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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between May 26 and June 1, 2024. The period prior to the poll witnessed the continuation and expansion of the war on the Gaza Strip, to include the ground offensive in the outskirts of the city of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, the occupation of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, the control of the Salah al-Din Corridor, also known as Philadelphia Corridor, and the return of the Israeli army to occupy Jabalia and other areas in the northern Gaza Strip. These developments led to an escalation of humanitarian suffering, and the displacement of about one million displaced and non-displaced people from the Rafah area and shelters to the Al-Mawasi area and other areas from which the Israeli army withdrew in the Khan Younis area, Deir al-Balah and other areas in the central Gaza Strip. Famine has also intensified in the northern Gaza Strip and other areas with little aid arriving those areas due to the closure of the Rafah crossing with Egypt after it was occupied by the Israeli army and the inability of the US-constructed floating dock in the north of the Strip, which became inactive due to storms. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced that he has asked the court to issue arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Galant, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, head of a movement in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar, and the commander of its military wing, Muhammad Deif. Efforts to reach a ceasefire failed during this period, despite the continuation of these efforts led by Qatar, Egypt and the United States, and despite Hamas' acceptance, in early May, of a ceasefire agreement presented to it by Egyptian mediators.

Talk of the “day after” continued with little progress due to the Israeli government's rejection of the idea. But talk of the need to reform and “revitalize” the PA led to the formation of a new Palestinian government, made up of professionals, headed by economist Muhammad Mustafa. Meanwhile, restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank continued, and the entrances to most towns and villages continued to be closed by the Israeli army in order to prevent residents from accessing main roads. Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages in unprotected areas in areas B and C of the West Bank also continued.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted with residents in specific areas where no active combat was present. The areas covered included parts of the Rafah and Khan Younis areas and the central Gaza Strip and all shelters therein, but not the northern besieged enclave and other areas of combat in the central Gaza Strip and in the eastern area of Rafah. This poll covers all of the above issues as well as other issues such as the domestic conditions and the domestic balance of power, the peace process and the alternative options available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

The sample size of this poll was 1570 adults, of whom 760 were interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank (in 76 residential locations) and 750 in the Gaza Strip (in 75 locations). Due to the uncertainty about the exact population size and distribution at that moment in the Gaza Strip, we almost doubled the sample size in that area in order to reduce the margin of error. The total sample was reweighted to reflect the actual relative size of the population in the two Palestinian areas. Thus, the sample used is representative of the entire populations of the two regions. The margin of error stands at +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

As in our previous two polls, three and six months ago, most of the questions in this poll, covering the second quarter of 2024, revolved around the October 7 attack and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war and the Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, the unprecedented human suffering of the Gaza Strip's residents, the atrocities of the war, the debate regarding the future of the Gaza Strip after the war, the possibility of fully invading Rafah and its repercussions, the decision of the Prosecutor General of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to request the arrest of leaders from Israel and Hamas, and public satisfaction with the performance of the various parties during the war. It should be noted that the samples in all three surveys does not include residents of the northern Gaza Strip who have remained in their homes since the beginning of the war due to the inability of our researchers to reach them and the lack of reliable data on their numbers and whereabouts in that area. It should also be noted that data from the current poll and the one immediately preceding it were collected during the ongoing fighting in the Gaza Strip, while the first poll was conducted during Israel's release of prisoners from the West Bank as part of the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel. Apart from the ceasefire, there was no similar development taking place in the Gaza Strip at that time, i.e. the end of November 2023. The current poll, as in the previous two polls, covers the consequences of the war on the internal balance of power, support for the Palestinian leadership, Palestinian-Israeli relations, and the political process.

Findings indicate that about 80% of Gazans have lost a relative or that a relative has been injured in the current war. Nevertheless, two thirds of the public support the October 7 attack and nearly 80% believe it has placed the Palestinian issue at the center of global attention. Although an overwhelming majority does not believe that the ICC's decisions, if issued, would lead to the arrest of leaders in Israel or Hamas, a majority believes such decisions could contribute to speeding the process of ending the war. Findings also indicate that two thirds of the public expect Hamas to win the war on Gaza, but this percentage drops to only about half in the Gaza Strip. Also, only half of Gazans expects Hamas to return to controlling the Strip after the war. While the public supports the text of the declaration of the Arab summit in Manama, the vast majority disagrees with President Abbas's statements at that summit. Demand for Abbas' resignation is increasing and the findings show a rise in the popularity of Hamas and Marwan Barghouti. Findings also indicate a significant drop in in the Gaza Strip in the support for the two-state solution, although about half of the public believes that the Palestinian priority should be ending the occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state. By contrast, support for armed struggle rises and support for dissolving the PA stands at more than 60%.

Humanitarian conditions: We start with the humanitarian and living conditions in the central and southern Gaza Strip. There has been a slight increase in the percentage of those who have lost relatives in this war to more than 60% and the results, as in the previous poll, indicate that about 80% of Gazans say that at least one of their family members has been killed or injured. The survey shows improvements in some indicators that have been monitored, such as the possibility of finding food, but the overwhelming majority still say they cannot reach those places where they can access food or water without a great difficulty or risk and that the shelters where they now live lack most of the basic needs. Thirty percent of Gazans say that the pier established by the US military on the coast of northern Gaza contributes to alleviating the suffering of the population through the delivery of humanitarian aid, but a majority says it does not. It should also be noted that there are significant complaints of discrimination on political grounds in the distribution of humanitarian aid, and that this percentage has increased to three-quarters in this survey.  Nearly two-thirds blame Israel for their suffering, and most others blame the United States. Putting the blame on Hamas in the Gaza Strip does not exceed 8%.

Support for the attack on October 7: While overall support for the October 7 Hamas offensive remains high, it has seen a four-percentage point decline compared to the previous poll, now at two-thirds. The decrease in this percentage came from the Gaza Strip, which saw a decrease of 14 percentage points. It is important to note that support for this attack, as we will see later, does not necessarily mean support for Hamas and does not mean support for any killings or atrocities committed against civilians. Support comes from another motive: findings show that more than 80% of Palestinians believe that the attack has put the Palestinian issue at the center of attention and eliminated years of neglect at the regional and international levels.

War crimes: As we found in the previous two polls, three and six months ago, almost all Palestinians believe that Israel is committing war crimes today while almost all believe that Hamas is not committing war crimes. Moreover, more than 90% believe that Hamas did not commit any atrocities against Israeli civilians on the seventh of October. Only one in ten Palestinians have seen videos showing atrocities committed by Hamas. The results show that those who watched the videos are about fifteen times more likely than those who did not to believe that Hamas fighters committed atrocities on October 7. It is useful in this context to mention that Al Jazeera is the most watched TV news station in Palestine as about 70% chose it as the most watched station during the past two months. Due to the current war conditions, West Bankers are more inclined than Gazans to watch Al Jazeera, with 83% of West Bankers saying it is their preferred channel.

The ICJ and the attack on Rafah: Three quarters of the public expect the ICJ to fail to stop a comprehensive ground invasion of Rafah because the US would protect Israel from the court's decisions. The percentage of Gazans who believe that an Israeli ground incursion into the entire city of Rafah will lead to a mass rush of people and displaced persons towards the border with Egypt is rising to about a third today, an increase of 6 points compared to our findings three months ago. It should be noted that Israeli tanks had entered the eastern area of Rafah and occupied the border with Egypt and the Salah al-Din, or Philadelphia, Corridor between Rafah and Egypt before data collection began for this poll.

The ICC: In light of the ICC prosecutor general's decision to request the court to issue arrest warrants for the Israeli prime minister Netanyahu and defense minister Galant, and three Hamas leaders, an overwhelming majority (71%) believes that the Israeli leaders will not actually be arrested and prosecuted. However, just under half believe that a court order for the arrest of Netanyahu and Galant could contribute to ending the war on the Gaza Strip. A similar percentage )71%) also believes that even if the ICC issues arrest warrants against them, Hamas leaders will not actually be arrested and tried even based on an ICC decision.  A majority in the West Bank and one-third of Gazans believe that the ICC decision against Hamas leaders will only increase the movement's popularity.

Ceasefire and who comes out the winner: Two-thirds said they support Hamas' decision, announced before the Israeli occupation of the Rafah crossing, to accept the ceasefire proposal submitted by Egypt. A majority expected Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement in the next few days. As we did in the previous two polls, we asked in the current one who would emerge victorious in this war, and a two-thirds majority said they expected Hamas to win, an increase of 4 percentage points compared to our previous poll three months ago. It is worth noting however that fewer Gazans, at just 48%, now expect Hamas to win, a decrease of 8 percentage points compared to the results three months ago. It's also worth noting that while almost no one in the West Bank expects Israel to win the current war, a quarter of Gazans expects Israel to win.

Who will control Gaza after the war: Unlike the previous poll, a larger percentage of West Bankers says today, compared to three months ago, that the Gaza Strip will remain under Hamas’ control, while more Gazans now believe that Hamas will not be the ruling power in the future. In a similar question, which included speculation or estimates regarding the most likely scenario for the day after the war, the results were close to the first question, with half of Gazans saying that Hamas would return to control the Gaza Strip.  We asked about the public's opinion of these scenarios. A little more than half of Gazans said they would prefer the return of Hamas, compared to about two-thirds in the West Bank. More than a quarter of Gazans said they would prefer a new Palestinian Authority with an elected president, parliament and government, an option that was not available in our previous poll.

Deployment of Arab security forces in the Gaza Strip:  In December 2023, we asked the public about its view towards the deployment in the Gaza Strip of an Arab security force, from Egypt and Jordan. At the time, we found widespread opposition of 70% to the idea even if these forces were deployed to assist the Palestinian security forces. In this poll, opposition to such a security force rises to 75%.

The Manama Arab Summit and Abbas statement: We asked the public how satisfied it was with the statement of the recent Arab summit in Manama, which demanded an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the convening of an international peace conference. The public was divided into two completely equal groups in terms of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. However, when asked whether or not they agree with Abbas' statement at that same Arab Summit in Manama in which he said that "the Hamas attack on the seventh of October provided Israel with more pretexts and justifications to attack the Gaza Strip," more than three quarters of the public said they disagreed with it. A larger percentage, about 80%, said they also disagreed with President Abbas' statement at the Summit that "Hamas's position rejecting ending the split and accepting international legitimacy served the Israeli plan to perpetuate the separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank."

Satisfaction with the performance of various parties during the war: As we did in the previous two polls, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by Palestinian, Arab/regional and international actors. The results show similar levels of satisfaction to the previous two polls, except for a significant rise in satisfaction with Iran.

	The percentage of satisfaction with Hamas and Yahya Sinwar remains very high. By contrast, satisfaction with Fatah and President Abbas continues to decline. The findings also suggests that the public is unwilling to give the new prime minister, Mohammad Mustafa, a chance to improve the government's performance, perhaps because he is close to President Abbas or perhaps the public does not know much about him.
	At the regional level, the highest satisfaction rate went to Yemen, Hezbollah, Qatar, and Iran, with Jordan and Egypt far behind them and in low rates. Evident in this poll is the increase in satisfaction with Iran, by an additional 19 percentage points compared to three months ago, probably due to Iran's direct missile attack on Israel in April.  But despite this spike in satisfaction with Iran's role in the war, it is odd that the majority of Palestinians see this attack as a show or a play rather than an Iranian determination to support the Palestinians. It is useful to see the division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip on this, with a majority of Gazans, versus only a third in the West Bank, saying that the Iranian missile attack was in support of the Palestinian people rather than theatrics.
	As for international non-regional actors, Russia had the highest satisfaction rating, slightly more than a quarter, followed by the United Nations, Germany, and the United States.
	In the context of the public's perception of the international repercussions triggered by the war on Gaza, the Palestinian public is optimistic that student protests at American universities will indeed bring about a change in US policy to make it more supportive of the Palestinian side or less supportive of the Israeli side, with about 70% believing this.

Support for Palestinian factions: When asked which political party or movement they prefer, the largest percentage (40%) said they prefer Hamas, followed by Fateh (20%), 8% chose third forces, and one third said they do not support any of them or have no opinion. These results mean that support for Hamas over the past three months has increased by 6 percentage points; support for Fatah has risen by 3 percentage points over the same period. In the same context, just over half believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while only 16% believe that Fateh under the leadership of Abbas is the most deserving.

Support for Palestinian leaders: At the leadership level, the current poll shows that support for Marwan Barghouti continues to rise. In a presidential election between three candidates, incumbent President Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti, a Fatah leader currently in an Israeli jail, Barghouti wins a majority of participants. In a two-way competition between Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former wins the vote of about 60% of the participating voters. In an open-ended question, i.e. without predetermined responses, we asked the public to name their preferred candidate to be president of the PA after Abbas. Marwan Barghouti came first, with 29% of the public mentioning his name, followed by Ismail Haniyeh (14%), Mohammed Dahlan (8%), Yahya Sinwar (7%), and Mustafa Barghouti (2%).

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas: Satisfaction with Abbas' performance stands at 12% and dissatisfaction with 85%. About 90% want the president to resign. Today, 94% of West Bankers and 83% of Gazans demand the resignation of the president.

The new government of Mohammad Mustafa: An overwhelming majority (72%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to carryout. In all of the reform items we asked about, we found that Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but a majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of the reforms agenda items.

What the public wants from the PA leadership: We asked the public for the second time since October 7 what political measures the PA leadership should take immediately to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip. We presented the public with three sets of priorities: reconciliation and reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the formation of a new PA national unity government, and the leadership and management of humanitarian service delivery to the Gaza Strip. In the current poll, the percentage that chose the first priority, to achieve immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has risen to more than half. The formation of a national unity government “to negotiate with Israel and the international community an end to the war and the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip in the future,” came second with one-third selecting it. The rest chose the third priority whereby the PA "leads a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the people of Gaza in cooperation with Egypt and the international community."

Support for the two-state solution: On Palestinian-Israeli relations, the results differ markedly from the results of the previous poll we published three months ago. Support for a two-state solution stands at just one-third and a majority says it supports armed struggle. In this regard, it is worth noting two findings: unlike the previous poll, in the current one, support for the two-state solution decreased significantly, and support for armed struggle increased. But the decline in support for a two-state solution came almost completely from the Gaza Strip, a dramatic drop of 30 percentage points. Despite this, nearly half, in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, believe that the top most vital goal for the Palestinian people should be an “Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.”

Support for Armed struggle: When considering three possible options for Palestinians to break the current deadlock in the political process to end the Israeli occupation, current findings point to an 8 percentage point rise in support for armed struggle to nearly one-third; and a 4-percentage point increase in support for non-violent resistance to nearly half.  More than 60% supported the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, and more than a fifth supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis.  Moreover, we we presented the public with three possible means of ending Israeli occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective, a little over half chose "armed struggle"; and a quarter chose negotiations. These results indicate an 8-percentage point increase in support for armed struggle with support for negotiations remaining unchanged. The rise in support for armed struggle comes from the Gaza Strip, where this percentage rises by 17 points.

Saudi-Israeli normalization: The poll found significant opposition of three quarters of the public to Saudi-Israeli normalization, even if it is conditioned on Israel accepting a Palestinian state and taking concrete and irreversible steps toward that goal.

The fall of the Netanyahu government: The Palestinian public is optimistic that Netanyahu's government can fall soon and that quick elections will be held in Israel. However, even if this happens and a new Israeli government is established without Netanyahu, the majority does not believe that this government will be willing to negotiate with the Palestinian side to end the occupation on the basis of a two-state solution.

How to respond to settler violence: Finally, in light of the increase in settler deadly attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, we asked West Bankers about the most effective, and at the same time, most realistic, means of combating this violence: To protect their areas, a little less than half chose to form armed groups by residents of the targeted areas, a little more than a quarter chose to deploy Palestinian police forces in the targeted areas, and about a fifth said they supported the demand for the “Israeli army to take effective measures to prevent settler terrorism.” A small percentage supported the “formation of unarmed groups by the residents of the targeted areas.” These results show a limited increase of 4 percentage points in support for the formation of armed groups compared to results obtained three months ago.

