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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 24 September 2016. The period before the poll witnessed the suspension of the process of local elections as a result of a decision by the Palestinian high court. It also witnessed an increase in cases of security breakdown especially in the Nablus area, major disruptions in access to running water throughout the West Bank, continued debate on the French Initiative, an acceptance by President Abbas of a Russian invitation for a meeting in Moscow with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and others. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers attitudes regarding local elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the increase in cases of security breakdown, water shortages, reconciliation, the peace process, the French Initiative, and the Russian invitation. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In addition to the usual trend issues, this poll focused on three matters: local elections, the water crisis that affected West Bank residents during the summer, and the recent rise in the number of incidents of internal security breakdown. Findings show that a majority of the public is dissatisfied with the decision of the high court to suspend the local election process and views it as a political decision aiming at cancelling the elections. If local elections are held today, the public is certain that Hamas will win in the Gaza Strip but it expects Fatah to win in the West Bank. Findings also indicate that a clear majority of West Bankers have suffered from water shortages during this past summer and that most of those who experienced water shortages had to buy water in tanks. While a large percentage of the public blames Israel for the water crisis, because it reduced water allocation to the Palestinian territories, a larger percentage places the blame on the Palestinian side. With regard to recent internal security breakdowns, the public sees three drivers: weak and inconsistent performance by the PA security services, weak courts and justice system, and a surge in family and societal conflicts.

There is no doubt that a great part of the motivation for the public rejection of the high court decision regarding local elections, despite the fact that these elections will take place under conditions of national and territorial disunity, is related to a democratic impulse. This attitude appears at odd with past findings in which national unity impulses trumped democratic ones. It is clear from the findings that the public believes that a successful holding of local elections throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will significantly improve the chances for holding presidential and parliamentary elections that have not been held for more than a decade. On the other hand, it is clear that the national unity impulse is not totally absent. About one third of the public is unhappy about the fact that local elections, if held, will take place under conditions of disunity. Indeed, a slight majority rejects the idea of holding parliamentary and presidential elections under the same conditions. It is worth noting that there are no significant differences between attitudes of the residents of the West Bank compared to those in the Gaza Strip regarding all the issues mentioned above, indicating perhaps that the motivation for both sides is not related to geography or region. 

Compared to our findings three months ago, current findings indicate a strengthening of three developments found in the second quarter of 2016: (1) support for armed action continues to decline; (2) support for the French Initiative increases slightly; and (3) Fatah’s popularity improves somewhat compared to that of Hamas and demand for Abbas’ resignation decreases. Nonetheless, the current level of support for an armed intifada remains high and a majority opposes the Russian invitation for a meeting between Abbas and Netanyahu in Moscow. Moreover, the public remains highly pessimistic about the French Initiative’s chances of success. Finally, Hamas’ candidate for the presidency, Ismail Haniyeh remains more popular than Abbas.  

(1) Local elections:

• 61% are dissatisfied with the high court’s decision to suspend the local elections process and 60% view it as politically motivated.
• If local elections are held, 50% say that the most important consideration for their vote is the ability of the electoral lists to deliver services; 31% say it is the ability to defend national rights.
• In local elections, 35% say that Fatah lists are the most able to deliver services and 17% say Hamas lists are the most able to do so.
• 28% say that Fatah local election lists, and 26% say Hamas local election lists, are the most able to defend national rights.
• 48% expect the cancelation of the local elections and 40% expect local elections to take place soon.
• The largest percentage expects Hamas to win in the Gaza Strip; in the West Bank, the largest percentage expects Fatah to win

A majority of 61% is displeased with the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice to temporarily suspend the local election process and 29% are pleased. Findings show that 60% believe that the decision was politically motivated and aimed at scuttling the election process while 31% believe that the decision was a legal one and aimed at correcting the election process.  Dissatisfaction with the court’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (63%) than in the West Bank (60%); among t hose whose age is 50 and above (68%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (52%); among Hamas supporters (77%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 61% respectively); among residents of cities (64%) compared to residents of villages and refugee camps (48% and 53% respectively); among men (64%) compared to women (57%); among the religious (64%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (50% and 60% respectively).

54% say that not holding local elections in the occupied East Jerusalem is not a good reason to stop local elections in the rest of the Palestinian territories. Similarly, 57% say that the fact that courts in the Gaza Strip, under Hamas control, ruled on election cases submitted to them in the Strip is not a good reason to stop local elections.  35% believe that Fatah and Hamas together wish to cancel local elections while 23% believe that it is Fatah that wishes to cancel these elections; only 14% believe that it is Hamas who wishes to cancel the elections.

41% say they have not registered to participate in local elections while 50% say they have registered. Among those who have registered, 81% say they intend to participate in the elections if and when they are held.  50% of those who intend to participate in the local elections say that the most important voting consideration is the ability of the electoral list to deliver services such as water, electricity, roads and other matters of daily life; 31% say that the most important consideration is the ability of the list to defend the rights of the Palestinian people and to contribute to the ending of the Israeli occupation; 9% say it is to serve the interests of the family; and 9% say the most important consideration is the support of the political party they are affiliated with. When evaluating the ability of the various electoral lists to meet the various considerations, 35% believe that the list supported by Fatah is the most able to deliver services while 17% believe that the list supported by Hamas is the most able to deliver services; 15% say it is the list of independents and professionals while only 3% say it is the list supported by the Left.  With regard to the ability to defend national rights and contribute to ending occupation, 28% believe that the list supported by Fatah is the most able to do that while 26% believe that the list supported by Hamas is the most able to do that; 11% say it is the list of independents and professionals while only 2% say it is the list supported by the Left.

The largest percentage (48%) believes that the local elections will be called off but 40% believe they will take place soon. If local elections do take place soon, the largest percentage (39%) believes they will assist in the process of reconciliation while 32% believe they will weaken the process of reconciliation and 25% think they will have no impact.  If local elections are held soon, a majority of 56% expects Hamas lists or lists supported by Hamas, and 21% expect Fatah lists or lists supported by Fatah, to win in the Gaza Strip. With regard to election outcome in the West Bank, 44% expect Fatah lists or lists supported by Fatah, and 26% expect Hamas lists or lists supported by Hamas, to win. Expectations of election outcome differ in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank. For example, while 66% of West Bankers expect Hamas lists would win in the Gaza Strip, the percentage among Gazans drops to 37%.   Moreover, while 36% of Gazans believe Fatah lists are likely to win in the local election in the Gaza Strip, the percentage drops to 14% among West Bankers. These differences diminish somewhat when predicting the outcome of the local elections in the West Bank: 34% of Gazans compared to 22% of West Bankers expect Hamas would win and 34% of Gazans and 49% of West Bankers expect Fatah would win.  More than three quarters of the public (76%) support, and 18% oppose, the participation of West Bank refugee camps in the local elections.

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• Demand for Abbas’ resignation decreases from 65% t0 61%.
• In presidential elections between President Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the latter receives 48% and the former 45%.
• In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the latter receives 36% and the former 58%.
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 32% and Fatah 37%.
• A majority of 51% rejects holding presidential and parliamentary elections under conditions of disunity identical to those under which local elections might, with public approval, be held.
• 42% believe that Fatah and president Abbas are the ones who impede the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections; only 22% put the blame on Hamas.

61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 33% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 65% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 58% in the West Bank and 65% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh;  Khalid Mishal and Mohammad Dahlan receive 5% each, Rami al Hamdallah receive and Mustapha Barghouti receive 4% each; Salam Fayyad receives 3%, and Saeb Erekat 1%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% today compared to 34% three months ago. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip.  If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 48% (compared to 48% three months ago) and the latter 45% (compared to 43% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 47% of the vote (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 50% (compared to 49% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 43% (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh 46% (compared to 47% three months ago).  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 21%, Barghouti 41% and Haniyeh 33%. And if presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 37% say they would vote for Fatah, 7% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 24% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 31% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 37% (compared to 33% three months ago) and for Fatah at 39% (compared to 35% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 36% (compared to 34% three months ago).

Despite supporting the holding of local elections under current conditions in which Hamas has effective control over the Gaza Strip and in which the PA under Abbas and the Reconciliation Government controls the West Bank, a slim majority of 51% opposes, and 42% support, holding presidential and parliamentary elections under identical conditions.  59% believe, and 32% do not believe, that a successful holding of local elections would hasten the holding of parliamentary and presidential election. A plurality of 42% believes that Fatah and president Abbas are the ones who are impeding the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in the Palestinian territories while only 22% believe that Hamas is the real impediment.

(3) Domestic and security conditions, Allenby Bridge terminal, and UNRWA:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 48% in the Gaza Strip and 42% in the West Bank.
• 46% of Gazans and 29% of West Bankers want to immigrate to other countries.
• The belief that there is corruption in the PA institutions stands at 79%; only 16% believe there is press freedom in the West Bank and 14% believe there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip.
• 47% believe that the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 46% believe it is an asset.
• 59% oppose and 26% support the return of Mohammad Dahlan to Fatah.
• 57% believe that the recent death of a detainee in Nablus due to beating by the PA security services was deliberate.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 15% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 48%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 42%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 44% and in the West Bank at 44%.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 46%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 29%. Three months ago 45% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Maan TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by al Jazeera TV (at 16%), Hamas’ al Aqsa TV (at 15%), Palestine TV at 14%, Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) at 11%, Al Arabiya at 6%, al Quds TV at 4%, and al Mayadeen at 2%. 

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%.  16% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 14% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  Only 33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority without fear.

47% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 46% view it as an asset. In light of Arab pressure on Abbas to unify Fatah ranks, 59% oppose and 26% support the return of Mohammad Dahlan to Fatah. Support for Dahlan’s return to Fatah is higher in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (19%); among Fatah supporters (46%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (17% and 22% respectively); in refugee camps (37%) compared to cities and villages (25% each); among men (29%) compared to women (23%); among the somewhat religious (30%) compared to the religious (21%); among refugees (30%) compared to non-refugees (24%); and among those working in the public sector (36%) compared to those working in the private sector (28%).

47% believe that the goal of the security campaigns occasionally carried out by the Palestinian security services is to enforce law and order; but 41% believe that these campaigns aim at cracking down on those who are opposed to the PA.  A majority of 57% believes that the recent death of a detainee from Nablus after being beaten by members of the PA security services was intentional while only 25% believe it was unintended mistake.  The public is divided on the main factors behind the recent incidents of security breakdown in the West Bank: 36% of the public believe that the main reason is the weakness of the PA security establishment and its failure to enforce the law on a continuous basis; 30% believe the reason is the rise in family and societal conflicts; and 29% believe that a weak court and justice system is the main reason for it.

33% of the public support the new high school (Tawjihi) system and 25% do not support it; 17% neither support nor oppose it and 22% have not heard about it.  91% of the public would like to see the Allenby Bridge Crossing open on 24-hour basis; however, only 46% expect that to happen.  An overwhelming majority of 79% is worried, and 19% are not worried, that recent reductions in the services provided by UNRWA to Palestinian refugees might lead to a gradual abandonment of its responsibilities to those refugees.

(4) Water Shortages:

• 58% of West Bankers indicate that their areas of residence have been affected by water shortages during this past summer and 64% of those affected indicate that they had to buy water by tanks.
• 45% blame Israel for the water shortages because it reduced the quantities of water made available to Palestinians; but 49% place the blame on the Palestinian side.
• 67% believe that there is no justice in water allocation between the various Palestinian localities and 48% believe there is no justice in water allocation to various neighborhoods in the area where they live.
• 55% believe that the PA should deal with the water crisis by digging more wells even if this measure leads to confrontations with the Israeli army.

