. This percentage rises to 55% among men compared to 46% among women, 56% among Fatah supporters, 50% among supporters of third parties, and 46% among Hamas supporters. It stands at 56% among holders of BA degree compared to 34% among the illiterates, and 60% among the employees compared to 42% among housewives.

                                        48% indicate that they would be opposed to such an agreement between Hamas and Dahlan while 40% indicate that they would be supportive. Support for such an agreement stands at 61% in the Gaza Strip compared to only 29% in the West Bank. Similarly, support is higher among the youth, between the ages of 18 and 22 (38%) compared to those whose age is 50 or above (32%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (64% and 53% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (35%), among holders of BA degree (44%) compared to illiterates (15%), among refugees (48%) compared to non-refugees (33%), and among those who work in the public sector (45%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (36%).

                                        78% believe that the PA measure that suspended payment to cover the cost of Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip, and similar other measures to pressure Hamas, will not succeed in ending the separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; only 13% think such measures can succeed in ending the separation.  Nonetheless, 47% of the public demand that Hamas accept the conditions put forward by the PA and Abbas if such acceptance can lead to improving conditions in the Gaza Strip; 38% demand that Hamas reject such conditions.

                                        31% believe that the election of Ismail Haniyeh and Yahiya Sinwar as Hamas leaders will weaken the chances for reconciliation; 25% believe it will lead to strengthen the chances; and 33% think it will have no impact on the chances for reconciliation.  Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 27% and pessimism at 64%. These findings are similar to those obtained three months ago.

                                        26% say they are satisfied and 61% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 56%.

                                         

                                        (3) PA payments to Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails:

                                        • 91% oppose the suspension of PA payments to Palestinian security prisoners
                                        • But 44% expect the PA to stop making the payments to the security prisoners

                                        91% are opposed to the suspension of PA payments to Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails; only 7% support such measure. Nonetheless, 46% believe that the PA will not stop making those payments to Palestinian security prisoners while 44% believe it will stop making them.  The belief that the PA will indeed stop the payments is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (43%), among men (47%) compared to women (41%), among the youth, between 18-22 years old (50%) compared to those who are 50 years old or higher (38%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (50% and 46% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (39%) among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (35%), and among the employees (46%) compared to housewives (40%).

                                         

                                        (4) Prisoners’ hunger strike:

                                        • 57% believe that the prisoners’ hunger strike has been partially successful
                                        • 69% believe that the strike has improved the leadership position of Barghouti

                                        57% believe that the hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails has partially succeeded while 28% believe it fully succeeded; 13% believe it has failed. Nonetheless, 69% believe that the hunger strike has enhanced the leadership status and role of Marwan Barghouti among the Palestinians while only 12% believe it has not done that. In fact, the strike did not improve the standing of Barghouti since the level of support for him in this poll, compared to that of Haniyeh or Abbas, did not change significantly, as we see below.

                                         

                                        (5) Hamas’ new document:

                                        • Half of those who have heard about the new Hamas document believes that it deviates from Hamas’ position as reflected in the charter and the other half believes that it maintains the same positions as in the charter
                                        • 30% believe that Hamas’ principle motivation behind the release of the new document is to present itself as a moderate movement

                                        The majority (53%) has not heard about Hamas’ new document; but 21% (of the total sample) believe the new document differs from some of Hamas’ basic principles and positions; 20% (of the total sample) believe it has maintained Hamas’ traditional principles and positions.  30% believe that the primary motivation behind the publication of the new document is Hamas’ desire to present itself to the world as a moderate movement; 18% believe that Hamas sought to reiterate its traditional positions as outlined in its original charter of 1987; and 16% think that Hamas sought to document the recent positions that the movement has adopted since it issued its original charter. 

                                         

                                        (6) Presidential and parliamentary elections: 

                                        • 62% want president Abbas to resign
                                        • Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 61%
                                        • In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, each receives 45%
                                        • In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 59% and the latter 35%
                                        • In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 39%, Hamas 29%, and third parties combined 10% of the vote

                                        62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago demand for Abbas resignation stood at 61% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 39% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 36% (41% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).