• Two thirds think Hamas’ decision to launch the October 7 attack was correct; 82% think it has revived international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that it could lead to increased recognition of Palestinian statehood
• Sixty one percent of all Gazans say a member of their family has been killed during the current war.
• 63% blame Israel for the current suffering of Gazans while 22% place the blame on the US; only 8% blame Hamas
• 91% think Hamas did not commit atrocities on October 7 and 90% say they did not see videos showing acts committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, such as the killing of women and children in their homes
• 71% believe that Netanyahu and Galant, will not be arrested and tried while 26% believe they will be; an identical percentage believes that Hamas leaders Haniyeh and Sinwar will not be arrested or tried
• 68% support Hamas' decision, announced in early May, to accept the ceasefire proposal
• 67% expect Hamas to win the war but Gazans are less optimistic with only 48%, expecting Hamas to win compared
• 61% say they prefer to have Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip after the war
• 76% disagree with Abbas statement at the Arab Summit in Manama that "Hamas' attack on October 7 provided Israel with more pretexts and justifications to attack the Gaza Strip;" 79% said they disagree with Abbas' statement at the same conference that "Hamas' position rejecting ending the split and accepting international legitimacy served the Israeli plan to consolidate the separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank"
• On PA priorities: 51% want the PA leadership to seek an immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;”  33% want it to form a national unity government and 12%, want the PA to lead a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the people
• Satisfaction with Hamas' performance during the war stands at 75%, with Yahya Sinwar’s at 65%, with Fateh’s 24%, with President Abbas’ 10%, and new prime minister Muhammad Mustafa’s 9%
• For the Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate went to Yemen, at 80%, Hezbollah (57%), Qatar (55%), Iran (49%), Jordan (25%), and Egypt (18%)
• For the international actors, satisfaction with Russia stands at 26%, with United Nations  at 12%),  Germany at 6%, and the United States at 3% 

For the third time since October 7, we asked the respondents in this poll what they thought of Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7^th offensive. Two thirds, compared to 71% in March 2024 and 72% in December 2023, say it was correct. As the figure below shows, the drop in supporting the decision came from the Gaza Strip. Current support in that area stands at 57% compared to 71% three months ago and 57% six months ago. The belief that Hamas' decision to launch the October 7 attack was correct increases among supporters of Hamas, third parties, those who do not support any of the well-known political forces, and among who say they would not participate in elections if they were held today (82%, 70%, 64%, and 62% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (48%).

Despite a four-percentage point drop in positively viewing the October 7 attach decision, the belief that the war on Gaza since that attack has "revived international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that it could lead to increased recognition of Palestinian statehood" rose by six percentage points to 82% while only 18% said that it did not do so.

64% of Gazans say they have enough food for a day or two; 36% say they don't have enough food for a day or two. These results show a significant improvement compared to the results we obtained three months ago when only 44% said they had enough food for a day or two. It is important to recall that the data collection did not include the northern area of the besieged Gaza Strip which, according to international reports, is currently witnessing a growing famine.

When they need food or water, only 26% of Gazans say they can reach a place where they can get help. 72% say they can but with great difficulty or risk, and 2% say they cannot. These results reflect a slight improvement compared to the situation three months ago.

Sixty one percent of all Gazans say a member of their family has been killed during the current war. In a separate question, 65% say a member of their family has been injured. When combining the two questions, the findings show that 78% say a member of their family has been either killed or injured; only 22% of Gazans say none of their family members have been killed or injured. Three months ago, 60% of Gazans said that one or more members of their family had been killed in the war and 78% were killed or injured during the current war.

We asked Gazans about the availability of essential needs like water, food, electricity, tents, blankets, clothes, medical care, and toilets.  The percentage of those who said "yes, available" ranged from 26% for tents to 44% for food. But a larger percentage said they could be obtained or accessed, but with great difficulty and risk. This was especially the case for medical care, tents, food, water and electricity. The results show that the seemingly unmet needs for most residents of the Gaza Strip are tents, clothes, blankets, medical care and electricity to charge telephones. These results constitute an improvement in most of these indicators compared to our findings three months ago.

We asked those in shelters about the identity of the organizers in charge. The majority of the respondents (53%) said it was UNRWA, 17% said it was government, 15% local Palestinian group, and 11% said other international organization.  These findings indicate a nine-percentage point decrease in the proportion of UNRWA-supervised shelters and an increase in the other percentages, essentially due to the fact that the number of built-up shelters, such as schools, has decreased while the number of tent gatherings has increased due to the recent displacement from Rafah to the Mawasi area.

We asked respondents to assess, based on their personal experience, the fairness of aid distribution to displaced residents currently in shelters. The vast majority (76%) said it was discriminatory while only 24% said it was fair. Three months ago, 70% said it was discriminatory.

We asked the public what they thought of the role of the temporary pier, established by the US military on the coast of northern Gaza, in delivering humanitarian aid. A majority of 78% said that this initiative does not contribute to alleviating the suffering of the population while 22% said it does. A larger percentage of Gazans, almost twice as much as we found in the West Bank, says that the American pier contributes to alleviating the suffering of the residents, 30% and 16% respectively.

A majority of 63% (compared to 64% three months ago) blames Israel for the current suffering of Gazans in the current war while 22% (compared to 20% three months ago) place the blame on the US; only 8% (compared to 7% three months ago) place the blame on Hamas, and only 4% (compared to 6% three months ago) blame the PA. It is worth noting that the percentage of Gazans who place the blame on Hamas stands today at 10% compared to 9% three months ago. 

As we found in the previous two polls, three and six months ago, almost all Palestinians (97% think Israel has committed war crimes during the current war. By contrast, only 9% (compared to 5% three months ago) think Hamas also committed such crimes; 2% think Israel has not committed such crimes and 88% think Hamas did not commit war crimes during the current war.

Ninety percent, compared to 80% three months ago, say they did not see videos, shown by international news outlets, showing acts committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, such as the killing of women and children in their homes; only 9% (6% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip) saw these videos.

When asked if Hamas did commit these atrocities that are seen in these videos, the overwhelming majority (91%) said no, it did not, and only 7% said it did. As shown in the figure below, the belief that Hamas fighters have committed atrocities against civilians is higher among those who did watch videos showing such atrocities (44%) compared to those who did not (3%).

Three quarters of the public expect the ICJ to fail to stop the Israeli offensive on Rafah because the US will protect Israel from the court's decisions while only 20% believe the ICJ will succeed in forcing Israel to stop its attack on Rafah.

We asked the public to speculate on the likely behavior of Rafah residents and displaced persons in the event of an Israeli ground tank invasion of that city: would these people in this case rush to safety on the Egyptian side? 31% of Gazans and 38% of West Bankers say that in that case residents and displaced people would rush towards the border and cross to safety in Egypt. Overall, 35%, compared to 40% three months ago, said they thought they would and 62% said they thought they wouldn't. It should be noted that Israeli tanks had entered the eastern area of Rafah and occupied the border crossing and the Salah al-Din or Philadelphia Corridor between Rafah and Egypt before data collection began.

In light of the ICC prosecutor's decision to request the court to issue arrest warrants against the Israeli prime minister and the defense minister, an overwhelming majority (71%) believes that the two, Netanyahu and Galant, will not actually be arrested and tried while 26% believe they will be.

Despite this, 45% believe that a court order for the arrest of Netanyahu and Galant would contribute to ending the war on the Gaza Strip while 52% believe it would not contribute to ending the war.

Moreover, an identical percentage (71%) believes that Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar will not actually be arrested and tried even if a decision is issued by the ICC at the request of the Prosecutor General of that court. By contrast, 23% believe they will be arrested if a decision is issued.

We asked about the impact of the ICC's decision to arrest and try Haniyeh and Sinwar on the level of popular support for Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Half of all Palestinians (59% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) believe it will increase the popularity of the movement while 15% believe it will decrease it and 33% believe it will have no impact on the movement's popularity.

68% support Hamas' decision, announced in early May just before Israel's occupation of the Rafah crossing, to accept the ceasefire proposal submitted by Egypt while 26% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 22% in the West Bank) oppose it. A majority of 58% expected Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire in the next few days while 39% did not expect it.

As we did in December 2023, we asked in the current poll who will emerge victorious in this war. A majority of 67% expects Hamas to win, compared to 64% three months ago and 70% six months ago. It is worth noting, as the figure below shows, that fewer Gazans today, at only 48%, expect Hamas to win compared to the results three and six months ago, when the percentages stood at 56% and 50%, respectively. By contrast, a larger percentage of West Bankers today, 79%, expect Hamas to win compared to the previous poll, at 69%. It's also worth noting that while almost no one in the West Bank expects Israel to win the current war, a quarter of Gazans expects Israel to win.

We asked the respondents to speculate about the party that will be in control of the Gaza Strip in the day after the end of the current war. A majority of 56% think it will be Hamas. However, unlike previous polls, there are significant differences between West Bankers and Gazans, with only 46% of Gazans saying Hamas will actually control that area, compared to a higher 62% in the West Bank, up from 59% in both areas three months ago. The current total represents a decrease of 3 percentage points compared to the results obtained three months ago. Only 4% believe that the Israeli army will be in control of the Gaza Strip. 11% believe that a new PA with an elected president, parliament, and government will be in control, 6% believe the current PA headed by Abbas will be in control, 7% believe the current PA but without Abbas will be in control, 2% choose one or more Arab states, and 2% choose the UN.

When asked who the public would prefer to control the Gaza Strip after the war, 61% (71% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) said it was Hamas, 16% chose a new Palestinian Authority with an elected president, parliament and government, 6% chose the current PA without Abbas, 6% also chose the return of the PA but under Abbas' control, 2% chose the UN, 1% selected one or more Arab states, and 1% selected the Israeli army. Three months ago, we asked an identical question, but with a slightly different set of options. At that time, 59% (64% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) preferred to see Hamas return to control the Gaza Strip after the war. Preference for Hamas to remain in control of the Gaza Strip after the war increases among the least educated (64%) compared to the most educated (56%), among supporters of Hamas, third parties, those who do not support any of the well-known political forces, and among those who say they would not participate in elections if they were held today (76%, 61%, 59%, and 50% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (44%).

In a similar question that included speculation or estimates regarding the most likely scenario for the day after the war, the results were almost identical to the question posed above with 57% (62% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip) saying that Hamas would return to control the Gaza Strip.  21% expected a new PA to be established with an elected president, parliament, and government, 6% expected the return of the PA under Abbas, 2% expected Israel to form local authorities, 2% expected the Israeli army to take over, 2% expected tribes and families to take over, and 1% expected multiple armed groups to assume control in the Gaza Strip.

Here too we asked about preferences regarding these scenarios. Preference for the return of Hamas stands at 59% (64% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip). Support for a new PA with an elected president, parliament, and government stands at 25%, and 6% support the return of the PA under Abbas.

In December 2023, we asked about the public's attitude towards the deployment of an Arab security force from Egypt and Jordan in the Gaza Strip. At that time, we found widespread opposition, standing at 70%, to the idea even if these forces were deployed to assist the Palestinian security forces. In this poll, opposition to such a security force rises to 75% and support stands at only 23%.

We asked the public how satisfied it was with the statement of the recent Arab summit in Manama, which demanded an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the convening of an international peace conference. The public was divided into two equal parts: 48% (55% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank) said they were satisfied with the statement and an identical percentage said they were dissatisfied.

We asked the public whether or not they agree with Abbas' statement at the Arab Summit in Manama that "Hamas' attack on October 7 provided Israel with more pretexts and justifications to attack the Gaza Strip." More than three quarters (76%) disagree and only 20% agree with Abbas’ statement.

A larger percentage (79%) said they disagree with Abbas' statement at the same conference that "Hamas' position rejecting ending the split and accepting international legitimacy served the Israeli plan to consolidate the separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank." Only 17% (29% in the Gaza Strip and 9% in the West Bank) agree with this statement. Opposition to Abbas' statements that Hamas' refusal to end the division served Israel's plan to consolidate the separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank increases among residents of the West Bank (86%) compared to the residents of the Gaza Strip (68%), among supporters of Hamas, those who would not participate in the elections if they were held today, those who do not intend to vote for any of the known parties and forces, and among supporters of third parties (90%, 80%, 77%, and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (62%), and among those who lost relatives in the current war (73%) compared to those who had no relatives killed (61%).

We asked the public for the second time what political measures the PA leadership should take today to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip. We presented the public with three options: reconciliation, the formation of a national unity government, and the provision of humanitarian services. In the current poll, the percentage that opted for “ an immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” has risen from 42% to 51% today. Second came “the formation of a national unity government whose mission is to negotiate with Israel and the international community an end to the war and the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip in the future,” with 33% opting for it, compared to 37% three months ago. The third option, chosen by only 12%, was for the PA to "lead a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the people of Gaza in cooperation with Egypt and the international community." It is worth noting that support in the Gaza Strip for reconciliation and reunification is higher than in the West Bank, 61% and 44% respectively, while support for the formation of a national unity government is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 36% and 29% respectively.

As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:

1. On Palestinian actors, satisfaction with Hamas' performance increases to 75% (82% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Yahya Sinwar (65%; 76% in the West Bank and 50% in the Gaza Strip), Fateh (24%; 25% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip), President Abbas (10%; 8% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip), and new prime minister Muhammad Mustafa (9%; 13% in the Gaza Strip and 6% in the West Bank).  Taken together, these findings, as indicated in the figure below, indicate an increase in satisfaction with Hamas and Sinwar compared to the situation three months ago. It also indicates that satisfaction with President Abbas and Fatah declined during the same period, and that the public is unwilling to give the new prime minister a chance to improve the performance of the government, perhaps because he is close to President Abbas or perhaps due to the fact that the public knows little about him.

2. For the Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate went to Yemen, as we found in our previous poll, where today it stands at 80% (86% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Hezbollah (57%), Qatar (55%), Iran (49%), Jordan (25%), and Egypt (18%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction in the current and previous poll in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The 19-percentage point rise in satisfaction with Iran is tangible, almost certainly due to Iran's direct missile attack on Israel in April. The percentage of those who view the Iranian attack as supporting the Palestinian people increases among the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (33%), among the most educated (44%) compared to the least educated (39%), among supporters of Hamas who do not support any of the well-known parties and supporters of third parties (50%, 48%, and 47%) compared to supporters of Fateh and those who say they would not participate in elections if they were held today (33% and 30% respectively).

But despite this significant increase in satisfaction with Iran's role in the war, it is surprising that a majority of Palestinians (57%) sees the attack as a show or theatrics while only 41% believe it was an act of support for the Palestinian people. It is interesting to see the division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on this, with a majority of 52% of Gazans compared to only 33% of West Bankers saying it was in support of the Palestinian people.

3. For the international actors, Russia received the highest satisfaction (26%; 31% in the Gaza Strip and 23% in the West Bank), followed by the United Nations (12%), Germany (6%), and the United States (3%).  Compared to our previous poll, the current results show a 4-percentage point increase in satisfaction with Russia, with the increase coming from the Gaza Strip (15 points) while satisfaction with Russia in the West Bank increased by only two points. Satisfaction with the United Nations has doubled, while remaining small, and satisfaction with U.S. performance also remains small.

In the context of the public's perception of the international developments triggered by the war on Gaza, the majority is optimistic about the ability of student protests in American universities to bring about a change in US policy making it more supportive of the Palestinian side or less supportive of the Israeli side (69% believe this while only 29% do not.

• In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti from Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, also from Fatah, and Ismael Haniyeh from Hamas, vote for Marwan Barghouti would stand at 42%, followed by Haniyeh at 27%, and Abbas at 5%.
• If the two presidential candidates were Barghouti and Haniyeh, 44% would vote for Barghouti and 29% for Haniyeh.
• 89% want Abbas to resign while 10% want him to remain in office.
• When asked which political party they support, 40% selected Hamas, 20% Fatah, 8% selected other or third-parties, and 33% said none of them or did not know
• If a presidential competition is to take place between three, Marwan Barghouti from Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, also from Fatah, and Ismael Haniyeh from Hamas, participation in the election would stand at 76%; vote for Marwan Barghouti would stand at 42%, the highest rate since September 2023, followed by Haniyeh at 27%, and Abbas at 5%. Among those who plan to vote, Barghouti receives 56%, Haniyeh 36%, and Abbas 6%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti among those planning to vote stood at 56% and Haniyeh at 32%, and Abbas at 11%.

However, if the new presidential elections were held with only two candidates, Mahmoud Abbas from Fatah and Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas, competing, the voter turnout would drop to 57%; vote for Haniyeh would stand at 43% and Abbas at 11%. Among those intending to vote, Haniyeh would receive 76% and Abbas 20%. Three months ago, the vote for Abbas among those intending to vote stood at 22% and vote for Haniyeh stood at 70%.

