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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5-8 September 2018. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the convening of the PLO Central Council, the launch of an indirect Hamas-Israel negotiations for a long term quiet or tahdia, the resumption of Egyptian efforts to reconcile Fatah and Hamas and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the US decision to stop all financial contributions to UNRWA and to suspend most aid to the PA, the Israeli adoption of a controversial nation-state law, and a leaked statement that President Abbas has reported that the Trump peace team had sought his views on the idea of Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. Moreover, this month of September coincides with the 25^th anniversary of the Oslo agreement. This press release addresses all these issues and covers other matters such as parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The poll examines internal Palestinian conditions and those related to Israeli-Palestinian relations and Palestinian-American relations. Findings of the third quarter indicate a decline in the popularity of both Fatah and Hamas compared to our findings three months ago. The decline might be attributed to the tense power struggle between the two movements that was in clear display during the past two months in the aftermath of the failed reconciliation efforts and a pointless quarrel over who has the right to negotiate a long term quiet, tahdia, or cessation of violence in the Gaza Strip, Hamas or the PA and what comes first, reconciliation or tahdia.  Findings show that more than 60% of the public want president Abbas to resign and that the public disagrees with some of the most important domestic policies of the Palestinian president. An overwhelming majority 

opposes his decision to cut the salaries of PA employees in the Gaza Strip; two-thirds oppose his demand to disarm armed groups in the Strip; and a majority is opposed to his demand that Hamas hand over full control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government. Moreover, a majority opposes Abbas’ position that tahdia between Hamas and Israel is the business of the PA and the PLO rather than that of Hamas. Indeed, a majority of the public supports Hamas’ efforts to reach an agreement with Israel on a long term Tahdia even in the absence of reconciliation. A larger percentage places the blame for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip on the president and the reconciliation government rather than on Hamas. Indeed, about half of the public believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people rather than an asset.

The public shows support for the convening of the PLO Central Council’s session in Ramallah last month and criticizes those factions that boycotted the meeting. Large majorities support the decisions taken by the Central Council regarding the suspension of Palestinian recognition of Israel, ending security coordination with the Israeli security services, and stopping all measures taken against PA employees in the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, the majority has no confidence that the Palestinian leadership will implement any of these decisions.

In exploring attitudes regarding the peace process, we examined issues like public perception of the two-state and the one-state solutions, a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, and attitudes toward the Oslo agreement. Findings show that a majority is opposed to the concept of two-state solution when that solution is presented without any description or details. But a majority supports that solution when it is defined as the creation of a Palestinian state along side the state of Israel on the basis of 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital. Only a quarter prefers a one-state solution, one in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equality in all issues, over a two-state solution. Findings show that two-thirds of the public are opposed to the idea of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation that, according to Abbas, was proposed by the US peace team. Furthermore, a larger majority of three quarters is opposed to a trilateral confederation between Palestine, Jordan and Israel. The great opposition to the Palestinian-Jordanian confederation is probably due to lack of trust in the US team and due to a Palestinian suspicion that the idea aims at preempting the goal of establishing a Palestinian state. Previous PSR findings during the past decade show support for such an idea exceeding 40%. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Oslo agreement, two thirds of the public indicate that the agreement had damaged Palestinian national interests; indeed, almost three quarters of the public believe that the situation today is worse than the pre-Oslo conditions. This of course does not mean that the public wants the return to Israeli occupation; rather, it seems that public is comparing conditions before and after Oslo in several other dimensions such as the multiplication of the size of settlement enterprise, the current split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and conflict between Fatah and Hamas, the ending of the first intifada by Oslo and the absence today of any similar popular movement to end the Israeli occupation, that on-going security coordination with Israel despite the diminished chances for peace, and public belief that the Palestinian political system is becoming more and more authoritarian and lacking any accountability.

Finally, in light of the deterioration in relations between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration, the US termination of most of its aid to the PA, and the US cancelation of its contributions to UNRWA, we asked the public about re-engagement with the US, the views on the “Deal of the Century,” and the chances that the US would succeed in ending UNRWA’s work. Findings show that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US or a return to negotiations with Israel. In fact, 90% expressed the belief that the US is biased in favor of Israel. Half of the public want the Palestinain leadership to reject the US “Deal of the Century” out of hand even before seeing it because it will certainly be bad for Palestinians while only a small minority of 14% thinks that the leadership sould accept the plan because it will certainly be better than the status quo. A majority believes that the Trump Administration will fail in its efforts to end the work of UNRWA but half is worried that if the US does succeed the outcome could contribute to ending the refugee issue.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 62% want president Abbas to resign; 32% want him to stay in office
• 35% are satisfied and 61% are dissatisfied with Abbas’ performance
• In presidential election between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 47% of the vote and the latter 45%; in presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 58% and the latter 37%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 36% of the popular vote and Hamas 27%

62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 32% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 54% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 35% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 42% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip). If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% and the latter 45% of the vote (compared to 47% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 40% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%.

If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah and Mustafa Barghouti are selected by 4% each, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad and Saeb Erikat by 2% each.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 27% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 28% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 34% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 21% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 43% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Only 5% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good or very good; 19% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good
• 43% blame the PA and Abbas for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip; only 24% place the blame on Hamas
• 45% of Gazans and 48% of West Bankers say they feel safe and secure
• 50% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers say they want to emigrate
• 50% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%. And, now that most US aid to the PA has been cut by the US Administration, an overwhelming majority of 77% is worried that the cut in aid could lead to increased unemployment and poverty and a deterioration in daily living conditions while 20% are not worried. In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (43%) blames the PA, president Abbas, and the reconciliation government; 24% blame Hamas, 8% blame Egypt, and 17% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 60% of Gazans, compared to 32% of West Bankers, blame the PA, Abbas and the reconciliation government; and 27% of Gazans, compared to 22% of West Bankers, blame Hamas. Blaming the PA and Abbas is also higher in cities and refugee camps (45% each) compared to villages and towns (32%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (80% and 49% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (13%), among the religious (50%) compared to the somewhat religious (37%), among those who oppose the peace process (60%) compared to supporters of the peace process (35%), among refugees (49%) compared to non-refugees (37%), and among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (30%).

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 45%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 48%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 51% and in the West Bank at 52%. One third of the public says it wants to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to half and declines in the West Bank to 22%.

Only 35% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 59% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%. Half of the public (50%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

In light of repeated reports on finding and destroying narcotics plantations in West Bank areas, we asked the public about the implications of these reports: 57% said that it indicates a recent rise in planting narcotics while 36% believe that it means that the PA security services are becoming more able and more effective in fighting narcotics.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Maan TV (at 14%), Al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (13% each), Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (at 12%), Al Arabiya (at 5%) and al Mayadeen and al Quds TV (4% each).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

• 67% are dissatisfied and 22% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government
• Optimism about the success of reconciliation stands at 28% and pessimism at 65%
• The public opposes the principle policies of Abbas regarding reconciliation

Findings show that 22% are satisfied and 67% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 30%. 28% optimistic and 65% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%. The poll examined public view of the principle Abbas policies regarding reconciliation and found widespread opposition against all of them. The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 31% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 62% disagrees. Three months ago, 40% said they agreed with Abbas. When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, two-thirds (66%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 28% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans, with 68% of Gazans and 65% of West Bankers expressing support for keeping the armed groups in place after reconciliation. Support for the continued existence of the armed groups is higher among supporters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 71% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (52%), among the religious (70%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (63% and 60% respectively), and among those who oppose the peace process (74%) compared to those who support the peace process (64%).  Moreover, an overwhelming majority (81%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 16% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 84% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.   

4) Israel-Hamas long-term tahdia, or truce, negotiations 

• 55% support and 38% oppose a long term tahdia agreement between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip even if such an agreement is reached in the absence of reconciliation
• But 46% expect such an agreement to lead to the full separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

A majority of 55% supports and 38% oppose a Hamas-Israel long-term tahdia, or cessation of violence, even in the absence of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. The agreement would entail the opening of the border crossing with Egypt and access to a seaport and an airport in a neighboring area in return for a Hamas enforcement of a long-term ceasefire as well as ending the Return Marches and the incendiary kites. Support for this long-term tahdia negotiations is higher in the Gaza Strip (63%) than in the West Bank (50%).  Moreover, support for the tahdia negotiation is higher among residents on refugee camps (58%) compared to residents of villages and towns (51%), among supporters of Hamas (64%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (50% and 51% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (52%), and among refugees (61%) compared to non-refugees (49%).

The public is divided in its assessment of the probable consequences of such long-term agreement in the absence of reconciliation: 46% believe that it could transform the current split into a permanent separation leading to the establishment of an independent political entity in the Gaza Strip, while 44% believe no such separation would come out of that long-term agreement. Nonetheless, if permanent separation occurs, 40% believe that Hamas will be seen as more responsible for such development than any other Palestinian faction because it negotiated with Israel and agreed to a long-term cessation of violence without the participation of the PA and the Palestinian leadership. A similar percentage (38%) believes that the PA leadership will be seen as more responsible for that development because it imposed sanctions on the Gaza Strip and did not offer the needed concessions to facilitate reconciliation.

5) Decisions of the Palestinian Central Council of the PLO

• 54% express opposition and 30% support to the boycott of the August Central Council meeting
• 66% support the resolution of the Central Council calling for suspending Palestinian recognition of Israel; 68% support the resolution to stop security coordination with Israel; and 76% support the resolution calling for an end to PA measures against the Gaza Strip
• But a majority believes that the PA leadership will not implement any of these decisions

A majority of 54% disagrees with the decision of various factions to boycott the latest meeting of the PLO’s Central Council in Ramallah and believe it was a wrong decision while 30% think it was the right decision.  A similar percentage (53%) believes that the boycott has damaged the legitimacy of the Central Council while a third believes it has not done that. The view that it was wrong to boycott the Council’s meeting rises in the West Bank (60%) and declines in the Gaza Strip (45%). It is also higher in villages and towns (62%) than in refugees camps (48%), among supporters of Fatah (71%) compared to supporters of Hamas (43%), among those who are 50 years or older (58%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (47%), among the somewhat religious (57%) compared to the religious and the non-religious (52% and 47% respectively), among those who support the peace process (58%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (49%), among the non-refugees (58%) c0mpared to the refugees (50%), and among the illiterates (62%) compared to the holders of BA degree (51%).

Two thirds (66%) support and 26% oppose the Central Council’s decision to suspend Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel until Israel recognizes the state of Palestine. But a majority of 52% believes that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and 35% believe it will implement it.  Similarly, 68% support and 25% oppose the Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel; but more than two-thirds (69%) believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 21% believe it will.  Moreover, 76% support and 18% oppose the Central Council’s decision to immediately stop all measures taken against PA employees in the Gaza Strip; but 50% of the public believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 37% believe it will.

6) Palestinian-Jordanian confederation

• Two thirds express opposition to a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation
• Three quarters express opposition to a trilateral confederation between Palestine, Jordan, and Israel

We asked the public about the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation in the context of the statement made by president Abbas regarding an offer made by the US peace team and in light of Abbas’ statement that the he favors a trilateral confederation that includes Palestine, Jordan, and Israel. About two-thirds rejected and 29% accepted a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. When asked about the trilateral confederation, Palestine, Jordan, and Israel, 75% rejected it and 18% accepted it. Support for a Palestinian confederation with Jordan is higher in the Gaza Strip (34%) compared to the West Bank (25%), in refugee camps (34%) compared to villages/towns and cities (26% and 28% respectively), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (43% and 35% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (25%), among those who support the peace process (34%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (18%), and among holders of BA degree (30%) compared to the illiterates (18%).