                                        If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 7%; Khalid Mishal and Rami al Hamdallah (5% each), and Salam Fayyad and Mustapha Barghouti (3% each); and Saeb Erekat at 1%. It is worth mentioning that Barghouti was preferred over all others by 33%. It is also worth mentioning that Dahlan (who, in this poll, is preferred over all others by 18% in the Gaza Strip compared to only 1% in the West Bank) has not gained more support in the Strip, in comparison to his standing three months ago, as a result of the agreement he has been reported to have made with Hamas.  

                                        If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, each would receive 45% of the vote (compared to 47% each three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 39% of the vote (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 55% (compared to 50% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 50% (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh 40% (compared to 45% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 41% and Haniyeh 32%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 35%. Here too, it is worth mentioning that support for Barghouti against Haniyeh and Abbas stood at 40% three months ago and 59% against Haniyeh alone, figures that are very similar to his current standing.

                                        If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 64% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 24% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 35% (compared to 34% three months ago) and for Fatah at 36% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 24% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 36% three months ago).

                                         

                                        (7) Domestic conditions:

                                        • Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and in the West Bank at 24%
                                        • Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 43% and in the West Bank at 53%
                                        • 47% of Gazans and 23% of West Bank seek to emigrate

                                        Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 24%. 47% of the public believe that conditions in the Gaza Strip would improve if Hamas accepted PA and Abbas conditions for reconciliation.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 43%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 53%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 38% and in the West Bank at 50%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 47%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 23%.

                                        We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Maan TV (at 14%), Palestine TV and Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) (at 13%), al Aqsa TV (at 11%), Al Arabiya and al Quds TV at 5% each), and al Mayadeen at 3%.

                                        Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%. Moreover, only 36% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 58% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.

                                         

                                        (8) The peace process:  

                                        • Support for a return to an armed intifada drops from 51% three months ago to 39% in this poll
                                        • After Trump’s visit, 51% believe that Palestinian-Israeli relations will worsen
                                        • Similarly, 50% believe that Palestinian-American relations will worsen
                                        • 43% believe that the election of Haniyeh and Sinwar to Hamas leadership will lead to escalation with Israel

                                        In the absence of peace negotiations, 74% support joining more international organizations, 54% support non-violent popular resistance, 39% support a return to an armed intifada, and 44% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 51%. Support for return to armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (35%), among men (44%) compared to women (34%), and among supporters of Hamas (66%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (27% and 42% respectively).

                                        After the visit of the US president, Trump, to Palestine and Israel, 51% believe that Palestinian-Israeli relation will continue to deteriorate, 13% think it will improve, and 33% think it will remain unchanged.  Similarly, 50% think Palestinian-American relation will continue to deteriorate, 11% think it will improve and 34% think it will remain unchanged.

                                        43% believe that the election of Ismail Haniyeh and Yahiya Sinwar to Hamas’ leadership roles will lead to escalation in Hamas-Israel relations; 15% think it will lead to greater calm in the relation, and 30% think it will have no impact on Hamas-Israel relation.

                                         

                                        (9) The Arab World and the Qatar crisis:

                                        • 80% of the public think that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own concerns and that Palestinian is no longer its principle cause
                                        • 67% stand against the measure taken against Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE

                                        80% (compared to 76% three months ago) say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 18% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principal cause. Similarly, 68% (compared to 59% three months ago) believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 21% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

                                        Two thirds (67%) of the public is opposed to the steps taken by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE against Qatar and only 12% support them. Support for Qatar is higher in the West Bank (71%) compared to the Gaza Strip (61%), among men (69%) compared to women (65%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (70%) compared to those whose age is 50 or above (65%), and among supporters of Hamas (79%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (60% and 64% respectively).