But if the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti from Fatah and Haniyeh from Hamas, participation would rise to 74%; 44% would vote for Barghouti and 29% for Haniyeh. Among those intending to vote, Barghouti would receive 59% and Haniyeh 39%. These findings indicate a drop in the vote for Barghouti among those intending to vote by 3 points and a rise in the vote for Haniyeh by 2 points.  

In our annual open-ended question, i.e. without predetermined options, we asked the public to name their preferred candidate to be president of the PA after Abbas. Marwan Barghouti came first, with 27% of the public, followed by Ismail Haniyeh (14%), Mohammed Dahlan (8%), Yahya Sinwar (7%), and Mustafa Barghouti (2%).

In a closed question, with predetermined options, we asked the public to select the person they prefer to see as President Abbas's successor. The largest percentage (39%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti; 23% preferred Ismail Haniyeh; 8% chose Yahya al Sinwar and Mohammad Dahlan; 2% chose Hussein al-Sheikh and Muhammad Shtayyeh; 1% preferred Khaled Meshaal, and 16% said they did not know or chose someone else. It is worth noting that the preference for Dahlan, al-Sheikh, and Shtayyeh, as in our previous survey, comes almost only from the Gaza Strip.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 12% and dissatisfaction at 86%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 8% in the West Bank (compared to 8% three months ago) and 19% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 27% three months ago).  Nine months ago, before the October 7 war, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 22% and dissatisfaction at 76%.

89% want Abbas to resign while 10% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 84% said they want Abbas to resign. Nine months ago, 78% wanted him to resign. Demand for Abbas' resignation today stands at 94% in the West Bank and 83% in the Gaza Strip.

When asked which political party or political trend they support, the largest percentage selected Hamas (40%), followed by Fatah (20%), while 8% selected other or third-party groups, and 33% said none of them or did not know. Three months ago, 34% supported Hamas and 17% selected Fatah. Nine months ago, before the current war, support for Hamas stood at 22% and support for Fatah stood at 26%. This means that support for Hamas during the past three months has witnessed an 6-point rise while support for Fatah rose 3 points during the same period. In the West Bank, support for Hamas today stands at 41% (compared to 35% three months ago), and for Fatah at 17% (compared to 12% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas today stands at 38% (compared to 34% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 24% (compared to 25% three months ago).

However, if new parliamentary elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, only 70% say they would participate in them, 32% would vote for Hamas, 17% for Fatah, 4% for third parties, and 16% remain undecided. Among those intending to vote, support for Hamas stands at 46%, Fatah 25%, third parties 6%, and the undecided at 25%. Compared to our findings three months ago, the current results among those intending to vote indicate a 1-point drop by for Hamas and a 3-point rise by Fatah. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Hamas among those intending to vote stands today at 44% (compared to 45% three months ago and 44% nine months ago) and vote for Fatah among those intending to vote stands today at 30% (compared to 26% three months ago and 32% nine months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas among the voters stands today at 48% (compared to 48% three months ago and 24% nine months ago) and vote for Fatah among those intending to vote stands today at 21% (compared to 16% three months ago and 40% nine months ago).

51% (compared to 49% three months ago) believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 16% (compared to 17% three months ago) believe that Fateh under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving; 27% (compared to 29% three months ago) believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership. Nine months ago, 27% said Hamas is the most deserving, 24% said Fateh led by Abbas is the most deserving, and 44% said both are unworthy of representation and leadership. The percentage of those who believe that Hamas is more worthy of representing and leading the Palestinian people than Fateh under the leadership of President Abbas increases in the West Bank (59%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), among supporters of Hamas (88%) compared to those who do not prefer any of the well-known parties and movements, those who would not participate in elections if they were held today, supporters of third parties, and supporters of Fateh (43%, 39%, 35%, and 12% respectively), and among those who lost relatives in the current war (43%) compared to those for whom no one was killed relatives (32%).

• 72% believe that the new Palestinian government of Mohammad Mustafa will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to do
• 77% believe that the new government of Mustafa will not succeed in combating corruption and 67% say it will not succeed in reforming PA institutions
• Aljazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine with 68% selecting it as the one they watched the most during the past two months; the second most popular TV station is Alaqsa (4%) followed by Palestine TV (3%), Palestine Today, Al-Arabiya, Ma’an and al Mayadeen (2% each).
• 69% believe that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 27% believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people
• Only 13% of the West Bankers feel safe and secure while 87% feel unsafe and unsecure.

• An overwhelming majority (72%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to do. By contrast, 21% believe it will succeed.
• We also asked the public about its expectations for the new government , such as carrying out specific reforms announced by this government or meeting the priorities of the public:

	77% believe that the new government will not succeed in combating corruption
	74% say it will not succeed in strengthening steadfastness in East Jerusalem
	73% believe that the government will not succeed in pushing for reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
	72% believe it will not succeed in improving economic conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
	71% believe it will not succeed in holding legislative and presidential elections
	71% say it will not succeed in providing relief for the Gaza Strip and reconstruction in the future
	71% say it will not succeed in ensuring financial stability
	71% say it will not succeed in empowering the judiciary and re-establishing the rule of law
	67% say it will not succeed in reforming PA institutions

It is important to note, as the following figure shows, that in all of these measures, Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but the majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of these reforms.

Aljazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine with 68% selecting it as the one they watched the most during the past two months. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to watch Aljazeera, 82% and 46% respectively. The second most popular TV station is Alaqsa (4%) followed by Palestine TV (3%), Palestine Today, Al-Arabiya, Ma’an and al Mayadeen (2% each).

A majority of 69% (compared to 65% three months ago) believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 27% (compared to 27% three months ago) believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people. Nine months ago, 62% said the PA is a burden and 35% said it was an achievement.

We asked the public in the West Bank about its personal and family safety and security. The findings show that only 13% feel safe and secure while 87% feel unsafe and unsecure. Three months ago, the perception of safety stood at 11% and nine months ago at 48%.

• 32% support and 65% oppose the idea of a two-state solution; 63% believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion
• 63% support a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 62% support dissolving the PA; and 22% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis
• 54% think “armed struggle” is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 25% think negotiations is most effective, and 16% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective
• Three quarters are opposed to a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal even if it is conditional on Israel accepting a Palestinian state and taking concrete and irreversible steps toward that goal.
• 63% are optimistic about the possibility of the fall of the Netanyahu government in the near future and the holding of quick elections in Israel
• In light of the increase in settler attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, 45% believe the formation of armed groups is the most effective means of confronting the settlers; 27% chose to deploy Palestinian police forces in the targeted areas  

32% support and 65% oppose the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details of the solution. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 45% and six months ago support stood at 34%. In the current poll, support for this solution came from Gaza Strip, a 30-point increase while dropping only two points in the West Bank.

Support for the two-state solution is usually linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Today, 61% (compared to 63% three months ago) believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion but 34% (compared to 37% three months ago) believe it is still practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or nonextant, and 31% believe the chances are medium or high.

When asked about its support and opposition to specific policy measures to break the stalemate: 66% supported joining more international organizations; 49% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 63% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 62% supported dissolving the PA; and 22% supported abandoning” the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months /’, 55% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 45% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 58% supported the dissolution of the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of one state.

We offered the public three methods to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent state and asked it to select the most effective. 54% (52% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) selected “armed struggle;” 25% (26% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip) selected negotiations; and 16% (14% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) selected popular non-violent resistance. As shown in the figure below, these findings indicate an 8-point rise in support for armed struggle despite the fact that support for negotiations did not change; and a 2-point drop in support for non-violence.  The rise in support for armed struggle comes from the Gaza Strip, where it increases by 17 points.

The poll found significant opposition of three quarters to Saudi-Israeli normalization, even if it is conditional on Israel accepting a Palestinian state and taking concrete and irreversible steps toward that goal. Only 21% support this process.

The public is optimistic about the possibility of the fall of the Netanyahu government in the near future and the holding of quick elections in Israel: 63% believe this while 34% do not.  However, if this happens and a new Israeli government is established without Netanyahu, a majority of 54% does not believe that such a government would be willing to negotiate with the Palestinian side an end to the Israeli occupation on the basis of the two-state solution while 41% believe so.

In light of the increase in settler terrorist attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, we asked West Bankers what means are most effective in combating this terrorism that are also the most realistic and feasible. The largest percentage (45%) chose the formation of armed groups by residents of the targeted areas in order to protect their areas; 27% chose to deploy Palestinian police forces in the targeted areas; another 19% chose the demand that the Israeli army take measures to prevent settler terrorism; and only 6% chose the formation, by residents of the targeted areas, of unarmed groups to protect their areas. As the figure below indicates there is 4-point rise in support for the formation of armed groups when compared to the finding of March, a 4-point increase in the demand for protection by the PA police; and a 4-point drop in the demand for an Israeli army measures to stop the settlers.

• 47% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.
• Half of the Palestinians think the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; 28% think it is the Israeli occupation

47% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages; 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; and 9% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (50%; 57% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; 28% said it is the Israeli occupation; 8% said it is corruption; 8% said it is unemployment; and 5% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, 56% (50% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; and 23% said it is the Israeli occupation.

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This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

Popularity of Hamas and Haniyeh drops and the popularity of Fateh and Abbas rises but pessimism regarding reconciliation prevails once again and a majority believes the new Obama administration will not succeed in reviving the peace process

28-30 March 2013
These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 28-30 March 2013. The  period before the poll witnessed the formation of a new Israeli government and a visit by the US president to Israel and Palestine. The period also witnessed the development of a new form of popular resistance against settlements through the establishment of tent encampments in areas threatened by settlement expansion. Reconciliation efforts between Fatah and Hamas failed to make progress despite the fact that the election commission has completed its voter registration campaign in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This press release covers public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today. It also covers issues related to the peace process, Obama’s visit, and Palestinian options in the confrontation against occupation. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (45)

Mixed news for the PA: satisfaction with Abbas, Fateh, and Fayyad are down, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank is lower than positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip,  and three quarters believe protests in the West Bank will continue and escalate, but about 70% side with Abbas in opposing return to negotiations before Israel freezes settlement construction and accepts the 1967 lines with swaps as a base for negotiations and almost three quarters support a UN bid seeking international recognition of Palestinian Statehood

13-15 September 2012

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-15 September 2012. This poll was conducted during a period that witnessed significant price hikes, particularly fuel prices, and right after the eruption of widespread protests in the West Bank that started in early September but quieted down after the Fayyad government restored the older prices of diesel and gas. In the Gaza Strip, a young unemployed man burned himself but no mass protests took place. The same period witnessed incidents of lawlessness in northern West Bank, including the assassination of a colonel in the Preventive Security force in Jenin. Preparation for local elections continued in the West Bank while reconciliation efforts stalemated with Abbas announcing that no reconciliation government will be formed until Hamas allowed the Election Commission to resume its work in the Gaza Strip and agreed to hold general elections, two conditions that Hamas rejected. Under these conditions, Fayyad proposed holding parliamentary elections in the West Bank. During this period, the PLO announced that it intends to seek UN recognition of Palestine as a non member state but did not specify a date for the request. The period witnessed continued settlers' violence against Palestinians and threats by Israeli foreign minister against Abbas. But with the end of Ramadan, Israeli Civil Administration issued more than one hundred thousand permits allowing Palestinians from the West Bank to visit Jerusalem and Israel. It is worth noting that president Abbas went into a visit to India during the worst days of West Bank mass protests. This survey covers Palestinian attitudes regarding West Bank protests, general and local elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today, the peace process, and other topics. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The third quarter of 2012 brings bad news for the PA in the West Bank. Positive evaluation of West Bank conditions drops significantly. Similarly, positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government drops sharply. Moreover, Fateh's popularity drops and satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas decreases. By contrast, positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises. Indeed, for the first time since the split in 2007, a larger percentage of Palestinians give more positive evaluation to conditions in the Gaza Strip than to conditions in the West Bank. It is clear that the wave of price hikes and the decisions taken by the Fayyad government, in raising prices of fuel, are responsible for this sudden shift in public attitudes and evaluations. Indeed, findings show that two thirds of the public say that the current difficult economic situation forces them to demonstrate and protest while more than three quarters of the public expect the current wave of protests to continue and escalate. More than half of the public (55%) expect the protests to spread into the Gaza Strip.

In the midst of this environment, pessimism regarding reconciliation increases with the percentage of those expecting the split to become permanent doubling in 18 months, since March 2011. Findings also show that two-thirds reject the idea of holding legislative elections in the West Bank only, believing that such elections would further consolidate the split. But a majority of Palestinians accept president Abbas' position that conditions reconciliation on a Hamas consent to holding elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  

The good news for PA lies in public support for its UN bid and for its positions on negotiation with Israel. Findings show strong opposition (about 70%) to return to negotiations with Israel before it freezes settlement construction and accepts the 1967 lines with swap as a base for negotiations. Despite the realization of a large majority that going to the UN would bring about suspension of financial assistance and transfers from the US, Israel, and Europe, about 70% support such a step. But the public does not want a symbolic step; instead, it wants Palestinian assertion of sovereignty over the so-called "Area C" and over the border crossings with Jordan. Finally, findings show a huge gap between public assessment of the PLO's and the PA's long term goals and those of Israel. For the first time, we asked the public to assess the long term goals of the PLO and the PA. Specifically, we asked the public to tell us if it thinks the Palestinian long term goal is to recover the lands occupied in 1967 or alternatively to recover the land of 1948 and destroy the state of Israel. Two thirds said that the long term goal is to recover all or parts of the 1967 territories while less than one quarter indicated that the goal is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 land. When asked about Israel's long term goal, more than 80% said it was to annex all lands occupied in 1967 and expel its population or deny them their political rights.

(1) Price Hikes and Popular Protests:

• More than three quarters of the public expect the continuation and escalation of popular protests against price hikes and two thirds say that high prices forces them to demonstrate and protest.
• 44% believe that the PA's financial crisis is manufactured and 51% believe it is real.
• 37% believe that the cause of the PA's financial crisis is the international crisis  and the inability of donor to fulfill their commitments and 28% believe the cause is the cessation of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• 51% oppose tax increase or retiring some of the public sector employees as the means to resolve the financial crisis.
• A majority of 53% believe the PA will be able to pay salaries during next year and 37% believe it will not be able to do so.

More than three quarters (76%) expect the West Bank protests to continue and escalate while 22% expect them to stop. Moreover, a majority of 55% expects the protests to spread into the Gaza Strip and 39% do not expect that and 66% say the price hikes and the inability to provide for a better life force them to take part in the protests and 33% say they do not wish to take part in these protests. The percentage of those who believe that the protests will spread to the Gaza Strip is equal among residents of the Gaza Strip and residents of the West Bank. But it increases among women (59%) compared to men (52%), and among supporters of Fateh (57%) compared to supporters of Hamas (45%). Similarly, the percentage of those who say that high prices force them to take part in the protests is equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But it increases among men (75%) compared to women (57%), among supporters of third parties and Fateh (80% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (60%), among holders of BA degree (68%) compared to illiterates (46%), and among laborers (78%) compared to housewives (52%).

51% of the public is convinced that the current financial crisis of the PA is real while 44% think it is manufactured. The belief that the crisis is manufactured increases in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), among those who oppose the peace process (54%) compared to supporters to the peace process (41%), among supporters of Hamas (60%) compared to supporters of Fateh and third parties (30% and 42% respectively), among those who are over 50 years of age (49%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (38%), among illiterates (49%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (39%), among farmers, merchants, the unemployed, and the professionals (60%, 56%, 51%, and 50% respectively) compared to employees and students (38% and 40% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (48%) compared to those who work in the public sector (36%), and among those who earn the least income (49%) compared to those who earn the highest income (39%).

The largest percentage (37%) believe that the international financial crisis and the inability of the donor countries to fulfill their obligations to the PA is the reason behind the financial crisis of the PA while 28% say the reason is the cessation of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and 16% say the reason behind the crisis is the revolts in the Arab World and the Arab preoccupation with their own problems.

Despite the seriousness of the financial crisis, 51% oppose increasing taxes or forcing a number of public sector employees into early retirement as means of resolving the crisis, while 30% support early retirement, 8% support a tax increase, and 10% support both, the early retirement and the tax increase. By contrast, 44% believe that a return to negotiations would resolve the financial crisis, as donor assistance would increase, while 34% believe that dissolving the PA resolves its financial crisis. In any case, a majority of 53% believes that the PA will continue to be able to pay salaries during next year while 37% believe the PA will not be able to do so.