46% of the public (58% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip) indicate that the areas where they live have suffered from water shortages during this past summer as a result of a decrease in the quantity of water allocated to them; 50% indicate that their areas did not suffer shortages. Shortages have been reported highest among residents of villages and towns (65%) compared to cities and refugee camps (43% and 45% respectively). Shortages are very high in the governorates of Jenin (79%), Hebron (76%), and Nablus and Salfit (75% each) followed by Ramallah (64%), and Toubas and Bethlehem (59% each). Shortages seem lower in Tulkarm (12%), Qalqilia (18%), Jerusalem (33%), and Jericho (43%).  A majority of 58% of those whose areas suffered from water shortages indicates that water did reach their homes at least once every week; 26% once every month; and 10% said water reached them only rarely.  Moreover, 64% of those who suffered water shortages indicate that they were forced to buy water by the tank to compensate for the decrease in water availability; 34% indicate that they were not forced to buy water by the tank.

While 45% of the public blame Israel for reducing the water quantities allocated to Palestinian territories, 49% place the blame on the Palestinian side (29% say that the water crisis is caused by PA mismanagement; 12% say it is due to crumbling infrastructure; and 8% say that water theft by some Palestinians prevent water from reaching its intended consumers). Two thirds (67%) of the public believe that there is no justice or fairness in the allocation of water to the various areas of the Palestinian territories; 19% believe water allocation is fair. Moreover, 48% of the public believe that there is no justice or fairness in the allocation of water to various neighborhoods in their area of residence while 46% think allocation is fair.  Given Israeli control over Palestinian water resources, a majority of 55% believes that the most effective means of addressing the recurring water crises is to dig more wells even if such a measure leads to confrontations with the Israeli army; 35% believe that water desalination is the most effective solution; and 4% believe that raising water rates on the consumers might reduce demand and help resolve the problem.

(5) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

• Optimism about reconciliation decreases from 36% to 31%.
• Only 28% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• 17% say that Hamas is responsible for the poor performance of the reconciliation government but 44% place the blame on the PA, President Abbas, and the prime minister.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 31% and pessimism at 65%. Three months ago optimism stood at 36% and pessimism at 60%.  28% say they are satisfied and 61% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 57%. Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 17% (8% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) while 30% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 14% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

(6) The peace process:

• 49% support and 50% oppose the two-state solution.
• 34% believe that negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state and 34% think armed action is the most effective means.
• 31% support a one-state solution.
• 53% support the French Initiative but only 28% expect it to succeed.
• 55% reject the Russian invitation for a meeting between Abbas and Netanyahu in Moscow.
• 54% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex all lands occupied in 1967 and expel the Palestinian citizens.
• 75% support joining more international organization, 64% support popular non-violent resistance, and 48% support a return to an armed intifada.

On the two-state solution, the public is divided into almost equal halves: 49% support and 50% oppose it. Three months ago, 51% supported it. Palestinians are divided into three groups on the most effective means of building a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 34% believe that negotiation is the most effective; 34% think armed action is the most effective; and 27% think non-violent popular resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 43% said armed action is the most effective means.  A majority of 56% believes that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement expansion while 40% believe that it is still viable. A minority of 31% supports a one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs enjoy equal rights; 67% oppose the one-state solution. Three months ago, support for the one-state solution stood at 34%. 73% believe that the chances for creating an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or non-existent while 25% believe the chances are medium or high.

54% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 56% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 36% opposed it. Support for the abandonment of the Oslo agreement stands at 53% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip.  But 63% of the public believe that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 27% think he is serious. Three months ago, 67% expressed the view that the president is not serious.

We asked the public about its support for the French Initiative. The initiative we presented to respondents as one that “calls for the formation of an international support group for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the holding of an international peace conference that would seek a settlement based on the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative in accordance with a specific time frame.” 53% of the respondents supported and 38% opposed the initiative. Support reached 51% in the West Bank compared to 57% in the Gaza Strip.  We also asked respondents to indicate their expectations regarding the success or failure of the French Initiative in assisting the goal of reaching Palestinian-Israeli peace. 28% expected success and 59% expected failure. Here too there was a significant difference between residents of the West Bank compared to residents of the Gaza Strip: 42% of Gazans, compared to only 21% of West Bankers, expected success.  A majority of 55% opposes and 36% support the acceptance of the Russian invitation to hold a meeting between President Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 80%; 20% are not worried. Furthermore, a majority of 54% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 30% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 14% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 64% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967. By contrast, 12% said it is to conquer the state of Israel and 11% said it is to conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.  An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 52% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 17% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places. Only 11% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change. 

44% support and 50% oppose the Saudi or Arab Peace Initiative.  39% support and 60% oppose the proposal that calls for mutual recognition of Israel as the homeland for the Jewish people and Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people in the aftermath of peace and after the establishment of a Palestinian state.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 75% support joining more international organizations, 64% support non-violent popular resistance, 48% support a return to an armed intifada, and 44% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 54%.

(7) The Arab World, Turkey, ISIS, and US elections:

• More than three quarters believe that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s primary cause and 60% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran.
• 39% believe that the Turkish-Israeli reconciliation agreement will contribute to reducing the siege and blockade on the Gaza Strip and 28% believe it will make it worse.
• 89% view ISIS as a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 83% support the war against it.
• 70% see no difference between the two US presidential candidates, Clinton and Trump.

76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 24% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.  60% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 27% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.  A majority of 64% believes that the recent visit of Saudi academics to the Palestinian territories and Jerusalem and their meeting with Israeli officials is a signal of accord between the Saudis and the Israelis; 26% think the visit does not signal that.

39% of the public believe that the recent Turkish-Israeli reconciliation will have a positive impact by reducing the siege and blockade on the Gaza Strip; by contrast, 28% think it will have the opposite effect by intensifying the siege and blockade, and 29% think it will have no impact.

An overwhelming majority of 89% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 5% believe it does represent true Islam. 6% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 9% (compared to 3% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.  83% support and 14% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

We asked the public about the US elections and which presidential candidate, Hilary Clinton or Donald Trump, is best for the Palestinians. A large majority (70%) believes that there is no difference between the two candidates, while 16% believe Clinton is better and 5% believe Trump is better.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% believe that the most vital national goal should be the establishment of a Palestinian state and the ending of occupation and 30% believe it should be the gaining of the refugees’ right of return.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is occupation, followed by corruption and poverty and unemployment.

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 29% of the pubic; 28% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 22% say it is poverty and unemployment, and 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (43)

With a majority objecting to return to negotiations without an Israeli acceptance of Palestinian conditions, and while a majority reaches the conclusion that the two state solution is no longer viable, domestic conditions - such as the financial crisis, the electricity crisis, and the failure of reconciliation - contribute to internal frustration and weaken the standing of PA leadership and all Palestinian factions

15-17 March 2012 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 15-17 March 2012. This poll was conducted immediately after a ceasefire went into effect in the Gaza Strip after more than 20 people were killed in Israeli missile attacks that came in response to rocket attacks launched from Gaza by resistance forces in retaliation for an Israeli assassination of the top commander of the Popular Resistance Committees. The period preceding the poll also witnessed talks by the Fayyad government about increasing taxes. It also witnessed the signing of the Doha agreement between Khalid Mish'al and Mahmud Abbas for the formation of a reconciliation government to be headed by Abbas. Ismail Haniyeh declared from Cairo his support for the Syrian revolt in what seemed to be the first statement by a Hamas leader on the subject. Security conditions in the West Bank somewhat deteriorated as a result of settlers' attacks or due to Israeli measures, such as setting more checkpoints, that came in response to the escalation in the Gaza Strip.  This poll covers Palestinian attitudes regarding the PA financial crisis, the Doha Agreement, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The first quarter of 2012 brings bad news to the governments of Fayyad and Haniyeh, to Fateh and Hamas, and to president Abbas. Findings show a significant drop in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government, particularly in the West Bank. The drop is probably due to anticipated fallout from the PA's financial crisis and in response to government talk about a tax increase and/or a reduction in the size of the public sector, two measures clearly rejected, as findings show, by a majority of respondents. The financial crisis, the slowdown in the UN bid, and pessimism about the chances for reconciliation might also be some of the factors behind the decline in the popularity of Fateh and the dissatisfaction with Abbas, especially in the West Bank.

Findings also indicate a significant decline in the popularity of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and a decrease in the positive evaluation of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, probably due to Hamas' behavior, standing on the sideline, during Gaza's rocket war with Israel and due to the prevailing pessimism about the chances for reconciliation, particularly given the outspoken criticism of the Doha agreement by some of Hamas' Gaza leaders at a time when the agreement receives massive public support from all sectors of the public. Perhaps the only positive sign for Hamas is the significant increase in the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh in the West Bank, which might have come as a result of his visibility lately during his travels to Arab and Islamic countries and as a result of his public support for the popular revolt in Syria, a revolt that receives the overwhelming support of the Palestinian public. It is worth noting in this context that a majority of the public does not believe that Hamas supports the Syrian revolt or simply does not know Hamas' real position regarding that revolt.

Findings also show that a majority of the public is opposed to the resumption of exploratory talks with Israel and almost half of the Palestinians believe that Abbas made a mistake by taking part few months ago in such talks in Amman. When asked about the viability of the two-state solution, a clear majority expressed the belief that settlement expansion has made such a solution unworkable. But when asked about abandoning it in favor of a one state solution, a clear majority opposed such a shift.

(1) PA's Financial Crisis:

• To solve PA's financial crisis, 29% support forcing early retirement in the public sector, 9% support increasing income tax, 11% support both adopting both measures, and 48% oppose both solutions.
• In searching for alternative solutions to the financial crisis, 52% support returning to peace negotiations as the means to obtain international financial support while 27% support dissolving the PA. 
• A majority of 60% believe that the PA is capable of surviving for a period between 3 to 10 years or longer

We asked the public about its view on how to deal with the financial crisis facing the PA, a crisis that might constrain its ability to pay salaries: 48% opposed solving PA's financial deficit by increasing taxes or forcing some public sector employees to take early retirement. Only 9% came in favor of a tax increase and 29% came in favor of the early retirement solution. 11% favored adopting options, the tax increase and the early retirement. Support for early retirement  increases among holders of BA degree (35%) compared to illiterates (14%), among farmers and students (56% and 35% respectively) compared to retirees and housewives (12% and 25% respectively), and among Hamas supporters (34%) compared to Fateh supporters (28%).

When we asked the public for alternative solutions to the financial crisis, other than the tax increase and the early retirement, a majority of 52% selected the option of returning to negotiations with Israel in order to obtain greater international financial support while 27% selected the option of dissolving the PA altogether. 21% selected various other options or could not come up with any. It is worth noting that about half of those who favor return to negotiations oppose unconditional return that does not insure an Israeli settlement freeze and an acceptance of the 1967 borders. Support for dissolving the PA increases among the youth between the ages of 18-28 (31%) compared to those over the age of 50 (20%), among graduates of colleges (31%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (7% and 21% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (46%) compared to those who support the peace process (22%), among those who work in the private sector (30%) compared to those who work in the public sector (25%), among supporters of Hamas (38%) compared to supporters of Fateh (17%).

When we asked the public about its expectations regarding the ability of the PA to survive for long given the current financial crisis, the continuation of occupation and settlement construction, and the suspension of peace negotiations, about one third (34%) said it can survive for ten or more years, 26% said it can survive for three to ten years, 14% said it can survive for a year or two, and 16% said it can survive for a year or less.

(2) The Doha Agreement and Reconciliation: 

• 84% support and 12% oppose the Doha Agreement, but only 46% believe that reconciliation will succeed and 49% believe it will not succeed.
• 62% want the reconciliation government, when established, to follow the peace policies of Abbas and 20% want it to follow Hamas' policies regarding the peace process.
• A majority of 57% expects international sanctions and suspension of financial aid to follow the formation of the reconciliation government.
• 69% welcome the Qatari role in reconciliation and other internal Palestinian matters.