                                         

                                        (10) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

                                        • 43% believe that the most vital goal of the Palestinian people should be the ending of occupation and the building of a state
                                        • In the eyes of 28% of the public, the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is corruption within the PA

                                        43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the Wet Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 16% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

                                        The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 28% of the public while 24% believe it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 20% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

                                        On The Eve Of The Israeli Withdrawal From The Gaza Strip, 84% See It As Victory For Armed Resistance And 40% Give Hamas Most Of The Credit For It; But 62% Are Opposed To Continued Attacks Against Israelis From The Gaza Strip, 60% Support Collection Of Arms From Armed Groups In Gaza, Fateh’s Electoral Standing Improved At Hamas’ Expense (47% To 30%), Optimism Prevails Over Pessimism, And 73% Support The Establishment Of A Palestinian State In The Gaza Strip That Would Gradually Extend To The West Bank

                                         

                                        7-9 September 2005 

                                        These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between September 7-9, 2005. The poll deals with Palestinian conditions on the eve of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the future of the peace process after disengagement, voting intentions and considerations in the upcoming Palestinian elections, and domestic Palestinian conditions. Total size of the sample is 1368 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (892) and the Gaza Strip (476) in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

                                        For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

                                         

                                        Main Findings

                                        Focus in this poll has been placed on Palestinian perception of the meaning of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in the context of the implementation of the Israeli disengagement plan and public expectations of the day after with focus on the future of the peace process. The poll also focused on the upcoming Palestinian parliamentary elections in terms of voters’ intentions and behavior.

                                        Three main findings emerge:

                                        (1) The Palestinian public views the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as victory for armed resistance to occupation; it gives Hamas most of the credit for this achievement.

                                        (2) In the meanwhile, with the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip underway, public top priorities are shifting: focus is now placed on matters of reconstruction and state building such as economic conditions, corruption, and law and order.

                                        (3) The change in priorities is weakening interest in armed resistance and increases demands for its cessation. Moreover, the change in the hierarchy of priorities in weakening the electoral appeal of Hamas and strengthening that of Fateh in anticipation of the upcoming parliamentary elections.

                                        It is evident that the unilateral nature of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has generated conflicting dynamics: on the one hand, a greater appreciation of the role of violence, and thereby the need to keep the armed pressure on Israel and to protect the arms of the resisting groups; on the other hand, a greater optimism about the future and the critical and urgent need to begin the process of reconstruction and state building, and thereby the need to maintain the existing ceasefire and the consolidation of Fateh’s position.

                                         

                                        (1) Prevailing Conditions on the Eve of Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip

                                        • 84% view Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as victory for armed resistance and 40% give Hamas most of the credit for that achievement
                                        • But a majority of 62% opposes continued armed resistance from the Gaza Strip and 60% support collection of arms from armed factions in the Strip
                                        • 77% support the continuation of the current ceasefire and 56% oppose (and 37%) support the suicide attack that took place in Beer Sheva in August
                                        • Priorities of the public focus on reconstruction and 73% support the creation of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders that would start in the Gaza Strip and gradually extends to the West Bank
                                        • Optimistic expectations prevails, particularly in the Gaza Strip, but fears remain

                                        Findings show significant increase in the percentage of those who see the Israeli withdrawal as victory for armed resistance from 72% in our last survey in June to 84% in this survey. The largest percentage (40%) gives Hamas most of the credit for this achievement while only 21% give the credit to the PA and 11% to Fateh. Belief that Hamas deserves most of the credit increases among women (44%) compared to men (36%), among holders of the preparatory certificate (47%) compared to holders of university degree (32%), among housewives (45%) compared to employees and farmers (29% each), among those would definitely refuse to buy a lottery ticket (45%) compared to those who would definitely agree to buy one (32%), among those working in the private sector (40%) compared to those working in the public sector (29%), among the married (42%) compared to the unmarried (33%), and among Hamas supporters (69%) compared to supporters of Fateh (24%).

                                        Despite the high public appreciation for armed resistance and for Hamas, findings show a majority opposition to continued armed attacks. 62% oppose (and 35% support) continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after a full Israeli withdrawal from that area. Opposition to armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal is greater in Gaza than in the West Bank (65% and 60% respectively). Findings also show that that a majority of 77% supports the continuation of the current ceasefire while only 22% oppose its continuation. This attitude is reflected in the opposition of 56% (and support of 37%) to the suicide attack that took place in August 2005 in Beer Sheva. Opposition to armed attacks is also reflected in the majority support (60%) for collection of arms from armed factions in the Gaza Strip; 37% oppose such a step. Percentage of support for the Gaza collection of arms is equal in the Gaza Strip to that of the West Bank but it increases among those definitely wishing to buy lottery tickets (73%) compared to those definitely opposed to buying lottery tickets (46%) and among Fateh’s supporters (74%) compared to Hamas’ supporters (43%).