7) 25 years after Oslo

• Three quarters of the public say that conditions today are worse than pre-Oslo conditions
• 36% place the blame for Oslo’s failure on Israel, 35% on the international community, and 27% on the Palestinian side
• Two thirds believe that Oslo has harmed Palestinian national interests

Twenty-five years after the signing of the Oslo agreement, we asked the public to tell us, based on personal experience, or based on what it had heard or read, if conditions today are better or worse than conditions before Oslo. Almost three quarter (73%) said conditions today are worse than those prevailing before Oslo; 13% said conditions today are better; and 10% said conditions today are the same as those before Oslo. The belief that conditions today are worse than the pre-Oslo days is higher in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (72%), in cities (74%) compared to refugee camps and villages/towns (67% and 71% respectively), among supporters of Hamas (77%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (62% and 71% respectively), and among those who oppose the peace process (78%) compared to those who support the peace process (74%).

We also asked the public about the most important reason for the failure of the Oslo agreement. More than one third (36%) said that Israel’s refusal to end its occupation and stop settlement construction was the main reason for the failure; 35% said that the lack of pressure on Israel from the international community was the main reason for the failure; and 27% said that it was the fault of the Palestinians themselves. In particular, the Palestinian contribution to the failure was divided as follows: 11% said the PA did not build strong public institutions that fights corruption and enforce the rule of law; 9% said that Fatah sought an exclusive control over that excluded the other factions; 6% said that Hamas and Islamic Jehad violated the agreement and carried out armed attacks against the Israelis; and 2% put the blame on the second intifada and the bombing attacks that targeted the Israelis.  We asked the public to assess the impact of Oslo on Palestinian national interests: two thirds (65%) said it damaged the national interest, 16% said it served the national interest, and 16% said it neither damaged nor served the national interest.

8) The peace process

• 47% support the two-state solution and 50% oppose it
• 53% support a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as a capital of Palestine while 24% prefer a one-state solution with equality to both sides
• 56% believe that settlement construction has made the two-state solution impractical
• 40% prefer to change the status quo through a peace agreement with Israel while 30% prefer to change it by waging an armed struggle
• 39% believe that negotiation is the most effective means of creating a Palestinian state and 33% believe that armed struggle is the most effective means
• 74% believe that the Israeli Nation-State Law poses a threat to the interests of the Arab citizens of Israel
• 57% believe that Israel’s long-term goal is to expel the Palestinians and 23% think it is to deny them their rights
• 45% believe that peace will improve their own living conditions and 17% believe it will make them worse

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 47% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, 43% supported this concept.  Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 53% said they prefer the two-state solution, 24% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 14% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.”  Support for the one-state solution is higher among those who support third parties and Fatah (37% and 31% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (28% and 26% respectively) compared to the religious (22%), among those who support the peace process (27%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (17%), and among holders of BA degree (30%) compared to the illiterates (21%).

A majority of 56% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 41% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 40% of the public while 30% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation” and 12% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance.” A small minority of 14% prefer to keep the status quo.  A large minority of 39% thinks that negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while a third (33%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means and 21% think non-violent resistance is the most effective.  The preference for reaching a peace agreement with Israel is higher in the West Bank (49%) compared to the Gaza Strip (26%), in villages and towns (48%) compared to cities and refugee camps (39% and 32% respectively), among women (43%) compared to men (37%), among those who support Fatah (57%) compared to those who support Hamas and third parties (19% and 35% respectively), among the somewhat religious (48%) compared to the religious and the non-religious (32% and 33% respectively), among those who support the peace process (53%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (17%), among non-refugees (46%) compared to refugees (33%), among the illiterates (53%) compared to holders of BA degree (33%), and among housewives (49%) compared to students (30%).  

An overwhelming majority of 78% say they are worried that in their daily life they would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 22% say they are worried.  Three quarter (74%) say that the newly issued Israeli “nation state” law poses a threat to the rights and interests of Israeli Arabs and 84% believe that the passing of this law will lead to an increase in settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  57% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 18% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.

80% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its problems and internal conflicts and that Palestine is not its primary cause; 19% believe that Palestine remains the primary cause of the Arab World. Moreover, 69% believe that an alliance already exists between Sunni Arabs and Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation; 22% disagrees with this assessment.

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 76% support joining more international organizations; 65% support popular non-violence resistance; 46% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 29% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis.

On the occasion of the International Day of Peace we asked the public about its expectations regarding the impact of a Palestinian-Israeli peace, when reached, on their living conditions. The largest percentage (45%) said it will improve its living conditions; 17% said it will worsen their living conditions; and 34% said peace will have no impact on their living conditions. The belief that peace is likely to improve one’s own living conditions is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (44%), in cities and villages/towns (46% and 45% respectively) compared to refugee camps (41%), among those who support third parties and Fatah supporters (53% and 50% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (36%), among those who support the peace process (49%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (37%), among the non-refugees (47%) compared to refugees (43%), and among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to the illiterates (41%).

9) American-Palestinian relations, the “Deal of the Century,” and the future of UNRAWA

• 62% oppose and 27% support a resumption of contacts with the Trump Administration
• 50% want the PA to reject the “Deal of the Century” out of hand because it will certainly be bad for Palestinians
• 90% believe the US is biased in favor of Israel
• 62% oppose and 31% support a change in PA policy to allow a resumption of US aid
• 55% believe the US will fail in shutting down UNRWA

A majority of 62% is opposed and 27% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Moreover, 58% want the PA to reject US efforts to make it negotiate with Israel; 37% support the resumption of negotiations with Israel.  Opposition to return to negotiations under US pressure is higher in the West Bank (60%) compared to the Gaza Strip (56%), in refugee camps and villages/towns (69% and 60% respectively) compared to cities (56%), among men (61%) compared to women (56%), among those who support Hamas (76%) compared to those who support Fatah and third parties (48% and 53% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (77%) compared to those who support the peace process (52%), and among those who work in the private sector (61%) compared to those who work in the public sector (56%).

Half of the public believes that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 31% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 14% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo.  90% of the public believe that if negotiations with Israel resumed under sponsorship of the Trump Administration, the US will be biased in favor of Israel and 6% think the US will be an honest broker.

In light of US cut of most aid to the PA, we asked the public if it would be better if the PA changed its policy to insure continued US aid: 62% said they want the PA to maintain its current policies and 31% said they want the PA to change its current policies to please the Americans. Support for a change in PA policy in order to restore US aid is higher in the Gaza Strip (39%) compared to the West Bank (27%), among those who support the peace process (36%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (24%), among refugees (37%) compared to non-refugees (26%), and among holders of BA degree (34%) compared to the illiterates (27%).

When we asked the public about its expectations from the PA leadership regarding US pressure, 49% said the PA will indeed change its policy and 43% said it does not expect the PA to change its policy.

We also asked the public about the US cancelation of its aid to UNRWA and what might happen if the US succeeds in shutting down this UN agency: 49% said that if UNRWA is closed down, the refugees’ cause will suffer and 46% said such a development will not end the refugee cause.  When asked about the chances for a US success in shutting down UNRWA, 55% said the US will not succeed and 37% said it will succeed.  The belief that the US will fail in shutting down UNRWA is higher in the Gaza Strip (58%) compared to the West Bank (54%), among men (58%) compared to women (53%), among those who support Fatah and Hamas (55% each) compared to those who support third parties (47%), among those whose age is 50 year or higher (59%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (47%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (63%) compared to supporters of the peace process (52%), among the illiterates (65%) compared to holders of PA degree (58%), and among those who work in the public sector (66%) compared to those who work in the private sector (53%).

When asked to speculate about the reasons that the US had the nerve to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem and to wage a campaign against UNRWA, 48% of the public said it was the weakness of and divisions in the Arab World, 28% said it was the result of the weakness of and divisions among the Palestinians, and 23% said it was due to the personality of Trump himself.

(10) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that ending occupation and building a state is the top most vital Palestinian goal
• 27% believe that poverty and unemployment is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today

42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 27% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 22% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 20% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 7-10 December 2017. The poll was conducted one day after the announcement by President Trump that he is recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and during a period in which limited clashes occurred between Palestinian protesters and Israeli soldiers throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By then, the Palestinian Authority has already publicly condemned the US measure and announced cessation of peace-related contacts with Washington. On the domestic front, reconciliation efforts continued to produce slow progress and a meeting held in Cairo declared that elections will take place before the end of 2018. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as general conditions in the Palestinian territories and certain aspects of the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2017 show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians view the decision by US President Donald Trump as a threat to Palestinian interests, one that requires an appropriate response. But the public is divided on what would be considered appropriate. While the largest percentage favors ending contacts with the US, submitting a formal complaint to the International Criminal Court, and a resumption of an armed intifada, the majority continues to favor responses that exclude armed struggle, despite the rise in support for such struggle during the past three months. Furthermore, it seems obvious that the public does not think that its leadership shares its view on what is considered to be an appropriate response to the American step.

In light of the US step, findings show an almost total public distrust of the role of regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan and Qatar, in the peace efforts organized by the US Administration. More than three quarters believe that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s first cause. Indeed, more than70% believe that despite the continuation of Israeli occupation, an alliance already exists between Sunni Arab states and Israel.

On top of that there is little or no confidence in the US Administration and its peace intentions. An overwhelming majority believes that any Trump peace plan will not meet the basic Palestinian need to end occupation and build an independent state. But here too one can see the gap between the position of the public and the public assessment of the position of the Palestinian leadership. Despite public confidence that the Trump ideas cannot serve as a basis for negotiations, about half of the public believes that President Abbas might accept the American ideas. Furthermore, more than 70% of the public believe that major Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt will also accept the Trump ideas.

Findings show that the public fully supports the assumption of security control by the reconciliation government in the Gaza Strip. In return, the public demands that the reconciliation government pay the salaries of the civil and security sectors which worked in the past under Hamas’ government. The public is also firmly opposed to the disarmament of the various armed groups in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, a majority demands the resignation of the reconciliation government if it does not lift the sanctions imposed by the PA over the Strip. If a national unity government is established, about half of the public rejects the idea that such a government should follow the peace program of President Abbas; only a minority wants the unity government to embrace Abbas’ peace program.

Finally, findings show how the US step has harmed Abbas’ popularity with further decline in his standing and increased demand for his resignation. Demand for Abbas resignation stands today at 70%, a first since such demand became high three years ago. If new presidential elections, in which Abbas competes against Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh, are held today, the latter could easily win. Even if the candidate against Abbas came from the small third parties (such as Mustafa Barghouti from al Mubadara), findings show that it is doubtful that Abbas could win. On the other hand, the party balance remains relatively stable, compared to the findings three months ago, with Fatah having an edge against Hamas. Hamas is more popular than Fatah in the Gaza Strip while Fatah is more popular than Hamas in the West Bank.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 70% want president Abbas to resign; level of satisfaction with Abbas’ performance stands at only 31%
• In a presidential election between Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former receives 53% of the vote and the latter 41%
• In a presidential election between Mustafa Barghouti and Mahmoud Abbas, each receives 45% of the vote
• In a presidential election between Ismail Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti, the former receives 37% and the latter 58%
• In a parliamentary election, Fatah receives 36% of the vote, Hamas 30%, and third parties combined 6%

70% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 26% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 67% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 64% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago demand for Abbas resignation stood at 60% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip.  If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 7% (1% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip); Mustapha Barghouti (5%); Rami al Hamdallah (5%), Khalid Mishal (3%), and Salam Fayyad (2%).