An overwhelming majority of 84% supports the Doha Agreement signed by Mahmud Abbas and Khalid Mish'al and calling for the formation of a reconciliation government to be headed by Abbas and to be tasked with conducting elections and starting Gaza reconstruction. 12% oppose the agreement.  Findings show that 93% of Fateh supporters and 81% of Hamas supporters are in favor of the Doha Agreement. But the public is split over the chances for reconciliation in the aftermath of the Doha Agreement with 46% expecting the two sides to succeed in implementing the agreement and 49% expecting them to fail. Worse yet, only 16% believe that a reconciliation government will be formed within weeks while 46% believe it will be formed after a long time and 31% believe that it will never be formed. Moreover, only 30% believe that Gaza and West Bank parliamentary and presidential elections will take place as scheduled in May or a little after that, 57% believe they will not take place, and 13% do not know. It is worth mentioning that three months ago 43% believed that elections will indeed take place on schedule or a little after that. Optimism about the chances for reconciliation increases among women (51%) compared to men (40%), among illiterates (55%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (43%), among the religious (51%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among supporters of the peace process (49%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (38%), among farmers and housewives (62% and 51% respectively) compared to business men, professionals and employees (33%, 33%, and 41% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh and Hamas (51% and 48%) compared to supporters of third parties and those who do not intend to participate in new elections (33% and 40% respectively).

If a reconciliation government, headed by Abbas, is established, 57% expect, and 35% do not expect, the return of international boycott, financial sanctions and aid cuts.  Perhaps this is why a majority of 62% believe that a new reconciliation government should abide by the peace policy of Abbas and the PLO while only 20% believe it should abide by the peace policy of Hamas. Belief that a new reconciliation agreement should follow the peace policies of Abbas and the PLO increases among men (67%) compared to women (57%), among graduates of colleges and holders of BA degree (66% and 64% respectively) compared to illiterates (42%), among those who define themselves as somewhat religious (67%) compared to the religious (54%), among supporters of the peace process (69%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (46%), among farmers and professionals (75% and 70% respectively) compared to housewives (55%), and among supporters of Fateh (91%) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%).

Half of the public (49%) believes that internal disagreements between Hamas leaders regarding the Doha agreement and the appointment of Abbas as prime minister for the reconciliation government are major and fundamental disagreements while 43% believe they are minor and marginal. In the context of the role played by Qatar in facilitating the Doha Agreement, a large majority of 69% welcomes, and 27% do not welcome, a Qatari role in Palestinian affairs.   Findings also show that if parliamentary and presidential elections were to take place now, 40% expect Fateh to win and 23% expect Hamas to win. The rest expects others to win or does not know.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• In the context of the rocket war in Gaza and southern Israel, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank drops from 47% to 31% and positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 26% to 13%.
• Belief that corruption exists in the West Bank's PA institutions stands at 73% while belief that corruption exists in the institutions of the Gazan dismissed government stands at 62%.
• Perception that press freedom exists in the West Bank stands at 66% and in the Gaza Strip at 50%. 
• Perception of safety and security drops in the Gaza Strip from 69% to 47% and in the West Bank from 59% to 51%.
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government drops from 41% to 36% and the Fayyad government from 44% to 34%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas drops in the West Bank from 67% three months ago to 60% today.

13% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 70% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, 26% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 47% described them as bad or very bad. It seems clear that the rocket war between Israel and resistance groups, which took place just before the conduct of the poll, has been responsible for the decrease in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip. By contrast, 31% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 36% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stood at 47%.

73% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 62% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. In the context of the recent step by the PA in the West Bank to submit corruption cases to courts, we asked the public if it thinks the PA is serious about fighting corruption: 53% said it was serious and 43% said it was not serious. Moreover, 66% of the public say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 31% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 50% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 40% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Findings also show that 30% of the public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 22% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security deteriorates in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank due to the war in the Gaza Strip and due to the deterioration of security conditions in the West Bank. It stands today at 51% in the West Bank (compared to 59% three months ago) and 47% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 69% three months ago).

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands today at 36% and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government stands at 34%. These findings indicate a decline in the positive evaluation of the performance of the two governments compared to the situation three months ago when it stood at 41% for the Haniyeh government and 44% for the Fayyad government. The decline, in the case of the Hamas government, might be due to the position taken by Hamas during the recent war in the Gaza Strip. In the case of the Fayyad government, the decline might be attributed to the talk about increasing taxes and reducing public expenditure as means of dealing with the PA's financial crisis. It is worth noting in this context that the positive evaluation of the Fayyad government has declined considerably in the West Bank from 48% three months ago to 33% in this poll while the positive evaluation of the Hamas government declined in the Gaza Strip from 37% to 31% during the same period. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Hamas government is higher among residents of the West Bank (40%) compared to residents of the Gaza Strip (31%), among women (40%) compared to men (33%), among those over the age of 50 (40%) compare to youth between the ages of 18-28 (35%), among illiterates (43%) compared to holders of BA degree (33%), among those who define themselves as religious (45%) compared to the somewhat religious (31%), among those opposed to the peace process (55%) compared to those who support the peace process (32%), among housewives (40%) compared to students (26%), among those who do not use the internet or use it once or several times every week (40% and 39% respectively) compared to those who use it every day (27%), and among those who say they will vote for Hamas or those who have not decided to whom they will vote (78% and 42% respectively) compared to those who will vote for Fateh, third parties, and those who will not participate in future elections (19%, 29%, and 26% respectively).

By contrast, positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government increases among men (38%) compared to women (31%), among residents of rural areas (39%) compared to residents of cities and refugee camps (33% and 34% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (42%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (18%), among farmers (71%) compared to laborers and housewives (30% and 31% respectively), among those employed in the public sector (39%) compared to those in the private sector (33%), and among supporters of Fateh (57%) compared to supporters of Hamas (21%).

Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 43% and 24% respectively.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 55% while 43% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. Three months ago, these figures stood at 60% and 38% respectively. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands in this poll at 48% in the Gaza Strip and 60% in the West Bank. Three months ago, 67% of West Bankers were satisfied with the performance of the president. The decline in the West Bank might be due to the slowdown of the UN bid, a bid that had been responsible, three months ago, for the increase in public satisfaction with Abbas in the first place. It is also possible that the public is unhappy with Abbas for accepting to take part in the exploratory negotiations in Amman early in the year despite continued Israeli refusal to suspend settlement construction or accept the 1967 borders as a basis for negotiations. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas is higher among men (58%) compared to women (52%), among those over the age of 50 (67%) compared to youth between the ages of 18-28 (51%), among residents of towns and villages (67%) compared to residents of cities (52%), among illiterates (71%) compared to college graduates (42%), among supporters of the peace process (64%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (29%), among farmers and retirees (84% and 70% respectively) compared to housewives and laborers (52% and 53%), and among supporters of Fateh (87%) compared to supporters of Hamas (26%).

(4) Presidency and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections are to be held today, Abbas would receive 54% and Haniyeh 42%.
• If the competition was between Marwan  Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the first receives 64% and the second 32%
• If new legislative elections are to be held today, Fateh would receive 42%, Hamas 27%, all other electoral lists 10%, and 20% remain undecided.
• The strongest alternative Fateh candidate to Abbas is Marwan Barghouti and if Abbas and Marwan Barghouti did not participate in the elections, the strongest Fateh alternative is Saeb Erikat.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 42% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 61%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 55% and Haniyeh 37%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 55% and Haniyeh 40% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 42%. These results indicate a considerable increase in Haniyeh's popularity in the West Bank compared to the situation three months ago when he received only 33%. The increase in Haniyeh's popularity in the West Bank might be due to his visibility during his recent visits to Arab and Islamic countries and due to his support for the Syrian popular revolt. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter would receive 32% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 72%.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 27% say they would vote for Hamas and 42% say they would vote for Fateh, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 27% indicating a significant decline of eight percentage points compared to the situation three months ago. This decline might reflect public dissatisfaction with Hamas' behavior during the recent war in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% compared to 25% three months ago. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 46% and in the West Bank at 40%. These results indicate a decline in Fateh's popularity in the West Bank by four percentage points, probably due to government talk about a tax increase and a reduction in expenditure.

In a question about the favored Fateh candidate to replace Abbas as a president, assuming Abbas would not run, a majority of 55% selectedMarwan Barghouti, followed by Saeb Erekat, Nasir al Qidwa, and  Mahmud al Aloul (3% each).  Abu Mahir Ghnaim and Ahmad Qurie’ received 2% each, Azzam al Ahmad and Jibril al Rojoub received 1% each. When we asked the public to select a candidate from a list that did not includeMarwan Barghouti, a large part of the vote went to Saeb Erikat (18%) followed by Nasir al Qidwa (9%), Mahmud al Aloul, Ahmad Qurie' and AbuMahir Ghnaim (7% each), Azzam al Ahmad (5%), Jibril al Rojoub (4%), and finally Salim al Za'noun (2%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation and build a state and 32% believe it should be to obtain the right of return
• 28% believe the first problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment while 25% think it is the continuation of Israeli occupation and 23% think it is the absence of national unity. 

45% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 8% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. These findings reflect continued stalemate in the UN bid, a bid that pushed the statehood goal to 59% six months ago at the peak of the UN drive. This percentage dropped to 48% three months ago and dropped an additional three percentage points in this poll.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% of the public while 25% believes the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 23% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 14% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 9% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

(6) The Syrian Popular Revolt and Hamas' and Hezbollah's attitudes:

• 83% support the Syrian popular revolution against the Assad regime and 9% support the Assad regime.
• 42% believe that Hamas supports the Syrian popular revolution and 27% believe Hezbollah supports the Syria revolution.
• The public is divided over the issue of foreign intervention to topple the Assad regime: 50% oppose it and 46% support it.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public (83%) supports the Syrian demonstrators seeking to bring down the Syrian regime led by president Assad. Only 9% support the Assad regime. But only 42% of the public believe that Hamas supports the Syrian demonstrators while 23% believe the movement supports the Assad regime, 5% believe it supports both sides, 7% believe it supports neither side, and 24% say they do not know Hamas' position.  With regard to Hezbollah's position on the Syrian revolt, only 27% of the public believe that it supports the Syrian demonstrators while 44% believe it supports the Assad regime, 4% believe it supports both sides, 3% believe it supports neither side, and 21% say they do not know Hezbollah's position. But Palestinian public support for the Syrian popular revolt does not necessarily mean it supports external military intervention to bring down the Assad regime: 50% oppose such intervention and 46% support it.

In the context of the Syrian revolt and the talk about the departure of Hamas leaders from Damascus, findings show that the largest percentage of the public (41%) wants Hamas to make the Gaza Strip the headquarter for its leadership while 19% selected other locations: 19% selected Doha, 17% selected Cairo, and 14% selected Amman.  

(7) Peace Process

• 58% support and 35% oppose a return to exploratory talks with Israel without an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement construction and accept the lines of 1967 as a basis for negotiations.
• 48% believe that Abbas' decision few months ago to take part in exploratory talks with Israel in Amman without a settlement freeze or acceptance of the 1967 lines as a basis for negotiations was a right decision and 43% believe it was a mistake.
• Now after the suspension of peace negotiations, 76% support returning to the UNSC for recognition of a Palestinian state and 61% support launching a popular peaceful resistance. By contrast, only 40% support dissolving the PA, 39% support an armed intifada, and 29% support giving up the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years to be slim or non-existent while 31% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• 58% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion while 37% believe that the solution remains feasible as settlements can be dismantled after reaching an agreement.
• 56% support and 42% oppose the Arab (Saudi) peace initiative and 55% oppose and 43% support mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people.
• 76% are worried and 24% are not worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished by Israel.
• 57% believe that the hunger strike by Palestinian prisoner Khader Adnan will help speed up the process of closing the file on administrative detention and 39% do not believe that.
• Arab revolts will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause in the eyes of 51% and a negative impact in the eyes of 22%. 24% believe they will have no impact, positive or negative.

Findings show that 58% oppose and 35% support return to Palestinian-Israeli exploratory talks in the absence of a settlement freeze and an Israeli acceptance of the line of the 1967 as a basis for negotiation. Support for returning to the talks is higher in the West Bank (38%) compared to the Gaza Strip (31%), among women (40%) compared to men (31%), among the youth between the ages of 18-28 (40%) compared to those over 50 years of age (31%), among the illiterates (39%) compared to those with a BA degree (30%), among the somewhat religious (39%) compared to the religious (32%), among supporters of the peace process (43%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (22%), and among supporters of Fateh (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%).