                                        The high positive evaluation of the role of violence while simultaneously opposing its continuation reflects a shift in public priorities towards a focus on reconstruction where poverty and unemployment comes at the top of the public list of priorities (40%) followed by occupation and corruption (25% each) and internal anarchy (8%). In June 2005, these percentages stood at 34% for poverty and unemployment, 33% for occupation, 24% for corruption, and 8% for internal anarchy.

                                        Similarly, findings show strong support (73%) for the establishment of a Palestinian state (with the 1967 lines as its borders) that would start in the Gaza Strip and gradually extends to the West Bank. The idea of a Gaza-first state receives identical support in the West Bank as in the Gaza Strip. But it finds greater support among those intending to vote for Fateh in the upcoming parliamentary elections (82%) compared to those intending to vote for Hamas (67%). It is important to point out that the question clearly identifies the borders of the state as those of the 1967, and therefore some or all respondents might have assumed that no further negotiations would be required to determine the final borders of the state. In other words, one should not assume that support for this Gaza-first state is automatically equivalent to support for the state with provisional borders referred to in the Road Map.

                                        The Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has created an optimistic atmosphere, particularly in the Gaza Strip. For example, findings show optimistic expectations regarding future improvement in the economic conditions among 64% of the public, progress in the peace process among 57%, links between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 57%, the view that the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip is the beginning of the end of the Israeli occupation among 56%, and the view that further withdrawals will take place in the West Bank in the future among 60%. But pessimism remains high, particularly in the West Bank, regarding the possibility of continued Israeli control over the Rafah crossing and thereby the transformation of the Gaza Strip into a big prison (among 57%) and the expectation that the Israeli withdrawal will be followed by internal infighting (among 60%). It is worth noting that the poll was conducted during the period in which Musa Arafat, security advisor to PA president, was assassinated in the Gaza Strip.

                                         

                                        (2) Future of the Peace Process after Disengagement

                                        • 69% support going to comprehensive final status negotiations and only 25% support a gradual interim solution
                                        • Support for the Road Map plan stands at 57% and opposition at 40%
                                        • If permanent status negotiations start with the Sharon government, only 30% expect that it would lead to an agreement while 68% believe that agreement is not possible
                                        • But if a compromise is reached with the current Israeli leadership, 53% believe Sharon is strong enough to convince the Israeli people to accept it and 50% believe Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas is strong enough to convince the Palestinian people to accept it.
                                        • 63% support (and 35% oppose) a two-state solution whereby the state of Israel is recognized as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine is recognized as the state for the Palestinian people
                                        • Level of support for reconciliation between the two peoples after the establishment of a Palestinians state reaches 75% and opposition 24%

                                         

                                        Findings show strong support (69%) for comprehensive final status negotiations with the aim of reaching a permanent status agreement rather than an interim or gradual solution which receives the support of only 25%. They also show that support for the Road Map remains unchanged at 57% and opposition at 40%. But support for final and comprehensive negotiations does not mean optimism about their outcome with the current Israeli government of Ariel Sharon. Indeed, 68% believe an agreement with Sharon is not possible while only 30% believe that such an agreement is possible. Nonetheless, if a compromise agreement is reached with the current Israeli leadership, 53% of the Palestinians believe thatSharon is strong enough to be able to convince the Israelis to accept it. Moreover, 50% of the Palestinians believe the Palestinian president, Mahmud Abbas, is strong enough to convince the Palestinians to accept it.

                                        A compromise agreement acceptable to 63% of the Palestinians is one based on a mutual recognition of identity whereby a Palestinian state is established next to the state of Israel and all final status issues are resolved. Israel in this case, would be recognized as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. Opposition to this compromise reaches 35%. (In December 2004, identical results regarding this compromise were obtained.) If a two-state solution is reached, 75% of the Palestinians would support reconciliation between the two peoples. Support for facets of reconciliation varies with 87% supporting open borders for labor and goods between the two states, 70% supporting joint economic ventures and institutions, 38% supporting enacting laws prohibiting incitement, 36% supporting joint political institutions aiming at creating a confederation between the two states, and 10% supporting text books that would recognize the state of Israel and does not call for the return of all Palestine to the Palestinians.