(2) Reconciliation: 

• A majority of 58% supports and 35% oppose Abbas' position linking reconciliation to a Hamas agreement on holding elections.
• But a majority of 66% oppose and only 28% support Fayyad's suggestion to hold elections in the West Bank only. A majority believes that holding elections in the West Bank only would consolidate separation.
• 42% believe that unity will not return, 14% think it will return soon, and 40% think it will return but only after a long time.

58% agree and 35% disagree with Abbas' position that the formation of a reconciliation government will come only after Hamas allows the Election Commission to resume work in the Gaza Strip and to set a date for elections. On the other hand, only 28% support and 66% oppose Fayyad's proposal to hold legislative elections in the West Bank only. Support for Abbas' position increases in the Gaza Strip (60%) compared to the West Bank (56%), among men (61%) compared to women (55%), among supporters of the peace process (64%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (42%), and among supporters of Fateh (81%) compared to supporters of Hamas and supporters of third parties (40% and 60% respectively). Opposition to Fayyad's suggestion increases in the Gaza Strip (70%) compared to the West Bank (64%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to supporters of the peace process (60%), among supporters of Hamas (85%) compared to supporters of Fateh and supporters of third parties (50% and 56% respectively), and among holders of BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (53%).

 Indeed, 63% believe that holding legislative elections in the West Bank only would lead to the consolidation of the West Bank-Gaza Strip split while only 10% believe it will increase the chances for reconciliation. In light of the stalemate in the Fateh-Hamas reconciliation efforts, the largest percentage (42%) believes that unity will never be restored and that two separate entities will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 14% believe that unity will be restored soon, and 40% believe unity will be restored but only after a long time. A year and a half ago, in March 2011, only 21% said unity will not be restored and two separate entities will be established.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip reaches 25% and conditions in the West Bank 19%.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank reaches 79% and in the public institutions in the Gaza Strip 63%.
• 42% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear and 26% believe that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in the Gaza Strip without fear.
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government reaches 35% and the Fayyad government 22%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas' continues to decrease reaching today 46%.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises from 22% to 25% while 52% say conditions are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank drops significantly from 30% last June to 19% in this poll. Today, 60% say conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad.  Indeed, only 15% of West Bankers describe conditions in the West Bank today as good or very good. It is worth noting that this is the first time since the split in 2007 that more Palestinians evaluate conditions in the Gaza Strip as better than conditions in the West Bank.

79% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 63% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, 24% say there is, and 42% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 17% say there is, and 35% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  Furthermore, 42% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, only 26% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These results indicate a significant increase in the perception of freedom to criticize authorities in the West Bank three months ago when it stood at 29%.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank reaches 56%  and in the Gaza Strip 64%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 58% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank. But findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 42%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 29%.

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands today at 35% and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government stands at 22%. Three months ago, positive evaluation stood at 36% for the performance of Fayyad and 38% for the performance of Haniyeh. Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 46% while 50% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 49% three months ago in June 2012 and 55% six months ago in March 2012. Satisfaction with Abbas increases in the West Bank (50%) compared to the Gaza Strip (40%), in rural areas (60%) compared to cities (43%), among men (51%) compared to women (42%), among those who define themselves as "somewhat religious" (52%) compared to the religious (41%), among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (26%), among supporters of Fateh and third parties (81% and 48% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (23%), among non-refugees (50%) compared to refugees (42%), among illiterates (47%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (41%), and among those who work in the public sector (53%) compared to those who work in the private sector (46%). 

 (4) Presidency, Legislative, and Local Elections:

• In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyeh, the former receives 51% of the vote and the latter 40%.
• In a  three way presidential elections, Abbas receives 20%, Haniyeh 29%, and Marwan Barghouti 45%).
• In parliamentary elections, Fateh receives 37% and Hamas 28% of the votes.
• 50%  say that local elections will take place on time, 47% say they will participate in the local elections, and 44% believe the elections will be fair.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 51% and Haniyeh 40% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 55%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 49% and Haniyeh 44%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 52% and Haniyeh 40% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 49% and Haniyeh 39%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter would receive 32% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 66%. If the presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives the highest percentage (45%) followed by Haniyeh (29%), and Abbas (20%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 69%. In our previous poll last June, Barghouti received 37%, Haniyeh 33%, and Abbas 25%. 

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 28% say they would vote for Hamas and 37% say they would vote for Fateh, 13% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 31% and in the West Bank at 25%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 40% and in the West Bank at 35%. These results indicate a decline in Fateh's popularity in the West Bank by six percentage points and in Hamas' popularity in the West Bank by two percentage points.

Only 38% of the public believe that local elections, scheduled to take place next month in the West Bank, will indeed take place as scheduled while 50% say it will not take place on the set date. 47% of West Bankers say they will participate in the upcoming local elections and 50% say they will not participate. When asked about the fairness of the upcoming local elections, 44% of the public believe that these elections, set to take place next month, will not be fair and an equal percentage (44%) believes they will be fair. Belief that local elections will be fair increases in the West Bank(46%) compared to the Gaza Strip (42%), in the cities (45%) compared to refugee camps (40%), among men (49%) compared to women (40%), among the somewhat religious (49%) compared to the religious (40%), among supporters of the peace process (50%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (31%), among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (35% and 41% respectively), among non-refugees (47%) compared to refugees (41%), among holders of BA degree (45%) compared to the illiterates (36%), and among those who work in the public sector (53%) compared to those who work in the private sector (46%).  

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% say that the first most vital Palestinian goal is to end Israeli occupation and establish a Palestinian state and 30% say it is the right of return for refugees.
• 32% say the most severe problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment and 23% say it is the continuation of the Israeli occupation.

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 32% of the public while 23% believe the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 19% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 9% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

(6) The Peace Process and Palestinian Options in the confrontation with Israeli occupation:

• 52% support and 46% oppose the two-state solution but 57% believe such a solution is no longer practical due to continued settlement expansion.
• 71% believe that that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent.
• But 68% oppose a one-state solution and only 30% support it.
• 69% oppose a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations before Israel freezes settlement construction and accept the 1967 lines with swaps as a base for negotiations.
• 73% support going to the UN, 61% support non-violent resistance, and 56% support a unilateral declaration of statehood.
• 59% oppose a return to an armed intifada and 52% oppose dissolving the PA.
• If Palestinians go to the UN, 80% believe Israel will stop the transfer of custom funds to the PA and 73% believe that the US will suspend its financial aid.
• In the aftermath of a UN recognition of Palestinian statehood, 66% support imposing Palestinian sovereignty over area C and 70% support taking control over the crossings with Jordan.
• 59% say they will participate in massive non-violent demonstrations that seek to break through check points and block roads used by the Israeli army and settlers.
• 72% are worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis.
• 81% believe that Israel's long term is to annex Palestinian territory occupied in 1967 and expel its population or deny them their rights.
• 66% believe that the PLO's and PA's long term goal is to recover all or parts of the land that was occupied in 1967 while 24% believe the goal is to defeat Israel and recover the land of 1948 or destroy its Jewish population.

Findings show that 52% of the public support and 46% oppose the two state solution. Support for this solution stood at 49% in our poll last June and 57% in March 2010. Findings also show that a majority of 57% (compared to 55% last June) believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to expanded settlement construction while only 37% believe the two state solution remains viable because settlements can be dismantled or evacuated once an agreement is reached. Findings also show that 71% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim to non-existent while 27% believe the chances are medium or high. Despite this, a majority of 68% oppose a one-state solution and only 30% support it.

Support for the two-state solution increases in the West Bank (55%) compared to the Gaza Strip (48%), in villages and towns (59%) compared to cities and refugee camps (51% each), among men (58%) compared to women (47%), among the somewhat religious (57%) compared to the religious (47%), among supporters of the peace process (58%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (40%), among supporters of Fateh and third parties (69% and 64% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (26%), among those over 50 years of age (63%) compared to those between 18 and 28 years of age (44%), and among those who finished elementary and preparatory schools (62% and 61% respectively) compared to the illiterates and the holders of BA degree (45% each).

Support for the one-state solution increases in the West Bank (34%) compared to the Gaza Strip (24%), among the somewhat religious (35%) compared to the religious (25%), among supporters of the peace process (34%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (26%), among supporters of Fateh and third parties (39% each) compared to supporters of Hamas (19%), among the illiterates (39%) compared to holders of BA degree (25%), and among those who work in the private sector (35%) compared to those who work in the public sector (30%).

Findings show that a large majority of 69% opposes and 29% support a return to negotiations with Israel before it freezes settlement construction and accepts the 1967 lines with swaps as a base for negotiations. Unconditional return to negotiations is opposed equally in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and by men and women. But opposition increases among the religious (73%) compared to the somewhat religious (66%), among those who oppose the peace process (80% compared to supporters of the peace process (64%) among supporters of Hamas and third parties (79% and 74% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (63%), and among holders of BA degree (71%) compared to illiterates (61%).

When asked about its views regarding six options that Palestinians have in their relations with Israel in the absence of negotiations, the public supported three and opposed three. Going to the UN for a recognition of a Palestinian state received the largest percentage of support (73%) while 26% opposed this option. 61% supported a non violent resistance while 38% opposed it. 56% supported a unilateral declaration of statehood while 43% opposed it. On the other hand a majority of 69% opposed the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution and 28% supported it; 59% opposed a resort to armed confrontations and 39% supported it; and 52% opposed a dissolution of the PA and 44% supported it.

Support for going to the UN remains very high despite recognition by the public that such an option will trigger financial sanctions. Findings show that 73% of the public believe that in the event of a Palestinian request for the UN to recognize Palestine as a state, the US will suspend financial assistance to the PA. 80% believe that Israel in this case will suspend transfer of custom funds to the PA. 56% believe Europe too will suspend financial assistance to the PA.

Findings also show that public support for and understanding of the UN bid is not restricted to the step's symbolic meaning. Instead, 66% of the public believe the PA should impose its sovereignty over all Palestinian territories in the West Bank including so-called "Area C" and begin the construction of an airport and the deployment of security services in that area. Only 28% of the public oppose such a step. Furthermore, 70% support extension of PA control over the crossings with Jordan even if such a step would lead to the closure of the Allenby Bridge ; 24% of the public is opposed to this step. Overall, the public is divided into three groups on its view of the best means to force Israel to end its occupation of the Palestinian state once that state is recognized by the international community: 33% support resort to peaceful means, 32% support armed means, and 28% support return to negotiations. If massive popular demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, with the aim of breaking through checkpoints and blocking roads used by the Israeli army and settlers, 59% of the public say they will participate in such demonstrations and 39% say they will not participate.  

Findings show that 72% of the Palestinian public are worried and 28% are not worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished. Moreover, the level of perceived threat regarding the aspirations of Israel in the long run is very high. 81% of Palestinians think that Israel’s long term goal is to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens or deny them political rights. When asked to assess the long term goal of the PLO and the PA, 66% believed it was to recover all or part of the land occupied in 1967 while 24% believed that it was to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 land or destroy its Jewish population. The percentage of those who believe that the PLO's and the PA's long term goal is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 land or destroy the Jewish population increases among women (28%) compared to men (20%), among the religious (25%) compared to the somewhat religious (22%), among those between 18 and 28 years old (28%) compared to those whose age is over 50 (15%), among the illiterates (29%) compared to holders of BA degree (18%), and among students, laborers, and housewives (28% each) compared to merchants, the retired, professionals, and employees (15%, 16%, 17%, and 18% respectively).

(7) Other Topics: Iran, Egypt, Syria, and American Elections:  

• 82% believe that a great regional war will follow an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Now after President Morsi has consolidated his power in Egypt, 42% believe that Egyptian-Israeli relations will remain unchanged, 21% believe it will improve, and 31% say the two sides will return to conflict.
• 90% condemn the armed attack against Egyptian soldiers on the Rafah border.
• 79% support Syrian demonstrators against the regime while 13% stand with the regime and Assad.
• If Obama wins the US presidential elections, 51% believe that such outcome will have no impact on Palestinian conditions while 32% believe it will have a negative impact and 9% believe it  will have a positive impact.
• In light of the statement made by US presidential candidate Mitt Romney regarding the cause of the gap between Palestinian and Israeli economies, 54% believe the cause of the gap is occupation, 33% believe the cause lies in the differences between the Palestinian and Israeli economic and political systems and only 7% attribute it to culture.

Iran: 43% believe that Israel will attack Iran's nuclear facilities in the coming months but 51% believe it will not. If Israel does attack Iran, 82% believe that such an attack will trigger a great regional war while 16% believe the attack will not lead to such a war.

Egypt: With Egyptian president Morsi consolidating his power, 42% believe Egyptian-Israeli relations will not change but 31% believe relations will go back to conflict and 21% believe relations will improve. Almost two thirds (64%) believe that Israel stood behind the armed attack carried out against Egyptian position along the borders with Rafah recently while 12% blame the attack on Egyptian terrorist groups or Bedouins from Sinai  and only 2% believe Hamas stood behind the attack. 90% of respondents condemn the attack 7% do not condemn it.

Arab Spring and Syria: Findings show that 48% believe that the Arab Spring will leave a positive impact on the Palestinian cause in the next year or two while 28% believe it will have no impact and 21% believe the impact will be negative. Findings also show that 79% of the public support the Syrian rebels while only 13% support the regime and Assad.

American Elections: A majority of 51% believe that an Obama victory in the upcoming American presidential elections will have no impact on the Palestinians while 32% believe it will have a negative impact and only 9% believe it will have a positive impact. Findings also show that the overwhelming majority of respondents reject the statement made by US presidential candidate Mitt Romney placing the cause of the wide gap between the Palestinian and Israeli economies on culture. Only 7% of the respondents agreed with Romney's statement while 54% saw occupation and 33% saw different political or economic systems as the causes for the wide gap between the two economies....Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between May 26 and June 1, 2024. The period prior to the poll witnessed the continuation and expansion of the war on the Gaza Strip, to include the ground offensive in the outskirts of the city of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, the occupation of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, the control of the Salah al-Din Corridor, also known as Philadelphia Corridor, and the return of the Israeli army to occupy Jabalia and other areas in the northern Gaza Strip. These developments led to an escalation of humanitarian suffering, and the displacement of about one million displaced and non-displaced people from the Rafah area and shelters to the Al-Mawasi area and other areas from which the Israeli army withdrew in the Khan Younis area, Deir al-Balah and other areas in the central Gaza Strip. Famine has also intensified in the northern Gaza Strip and other areas with little aid arriving those areas due to the closure of the Rafah crossing with Egypt after it was occupied by the Israeli army and the inability of the US-constructed floating dock in the north of the Strip, which became inactive due to storms. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced that he has asked the court to issue arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Galant, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, head of a movement in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar, and the commander of its military wing, Muhammad Deif. Efforts to reach a ceasefire failed during this period, despite the continuation of these efforts led by Qatar, Egypt and the United States, and despite Hamas' acceptance, in early May, of a ceasefire agreement presented to it by Egyptian mediators.

Talk of the “day after” continued with little progress due to the Israeli government's rejection of the idea. But talk of the need to reform and “revitalize” the PA led to the formation of a new Palestinian government, made up of professionals, headed by economist Muhammad Mustafa. Meanwhile, restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank continued, and the entrances to most towns and villages continued to be closed by the Israeli army in order to prevent residents from accessing main roads. Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages in unprotected areas in areas B and C of the West Bank also continued.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted with residents in specific areas where no active combat was present. The areas covered included parts of the Rafah and Khan Younis areas and the central Gaza Strip and all shelters therein, but not the northern besieged enclave and other areas of combat in the central Gaza Strip and in the eastern area of Rafah. This poll covers all of the above issues as well as other issues such as the domestic conditions and the domestic balance of power, the peace process and the alternative options available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

The sample size of this poll was 1570 adults, of whom 760 were interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank (in 76 residential locations) and 750 in the Gaza Strip (in 75 locations). Due to the uncertainty about the exact population size and distribution at that moment in the Gaza Strip, we almost doubled the sample size in that area in order to reduce the margin of error. The total sample was reweighted to reflect the actual relative size of the population in the two Palestinian areas. Thus, the sample used is representative of the entire populations of the two regions. The margin of error stands at +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

As in our previous two polls, three and six months ago, most of the questions in this poll, covering the second quarter of 2024, revolved around the October 7 attack and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war and the Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, the unprecedented human suffering of the Gaza Strip's residents, the atrocities of the war, the debate regarding the future of the Gaza Strip after the war, the possibility of fully invading Rafah and its repercussions, the decision of the Prosecutor General of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to request the arrest of leaders from Israel and Hamas, and public satisfaction with the performance of the various parties during the war. It should be noted that the samples in all three surveys does not include residents of the northern Gaza Strip who have remained in their homes since the beginning of the war due to the inability of our researchers to reach them and the lack of reliable data on their numbers and whereabouts in that area. It should also be noted that data from the current poll and the one immediately preceding it were collected during the ongoing fighting in the Gaza Strip, while the first poll was conducted during Israel's release of prisoners from the West Bank as part of the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel. Apart from the ceasefire, there was no similar development taking place in the Gaza Strip at that time, i.e. the end of November 2023. The current poll, as in the previous two polls, covers the consequences of the war on the internal balance of power, support for the Palestinian leadership, Palestinian-Israeli relations, and the political process.