Findings also show that 43% believe that president Abbas made a mistake when he agreed few months ago to take part in exploratory talks with Israel in Amman without an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement construction and accept the line of the 1967 borders as a basis for negotiations. 48% believe Abbas' decision was the right one.  Belief that Abbas made the right decision increases in the West Bank (52%) compared to the Gaza Strip (42%), among non refugees (52%) compared to refugees (45%), among residents of villages and towns (56%) compared to refugee camps and cities (44% and 47% respectively), among illiterates (53%) compared to holders of BA degree (45%), among those who define themselves as somewhat religious (54%) compared to the religious (41%), among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (27%), among farmers (72%) compared to professionals, employees, and students (42%, 46%, and 46% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%).

Findings also show that a majority of the public supports two alternatives to negotiations and oppose three others. 76% support returning to the UN to gain recognition of a Palestinian state and 61% support launching a non violent campaign against Israeli occupation. On the other hand, only 40% support dissolving the PA, 39% support launching a new armed intifada, and 29% support abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

Findings also show that 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years to be slim to non-existent while 31% believe the chances to be medium or high. Worse yet, 58% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to expanded settlement construction while only 37% believe the two state solution remains viable because settlements can be dismantled or evacuated once an agreement is reached. Belief that the two-state solution is no longer practical increases among holders of BA degree (65%) compared to illiterates (46%), among those opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to supporters of the peace process (52%), and among supporters of Hamas (65%) compared to supporters of Fateh (45%).

Findings show that a majority of 56% supports and 42% oppose the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative which calls for Arab recognition of Israel and for normalization of relations with it in return for its withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. On the other hand, 55% oppose and 43% support recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people.

Findings also show that more than three quarters (76%) of the Palestinian public are worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished. They also show that 67% believe that the hunger strike by administrative detainee Khader Adnan and the agreement reached to end that strike will contribute to speeding up the process of closing the file of administrative detention while 39% do not share this view. Finally, more than half of the Palestinians (51%) believe that Arab revolts will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause while 22% believe that they will have a negative impact. 24% believe they will have no impact, positive or negative. 

 (8) An attack on Iran

• 46% expect and 48% do not expect an Israeli military offensive against Iran in the coming months.
• If Israel does carry out a military strike on Iran, 85% expect such an attack to lead to a major regional war.

Findings show that the Palestinians are divided regarding the assessment of an Israeli military strike against Iran: 46% believe Israel will indeed strike Iran in the coming months and 48% believe it will not. But findings show a semi consensus (85%) that such a strike, if it takes place, would trigger a major regional war and 11% do not expect that..... Full Report

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

Stable majorities of the Israeli and Palestinians publics support the Quartet's roadmap. Abu Mazin's nomination as Prime Minister increases optimism about return to negotiations.

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, have conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion. 

This joint poll is the fifth in an ongoing research project into the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 at the wake of the Camp David summit. The current poll was designed to examine attitudes toward the appointment of Abu Mazin as a prime minister, issues of political reform, the war in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and reconciliation. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1315 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted between April 3- 7. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with two representative samples of 502 Israeli Jews and 501 Israeli Arabs. The Israeli sample was properly weighted according to the proportion of the respective sectors to produce the overall Israeli estimates (sampling error of 3.9%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russianbetween April 3 – 11. 

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at Tel 02-2964933 or email kshikaki@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at Tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

Summary of Results 

1) The Peace Process:

• Palestinian and Israeli attitudes toward the Quartet’s roadmap remain highly stable since last November and seem not to have been affected by the war in Iraq. 55% of the Palestinians and 61% of the Israelis support it. 39% percent of the Palestinians and 35% of the Israelis oppose it. Last November, 54% of the Palestinians and 59% of the Israelis supported and 42% and 38% respectively opposed it.
• A majority of 71% of the Palestinians (compared to 76% last November) supports a mutual cessation of violence while 27% (compared to 22% last November) oppose it. Under conditions of mutual ceasefire, 50% of the Palestinians would support taking measures against those who would continue to carry out attacks against Israeli civilians, while 45% would oppose doing so. Last November, support for such measures stood at 56% and opposition at 40%.  Still, three quarters acknowledge that failure to take such measures would impede the revival of the peace process. On the other hand, 79% express concern that taking such measures may lead to civil war.
• In the absence of a mutual cessation of violence, a majority of 57% (compared to 53% last November) continues to support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 40% oppose it. Support for attacks on soldiers and settlers remains very high (over 90%) as in the previous poll. As in November, two thirds continue to believe that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not. Among Israelis, only 23% believe that the Intifada has so far achieved Palestinian national and political goals.
•  Palestinians are divided over whether the US and other members of the Quartet would put heavy pressure on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to accept the roadmap with 45% believing that they would and 46% that they would not. Israelis however are much more certain that such pressure is soon to come.  85% of the Israeli public believe so. A clear majority of 79% of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis would oppose such American and international pressure if it was put on the Palestinian Authority or on Israel respectively. However 36% of the Israelis but only 17% of the Palestinians would support it. Interestingly enough 38% of the Palestinians would support the deployment of international forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to force the Palestinians and the Israelis to accept and implement the roadmap. An additional 9% would support such deployment only if the forces were European. Forty-eight percent would oppose any deployment of international forces, and less than one percent would support the deployment if the forces were made up of Americans only. Israelis are less supportive of the deployment of international forces in general but more favorable to American forces. 24% of the Israelis support the deployment of international forces, and additional 13% support it if these are American forces. Only 3% support it if the forces were to be European. 58% oppose the idea altogether.
•  A majority of 65% of the Palestinians (compared to 73% last November) and 77% of the Israelis (75% last November) supports reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by the state of Israel.

2) Abu Mazin Appointment as Prime Minister

•  A majority of Palestinians (64%) supports the creation of the position of a prime minister while 28% oppose that step. But support for Abu Mazin as a prime minister is slightly less, at 61%, and opposition slightly higher, at 32%.
•  A majority of 70% of the Palestinians and 67% of the Israelis believes that a government headed by Abu Mazin would be able to renew negotiations with Israel. However, only 39% of the Palestinians believe that it would be able to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire on all Palestinian factions and 53% believe that it would not. Similarly only 36% of the Israelis believe that Abu Mazin would be able to calm down the Intifada and reduce the violence, and 56% don't believe in that. It is worth noting that while the appointment of Abu Mazin has not changed Palestinian expectations regarding the prospect for joint cessation of violence and return to negotiations (standing at 18%, compared to 16% last November), a shift did occur in the expectations regarding the prospect for a continued armed confrontations and no return to negotiations. In this poll, only 27% of Palestinians (compared to 42% last November) believe that armed confrontations would not stop and the two sides would not return to negotiations. As to political reforms, only 43% of the Palestinians and 32% of the Israelis believe that Abu Mazin would be able to carry out political reform in the Palestinian authority. Moreover, Israelis seem to remain skeptical about the chances of a democratic regime to be established in the Palestinian authority or in a future Palestinian state. Only 9% percent of the Israeli public give it high or very high chances.
•  Palestinians are divided in two halves over the issue of whether Abu Mazin will be able to form a government that could win the confidence of the Palestinians, with 43% believing he would and 43% believing he would not. It is worth remembering that only 40% were willing in November 2002 to give confidence to Arafat’s current government.
•  Palestinians are also divided over the issue of whether the appointment of Abu Mazin represents erosion in the authority and status of Yasir Arafat with 50% agreeing with that and 43% disagreeing. Israelis are even more skeptical than that. Only, 38% of the Israeli public see the nomination of Abu Mazin's as signifying an erosion in Arafat's political status.
•  While a Palestinian majority of 86% supports internal and external calls for wide and fundamental political reforms, only 44% support (and 50% oppose) the call for changing the Palestinian political system so that power would reside in the hands of the prime minister while the position of the president would become ceremonial. Support for this change in the political system stood at 47% last November and opposition at 49%.

3) War in Iraq

• Almost all Palestinians oppose the war on Iraq; with 58% of them believing that the primary motive of the US is to seize Iraqi oil, 32% believing the motive to be to help Israel, and only 2% believing it to be to disarm Iraq from weapons of mass destruction. The great majority of the Israeli public on the other hand, supports the war (76%), and 50% believe that the primary reason for the war was to disarm Iraq from weapons of mass destruction; 30% believe that the primary motive was to seize Iraqi oil and only 5% believe that it had anything to do with Israel. 60% of the Israelis also believe that France and Germany objected to the war primarily in order to protect their economic interests in Iraq and the Arab world.
• While 78% of the Palestinian respondents believe that the war in Iraq would strengthen Palestinian desire to carry out attacks on Israelis and 61% believe that it would take Israelis and Palestinians further away from the peace process, only 46% believe (and 44% do not believe) that Israel would be able to exploit the opportunity to carry out a mass expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
•  Most Palestinians (61%) believe that Iraq of Saddam Hussein would win the war in Iraq while only 12% believe that the winner will be the US and its allies. Eighteen percent see all sides as losers. Among Israelis only 3% believed that Iraq of Saddam Hussein would win the war.

4) Domestic Israeli Issues

• The Israeli survey also examined the Israeli public's assessments of the current economic crisis. Fifty one percent of the Israelis believe that the crisis stems mainly from the Intifada and the cessation of foreign investments. Additional 29% put the blame on mismanagement of the economy by the current and previous government. Only 8% blame welfare payments which don't encourage people to go out to work. As to the conditions needed to put the economy back on track, 49% believe that it is impossible to solve the crisis without the opening of a political process with the Palestinians and 47% believe it is possible..
•  Israelis were asked as to their preferences on government spending in several areas. 93% of the public support more spending for creating jobs, 81% support more spending for healthcare, 75% support more spending for education and only 47% support more spending for national security. On the other hand, 70% prefer to reduce spending of settlements, and 66% would like to see less spending for religious establishments and seminaries.

5) Domestic Palestinian Issues

• Arafat’s popularity, at 35%, remains unchanged since last November. Marwan Barghouti is the second most popular Palestinian leader with 20% support. Despite his appointment as a prime minister, Abu Mazin’spopularity remains unchanged at 3%.
• Fateh, at 26%, is still the most popular faction followed by Hamas at 17%. Fateh’s support stood at 27% last November. Total support for Islamists (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and independent Islamists) stands at 29% compared to 25% last November. The combined strength of all Palestinian opposition factions, Islamist and nationalist, stands at 32% while 41% remain undecided. 
•  A majority of 81% believes that there is corruption in the Palestinian Authority and only 30% among those believe that corruption will decline in the future. Last November, 84% believed corruption existed in the PA.
•  Palestinians are divided over the performance of the finance minister, Salam Fayyad, with 35% satisfied, 36% unsatisfied, and 29% unsure.
•  Fourteen percent, compared to 20% last November, say that conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip lead them to seek permanent emigration.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-17 March 2018. The poll was conducted after the explosion of a roadside bomb that targeted the convoy of Palestinian Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah during his visit to the Gaza Strip and amid mutual accusations between Fatah and Hamas regarding the responsibility for the stalemate in reconciliation and the Gaza explosion. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed also the publication of leaks concerning alleged substance of the American “Deal of the Century.” Several other developments may have influenced the findings of the poll: reports were published regarding an eavesdropping by PA security services on citizens’ phone calls; public participation in non-violent protests diminished considerably; talks emerged around possible participation of East Jerusalemites in Jerusalem’s municipal elections; and warnings were issued by international agencies concerning the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as general conditions in the Palestinian territories and various aspects of the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In the first quarter of 2018, PSR’s poll explored various issues and public concerns: (1) the American role in the peace process and reports concerning the “deal of the century,” (2) the Gaza explosion which targeted the Prime Minister’s convey, (3) the great decline in popular participation in non-violent confrontations, (4) the possible participation of East Jerusalemites in Jerusalem’s municipal elections, and (5) other internal matters such as the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip, eavesdropping on phone calls of Palestinian citizens, the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights, reconciliation, and the internal balance of power.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians views the American role in the peace process as biased in favor of Israel and refuses the purported American ideas that have been reportedly included in the American “deal of the century,” such as making Abu Dis a capital of the Palestinian state or expanding the southern borders of the Gaza Strip into Sinai. The majority views the American suspension of support for UNRWA as aiming at closing the refugees’ file and deny them their right of return. A large percentage worries that this American position might weaken the ability of the Palestinian side to defend the rights of the refugees. For all of this, about two-thirds are opposed to the renewal of contacts between the PA and the US or the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Despite the fact that a large percentage supports the peace process, more than 90% expect to see no peace between Palestine and Israel in the next five, ten, or even 100 years. The largest percentage views the medium and long term future with a great deal of trepidation, pessimism and frustration.