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 66%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 36% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (38% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip).  If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 53% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 50% for Haniyeh and 42% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 33% of the vote (compared to 36% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 66% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh 43% (compared to 42% three months ago). If the competition was between President Abbas from Fatah and Mustafa Barghouti from al Mubadara (Initiative), the two receive an identical percentage of 45%. Mustafa Barghouti receives 57% of the vote in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank and Abbas receies 39% of the vote in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank. Vote for Mustafa Barghouti is higher in the cities (48%) compared to villages and refugee camps (33% and 44% respectively), among the religious (50%) compared to the unreligious (36%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (87% and 80% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (16%), among those whose age is between 18-22 years (55%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (38%), among refugees (56%) compared to none-refugees (34%), among holders of BA degree (49%) compared to illiterates (2%), among students, merchants, and retirees (66%, 55%, and 54% respectively) compared to the unemployed, employees, and housewives (34%, 40%, and 43% respectively), and among those who work in the private sector (46%) compared to those who work in the public sector (35%).

If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 18%, Barghouti 41% and Haniyeh 36%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%. If presidential elections are held soon, 42% want Hamas to nominate one of its leader while 45% prefer to see Hamas supporting a third party or an independent candidate.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 30% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 6% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 27% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 29% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 36% (compared to 31% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 41% (compared to 42% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Only 34% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear
• Perception of personal safety and security stands at 53% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank
• 41% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers seek to immigrate to other countries
• Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions stands at 77%

Only 34% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 61% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.  Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 12%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 53%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 45%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 49% and in the West Bank at 50%.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 41%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago, 43% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers indicated that they seek to immigrate. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Maan TV (15%), al Aqsa TV (14%), Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Al Arabiya (6%) al Quds TV (6%), and al Mayadeen (3%).  

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

• 81% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the civil and security sectors’ employees who served the pervious Hamas government in the Gaza Strip
• 78% want the police department in the Gaza Strip to come under the full control of the reconciliation government
• 38% are satisfied and 55% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government
• Optimism about the future of reconciliation increases from 31% to 50%
• 78% support the formation of a national unity government but only 43% want such a government to abide by the policies of president Abbas
• 72% want to keep factions’ armed wings in the Gaza Strip in place
• 51% want the resignation of the reconciliation government if it does not remove the PA-imposed sanctions on the Gaza Strip 

81% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the civil employees of the former Hamas government but 14% do not want it to do so.  Similarly, 81% of the public want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the security sector employees of the former Hamas government and 14% do not want it to do so.  78% support placing the police department in the Gaza Strip, which is currently under the control of Hamas, to come under the control of the reconciliation government so that the police departments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would come under the one command and control center; 19% are opposed to that and prefer to maintain the current status quo.

Now that it has taken control of the border crossings and the headquarters of the ministries and other public agencies, 38% are satisfied and 55% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Satisfaction is higher in the West Bank (41%) compared to the Gaza Strip (33%), in villages and towns (45%) compared to refugee camps and cities (34% and 37% respectively), among women (37%) compared to men (32%), among the unreligious (45%) compared to the religious and the somewhat religious (37% each), among Fatah supporters (61%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (25% and 33% respectively), among the non-refugees (41%) compared to the refugees (35%), among the illiterates (43%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (31%), among the retirees (50%) compared to the farmers, merchants, and students (19%, 27% and 35% respectively), and among those who work in the public sector (41%) compared to those who work in the private sector (35%).

50% are optimistic and 45% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 31% and pessimism at 61%.  Despite the rise in optimism, only 43% expect the reconciliation government to take real control of the security conditions in the Gaza Strip; 47% do not expect that to happen.   In this context, 45% of the public believe that the latest factional meeting in Cairo has been neither a success nor a failure while 19% view it as a success and 27% as a failure.

78% support the formation of a national unity government composed of Fatah, Hamas, and other faction while only 17% prefer to keep the current reconciliation government.  If a national unity government is established, the public is divided over its peace program: 43% want it to adhere to Abbas policy but 49% does not want to do so. Support for the adherence to Abbas policy is higher in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (35%), in villages and towns (48%) compared to refugee camps and cities (40% and 42% respectively), among women (45%) compared to men (41%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (50% and 47% respectively) compared to the religious (38%), among Fatah supporters (76%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (19% and 38% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (44%) compared to those whose age is between 18-22 (34%), among none-refugees (48%) compared to refugees (38%), among the illiterates (58%) compared to those how hold a BA degree (35%), among housewives and employees (46% and 44% respectively) compared to students and merchants (29% and 37% respectively), and among those who work in the public sector (48%) compared to those who work in the private sector (40%).

Responding to Abbas’ call for “one government, one gun,” 72% want the armed groups that belong to the various factions in the Gaza Strip to remain in place and only 22% support disbanding them. Support for keeping the armed wings is higher among the religious (79%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (52% and 67% respectively), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (88% and 78%) compared to Fatah supporters (49%), among holders of BA degree (69%) compared to the illiterates (59%), and among those who work in the private sector (73%) compared to those who work in the public sector (61%).

Only 43% believe that the date set for elections in the latest factional meeting in Cairo is appropriate while 33% think it is late and 16% think it is too early.  70% support holding legislative and presidential elections but only after resolving all remaining issues such as control over security, PLO, and the armed factions; 26% support holding elections immediately, without resolving these other issues.

The largest percentage (45%) believes that the reason behind Abbas’ decision not to remove the sanctions he had imposed on the Gaza Strip is to pressure Hamas to make more concessions that would remove the obstacles to reconciliation. On the other hand, 22% believe that he has not removed the sanctions in order to insure a slow process of reconciliation and 23% think he seeks to bring about the collapse of the process of reconciliation.  51% support and 38% oppose the resignation of the reconciliation government led by Rami al Hamdallah if it does not immediately remove the Abbas-imposed sanctions on the Gaza Strip.  Demand for the resignation of the Hamdallah government is higher in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (47%), in refugee camps (60%) compared to villages and towns (44%), among men (53%) compared to women (50%), among the religious (56%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (49% and 48% respectively), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (73% and 61% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (30%), among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (48%), among holders of BA degree (55%) compared to illiterates (45%), and among those who work in the private sector (51%) compared to those who work in the public sector (46%).

For the next three months, the top priority of the reconciliation government in the eyes of 42% of the public should be the delivery of electricity and water to Gazans on daily basis while 30% believe it should be the opening of the crossings, 10% think it should be the resolution of the problem of the payment to the employees of the former Hamas government, 9% believe it should be the holding of elections, 6% the imposition of control over security matters in the Gaza Strip, and 2% the convening of the existing Palestinian Legislative Council. For the next year, the top priority of the reconciliation government in the eyes of 41% of the public should be the opening of the crossings; delivery of electricity and water to Gazans on daily basis (31%), while 11% think it should be the holding of elections, 7% think it should be the resolution of the problem of the payment to the employees of the former Hamas government, 7% believe it should be the imposition of control over security matters in the Gaza Strip, and 3% the convening of the existing Palestinian Legislative Council. 51% believe that the reconciliation effort is not linked to the restoration of negotiations and the peace process while 43% think that it is indeed linked.

24% think Fatah and Abbas came out of reconciliation winners and 20% think Hamas came out a winner. But 48% believe that Fatah and Hamas have come out neither winners no losers.  With regard to regional players, the largest percentage (51%) believes that Egypt came out of reconciliation a winner while only 34% described Saudi Arabia as a winner (and 25% as a loser), 33% said Qatar came out a winner (and 26% as a loser), and 27% said Iran came out a winner (and 26% as a loser). Although 33% characterized Israel as a winner, 46% characterized it as a loser.

(4) The peace process:  

• 91% say the US policy of recognizing Jerusalem as a capital of Israel constitutes a threat to Palestinian interests
• In response to US announcement, 45% want a PA policy that stops all contacts with the US Administration, submit an official complaint to the ICC, and seek a return to an armed intifada
• Findings show an increase in the belief that armed action is the most effective means for establishing a Palestinian state from 35% to 44% and a decrease in the belief that negotiations is the most effective means from 33% to 27%
• 72% believe that the Trump Administration will not propose a Palestinian-Israeli peace plan and if one is indeed proposed by the US, 86% believe it will not meet Palestinian needs for ending occupation and building a state
• But 49% believe that president Abbas might accept such a US plan and 72% believe that Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia might also accept it
• Confidence in the role and position of major Arab counties in the peace process is slim with three quarters believing that Palestine is no longer the Arabs’ first cause

91% characterize Trumps declaration recognizing Jerusalem as a capital of Israel as a threat to Palestinian interests (79% as a great threat and 12% as a limited threat) while only 7% saw no threat in the declaration. The largest percentage (45%) believes that the most appropriate Palestinian measure against the US step is to stop all contacts with the American Administration, submit a formal complaint to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and resort to an armed intifada. But 27% think it should stop the contacts and submit a complaint to the ICC, but should resort to non-violent resistance. Still, 12% want the PA to only denounce the US step and stop the contacts with the US Administration and an identical percentage wants it to denounce the step while maintaining contacts with the US toward reaching a permanent peace.  Support for stopping contacts, submitting a complaint to the ICC and resorting to an armed intifada is higher in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (40%), among men (48%) compared to women (43%), among the religious (47%) compared to the unreligious (34%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (58% and 50% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (36%), among holders of BA degree (45%) compared to the illiterates (37%), and among farmers and students (85% and 51% respectively) compared to housewives and merchants (41% and 42%). However, only 27% of the public believe that the Palestinian leadership will actually stop contacts with the US, submit an ICC complaint, and resort to an armed intifada while 24% believe the PA will denounce the US step but will maintain contacts with the Trump Administration.

The largest percentage (44%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 27% think negotiation is the most effective means and 23% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, only 35% indicated that armed resistance is the answer and 33% sided with negotiation.  Support for armed action is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (42%), in cities (45%) compared to villages and towns (37%), among men (47%) compared to women (40%), among the religious (49%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (32% and 40% respectively), among supporters of Hamas (67%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (20% and 38%), among refugees (47%) compared to non-refugees (41%), among the illiterates (48%) compared to holders of BA degree (44%), and among farmers, merchants, and students (72%, 52%, and 46% respectively) compared to housewives and professionals (40% and 42% respectively).

An overwhelming majority of 72% believes that the Trump Administration will not submit any ideas or plans for Palestinian-Israeli peace while 24% think it will do so.  But even if the US does submit a peace proposal, an even larger majority of 86% believes that such a proposal will not meet Palestinian need to end occupation and build a state; only 11% think the proposal will indeed meet such needs.  Nonetheless, 49% believe that president Abbas might accept the American peace plan if one is indeed submitted to him while 42% believe he will not accept it.  Belief that Abbas might accept the US proposals is higher in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (41%), in refugee camps and cities (55% and 51% respectively) compared to villages and towns (39%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (65% and 53% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (43%), among those whose age is between 18-22 years (50%) compared to those whose age is over 40 years (47%), among refugees (53%) compared to non-refugees (45%), among holders of BA degree (54%) compared to illiterates (45%), among farmers, professionals, and students (63%, 56%, and 53% respectively) compared to retirees, laborers, and housewives (40%, 45%, and 47% respectively), and among those who work in the private sector (49%) compared to those who work in the public sector (46%).   When asked about the Israeli side, 65% said that they think the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu will accept such American peace plan; only 26% think he will not accept it.  Moreover, 72% of the public believe that major Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia (or at least one of them) will accept this American plan if submitted; only 20% think they will not accept it.