Findings indicate that about 80% of Gazans have lost a relative or that a relative has been injured in the current war. Nevertheless, two thirds of the public support the October 7 attack and nearly 80% believe it has placed the Palestinian issue at the center of global attention. Although an overwhelming majority does not believe that the ICC's decisions, if issued, would lead to the arrest of leaders in Israel or Hamas, a majority believes such decisions could contribute to speeding the process of ending the war. Findings also indicate that two thirds of the public expect Hamas to win the war on Gaza, but this percentage drops to only about half in the Gaza Strip. Also, only half of Gazans expects Hamas to return to controlling the Strip after the war. While the public supports the text of the declaration of the Arab summit in Manama, the vast majority disagrees with President Abbas's statements at that summit. Demand for Abbas' resignation is increasing and the findings show a rise in the popularity of Hamas and Marwan Barghouti. Findings also indicate a significant drop in in the Gaza Strip in the support for the two-state solution, although about half of the public believes that the Palestinian priority should be ending the occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state. By contrast, support for armed struggle rises and support for dissolving the PA stands at more than 60%.

Humanitarian conditions: We start with the humanitarian and living conditions in the central and southern Gaza Strip. There has been a slight increase in the percentage of those who have lost relatives in this war to more than 60% and the results, as in the previous poll, indicate that about 80% of Gazans say that at least one of their family members has been killed or injured. The survey shows improvements in some indicators that have been monitored, such as the possibility of finding food, but the overwhelming majority still say they cannot reach those places where they can access food or water without a great difficulty or risk and that the shelters where they now live lack most of the basic needs. Thirty percent of Gazans say that the pier established by the US military on the coast of northern Gaza contributes to alleviating the suffering of the population through the delivery of humanitarian aid, but a majority says it does not. It should also be noted that there are significant complaints of discrimination on political grounds in the distribution of humanitarian aid, and that this percentage has increased to three-quarters in this survey.  Nearly two-thirds blame Israel for their suffering, and most others blame the United States. Putting the blame on Hamas in the Gaza Strip does not exceed 8%.

Support for the attack on October 7: While overall support for the October 7 Hamas offensive remains high, it has seen a four-percentage point decline compared to the previous poll, now at two-thirds. The decrease in this percentage came from the Gaza Strip, which saw a decrease of 14 percentage points. It is important to note that support for this attack, as we will see later, does not necessarily mean support for Hamas and does not mean support for any killings or atrocities committed against civilians. Support comes from another motive: findings show that more than 80% of Palestinians believe that the attack has put the Palestinian issue at the center of attention and eliminated years of neglect at the regional and international levels.

War crimes: As we found in the previous two polls, three and six months ago, almost all Palestinians believe that Israel is committing war crimes today while almost all believe that Hamas is not committing war crimes. Moreover, more than 90% believe that Hamas did not commit any atrocities against Israeli civilians on the seventh of October. Only one in ten Palestinians have seen videos showing atrocities committed by Hamas. The results show that those who watched the videos are about fifteen times more likely than those who did not to believe that Hamas fighters committed atrocities on October 7. It is useful in this context to mention that Al Jazeera is the most watched TV news station in Palestine as about 70% chose it as the most watched station during the past two months. Due to the current war conditions, West Bankers are more inclined than Gazans to watch Al Jazeera, with 83% of West Bankers saying it is their preferred channel.

The ICJ and the attack on Rafah: Three quarters of the public expect the ICJ to fail to stop a comprehensive ground invasion of Rafah because the US would protect Israel from the court's decisions. The percentage of Gazans who believe that an Israeli ground incursion into the entire city of Rafah will lead to a mass rush of people and displaced persons towards the border with Egypt is rising to about a third today, an increase of 6 points compared to our findings three months ago. It should be noted that Israeli tanks had entered the eastern area of Rafah and occupied the border with Egypt and the Salah al-Din, or Philadelphia, Corridor between Rafah and Egypt before data collection began for this poll.

The ICC: In light of the ICC prosecutor general's decision to request the court to issue arrest warrants for the Israeli prime minister Netanyahu and defense minister Galant, and three Hamas leaders, an overwhelming majority (71%) believes that the Israeli leaders will not actually be arrested and prosecuted. However, just under half believe that a court order for the arrest of Netanyahu and Galant could contribute to ending the war on the Gaza Strip. A similar percentage )71%) also believes that even if the ICC issues arrest warrants against them, Hamas leaders will not actually be arrested and tried even based on an ICC decision.  A majority in the West Bank and one-third of Gazans believe that the ICC decision against Hamas leaders will only increase the movement's popularity.

Ceasefire and who comes out the winner: Two-thirds said they support Hamas' decision, announced before the Israeli occupation of the Rafah crossing, to accept the ceasefire proposal submitted by Egypt. A majority expected Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement in the next few days. As we did in the previous two polls, we asked in the current one who would emerge victorious in this war, and a two-thirds majority said they expected Hamas to win, an increase of 4 percentage points compared to our previous poll three months ago. It is worth noting however that fewer Gazans, at just 48%, now expect Hamas to win, a decrease of 8 percentage points compared to the results three months ago. It's also worth noting that while almost no one in the West Bank expects Israel to win the current war, a quarter of Gazans expects Israel to win.

Who will control Gaza after the war: Unlike the previous poll, a larger percentage of West Bankers says today, compared to three months ago, that the Gaza Strip will remain under Hamas’ control, while more Gazans now believe that Hamas will not be the ruling power in the future. In a similar question, which included speculation or estimates regarding the most likely scenario for the day after the war, the results were close to the first question, with half of Gazans saying that Hamas would return to control the Gaza Strip.  We asked about the public's opinion of these scenarios. A little more than half of Gazans said they would prefer the return of Hamas, compared to about two-thirds in the West Bank. More than a quarter of Gazans said they would prefer a new Palestinian Authority with an elected president, parliament and government, an option that was not available in our previous poll.

Deployment of Arab security forces in the Gaza Strip:  In December 2023, we asked the public about its view towards the deployment in the Gaza Strip of an Arab security force, from Egypt and Jordan. At the time, we found widespread opposition of 70% to the idea even if these forces were deployed to assist the Palestinian security forces. In this poll, opposition to such a security force rises to 75%.

The Manama Arab Summit and Abbas statement: We asked the public how satisfied it was with the statement of the recent Arab summit in Manama, which demanded an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the convening of an international peace conference. The public was divided into two completely equal groups in terms of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. However, when asked whether or not they agree with Abbas' statement at that same Arab Summit in Manama in which he said that "the Hamas attack on the seventh of October provided Israel with more pretexts and justifications to attack the Gaza Strip," more than three quarters of the public said they disagreed with it. A larger percentage, about 80%, said they also disagreed with President Abbas' statement at the Summit that "Hamas's position rejecting ending the split and accepting international legitimacy served the Israeli plan to perpetuate the separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank."

Satisfaction with the performance of various parties during the war: As we did in the previous two polls, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by Palestinian, Arab/regional and international actors. The results show similar levels of satisfaction to the previous two polls, except for a significant rise in satisfaction with Iran.

	The percentage of satisfaction with Hamas and Yahya Sinwar remains very high. By contrast, satisfaction with Fatah and President Abbas continues to decline. The findings also suggests that the public is unwilling to give the new prime minister, Mohammad Mustafa, a chance to improve the government's performance, perhaps because he is close to President Abbas or perhaps the public does not know much about him.
	At the regional level, the highest satisfaction rate went to Yemen, Hezbollah, Qatar, and Iran, with Jordan and Egypt far behind them and in low rates. Evident in this poll is the increase in satisfaction with Iran, by an additional 19 percentage points compared to three months ago, probably due to Iran's direct missile attack on Israel in April.  But despite this spike in satisfaction with Iran's role in the war, it is odd that the majority of Palestinians see this attack as a show or a play rather than an Iranian determination to support the Palestinians. It is useful to see the division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip on this, with a majority of Gazans, versus only a third in the West Bank, saying that the Iranian missile attack was in support of the Palestinian people rather than theatrics.
	As for international non-regional actors, Russia had the highest satisfaction rating, slightly more than a quarter, followed by the United Nations, Germany, and the United States.
	In the context of the public's perception of the international repercussions triggered by the war on Gaza, the Palestinian public is optimistic that student protests at American universities will indeed bring about a change in US policy to make it more supportive of the Palestinian side or less supportive of the Israeli side, with about 70% believing this.

Support for Palestinian factions: When asked which political party or movement they prefer, the largest percentage (40%) said they prefer Hamas, followed by Fateh (20%), 8% chose third forces, and one third said they do not support any of them or have no opinion. These results mean that support for Hamas over the past three months has increased by 6 percentage points; support for Fatah has risen by 3 percentage points over the same period. In the same context, just over half believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while only 16% believe that Fateh under the leadership of Abbas is the most deserving.

Support for Palestinian leaders: At the leadership level, the current poll shows that support for Marwan Barghouti continues to rise. In a presidential election between three candidates, incumbent President Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti, a Fatah leader currently in an Israeli jail, Barghouti wins a majority of participants. In a two-way competition between Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former wins the vote of about 60% of the participating voters. In an open-ended question, i.e. without predetermined responses, we asked the public to name their preferred candidate to be president of the PA after Abbas. Marwan Barghouti came first, with 29% of the public mentioning his name, followed by Ismail Haniyeh (14%), Mohammed Dahlan (8%), Yahya Sinwar (7%), and Mustafa Barghouti (2%).

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas: Satisfaction with Abbas' performance stands at 12% and dissatisfaction with 85%. About 90% want the president to resign. Today, 94% of West Bankers and 83% of Gazans demand the resignation of the president.

The new government of Mohammad Mustafa: An overwhelming majority (72%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to carryout. In all of the reform items we asked about, we found that Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but a majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of the reforms agenda items.

What the public wants from the PA leadership: We asked the public for the second time since October 7 what political measures the PA leadership should take immediately to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip. We presented the public with three sets of priorities: reconciliation and reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the formation of a new PA national unity government, and the leadership and management of humanitarian service delivery to the Gaza Strip. In the current poll, the percentage that chose the first priority, to achieve immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has risen to more than half. The formation of a national unity government “to negotiate with Israel and the international community an end to the war and the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip in the future,” came second with one-third selecting it. The rest chose the third priority whereby the PA "leads a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the people of Gaza in cooperation with Egypt and the international community."

Support for the two-state solution: On Palestinian-Israeli relations, the results differ markedly from the results of the previous poll we published three months ago. Support for a two-state solution stands at just one-third and a majority says it supports armed struggle. In this regard, it is worth noting two findings: unlike the previous poll, in the current one, support for the two-state solution decreased significantly, and support for armed struggle increased. But the decline in support for a two-state solution came almost completely from the Gaza Strip, a dramatic drop of 30 percentage points. Despite this, nearly half, in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, believe that the top most vital goal for the Palestinian people should be an “Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.”

Support for Armed struggle: When considering three possible options for Palestinians to break the current deadlock in the political process to end the Israeli occupation, current findings point to an 8 percentage point rise in support for armed struggle to nearly one-third; and a 4-percentage point increase in support for non-violent resistance to nearly half.  More than 60% supported the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, and more than a fifth supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis.  Moreover, we we presented the public with three possible means of ending Israeli occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective, a little over half chose "armed struggle"; and a quarter chose negotiations. These results indicate an 8-percentage point increase in support for armed struggle with support for negotiations remaining unchanged. The rise in support for armed struggle comes from the Gaza Strip, where this percentage rises by 17 points.

Saudi-Israeli normalization: The poll found significant opposition of three quarters of the public to Saudi-Israeli normalization, even if it is conditioned on Israel accepting a Palestinian state and taking concrete and irreversible steps toward that goal.

The fall of the Netanyahu government: The Palestinian public is optimistic that Netanyahu's government can fall soon and that quick elections will be held in Israel. However, even if this happens and a new Israeli government is established without Netanyahu, the majority does not believe that this government will be willing to negotiate with the Palestinian side to end the occupation on the basis of a two-state solution.

How to respond to settler violence: Finally, in light of the increase in settler deadly attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, we asked West Bankers about the most effective, and at the same time, most realistic, means of combating this violence: To protect their areas, a little less than half chose to form armed groups by residents of the targeted areas, a little more than a quarter chose to deploy Palestinian police forces in the targeted areas, and about a fifth said they supported the demand for the “Israeli army to take effective measures to prevent settler terrorism.” A small percentage supported the “formation of unarmed groups by the residents of the targeted areas.” These results show a limited increase of 4 percentage points in support for the formation of armed groups compared to results obtained three months ago.

• For the third time since October 7, we asked the respondents in this poll what they thought of Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7^th offensive. Two thirds, compared to 71% in March 2024 and 72% in December 2023, say it was correct. As the figure below shows, the drop in supporting the decision came from the Gaza Strip. Current support in that area stands at 57% compared to 71% three months ago and 57% six months ago.

• Despite a four-percentage point drop in positively viewing the October 7 attach decision, the belief that the war on Gaza since that attack has "revived international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that it could lead to increased recognition of Palestinian statehood" rose by six percentage points to 82% while only 18% said that it did not do so.

• 64% of Gazans say they have enough food for a day or two; 36% say they don't have enough food for a day or two. These results show a significant improvement compared to the results we obtained three months ago when only 44% said they had enough food for a day or two. It is important to recall that the data collection did not include the northern area of the besieged Gaza Strip which, according to international reports, is currently witnessing a growing famine.
• When they need food or water, only 26% of Gazans say they can reach a place where they can get help. 72% say they can but with great difficulty or risk, and 2% say they cannot. These results reflect a slight improvement compared to the situation three months ago.
• Sixty one percent of all Gazans say a member of their family has been killed during the current war. In a separate question, 65% say a member of their family has been injured. When combining the two questions, the findings show that 78% say a member of their family has been either killed or injured; only 22% of Gazans say none of their family members have been killed or injured. Three months ago, 60% of Gazans said that one or more members of their family had been killed in the war and 78% were killed or injured during the current war.

• We asked Gazans about the availability of essential needs like water, food, electricity, tents, blankets, clothes, medical care, and toilets.  The percentage of those who said "yes, available" ranged from 26% for tents to 44% for food. But a larger percentage said they could be obtained or accessed, but with great difficulty and risk. This was especially the case for medical care, tents, food, water and electricity. The results show that the seemingly unmet needs for most residents of the Gaza Strip are tents, clothes, blankets, medical care and electricity to charge telephones. These results constitute an improvement in most of these indicators compared to our findings three months ago.

• We asked those in shelters about the identity of the organizers in charge. The majority of the respondents (53%) said it was UNRWA, 17% said it was government, 15% local Palestinian group, and 11% said other international organization.  These findings indicate a nine-percentage point decrease in the proportion of UNRWA-supervised shelters and an increase in the other percentages, essentially due to the fact that the number of built-up shelters, such as schools, has decreased while the number of tent gatherings has increased due to the recent displacement from Rafah to the Mawasi area.
• We asked respondents to assess, based on their personal experience, the fairness of aid distribution to displaced residents currently in shelters. The vast majority (76%) said it was discriminatory while only 24% said it was fair. Three months ago, 70% said it was discriminatory.
• We asked the public what they thought of the role of the temporary pier, established by the US military on the coast of northern Gaza, in delivering humanitarian aid. A majority of 78% said that this initiative does not contribute to alleviating the suffering of the population while 22% said it does. A larger percentage of Gazans, almost twice as much as we found in the West Bank, says that the American pier contributes to alleviating the suffering of the residents, 30% and 16% respectively.
• A majority of 63% (compared to 64% three months ago) blames Israel for the current suffering of Gazans in the current war while 22% (compared to 20% three months ago) place the blame on the US; only 8% (compared to 7% three months ago) place the blame on Hamas, and only 4% (compared to 6% three months ago) blame the PA. It is worth noting that the percentage of Gazans who place the blame on Hamas stands today at 10% compared to 9% three months ago. 