Findings show that about half of the public believes that Israel stands behind the explosion that targeted the convoy of the Palestinian Prime Minister during his visit to the Gaza Strip. About three quarters of the public think that the aim of the explosion was to foil reconciliation efforts. About a quarter of Gazans however believe that the explosion represented a protest against the policies of the PA government toward the Gaza Strip.

Despite great public support for non-violent protests and the great admiration the public has for the Palestinian youth, Ahd Tamimi, viewing her as a role model and a symbol of popular resistance, the largest percentage attributes the significant decrease in public participation in non-violent protests to a weak public confidence in the Palestinian leadership and factions. Many also believe that the public thinks that such protests are ineffective in the confrontation with Israel. Indeed, findings of the poll show that about half of the public is in favor of a return to an armed intifada.

Findings also show that despite concerns about being seen as an acceptance of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, a majority of the public favors the participation of East Jerusalemites in the next Jerusalem municipal elections. Participation in the vote is seen as giving East Jerusalemites the ability to influence the municipal policies that affect them. Among all Palestinians, but more significantly among East Jerusalemites, less than a third are opposed to such participation.

Finally, when looking at internal conditions, findings show that:

Almost all Palestinians view conditions in the Gaza Strip as dire, bad or very bad. Responsibility for this situation is placed first on Israel, then the PA, and finally Hamas. But for       Gazans, the blame is placed first on the PA, with Israel and Hamas second and third respectively.

About two-thirds think that the PA security services do indeed eavesdrop on phone calls of citizens and officials and more than 60% believe that such eavesdropping is done illegally and without any just cause. A majority believes that such behavior benefits the occupation first and foremost and that the Palestinian judiciary is incapable of putting an end to it.

Those who positively view Palestinian democracy, seeing it as good or very good, are less than a quarter while about two-thirds believe that Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cannot criticize the PA without fear.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation plummets to less than a third; satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government does not exceed one third; and about half of the public puts the blame for the poor showing of the reconciliation government on the PA and the PA leadership while a small minority puts the blame on Hamas.

Finally, the domestic balance of power remains relatively unchanged compared to three months ago: more than two-thirds demand the resignation of president Abbas; a Hamas candidate wins against Abbas in presidential elections; but Fatah enjoys more popular support than Hamas, with a five point difference in its favor.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections: 

•  68% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 27% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 70% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 62% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 64% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip.
•  If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 29% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 8% (2% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip), Rami al Hamdallah (7%), Mustafa Barghouti (4%); Khalid Mishal (3%), and Salam Fayyad (2%).
•  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 40% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (36% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 52% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 53% for Haniyeh and 41% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the vote (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 66% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh 45% (compared to 43% three months ago). If the competition was between President Abbas from Fatah and Mustafa Barghouti from al Mubadara (Initiative), Abbas receives 48% and Mustafa Barghouti receives 43% of the vote.
•  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 38% and Haniyeh 37%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%.
•  If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 25% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 32% (compared to 36% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 41% three months ago).
•  

(2) Domestic conditions, status of democracy, eavesdropping on phone calls, and 3G:

•  Only 33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 63% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear. In a question about the status of democracy in Palestine and other countries, only 23% say Palestinian democracy is good or very good while only 10% say democracy in Egypt is good or very good. By contrast, 64% say democracy in Turkey is good or very good; 57% say democracy in Israel is good or very good, and 55% say democracy in France is good or very good.
•  Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%. In an open-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening of conditions in the Gaza Strip: the largest percentage (39%) blames Israel; 25% blame the PA, president Abbas, the reconciliation government, or Fatah; and 18% blame Hamas. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 43% of West Bankers compared to only 30% of Gazans blame Israel; and 16% of West Bankers compared to 43% of Gazans blame the PA, Abbas, the reconciliation government, and Fatah. However, responses of West Bankers and Gazans are almost identical regarding Hamas’ responsibility: 19% of West Bankers and 18% of Gazans blame Hamas.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 54%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 53%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 53% and in the West Bank at 45%.
•  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 19%. Three months ago, 41% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers indicated that they seek to immigrate.
•  We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Maan TV (15%), Palestine TV and Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (13% each), al Aqsa TV (12%), Al Arabiya, al Mayadeen, and al Quds TV (5% each).   
•  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 78%.
•  A majority of 52% views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
•  We asked the public about the media reports regarding a possible eavesdropping by the Palestinian security services on phone calls of Palestinian officials and citizens:

  62% say they believe that the reports are accurate and 29% believe they are inaccurate.

  62% do not think, and 26% think, that the eavesdropping on phones was legal or for legitimate purposes.

  56% think the primary beneficiary of eavesdropping conducted by the Palestinian security services is the Israel occupation while 25% think it is the PA administration and leadership, and only 12% think it is the Palestinian citizen and his or her security.

  Moreover, a majority of 53% think that if a Palestinian citizen (or even a former head of a Palestinian security service) submits a complaint to the Palestinian judiciary, it would be incapable of putting an end to this eavesdropping. Only 37% believe that the judiciary is capable of ending the eavesdropping.

• We asked the public about the rates for 3G service, a newly introduced service by Palestinian providers in the West Bank that allows for faster access to the internet on mobile phones: a majority of West Bankers (57%) describes the rates as high or very high and only 3% describe them as low. 11% think the rates are reasonable or medium. 30% did not know much about the service or the rates.

• We asked respondents about giving or donating money to the poor and charities:

   Two-thirds believe that the primary motivation behind giving to the poor is to win God’s satisfaction while less than a quarter (23%) think that people give to the poor in order to win the satisfaction of other people.

  Three quarters of the respondents say that they give to the poor and 23% say they do not. When asked in an open-ended question about its own motivation for giving, an overwhelming majority (80%) says that it is driven by religious incentive (such winning God’s satisfaction) while 20% say that it is driven by humanistic or social incentives (such as to ease the burden on or help the poor).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

•  Now that it has taken control of the border crossings and the headquarters of the ministries and other public agencies, 26% are satisfied and 65% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 38%.
• 30%, compared to 50% three months ago, are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation.
• The largest percentage (45%) believes that the PA, president Abbas, and the prime minister are responsible for the poor showing of the reconciliation government. By contrast, only 15% believe that Hamas is responsible for that poor showing; 13% say the government is doing a good job; and 27% do not who is to blame. It is worth noting that the responses of West Bankers are greatly different from those of Gazans: while about one  third (32%) of West Bankers blames the PA, Abbas and the prime minister, 69% of Gazans puts the blame on these three. By contrast, only 12% of West Bankers, compared to 21% of Gazans, blame Hamas.
•  We also asked the public about two claims: the one made by the reconciliation government that Hamas is preventing it from assuming control over the Gaza Strip, particularly in financial and security matters, and the claim made by Hamas that the reconciliation government is failing to carry out its responsibilities and duties in the Strip and that it continues to impose sanction on Gazans. About a third (32%) believes the two claims are baseless while 14% think the two claims are accurate. By contrast, 23% believe Hamas’ claim to be accurate and only 14% believe that the claim of the reconciliation government is accurate.
•   37% (60% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) support the Dahlan-Hamas efforts to reach an agreement on creating a joint administration for the Gaza Strip while 45% (36% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank) are opposed to such efforts.
• We asked respondents about the Gaza explosion that targeted the convey of the prime minister: 

  In an open question, we asked the public about its estimate of the party behind the explosion: the largest percentage (45%) believes it is the occupation; 14% believe it is Hamas and an identical percentage believes it is the PA or one of its agencies; 2% think it is Fatah, 1% think it is Dahlan, and 3% think it is one of the extremist groups.

About three quarters (74%) believe that the aim of the perpetrators is to foil the reconciliation efforts while 17% (23% in the Gaza Strip and 14% in the West Bank) believe that the aim is to protest against the policies of the reconciliation government toward the Gaza Strip.

(4) The peace process:  

•  48% support the two-state solution and 50% oppose it. Moreover, 46% believe that a Palestinian majority supports the two-state solution and 47% say a majority is opposed to it. Similarly, 50% believe that a majority of Israelis are opposed to the two-state solution and 41% think an Israeli majority supports that solution.
•  57% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to settlement expansion while only 40% think that it remains feasible because settlements can be evacuated. Similarly, 73% believe that the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or nonexistent while 25% think the chances are high or medium.
•  Despite the above, only 28% support a one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israelis have equal rights and 69% are opposed.
•  The largest percentage (35%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 31% think negotiation is the most effective means and 25% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 44% indicated that armed resistance is the answer and 27% sided with negotiation.
•  92% indicate that they have heard, and 8% have not heard, of Ahd Tamimi, a Palestinian youth activist being tried by the Israeli occupation on charges that she slapped an Israeli soldier. Among those who have heard about her, 64% say that they want her to be a role model for them and their relatives.
•  60% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 16% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.
• Similarly, 77% say that they are worried that they would be hurt on their daily life by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 22% are not worried.
•  In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternatives: 74% support joining more international organizations; 63% support popular non-violence; 48% support a return to an armed intifada; and 49% support dissolving the PA.
• A majority of 52% indicates that it supports the resolutions made by the recent meeting of the PLO’s Central Council, such as the cancellation of the recognition of Israel, the suspension of the Oslo Agreement, and others, while 18% indicate that they agree with some but not all of them, and 24% oppose them. Nonetheless, about two-thirds (65%) believe that president Abbas will not implement these decisions and only 24% believe he will implement them.  
• We asked the public about its view on why popular participation in non-violent protests, particularly those related to the American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, has been waning: 39% say it is due to lack of trust between the public on the one hand and the PA leadership and factions on the other; 27% say it is due to the fact that non-violence is ineffective; and 25% say that it is due to the fact that many people think that the responsibility for confronting Israel and the US falls on the shoulders of the PA.
• Moreover, 74% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 24% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.
•  In fact, 70% believe that there is already an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 20% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.
•  46% of all the Palestinian public support the participation of East Jerusalemites in the next Israeli municipal elections by nomination and voting while 15% support only voting, and 29% say that they are opposed to all kinds of participation. Support for participation, either by nomination or voting, declines to 42% among East Jerusalemites but the opposition to participation among them remains almost identical (30%) to that of the general population. It is worth noting however that a large percentage (28%) did not express any views on the matter, probably out of concern that it might be risky to state its views on the subject or that its answer might not be a popular one.
• We asked the public about its expectations regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations after 10 years and after 100 years:

   25% believe that after 10 years conditions, or the status quo, will be as they are now with occupation and settlement expansion continuing with little change; 34% say settlements will expand and there will be one political entity characterized by a system of apartheid that discriminates against the Palestinians; 24% believe that there will be a war or an armed intifada that will end the occupation. Only 9% believe that there will be peace between Israel and the Palestinians and a Palestinian state will be established.

After 100 years, only 12% believe that things will be as they are now with occupation and settlement expansion continuing; 30% think settlements will expand and there will be one apartheid state that discriminates against the Palestinians; 29% think there will be a war or an intifada that will end the occupation. The belief that there will be peace between Israel and a Palestinian state remains unchanged at 9%.