Regarding public trust in the roles and positions of major Arab countries in the peace process and the US efforts to develop a regional agreement in the context of Palestinian-Israeli peace, an overwhelming majority of 82% says that it does not trust the Saudi role, 75% do not trust the Emirati role, 70% do not trust the Egyptian role, and 59% do not trust the Jordanian or the Qatari roles. Moreover, 76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 23% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. In fact, 71% believe that there is already an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 21% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state. Three months ago, only 64% said that an Arab Sunni alliance already exists with Israel.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 48% say that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be the ending of occupation and the building of the Palestinian state
• The most serious problem facing Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement construction

48% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 28% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 29% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 26% say it is poverty and unemployment; 20% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

 30 - 31 December 2004

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on Thursday and Friday 30 and 31 December 2004. Total size of the sample is 1319 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3% and rejection rate 2%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa, at Tel   02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.
 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: 

The poll aimed at examining possible changes in Palestinian public attitudes in the post Arafat era regarding six basic elements of Israeli-Palestinian permanent status negotiations: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange, (2) Refugees, (3) Jerusalem, (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state, (5) Security arrangements, and (6) End of conflict. Questions regarding similar and identical elements were asked in December 2003. While the 2003 elements were presented as constituting the main components of the Geneva Initiative, this poll made no mention of the Geneva initiative and the elements were presented as constituting a possible permanent status agreement. The poll also sought to revisit a question asked in June 2003 regarding public willingness to accept a settlement that would contain a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. The findings indicate a significant increase toward more dovish views among Palestinians compared to the situation 12 and 18 months ago. It should be emphasized that these figures have been obtained after a prolonged period of reduced violence between the two sides and during the Palestinian election campaign. Here are the main findings:

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange 

63% support or strongly support and 35% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2003. At that time, support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 57% and opposition at 41%.

(2) Refugees 

46% support and 50% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2003, only 25% agreed with an identical compromise while 72% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem 

44% support and 54% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2003, an identical compromise had a similar reception with 46% supporting it and 52% opposing it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian state 

27% support and 61% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety.Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise that contained all these elements with the exception of the part on the deployment of a multinational force received in December 2003 the support of 36% and the opposition of 63%.

(5) Security Arrangements 

53% support and 45% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel will have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2003, a similar compromise that contained these same elements with the exception of the part on the multinational force received the support of 23% and the opposition of 76%.

(6) End of Conflict 

69% support and 29% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2003 the support of 42% and the opposition of 55%.

The Whole Package

54% support and 44% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2003, 39% supported and 58% opposed an identical overall combined package presented in the context of the Geneva Initiative. 

The main difference between the December 2003 and the December 2004 versions presented to the respondents is that while the first version stated that the package was that of the Geneva initiative, the second did not. In addition, in presenting the elements of the compromise in December 2004, we merged the parts dealing with the multinational force (presented in 2003 as a separate element) into the two elements of the demilitarized state and the security arrangements. 
 

Mutual Recognition of Identity 

63% support and 35% oppose the proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there would be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. In June 2003, only 52% of the Palestinians supported this proposal and 46% opposed it.

SUMMARY TABLE OF THE FINDINGS

Changes in Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement Framework among Palestinians in the last year

Results in Numbers

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the preparation for the holding of the first phase of local elections in rural areas and small towns in the West Bank but without a confirmation of the date for holding the second phase of local elections in cities and big towns. Hamas prevented the holding of the local elections in the Gaza Strip. The first phase of local elections was held in the West Bank on 11 December, the last day of the field work, in 154 localities and the participation rate stood at 66% according the Palestinian Central Elections Commission. The number of participants stood at 262,827 voters. This period witnessed also various violent incidents in Palestinian universities and the death of one student. Israel classified 6 Palestinian human rights NGOs as terrorist organizations. The UK labeled Hamas as a terrorist organization. This press release addresses some of these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2021 show that while the public is pessimistic about the prospects of holding parliamentary or presidential elections in the near future, it is optimistic that the second phase of local elections will take place soon. The second phase of local elections is now set to take place in cities and big towns on 26 March 2022. The findings show that Fatah is more popular than Hamas in West Bank cities that will participate in the second phase of the local elections while Hamas is more popular in the Gazan cities that might participate in the second phase of the local elections.  Nonetheless, the findings show that the overall domestic balance of power between Fatah and Hamas has not changed compared to 

our findings of September 2021. Hamas is more popular than Fatah, and Ismail Haniyyeh easily wins against president Abba and prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh in one to one competitions. But Marwan Barghouti, also from Fatah, wins against Haniyyeh with two-thirds voting for him. Three quarters of the public demand the resignation of president Abbas.

What is noticeable however is that despite the stability in the domestic balance of power, there is a clear disappointment in Hamas’ leadership indirectly expressed by the public compared to the situation six and even three months ago. The findings show that the percentage of those who choose Hamas to represent and lead the Palestinian people has declined significantly and the gap between those who choose Hamas compared to those who choose Fatah, under Abbas’ leadership, has now narrowed to 11 percentage points in favor of Hamas; in September, the gap stood at 26 points in favor of Hamas and in June, a month after the Hamas-Israel May 2021 war, the gap stood at 39% in favor of Hamas. The percentage of those who believe that neither Fatah, under Abbas, nor Hamas deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people has now increased considerably.

In this poll, we have asked about various political solutions to the conflict with Israel and about the confidence building measures that seek to improve the daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The findings show the following:

• The majority is still opposed to the two-state solution. But support for this solution has increased compared to the September 2021 findings and decreased compared to the October 2021 findings.  
• The two-state solution remains the one with the largest percentage of support compared to other solutions, including that of the one-state solution in which the two sides, Palestinians and Israeli Jews, enjoy equal rights; support for the one-state solution is higher than one quarter and less than one third.
• There is a clear majority, higher than 60%, in favor confidence building measures that improves Palestinian daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the current level of support is higher than that of September 2021 when we first asked about the issue.

Findings also show that despite a two-third opposition to a resumption of unconditional bilateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, a large minority approaching about half of the public is in favor of a resumption of such negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Moreover, despite the opposition of the majority to the resumption of dialogue between the US and PA, a large minority approaching half of the public believes that the US is the most effective in influencing the decisions of the Palestinians and the Israelis on the matter of the renewal of the peace process. Also on the peace process, findings show a decrease in the percentage of those who believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and an increase in the percentage of those who believe that negotiation is the most effective. Nonetheless, armed struggle is viewed as more effective than negotiations.

Findings also show that the largest percentage of respondents believes the main Israeli motivation behind the labeling of six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations is to weaken the ability of these organizations to document Israeli violations of human rights and to weaken the PA efforts to take Israelis to the International Criminal Court.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• Pessimism about holding national elections and optimism about holding local elections
• Fatah wins against Hamas in West Bank cities and Hamas wins in Gaza Strip cities
• In presidential elections, Ismail Haniyyeh wins against president Abbas and prime minister Shtayyeh but loses against Marwan Barghouti
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas wins 38% of the vote and Fatah 35%
• 34% see Hamas, and 23% see Fatah, more deserving to represent and lead the Palestinians 

70% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 27% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 52% (62% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Nonetheless, a majority of 59% (68% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) expect the holding of the second stage of local elections in cities and big towns in the near future; 34% do not expect that.

Fatah is more popular than Hamas (38% to 30%) in West Bank cities which will participate in the second phase of local elections while Hamas is more popular than Fatah (47% to 29%) in the cities in the Gaza Strip that might participate in the second phase of local elections.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 35% and Haniyeh 58% of the votes (compared to 56% for Haniyeh and 34% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 33% of the votes (compared to 34% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 52% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 65% and from among those Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 52% and from among those the former receives 33% and the latter 59%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received 31% and Haniyyeh 60%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 35% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 5% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 27% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 21% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 78% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 38% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 37% and Fatah at 32%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 27% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 38% three months ago).

In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 34% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 36% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 45% selected Hamas, 19% Fatah under Abbas, and 28% said neither side deserves such a role. In this poll, the percentage of those selecting Hamas for representation and leadership is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (30%), among those whose age is 50 years and above (35%) compared to the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (30%), among Hamas supporters (89%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (6% and 15% respectively), in refugee camps and cities (39% and 34% respectively) compared to villages (28%), among professionals and students (43% and 36% respectively) compared to laborers (30%), among those who work in the public sector (36%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (31%), among those with the lowest income (37%) compared to those with the highest income (24%), among the religious (47%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (18% and 24% respectively).  

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31% and in the Gaza Strip at 5%; but perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 79% and the West Bank at 51%.
• 27% want to emigrate; the percentage stands at 31% in the Gaza Strip and 23% in the West Bank.
• 84% say there is corruption in the institutions of the PA and 69% say there is corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip
• Only one third is optimistic about the prospects of reconciliation; and 56%  view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 79% and in the West Bank at 51%. 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 31% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 21% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 36% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 83% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 61% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

A minority of 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 59% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (56%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 34% viewed it as an asset.  Looking at the prospects of reconciliation, 33% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic. Three months ago, optimism stood at 32%.

After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 71% expect failure; only 23% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29% of the public expect success and 65% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 69% expects failure and 27% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 27%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Maan (10%), Palestine Today (9%), al Mayadeen (4%), and al Arabiya (3%).

(3) The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• A majority in the West Bank says it has already received the Covid-19 vaccination and about one quarter in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip does not want to take the vaccine.
• 77% are satisfied with the efforts of the PA government to make the vaccine available but only 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the virus.

 58% (68% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 18% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24% say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.  An overwhelming majority of 77% (87% in the Gaza Strip and 71% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 21% are dissatisfied.  But only 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 42% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, only 45% expressed satisfaction.

The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 69% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 69% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 39%.

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• 39% support the two-state solution and 59% are opposed; support for a one-state solution reaches up to 29%.
• To break the deadlock, 56% support popular non-violent resistance, 50% support a return to armed intifada, and 48% support dissolving the PA
• 61% view positively the confidence building measures between the PA and Israel that aim at improving livening conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• The largest percentage (42%) views armed struggle as the most effective means of ending the occupation
• 61% say the international, regional, and local conditions does not make it possible to resume peace negotiations, but 46% support a resumption of negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet
• The largest percentage believes that the Israeli classification of Palestinian human rights organizations as terrorist aims at weaking the efforts of these organizations to document Israeli violations 

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 36%.   When asked about their preferences regarding a political solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from among three specific solutions, one third (33%) preferred the “two state solution, the state of Palestine next to the state of Israel,” 16% preferred a “one state solution, from the River to the Sea, with equal rights to Jews and Arabs,” and 11% preferred a one state solution in which the status of the Palestinians would be “the same as the status of the inside Palestinians,” and 32% preferred other solutions, such as “historic Palestine,” or “full Palestine,” or “independent Palestine,” and others. In this context, reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 29% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 65% expressed opposition. Support for the one-state with equal rights in the West Bank (30%) compared to the Gaza Strip (27%), among youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (32%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (29%), among supporters of Fatah (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (17% and 30% respectively), in villages and small towns (44%) compared to refugee camps and cities (26% and 27% respectively), among women (30%) compared to men (27%), and among laborers and students (36% and 33% respectively) compared to employees and professionals (24% each).

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 56% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 50% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 61% said it looks positively, while 33% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 56% of the public said it viewed these measures positively. Support for confidence building measures is higher in the West Bank (66%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among those whose age is 50 years or higher (62%) compared to the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (52%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (74% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (51%), in villages and cities (66% and 61% respectively) compared to refugee camps (56%), among women (64%) compared to men (59%), among businessmen (67%) compared to students (55%), among those who work in the private sector and the non-governmental institutions (64%) compared to those who work in the public sector (47%), among the married (62%) compared to the unmarried (56%), and among those whose has the highest income (68%) compared to those with the lowest income (52%).  

A majority of 59% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 42% chose armed struggle, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 48% chose armed struggle and 28% chose negotiations.