                                         

                                        (3) Voting Intentions and Considerations in the Upcoming Legislative Elections

                                        • 74% say they will participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections; 47% of the likely voters will vote for Fateh, 30% for Hamas, 11% for other groups, and 11% remain undecided
                                        • Ability to fight corruption is the first top voting consideration followed by name of list or political party, ability to improve economic conditions, ability to reach a peace agreement with Israel, and ability to protect national unity.
                                        • Hamas is the most able to fight corruption and Fateh is the most able to improve economic conditions, move the peace process forward, and protect national unity
                                        • Mahmud Abbas is the preferred candidate for the presidency and Marwan Barghouti for the position of the vice president and the position of prime minister  

                                        Findings show that 74% of the Palestinians will participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections in January 2006. Voting intentions among the likely participants indicate an increase of Fateh’s support from 44% last June to 47% in this poll and a drop in Hamas’ support from 33% to 30% during the same period. 11% will vote for other factions and groups and 11% remain undecided.   From among eight vital considerations in voting for election lists, # (1) is the ability to fight corruption receiving 24%, # (2) the name or affiliation of the list with 19%, # (3) ability to improve economic conditions with 15%, # (4) ability to reach a peace agreement with Israel with 14%, # (5) ability to maintain national unity with 10%, # (6) ability to enforce law and order with 8%, # (7) ability to protect refugee rights in negotiations with 6%, and finally # (8) ability to insure the continuation of the intifada with 4%.

                                        Hamas is the most able to fight corruption (receiving 46% vs. 37% to Fateh) and to insure the continuation of the intifada (receiving 62% vs. 24% to Fateh). Fateh is perceived as the most able to improve the economy (receiving 46% vs. 31% for Hamas), to push the peace process forward (receiving 64% for Fateh vs. 21% for Hamas), to protect national unity (receiving 46% vs. 37% for Hamas), to enforce law and order (receiving 54% vs. 31% for Hamas) and to protect refugee rights (receiving 44% for Fateh and 37% for Hamas).

                                        In a closed question, in a contest for the position of PA president between Mahmud Abbas (Fateh), Mahmud Zahhar (Hamas), and Mustafa Barghouti (others), Abbas comes first with 44% followed by Zahhar with 21% and Barghouti with 19%. In a closed question, in a contest over the position of vice president, Marwan Barghouti receives the greatest level of support with 24% followed by Mahmud Zahhar with 14%, Ismail Haniyyah with 13%, Mohammad Dahlan and Mustafa Barghouti with 9% each, Farouq Qaddoumi with 8%, and finally Ahmad Qurai and Saeb Erikat with 6% each. In a closed question, in a contest over the position of prime minister, Marwan Barghouti comes first with 30% followed by Zahhar with 22%, Mustafa Barghouti with 17%, and Qurai and Dahlan with 8% each. Public satisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas increases from 60% last June to 64% in this poll.

                                         

                                        (4) Domestic Conditions and Political Sympathies

                                        • 87% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions; among those, 61% believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future
                                        • Only 36% say that their security and safety and that of their family is insured these days and 64% say it is not
                                        • Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy stands at 32%
                                        • The popularity of Fateh stands at 39% and Hamas at 27% (compared to 41% and 30% respectively in June 2005)

                                        Findings show that an overwhelming majority (87%) believes that corruption exists in PA institutions. A majority among those (61%) believes that this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future. Only 33% believe that corruption will decrease in the future. The percentage of those who believe corruption does not exist in the PA does not exceed 9%.

                                        Findings also show that about two thirds (64%) believe that these days they and their families lack security and safety while only 36% say they now have security and safety. A clear difference exists between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with more Gazans feeling safe and secure than West Bankers (55% to 25% respectively).

                                        As for the status of democracy in the Palestinian areas, 32% (compared to 37% last June) give it a positive evaluation.

                                        Popularity of Fateh stands today at 39% compared to 41% last June. Fateh’s popularity in the West Bank is almost identical to its popularity in the Gaza Strip (38%  and 40% respectively). Hamas’ popularity dropped from 30% to 27% during the same period. Hamas’ popularity is higher in the Gaza Strip (32%) compared to the West Bank (25%). ... Full Report

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