• As we found in the previous two polls, three and six months ago, almost all Palestinians (97% think Israel has committed war crimes during the current war. By contrast, only 9% (compared to 5% three months ago) think Hamas also committed such crimes; 2% think Israel has not committed such crimes and 88% think Hamas did not commit war crimes during the current war.
• Ninety percent, compared to 80% three months ago, say they did not see videos, shown by international news outlets, showing acts committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, such as the killing of women and children in their homes; only 9% (6% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip) saw these videos.
• When asked if Hamas did commit these atrocities that are seen in these videos, the overwhelming majority (91%) said no, it did not, and only 7% said it did. As shown in the figure below, the belief that Hamas fighters have committed atrocities against civilians is higher among those who did watch videos showing such atrocities (44%) compared to those who did not (3%).

• Three quarters of the public expect the ICJ to fail to stop the Israeli offensive on Rafah because the US will protect Israel from the court's decisions while only 20% believe the ICJ will succeed in forcing Israel to stop its attack on Rafah.

• We asked the public to speculate on the likely behavior of Rafah residents and displaced persons in the event of an Israeli ground tank invasion of that city: would these people in this case rush to safety on the Egyptian side? 31% of Gazans and 38% of West Bankers say that in that case residents and displaced people would rush towards the border and cross to safety in Egypt. Overall, 35%, compared to 40% three months ago, said they thought they would and 62% said they thought they wouldn't. It should be noted that Israeli tanks had entered the eastern area of Rafah and occupied the border crossing and the Salah al-Din or Philadelphia Corridor between Rafah and Egypt before data collection began.

• In light of the ICC prosecutor's decision to request the court to issue arrest warrants against the Israeli prime minister and the defense minister, an overwhelming majority (71%) believes that the two, Netanyahu and Galant, will not actually be arrested and tried while 26% believe they will be.
• Despite this, 45% believe that a court order for the arrest of Netanyahu and Galant would contribute to ending the war on the Gaza Strip while 52% believe it would not contribute to ending the war.
• Moreover, an identical percentage (71%) believes that Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar will not actually be arrested and tried even if a decision is issued by the ICC at the request of the Prosecutor General of that court. By contrast, 23% believe they will be arrested if a decision is issued.
• We asked about the impact of the ICC's decision to arrest and try Haniyeh and Sinwar on the level of popular support for Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Half of all Palestinians (59% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) believe it will increase the popularity of the movement while 15% believe it will decrease it and 33% believe it will have no impact on the movement's popularity.

• 68% support Hamas' decision, announced in early May just before Israel's occupation of the Rafah crossing, to accept the ceasefire proposal submitted by Egypt while 26% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 22% in the West Bank) oppose it. A majority of 58% expected Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire in the next few days while 39% did not expect it.
• As we did in December 2023, we asked in the current poll who will emerge victorious in this war. A majority of 67% expects Hamas to win, compared to 64% three months ago and 70% six months ago. It is worth noting, as the figure below shows, that fewer Gazans today, at only 48%, expect Hamas to win compared to the results three and six months ago, when the percentages stood at 56% and 50%, respectively. By contrast, a larger percentage of West Bankers today, 79%, expect Hamas to win compared to the previous poll, at 69%. It's also worth noting that while almost no one in the West Bank expects Israel to win the current war, a quarter of Gazans expects Israel to win.

• We asked the respondents to speculate about the party that will be in control of the Gaza Strip in the day after the end of the current war. A majority of 56% think it will be Hamas. However, unlike previous polls, there are significant differences between West Bankers and Gazans, with only 46% of Gazans saying Hamas will actually control that area, compared to a higher 62% in the West Bank, up from 59% in both areas three months ago. The current total represents a decrease of 3 percentage points compared to the results obtained three months ago. Only 4% believe that the Israeli army will be in control of the Gaza Strip. 11% believe that a new PA with an elected president, parliament, and government will be in control, 6% believe the current PA headed by Abbas will be in control, 7% believe the current PA but without Abbas will be in control, 2% choose one or more Arab states, and 2% choose the UN.
• When asked who the public would prefer to control the Gaza Strip after the war, 61% (71% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) said it was Hamas, 16% chose a new Palestinian Authority with an elected president, parliament and government, 6% chose the current PA without Abbas, 6% also chose the return of the PA but under Abbas' control, 2% chose the UN, 1% selected one or more Arab states, and 1% selected the Israeli army. Three months ago, we asked an identical question, but with a slightly different set of options. At that time, 59% (64% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) preferred to see Hamas return to control the Gaza Strip after the war.

• In a similar question that included speculation or estimates regarding the most likely scenario for the day after the war, the results were almost identical to the question posed above with 57% (62% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip) saying that Hamas would return to control the Gaza Strip.  21% expected a new PA to be established with an elected president, parliament, and government, 6% expected the return of the PA under Abbas, 2% expected Israel to form local authorities, 2% expected the Israeli army to take over, 2% expected tribes and families to take over, and 1% expected multiple armed groups to assume control in the Gaza Strip.
• Here too we asked about preferences regarding these scenarios. Preference for the return of Hamas stands at 59% (64% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip). Support for a new PA with an elected president, parliament, and government stands at 25%, and 6% support the return of the PA under Abbas.

• In December 2023, we asked about the public's attitude towards the deployment of an Arab security force from Egypt and Jordan in the Gaza Strip. At that time, we found widespread opposition, standing at 70%, to the idea even if these forces were deployed to assist the Palestinian security forces. In this poll, opposition to such a security force rises to 75% and support stands at only 23%.

• We asked the public how satisfied it was with the statement of the recent Arab summit in Manama, which demanded an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the convening of an international peace conference. The public was divided into two equal parts: 48% (55% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank) said they were satisfied with the statement and an identical percentage said they were dissatisfied.
• We asked the public whether or not they agree with Abbas' statement at the Arab Summit in Manama that "Hamas' attack on October 7 provided Israel with more pretexts and justifications to attack the Gaza Strip." More than three quarters (76%) disagree and only 20% agree with Abbas’ statement.
• A larger percentage (79%) said they disagree with Abbas' statement at the same conference that "Hamas' position rejecting ending the split and accepting international legitimacy served the Israeli plan to consolidate the separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank." Only 17% (29% in the Gaza Strip and 9% in the West Bank) agree with this statement.

• We asked the public for the second time what political measures the PA leadership should take today to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip. We presented the public with three options: reconciliation, the formation of a national unity government, and the provision of humanitarian services. In the current poll, the percentage that opted for “ an immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” has risen from 42% to 51% today. Second came “the formation of a national unity government whose mission is to negotiate with Israel and the international community an end to the war and the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip in the future,” with 33% opting for it, compared to 37% three months ago. The third option, chosen by only 12%, was for the PA to "lead a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the people of Gaza in cooperation with Egypt and the international community." It is worth noting that support in the Gaza Strip for reconciliation and reunification is higher than in the West Bank, 61% and 44% respectively, while support for the formation of a national unity government is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 36% and 29% respectively.
• As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:

1. On Palestinian actors, satisfaction with Hamas' performance increases to 75% (82% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Yahya Sinwar (65%; 76% in the West Bank and 50% in the Gaza Strip), Fateh (24%; 25% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip), President Abbas (10%; 8% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip), and new prime minister Muhammad Mustafa (9%; 13% in the Gaza Strip and 6% in the West Bank).  Taken together, these findings, as indicated in the figure below, indicate an increase in satisfaction with Hamas and Sinwar compared to the situation three months ago. It also indicates that satisfaction with President Abbas and Fatah declined during the same period, and that the public is unwilling to give the new prime minister a chance to improve the performance of the government, perhaps because he is close to President Abbas or perhaps due to the fact that the public knows little about him.

2. For the Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate went to Yemen, as we found in our previous poll, where today it stands at 80% (86% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Hezbollah (57%), Qatar (55%), Iran (49%), Jordan (25%), and Egypt (18%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction in the current and previous poll in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The 19-percentage point rise in satisfaction with Iran is tangible, almost certainly due to Iran's direct missile attack on Israel in April.  But despite this significant increase in satisfaction with Iran's role in the war, it is surprising that a majority of Palestinians (57%) sees the attack as a show or theatrics while only 41% believe it was an act of support for the Palestinian people. It is interesting to see the division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on this, with a majority of 52% of Gazans compared to only 33% of West Bankers saying it was in support of the Palestinian people.

3. For the international actors, Russia received the highest satisfaction (26%; 31% in the Gaza Strip and 23% in the West Bank), followed by the United Nations (12%), Germany (6%), and the United States (3%).  Compared to our previous poll, the current results show a 4-percentage point increase in satisfaction with Russia, with the increase coming from the Gaza Strip (15 points) while satisfaction with Russia in the West Bank increased by only two points. Satisfaction with the United Nations has doubled, while remaining small, and satisfaction with U.S. performance also remains small.

• In the context of the public's perception of the international developments triggered by the war on Gaza, the majority is optimistic about the ability of student protests in American universities to bring about a change in US policy making it more supportive of the Palestinian side or less supportive of the Israeli side (69% believe this while only 29% do not.

• If a presidential competition is to take place between three, Marwan Barghouti from Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, also from Fatah, and Ismael Haniyeh from Hamas, participation in the election would stand at 76%; vote for Marwan Barghouti would stand at 42%, the highest rate since September 2023, followed by Haniyeh at 27%, and Abbas at 5%. Among those who plan to vote, Barghouti receives 56%, Haniyeh 36%, and Abbas 6%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti among those planning to vote stood at 56% and Haniyeh at 32%, and Abbas at 11%.

• However, if the new presidential elections were held with only two candidates, Mahmoud Abbas from Fatah and Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas, competing, the voter turnout would drop to 57%; vote for Haniyeh would stand at 43% and Abbas at 11%. Among those intending to vote, Haniyeh would receive 76% and Abbas 20%. Three months ago, the vote for Abbas among those intending to vote stood at 22% and vote for Haniyeh stood at 70%.

• But if the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti from Fatah and Haniyeh from Hamas, participation would rise to 74%; 44% would vote for Barghouti and 29% for Haniyeh. Among those intending to vote, Barghouti would receive 59% and Haniyeh 39%. These findings indicate a drop in the vote for Barghouti among those intending to vote by 3 points and a rise in the vote for Haniyeh by 2 points.  

• In our annual open-ended question, i.e. without predetermined options, we asked the public to name their preferred candidate to be president of the PA after Abbas. Marwan Barghouti came first, with 27% of the public, followed by Ismail Haniyeh (14%), Mohammed Dahlan (8%), Yahya Sinwar (7%), and Mustafa Barghouti (2%).
• In a closed question, with predetermined options, we asked the public to select the person they prefer to see as President Abbas's successor. The largest percentage (39%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti; 23% preferred Ismail Haniyeh; 8% chose Yahya al Sinwar and Mohammad Dahlan; 2% chose Hussein al-Sheikh and Muhammad Shtayyeh; 1% preferred Khaled Meshaal, and 16% said they did not know or chose someone else. It is worth noting that the preference for Dahlan, al-Sheikh, and Shtayyeh, as in our previous survey, comes almost only from the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 12% and dissatisfaction at 86%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 8% in the West Bank (compared to 8% three months ago) and 19% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 27% three months ago).  Nine months ago, before the October 7 war, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 22% and dissatisfaction at 76%.
• 89% want Abbas to resign while 10% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 84% said they want Abbas to resign. Nine months ago, 78% wanted him to resign. Demand for Abbas' resignation today stands at 94% in the West Bank and 83% in the Gaza Strip.

• When asked which political party or political trend they support, the largest percentage selected Hamas (40%), followed by Fatah (20%), while 8% selected other or third-party groups, and 33% said none of them or did not know. Three months ago, 34% supported Hamas and 17% selected Fatah. Nine months ago, before the current war, support for Hamas stood at 22% and support for Fatah stood at 26%. This means that support for Hamas during the past three months has witnessed an 6-point rise while support for Fatah rose 3 points during the same period. In the West Bank, support for Hamas today stands at 41% (compared to 35% three months ago), and for Fatah at 17% (compared to 12% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas today stands at 38% (compared to 34% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 24% (compared to 25% three months ago).

• However, if new parliamentary elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, only 70% say they would participate in them, 32% would vote for Hamas, 17% for Fatah, 4% for third parties, and 16% remain undecided. Among those intending to vote, support for Hamas stands at 46%, Fatah 25%, third parties 6%, and the undecided at 25%. Compared to our findings three months ago, the current results among those intending to vote indicate a 1-point drop by for Hamas and a 3-point rise by Fatah. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Hamas among those intending to vote stands today at 44% (compared to 45% three months ago and 44% nine months ago) and vote for Fatah among those intending to vote stands today at 30% (compared to 26% three months ago and 32% nine months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas among the voters stands today at 48% (compared to 48% three months ago and 24% nine months ago) and vote for Fatah among those intending to vote stands today at 21% (compared to 16% three months ago and 40% nine months ago).

• 51% (compared to 49% three months ago) believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 16% (compared to 17% three months ago) believe that Fateh under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving; 27% (compared to 29% three months ago) believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership. Nine months ago, 27% said Hamas is the most deserving, 24% said Fateh led by Abbas is the most deserving, and 44% said both are unworthy of representation and leadership.

• An overwhelming majority (72%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to do. By contrast, 21% believe it will succeed.
• We also asked the public about its expectations for the new government , such as carrying out specific reforms announced by this government or meeting the priorities of the public:

	77% believe that the new government will not succeed in combating corruption
	74% say it will not succeed in strengthening steadfastness in East Jerusalem
	73% believe that the government will not succeed in pushing for reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
	72% believe it will not succeed in improving economic conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
	71% believe it will not succeed in holding legislative and presidential elections
	71% say it will not succeed in providing relief for the Gaza Strip and reconstruction in the future
	71% say it will not succeed in ensuring financial stability
	71% say it will not succeed in empowering the judiciary and re-establishing the rule of law
	67% say it will not succeed in reforming PA institutions

It is important to note, as the following figure shows, that in all of these measures, Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but the majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of these reforms.

• Aljazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine with 68% selecting it as the one they watched the most during the past two months. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to watch Aljazeera, 82% and 46% respectively. The second most popular TV station is Alaqsa (4%) followed by Palestine TV (3%), Palestine Today, Al-Arabiya, Ma’an and al Mayadeen (2% each).
• A majority of 69% (compared to 65% three months ago) believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 27% (compared to 27% three months ago) believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people. Nine months ago, 62% said the PA is a burden and 35% said it was an achievement.
• We asked the public in the West Bank about its personal and family safety and security. The findings show that only 13% feel safe and secure while 87% feel unsafe and unsecure. Three months ago, the perception of safety stood at 11% and nine months ago at 48%.

• 32% support and 65% oppose the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details of the solution. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 45% and six months ago support stood at 34%. In the current poll, support for this solution came from Gaza Strip, a 30-point increase while dropping only two points in the West Bank.

• Support for the two-state solution is usually linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Today, 61% (compared to 63% three months ago) believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion but 34% (compared to 37% three months ago) believe it is still practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or nonextant, and 31% believe the chances are medium or high.
• When asked about its support and opposition to specific policy measures to break the stalemate: 66% supported joining more international organizations; 49% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 63% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 62% supported dissolving the PA; and 22% supported abandoning” the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months /’, 55% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 45% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 58% supported the dissolution of the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of one state.

• We offered the public three methods to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent state and asked it to select the most effective. 54% (52% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) selected “armed struggle;” 25% (26% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip) selected negotiations; and 16% (14% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) selected popular non-violent resistance. As shown in the figure below, these findings indicate an 8-point rise in support for armed struggle despite the fact that support for negotiations did not change; and a 2-point drop in support for non-violence.  The rise in support for armed struggle comes from the Gaza Strip, where it increases by 17 points.