A majority of 61% thinks that current international, regional, and local conditions does not make possible a resumption of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis while 35% think that these conditions make a resumption of negotiations possible.  Under current conditions, a majority of 66% opposes and 26% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 46%; 49% are opposed. Support for a return to negotiations under a Quartet sponsorship is higher in the West Bank (47%) compared to the Gaza Strip (45%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (69% and 68% respectively), compared to supporters of Hamas (32%), in villages (50%) compared to refugee camps and cities (45% and 46% respectively), among students and businessmen (53% and 52% respectively) compared to professionals and employees (38% and 44% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (49%) compared to those who work in the private and nongovernmental sectors (45%), among those with the highest income (55%) compared to those with the lowest income (40%), and among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (59% and 48% respectively) compared to the religious (43%).  

56% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Yet, when asked about the country or party that is most influential in convincing the Palestinian and Israeli sides to return to the peace process, 46% said the US, 33% said Arab countries such as Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, or Qatar, 10% said Europe, and 3% said Russia.

We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 38% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 19% selected the loss of the will to fight.

When asked about the country or party most responsible for derailing the peace process in the region, 65% said it is Israel, 15% said it is the US, 15% said it is Arab countries, and 3% said Palestine.

We asked the public about its views on the reason Israel labelled six Palestinian human rights NGOs, such as Al Haq and Addameer, as terrorists organizations. The largest percentage (40%) said the Israeli decision aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights; 20% said it aimed at weakening the PA-led campaign to try Israelis at the International Criminal Court; 17% said it aimed at weaking the ability of these NGOs to document PA violations of human rights in the West Bank; 11% said it aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Hamas’ violations of human rights in the Gaza Strip, and another 11% said it aimed at weakening the PFLP.   

In reaction to the UK government decision to label Hamas as a terrorist organization and the idea of boycotting British products, 49% expressed the belief that such a boycott would be effective in forcing the UK government to rescind its decision while 45% think the boycott would not be effective. The belief in the efficacy of the boycott of British products is higher in the West Bank (52%) compared to the Gaza Strip (45%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (54%) compared to those whose age is 50 or higher (45%), in villages (57%) compared to refugee camps and cities (46% and 48% respectively), and among women (52%) compared to men (47%).  

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 41% view ending the occupation and building a Palestinian state as the most vital national goal
• The largest percentage (33%) view Israeli occupation as the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today 

41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (26%; 15% in the Gaz Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 22% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 20% said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 5%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 26% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the internal violence, and 10% said it is the split or division.

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll

ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION BUT ARE LESS WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE THAN THEIR LEADERS

27-31 July  2000

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, have conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion.

The poll sought to examine the views of the two peoples in the wake of the failed summit at Camp David. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of communication at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of political science and director of PSR. The two surveys included identical questions. A representative sample of 1259 Palestinian in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. A representative sample of 525 Israelis was interviewed by telephone (sampling error of 4.5%). The interviews were conducted between July 27-31.

PSR and the Truman Institute hope that this joint poll will be a first stage in an ongoing research into the opinions of the two publics during the coming years.

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org, and on the Israeli survey, please contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@huji.ac.il.

Summary of Results

The overall picture emerging from the surveys on the Camp David summit is that both publics are less willing than their leaders to pay the price of peace, although they expect a compromise agreement to be reached and support reconciliation between the two people.
 

1. Views on positions expressed and concessions made at Camp David

A majority of both publics is critical of the positions presented at Camp David by their leader.

While the majority of Palestinians (68%) believe that Arafat's overall position at the summit was "just right", most Palestinians view Arafat's issue-specific positions as reported in the media as "too much of a compromise".

The Israeli public is even less supportive of Barak's overall position. Fifty seven percent believe that overall Israeli position was too much of a compromise, 25% think that the Israeli position was just right, and 13% think that Israel could compromise even more.

The position most strongly opposed by Israelis is that with regard to the refugees. Sixty four percent think that Barak made too much of a compromise by willing to have several thousands of refugees return to Israel every year over the coming years, even without taking moral or legal responsibility for the refugee problem. On the other hand Arafat's position on this issue that Israel recognize resolution 194 and show willingness to absorb hundreds of thousands of refugees is supported by 68% of the Palestinians, while only 20% regard this position as too much of a compromise.

The highest level of support expressed by the Israeli public concerns the security arrangements. Forty six percent think that Barak's position on this issue is just right, and an additional 13% believe that Israel could even compromise more. Among the Palestinians on the other hand 68% found "too much of a compromise" in the reported security arrangements, and only 25% found this position to be "just right" or "not enough of a compromise".

On the issue of Jerusalem, a similar majority of 57% in both samples thought that the positions presented by their leaders at the summit on which reportedly the talks broke down were still "too much of a compromise". Forty one percent of the Israelis and 36% of the Palestinians found their delegations' positions to be "just right" or "not enough of a compromise".

Similarly on the issue of the Palestinian state and borders 56% of the Israelis and 51% of the Palestinians thought their leaders' positions were "too much of a compromise. On the settlements issue, 52% of Israelis and 55% of Palestinians considered their delegation's positions as too compromising.

2. What is next?

Despite these critical attitudes towards their leaders' positions in the negotiations, a considerable majority of both publics (79% of Israelis and 75% of Palestinians) believes that in the long run an agreement will be reached and that the breakdown of the talks does not signal the end of negotiations. Only 19% of Israelis and 23% of Palestinians believe that the failure in Camp David is the end of the peace process and there is no chance to reach an agreement in the years to come.

If however no agreement is reached in the coming months and violent confrontations erupt in the West Bank and Gaza, a majority of the Israelis (54% and 58% ) do not believe that either side will achieve greater political gains than in negotiations. On the other hand, a majority of the Palestinians (57%) do believe that such confrontations will help them achieve greater gains, and only a third believe that Israel will gain from such developments. In accordance with such expectations around 60% of the Palestinians support violent confrontations and the emulation of Hizbullah methods if no agreement is reached in the coming months.

While 56% of the Palestinians support a unilateral state declaration in September, only 31% of Israelis believe that this will happen if no agreement is reached by then. In case a Palestinian state is declared unilaterally 27% of Israelis support harsh retaliatory measures (re-occupation or annexation of territories), another 20 percent support an Israeli blockade coupled with international pressure, and 39% support continued negotiations with the Palestinians. Palestinians overestimate Israeli willingness to retaliate harshly.

 3. Chances for reconciliation and lasting peace

If an agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel, Israelis (72%) and Palestinians (75%) overwhelmingly support reconciliation efforts between Israel and the Palestinian state, but both publics think it may take many years and perhaps generations, if at all. Israelis correctly perceive that reconciliation may be harder for the Palestinians, who are indeed more skeptical about its prospects. Most Israelis (58%) but only a third of the Palestinians think that a lasting peace is possible. Furthermore, two thirds of the Palestinians think that a majority of Israelis believe that a lasting peace is impossible, and 55% of the Israelis think the same about Palestinians.

Given a state of peace between Israel and a Palestinian state, Israelis and Palestinians vary with respect to their support for various steps toward normalization. While Palestinians mainly support open borders and economic cooperation, Israelis see more favorably than Palestinians cultural changes in education and public discourse and social interaction. 

• 75% of Israelis and Palestinians support joint economic institutions and ventures
• 56% of Israelis and 38% of Palestinians support legal measures against inciting against the other side
• 53% of Israelis and 85% of Palestinians support open borders and free movement of people and goods
• 47% of Israelis and 10% of Palestinians support a school curriculum that educates to give up aspirations for parts of the "homeland" which are in the other state
• 41% of Israelis and 31% of Palestinians support joint political institutions leading to a confederation
• On a personal level under conditions of peace, 69% of Israelis would invite a Palestinian colleague to their home, and 62% are willing to visit a Palestinian colleague in his home. Forty one percent of Palestinians would invite or visit an Israeli colleague

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 24 September 2016. The period before the poll witnessed the suspension of the process of local elections as a result of a decision by the Palestinian high court. It also witnessed an increase in cases of security breakdown especially in the Nablus area, major disruptions in access to running water throughout the West Bank, continued debate on the French Initiative, an acceptance by President Abbas of a Russian invitation for a meeting in Moscow with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and others. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers attitudes regarding local elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the increase in cases of security breakdown, water shortages, reconciliation, the peace process, the French Initiative, and the Russian invitation. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In addition to the usual trend issues, this poll focused on three matters: local elections, the water crisis that affected West Bank residents during the summer, and the recent rise in the number of incidents of internal security breakdown. Findings show that a majority of the public is dissatisfied with the decision of the high court to suspend the local election process and views it as a political decision aiming at cancelling the elections. If local elections are held today, the public is certain that Hamas will win in the Gaza Strip but it expects Fatah to win in the West Bank. Findings also indicate that a clear majority of West Bankers have suffered from water shortages during this past summer and that most of those who experienced water shortages had to buy water in tanks. While a large percentage of the public blames Israel for the water crisis, because it reduced water allocation to the Palestinian territories, a larger percentage places the blame on the Palestinian side. With regard to recent internal security breakdowns, the public sees three drivers: weak and inconsistent performance by the PA security services, weak courts and justice system, and a surge in family and societal conflicts.

There is no doubt that a great part of the motivation for the public rejection of the high court decision regarding local elections, despite the fact that these elections will take place under conditions of national and territorial disunity, is related to a democratic impulse. This attitude appears at odd with past findings in which national unity impulses trumped democratic ones. It is clear from the findings that the public believes that a successful holding of local elections throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will significantly improve the chances for holding presidential and parliamentary elections that have not been held for more than a decade. On the other hand, it is clear that the national unity impulse is not totally absent. About one third of the public is unhappy about the fact that local elections, if held, will take place under conditions of disunity. Indeed, a slight majority rejects the idea of holding parliamentary and presidential elections under the same conditions. It is worth noting that there are no significant differences between attitudes of the residents of the West Bank compared to those in the Gaza Strip regarding all the issues mentioned above, indicating perhaps that the motivation for both sides is not related to geography or region. 

Compared to our findings three months ago, current findings indicate a strengthening of three developments found in the second quarter of 2016: (1) support for armed action continues to decline; (2) support for the French Initiative increases slightly; and (3) Fatah’s popularity improves somewhat compared to that of Hamas and demand for Abbas’ resignation decreases. Nonetheless, the current level of support for an armed intifada remains high and a majority opposes the Russian invitation for a meeting between Abbas and Netanyahu in Moscow. Moreover, the public remains highly pessimistic about the French Initiative’s chances of success. Finally, Hamas’ candidate for the presidency, Ismail Haniyeh remains more popular than Abbas.  

(1) Local elections:

• 61% are dissatisfied with the high court’s decision to suspend the local elections process and 60% view it as politically motivated.
• If local elections are held, 50% say that the most important consideration for their vote is the ability of the electoral lists to deliver services; 31% say it is the ability to defend national rights.
• In local elections, 35% say that Fatah lists are the most able to deliver services and 17% say Hamas lists are the most able to do so.
• 28% say that Fatah local election lists, and 26% say Hamas local election lists, are the most able to defend national rights.
• 48% expect the cancelation of the local elections and 40% expect local elections to take place soon.
• The largest percentage expects Hamas to win in the Gaza Strip; in the West Bank, the largest percentage expects Fatah to win

A majority of 61% is displeased with the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice to temporarily suspend the local election process and 29% are pleased. Findings show that 60% believe that the decision was politically motivated and aimed at scuttling the election process while 31% believe that the decision was a legal one and aimed at correcting the election process.  Dissatisfaction with the court’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (63%) than in the West Bank (60%); among t hose whose age is 50 and above (68%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (52%); among Hamas supporters (77%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 61% respectively); among residents of cities (64%) compared to residents of villages and refugee camps (48% and 53% respectively); among men (64%) compared to women (57%); among the religious (64%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (50% and 60% respectively).

54% say that not holding local elections in the occupied East Jerusalem is not a good reason to stop local elections in the rest of the Palestinian territories. Similarly, 57% say that the fact that courts in the Gaza Strip, under Hamas control, ruled on election cases submitted to them in the Strip is not a good reason to stop local elections.  35% believe that Fatah and Hamas together wish to cancel local elections while 23% believe that it is Fatah that wishes to cancel these elections; only 14% believe that it is Hamas who wishes to cancel the elections.

41% say they have not registered to participate in local elections while 50% say they have registered. Among those who have registered, 81% say they intend to participate in the elections if and when they are held.  50% of those who intend to participate in the local elections say that the most important voting consideration is the ability of the electoral list to deliver services such as water, electricity, roads and other matters of daily life; 31% say that the most important consideration is the ability of the list to defend the rights of the Palestinian people and to contribute to the ending of the Israeli occupation; 9% say it is to serve the interests of the family; and 9% say the most important consideration is the support of the political party they are affiliated with. When evaluating the ability of the various electoral lists to meet the various considerations, 35% believe that the list supported by Fatah is the most able to deliver services while 17% believe that the list supported by Hamas is the most able to deliver services; 15% say it is the list of independents and professionals while only 3% say it is the list supported by the Left.  With regard to the ability to defend national rights and contribute to ending occupation, 28% believe that the list supported by Fatah is the most able to do that while 26% believe that the list supported by Hamas is the most able to do that; 11% say it is the list of independents and professionals while only 2% say it is the list supported by the Left.

The largest percentage (48%) believes that the local elections will be called off but 40% believe they will take place soon. If local elections do take place soon, the largest percentage (39%) believes they will assist in the process of reconciliation while 32% believe they will weaken the process of reconciliation and 25% think they will have no impact.  If local elections are held soon, a majority of 56% expects Hamas lists or lists supported by Hamas, and 21% expect Fatah lists or lists supported by Fatah, to win in the Gaza Strip. With regard to election outcome in the West Bank, 44% expect Fatah lists or lists supported by Fatah, and 26% expect Hamas lists or lists supported by Hamas, to win. Expectations of election outcome differ in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank. For example, while 66% of West Bankers expect Hamas lists would win in the Gaza Strip, the percentage among Gazans drops to 37%.   Moreover, while 36% of Gazans believe Fatah lists are likely to win in the local election in the Gaza Strip, the percentage drops to 14% among West Bankers. These differences diminish somewhat when predicting the outcome of the local elections in the West Bank: 34% of Gazans compared to 22% of West Bankers expect Hamas would win and 34% of Gazans and 49% of West Bankers expect Fatah would win.  More than three quarters of the public (76%) support, and 18% oppose, the participation of West Bank refugee camps in the local elections.

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• Demand for Abbas’ resignation decreases from 65% t0 61%.
• In presidential elections between President Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the latter receives 48% and the former 45%.
• In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the latter receives 36% and the former 58%.
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 32% and Fatah 37%.
• A majority of 51% rejects holding presidential and parliamentary elections under conditions of disunity identical to those under which local elections might, with public approval, be held.
• 42% believe that Fatah and president Abbas are the ones who impede the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections; only 22% put the blame on Hamas.

61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 33% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 65% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 58% in the West Bank and 65% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh;  Khalid Mishal and Mohammad Dahlan receive 5% each, Rami al Hamdallah receive and Mustapha Barghouti receive 4% each; Salam Fayyad receives 3%, and Saeb Erekat 1%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% today compared to 34% three months ago. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip.  If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 48% (compared to 48% three months ago) and the latter 45% (compared to 43% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 47% of the vote (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 50% (compared to 49% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 43% (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh 46% (compared to 47% three months ago).  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 21%, Barghouti 41% and Haniyeh 33%. And if presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 37% say they would vote for Fatah, 7% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 24% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 31% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 37% (compared to 33% three months ago) and for Fatah at 39% (compared to 35% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 36% (compared to 34% three months ago).

Despite supporting the holding of local elections under current conditions in which Hamas has effective control over the Gaza Strip and in which the PA under Abbas and the Reconciliation Government controls the West Bank, a slim majority of 51% opposes, and 42% support, holding presidential and parliamentary elections under identical conditions.  59% believe, and 32% do not believe, that a successful holding of local elections would hasten the holding of parliamentary and presidential election. A plurality of 42% believes that Fatah and president Abbas are the ones who are impeding the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in the Palestinian territories while only 22% believe that Hamas is the real impediment.

(3) Domestic and security conditions, Allenby Bridge terminal, and UNRWA:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 48% in the Gaza Strip and 42% in the West Bank.
• 46% of Gazans and 29% of West Bankers want to immigrate to other countries.
• The belief that there is corruption in the PA institutions stands at 79%; only 16% believe there is press freedom in the West Bank and 14% believe there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip.
• 47% believe that the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 46% believe it is an asset.
• 59% oppose and 26% support the return of Mohammad Dahlan to Fatah.
• 57% believe that the recent death of a detainee in Nablus due to beating by the PA security services was deliberate.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 15% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 48%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 42%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 44% and in the West Bank at 44%.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 46%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 29%. Three months ago 45% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Maan TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by al Jazeera TV (at 16%), Hamas’ al Aqsa TV (at 15%), Palestine TV at 14%, Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) at 11%, Al Arabiya at 6%, al Quds TV at 4%, and al Mayadeen at 2%. 

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%.  16% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 14% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  Only 33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority without fear.

47% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 46% view it as an asset. In light of Arab pressure on Abbas to unify Fatah ranks, 59% oppose and 26% support the return of Mohammad Dahlan to Fatah. Support for Dahlan’s return to Fatah is higher in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (19%); among Fatah supporters (46%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (17% and 22% respectively); in refugee camps (37%) compared to cities and villages (25% each); among men (29%) compared to women (23%); among the somewhat religious (30%) compared to the religious (21%); among refugees (30%) compared to non-refugees (24%); and among those working in the public sector (36%) compared to those working in the private sector (28%).

47% believe that the goal of the security campaigns occasionally carried out by the Palestinian security services is to enforce law and order; but 41% believe that these campaigns aim at cracking down on those who are opposed to the PA.  A majority of 57% believes that the recent death of a detainee from Nablus after being beaten by members of the PA security services was intentional while only 25% believe it was unintended mistake.  The public is divided on the main factors behind the recent incidents of security breakdown in the West Bank: 36% of the public believe that the main reason is the weakness of the PA security establishment and its failure to enforce the law on a continuous basis; 30% believe the reason is the rise in family and societal conflicts; and 29% believe that a weak court and justice system is the main reason for it.

33% of the public support the new high school (Tawjihi) system and 25% do not support it; 17% neither support nor oppose it and 22% have not heard about it.  91% of the public would like to see the Allenby Bridge Crossing open on 24-hour basis; however, only 46% expect that to happen.  An overwhelming majority of 79% is worried, and 19% are not worried, that recent reductions in the services provided by UNRWA to Palestinian refugees might lead to a gradual abandonment of its responsibilities to those refugees.

(4) Water Shortages:

• 58% of West Bankers indicate that their areas of residence have been affected by water shortages during this past summer and 64% of those affected indicate that they had to buy water by tanks.
• 45% blame Israel for the water shortages because it reduced the quantities of water made available to Palestinians; but 49% place the blame on the Palestinian side.
• 67% believe that there is no justice in water allocation between the various Palestinian localities and 48% believe there is no justice in water allocation to various neighborhoods in the area where they live.
• 55% believe that the PA should deal with the water crisis by digging more wells even if this measure leads to confrontations with the Israeli army.

46% of the public (58% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip) indicate that the areas where they live have suffered from water shortages during this past summer as a result of a decrease in the quantity of water allocated to them; 50% indicate that their areas did not suffer shortages. Shortages have been reported highest among residents of villages and towns (65%) compared to cities and refugee camps (43% and 45% respectively). Shortages are very high in the governorates of Jenin (79%), Hebron (76%), and Nablus and Salfit (75% each) followed by Ramallah (64%), and Toubas and Bethlehem (59% each). Shortages seem lower in Tulkarm (12%), Qalqilia (18%), Jerusalem (33%), and Jericho (43%).  A majority of 58% of those whose areas suffered from water shortages indicates that water did reach their homes at least once every week; 26% once every month; and 10% said water reached them only rarely.  Moreover, 64% of those who suffered water shortages indicate that they were forced to buy water by the tank to compensate for the decrease in water availability; 34% indicate that they were not forced to buy water by the tank.

While 45% of the public blame Israel for reducing the water quantities allocated to Palestinian territories, 49% place the blame on the Palestinian side (29% say that the water crisis is caused by PA mismanagement; 12% say it is due to crumbling infrastructure; and 8% say that water theft by some Palestinians prevent water from reaching its intended consumers). Two thirds (67%) of the public believe that there is no justice or fairness in the allocation of water to the various areas of the Palestinian territories; 19% believe water allocation is fair. Moreover, 48% of the public believe that there is no justice or fairness in the allocation of water to various neighborhoods in their area of residence while 46% think allocation is fair.  Given Israeli control over Palestinian water resources, a majority of 55% believes that the most effective means of addressing the recurring water crises is to dig more wells even if such a measure leads to confrontations with the Israeli army; 35% believe that water desalination is the most effective solution; and 4% believe that raising water rates on the consumers might reduce demand and help resolve the problem.

(5) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

• Optimism about reconciliation decreases from 36% to 31%.
• Only 28% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• 17% say that Hamas is responsible for the poor performance of the reconciliation government but 44% place the blame on the PA, President Abbas, and the prime minister.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 31% and pessimism at 65%. Three months ago optimism stood at 36% and pessimism at 60%.  28% say they are satisfied and 61% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 57%. Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 17% (8% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) while 30% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 14% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

(6) The peace process:

• 49% support and 50% oppose the two-state solution.
• 34% believe that negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state and 34% think armed action is the most effective means.
• 31% support a one-state solution.
• 53% support the French Initiative but only 28% expect it to succeed.
• 55% reject the Russian invitation for a meeting between Abbas and Netanyahu in Moscow.
• 54% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex all lands occupied in 1967 and expel the Palestinian citizens.
• 75% support joining more international organization, 64% support popular non-violent resistance, and 48% support a return to an armed intifada.

On the two-state solution, the public is divided into almost equal halves: 49% support and 50% oppose it. Three months ago, 51% supported it. Palestinians are divided into three groups on the most effective means of building a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 34% believe that negotiation is the most effective; 34% think armed action is the most effective; and 27% think non-violent popular resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 43% said armed action is the most effective means.  A majority of 56% believes that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement expansion while 40% believe that it is still viable. A minority of 31% supports a one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs enjoy equal rights; 67% oppose the one-state solution. Three months ago, support for the one-state solution stood at 34%. 73% believe that the chances for creating an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or non-existent while 25% believe the chances are medium or high.

54% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 56% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 36% opposed it. Support for the abandonment of the Oslo agreement stands at 53% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip.  But 63% of the public believe that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 27% think he is serious. Three months ago, 67% expressed the view that the president is not serious.

We asked the public about its support for the French Initiative. The initiative we presented to respondents as one that “calls for the formation of an international support group for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the holding of an international peace conference that would seek a settlement based on the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative in accordance with a specific time frame.” 53% of the respondents supported and 38% opposed the initiative. Support reached 51% in the West Bank compared to 57% in the Gaza Strip.  We also asked respondents to indicate their expectations regarding the success or failure of the French Initiative in assisting the goal of reaching Palestinian-Israeli peace. 28% expected success and 59% expected failure. Here too there was a significant difference between residents of the West Bank compared to residents of the Gaza Strip: 42% of Gazans, compared to only 21% of West Bankers, expected success.  A majority of 55% opposes and 36% support the acceptance of the Russian invitation to hold a meeting between President Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 80%; 20% are not worried. Furthermore, a majority of 54% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 30% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 14% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 64% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967. By contrast, 12% said it is to conquer the state of Israel and 11% said it is to conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.  An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 52% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 17% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places. Only 11% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change. 

44% support and 50% oppose the Saudi or Arab Peace Initiative.  39% support and 60% oppose the proposal that calls for mutual recognition of Israel as the homeland for the Jewish people and Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people in the aftermath of peace and after the establishment of a Palestinian state.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 75% support joining more international organizations, 64% support non-violent popular resistance, 48% support a return to an armed intifada, and 44% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 54%.

(7) The Arab World, Turkey, ISIS, and US elections:

• More than three quarters believe that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s primary cause and 60% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran.
• 39% believe that the Turkish-Israeli reconciliation agreement will contribute to reducing the siege and blockade on the Gaza Strip and 28% believe it will make it worse.
• 89% view ISIS as a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 83% support the war against it.
• 70% see no difference between the two US presidential candidates, Clinton and Trump.

76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 24% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.  60% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 27% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.  A majority of 64% believes that the recent visit of Saudi academics to the Palestinian territories and Jerusalem and their meeting with Israeli officials is a signal of accord between the Saudis and the Israelis; 26% think the visit does not signal that.

39% of the public believe that the recent Turkish-Israeli reconciliation will have a positive impact by reducing the siege and blockade on the Gaza Strip; by contrast, 28% think it will have the opposite effect by intensifying the siege and blockade, and 29% think it will have no impact.

An overwhelming majority of 89% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 5% believe it does represent true Islam. 6% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 9% (compared to 3% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.  83% support and 14% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

We asked the public about the US elections and which presidential candidate, Hilary Clinton or Donald Trump, is best for the Palestinians. A large majority (70%) believes that there is no difference between the two candidates, while 16% believe Clinton is better and 5% believe Trump is better.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% believe that the most vital national goal should be the establishment of a Palestinian state and the ending of occupation and 30% believe it should be the gaining of the refugees’ right of return.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is occupation, followed by corruption and poverty and unemployment.

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 29% of the pubic; 28% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 22% say it is poverty and unemployment, and 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (43)

With a majority objecting to return to negotiations without an Israeli acceptance of Palestinian conditions, and while a majority reaches the conclusion that the two state solution is no longer viable, domestic conditions - such as the financial crisis, the electricity crisis, and the failure of reconciliation - contribute to internal frustration and weaken the standing of PA leadership and all Palestinian factions

15-17 March 2012 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 15-17 March 2012. This poll was conducted immediately after a ceasefire went into effect in the Gaza Strip after more than 20 people were killed in Israeli missile attacks that came in response to rocket attacks launched from Gaza by resistance forces in retaliation for an Israeli assassination of the top commander of the Popular Resistance Committees. The period preceding the poll also witnessed talks by the Fayyad government about increasing taxes. It also witnessed the signing of the Doha agreement between Khalid Mish'al and Mahmud Abbas for the formation of a reconciliation government to be headed by Abbas. Ismail Haniyeh declared from Cairo his support for the Syrian revolt in what seemed to be the first statement by a Hamas leader on the subject. Security conditions in the West Bank somewhat deteriorated as a result of settlers' attacks or due to Israeli measures, such as setting more checkpoints, that came in response to the escalation in the Gaza Strip.  This poll covers Palestinian attitudes regarding the PA financial crisis, the Doha Agreement, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The first quarter of 2012 brings bad news to the governments of Fayyad and Haniyeh, to Fateh and Hamas, and to president Abbas. Findings show a significant drop in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government, particularly in the West Bank. The drop is probably due to anticipated fallout from the PA's financial crisis and in response to government talk about a tax increase and/or a reduction in the size of the public sector, two measures clearly rejected, as findings show, by a majority of respondents. The financial crisis, the slowdown in the UN bid, and pessimism about the chances for reconciliation might also be some of the factors behind the decline in the popularity of Fateh and the dissatisfaction with Abbas, especially in the West Bank.

Findings also indicate a significant decline in the popularity of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and a decrease in the positive evaluation of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, probably due to Hamas' behavior, standing on the sideline, during Gaza's rocket war with Israel and due to the prevailing pessimism about the chances for reconciliation, particularly given the outspoken criticism of the Doha agreement by some of Hamas' Gaza leaders at a time when the agreement receives massive public support from all sectors of the public. Perhaps the only positive sign for Hamas is the significant increase in the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh in the West Bank, which might have come as a result of his visibility lately during his travels to Arab and Islamic countries and as a result of his public support for the popular revolt in Syria, a revolt that receives the overwhelming support of the Palestinian public. It is worth noting in this context that a majority of the public does not believe that Hamas supports the Syrian revolt or simply does not know Hamas' real position regarding that revolt.

Findings also show that a majority of the public is opposed to the resumption of exploratory talks with Israel and almost half of the Palestinians believe that Abbas made a mistake by taking part few months ago in such talks in Amman. When asked about the viability of the two-state solution, a clear majority expressed the belief that settlement expansion has made such a solution unworkable. But when asked about abandoning it in favor of a one state solution, a clear majority opposed such a shift.

(1) PA's Financial Crisis:

• To solve PA's financial crisis, 29% support forcing early retirement in the public sector, 9% support increasing income tax, 11% support both adopting both measures, and 48% oppose both solutions.
• In searching for alternative solutions to the financial crisis, 52% support returning to peace negotiations as the means to obtain international financial support while 27% support dissolving the PA. 
• A majority of 60% believe that the PA is capable of surviving for a period between 3 to 10 years or longer

We asked the public about its view on how to deal with the financial crisis facing the PA, a crisis that might constrain its ability to pay salaries: 48% opposed solving PA's financial deficit by increasing taxes or forcing some public sector employees to take early retirement. Only 9% came in favor of a tax increase and 29% came in favor of the early retirement solution. 11% favored adopting options, the tax increase and the early retirement. Support for early retirement  increases among holders of BA degree (35%) compared to illiterates (14%), among farmers and students (56% and 35% respectively) compared to retirees and housewives (12% and 25% respectively), and among Hamas supporters (34%) compared to Fateh supporters (28%).

When we asked the public for alternative solutions to the financial crisis, other than the tax increase and the early retirement, a majority of 52% selected the option of returning to negotiations with Israel in order to obtain greater international financial support while 27% selected the option of dissolving the PA altogether. 21% selected various other options or could not come up with any. It is worth noting that about half of those who favor return to negotiations oppose unconditional return that does not insure an Israeli settlement freeze and an acceptance of the 1967 borders. Support for dissolving the PA increases among the youth between the ages of 18-28 (31%) compared to those over the age of 50 (20%), among graduates of colleges (31%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (7% and 21% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (46%) compared to those who support the peace process (22%), among those who work in the private sector (30%) compared to those who work in the public sector (25%), among supporters of Hamas (38%) compared to supporters of Fateh (17%).

When we asked the public about its expectations regarding the ability of the PA to survive for long given the current financial crisis, the continuation of occupation and settlement construction, and the suspension of peace negotiations, about one third (34%) said it can survive for ten or more years, 26% said it can survive for three to ten years, 14% said it can survive for a year or two, and 16% said it can survive for a year or less.

(2) The Doha Agreement and Reconciliation: 

• 84% support and 12% oppose the Doha Agreement, but only 46% believe that reconciliation will succeed and 49% believe it will not succeed.
• 62% want the reconciliation government, when established, to follow the peace policies of Abbas and 20% want it to follow Hamas' policies regarding the peace process.
• A majority of 57% expects international sanctions and suspension of financial aid to follow the formation of the reconciliation government.
• 69% welcome the Qatari role in reconciliation and other internal Palestinian matters.

An overwhelming majority of 84% supports the Doha Agreement signed by Mahmud Abbas and Khalid Mish'al and calling for the formation of a reconciliation government to be headed by Abbas and to be tasked with conducting elections and starting Gaza reconstruction. 12% oppose the agreement.  Findings show that 93% of Fateh supporters and 81% of Hamas supporters are in favor of the Doha Agreement. But the public is split over the chances for reconciliation in the aftermath of the Doha Agreement with 46% expecting the two sides to succeed in implementing the agreement and 49% expecting them to fail. Worse yet, only 16% believe that a reconciliation government will be formed within weeks while 46% believe it will be formed after a long time and 31% believe that it will never be formed. Moreover, only 30% believe that Gaza and West Bank parliamentary and presidential elections will take place as scheduled in May or a little after that, 57% believe they will not take place, and 13% do not know. It is worth mentioning that three months ago 43% believed that elections will indeed take place on schedule or a little after that. Optimism about the chances for reconciliation increases among women (51%) compared to men (40%), among illiterates (55%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (43%), among the religious (51%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among supporters of the peace process (49%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (38%), among farmers and housewives (62% and 51% respectively) compared to business men, professionals and employees (33%, 33%, and 41% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh and Hamas (51% and 48%) compared to supporters of third parties and those who do not intend to participate in new elections (33% and 40% respectively).

If a reconciliation government, headed by Abbas, is established, 57% expect, and 35% do not expect, the return of international boycott, financial sanctions and aid cuts.  Perhaps this is why a majority of 62% believe that a new reconciliation government should abide by the peace policy of Abbas and the PLO while only 20% believe it should abide by the peace policy of Hamas. Belief that a new reconciliation agreement should follow the peace policies of Abbas and the PLO increases among men (67%) compared to women (57%), among graduates of colleges and holders of BA degree (66% and 64% respectively) compared to illiterates (42%), among those who define themselves as somewhat religious (67%) compared to the religious (54%), among supporters of the peace process (69%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (46%), among farmers and professionals (75% and 70% respectively) compared to housewives (55%), and among supporters of Fateh (91%) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%).

Half of the public (49%) believes that internal disagreements between Hamas leaders regarding the Doha agreement and the appointment of Abbas as prime minister for the reconciliation government are major and fundamental disagreements while 43% believe they are minor and marginal. In the context of the role played by Qatar in facilitating the Doha Agreement, a large majority of 69% welcomes, and 27% do not welcome, a Qatari role in Palestinian affairs.   Findings also show that if parliamentary and presidential elections were to take place now, 40% expect Fateh to win and 23% expect Hamas to win. The rest expects others to win or does not know.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• In the context of the rocket war in Gaza and southern Israel, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank drops from 47% to 31% and positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 26% to 13%.
• Belief that corruption exists in the West Bank's PA institutions stands at 73% while belief that corruption exists in the institutions of the Gazan dismissed government stands at 62%.
• Perception that press freedom exists in the West Bank stands at 66% and in the Gaza Strip at 50%. 
• Perception of safety and security drops in the Gaza Strip from 69% to 47% and in the West Bank from 59% to 51%.
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government drops from 41% to 36% and the Fayyad government from 44% to 34%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas drops in the West Bank from 67% three months ago to 60% today.

13% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 70% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, 26% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 47% described them as bad or very bad. It seems clear that the rocket war between Israel and resistance groups, which took place just before the conduct of the poll, has been responsible for the decrease in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip. By contrast, 31% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 36% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stood at 47%.

73% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 62% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. In the context of the recent step by the PA in the West Bank to submit corruption cases to courts, we asked the public if it thinks the PA is serious about fighting corruption: 53% said it was serious and 43% said it was not serious. Moreover, 66% of the public say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 31% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 50% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 40% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Findings also show that 30% of the public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 22% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security deteriorates in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank due to the war in the Gaza Strip and due to the deterioration of security conditions in the West Bank. It stands today at 51% in the West Bank (compared to 59% three months ago) and 47% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 69% three months ago).

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands today at 36% and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government stands at 34%. These findings indicate a decline in the positive evaluation of the performance of the two governments compared to the situation three months ago when it stood at 41% for the Haniyeh government and 44% for the Fayyad government. The decline, in the case of the Hamas government, might be due to the position taken by Hamas during the recent war in the Gaza Strip. In the case of the Fayyad government, the decline might be attributed to the talk about increasing taxes and reducing public expenditure as means of dealing with the PA's financial crisis. It is worth noting in this context that the positive evaluation of the Fayyad government has declined considerably in the West Bank from 48% three months ago to 33% in this poll while the positive evaluation of the Hamas government declined in the Gaza Strip from 37% to 31% during the same period. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Hamas government is higher among residents of the West Bank (40%) compared to residents of the Gaza Strip (31%), among women (40%) compared to men (33%), among those over the age of 50 (40%) compare to youth between the ages of 18-28 (35%), among illiterates (43%) compared to holders of BA degree (33%), among those who define themselves as religious (45%) compared to the somewhat religious (31%), among those opposed to the peace process (55%) compared to those who support the peace process (32%), among housewives (40%) compared to students (26%), among those who do not use the internet or use it once or several times every week (40% and 39% respectively) compared to those who use it every day (27%), and among those who say they will vote for Hamas or those who have not decided to whom they will vote (78% and 42% respectively) compared to those who will vote for Fateh, third parties, and those who will not participate in future elections (19%, 29%, and 26% respectively).

By contrast, positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government increases among men (38%) compared to women (31%), among residents of rural areas (39%) compared to residents of cities and refugee camps (33% and 34% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (42%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (18%), among farmers (71%) compared to laborers and housewives (30% and 31% respectively), among those employed in the public sector (39%) compared to those in the private sector (33%), and among supporters of Fateh (57%) compared to supporters of Hamas (21%).

Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 43% and 24% respectively.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 55% while 43% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. Three months ago, these figures stood at 60% and 38% respectively. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands in this poll at 48% in the Gaza Strip and 60% in the West Bank. Three months ago, 67% of West Bankers were satisfied with the performance of the president. The decline in the West Bank might be due to the slowdown of the UN bid, a bid that had been responsible, three months ago, for the increase in public satisfaction with Abbas in the first place. It is also possible that the public is unhappy with Abbas for accepting to take part in the exploratory negotiations in Amman early in the year despite continued Israeli refusal to suspend settlement construction or accept the 1967 borders as a basis for negotiations. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas is higher among men (58%) compared to women (52%), among those over the age of 50 (67%) compared to youth between the ages of 18-28 (51%), among residents of towns and villages (67%) compared to residents of cities (52%), among illiterates (71%) compared to college graduates (42%), among supporters of the peace process (64%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (29%), among farmers and retirees (84% and 70% respectively) compared to housewives and laborers (52% and 53%), and among supporters of Fateh (87%) compared to supporters of Hamas (26%).

(4) Presidency and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections are to be held today, Abbas would receive 54% and Haniyeh 42%.
• If the competition was between Marwan  Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the first receives 64% and the second 32%
• If new legislative elections are to be held today, Fateh would receive 42%, Hamas 27%, all other electoral lists 10%, and 20% remain undecided.
• The strongest alternative Fateh candidate to Abbas is Marwan Barghouti and if Abbas and Marwan Barghouti did not participate in the elections, the strongest Fateh alternative is Saeb Erikat.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 42% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 61%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 55% and Haniyeh 37%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 55% and Haniyeh 40% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 42%. These results indicate a considerable increase in Haniyeh's popularity in the West Bank compared to the situation three months ago when he received only 33%. The increase in Haniyeh's popularity in the West Bank might be due to his visibility during his recent visits to Arab and Islamic countries and due to his support for the Syrian popular revolt. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter would receive 32% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 72%.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 27% say they would vote for Hamas and 42% say they would vote for Fateh, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 27% indicating a significant decline of eight percentage points compared to the situation three months ago. This decline might reflect public dissatisfaction with Hamas' behavior during the recent war in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% compared to 25% three months ago. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 46% and in the West Bank at 40%. These results indicate a decline in Fateh's popularity in the West Bank by four percentage points, probably due to government talk about a tax increase and a reduction in expenditure.

In a question about the favored Fateh candidate to replace Abbas as a president, assuming Abbas would not run, a majority of 55% selectedMarwan Barghouti, followed by Saeb Erekat, Nasir al Qidwa, and  Mahmud al Aloul (3% each).  Abu Mahir Ghnaim and Ahmad Qurie’ received 2% each, Azzam al Ahmad and Jibril al Rojoub received 1% each. When we asked the public to select a candidate from a list that did not includeMarwan Barghouti, a large part of the vote went to Saeb Erikat (18%) followed by Nasir al Qidwa (9%), Mahmud al Aloul, Ahmad Qurie' and AbuMahir Ghnaim (7% each), Azzam al Ahmad (5%), Jibril al Rojoub (4%), and finally Salim al Za'noun (2%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation and build a state and 32% believe it should be to obtain the right of return
• 28% believe the first problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment while 25% think it is the continuation of Israeli occupation and 23% think it is the absence of national unity. 

45% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 8% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. These findings reflect continued stalemate in the UN bid, a bid that pushed the statehood goal to 59% six months ago at the peak of the UN drive. This percentage dropped to 48% three months ago and dropped an additional three percentage points in this poll.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% of the public while 25% believes the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 23% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 14% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 9% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

(6) The Syrian Popular Revolt and Hamas' and Hezbollah's attitudes:

• 83% support the Syrian popular revolution against the Assad regime and 9% support the Assad regime.
• 42% believe that Hamas supports the Syrian popular revolution and 27% believe Hezbollah supports the Syria revolution.
• The public is divided over the issue of foreign intervention to topple the Assad regime: 50% oppose it and 46% support it.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public (83%) supports the Syrian demonstrators seeking to bring down the Syrian regime led by president Assad. Only 9% support the Assad regime. But only 42% of the public believe that Hamas supports the Syrian demonstrators while 23% believe the movement supports the Assad regime, 5% believe it supports both sides, 7% believe it supports neither side, and 24% say they do not know Hamas' position.  With regard to Hezbollah's position on the Syrian revolt, only 27% of the public believe that it supports the Syrian demonstrators while 44% believe it supports the Assad regime, 4% believe it supports both sides, 3% believe it supports neither side, and 21% say they do not know Hezbollah's position. But Palestinian public support for the Syrian popular revolt does not necessarily mean it supports external military intervention to bring down the Assad regime: 50% oppose such intervention and 46% support it.

In the context of the Syrian revolt and the talk about the departure of Hamas leaders from Damascus, findings show that the largest percentage of the public (41%) wants Hamas to make the Gaza Strip the headquarter for its leadership while 19% selected other locations: 19% selected Doha, 17% selected Cairo, and 14% selected Amman.  

(7) Peace Process

• 58% support and 35% oppose a return to exploratory talks with Israel without an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement construction and accept the lines of 1967 as a basis for negotiations.
• 48% believe that Abbas' decision few months ago to take part in exploratory talks with Israel in Amman without a settlement freeze or acceptance of the 1967 lines as a basis for negotiations was a right decision and 43% believe it was a mistake.
• Now after the suspension of peace negotiations, 76% support returning to the UNSC for recognition of a Palestinian state and 61% support launching a popular peaceful resistance. By contrast, only 40% support dissolving the PA, 39% support an armed intifada, and 29% support giving up the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years to be slim or non-existent while 31% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• 58% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion while 37% believe that the solution remains feasible as settlements can be dismantled after reaching an agreement.
• 56% support and 42% oppose the Arab (Saudi) peace initiative and 55% oppose and 43% support mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people.
• 76% are worried and 24% are not worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished by Israel.
• 57% believe that the hunger strike by Palestinian prisoner Khader Adnan will help speed up the process of closing the file on administrative detention and 39% do not believe that.
• Arab revolts will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause in the eyes of 51% and a negative impact in the eyes of 22%. 24% believe they will have no impact, positive or negative.

Findings show that 58% oppose and 35% support return to Palestinian-Israeli exploratory talks in the absence of a settlement freeze and an Israeli acceptance of the line of the 1967 as a basis for negotiation. Support for returning to the talks is higher in the West Bank (38%) compared to the Gaza Strip (31%), among women (40%) compared to men (31%), among the youth between the ages of 18-28 (40%) compared to those over 50 years of age (31%), among the illiterates (39%) compared to those with a BA degree (30%), among the somewhat religious (39%) compared to the religious (32%), among supporters of the peace process (43%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (22%), and among supporters of Fateh (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%).

Findings also show that 43% believe that president Abbas made a mistake when he agreed few months ago to take part in exploratory talks with Israel in Amman without an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement construction and accept the line of the 1967 borders as a basis for negotiations. 48% believe Abbas' decision was the right one.  Belief that Abbas made the right decision increases in the West Bank (52%) compared to the Gaza Strip (42%), among non refugees (52%) compared to refugees (45%), among residents of villages and towns (56%) compared to refugee camps and cities (44% and 47% respectively), among illiterates (53%) compared to holders of BA degree (45%), among those who define themselves as somewhat religious (54%) compared to the religious (41%), among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (27%), among farmers (72%) compared to professionals, employees, and students (42%, 46%, and 46% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%).

Findings also show that a majority of the public supports two alternatives to negotiations and oppose three others. 76% support returning to the UN to gain recognition of a Palestinian state and 61% support launching a non violent campaign against Israeli occupation. On the other hand, only 40% support dissolving the PA, 39% support launching a new armed intifada, and 29% support abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

Findings also show that 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years to be slim to non-existent while 31% believe the chances to be medium or high. Worse yet, 58% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to expanded settlement construction while only 37% believe the two state solution remains viable because settlements can be dismantled or evacuated once an agreement is reached. Belief that the two-state solution is no longer practical increases among holders of BA degree (65%) compared to illiterates (46%), among those opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to supporters of the peace process (52%), and among supporters of Hamas (65%) compared to supporters of Fateh (45%).

Findings show that a majority of 56% supports and 42% oppose the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative which calls for Arab recognition of Israel and for normalization of relations with it in return for its withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. On the other hand, 55% oppose and 43% support recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people.

Findings also show that more than three quarters (76%) of the Palestinian public are worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished. They also show that 67% believe that the hunger strike by administrative detainee Khader Adnan and the agreement reached to end that strike will contribute to speeding up the process of closing the file of administrative detention while 39% do not share this view. Finally, more than half of the Palestinians (51%) believe that Arab revolts will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause while 22% believe that they will have a negative impact. 24% believe they will have no impact, positive or negative. 

 (8) An attack on Iran

• 46% expect and 48% do not expect an Israeli military offensive against Iran in the coming months.
• If Israel does carry out a military strike on Iran, 85% expect such an attack to lead to a major regional war.

Findings show that the Palestinians are divided regarding the assessment of an Israeli military strike against Iran: 46% believe Israel will indeed strike Iran in the coming months and 48% believe it will not. But findings show a semi consensus (85%) that such a strike, if it takes place, would trigger a major regional war and 11% do not expect that..... Full Report