(5) Palestinian-American relations and “the deal of the century”:

•  65% are opposed to the resumption of contacts with the American administration that have been suspended last December after the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel; 21% favor a resumption of contacts. Similarly, 68% say that the PA leadership should not return to negotiations with Israel if the US administration asks it to do so while 27% say it should comply with the US request.
• A slim majority of 51% says that if the US submits its peace plan, the so-called “deal of the century,” the PA leadership should reject it regardless of its content because it must be bad for Palestinians while 29% say that the leadership should accept or reject the plan only after reviewing and discussing its content. Only 11% say that the Palestinian leadership should accept the “deal of the century.”
•  If negotiations with Israel resume under US sponsorship, the US will be biased in favor of Israel in the eyes of 88% of the Palestinians while only 7% think the US will be an honest broker and 2% think it will be biased in favor of the Palestinians.
•  A majority of 52% believes that the US administration has suspended its support for UNRWA because it seeks to close the file of the refugees and deny them their right of return while 43% think the US did that in order to pressure President Abbas to force him to return to negotiations with the US over the “deal of the century.”  Moreover, 49% think that the suspension of US support for UNRWA will not weaken the Palestinian negotiating position regarding the rights of the refugees but 45% think it will indeed weaken it.
• We asked the public about its views regarding some of the leaked ideas that are allegedly linked to the “deal of the century:”

On Jerusalem, 94% say they are opposed to making Abu Dis a capital of the Palestinian state; 4% support the idea.

  86% are opposed and 10% support the idea of expanding the Gaza Strip to include parts of Sinai in return for an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank.

63% oppose and 31% support the idea of allowing Israeli Jews to live in the Palestinian state as citizens or residents while respecting the Palestinian law and enjoying the same rights and duties as the Palestinians.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; 20% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

 23 January - 03 February 2008 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 23 January and 3 February 2008. This period witnessed the forced opening of the Rafah Crossings by Hamas and the march of hundreds of thousands of Gazans across the border with Egypt.  Total size of the sample is 3430 adults (2198 in the West Bank and 1232 in the Gaza Strip) interviewed face to face in 245 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 2%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 
 

Main Findings: 

Findings indicate a clear increase in the popularity of Hamas compared to that of Fateh. This is the first time since March 2006 in which we witness an increase in Hamas’s popularity. The increase reflects public appreciation, particularly in the Gaza Strip, of Hamas’s role in forcing open the borders of the Gaza Strip with Egypt. But the improved standing of Hamas does not mean public acceptance of its military takeover of the Gaza Strip as the overwhelming majority continues to reject Hamas’s June 2007 violent takeover. 

•  Hamas’s popularity increases from 31% to 34% and Fateh’s drops from 49% to 46% in one month between December 2007 and January 2008. In the Gaza Strip, the popularity of Hamas increases from 33% to 39% and the popularity of Fateh decreases from 52% to 46% during the same period. 
•  The popularity of Mahmud Abbas stands at 51% and Ismail Haniyeh at 43%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas’s popularity stands at 50% and Haniyeh’s at 46%. If the competition is between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives the support of 60% and the latter 35%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 56% and Haniyeh 42%. In December 2007, Abbas’s popularity stood at 56% and Haniyeh’s at 37%. 
•   Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas drops from 50% last December to 46% in this poll. Satisfaction with the performance of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 44%. In the Gaza Strip, satisfaction with the performance of Haniyeh is greater than satisfaction with the performance of Abbas; the former receives 52% and the latter 48%. 
•  Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Ismail Haniyeh reaches 37% compared to 36% for the performance of the government of Salam Fayyad. In the Gaza Strip, positive evaluation of the performance of Haniyeh’s government stands at 43% and Fayyad’s 37%. 
• 31% of the public believes that Haniyeh’s government is the one that has legitimacy while 33% say Fayyad’s government is the one that has legitimacy. 24% say the two governments lack legitimacy and 8% say the two governments are legitimate. In the Gaza Strip, Haniyeh’s government is perceived as more legitimate (35%) than Fayyad’s (33%).  In December 2007, only 27% said Haniyeh’s government was legitimate and 37% said Fayyad’s government was legitimate. 
•  Despite improvement in Hamas’s public standing, the majority (72%) still opposes its violent takeover of the Gaza Strip; only a quarter supports it. In the Gaza Strip, opposition to Hamas’s takeover stands at 67% and support at 31%. 
•  The public says that conditions in the West Bank are better than conditions in the Gaza Strip in the realms of economy (4% for Gaza and 43% for the West Bank), enforcement of law and order (28% for Gaza and 54% for the West Bank), democracy and freedom of the press (27% for Gaza and 51% for the West Bank), and personal safety and security (54% for Gaza and 61% for the West Bank). 
•   42% support the stand taken by Abbas and Fateh regarding return to dialogue with Hamas while 35% support the stand taken by Hamas.  Support for Abbas and Fateh’s stand stood at 46% last December and support for Hamas’s stood at 27%.  

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

Stable Majority Support for Clinton’s Final Status Package Among Israelis but Decline in Support Among Palestinians Large support in both publics for the extension of the cease fire

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted December 6-15 jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah 

The joint poll examined the impact of the recent political developments in Israel and primary and local elections in the Palestinian Authority on Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding President Clinton’s package for a Palestinian Israeli final status settlement. We examined this package twice before in December 2003 and December 2004. This is the first time we revisit theses issues in the post disengagement era. The findings indicate virtual stability in Israeli majority support for Clinton’s package but a noticeable decline in Palestinian support for this package compared to last December. 

The poll further examined both publics’ reactions to the extension of the current ceasefire and to a plan to cope with the members of armed groups belonging to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fateh. Most Palestinians (80%) and Israelis (80%) support the extension of the ceasefire. An overwhelming majority among Palestinians (81%) support the absorbance of the Palestinian armed factions into the Palestinian Authority security forces. More surprisingly, among Israelis, there is also majority support (53%) for this plan for dismantling the Palestinian armed factions. 

Two other important issues explored in the Israeli sample were Israelis’ acceptance of negotiations with the Hamas and the release of Marwan Barghouti from prison. 50% of the Israelis support and 47% oppose negotiations with Hamas if this is called for in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. 34% support the release of Barghouti and negotiations with him if this is required to reach a compromise settlement.

Other issues examined in this poll are attitudes towards the Israeli Palestinian Agreement on the Rafah Crossing, and Israeli and Palestinian voting intentions in the coming elections in both political systems. 

Total Palestinian sample size is 1316 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 118 randomly selected locations between December 6 and 8, 2005. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 600 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between December 8 and 15, 2005. The margin of error is 4%. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

Summary of Findings 

(A) Clinton Parameters 

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict including (1) Final borders and territorial exchange, (2) Refugees, (3) Jerusalem, (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state, (5) Security arrangements, and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues twice before in December 2003 and December 2004. In the current poll we revisit these crucial issues for the first time afterIsrael’s evacuation of the Gaza Strip and following the significant political developments in both societies in recent weeks. 

The findings indicate stability in the level of support among Israelis and decline in support among Palestinians compared to one year ago. Among Israelis a majority of 64% support these parameters as a combined overall package just like a year ago. Among Palestinians however 46% support the package now compared to a majority of 54% last year. 

Apparently these results reflect the joint impact of each public’s disappointment with the results of the disengagement and the recent dramatic developments in the Israeli and Palestinian political scenes.  Among Israelis we would expect increased willingness to compromise given Sharon’s signals of moderation. This is presumably offset by the renewed violence from the Gaza Strip which frustrates many Israelis who supported the disengagement. Palestinian decline in support for Clinton’s parameters similarly reflects the fierce political electoral competition in the PA which feeds more militant attitudes combined with disappointment with the meager outcome the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip yielded.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange 

Among Palestinians 55% support or strongly support and 42% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2004. At that time, support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 63% and opposition at 35%.

Among Israelis 53% support and 42% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel.Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In January 2005, 55% of the Israelis supported this component while 43% opposed it.

(2) Refugees 

Among Palestinians, 40% support and 57% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries likeAustralia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2004, 46% agreed with an identical compromise while 50% opposed it.

Among Israelis 43% support such an arrangement and 53% oppose it compared to 44% who supported it in January 2004 and 52% who opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem 

In the Palestinian public 33% support and 65% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2004, an identical compromise had a higher reception with 44% supporting it and 54% opposing it.

Among Israelis, 38% agree and 60% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In January 2005, 39% supported this arrangement and 60% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State 

Among Palestinians 20% support and 78% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2004 the support of 27% and the opposition of 71%.

Among Israelis 69% agree and 30% disagree to this arrangement compared to 68% who agreed and 30% who disagreed to it a year ago in January 2005.

(5) Security Arrangements 

In the Palestinian public 43% support and 55% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel will have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2004, 53% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 45% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 62% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 61% who supported it and 37% who opposed it a year ago in January 2005.

(6) End of Conflict   

In the Palestinian public 64% support and 34% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2004 the support of 69% and the opposition of 29%.

In the Israeli public 80% support and 18% oppose this component in the final status framework. In January 2005, 76% of the Israelis supported it while 23% opposed it.

The Whole Package 

Among Palestinians 46% support and 50% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2004, 54% supported and 44% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 64% support and 33% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package, just like a year ago. 

46% of the Israelis know that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package. 39% believe that the majority opposes it. This level of awareness indicates that despite the solid support for the package it has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 43% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 47% believe that the majority opposes it. In addition a plurality in both Palestinian and Israeli societies believe that the other side’s majority opposes such a package. 46% of the Israelis and 52% of the Palestinians think so.

Summary Table of the Findings 

(B) Other Conflict Resolution Issues 

• 60% of the Palestinians support and 36% oppose the roadmap plan. Among Israelis 65% support the plan compared to 31% who oppose it.
• Despite these levels of support both publics are not very optimistic regarding the pace in which a Palestinian Israeli political settlement will be reached. 23% of the Israelis and 44% of the Palestinians believe a political settlement is not possible ever, 36% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians believe it will be achieved in the next generation or many generation to come, 34% of the Israelis and 19% of the Palestinians think it will be reached in the next decade or the next few years.
• If in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians, Israel will have to release Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiate with him, 34% of the Israelis support such a step compared to 62% who oppose it.
• 50% of the Israelis support and 47% oppose negotiations with Hamas if Israel will have to do it in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians
• 53% of the Israelis support and 40% oppose a proposal to disarm the organizations that belong to Hamas, Jihad and Fatah by integrating them into the Palestinian security forces under the supervision of the PA. 81% of the Palestinians support the proposal to absorb the members of these armed groups into the security services whereby all armed forces become part of the Palestinian Authority compared to only 17% who oppose it.
• 80% of the Palestinians and 80% of the Israelis support the extension of the cease fire which expires at the end of this month.