• The poll found significant opposition of three quarters to Saudi-Israeli normalization, even if it is conditional on Israel accepting a Palestinian state and taking concrete and irreversible steps toward that goal. Only 21% support this process.
• The public is optimistic about the possibility of the fall of the Netanyahu government in the near future and the holding of quick elections in Israel: 63% believe this while 34% do not.  However, if this happens and a new Israeli government is established without Netanyahu, a majority of 54% does not believe that such a government would be willing to negotiate with the Palestinian side an end to the Israeli occupation on the basis of the two-state solution while 41% believe so.
• In light of the increase in settler terrorist attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, we asked West Bankers what means are most effective in combating this terrorism that are also the most realistic and feasible. The largest percentage (45%) chose the formation of armed groups by residents of the targeted areas in order to protect their areas; 27% chose to deploy Palestinian police forces in the targeted areas; another 19% chose the demand that the Israeli army take measures to prevent settler terrorism; and only 6% chose the formation, by residents of the targeted areas, of unarmed groups to protect their areas. As the figure below indicates there is 4-point rise in support for the formation of armed groups when compared to the finding of March, a 4-point increase in the demand for protection by the PA police; and a 4-point drop in the demand for an Israeli army measures to stop the settlers.

• 47% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages; 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; and 9% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (50%; 57% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; 28% said it is the Israeli occupation; 8% said it is corruption; 8% said it is unemployment; and 5% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, 56% (50% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; and 23% said it is the Israeli occupation.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. (26)

A Total Lack of Confidence in the Annapolis Process Keeps Hamas’s Popularity Stable Despite Worsening Conditions in the Gaza Strip

11-16 December 2007

•  54% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters. These results indicate a slight increase in support for the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement package among Palestinians and a slight decrease among Israelis compared to December 2012. 36% of the Palestinians support yielding if there will be pressure by US on Palestinians and Israelis to accept a settlement along the lines of the Clinton / Geneva ideas and 60% of the Palestinians oppose accepting such American pressure. 
•  Following the intensified involvement of the US in the region, 39% of the Israelis expect this involvement to be successful, while 29% of the Israelis think it will be a failure. 22% of the Israelis think it will have no impact. Compared to the poll conducted August 2009, several months after the election of Obama, there is a slight decline in the expectation that US involvement under the leadership of Obama would be successful.
•  23% of Israelis think that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 28% think it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 40% think it is supportive of both sides equally. Compared to previous polls, there is an increase in the Israelis belief that the US under the leadership of Obama is more supportive of the Israel or balanced.
•  Each side perceives the other side as constituting a threat to its very existence: 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals in the long run are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 24% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 34% of the Israelis think that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 21% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 13 and 16, 2013. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 601 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 12 and 21, 2013. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Ifat Maoz, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, and the Department of Communication, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki, at email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.
On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Ifat Maoz at email msifat@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

 (A) Attitudes, perceptions and expectations regarding a permanent settlement

Clinton/Geneva Parameters

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We address these issues regularly since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues, amidst a turbulent Middle East and the return of the Palestinians and Israelis to permanent status negotiations.

•  54% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters. The results are similar to the figures in December 2012 (56% support among Israelis and 43% support among Palestinians).
• Since 2003, we observed only once majority support for such a settlement on both sides: in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat. The level of support then was 64% among Israelis and 54% among Palestinians.
• Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton / Geneva permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 52% support or strongly support and 48% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2012, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 53% and opposition at 45%.

Among Israelis 44% support and 48% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2012, 46% of the Israelis supported this component while 49% opposed it.

(2) Refugees

Among Palestinians 46% support and 52% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2012, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 56% opposed it.

Among Israelis 39% support such an arrangement and 50% oppose it. In December 2012, 42% supported it and 49% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 32% support and 68% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2012, an identical compromise obtained 29% support and 70% opposition.

Among Israelis, 37% agree and 56% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2012, similarly, 38% supported this arrangement and 59% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 28% support and 71% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2012, 28% support, and opposition reached 71%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians, as in previous polls, although the current level of support is the highest since 2003. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

Among Israelis 60% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 70% support and 26% opposition obtained in December 2012.

(5) Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 52% support and 48% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In comparison, in December 2012,46% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 53% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 52% support and 39% oppose this arrangement compared to 59% who supported it and 35% who opposed it in December 2012.

(6) End of Conflict

In the Palestinian public 63% support and 36% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. In December 2012 59% supported and 39% opposed this item.

In the Israeli public 66% support and 28% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2012, similarly, 68% of the Israelis supported it while 28% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 46% support and 53% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2012, 43% supported and 56% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 54% support and 37% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In December 2012 56% supported and 40% opposed such a package.

 
 (B) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda

The Israeli-Palestinian Track

•  Dismantling settlements - 47% of the Israelis support and 48% oppose the dismantling of most of the settlements in the West Bank as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
•  Mutual Recognition - As we do periodically in our joint polls, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 58% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 34% opposes it. Among Palestinians, 43% support and 56% oppose this step. In June 2013, 57% of the Israelis supported and 37% opposed this mutual recognition; among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were similar to the current poll (42% support and 56% oppose).
•  63% of Israelis and 53% of Palestinians support the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution and 32% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians oppose it. In June 2013, just before Palestinians and Israelis returned to negotiations, 62% of Israelis supported a two-state solution and 33% opposed it and 53% of the Palestinians supported it and 46% opposed it.
•  The Saudi: Plan 64% of the Israelis and 50% of the Palestinians oppose the Saudi peace plan, 33% of the Israelis and 47% of the Palestinians support it. In June 2013, 56% of the Palestinians supported the Saudi plan and 41% opposed it, while 24% of the Israelis supported and 67% opposed it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations.

 (C) Conflict management and threat perceptions

• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 24% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 34% among Israelis thinks that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 21% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 15% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 37% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967.

(D) US policy toward the conflict following the intensified involvement of the US in the region

Following the increase in U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we examined the attitudes towards U.S. involvement in the area.

In December 2008, immediately after the election of Barack Obama for U.S President, we examined Palestinians’ and Israelis’ expectations regarding the policy that the new Obama administration might choose to implement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since then, the our joint polls have been tracing the attitudes of both Palestinian and Israeli public, in order to determine if there has been an attitude change towards U.S. involvement in the area.

Israeli stances toward US policy under the leadership of Obama

•  23% of Israelis think that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 28% think it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 40% think it is supportive of both sides equally. Compared to previous polls, there is a significant increase in the Israeli belief that the US policy under the leadership of Obama is more supportive of Israel or balanced. (In December 2009, 13% of Israelis thought that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 40% thought it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 37% thought it is supportive of both sides equally; In August 2009, the relevant percentages of the Israeli public were 12%, 40% and 23% accordingly).
• This survey examined the perceptions regarding the results of a more active involvement of the U.S. in the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. If the US plays a more active role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 39% of the Israelis expect this involvement to be successful, while 29% think it will be a failure. 22% of the Israelis think it will have no impact. Compared to the poll conducted in September 2009, there is a slight decline in the expectation that US involvement under the leadership of Obama would be successful - 42% of the Israelis expected this involvement to be successful, while 30% thought it would be a failure and 18% thought it would have no impact.
• While the support for a two state solution is high, standing at 63%, opinions are divided about the right way to respond if there will be U.S. pressure to accept such a solution. 41% of Israelis think that Israel should yield to American pressure if the US under the Obama’s leadership pressures Israel to accept the two state solution. 43% of Israelis think Israel should reject such pressure. In our June 2009 Poll we found that before President Obama’s speech in Cairo, delivered at the same month, 50% of Israelis thought that Israel should yield to the American pressure if the US under the Obama’s leadership pressures Israel to accept the two state solution and 42% of them thought Israel should reject such pressure. After the speech, willingness to yield to such US pressure increased to 52%, and rejection of it decreased by 4 percentage points to 38%.

Palestinians’ stances toward US policy under the leadership of Obama

•  37% of the Palestinians support yielding to the American pressure if the US under the Obama’s leadership pressures Palestinians (and Israelis) to accept the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement. 60% of them think that Palestinians should reject such pressure.
• 30% of the Palestinians think that most of the Palestinians will agree to yield to American pressure on Palestinians and Israelis to accept the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement and 65% think that most Palestinians will oppose such pressure.
• 63% of the Palestinians think that most Israelis will yield to American pressure on both sides to accept the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement and 31% think that most Israelis will oppose such pressure.

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This joint survey was conducted with the support of  the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll, December 2013

The majority of Israelis (63%) and of Palestinians (53%) support the two-state solution. However, the mutual threat perceptions are very high and 83% of Palestinians and 55% of Israelis feel threatened by the intentions of other side.

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.

This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

•  63% of Israelis and 53% of Palestinians support the two states solution. 41% of Israelis think that Israel should yield if there will be pressure by US President Obama to accept the two states solution. 43% of the Israelis oppose accepting the two states solution even if there will be pressure by US President Obama. Compared to previous polls, there is a decrease in Israeli willingness to yield US pressure to accept a peace arrangement.
•  54% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters. These results indicate a slight increase in support for the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement package among Palestinians and a slight decrease among Israelis compared to December 2012. 36% of the Palestinians support yielding if there will be pressure by US on Palestinians and Israelis to accept a settlement along the lines of the Clinton / Geneva ideas and 60% of the Palestinians oppose accepting such American pressure. 
• Following the intensified involvement of the US in the region, 39% of the Israelis expect this involvement to be successful, while 29% of the Israelis think it will be a failure. 22% of the Israelis think it will have no impact. Compared to the poll conducted August 2009, several months after the election of Obama, there is a slight decline in the expectation that US involvement under the leadership of Obama would be successful.
•  23% of Israelis think that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 28% think it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 40% think it is supportive of both sides equally. Compared to previous polls, there is an increase in the Israelis belief that the US under the leadership of Obama is more supportive of the Israel or balanced.
• Each side perceives the other side as constituting a threat to its very existence: 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals in the long run are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 24% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 34% of the Israelis think that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 21% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 13 and 16, 2013. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 601 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 12 and 21, 2013. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Ifat Maoz, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, and the Department of Communication, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki, at email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey,
contact Prof Ifat Maoz at email msifat@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

 (A) Attitudes, perceptions and expectations regarding a permanent settlement

Clinton/Geneva Parameters

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We address these issues regularly since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues, amidst a turbulent Middle East and the return of the Palestinians and Israelis to permanent status negotiations.

• 54% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters. The results are similar to the figures in December 2012 (56% support among Israelis and 43% support among Palestinians).
• Since 2003, we observed only once majority support for such a settlement on both sides: in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat. The level of support then was 64% among Israelis and 54% among Palestinians.

Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton / Geneva permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 52% support or strongly support and 48% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2012, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 53% and opposition at 45%.

Among Israelis 44% support and 48% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2012, 46% of the Israelis supported this component while 49% opposed it.

(2) Refugees

Among Palestinians 46% support and 52% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2012, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 56% opposed it.

Among Israelis 39% support such an arrangement and 50% oppose it. In December 2012, 42% supported it and 49% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 32% support and 68% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2012, an identical compromise obtained 29% support and 70% opposition.

Among Israelis, 37% agree and 56% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2012, similarly, 38% supported this arrangement and 59% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 28% support and 71% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2012, 28% support, and opposition reached 71%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians, as in previous polls, although the current level of support is the highest since 2003. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

Among Israelis 60% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 70% support and 26% opposition obtained in December 2012.

(5) Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 52% support and 48% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In comparison, in December 2012,46% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 53% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 52% support and 39% oppose this arrangement compared to 59% who supported it and 35% who opposed it in December 2012.

(6) End of Conflict

In the Palestinian public 63% support and 36% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. In December 2012 59% supported and 39% opposed this item.

In the Israeli public 66% support and 28% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2012, similarly, 68% of the Israelis supported it while 28% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 46% support and 53% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2012, 43% supported and 56% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 54% support and 37% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In December 2012 56% supported and 40% opposed such a package.

 
 (B) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda

The Israeli-Palestinian Track

• Dismantling settlements - 47% of the Israelis support and 48% oppose the dismantling of most of the settlements in the West Bank as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
• Mutual Recognition - As we do periodically in our joint polls, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 58% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 34% opposes it. Among Palestinians, 43% support and 56% oppose this step. In June 2013, 57% of the Israelis supported and 37% opposed this mutual recognition; among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were similar to the current poll (42% support and 56% oppose).
• 63% of Israelis and 53% of Palestinians support the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution and 32% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians oppose it. In June 2013, just before Palestinians and Israelis returned to negotiations, 62% of Israelis supported a two-state solution and 33% opposed it and 53% of the Palestinians supported it and 46% opposed it.
• The Saudi: Plan 64% of the Israelis and 50% of the Palestinians oppose the Saudi peace plan, 33% of the Israelis and 47% of the Palestinians support it. In June 2013, 56% of the Palestinians supported the Saudi plan and 41% opposed it, while 24% of the Israelis supported and 67% opposed it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations.

 (C) Conflict management and threat perceptions

• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 24% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 34% among Israelis thinks that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 21% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 15% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 37% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967.

(D) US policy toward the conflict following the intensified involvement of the US in the region

Following the increase in U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we examined the attitudes towards U.S. involvement in the area.

In December 2008, immediately after the election of Barack Obama for U.S President, we examined Palestinians’ and Israelis’ expectations regarding the policy that the new Obama administration might choose to implement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since then, the our joint polls have been tracing the attitudes of both Palestinian and Israeli public, in order to determine if there has been an attitude change towards U.S. involvement in the area.

Israeli stances toward US policy under the leadership of Obama

•  23% of Israelis think that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 28% think it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 40% think it is supportive of both sides equally. Compared to previous polls, there is a significant increase in the Israeli belief that the US policy under the leadership of Obama is more supportive of Israel or balanced. (In December 2009, 13% of Israelis thought that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 40% thought it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 37% thought it is supportive of both sides equally; In August 2009, the relevant percentages of the Israeli public were 12%, 40% and 23% accordingly).
• This survey examined the perceptions regarding the results of a more active involvement of the U.S. in the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. If the US plays a more active role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 39% of the Israelis expect this involvement to be successful, while 29% think it will be a failure. 22% of the Israelis think it will have no impact. Compared to the poll conducted in September 2009, there is a slight decline in the expectation that US involvement under the leadership of Obama would be successful - 42% of the Israelis expected this involvement to be successful, while 30% thought it would be a failure and 18% thought it would have no impact.
•  While the support for a two state solution is high, standing at 63%, opinions are divided about the right way to respond if there will be U.S. pressure to accept such a solution. 41% of Israelis think that Israel should yield to American pressure if the US under the Obama’s leadership pressures Israel to accept the two state solution. 43% of Israelis think Israel should reject such pressure. In our June 2009 Poll we found that before President Obama’s speech in Cairo, delivered at the same month, 50% of Israelis thought that Israel should yield to the American pressure if the US under the Obama’s leadership pressures Israel to accept the two state solution and 42% of them thought Israel should reject such pressure. After the speech, willingness to yield to such US pressure increased to 52%, and rejection of it decreased by 4 percentage points to 38%.

Palestinians’ stances toward US policy under the leadership of Obama

• 37% of the Palestinians support yielding to the American pressure if the US under the Obama’s leadership pressures Palestinians (and Israelis) to accept the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement. 60% of them think that Palestinians should reject such pressure.
•  30% of the Palestinians think that most of the Palestinians will agree to yield to American pressure on Palestinians and Israelis to accept the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement and 65% think that most Palestinians will oppose such pressure.
•  63% of the Palestinians think that most Israelis will yield to American pressure on both sides to accept the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement and 31% think that most Israelis will oppose such pressure.

6-8 September 2007   

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during September 6-8, 2007. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. This poll release covers three issues: Hamas’s military action in the Gaza Strip, elections and balance of power, and the peace process. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or emailpcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that only one fifth of the Palestinians supports Hamas’s military takeover of the Gaza Strip and that Fateh and PA President Mahmud Abbas have benefited from Hamas’s step as their popularity has increased significantly. Moreover, a majority supports the recently released presidential decree regarding election law and supports holding early elections. Findings show that a larger percentage of the public blames Hamas rather than Fateh for the problems confronting the Gaza Strip today. A large percentage accepts the position of the PA president regarding resumption of dialogue with Hamas while a much smaller percentage supports the position of Hamas regarding dialogue. Nonetheless, 40% of the public wants the government of Ismail Haniyeh to stay in office and half of the Gazans say their security and personal safety and that of their families are now assured.

These findings indicate that Hamas has failed in convincing Palestinians to accept its narrative regarding the need to carry out its military takeover or the best way to resolve the crisis created by the takeover. Moreover, Hamas has failed to convince the public to accept its narrative regarding the responsibility of president Abbas and Fateh for the problems Gazaconfronted after the takeover such as the closure of the Rafah Crossing or the electricity cutoff. For all this, Hamas paid dearly by losing six percentage points in its popularity during the last six months. But Hamas succeeded in enforcing law and order in the Gaza Strip where half of the population feel their security and safety are now assured; a feeling they did not have for years. It is for this reason perhaps that 40% of the public want the Hamas government led by Haniyeh to stay in office.

Findings show that Fateh and Abbas’s government have gained more than they have lost as a result of the Hamas takeover. Fateh and the PA government led by Salam Fayad have failed to meet public expectations in two of its most important needs: enforcing law and order and fighting corruption. They have also failed in wining the battle over hearts and minds through the effective use of the media. As importantly, they have failed to positively affect the level of public optimism about the future of the peace process. But Abbas and Fateh succeeded in wining public support for their position regarding the best way out of the current crisis with Hamas and regarding the need to amend the electoral system and the need to introduce eligibility conditions for party and individual nomination for the parliamentary and presidential elections, conditions that are strongly opposed by Hamas. They have also succeeded in convincing the public of the need to hold early elections. For all this, and for the first time since the last parliamentary elections, Fateh managed to increase its popularity by five percentage points during the last three months.  

(1) Hamas’s Military Takeover of the Gaza Strip

• 22% support and 73% oppose Hamas’s military takeover of the Gaza Strip. Support for Hamas’s military action reaches 31% in the Gaza Strip compared to 17% in the West Bank.
• 40% agree and 52% disagree that Haniyeh’s government should stay in office despite dismissal by the president. 32% evaluate the performance of the Haniyeh government as good or very good and 43% think it is bad or very bad.
• By contrast, 49% agree and 44% disagree that the government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad should stay in office. Positive evaluation of the Fayyad government reaches 44% and negative evaluation 28%.
• The party most responsible for the closure of the Rafah Crossing is Israel in the eyes of 41% of the Palestinians, Hamas in the eyes of 26%, Fateh in the eyes of 15%, and Egypt in the eyes of 2%. Blaming Hamas for the closure of the Rafah Crossing increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (22%). Similarly, blaming Fateh increases in the Gaza Strip (19%) compared to the West Bank (12%).
• To end the current crisis between Fateh and Hamas, 27% accept Hamas’s view which calls for unconditional dialogue with President Abbas based on the exiting status quo today and 46% accept Abbas’s and Fateh’s view which calls for a dialogue but only after Hamas transfers control over the security headquarters to its rightful owners and return to the status quo ante.
• The largest percentage (29%) expects the unification of the two authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within months and 19% expect it within a year or two. On the other hand, 20% believe unification will not take place in the next two years and 22% believe that the separation will become permanent. 

Findings show that Hamas’s military takeover in June finds little support among the public with only 22% favoring it and about three quarters (73%) opposing it. Support for the Hamas step increases in the Gaza Strip (31%) compared to the West Bank (17%), among those opposed to the peace process (45%) compared to those supporting it (18%), among Hamas’s supporters (72%) compared to Fateh’s supporters (4%), among refugees (27%) compared to non-refugees (18%), among students (33%) compared to retired persons (14%), laborers (17%), and employees (18%), and among the youth between 18-22 years of age (28%) compared to those over 52 years of age (18%).

Despite the high level of opposition to the Hamas takeover, a large percentage (40%) agrees that the government of Ismail Haniyeh can stay in office despite the fact that it was dismissed by the PA president. Almost a third (32%) evaluates the performance of the Haniyeh government as good or very good while 43% evaluate it as bad or very bad. Support for keeping the Haniyeh government in office increases in the Gaza Strip (44%) compared to the West Bank (38%). Moreover, positive evaluation of the Haniyeh government increases in the Gaza Strip (38%) compared to the West Bank (28%).

However, support for keeping the government of Salam Fayyad in office is greater than support for keeping the Haniyeh government in office. About half of the respondents (49%) agrees and 44% disagree with keeping the Fayyad government in office. Findings show no difference on this matter between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Moreover, the performance of the Fayyad government receives more positive evaluation than that of the Haniyeh government with 44% giving it a positive evaluation and 28% giving it a negative evaluation. Here too we find no differences between residents of the West Bank and those of the Gaza Strip.

These positions toward the two governments affect public perception of their legitimacy with 30% viewing the Haniyeh government as the legitimate PA government and 38% viewing the Fayyad government as the legitimate one; 22% believe both governments are illegitimate and 5% say the two governments are legitimate. Belief in the legitimacy of Haniyeh’s government increases in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (27%), among those who identify themselves as “religious” (34%) compared to those who identify themselves as “somewhat religious” (19%), among those opposed to the peace process (51%) compared to supporters of the peace process (24%), and among supporters of Hamas (80%) compared to supporters of Fateh (4%) .

Reluctance from a majority of Palestinians to grant legitimacy to either government is in part explained by the failure of the two governments to win the battle over hearts and minds. Findings show that the largest percentage (45%) does not trust the media of Hamas/Haniyeh or Fateh/Fayyad and only 19% trust the media of Hamas/Haniyeh while 27% trust the media of Fateh/Fayyad. Trust in Hamas/Haniyeh’s media increases in the Gaza Strip (27%) compared to the West Bank (15%). Similarly, trust in Fateh/Fayyad media increases in the Gaza Strip (30%) compared to the West Bank (25%). It is noticeable that while in the West Bank 50% say they do not trust either media, the percentage in the Gaza Strip of those not trusting either side decreases to 37%.

Perceptions of legitimacy and media effectiveness affect views regarding responsibility for the problems that plagued the Gaza Strip after the military takeover. The percentage of those blaming Hamas for those problems is higher than the percentage of those blaming Fateh and president Abbas. For example, 26% say that Hamas is responsible for the closure of the Rafah Crossing while only 15% blame Fateh. It is noticeable that the percentage of those blaming Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (22%) and that the percentage of those blaming Fateh is also higher in the Gaza Strip (19%) compared to the West Bank (12%). However, the largest percentage (41%) blames Israel while only 2% blameEgypt for the closure of the Rafah Crossing. Similar findings are found regarding the recent electricity cutoff with 23% blaming Hamas and 18% blaming president Abbas and the Fayyad government. The largest percentage (43%) blamed Israel and 10% blamed the European Union. Blaming Hamas and Fateh increases in the Gaza Strip (29% and 22% respectively) while blaming Israel increases in the West Bank (49%) compared to the Gaza Strip (32%).

Findings show that about one third of the public believes that the top priority for the Fayyad government should be the enforcement of law and order and ending lawlessness followed by conducting political reforms and fighting corruption (22%). Ending international sanctions and returning to the peace process come third and fourth (18% each).

Findings show greater public willingness to accept positions advanced by president Abbas and Fateh to solve the current crisis with Hamas than those advanced by Hamas. For example, 46% say that they accept Abbas/Fateh’s position which calls for dialogue only after Hamas transfers control over the security headquarters to its rightful owners allowing the return to the status quo ante. On the other hand, only 27% say they accept Hamas’s view which calls for unconditional dialogue with President Abbas based on the existing status quo today. Support for Hamas’s position increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (24%). It is interesting to note that support for Abbas/Fateh’s position increases also in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (44%). About one quarter (24%) opposes both views.

Finally, poll findings indicate a strong split among the public regarding the future of the political unity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The largest percentage (29%) expects the unification of the two authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within months and 19% expect it within a year or two. On the other hand, 20% believe unification will not take place in the next two years and 22% believe that the separation will become permanent.  In other words, 48% expect unification within the next two years and 42% do not expect unification in the future or near future. Optimism about unification within the next two years increases in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (42%).

(2) Public Evaluation of West Bank and Gaza Conditions

• Among all respondents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, only 8% evaluate the situation in the Gaza Strip as good or very good while 27% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good.
• West Bank-Gaza Strip public expectations regarding future conditions in the Gaza Strip tend to be pessimistic while expectations regarding future conditions in the West Bank tend to show some optimism.
• Percentage of those wishing to immigrate to other countries continues to increase from 28% last June to 32% in this poll. The percentage is higher in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to West Bank (29%).
• 41% say they feel their security and personal safety and those of their family are assured today and 59% say they are not assured. Feelings of security and safety increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (35%).

Findings show that the public is highly pessimistic about current and future conditions in the Gaza Strip and a little optimistic about conditions in the West Bank. Only 8% of all respondents view current conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good. This evaluation is shared equally by respondents in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By contrast, 27% say that current conditions in the West Bank are good or very good. Here, however the evaluation is not shared equally by respondents in the two areas as 40% in the Gaza Strip compared to 20% in the West Bank say that conditions in the West Bank are good or very good.  Similarly, expectations about the future reflect much greater pessimism about conditions in the Gaza Strip than about conditions in the West Bank. For example, while only 21% expect economic conditions to improve in the Gaza Strip, 56% expect these conditions to improve in the West Bank. Moreover, while only 28% expect conditions of democracy and freedom of speech and press will improve in the Gaza Strip, 47% expect these conditions to improve in the West Bank. In general, residents of the Gaza Strip tend to show more optimism regarding conditions in their area as well as in the West Bank while residents of the West Bank tend to show less optimism regarding conditions in both areas.

The negative and pessimistic evaluation of conditions today and in the future affects the percentage of respondents’ wish to immigrate to other countries leading to an increase from 28%last June, during the Hamas military takeover of the Gaza Strip, to 32% in this poll. The wish to immigrate increases in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to West Bank (29%), among residents of refugee camps (39%) compared to residents of cities (30%) and towns and villages (31%), among supporters of Fateh (40%) compared to supporters of Hamas (20%), among holders of BA degree (44%) compared to illiterates (13%), among men (38%) compared to women (27%), among students (53%) compared to farmers (10%) and housewives (25%), and among the youth between ages of 23-27 years (46%) and 18-22 years (44%) compared to those over 52 years of age (8%) and those between 43-52 years of age (26%).  

Finally, findings show an increase in the perception of security and safety in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip compared to the situation three months ago. Today, 41% (compared to 26% in mid June) say they feel their security and personal safety and those of their family are assured and 59% say they are not assured. Feelings of security and safety increase in the Gaza Strip (49% compared to 41% three months ago) compared to the West Bank (35% compared to 18% three months ago).

(3) Presidential Decree on Elections, Early Elections, and Balance of Power:

• 58% support and 34% oppose the most recent presidential decree regarding the amendment to the electoral system basing it on proportional representation with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip becoming one electoral district and with the distribution of seats reflecting the percentage of popular vote received in the whole country.
• Moreover, 62% support and 32% oppose eligibility conditions imposed by the decree on candidate lists wishing to participate in elections including their commitments to the PLO, the Declaration of Independence, and the Basic Law. A similar percentage (61%) accepts and 32% oppose the application of this eligibility condition on candidates for the presidential elections.
• Support for early elections reaches 62% and opposition 33%. Support increases in the Gaza Strip (65%) compared to the West Bank (60%).
• Popularity of Hamas drops to 31% losing two percentage points compared to its popularity in mid June and six percentage points compared to mid March. The popularity of Fateh increases from 43% three months ago to 48% in this poll.
• If new presidential elections took place today and the only two candidates were Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the percentage of non participation would reach 38%. From among those willing to participate, 59% say they will vote for Abbas, 36% say they will vote for Haniyeh, and 5% remain undecided.
• Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas increases from 36%  last June to 45% in this poll.

Findings show that the public supports the presidential decree issued in early September regarding the election law. Support covers two aspects of the decree.  A majority of 58% support, and 34% oppose, changing the electoral system so that it becomes fully based on a proportional representation system; whereby seats are distributed based on percentage of popular vote in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as one electoral district. The last legislative elections, conducted in January 2006, were based on a mixed system, proportional representation in a single district and a majority system in 16 district. Findings also show that a majority of 62% supports and 32% oppose eligibility conditions imposed by the decree on candidate lists wishing to participate in elections including their commitments to the PLO, the Declaration of Independence, and the Basic Law. A similar percentage (61%) accepts and 32% oppose the application of this eligibility condition on candidates for the presidential elections.

Support for amending the electoral law to proportional representation increases in West Bank (60%) compared to the Gaza Strip (53%), among supporters of the peace process (64%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (33%), and among supporters of Fateh (82%) compared to supporters of Hamas (35%). 

Findings also show that a majority of 62% supports and 32% oppose the holding of early presidential and legislative elections. Support for early elections increases in the Gaza Strip (65%) compared to the West Bank (60%), among supporters of the peace process (71%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (26%), and among supporters of Fateh (89%) compared to supporters of Hamas (39%). It is interesting that 32% of the public say that the lists and candidates they have voted for in the last legislative elections no longer represent them while 63% say they still represent them. Of those who voted for the Hamas list and candidates in the last elections, 36% say they no longer represent them while only 28% of Fateh voters say that Fateh and its candidates no longer represent them.

If new parliamentary elections are held today, Hamas would receive 31% and Fateh would receive 48%. These findings indicate a drop of two percentage points in the popularity of Hamas compared to its standing in mid June and a drop of six percentage points in its popularity compared to its standing in mid March. For Fateh, the finding indicates an increase of five percentage points compared to its standing in mid June. It is noticeable that this is the first time since the January 2006 elections, when it won 42% of the vote, that Fateh’s popularity has significantly increased. The popularity of all the third parties combined reaches 11%, and 10% remain undecided. Hamas’s popularity increases in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (28%) and Fateh’s popularity too increases in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to West Bank (47%).

If new presidential elections took place today and the only two candidates were Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the percentage of non participation would reach 38%. From among those willing to participate, 59% say they will vote for Abbas, 36% say they will vote for Haniyeh, and 5% remain undecided.  If the competition is between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, nonparticipation would drop to 29% and from among those willing to participate, 63% say they will vote for Barghouti, 32% say they will vote for Haniyeh, and 5% remain undecided. These results indicate a significant increase in the percentage of those voting for Abbas compared to the situation in mid June when it reached 49% compared to 42% for Haniyeh. Moreover, vote for Barghouti increases in this poll compared to where it was last June when it stood at 59% compared to 35% for Haniyeh.

Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas increases from 36%  last June to 45% in this poll.

(4) Peace Process

• Only one quarter (26%) of the public expects the November peace conference called for by the US to succeed and 67% expect it to fail in making progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
• 57% agree and 41% disagree with the proposed two-state solution whereby Palestinians recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis recognize Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the solution of all the issues of the conflict.
• Similarly, 58% support and 37% oppose conducting negotiations with the aim of establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel on the permanent issues such as the permanent borders, holy places and refugees.
• But only 46% would support and 48% would oppose a permanent settlement of the borders of the Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with the exception of settlements in about 5% of the West Bank where a swap would take place with Palestinians receiving an equal amount of territories from Israel proper. Support for this settlement increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (42%).

Poll findings show that the public remains highly pessimistic about the chances of success for the international peace conference proposed by the US Administration for November 2007. Only one quarter (26%) of the public expects the November peace conference to succeed and 67% expect it to fail in making progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Optimism increases in the Gaza Strip (30%) compared to the West Bank (23%), among supporters of the peace process (31%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (11%), among supporters of Fateh (41%) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%), and among the illiterates (34%) compared to holders of BA degree (22%).

Findings show that a majority of 57% agrees and 41% disagree with the proposed two-state solution whereby Palestinians recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis recognize Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the solution of all the issues of the conflict. Similarly, 58% support and 37% oppose conducting negotiations with the aim of establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the state ofPalestine and the state of Israel on the permanent issues such as the permanent borders, holy places and refugees. But only 46% would support and 48% would oppose a permanent settlement of the borders of the Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with the exception of settlements in about 5% of the West Bank where a land swap would take place with Palestinians receiving an equal amount of territories from Israel proper. Support for this compromise increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (42%), among residents of refugee camps (51%) compared to residents of villages and towns (44%), among supporters of the peace process (54%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (24%) and among supporters of Fateh (60%) compared to supporters of Hamas (33%).... Full Report