(C) Palestinian-Israeli Agreement on Crossings

• 41% of the Palestinians support and 56% oppose the agreement for the opening of the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt. According to the agreement, the crossing will be operated by the PA and Egypt under the supervision of European Union and Israeli observers will monitor it through video broadcasts. Among Israelis, 56% support and 40% oppose it.
• With regard to the presence of the European Union observers, 58% of the Palestinians and only 37% of the Israelis oppose their role in the crossing.
• 37% of the Palestinians believe the agreement weakens Palestinian sovereignty compared to 58% who think the opposite.
• 61% of the Palestinians oppose the resumption of violence from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, as most (84%) expect that resumption of violence will lead to the closing of the crossing. 62% of the Palestinians also suspect that Israel will not continue to implement the agreement on crossing and movement.
• Following the agreement on crossings, only 19% among Palestinians feel that the freedom of movement between the West Bank and the Gaza strip has improved compared to 57% who expected such an improvement in September. More generally, 45% of the Palestinians believe that the situation in the Gaza Strip has become better than before the disengagement compared to 52% who think it became worse or remained the same. 55% believe Gaza has remained a big prison

(D) Attitudes Towards Settlements and the Disengagement

• An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (82%) but also 50% of the Israelis see the evacuation of the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel. 48% among Israelis and 17% among Palestinians don’t see it as such. In addition, 68% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Intifada and armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve. Nevertheless 46% of the Palestinians don’t see the evacuation of settlements from the Gaza strip as the beginning of the end of the occupation and the establishment of a state compared to 52% who do see it as such.
• Considering the outcome of the disengagement in Gaza, 49% of the Israelis believe they will support future unilateral disengagement plans in the West Bank Compared to 43% who will oppose them.
• The percent of Israelis supporting the dismantling of most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians returned to the levels from before the disengagement. 62% supported such a step in June just before the disengagement, and 61% support it now. Israelis’ assessments of the settlements’ contribution to Israel’s national security decreased somewhat following the disengagement. 32% of the Israelis believe that the settlements contribute to Israel’s national security (37% in June), while 40% believe they hurt it (39% in June). 23% think that settlements neither contribute nor hurt (19% in June).
• As to the future of the settlements in the longer run, 64% of the Israeli public, believe that in the coming years the number of settlements in the West Bank will decrease (compared to 50% who thought so in September), 14% expect the number of settlements to increase (19% in September). In contrast, among Palestinians 45% fear that the number of settlements will increase in the future and 42% think it will decline. In September, 52% and 39% respectively thought so.

(E) Israeli Elections 

• At the time of the survey, 17% have not decided yet whom to vote for in the coming election, 12% of Israeli eligible voters claim they will not vote. Ariel Sharon’s party “Kadima” obtains 27% of the vote, the Labor party headed by Amir Peretz obtains 15% of the vote, and the Likud 6% of the vote.
• 13% of the Israelis believe that the elections will focus mainly on the political process with the Palestinians, 20% believe it will center around security issues, 48% think it will focus on social/economic issues, and 7% think it will focus on corruption.
• 33% of the Israelis believe that Amir Peretz will deal better with Israel’s social/economic problems compared to 29% who think that Sharon will do it better and 16% who believe in Netanyahu’s skills. However with respect to security and foreign affairs issues, Sharon comes out the favorite with 60% who believe he can deal with those better. 19% believe it is Netanyahu who can handle these issues better, and 12% believe Amir Peretz will do this job better.
• 46% of the Israeli public believe that Sharon leaving the Likud and forming a new party will increase the chances for a peace process with the Palestinians compared to 5% who believe the chances will decline, and 41% who believe it will have no impact. . Among the Palestinians, only 20% believe that Sharon’s step will increase chances for the peace process compared to 36% who believe it will decline and 35% who believe it will have no impact.
• In the same context, 72% of the Israelis believe that Sharon is able to convince the Israeli public to accept a compromise agreement with the Palestinians if such an agreement is reached. Only 29% however think that Amir Peretz will be able to do this.

(F) Palestinian Elections 

• If elections are held today, findings show that 78% of the Palestinians would participate (compared to 74% last September). 
• Among those intending to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections, 50% will vote for Fateh, 32% for Hamas, 9% for other factions and groups including independents, and 9% remain undecided. Last September, Fateh received 47% of the vote, while Hamas received 30%, others factions 11%, and 11% were undecided. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Fateh increases from 47% to 53% during the same period.
• In a closed question, in a contest for the office of PA president between Mahmud Abbas, Mahmud Zahhar, and Mustafa Barghouti, Abbas comes first with 41% followed by Zahhar with 21% and Barghouti with 19%. These results are similar to those obtained in our last poll in September.
• In a closed question with a list of five candidates, in a contest over the office of prime minister, Marwan Barghouti comes first with 36% followed by Zahhar with 20%, Mustafa Barghouti with 14%, Dahlan with 11%, and Qurai with 6%. Last September, Marwan Barghouti received 30%, Zahhar 22%, Mustafa Barghouti 17%, Dahlan 8%, and Qurai 8%.
• Among the whole population (those intending and those not intending to participate in the elections), support for Fateh reaches 45% and Hamas 28%. Last September, support for Fateh stood at 39% and Hamas at 27%. Support for Fateh in the Gaza Strip increases from 40% to 49% during the same period.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-16 March 2019. The period before the conduct of the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) by the PA president, the announcement that a new PLC, but not presidential, elections will take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within six months, the selection of Mohammad Shtayyeh to be the next prime minister following the resignation of the Hamdallah government, and the eruption of demonstrations in the Gaza Strip against high cost of living conditions and their violent suppression by Hamas’ police and armed wing . The period also witnessed the implementation of Israel’s decision to deduct a small amount of the Palestinian custom revenues it transfers every month to the PA and the PA response refusing to accept any of these funds, a Palestinian-Israeli escalation in al-Aqsa Mosque in the aftermath of a Waqf decision to re-open Bab al Rahma (Gate of Mercy) area for Muslim prayer and an Israeli ban on prayer in that area, and the formation of a new Israeli electoral list representing the center in preparation for Israeli parliamentary elections which are scheduled to take place next month. Finally, the US Administration announced during this period its intentions to release its peace plan, known as the “Deal of the Century,” after the holding of the Israeli elections. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2019  indicate a rise in support for the two-state solution, but the largest percentage remains opposed to this solution. Support for negotiations, as the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state rises while the belief that armed struggle is the most effective means drops. But distrust in the seriousness of the Trump Administration increases. Similarly, findings show a significant rise in the belief that the Trump plan will not include a Palestinian state, nor will it include a reference to East Jerusalem as a capital for the state, or an emphasis on the 1967 borders, or a call to a just solution to the refugee problem, or a call to end the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army. Given all these doubts about the plan, about 80% demand that the PA leadership reject the American plan when made public.

Findings also show that about three quarters of the public demand the simultaneous holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A similar percentage indicates its rejection of holding parliamentary elections if no presidential elections were held at the same time and if restricted to the West Bank. 60% would oppose elections, even if held in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, if restricted to a parliamentary vote.  If the PA manages to hold parliamentary elections only and only in the West Bank, less than 30% of West Bankers say they will participate in that vote.

Findings also show that if presidential elections are held today, Abbas would win against Hamas’ Haniyyeh. Three months ago, Haniyyeh was able to win against Abbas. Abbas’ recent confrontation with the Israeli government over payment to the families of prisoners and martyrs and the deduction from the Palestinian custom revenues might have contributed to the rise in his popularity. By contrast, Hamas’ violent suppression of the recent popular demonstrations in the Gaza Strip might have contributed to the decline in support for Haniyyeh. If parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah would win the largest share of the vote indicating a significant rise in its popularity compared to our findings three months ago. Support for Hamas on the other hand drops slightly compared to our findings three months ago. Vote for the two factions has probably been affected by the same factors that affected support for Abbas and Haniyyeh.

Findings indicate that the public is evenly divided over the selection of Shtayyeh as the next prime minister, one satisfied and the other dissatisfied with the selection. But the largest percentage believe a government led by Shtayyeh will not succeed in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or in organizing elections, or in improving Palestinian economic conditions. Given the Israeli decision to deduct part of the custom revenues Israel transfers to the PA on monthly basis and the PA response by refusing to accept any of those funds, a large majority expresses pessimism about the ability of the PA to pay salaries to its public sector and a majority says that this development could lead to PA collapse.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• Only 43% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 46% believe no elections will take place.
• An overwhelming majority (72%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 10% want parliamentary elections only. 13% do not want any elections.
• An overwhelming majority (72%) expects Israel to refuse to allow election to take place in East Jerusalem and 15% expect Israel to allow it. Similarly, 53% believe that Hamas will not allow election to take place in the Gaza Strip if such vote was restricted to parliamentary elections and 33% believe it will allow such election.
• If elections were for a parliament and a president, 66% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 26% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip.  But if elections were for a parliament only, 59% say they want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 32% would oppose that.
• About three quarters (74%) oppose and 19% support the holding of parliamentary elections only and only in the West Bank. Similarly, 62% oppose and 31% support the holding of parliamentary elections only even if they are to take place in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
• 54% say they will not participate in West Bank-Gaza Strip elections if they were restricted to a parliamentary vote and 41% say they will participate in such elections. Similarly, 61% say they will not participate in elections if they were parliamentary only and if they were to take place in the West Bank only; 29% say they will participate in such elections.
• If elections were parliamentary only and took place only in the West Bank but some of the members of the new parliament were from the Gaza Strip, only 50% say such a parliament would represent both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 34% say it would represent the West Bank only. In the Gaza Strip, the largest percentage (48%) say such a parliament would represent the West Bank only and 45% say it would represent both areas.
• 54% are dissatisfied with the dissolution of the PLC while 37% say they are satisfied. It is worth noting that three months ago, before the actual dissolution of the PLC, 47% said they would support its dissolution and 43% said they would oppose such a step.  Today, 53% view the dissolution of the PLC as illegal and unconstitutional while 33% view it as legal and constitutional.
• 64% are worried and 34% are not worried that domestic conditions would deteriorate in case the position of the president become vacant. But 47% believe that when the position of the president is vacant, Palestinian factions will be able to reach an agreement on conducting presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to elect a successor; 45% believe that the factions will not reach such an agreement
• 60% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 68% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 55% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 62%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 40% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 32% (38% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 51% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 47% of the vote (compared to 36% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 51% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 55% (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh 33% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 64% and Haniyeh 33%.
• If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (2% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 4%; Khalid Mishal, Saeb Erikat, and Mustafa Barghouti by 3% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 8% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 31% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 39% three months ago).
• A majority of 54% view and 42% do not view the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It is worth noting that the belief that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people stood at 58% nine months ago and at 69% thirteen years ago. 

(2) Mohammad Shtayyeh, a new prime minister:

• 38% are satisfied and 40% are dissatisfied with the selection of Mohammad Shtayyeh as the next prime minister. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction reaches 52%.
• The largest percentage (48%) believes that a government led by Shtayyeh will not succeed in achieving reconciliation and unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 35% believe it will succeed.
• Similarly, the largest percentage (44%) believes that a government led by Shtayyeh will not be able to organize legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% think it will succeed.
• Half of the public believes that a Shtayyeh government will not be able to improve economic conditions in the PA while 36% believe it will be able to do that.

(3) Domestic conditions:

• Now after Israel deducted part of the custom revenues it transfers to the PA and after the PA has refused to accept the incomplete transfer, an overwhelming majority (69%) is worried and 25% are not worried that the PA will not be able to pay salaries to its public sector. Moreover 54% are worried and 40% are not worried that the PA’s inability to pay salaries to its public sector will lead to PA collapse
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.
• In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Israel, Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (37%) blames Israel while 25% blame Abbas and the PA, 21% blame Hamas, 4% blame Egypt, and 9% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 41% of Gazans, compared to 16% of West Bankers, blame Abbas and the PA and 27% of Gazans, compared to 17% of West Bankers, blame Hamas.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 64%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 57%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 55% and in the West Bank at 47%.
• 29% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 43% and declines in the West Bank to 20%.
• Only 32% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 65% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 41% say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 53% believe that they cannot.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82%.
• The public is divided over the assessment of the PA: 47% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 47% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Palestine and Al Aqsa TV (14% each), Maan TV and Palestine Today (at 12% each), Al Arabiya (at 6%) and al Mayadeen (at 5%).

(4) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government: 

• 30% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.
• The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 38% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 58% disagrees. Three months ago, 34% said they agreed with Abbas.
• When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, 71% said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 24% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no major differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans.
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (82%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 14% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government.

5) The peace process

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 48% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 43%.
• Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 49% said they prefer the two-state solution, 17% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 23% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.” Three months ago, support for the two-state solution stood at 45%, for the one state solution at 22%, and 23% preferred a third undefined alternative.
• A majority of 58% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 39% of the public while 30% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 17% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 34% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 34% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• The public is divided over the role of negotiations and armed struggle in the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 37% think that negotiation is the most effective means while 36% think armed struggle is the most effective means, while 22% believe that non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 28% said negotiation is the most effective means and 44% said armed struggle is the most effective means.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 55% support popular non-violent resistance; 47% support a return to an armed intifada; 41% support dissolving the PA; and 31% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 47% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
• 65% support and 31% oppose the PLO Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel. But 78% believe that the PA leadership and security services will not stop security coordination with Israel
• More than three quarters (76%) believe that if Israel ban Muslim prayer at al Rahma Gate (Gate of Mercy) area, Palestinian protests will succeed, as the case was with the metal detector gates, in forcing Israel to allow such prayer; 21% believe Palestinian protests will not succeed this time.
• A majority 64% believe that visits of Israeli officials to Arab countries damage the chances for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; 8% believe the visits help to promote peace and 26% believe they neither help nor hurt conflict resolution. 
• A slim majority of 51% expect the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 22% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections. But three quarters believe that even if the center-left win the elections, conditions will stay as they are today or become worse; only 10% expect Palestinian-Israeli conditions to improve in that case. 

6) Trump’s Peace Plan:

• An overwhelming majority (83%) believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about launching a new peace plan and 12% believe it is serious.
• A large majority of 79% believes that if the US does indeed offer a peace plan, it will not call for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel; 15% believe it will.
• A similar percentage (81%) believes that the plan will not call for a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem; 14% believe it will.
• 78% believe the Trump plan will not call for the borders of the Palestinian state to be based on the lines of June 1967 with minor mutual land swaps; 17% believe it will.
• An overwhelming majority of 84% believes the plan will not call for a just solution to the refugee problem; 10% believe it will.
• Similarly, 84% believe the plan will not call for the ending of the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the areas occupied in 1967; 11% believe it will.
• 79% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan, if offered, and 14% believe it should accept it.
• But if the Trump plan does indeed include all such items, such as a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, with borders based on the 1967 lines, a just solution to the refugees’ problem, and an Israeli army withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, a majority of 52% calls for rejecting it and 43% call for accepting it. Call for accepting the plan is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 55% while the call for rejecting it is higher in the West Bank, standing at 59%.
• A majority of 64% is opposed and 23% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

 Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

'PESSIMISM' UNDERSCORES FINDINGS OF NEW ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION POLL

5-11 July 2002

The poll, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, finds that the Palestinians are determined to continue their struggle and Israelis strongly support PM Sharon's current policy.

A joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion, conducted between July 5-11 2001, finds that both publics are pessimistic concerning the long-term prospects of renewing the peace process.

Forty one percent of the Israelis and 46 percent of the Palestinians believe that there is no chance to reach a peace agreement in the foreseeable future

The joint poll, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, is the second in an ongoing research project into the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 at the wake of the Camp David summit. The current poll was designed to examine the impact of the year-long armed confrontations on the attitudes towards peace and reconciliation.

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included identical questions. A representative sample of 1318 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. A representative sample of 1019 Israelis (519 Jews and 500 Arabs) was interviewed by telephone (sampling error of 3.9%). The interviews were conducted between July 5-11.

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at Tel: 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at Tel: 03-6419429 or email jshamir@huji.ac.il.

Summary of Results 

I. A Pessimistic Outlook

The overall picture emerging from the surveys is pessimistic with regard to the prospects of renewing the peace process. This pessimism both feeds and is a result of the ongoing violent confrontations between Israel and the Palestinians. Consequently, the Palestinians are determined to continue their armed struggle while Israelis by and large support Sharon's current policy.

The pessimistic outlook is expressed mainly in both publics' assessment of what will happen in the long run. Forty one percent of the Israelis and 46 percent of the Palestinians believe that there is no chance to reach a peace agreement in the foreseeable future, compared to only 19 percent of the Israelis and 23 percent of the Palestinians who felt so immediately after the Camp David summit.

Similarly, 59 percent of the Palestinians and 46 percent of the Israelis characterize their relations five to ten years from now as conflictual and violent, compared to 31 percent of the Palestinians and 10 percent of the Israelis who felt so a year ago.

II. Reserved Support for the Cease-fire and the Mitchell Report

While both publics support their government's decision to accept the Mitchell report which calls for a cease-fire and a freeze on settlements (50% of Palestinians and 68% of the Israelis), and a return to the negotiation table (63% of Palestinians and 66% of Israelis), fifty percent of the Israelis oppose continuing the negotiations from where they stopped at Taba compared to only 33% of the Palestinians. Despite support for the cease-fire, Palestinians' support for armed attacks continues to be strong.

Ninety two percent support armed attacks against Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, and 58% support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel.

Israelis in turn, by and large support Sharon's policy so far to continue with moderate military measures in order to maintain the option for future negotiations (44%). Thirty seven percent of the Israelis however want to react in full force in order to remove Arafat from power and only 16% support a unilateral cease-fire. 

III. Impact of the Intifada on reconciliation sentiments

Despite the overall pessimistic outlook, there is a surprisingly small impact of the year long Intifada on Palestinians' and Israelis' sentiments towards reconciliation given a state of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Under such conditions, 73% of the Palestinians and 73% of the Israelis would support a process of reconciliation despite the ongoing hostilities. While Palestinians would mainly support open borders and economic cooperation, Israelis see more favorably than Palestinians cultural changes in education and public discourse and social interaction.

More specifically: 

• Eighty four percent of the Palestinians and 53% of the Israelis would support open borders 
• 60% of the Palestinians and 70% of the Israelis would support joint economic institutions and ventures
• 25% of the Palestinians and 45% of the Israelis would support joint political institutions designed eventually to lead to a confederate system
• 31% of the Palestinians and 59% of the Israelis would support legal measures to prevent incitement against the other side
• 7% of the Palestinians and 36% of the Israelis would support a school curriculum, which educates school children to give up irredentist aspirations.
• On a personal level under conditions of peace, 63% of the Israeli Jews would invite a Palestinian colleague to their home, and 51% are willing to visit a Palestinian colleague in his home. Twenty seven percent of the Palestinians would invite, and 28% would visit an Israeli colleague.

Most of these figures almost didn't change for the Israelis from last year when measured before the Intifada and went down only slightly for some of the items for the Palestinians.

IV. Economic Impact of the Intifada

While the Intifada seems to have affected only marginally attitudes towards reconciliation it is perceived to have affected greatly both the national and personal economic situation in both societies. Eighty nine percent of the Israelis and 93% of the Palestinians think that the Intifada had an adverse effect on the nations' economic situation. Thirty eight percent of the Israelis and 80% of the Palestinians feel that the Intifada had a harmful impact on their personal economic situation.

A peace agreement however, is expected to greatly improve this situation. Eighty three percent of the Israelis and 81% of the Palestinians believe that a peace agreement will have a beneficial impact on the nation's economic situation. Similarly 50% of the Israelis and 74% of the Palestinians believe that their personal economic situation will improve as a result of a peace agreement.

While economic considerations may potentially reduce mutual violence, they are perceived less important than other national interests, which feed the conflict. The most important Palestinian national interest is considered to be the "end of occupation" by the Palestinians (50%), and "security" by the Israelis (48%). Improving the living conditions ranks only third in importance in both populations.

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, March 2011 

In the backdrop of the demonstrations in the Arab world, neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider such demonstrations to be capable of ending occupation in the West Bank 

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.   

Given the dramatic events in the Arab world, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about similar demonstrations in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

48% of Israelis consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the West Bank against Israeli occupation to be medium or high. 40% consider those chances to be low or non-existent;.

Large majorities of both Palestinians (66%) and Israelis (73%) do not consider such demonstration in the West Bank to be capable of ending occupation or stopping settlements. Only 31% among Palestinians and 13% among Israelis think such demonstrations can end occupation and settlement activity.

63% of the Palestinians oppose and 32% support the attack in the Itamar settlement in the West Bank in which a family of five was murdered. 

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between March 17 and 19, 2011. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 601 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between March21 and 28, 2011. The margin of error is 4.0%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding the uprising in the Arab world

• 52% of the Palestinians feel a need for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to organize demonstrations similar to those occurring in other Arab countries. 40% do not feel the need for such demonstrations. But Among Gazans, the percentage of those who feel the need to organize demonstrations against the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip rises to 67%. A majority of Israelis (54%) consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the Gaza Strip against the Hamas government low or non-existent; 36% consider those chances to be medium or high.
• 47% of the Palestinians feel a need for Palestinians in the West Bank to organize demonstrations similar to those occurring in other Arab countries. 50% do not feel the need for such demonstrations. But Among West Bankers,, the percentage of those who feel the need to organize demonstrations against the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank decreases to 36%. A majority of Israelis (51%) consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the West Bank against the PA government low or non-existent; 39% consider those chances to be medium or high. 
• 40% of Israelis consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the West Bank against Israeli occupation to be low or non-existent; 48% consider those chances to be medium or high.
• Large majorities of both Palestinians (66%) and Israelis (73%) do not consider such demonstration in the West Bank to be capable of ending occupation or stopping settlements. Only 31% among Palestinians and 13% among Israelis think such demonstrations can end occupation and settlement activity.
• 69% of Israelis think that the chances of such demonstrations to occur among the Israeli-Arab public against the Israeli government are non-existent or low; 22% consider those chances to be medium or high.
• A majority of the Palestinians (54%), and a plurality among Israelis (42%) believe that the chances of establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years did not change in light of the developments in Egypt and other Arab countries. 21% of the Palestinians and 25% of the Israelis think that the chances have increased; 23% of the Palestinians and 22% of the Israelis think that the chances have decreased. Majorities on both sides consider the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state as low or non-existent (67% among Palestinians and 59% among Israelis.

(B) Renewal of violence between Israelis and Palestinians

• 63% of the Palestinians oppose and 32% support the attack in Itamar in which a family of five was murdered.
• In light of the attack in Itamar, 59% among Israelis oppose and 33% support the government policy to relax the security measures in the West Bank such as the removal of road blocks.
• Among Israelis, 74% oppose and 16% support the settlers’ actions which damage Palestinian property and block roads (labeled “price tag”) in response to removal of illegal outposts by the Israeli government.
• 66% of the Israelis believe that that the settlers’ actions against Israeli soldiers and policemen during the evacuation of the Gilad farm in the West Bank pose a danger or grave danger to democracy. In our November 2002 poll 74% of Israelis believed so and 21% thought they do not pose a danger.
• 54% of Israelis think the Israeli government is not strict enough in imposing the rule of law in the “territories” while 34% believe it is strict enough. In our November 2002 poll, 53% believed it is not strict enough while 41% of Israelis believed that the government is strict enough.
• 63% of the Israelis support a tough governmental policy against extreme Israeli elements in the “territories” like those who shoot Palestinian olive pickers even if this can result in a confrontation with settlers; 30% oppose it. In our November 2002 poll, 70% supported such a policy while 24% opposed it. 

 (C) Conflict management, peace initiatives and threat perceptions 

• After the US has used its veto power against the UNSC resolution regarding Israeli settlements, 47% of the Israelis and 57% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will continue. 83%of the Israelis and 52% of the Palestinians expect that some armed attacks will continue as well.
• 54% of the Israelis support and 41% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. However 53% think that the majority of the Israeli public opposes such negotiations and only 31% think a majority supports it.
• 56% of the Israelis oppose and 31% support the Saudi initiative, while 56% of the Palestinians support the plan and 41% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In our December 2010 poll there was a similar level of support for the plan among both Israelis and Palestinians.
• In our poll we also examine periodically Israelis’ and Palestinians’ readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 52% of the Israelis, support such a mutual recognition; recognition of identity and 36%oppose it. Among Palestinians, 48% support and 50% oppose it.
• Among Israelis, 54% are worried and 41% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, just like in our previous poll in December. Among Palestinians 70% are worried and 30% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. In our last poll in December, 75% of the Palestinians said they were worried and 25% said they were not worried.
• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend the borders of the state to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens. A plurality of the Israelis (34%) fears that the Palestinians’ aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel.