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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-17 March 2018. The poll was conducted after the explosion of a roadside bomb that targeted the convoy of Palestinian Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah during his visit to the Gaza Strip and amid mutual accusations between Fatah and Hamas regarding the responsibility for the stalemate in reconciliation and the Gaza explosion. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed also the publication of leaks concerning alleged substance of the American “Deal of the Century.” Several other developments may have influenced the findings of the poll: reports were published regarding an eavesdropping by PA security services on citizens’ phone calls; public participation in non-violent protests diminished considerably; talks emerged around possible participation of East Jerusalemites in Jerusalem’s municipal elections; and warnings were issued by international agencies concerning the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as general conditions in the Palestinian territories and various aspects of the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In the first quarter of 2018, PSR’s poll explored various issues and public concerns: (1) the American role in the peace process and reports concerning the “deal of the century,” (2) the Gaza explosion which targeted the Prime Minister’s convey, (3) the great decline in popular participation in non-violent confrontations, (4) the possible participation of East Jerusalemites in Jerusalem’s municipal elections, and (5) other internal matters such as the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip, eavesdropping on phone calls of Palestinian citizens, the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights, reconciliation, and the internal balance of power.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians views the American role in the peace process as biased in favor of Israel and refuses the purported American ideas that have been reportedly included in the American “deal of the century,” such as making Abu Dis a capital of the Palestinian state or expanding the southern borders of the Gaza Strip into Sinai. The majority views the American suspension of support for UNRWA as aiming at closing the refugees’ file and deny them their right of return. A large percentage worries that this American position might weaken the ability of the Palestinian side to defend the rights of the refugees. For all of this, about two-thirds are opposed to the renewal of contacts between the PA and the US or the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Despite the fact that a large percentage supports the peace process, more than 90% expect to see no peace between Palestine and Israel in the next five, ten, or even 100 years. The largest percentage views the medium and long term future with a great deal of trepidation, pessimism and frustration.

Findings show that about half of the public believes that Israel stands behind the explosion that targeted the convoy of the Palestinian Prime Minister during his visit to the Gaza Strip. About three quarters of the public think that the aim of the explosion was to foil reconciliation efforts. About a quarter of Gazans however believe that the explosion represented a protest against the policies of the PA government toward the Gaza Strip.

Despite great public support for non-violent protests and the great admiration the public has for the Palestinian youth, Ahd Tamimi, viewing her as a role model and a symbol of popular resistance, the largest percentage attributes the significant decrease in public participation in non-violent protests to a weak public confidence in the Palestinian leadership and factions. Many also believe that the public thinks that such protests are ineffective in the confrontation with Israel. Indeed, findings of the poll show that about half of the public is in favor of a return to an armed intifada.

Findings also show that despite concerns about being seen as an acceptance of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, a majority of the public favors the participation of East Jerusalemites in the next Jerusalem municipal elections. Participation in the vote is seen as giving East Jerusalemites the ability to influence the municipal policies that affect them. Among all Palestinians, but more significantly among East Jerusalemites, less than a third are opposed to such participation.

Finally, when looking at internal conditions, findings show that:

Almost all Palestinians view conditions in the Gaza Strip as dire, bad or very bad. Responsibility for this situation is placed first on Israel, then the PA, and finally Hamas. But for       Gazans, the blame is placed first on the PA, with Israel and Hamas second and third respectively.

About two-thirds think that the PA security services do indeed eavesdrop on phone calls of citizens and officials and more than 60% believe that such eavesdropping is done illegally and without any just cause. A majority believes that such behavior benefits the occupation first and foremost and that the Palestinian judiciary is incapable of putting an end to it.

Those who positively view Palestinian democracy, seeing it as good or very good, are less than a quarter while about two-thirds believe that Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cannot criticize the PA without fear.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation plummets to less than a third; satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government does not exceed one third; and about half of the public puts the blame for the poor showing of the reconciliation government on the PA and the PA leadership while a small minority puts the blame on Hamas.

Finally, the domestic balance of power remains relatively unchanged compared to three months ago: more than two-thirds demand the resignation of president Abbas; a Hamas candidate wins against Abbas in presidential elections; but Fatah enjoys more popular support than Hamas, with a five point difference in its favor.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections: 

•  68% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 27% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 70% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 62% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 64% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip.
•  If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 29% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 8% (2% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip), Rami al Hamdallah (7%), Mustafa Barghouti (4%); Khalid Mishal (3%), and Salam Fayyad (2%).
•  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 40% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (36% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 52% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 53% for Haniyeh and 41% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the vote (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 66% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh 45% (compared to 43% three months ago). If the competition was between President Abbas from Fatah and Mustafa Barghouti from al Mubadara (Initiative), Abbas receives 48% and Mustafa Barghouti receives 43% of the vote.
•  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 38% and Haniyeh 37%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%.
•  If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 25% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 32% (compared to 36% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 41% three months ago).
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(2) Domestic conditions, status of democracy, eavesdropping on phone calls, and 3G:

•  Only 33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 63% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear. In a question about the status of democracy in Palestine and other countries, only 23% say Palestinian democracy is good or very good while only 10% say democracy in Egypt is good or very good. By contrast, 64% say democracy in Turkey is good or very good; 57% say democracy in Israel is good or very good, and 55% say democracy in France is good or very good.
•  Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%. In an open-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening of conditions in the Gaza Strip: the largest percentage (39%) blames Israel; 25% blame the PA, president Abbas, the reconciliation government, or Fatah; and 18% blame Hamas. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 43% of West Bankers compared to only 30% of Gazans blame Israel; and 16% of West Bankers compared to 43% of Gazans blame the PA, Abbas, the reconciliation government, and Fatah. However, responses of West Bankers and Gazans are almost identical regarding Hamas’ responsibility: 19% of West Bankers and 18% of Gazans blame Hamas.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 54%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 53%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 53% and in the West Bank at 45%.
•  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 19%. Three months ago, 41% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers indicated that they seek to immigrate.
•  We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Maan TV (15%), Palestine TV and Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (13% each), al Aqsa TV (12%), Al Arabiya, al Mayadeen, and al Quds TV (5% each).   
•  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 78%.
•  A majority of 52% views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
•  We asked the public about the media reports regarding a possible eavesdropping by the Palestinian security services on phone calls of Palestinian officials and citizens:

  62% say they believe that the reports are accurate and 29% believe they are inaccurate.

  62% do not think, and 26% think, that the eavesdropping on phones was legal or for legitimate purposes.

  56% think the primary beneficiary of eavesdropping conducted by the Palestinian security services is the Israel occupation while 25% think it is the PA administration and leadership, and only 12% think it is the Palestinian citizen and his or her security.

  Moreover, a majority of 53% think that if a Palestinian citizen (or even a former head of a Palestinian security service) submits a complaint to the Palestinian judiciary, it would be incapable of putting an end to this eavesdropping. Only 37% believe that the judiciary is capable of ending the eavesdropping.

• We asked the public about the rates for 3G service, a newly introduced service by Palestinian providers in the West Bank that allows for faster access to the internet on mobile phones: a majority of West Bankers (57%) describes the rates as high or very high and only 3% describe them as low. 11% think the rates are reasonable or medium. 30% did not know much about the service or the rates.

• We asked respondents about giving or donating money to the poor and charities:

   Two-thirds believe that the primary motivation behind giving to the poor is to win God’s satisfaction while less than a quarter (23%) think that people give to the poor in order to win the satisfaction of other people.

  Three quarters of the respondents say that they give to the poor and 23% say they do not. When asked in an open-ended question about its own motivation for giving, an overwhelming majority (80%) says that it is driven by religious incentive (such winning God’s satisfaction) while 20% say that it is driven by humanistic or social incentives (such as to ease the burden on or help the poor).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

•  Now that it has taken control of the border crossings and the headquarters of the ministries and other public agencies, 26% are satisfied and 65% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 38%.
• 30%, compared to 50% three months ago, are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation.
• The largest percentage (45%) believes that the PA, president Abbas, and the prime minister are responsible for the poor showing of the reconciliation government. By contrast, only 15% believe that Hamas is responsible for that poor showing; 13% say the government is doing a good job; and 27% do not who is to blame. It is worth noting that the responses of West Bankers are greatly different from those of Gazans: while about one  third (32%) of West Bankers blames the PA, Abbas and the prime minister, 69% of Gazans puts the blame on these three. By contrast, only 12% of West Bankers, compared to 21% of Gazans, blame Hamas.
•  We also asked the public about two claims: the one made by the reconciliation government that Hamas is preventing it from assuming control over the Gaza Strip, particularly in financial and security matters, and the claim made by Hamas that the reconciliation government is failing to carry out its responsibilities and duties in the Strip and that it continues to impose sanction on Gazans. About a third (32%) believes the two claims are baseless while 14% think the two claims are accurate. By contrast, 23% believe Hamas’ claim to be accurate and only 14% believe that the claim of the reconciliation government is accurate.
•   37% (60% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) support the Dahlan-Hamas efforts to reach an agreement on creating a joint administration for the Gaza Strip while 45% (36% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank) are opposed to such efforts.
• We asked respondents about the Gaza explosion that targeted the convey of the prime minister: 

  In an open question, we asked the public about its estimate of the party behind the explosion: the largest percentage (45%) believes it is the occupation; 14% believe it is Hamas and an identical percentage believes it is the PA or one of its agencies; 2% think it is Fatah, 1% think it is Dahlan, and 3% think it is one of the extremist groups.

About three quarters (74%) believe that the aim of the perpetrators is to foil the reconciliation efforts while 17% (23% in the Gaza Strip and 14% in the West Bank) believe that the aim is to protest against the policies of the reconciliation government toward the Gaza Strip.

(4) The peace process:  

•  48% support the two-state solution and 50% oppose it. Moreover, 46% believe that a Palestinian majority supports the two-state solution and 47% say a majority is opposed to it. Similarly, 50% believe that a majority of Israelis are opposed to the two-state solution and 41% think an Israeli majority supports that solution.
•  57% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to settlement expansion while only 40% think that it remains feasible because settlements can be evacuated. Similarly, 73% believe that the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or nonexistent while 25% think the chances are high or medium.
•  Despite the above, only 28% support a one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israelis have equal rights and 69% are opposed.
•  The largest percentage (35%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 31% think negotiation is the most effective means and 25% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 44% indicated that armed resistance is the answer and 27% sided with negotiation.
•  92% indicate that they have heard, and 8% have not heard, of Ahd Tamimi, a Palestinian youth activist being tried by the Israeli occupation on charges that she slapped an Israeli soldier. Among those who have heard about her, 64% say that they want her to be a role model for them and their relatives.
•  60% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 16% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.
• Similarly, 77% say that they are worried that they would be hurt on their daily life by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 22% are not worried.
•  In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternatives: 74% support joining more international organizations; 63% support popular non-violence; 48% support a return to an armed intifada; and 49% support dissolving the PA.
• A majority of 52% indicates that it supports the resolutions made by the recent meeting of the PLO’s Central Council, such as the cancellation of the recognition of Israel, the suspension of the Oslo Agreement, and others, while 18% indicate that they agree with some but not all of them, and 24% oppose them. Nonetheless, about two-thirds (65%) believe that president Abbas will not implement these decisions and only 24% believe he will implement them.  
• We asked the public about its view on why popular participation in non-violent protests, particularly those related to the American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, has been waning: 39% say it is due to lack of trust between the public on the one hand and the PA leadership and factions on the other; 27% say it is due to the fact that non-violence is ineffective; and 25% say that it is due to the fact that many people think that the responsibility for confronting Israel and the US falls on the shoulders of the PA.
• Moreover, 74% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 24% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.
•  In fact, 70% believe that there is already an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 20% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.
•  46% of all the Palestinian public support the participation of East Jerusalemites in the next Israeli municipal elections by nomination and voting while 15% support only voting, and 29% say that they are opposed to all kinds of participation. Support for participation, either by nomination or voting, declines to 42% among East Jerusalemites but the opposition to participation among them remains almost identical (30%) to that of the general population. It is worth noting however that a large percentage (28%) did not express any views on the matter, probably out of concern that it might be risky to state its views on the subject or that its answer might not be a popular one.
• We asked the public about its expectations regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations after 10 years and after 100 years:

   25% believe that after 10 years conditions, or the status quo, will be as they are now with occupation and settlement expansion continuing with little change; 34% say settlements will expand and there will be one political entity characterized by a system of apartheid that discriminates against the Palestinians; 24% believe that there will be a war or an armed intifada that will end the occupation. Only 9% believe that there will be peace between Israel and the Palestinians and a Palestinian state will be established.

After 100 years, only 12% believe that things will be as they are now with occupation and settlement expansion continuing; 30% think settlements will expand and there will be one apartheid state that discriminates against the Palestinians; 29% think there will be a war or an intifada that will end the occupation. The belief that there will be peace between Israel and a Palestinian state remains unchanged at 9%.

(5) Palestinian-American relations and “the deal of the century”:

•  65% are opposed to the resumption of contacts with the American administration that have been suspended last December after the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel; 21% favor a resumption of contacts. Similarly, 68% say that the PA leadership should not return to negotiations with Israel if the US administration asks it to do so while 27% say it should comply with the US request.
• A slim majority of 51% says that if the US submits its peace plan, the so-called “deal of the century,” the PA leadership should reject it regardless of its content because it must be bad for Palestinians while 29% say that the leadership should accept or reject the plan only after reviewing and discussing its content. Only 11% say that the Palestinian leadership should accept the “deal of the century.”
•  If negotiations with Israel resume under US sponsorship, the US will be biased in favor of Israel in the eyes of 88% of the Palestinians while only 7% think the US will be an honest broker and 2% think it will be biased in favor of the Palestinians.
•  A majority of 52% believes that the US administration has suspended its support for UNRWA because it seeks to close the file of the refugees and deny them their right of return while 43% think the US did that in order to pressure President Abbas to force him to return to negotiations with the US over the “deal of the century.”  Moreover, 49% think that the suspension of US support for UNRWA will not weaken the Palestinian negotiating position regarding the rights of the refugees but 45% think it will indeed weaken it.
• We asked the public about its views regarding some of the leaked ideas that are allegedly linked to the “deal of the century:”

On Jerusalem, 94% say they are opposed to making Abu Dis a capital of the Palestinian state; 4% support the idea.

  86% are opposed and 10% support the idea of expanding the Gaza Strip to include parts of Sinai in return for an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank.

63% oppose and 31% support the idea of allowing Israeli Jews to live in the Palestinian state as citizens or residents while respecting the Palestinian law and enjoying the same rights and duties as the Palestinians.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; 20% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

Stable majorities of the Israeli and Palestinians publics support the Quartet's roadmap. Abu Mazin's nomination as Prime Minister increases optimism about return to negotiations.

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, have conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion. 

This joint poll is the fifth in an ongoing research project into the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 at the wake of the Camp David summit. The current poll was designed to examine attitudes toward the appointment of Abu Mazin as a prime minister, issues of political reform, the war in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and reconciliation. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1315 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted between April 3- 7. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with two representative samples of 502 Israeli Jews and 501 Israeli Arabs. The Israeli sample was properly weighted according to the proportion of the respective sectors to produce the overall Israeli estimates (sampling error of 3.9%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russianbetween April 3 – 11. 

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at Tel 02-2964933 or email kshikaki@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at Tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

Summary of Results 

1) The Peace Process:

• Palestinian and Israeli attitudes toward the Quartet’s roadmap remain highly stable since last November and seem not to have been affected by the war in Iraq. 55% of the Palestinians and 61% of the Israelis support it. 39% percent of the Palestinians and 35% of the Israelis oppose it. Last November, 54% of the Palestinians and 59% of the Israelis supported and 42% and 38% respectively opposed it.
• A majority of 71% of the Palestinians (compared to 76% last November) supports a mutual cessation of violence while 27% (compared to 22% last November) oppose it. Under conditions of mutual ceasefire, 50% of the Palestinians would support taking measures against those who would continue to carry out attacks against Israeli civilians, while 45% would oppose doing so. Last November, support for such measures stood at 56% and opposition at 40%.  Still, three quarters acknowledge that failure to take such measures would impede the revival of the peace process. On the other hand, 79% express concern that taking such measures may lead to civil war.
• In the absence of a mutual cessation of violence, a majority of 57% (compared to 53% last November) continues to support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 40% oppose it. Support for attacks on soldiers and settlers remains very high (over 90%) as in the previous poll. As in November, two thirds continue to believe that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not. Among Israelis, only 23% believe that the Intifada has so far achieved Palestinian national and political goals.
•  Palestinians are divided over whether the US and other members of the Quartet would put heavy pressure on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to accept the roadmap with 45% believing that they would and 46% that they would not. Israelis however are much more certain that such pressure is soon to come.  85% of the Israeli public believe so. A clear majority of 79% of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis would oppose such American and international pressure if it was put on the Palestinian Authority or on Israel respectively. However 36% of the Israelis but only 17% of the Palestinians would support it. Interestingly enough 38% of the Palestinians would support the deployment of international forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to force the Palestinians and the Israelis to accept and implement the roadmap. An additional 9% would support such deployment only if the forces were European. Forty-eight percent would oppose any deployment of international forces, and less than one percent would support the deployment if the forces were made up of Americans only. Israelis are less supportive of the deployment of international forces in general but more favorable to American forces. 24% of the Israelis support the deployment of international forces, and additional 13% support it if these are American forces. Only 3% support it if the forces were to be European. 58% oppose the idea altogether.
•  A majority of 65% of the Palestinians (compared to 73% last November) and 77% of the Israelis (75% last November) supports reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by the state of Israel.

2) Abu Mazin Appointment as Prime Minister

•  A majority of Palestinians (64%) supports the creation of the position of a prime minister while 28% oppose that step. But support for Abu Mazin as a prime minister is slightly less, at 61%, and opposition slightly higher, at 32%.
•  A majority of 70% of the Palestinians and 67% of the Israelis believes that a government headed by Abu Mazin would be able to renew negotiations with Israel. However, only 39% of the Palestinians believe that it would be able to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire on all Palestinian factions and 53% believe that it would not. Similarly only 36% of the Israelis believe that Abu Mazin would be able to calm down the Intifada and reduce the violence, and 56% don't believe in that. It is worth noting that while the appointment of Abu Mazin has not changed Palestinian expectations regarding the prospect for joint cessation of violence and return to negotiations (standing at 18%, compared to 16% last November), a shift did occur in the expectations regarding the prospect for a continued armed confrontations and no return to negotiations. In this poll, only 27% of Palestinians (compared to 42% last November) believe that armed confrontations would not stop and the two sides would not return to negotiations. As to political reforms, only 43% of the Palestinians and 32% of the Israelis believe that Abu Mazin would be able to carry out political reform in the Palestinian authority. Moreover, Israelis seem to remain skeptical about the chances of a democratic regime to be established in the Palestinian authority or in a future Palestinian state. Only 9% percent of the Israeli public give it high or very high chances.
•  Palestinians are divided in two halves over the issue of whether Abu Mazin will be able to form a government that could win the confidence of the Palestinians, with 43% believing he would and 43% believing he would not. It is worth remembering that only 40% were willing in November 2002 to give confidence to Arafat’s current government.
•  Palestinians are also divided over the issue of whether the appointment of Abu Mazin represents erosion in the authority and status of Yasir Arafat with 50% agreeing with that and 43% disagreeing. Israelis are even more skeptical than that. Only, 38% of the Israeli public see the nomination of Abu Mazin's as signifying an erosion in Arafat's political status.
•  While a Palestinian majority of 86% supports internal and external calls for wide and fundamental political reforms, only 44% support (and 50% oppose) the call for changing the Palestinian political system so that power would reside in the hands of the prime minister while the position of the president would become ceremonial. Support for this change in the political system stood at 47% last November and opposition at 49%.

3) War in Iraq

• Almost all Palestinians oppose the war on Iraq; with 58% of them believing that the primary motive of the US is to seize Iraqi oil, 32% believing the motive to be to help Israel, and only 2% believing it to be to disarm Iraq from weapons of mass destruction. The great majority of the Israeli public on the other hand, supports the war (76%), and 50% believe that the primary reason for the war was to disarm Iraq from weapons of mass destruction; 30% believe that the primary motive was to seize Iraqi oil and only 5% believe that it had anything to do with Israel. 60% of the Israelis also believe that France and Germany objected to the war primarily in order to protect their economic interests in Iraq and the Arab world.
• While 78% of the Palestinian respondents believe that the war in Iraq would strengthen Palestinian desire to carry out attacks on Israelis and 61% believe that it would take Israelis and Palestinians further away from the peace process, only 46% believe (and 44% do not believe) that Israel would be able to exploit the opportunity to carry out a mass expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
•  Most Palestinians (61%) believe that Iraq of Saddam Hussein would win the war in Iraq while only 12% believe that the winner will be the US and its allies. Eighteen percent see all sides as losers. Among Israelis only 3% believed that Iraq of Saddam Hussein would win the war.

4) Domestic Israeli Issues

• The Israeli survey also examined the Israeli public's assessments of the current economic crisis. Fifty one percent of the Israelis believe that the crisis stems mainly from the Intifada and the cessation of foreign investments. Additional 29% put the blame on mismanagement of the economy by the current and previous government. Only 8% blame welfare payments which don't encourage people to go out to work. As to the conditions needed to put the economy back on track, 49% believe that it is impossible to solve the crisis without the opening of a political process with the Palestinians and 47% believe it is possible..
•  Israelis were asked as to their preferences on government spending in several areas. 93% of the public support more spending for creating jobs, 81% support more spending for healthcare, 75% support more spending for education and only 47% support more spending for national security. On the other hand, 70% prefer to reduce spending of settlements, and 66% would like to see less spending for religious establishments and seminaries.

5) Domestic Palestinian Issues

• Arafat’s popularity, at 35%, remains unchanged since last November. Marwan Barghouti is the second most popular Palestinian leader with 20% support. Despite his appointment as a prime minister, Abu Mazin’spopularity remains unchanged at 3%.
• Fateh, at 26%, is still the most popular faction followed by Hamas at 17%. Fateh’s support stood at 27% last November. Total support for Islamists (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and independent Islamists) stands at 29% compared to 25% last November. The combined strength of all Palestinian opposition factions, Islamist and nationalist, stands at 32% while 41% remain undecided. 
•  A majority of 81% believes that there is corruption in the Palestinian Authority and only 30% among those believe that corruption will decline in the future. Last November, 84% believed corruption existed in the PA.
•  Palestinians are divided over the performance of the finance minister, Salam Fayyad, with 35% satisfied, 36% unsatisfied, and 29% unsure.
•  Fourteen percent, compared to 20% last November, say that conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip lead them to seek permanent emigration.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-16 March 2019. The period before the conduct of the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) by the PA president, the announcement that a new PLC, but not presidential, elections will take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within six months, the selection of Mohammad Shtayyeh to be the next prime minister following the resignation of the Hamdallah government, and the eruption of demonstrations in the Gaza Strip against high cost of living conditions and their violent suppression by Hamas’ police and armed wing . The period also witnessed the implementation of Israel’s decision to deduct a small amount of the Palestinian custom revenues it transfers every month to the PA and the PA response refusing to accept any of these funds, a Palestinian-Israeli escalation in al-Aqsa Mosque in the aftermath of a Waqf decision to re-open Bab al Rahma (Gate of Mercy) area for Muslim prayer and an Israeli ban on prayer in that area, and the formation of a new Israeli electoral list representing the center in preparation for Israeli parliamentary elections which are scheduled to take place next month. Finally, the US Administration announced during this period its intentions to release its peace plan, known as the “Deal of the Century,” after the holding of the Israeli elections. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2019  indicate a rise in support for the two-state solution, but the largest percentage remains opposed to this solution. Support for negotiations, as the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state rises while the belief that armed struggle is the most effective means drops. But distrust in the seriousness of the Trump Administration increases. Similarly, findings show a significant rise in the belief that the Trump plan will not include a Palestinian state, nor will it include a reference to East Jerusalem as a capital for the state, or an emphasis on the 1967 borders, or a call to a just solution to the refugee problem, or a call to end the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army. Given all these doubts about the plan, about 80% demand that the PA leadership reject the American plan when made public.

Findings also show that about three quarters of the public demand the simultaneous holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A similar percentage indicates its rejection of holding parliamentary elections if no presidential elections were held at the same time and if restricted to the West Bank. 60% would oppose elections, even if held in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, if restricted to a parliamentary vote.  If the PA manages to hold parliamentary elections only and only in the West Bank, less than 30% of West Bankers say they will participate in that vote.

Findings also show that if presidential elections are held today, Abbas would win against Hamas’ Haniyyeh. Three months ago, Haniyyeh was able to win against Abbas. Abbas’ recent confrontation with the Israeli government over payment to the families of prisoners and martyrs and the deduction from the Palestinian custom revenues might have contributed to the rise in his popularity. By contrast, Hamas’ violent suppression of the recent popular demonstrations in the Gaza Strip might have contributed to the decline in support for Haniyyeh. If parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah would win the largest share of the vote indicating a significant rise in its popularity compared to our findings three months ago. Support for Hamas on the other hand drops slightly compared to our findings three months ago. Vote for the two factions has probably been affected by the same factors that affected support for Abbas and Haniyyeh.

Findings indicate that the public is evenly divided over the selection of Shtayyeh as the next prime minister, one satisfied and the other dissatisfied with the selection. But the largest percentage believe a government led by Shtayyeh will not succeed in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or in organizing elections, or in improving Palestinian economic conditions. Given the Israeli decision to deduct part of the custom revenues Israel transfers to the PA on monthly basis and the PA response by refusing to accept any of those funds, a large majority expresses pessimism about the ability of the PA to pay salaries to its public sector and a majority says that this development could lead to PA collapse.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• Only 43% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 46% believe no elections will take place.
• An overwhelming majority (72%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 10% want parliamentary elections only. 13% do not want any elections.
• An overwhelming majority (72%) expects Israel to refuse to allow election to take place in East Jerusalem and 15% expect Israel to allow it. Similarly, 53% believe that Hamas will not allow election to take place in the Gaza Strip if such vote was restricted to parliamentary elections and 33% believe it will allow such election.
• If elections were for a parliament and a president, 66% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 26% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip.  But if elections were for a parliament only, 59% say they want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 32% would oppose that.
• About three quarters (74%) oppose and 19% support the holding of parliamentary elections only and only in the West Bank. Similarly, 62% oppose and 31% support the holding of parliamentary elections only even if they are to take place in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
• 54% say they will not participate in West Bank-Gaza Strip elections if they were restricted to a parliamentary vote and 41% say they will participate in such elections. Similarly, 61% say they will not participate in elections if they were parliamentary only and if they were to take place in the West Bank only; 29% say they will participate in such elections.
• If elections were parliamentary only and took place only in the West Bank but some of the members of the new parliament were from the Gaza Strip, only 50% say such a parliament would represent both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 34% say it would represent the West Bank only. In the Gaza Strip, the largest percentage (48%) say such a parliament would represent the West Bank only and 45% say it would represent both areas.
• 54% are dissatisfied with the dissolution of the PLC while 37% say they are satisfied. It is worth noting that three months ago, before the actual dissolution of the PLC, 47% said they would support its dissolution and 43% said they would oppose such a step.  Today, 53% view the dissolution of the PLC as illegal and unconstitutional while 33% view it as legal and constitutional.
• 64% are worried and 34% are not worried that domestic conditions would deteriorate in case the position of the president become vacant. But 47% believe that when the position of the president is vacant, Palestinian factions will be able to reach an agreement on conducting presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to elect a successor; 45% believe that the factions will not reach such an agreement
• 60% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 68% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 55% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 62%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 40% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 32% (38% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 51% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 47% of the vote (compared to 36% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 51% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 55% (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh 33% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 64% and Haniyeh 33%.
• If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (2% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 4%; Khalid Mishal, Saeb Erikat, and Mustafa Barghouti by 3% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 8% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 31% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 39% three months ago).
• A majority of 54% view and 42% do not view the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It is worth noting that the belief that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people stood at 58% nine months ago and at 69% thirteen years ago. 

(2) Mohammad Shtayyeh, a new prime minister:

• 38% are satisfied and 40% are dissatisfied with the selection of Mohammad Shtayyeh as the next prime minister. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction reaches 52%.
• The largest percentage (48%) believes that a government led by Shtayyeh will not succeed in achieving reconciliation and unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 35% believe it will succeed.
• Similarly, the largest percentage (44%) believes that a government led by Shtayyeh will not be able to organize legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% think it will succeed.
• Half of the public believes that a Shtayyeh government will not be able to improve economic conditions in the PA while 36% believe it will be able to do that.

(3) Domestic conditions:

• Now after Israel deducted part of the custom revenues it transfers to the PA and after the PA has refused to accept the incomplete transfer, an overwhelming majority (69%) is worried and 25% are not worried that the PA will not be able to pay salaries to its public sector. Moreover 54% are worried and 40% are not worried that the PA’s inability to pay salaries to its public sector will lead to PA collapse
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.
• In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Israel, Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (37%) blames Israel while 25% blame Abbas and the PA, 21% blame Hamas, 4% blame Egypt, and 9% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 41% of Gazans, compared to 16% of West Bankers, blame Abbas and the PA and 27% of Gazans, compared to 17% of West Bankers, blame Hamas.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 64%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 57%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 55% and in the West Bank at 47%.
• 29% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 43% and declines in the West Bank to 20%.
• Only 32% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 65% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 41% say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 53% believe that they cannot.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82%.
• The public is divided over the assessment of the PA: 47% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 47% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Palestine and Al Aqsa TV (14% each), Maan TV and Palestine Today (at 12% each), Al Arabiya (at 6%) and al Mayadeen (at 5%).

(4) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government: 

• 30% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.
• The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 38% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 58% disagrees. Three months ago, 34% said they agreed with Abbas.
• When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, 71% said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 24% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no major differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans.
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (82%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 14% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government.

5) The peace process

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 48% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 43%.
• Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 49% said they prefer the two-state solution, 17% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 23% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.” Three months ago, support for the two-state solution stood at 45%, for the one state solution at 22%, and 23% preferred a third undefined alternative.
• A majority of 58% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 39% of the public while 30% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 17% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 34% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 34% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• The public is divided over the role of negotiations and armed struggle in the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 37% think that negotiation is the most effective means while 36% think armed struggle is the most effective means, while 22% believe that non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 28% said negotiation is the most effective means and 44% said armed struggle is the most effective means.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 55% support popular non-violent resistance; 47% support a return to an armed intifada; 41% support dissolving the PA; and 31% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 47% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
• 65% support and 31% oppose the PLO Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel. But 78% believe that the PA leadership and security services will not stop security coordination with Israel
• More than three quarters (76%) believe that if Israel ban Muslim prayer at al Rahma Gate (Gate of Mercy) area, Palestinian protests will succeed, as the case was with the metal detector gates, in forcing Israel to allow such prayer; 21% believe Palestinian protests will not succeed this time.
• A majority 64% believe that visits of Israeli officials to Arab countries damage the chances for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; 8% believe the visits help to promote peace and 26% believe they neither help nor hurt conflict resolution. 
• A slim majority of 51% expect the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 22% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections. But three quarters believe that even if the center-left win the elections, conditions will stay as they are today or become worse; only 10% expect Palestinian-Israeli conditions to improve in that case. 

6) Trump’s Peace Plan:

• An overwhelming majority (83%) believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about launching a new peace plan and 12% believe it is serious.
• A large majority of 79% believes that if the US does indeed offer a peace plan, it will not call for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel; 15% believe it will.
• A similar percentage (81%) believes that the plan will not call for a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem; 14% believe it will.
• 78% believe the Trump plan will not call for the borders of the Palestinian state to be based on the lines of June 1967 with minor mutual land swaps; 17% believe it will.
• An overwhelming majority of 84% believes the plan will not call for a just solution to the refugee problem; 10% believe it will.
• Similarly, 84% believe the plan will not call for the ending of the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the areas occupied in 1967; 11% believe it will.
• 79% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan, if offered, and 14% believe it should accept it.
• But if the Trump plan does indeed include all such items, such as a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, with borders based on the 1967 lines, a just solution to the refugees’ problem, and an Israeli army withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, a majority of 52% calls for rejecting it and 43% call for accepting it. Call for accepting the plan is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 55% while the call for rejecting it is higher in the West Bank, standing at 59%.
• A majority of 64% is opposed and 23% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

 23 January - 03 February 2008 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 23 January and 3 February 2008. This period witnessed the forced opening of the Rafah Crossings by Hamas and the march of hundreds of thousands of Gazans across the border with Egypt.  Total size of the sample is 3430 adults (2198 in the West Bank and 1232 in the Gaza Strip) interviewed face to face in 245 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 2%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 
 

Main Findings: 

Findings indicate a clear increase in the popularity of Hamas compared to that of Fateh. This is the first time since March 2006 in which we witness an increase in Hamas’s popularity. The increase reflects public appreciation, particularly in the Gaza Strip, of Hamas’s role in forcing open the borders of the Gaza Strip with Egypt. But the improved standing of Hamas does not mean public acceptance of its military takeover of the Gaza Strip as the overwhelming majority continues to reject Hamas’s June 2007 violent takeover. 

•  Hamas’s popularity increases from 31% to 34% and Fateh’s drops from 49% to 46% in one month between December 2007 and January 2008. In the Gaza Strip, the popularity of Hamas increases from 33% to 39% and the popularity of Fateh decreases from 52% to 46% during the same period. 
•  The popularity of Mahmud Abbas stands at 51% and Ismail Haniyeh at 43%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas’s popularity stands at 50% and Haniyeh’s at 46%. If the competition is between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives the support of 60% and the latter 35%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 56% and Haniyeh 42%. In December 2007, Abbas’s popularity stood at 56% and Haniyeh’s at 37%. 
•   Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas drops from 50% last December to 46% in this poll. Satisfaction with the performance of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 44%. In the Gaza Strip, satisfaction with the performance of Haniyeh is greater than satisfaction with the performance of Abbas; the former receives 52% and the latter 48%. 
•  Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Ismail Haniyeh reaches 37% compared to 36% for the performance of the government of Salam Fayyad. In the Gaza Strip, positive evaluation of the performance of Haniyeh’s government stands at 43% and Fayyad’s 37%. 
• 31% of the public believes that Haniyeh’s government is the one that has legitimacy while 33% say Fayyad’s government is the one that has legitimacy. 24% say the two governments lack legitimacy and 8% say the two governments are legitimate. In the Gaza Strip, Haniyeh’s government is perceived as more legitimate (35%) than Fayyad’s (33%).  In December 2007, only 27% said Haniyeh’s government was legitimate and 37% said Fayyad’s government was legitimate. 
•  Despite improvement in Hamas’s public standing, the majority (72%) still opposes its violent takeover of the Gaza Strip; only a quarter supports it. In the Gaza Strip, opposition to Hamas’s takeover stands at 67% and support at 31%. 
•  The public says that conditions in the West Bank are better than conditions in the Gaza Strip in the realms of economy (4% for Gaza and 43% for the West Bank), enforcement of law and order (28% for Gaza and 54% for the West Bank), democracy and freedom of the press (27% for Gaza and 51% for the West Bank), and personal safety and security (54% for Gaza and 61% for the West Bank). 
•   42% support the stand taken by Abbas and Fateh regarding return to dialogue with Hamas while 35% support the stand taken by Hamas.  Support for Abbas and Fateh’s stand stood at 46% last December and support for Hamas’s stood at 27%.  

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

Stable Majority Support for Clinton’s Final Status Package Among Israelis but Decline in Support Among Palestinians Large support in both publics for the extension of the cease fire

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted December 6-15 jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah 

The joint poll examined the impact of the recent political developments in Israel and primary and local elections in the Palestinian Authority on Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding President Clinton’s package for a Palestinian Israeli final status settlement. We examined this package twice before in December 2003 and December 2004. This is the first time we revisit theses issues in the post disengagement era. The findings indicate virtual stability in Israeli majority support for Clinton’s package but a noticeable decline in Palestinian support for this package compared to last December. 

The poll further examined both publics’ reactions to the extension of the current ceasefire and to a plan to cope with the members of armed groups belonging to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fateh. Most Palestinians (80%) and Israelis (80%) support the extension of the ceasefire. An overwhelming majority among Palestinians (81%) support the absorbance of the Palestinian armed factions into the Palestinian Authority security forces. More surprisingly, among Israelis, there is also majority support (53%) for this plan for dismantling the Palestinian armed factions. 

Two other important issues explored in the Israeli sample were Israelis’ acceptance of negotiations with the Hamas and the release of Marwan Barghouti from prison. 50% of the Israelis support and 47% oppose negotiations with Hamas if this is called for in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. 34% support the release of Barghouti and negotiations with him if this is required to reach a compromise settlement.

Other issues examined in this poll are attitudes towards the Israeli Palestinian Agreement on the Rafah Crossing, and Israeli and Palestinian voting intentions in the coming elections in both political systems. 

Total Palestinian sample size is 1316 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 118 randomly selected locations between December 6 and 8, 2005. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 600 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between December 8 and 15, 2005. The margin of error is 4%. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

Summary of Findings 

(A) Clinton Parameters 

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict including (1) Final borders and territorial exchange, (2) Refugees, (3) Jerusalem, (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state, (5) Security arrangements, and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues twice before in December 2003 and December 2004. In the current poll we revisit these crucial issues for the first time afterIsrael’s evacuation of the Gaza Strip and following the significant political developments in both societies in recent weeks. 

The findings indicate stability in the level of support among Israelis and decline in support among Palestinians compared to one year ago. Among Israelis a majority of 64% support these parameters as a combined overall package just like a year ago. Among Palestinians however 46% support the package now compared to a majority of 54% last year. 

Apparently these results reflect the joint impact of each public’s disappointment with the results of the disengagement and the recent dramatic developments in the Israeli and Palestinian political scenes.  Among Israelis we would expect increased willingness to compromise given Sharon’s signals of moderation. This is presumably offset by the renewed violence from the Gaza Strip which frustrates many Israelis who supported the disengagement. Palestinian decline in support for Clinton’s parameters similarly reflects the fierce political electoral competition in the PA which feeds more militant attitudes combined with disappointment with the meager outcome the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip yielded.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange 

Among Palestinians 55% support or strongly support and 42% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2004. At that time, support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 63% and opposition at 35%.

Among Israelis 53% support and 42% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel.Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In January 2005, 55% of the Israelis supported this component while 43% opposed it.

(2) Refugees 

Among Palestinians, 40% support and 57% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries likeAustralia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2004, 46% agreed with an identical compromise while 50% opposed it.

Among Israelis 43% support such an arrangement and 53% oppose it compared to 44% who supported it in January 2004 and 52% who opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem 

In the Palestinian public 33% support and 65% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2004, an identical compromise had a higher reception with 44% supporting it and 54% opposing it.

Among Israelis, 38% agree and 60% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In January 2005, 39% supported this arrangement and 60% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State 

Among Palestinians 20% support and 78% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2004 the support of 27% and the opposition of 71%.

Among Israelis 69% agree and 30% disagree to this arrangement compared to 68% who agreed and 30% who disagreed to it a year ago in January 2005.

(5) Security Arrangements 

In the Palestinian public 43% support and 55% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel will have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2004, 53% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 45% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 62% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 61% who supported it and 37% who opposed it a year ago in January 2005.

(6) End of Conflict   

In the Palestinian public 64% support and 34% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2004 the support of 69% and the opposition of 29%.

In the Israeli public 80% support and 18% oppose this component in the final status framework. In January 2005, 76% of the Israelis supported it while 23% opposed it.

The Whole Package 

Among Palestinians 46% support and 50% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2004, 54% supported and 44% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 64% support and 33% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package, just like a year ago. 

46% of the Israelis know that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package. 39% believe that the majority opposes it. This level of awareness indicates that despite the solid support for the package it has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 43% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 47% believe that the majority opposes it. In addition a plurality in both Palestinian and Israeli societies believe that the other side’s majority opposes such a package. 46% of the Israelis and 52% of the Palestinians think so.

Summary Table of the Findings 

(B) Other Conflict Resolution Issues 

• 60% of the Palestinians support and 36% oppose the roadmap plan. Among Israelis 65% support the plan compared to 31% who oppose it.
• Despite these levels of support both publics are not very optimistic regarding the pace in which a Palestinian Israeli political settlement will be reached. 23% of the Israelis and 44% of the Palestinians believe a political settlement is not possible ever, 36% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians believe it will be achieved in the next generation or many generation to come, 34% of the Israelis and 19% of the Palestinians think it will be reached in the next decade or the next few years.
• If in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians, Israel will have to release Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiate with him, 34% of the Israelis support such a step compared to 62% who oppose it.
• 50% of the Israelis support and 47% oppose negotiations with Hamas if Israel will have to do it in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians
• 53% of the Israelis support and 40% oppose a proposal to disarm the organizations that belong to Hamas, Jihad and Fatah by integrating them into the Palestinian security forces under the supervision of the PA. 81% of the Palestinians support the proposal to absorb the members of these armed groups into the security services whereby all armed forces become part of the Palestinian Authority compared to only 17% who oppose it.
• 80% of the Palestinians and 80% of the Israelis support the extension of the cease fire which expires at the end of this month.

(C) Palestinian-Israeli Agreement on Crossings

• 41% of the Palestinians support and 56% oppose the agreement for the opening of the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt. According to the agreement, the crossing will be operated by the PA and Egypt under the supervision of European Union and Israeli observers will monitor it through video broadcasts. Among Israelis, 56% support and 40% oppose it.
• With regard to the presence of the European Union observers, 58% of the Palestinians and only 37% of the Israelis oppose their role in the crossing.
• 37% of the Palestinians believe the agreement weakens Palestinian sovereignty compared to 58% who think the opposite.
• 61% of the Palestinians oppose the resumption of violence from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, as most (84%) expect that resumption of violence will lead to the closing of the crossing. 62% of the Palestinians also suspect that Israel will not continue to implement the agreement on crossing and movement.
• Following the agreement on crossings, only 19% among Palestinians feel that the freedom of movement between the West Bank and the Gaza strip has improved compared to 57% who expected such an improvement in September. More generally, 45% of the Palestinians believe that the situation in the Gaza Strip has become better than before the disengagement compared to 52% who think it became worse or remained the same. 55% believe Gaza has remained a big prison

(D) Attitudes Towards Settlements and the Disengagement

• An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (82%) but also 50% of the Israelis see the evacuation of the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel. 48% among Israelis and 17% among Palestinians don’t see it as such. In addition, 68% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Intifada and armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve. Nevertheless 46% of the Palestinians don’t see the evacuation of settlements from the Gaza strip as the beginning of the end of the occupation and the establishment of a state compared to 52% who do see it as such.
• Considering the outcome of the disengagement in Gaza, 49% of the Israelis believe they will support future unilateral disengagement plans in the West Bank Compared to 43% who will oppose them.
• The percent of Israelis supporting the dismantling of most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians returned to the levels from before the disengagement. 62% supported such a step in June just before the disengagement, and 61% support it now. Israelis’ assessments of the settlements’ contribution to Israel’s national security decreased somewhat following the disengagement. 32% of the Israelis believe that the settlements contribute to Israel’s national security (37% in June), while 40% believe they hurt it (39% in June). 23% think that settlements neither contribute nor hurt (19% in June).
• As to the future of the settlements in the longer run, 64% of the Israeli public, believe that in the coming years the number of settlements in the West Bank will decrease (compared to 50% who thought so in September), 14% expect the number of settlements to increase (19% in September). In contrast, among Palestinians 45% fear that the number of settlements will increase in the future and 42% think it will decline. In September, 52% and 39% respectively thought so.

(E) Israeli Elections 

• At the time of the survey, 17% have not decided yet whom to vote for in the coming election, 12% of Israeli eligible voters claim they will not vote. Ariel Sharon’s party “Kadima” obtains 27% of the vote, the Labor party headed by Amir Peretz obtains 15% of the vote, and the Likud 6% of the vote.
• 13% of the Israelis believe that the elections will focus mainly on the political process with the Palestinians, 20% believe it will center around security issues, 48% think it will focus on social/economic issues, and 7% think it will focus on corruption.
• 33% of the Israelis believe that Amir Peretz will deal better with Israel’s social/economic problems compared to 29% who think that Sharon will do it better and 16% who believe in Netanyahu’s skills. However with respect to security and foreign affairs issues, Sharon comes out the favorite with 60% who believe he can deal with those better. 19% believe it is Netanyahu who can handle these issues better, and 12% believe Amir Peretz will do this job better.
• 46% of the Israeli public believe that Sharon leaving the Likud and forming a new party will increase the chances for a peace process with the Palestinians compared to 5% who believe the chances will decline, and 41% who believe it will have no impact. . Among the Palestinians, only 20% believe that Sharon’s step will increase chances for the peace process compared to 36% who believe it will decline and 35% who believe it will have no impact.
• In the same context, 72% of the Israelis believe that Sharon is able to convince the Israeli public to accept a compromise agreement with the Palestinians if such an agreement is reached. Only 29% however think that Amir Peretz will be able to do this.

(F) Palestinian Elections 

• If elections are held today, findings show that 78% of the Palestinians would participate (compared to 74% last September). 
• Among those intending to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections, 50% will vote for Fateh, 32% for Hamas, 9% for other factions and groups including independents, and 9% remain undecided. Last September, Fateh received 47% of the vote, while Hamas received 30%, others factions 11%, and 11% were undecided. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Fateh increases from 47% to 53% during the same period.
• In a closed question, in a contest for the office of PA president between Mahmud Abbas, Mahmud Zahhar, and Mustafa Barghouti, Abbas comes first with 41% followed by Zahhar with 21% and Barghouti with 19%. These results are similar to those obtained in our last poll in September.
• In a closed question with a list of five candidates, in a contest over the office of prime minister, Marwan Barghouti comes first with 36% followed by Zahhar with 20%, Mustafa Barghouti with 14%, Dahlan with 11%, and Qurai with 6%. Last September, Marwan Barghouti received 30%, Zahhar 22%, Mustafa Barghouti 17%, Dahlan 8%, and Qurai 8%.
• Among the whole population (those intending and those not intending to participate in the elections), support for Fateh reaches 45% and Hamas 28%. Last September, support for Fateh stood at 39% and Hamas at 27%. Support for Fateh in the Gaza Strip increases from 40% to 49% during the same period.

 Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

'PESSIMISM' UNDERSCORES FINDINGS OF NEW ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION POLL

5-11 July 2002

The poll, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, finds that the Palestinians are determined to continue their struggle and Israelis strongly support PM Sharon's current policy.

A joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion, conducted between July 5-11 2001, finds that both publics are pessimistic concerning the long-term prospects of renewing the peace process.

Forty one percent of the Israelis and 46 percent of the Palestinians believe that there is no chance to reach a peace agreement in the foreseeable future

The joint poll, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, is the second in an ongoing research project into the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 at the wake of the Camp David summit. The current poll was designed to examine the impact of the year-long armed confrontations on the attitudes towards peace and reconciliation.

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included identical questions. A representative sample of 1318 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. A representative sample of 1019 Israelis (519 Jews and 500 Arabs) was interviewed by telephone (sampling error of 3.9%). The interviews were conducted between July 5-11.

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at Tel: 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at Tel: 03-6419429 or email jshamir@huji.ac.il.

Summary of Results 

I. A Pessimistic Outlook

The overall picture emerging from the surveys is pessimistic with regard to the prospects of renewing the peace process. This pessimism both feeds and is a result of the ongoing violent confrontations between Israel and the Palestinians. Consequently, the Palestinians are determined to continue their armed struggle while Israelis by and large support Sharon's current policy.

The pessimistic outlook is expressed mainly in both publics' assessment of what will happen in the long run. Forty one percent of the Israelis and 46 percent of the Palestinians believe that there is no chance to reach a peace agreement in the foreseeable future, compared to only 19 percent of the Israelis and 23 percent of the Palestinians who felt so immediately after the Camp David summit.

Similarly, 59 percent of the Palestinians and 46 percent of the Israelis characterize their relations five to ten years from now as conflictual and violent, compared to 31 percent of the Palestinians and 10 percent of the Israelis who felt so a year ago.

II. Reserved Support for the Cease-fire and the Mitchell Report

While both publics support their government's decision to accept the Mitchell report which calls for a cease-fire and a freeze on settlements (50% of Palestinians and 68% of the Israelis), and a return to the negotiation table (63% of Palestinians and 66% of Israelis), fifty percent of the Israelis oppose continuing the negotiations from where they stopped at Taba compared to only 33% of the Palestinians. Despite support for the cease-fire, Palestinians' support for armed attacks continues to be strong.

Ninety two percent support armed attacks against Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, and 58% support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel.

Israelis in turn, by and large support Sharon's policy so far to continue with moderate military measures in order to maintain the option for future negotiations (44%). Thirty seven percent of the Israelis however want to react in full force in order to remove Arafat from power and only 16% support a unilateral cease-fire. 

III. Impact of the Intifada on reconciliation sentiments

Despite the overall pessimistic outlook, there is a surprisingly small impact of the year long Intifada on Palestinians' and Israelis' sentiments towards reconciliation given a state of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Under such conditions, 73% of the Palestinians and 73% of the Israelis would support a process of reconciliation despite the ongoing hostilities. While Palestinians would mainly support open borders and economic cooperation, Israelis see more favorably than Palestinians cultural changes in education and public discourse and social interaction.

More specifically: 

• Eighty four percent of the Palestinians and 53% of the Israelis would support open borders 
• 60% of the Palestinians and 70% of the Israelis would support joint economic institutions and ventures
• 25% of the Palestinians and 45% of the Israelis would support joint political institutions designed eventually to lead to a confederate system
• 31% of the Palestinians and 59% of the Israelis would support legal measures to prevent incitement against the other side
• 7% of the Palestinians and 36% of the Israelis would support a school curriculum, which educates school children to give up irredentist aspirations.
• On a personal level under conditions of peace, 63% of the Israeli Jews would invite a Palestinian colleague to their home, and 51% are willing to visit a Palestinian colleague in his home. Twenty seven percent of the Palestinians would invite, and 28% would visit an Israeli colleague.

Most of these figures almost didn't change for the Israelis from last year when measured before the Intifada and went down only slightly for some of the items for the Palestinians.

IV. Economic Impact of the Intifada

While the Intifada seems to have affected only marginally attitudes towards reconciliation it is perceived to have affected greatly both the national and personal economic situation in both societies. Eighty nine percent of the Israelis and 93% of the Palestinians think that the Intifada had an adverse effect on the nations' economic situation. Thirty eight percent of the Israelis and 80% of the Palestinians feel that the Intifada had a harmful impact on their personal economic situation.

A peace agreement however, is expected to greatly improve this situation. Eighty three percent of the Israelis and 81% of the Palestinians believe that a peace agreement will have a beneficial impact on the nation's economic situation. Similarly 50% of the Israelis and 74% of the Palestinians believe that their personal economic situation will improve as a result of a peace agreement.

While economic considerations may potentially reduce mutual violence, they are perceived less important than other national interests, which feed the conflict. The most important Palestinian national interest is considered to be the "end of occupation" by the Palestinians (50%), and "security" by the Israelis (48%). Improving the living conditions ranks only third in importance in both populations.

14-20 June 2007 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during June 14-20, 2007. This poll deals with several issues including early elections, infighting, future of the PA, confidence in leaders and institutions, and the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults, 830 in the West Bank and 440 in the Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at Tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the recent infighting has angered most Palestinians and led to a loss of confidence in the leadership and most of the security services. They also show that while there is a clear support for the American security plan and for holding early parliamentary and presidential elections, the public is split over other alternatives such as the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority and replacing it with an international trusteeship or the establishment of a confederation with Jordan.

Findings show that more than 40% support alternatives to the current status quo such as the dissolution of the PA and its replacement with an international trusteeship or return to Israeli occupation. A similar percentage supports a confederation with Jordan now or later after the establishment of a Palestinian state. Findings also show that Hamas has lost some of its popularity in light of the events in the Gaza Strip but that Fateh’s popularity has not benefited from those same events. Pessimism characterizes public assessment of domestic developments with a majority describing infighting and lawlessness as the most immediate and dangerous threat to Palestinians while Israeli occupation came third in a list of threats. A relatively large percentage expressed desire to immigrate to foreign countries. Similarly, a relatively large percentage said it was not proud of being Palestinian.

Despite the continued support for the peace process and the two-state solution, the poll shows a great level of pessimism regarding the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years. Pessimism also prevails regarding the chances of reaching a compromise agreement with the Israeli Olmert government. Nonetheless, a large percentage expressed support for the American security plan after being told of its main components. 

(1) Early Elections and Domestic Balance of Power  

• Overwhelming majority (75%) supports holding early parliamentary and presidential elections and 22% oppose it.
• 56% support the declaration of the emergency situation and the formation of an emergency government and 38% oppose that. Support for the declaration and the emergency government increases to 59% in the West Bank and decreases to 49% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fateh would receive 43% of the popular vote and Hamas would receive 33%.
• If new presidential elections are held today, Mahmud Abbas would receive 49% and Ismail Haniyeh would receive 42%. If the competition is between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 59% and the latter would receive 35%.

Findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip support the holding of early parliamentary and presidential elections while 22% oppose it. The high level of support indicates public conviction that the split caused by the Gaza events might deepen with time leading to a permanent separation between the two geographically separated entities of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Support for early elections might reflect public desire not only to reject violence as the means to solve domestic problems but also to reunify the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Attitudes of Gazans do not differ from those of West Bankers regarding early elections. In fact, support for early elections is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to theWest Bank (73%). Support for early elections increases among illiterates (83%) and those with elementary education (79%) compared to those with BA degree (72%), among those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (82%) compared to those who define themselves as opposed to the peace process (47%), and among supporters of Fateh (91%) compared to supporters of Hamas (60%).

Findings show that a majority of 56% support the declaration of emergency and the formation of an emergency government while 38% oppose it. The relatively low level of support for the emergency declaration compared to the support for early elections indicates that a significant part of the public is concerned about the consequences of the formation of an emergency government on the infighting and the split between Gaza and the West Bank. Concern about the emergency situation increases in the Gaza Strip where only 49% support it compared to 59% in the West Bank. Support for the declaration of emergency and for the emergency government increases also among those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (62%) compared to those who define themselves as opposed to the peace process (30%), and among supporters of Fateh (83%) compared to supporters of Hamas (30%).

If new elections are held today, support for Fateh would remain as it was three months ago (43%) while Hamas’s popularity drops to 33%. Hamas’s popularity stood at 37% in our last survey in March 2007. Hamas’s popularity drops particularly in the West Bank (27%) compared to its popularity three months ago when it stood at 35%. In the Gaza Strip, findings show Hamas’s popularity unchanged compared to three months ago (40%). Fateh’s popularity increases slightly in the West Bank (from 41% to 43%) and drops slightly in the Gaza Strip (from 46% to 42%). These findings show that the Gaza events did not have a great impact on the domestic balance of power between Fateh and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, support for Hamas drops while support for Fateh increases slightly. Yet, most of those who defected from Hamas have not shifted loyalty to Fateh and have opted instead to become “undecided.” Findings show that the undecided category has increased from 8% in our March survey to 13% in this poll. The implication is that the decrease in Hamas’s popularity could be temporary and that Fateh remains unable to benefit from Hamas’s mistakes. Findings also show that the other parties and factions have also failed to present themselves as an alternative to the two large factions, Fateh and Hamas. The combined strength of all other parties remains unchanged at 12% compared to their strength three months ago.

Findings regarding the presidential race show a decrease in the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh. In a competition between Haniyeh and Mahmud Abbas, the former receives 42% and the latter 49%. But 40% say they will not participate in such elections if the only two candidates are Haniyeh and Abbas. If the competition is between Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti, the non participation rate drops to 31% and Barghouti wins by 59% compared to 35% for Haniyeh. Barghouti wins against Haniyeh in the Gaza Strip (55% compared to 41%) and theWest Bank (62% compared to 30%).

(2) Infighting, Performance of Public Institutions, and the Future of the PA  

• 59% believe that Fateh and Hamas are equally responsible for the infighting, but 15% believe Fateh is more responsible than Hamas and 14% believe Hamas is more responsible than Fateh for the infighting.
• 71% believe that neither Fateh nor Hamas came out a winner from the infighting. But 18% believe that Hamas came out a winner and only 4% believe Fateh came out a winner.
• Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas during the infighting does not exceed 13% and dissatisfaction 84%. Satisfaction with the performance of Ismail Haniyeh reaches 22% and dissatisfaction 74%. Satisfaction with the overall performance of Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 60%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of the National Unity Government during the three months since formation stands at 17% and dissatisfaction at 81%.
• Confidence in various security services and armed groups ranges between the low for Preventive Security, Intelligence, Executive Force, and Presidential Guard (33% to 37%) and medium for the National Forces (48%), al Qassam Brigades (45%), al Aqsa Brigades (50%), and Police (58%).
• 41% support the dissolution of the PA and 49% oppose that. The percentage of those who support the dissolution of the PA is divided into those who would like to replace with an international trusteeship (26%) and those who want to replace it with a return to Israeli occupation (16%).
• Support for a confederation with Jordan reaches 42% and opposition 52%.

Findings indicate that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians does not blame foreign parties for the infighting. Instead, responsibility is placed equally on Fateh and Hamas. Only 9% believe Fateh and Hamas are not responsible for the infighting and 59% blame both sides equally while 15% believe Fateh is more responsible and 14% believe Hamas is more responsible. Moreover, a majority of 71% believe that Fateh and Hamas have not come out winners from the infighting. But in light of the reality of Hamas control in Gaza, 18% believe it has emerged a winner while only 4% believe Fateh has been the winner.

Findings also show that the public has lost confidence in its leadership and in the majority of the security services and armed resistance groups. Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas during the infighting does not exceed 13% and dissatisfaction stands at 84%. Similarly, satisfaction with the performance of Prime Minister Haniyeh does not exceed 22% and dissatisfaction stands at 74%. Dissatisfaction with the overall performance of Mahmud Abbas drops from 53% three months ago to 36% in this poll. Dissatisfaction with Abbas’s performance stands today at 60%.  Findings also show a great disappointment with the performance of the national unity government during the last three months with 81% saying that they are dissatisfied with its performance and only 17% expressing satisfaction.

Confidence in the security services and armed groups ranges between little and medium. Confidence in the preventive security stands at 33%, General Intelligence 34%, Executive Force 35%, Presidential Guard 37%, al Qassam Brigades 45%, the National Security forces 48%, al Aqsa Brigades 50%, and Police 58%.

The worsening conditions and the lack of trust in the PA leadership and institutions force people to seek alternatives. Findings show that 41% support the dissolution of the PA and 49% oppose that. The percentage of those who support PA dissolution is the sum of those who want to replace it with an international trusteeship (26%) and those who want to replace it with a return to full Israeli occupation (16%). Similarly, findings show that 42% support and 52% oppose the establishment of a confederation with Jordan. The percentage of those who support the confederation is the sum of those who want such a confederation now--before the creation of a Palestinian state-- (25%) and those who wish to have a confederation with Jordan but only after a Palestinian state is established (17%). Support for a confederation-now is equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Support for this step increases among residents of cities (29%) compared to refugee camps (20%), among illiterates (28%) compared to holders of BA degree (22%), among those over 52 years of age (35%) compared to those between 18-22 years of age (19%), and among supporters of Fateh (28%) compared to supporters of Hamas (17%).

(3) Other Domestic Issues  

• 90% describe current Palestinian conditions as bad or very bad.
• The most serious and immediate threat to Palestinians today is infighting and lawlessness in the eyes of 56% followed by poverty and unemployment , Israeli occupation and settlements, and finally international sanctions
• 73% do not feel secure in their homes and 26% say they feel secure. Feeling of security increases in the Gaza Strip to 41% and decreases in the West Bank to 18%.
• 85% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions and 59% of those believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future.
• 28% say they want to immigrate to foreign countries and 23% say they are not proud of being Palestinian.
• 41% believe that democracy is a successful system suitable to Palestine and 54% say it is a failed system unsuitable for Palestine.
• Overwhelming majority (82%) describes acts such as kidnappings of foreigners and bombing of internet cafes and foreign schools as criminal deserving condemnation and only 3% describe them as nationalist deserving support.

Overwhelming majority of Palestinians (90%) describes current condition as bad or very bad while only 6% describe it as good or very good. Findings show that the most immediate and dangerous threat confronting Palestinians today is infighting and lawlessness as perceived by 56% of the public followed by poverty and unemployment as perceived by 21%, Israeli occupation and settlements as perceived by 12%, and finally international boycott and financial sanctions as perceived by 10%. 73% of the public say they do not feel safe or secure in their homes while 26% say they do feel safe and secure. It seems that with Hamas’s control over Gaza complete, more Gazans (41%) feel safe and secure than West Bankers (18%). Findings also show that a great majority of 85% believes that corruption exists in the PA institutions and that among those 59% believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future.

Conditions described above lead 28% of the Palestinians to seek immigration to other countries while 23% say they are not proud of being Palestinians. It is worth mentioning that more than a year ago, in May 2006, the percentage of those wishing to immigrate stood at 17% and the percentage of those not proud of being Palestinians did not exceed 2%. 

Similarly, events in Gaza have affected public evaluation of democracy. In this poll 41% (compared to 56% in our last survey in March 2007) said that democracy is a viable system suitable for Palestine and 54% (compared to 40% last March) said that democracy is a failed system unsuitable for Palestine. Despite this negative assessment of democracy, 42% of those who said that democracy is unsuitable for Palestine said they want to maintain it despite its problems while 45% said it should be replaced with an undemocratic system.

Findings show that despite the spread of violence and calls for extremism in the Gaza Strip, the overwhelming majority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (82%) describes acts such as kidnapping of foreigners, burning of internet cafes, and bombing of foreign schools as criminal deserving condemnation while only 3% describe them as nationalist deserving support. 12% say some of these acts are nationalist and others are criminal. 

(4) Peace Process   

• Support for the Saudi initiative stands at 66% and opposition at 31%. 36% say they believe that Hamas supports the Saudi Initiative and 41% say it opposes it.
• 60% support and 38% oppose a two-state proposal based on mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict. In such a case, 70% would support and 28% would oppose reconciliation between the two peoples.
• After being informed of its main items, 63% support and 36% oppose the May 2007 American Security Plan.
• 63% support the proposed ceasefire proposal of PA president and 34% oppose it.
• 35% support and 61% oppose deployment of armed international forces along the Gaza borders with Egypt and Israel in order to prevent smuggling and rocket attacks againstIsrael.
• Only 26% believe that the chances are medium or high for the creation of a Palestinian state in the next five years; 70% say the chances are slim or non existent.
• Similarly, only 31% believe that it is possible these days to reach a compromise agreement with Olmert’s government and 65% say that it is impossible to do so.

The poll asked about public attitudes regarding various aspects of the peace process in order to asses the impact of the infighting on those attitudes. Findings indicate a slight decrease in support for the Saudi initiative and for the two-state solution but show support for security proposals aimed at restoring stability to Palestinian-Israeli relations. They also show a great deal of pessimism about the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state or for reaching a compromise settlement with the Israeli Olmert government.

Support for the Saudi initiative drops to 66%, compared to 72% in our March poll. Opposition to this initiative stands at 31%. Findings also show that 36% of the public believe that Hamas supports the Saudi initiative while 41% believe it does not. Moreover, 25% believe that the Olmert government supports the initiative while 55% believe it does not. When, in an elaboration of a possible version of the Saudi initiative, we inserted a proposed solution to the refugee problem based on the Clinton Parameters of 2000, i.e., a solution based on UN resolution 194 but in which return to Israel is subject to an Israeli decision, support for this version of the Saudi initiative drops to 46% and opposition increases to 49%.

Findings also show that 60%, compared to 63% last March, support and 38% oppose a two-state solution whereby Israel is recognized as the state for the Jewish people and Palestineis recognized as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict. In such an environment, 70% would support reconciliation between the two peoples.

Respondents were presented with a list of the major components of the American security plan that was presented to the parties in May 2007 and included from the Palestinian side the ending of terrorism, stopping the launching of rockets against Israel, ending smuggling of arms, and putting an end to lawlessness, and from the Israeli side the opening of international crossings, linking the West Bank with Gaza, and removal of Israeli check points in the West Bank. 63% said they support and 36% said they oppose the American security plan. Similarly, 63% supported and 34% opposed the plan presented by PA president Abbas for a ceasefire with Israel that would start in the Gaza Strip and then extend to the West Bank. Support for this ceasefire plan stands at 54% in the Gaza Strip and 68% in the West Bank.

Findings indicate a strong opposition to the deployment of armed international forces along the borders with Egypt and Israel in order to prevent smuggling and launching of rockets against Israel. Only 35% supported and 61% opposed this proposal. Support for the deployment of such forces increases to 38% in the Gaza Strip and decreases to 33% in the West Bank. Support also increases among supporters of Fateh (48%) compared to supporters of Hamas (18%).

Despite the support for the Saudi initiative and the two-state solution, only 26% believe that the chances are medium or high for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years while 70% believe the chances are low or non existent. Similarly, only 31% believe that it is possible these days to reach a compromise agreement with the Olmert government and 65% believe it is impossible.... Full Report

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, March 2011 

In the backdrop of the demonstrations in the Arab world, neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider such demonstrations to be capable of ending occupation in the West Bank 

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.   

Given the dramatic events in the Arab world, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about similar demonstrations in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

48% of Israelis consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the West Bank against Israeli occupation to be medium or high. 40% consider those chances to be low or non-existent;.

Large majorities of both Palestinians (66%) and Israelis (73%) do not consider such demonstration in the West Bank to be capable of ending occupation or stopping settlements. Only 31% among Palestinians and 13% among Israelis think such demonstrations can end occupation and settlement activity.

63% of the Palestinians oppose and 32% support the attack in the Itamar settlement in the West Bank in which a family of five was murdered. 

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between March 17 and 19, 2011. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 601 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between March21 and 28, 2011. The margin of error is 4.0%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding the uprising in the Arab world

• 52% of the Palestinians feel a need for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to organize demonstrations similar to those occurring in other Arab countries. 40% do not feel the need for such demonstrations. But Among Gazans, the percentage of those who feel the need to organize demonstrations against the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip rises to 67%. A majority of Israelis (54%) consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the Gaza Strip against the Hamas government low or non-existent; 36% consider those chances to be medium or high.
• 47% of the Palestinians feel a need for Palestinians in the West Bank to organize demonstrations similar to those occurring in other Arab countries. 50% do not feel the need for such demonstrations. But Among West Bankers,, the percentage of those who feel the need to organize demonstrations against the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank decreases to 36%. A majority of Israelis (51%) consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the West Bank against the PA government low or non-existent; 39% consider those chances to be medium or high. 
• 40% of Israelis consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the West Bank against Israeli occupation to be low or non-existent; 48% consider those chances to be medium or high.
• Large majorities of both Palestinians (66%) and Israelis (73%) do not consider such demonstration in the West Bank to be capable of ending occupation or stopping settlements. Only 31% among Palestinians and 13% among Israelis think such demonstrations can end occupation and settlement activity.
• 69% of Israelis think that the chances of such demonstrations to occur among the Israeli-Arab public against the Israeli government are non-existent or low; 22% consider those chances to be medium or high.
• A majority of the Palestinians (54%), and a plurality among Israelis (42%) believe that the chances of establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years did not change in light of the developments in Egypt and other Arab countries. 21% of the Palestinians and 25% of the Israelis think that the chances have increased; 23% of the Palestinians and 22% of the Israelis think that the chances have decreased. Majorities on both sides consider the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state as low or non-existent (67% among Palestinians and 59% among Israelis.

(B) Renewal of violence between Israelis and Palestinians

• 63% of the Palestinians oppose and 32% support the attack in Itamar in which a family of five was murdered.
• In light of the attack in Itamar, 59% among Israelis oppose and 33% support the government policy to relax the security measures in the West Bank such as the removal of road blocks.
• Among Israelis, 74% oppose and 16% support the settlers’ actions which damage Palestinian property and block roads (labeled “price tag”) in response to removal of illegal outposts by the Israeli government.
• 66% of the Israelis believe that that the settlers’ actions against Israeli soldiers and policemen during the evacuation of the Gilad farm in the West Bank pose a danger or grave danger to democracy. In our November 2002 poll 74% of Israelis believed so and 21% thought they do not pose a danger.
• 54% of Israelis think the Israeli government is not strict enough in imposing the rule of law in the “territories” while 34% believe it is strict enough. In our November 2002 poll, 53% believed it is not strict enough while 41% of Israelis believed that the government is strict enough.
• 63% of the Israelis support a tough governmental policy against extreme Israeli elements in the “territories” like those who shoot Palestinian olive pickers even if this can result in a confrontation with settlers; 30% oppose it. In our November 2002 poll, 70% supported such a policy while 24% opposed it. 

 (C) Conflict management, peace initiatives and threat perceptions 

• After the US has used its veto power against the UNSC resolution regarding Israeli settlements, 47% of the Israelis and 57% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will continue. 83%of the Israelis and 52% of the Palestinians expect that some armed attacks will continue as well.
• 54% of the Israelis support and 41% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. However 53% think that the majority of the Israeli public opposes such negotiations and only 31% think a majority supports it.
• 56% of the Israelis oppose and 31% support the Saudi initiative, while 56% of the Palestinians support the plan and 41% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In our December 2010 poll there was a similar level of support for the plan among both Israelis and Palestinians.
• In our poll we also examine periodically Israelis’ and Palestinians’ readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 52% of the Israelis, support such a mutual recognition; recognition of identity and 36%oppose it. Among Palestinians, 48% support and 50% oppose it.
• Among Israelis, 54% are worried and 41% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, just like in our previous poll in December. Among Palestinians 70% are worried and 30% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. In our last poll in December, 75% of the Palestinians said they were worried and 25% said they were not worried.
• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend the borders of the state to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens. A plurality of the Israelis (34%) fears that the Palestinians’ aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (41)

Massive support for going to the UN, but a majority expects US and Israeli financial and political sanctions and three quarters want an actual exercise of sovereignty throughout the West Bank

15-17 September 2011    

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 15-17 September 2011. The poll was conducted after the PLO declaration of its intention to seek membership in the UN. President Abbas announced the intention to go to the UNSC during data collection. This press release covers Palestinian attitudes regarding the UN issue, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the most serious problems confronting Palestinians today. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2011 show that a semi consensus is evolving over the issue of seeking UN membership and recognition of Palestinian statehood despite the fact that a large majority believes that the step will lead to the suspension of American financial support and Israeli custom transfers and will lead to greater hardships on the ground with more Israeli checkpoints and settlement activities. Findings also show that the overwhelming majority of the public want the PA to exercise actual sovereignty throughout the entire West Bank and to insist on assuming control over the Allenby Crossing with Jordan even if such steps lead to a confrontation with the Israeli army and settlers. While findings show widespread opposition to return to an armed intifada, a majority supports, and wants to participate in, large scale peaceful demonstrations. Only 50% however expect Palestine to become a member of the UN this month.

Findings also show that the popularity of Abbas and Fateh has increased somewhat in light of the debate over the UN step. Findings also show a surprising increase in the percentage of those who wish to immigrate from the Gaza Strip, reaching 50%. They also show widespread criticism of, and objection to, Hamas’ government decision to ban travel of Gazan students to the US for studies and to the decision requiring prior approval of NGO staff to travel abroad to participate in conferences. Findings also show very little support to the decision by the PA Attorney General to ban the airing of the satirical TV series “Watan ala Watar” seeing the decision as a violation of the freedom of expression.  

(1) Going to the UN:

• 83% support and 16% oppose going to the UN to obtain membership for a Palestinian state.
• In response to the Palestinian UN efforts, 78% expect Israel to stop transfer of custom funds to the PA and 64% expect the US to stop its financial support to the Palestinians.
• 77% expect the US to use its veto power at the UNSC to prevent admittance of the State of Palestine to the UN.
• After the UN vote, 75% want the PA to exercise sovereignty throughout the West Bank and 73% want the PA to assert control over the Allenby crossing with Jordan.
• A majority of 61% supports non-violent resistance as the means to impose Palestinian sovereignty and 54% say they want to participate in peaceful demonstrations.
• By contrast, only 35% support, and 64% oppose, return to an armed intifada.

83% support and 16% oppose going to the UNSC to obtain recognition of Palestine as a state. Moreover, 74% believe that there is no point in returning to negotiations with Israel without acceptable terms of reference or without freezing settlement construction and that therefore president Abbas is right in seeking UN involvement. Support for going to the UN reaches 86% in the Gaza Strip and 81% in the West Bank. Support for the step increases among supporters of the peace process (87%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (70%), and among supporters of Fateh (91%) compared to supporters of Hamas (78%).

In response to the Palestinian decision to go to the UN, an overwhelming majority of 78% expects Israel to suspend transfer of custom funds to the PA or to suspend the transfer and take additional measures to make occupation harsher by setting more checkpoints and expanding settlement construction.  Similarly, 64% expect the US to respond to the UN drive by suspending its financial contribution to the PA or by suspending the contribution and imposing political restrictions.  77% expect the US to use its veto power at the UNSC to prevent admission of Palestine to the UN but 58% believe that most European countries will recognize the new state of Palestine. 50% expect Palestine to become a UN member state this September and 43% do not expect that.

After the UN recognition of Palestine as a state, 75% (76% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip) want the PA to exercise sovereignty throughout the entire West Bank even if such a measure leads to a confrontation between the PA and the Israeli army and settlers. Support for imposition of Palestinian sovereignty increases in the West Bank (76%) compared to the Gaza Strip (71%), among supporters of the peace process (80%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (69%), among those with most use of internet (82%) compared to those who do not use the internet (73%), and among supporters of Fateh (79%) compared to supporters of Hamas (66%). Similarly, 73% (71% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip) want the PA to assert Palestinian sovereignty over the Allenby crossing with Jordan even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing. 

Only 35% support a return to an armed intifada and 64% oppose it.  By contrast, 61% support resort to popular, unarmed and non-violent resistance and 54% say they will participate in peaceful demonstrations that would seek to breach checkpoints and block roads used by Israeli army and settlers after the UN recognition of the state of Palestine. Moreover, an identical percentage says that if large scale peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, they would contribute to the process of ending Israeli occupation. Belief that peaceful demonstrations can contribute to ending occupation is higher in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (48%), among supporters of the peace process (57%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (50%), and among holders of BA degree (58%) compared to illiterates (39%).

(2) Conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, performance of the governments of Fayyad and Haniyeh, and presidency and legislative elections

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank is higher than that of conditions in the Gaza Strip in areas of general conditions, freedom of the press, and the ability of citizens to criticize authorities without fear. But percentage of those who believe corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank is higher than percentage of those who believe corruption exists in Hamas’ public institutions in the Gaza Strip.
• Positive evaluation of the performance of Haniyeh’s government stands at 34% and Fayyad’s at 53%.
• 49% of Gazans say they want to immigrate while in the West Bank only 28% want to do the same.
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 52% and dissatisfaction at 44%.
• If new presidential elections were to take place today, Abbas would receive 59% of the vote and Haniyeh 34%.
• If new legislative elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 29% of the vote, Fateh 45%, third parties combined 13%, and 14% remain undecided.
• 23% support and 42% oppose the decision by the PA’s Attorney General to ban the satirical series “Watan ala Watar” and 35% have no opinion.
• 20% support and 71% oppose the decision of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip to ban the travel of students to the US to continue their studies.

23% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 50% describe them as bad or very bad. By contrast, 39% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 30% describe them as bad or very bad. Moreover, 65% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 30% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, only 48% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 38% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip.  36% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 26% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. On the other hand, 71% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 58% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. Perception of safety and security stands at 68% in the West Bank and 65% in the Gaza Strip.

Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 34% and Salam Fayyad’s at 53%. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 39% and 43% respectively.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 49%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 28%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 40% and 26% respectively.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 52% while 44% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 39% in the Gaza Strip and 59% in the West Bank.  If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 59% and Haniyeh 34% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 60%. These results indicate a significant increase in Abbas’ popularity and a decline in Haniyeh’s compared to the situation three months ago when Abbas received the support of 54% and Haniyeh 38%. Support for Abbas reaches 63% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip while support for Haniyeh stands at 29% in the West Bank and 42% in the Gaza Strip. Support for Abbas increases also among men (62%) compared to women (55%) while support for Haniyeh increases among women (39%) compared to men (30%).  If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter would receive 30% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 67%.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 67% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 45% say they would vote for Fateh, 13% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 14% are undecided. These results indicate an increase of three percentage points in Fateh’s popularity compared to the situation three months ago. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip in this poll stands at 36 % and in the West Bank 25%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands at 43% and in the West Bank 46%.  

Only 23% support the decision by PA’s Attorney General to ban the satirical TV series “Watan ala Watar” and 42% oppose the decision while 35% have no opinion on the matter. Supporters of the decision accuse the series of mocking PA institutions and ridiculing its leaders or being of low quality and repulsive. Opposition to the decision is based on the argument that it represents a gross violation of freedom of expression or because it is not up to the Attorney General to suspend a TV series.  Opposition to the decision is higher among the youth, between the ages of 18 and 28 years of age (50%) compared to those between the ages of 29 and 39 (44%) and those whose age is 40 or above (35%), among those who oppose the peace process (50%) compared to those who support the peace process (40%), among those with most use of internet (56%) compared to those who do not use the internet (32%), and among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (16%). Opposition to the decision stands at 42% among supporters of Fateh and 39% among supporters of Hamas.

71% oppose and 20% support the decision by the Hamas government to prevent students who received scholarships from Amideast to travel to the US for studies.  Similarly, 63% oppose and 27% support the decision by the Hamas government instructing staff of NGOs wishing to travel abroad to attend conferences to submit a request for permission to travel two weeks in advance of travel date.  Opposition to the Hamas government’s decision to ban travel of students to the US is higher in the West Bank (76%) compared to the Gaza Strip (63%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 28 years of age (76%) compared to those whose age is 40 or over (69%), among those who say they are “somewhat religious” (77%) compared to those who say they are religious (64%) among supporters of the peace process (77%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (54%), among those with most use of internet (81%) compared to those who do not use the internet (70%), among holders of BA degree (77%) compared to illiterates (49%), and among supporters of Fateh (83%) compared to supporters of Hamas (45%).

(3) The Peace Process

• 55% support and 40% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative
• 46% support and 52% oppose a mutual recognition of national identity of Israel and Palestine
• 73% are worried and 27% are not worried that they or members of their family would be hurt by Israelis or their land will be confiscated or homes demolished
• 58% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to annex the West Bank and expel its inhabitants and 19% believe that its goal is to annex the West Bank and deny Palestinians their political rights

55% of the Palestinians support the Saudi initiative and 40% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. Inreturn, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our June 2011 poll there was a similar level of support for the plan.  Findings also show that 46% support and 52% oppose a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish People and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the resolution of all issues of conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state. These figures are similar to those obtained in our last poll in June.

Moreover, 73% are worried and 27% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.  The level of perceived threat regarding the aspirations of Israel in the long run is very high. 58% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 19% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. Only 21% think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967.

(4) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 59% believe that Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital is the most vital Palestinian goal while 24% believe that the most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return
• Problems of poverty and unemployment, the absence of national unity, and the continuation of Israeli occupation are seen equally as the top three problems facing Palestinians today.

The largest percentage (59%) believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 24% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 11% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 7% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. Three months ago, only 48% viewed statehood within the 1967 borders as the most vital goal. It is likely that the drive to gain UN membership and recognition has pushed this goal to the top priority for a greater number of Palestinians. The belief that Palestinian statehood should be the most vital goal increases in the West Bank (63%) compared to the Gaza Strip (50%), among supporters of the peace process (65%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (46%), among supporters of Fateh (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas (58%), and among illiterates and those with elementary education (70%) compared to holders of BA degree (54%).

Five main problems confront Palestinians today: the most serious problem in the eyes of 25% of the public is the spread of poverty and unemployment while an identical percentage believes that it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip, and 24% believe that it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 13% believe it to be the corruption in some public institutions, and 7% believe it to be the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings..... Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 11-14 December 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the announcement by the Palestinian Election Commission and President Abbas that all factions have agreed to the holding of legislative elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But no decree was issued by Abbas during the period of the data collection. The period also witnessed a debate among Palestinians over the decision of the PA Attorney General to ask the court to block public access to more than 50 Palestinian media websites. Hamas allowed the construction of an American field hospital on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Israel. Power was cut by the Israeli Electric Corporation to central West Bank for two hours every day in many locations served by the Jerusalem District Electricity Company due to unpaid bills. On the Israeli side, prime minister Netanyahu was indicted for corruption and Israeli political parties failed to form a government coalition leading to a decision to hold a third parliamentary election in a single year. The US government declared a new position regarding Israeli settlements in which it disputed the illegality of these settlements from an international law standpoint. In the meanwhile, the US Congress started an on-going effort to impeach president Trump for the use of the presidency to attain personal gains.  This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2019 show a small majority indicating optimism about the holding of legislative elections in the near future. Moreover, the poll shows that majority is in favor of holding these elections even if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem; in case of Israeli opposition, the public says that East Jerusalemites should vote wherever they can, in Jerusalem and outside it. The bad news however, is that half of the public believes that these upcoming elections will not be free or fair. Furthermore, only half of the public trusts the ability of the Palestinian Election Commission (PEC) to manage the election process with integrity and less than half has confidence in the ability of the police, whether in West Bank and the PA or in the Gaza Strip under Hamas, to provide protection to the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Indeed, a majority believes that Hamas will not be able to conduct its election campaign in the West Bank, and Fatah in the Gaza Strip, without restrictions and interference. These findings indicate a diminished public trust in the entire election process, due probably in part to a distrust in PEC, as indeed supported by the findings, and in the PA public institutions in both areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Worst of all, a large majority believes that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah, in the West Bank, will not accept the outcome and if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas, in the Gaza Strip, will not accept the outcome. This finding demonstrates beyond any doubt the absence of public confidence in the democratic credentials of the two major political parties, Fatah and Hamas, and raise a big question about the extent of the damage and political corruption that have been generated by the absence of democratic life and by the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 2007.

On the ability of a newly elected legitimate government to dissolve the armed groups in the Gaza Strip and collect their arms, a large majority indicates opposition to such measure. Indeed, the majority believes that protecting or keeping the arms of the armed groups has greater legitimacy than that of the electoral legitimacy of the government. These findings reveal that the public does not take the election and its legitimacy seriously (which might be an outcome of the problems identified above) and that in the absence of a viable peace process, the public puts its trust, first and foremost, in armed struggle. 

Findings show that if elections take place today, Fatah would receive the biggest share of the vote, followed by Hamas, existing third parties, newly created third parties, and finally an electoral list loyal to Mohammad Dahlan. With this range of options, only a small percentage of participating votes remains undecided. Needless to say, the formation of an electoral list loyal to Dahlan will significantly weaken the size of Fatah’s share of the vote and might threaten its ability to emerge as the biggest party. This problem, unique to Fatah, can be exacerbated by its persistent lack of discipline, as demonstrated by the elections of 1996 and 2006, if, for example, other unofficial Fatah lists were formed by disgruntled senior party members who fail to make it to a realistic spot in the party’s election list. This means that Fatah might find itself competing against itself thereby ending up with greater fragmentation and great many lost votes. But the greatest threat to a Fatah electoral victory would be its failure to integrate Marwan Barghouti and his supporters in its electoral list. In such a case, as temporarily happened in the 2006 elections, he might form his own electoral list thereby splitting Fatah’s vote and insuring that Hamas would receive the greatest share of the vote.   

On other domestic political issues, findings indicate that a plurality in the West Bank thinks that Hamas should have participated in the recent exchange of rocket fire between Israel and Islamic Jihad. But the situation in the Gaza Strip is different as a greater plurality thinks that Hamas’ decision of refraining from participation has been the correct decision. We also found a large majority views the decision of the PA Attorney General to seek court authorization to block Palestinian media websites as an attack on freedom of speech and therefore he should not stay in his office because he apparently does not believe in free speech. We also found an overwhelming majority supporting the PA government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years.

Two thirds of the public view the US decision recognizing the legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as destructive the two-state solution. A majority views the decision as destructive also to the one-state solution and that one of its outcomes will be to push Israel to annex parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley. This American position led to a significant increase in the percentage of Palestinians, standing today at three quarters, who demand that the Palestinian leadership reject the American peace plan, or the Deal of the Century, out of hand, without even looking at its substance while 70% indicate opposition to a restoration of PA dialogue with the Trump Administration.

Finally, findings show that a majority is opposed to the two-state solution, but support for it remains higher than the support for the one-state solution. They also indicate a slight increase in support for armed struggle or a return to armed intifada. It is noticeable however that a majority of the public thinks that the indictment of Israeli prime minister Netanyahu will soon lead to his removal from power. Similarly, a majority is optimistic about the ability of the US Congress to impeach President Trump and a similar majority is optimistic that he will lose the upcoming US presidential elections. This public betting on the dynamics of domestic Israeli politics and on the workings of the US Congress might be one of the reasons why we still find more public support for the two-state solution compared to other alternative solutions to the conflict with Israel. 

(1) A new legislative election?

• A majority of 52% of the public expects general elections to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 37% believe no elections will take place. Three months ago, only 38% expected that elections will take place soon.
• 44% support the holding of simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose a separation between the two, while 23% say they support the holding of parliamentary elections to be followed few months later by presidential elections, and 22% want simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections but do not oppose separating them by few months.
• A majority of 56% (65% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) says that if Israel prevented Palestinian legislative elections in East Jerusalem, voting should be made possible for the residents in any polling station in the West Bank; 35% disagree and say that no election should take place if Israel prevents it in East Jerusalem.
• Only 50% trust and 44% do not trust the integrity and capacity of the Palestinian Election Commission to successfully manage the election process.
• Moreover, only 48% trust, and 46% do not trust, the ability of the West Bank Palestinian police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Similarly, only 47% trust, and 41% do not trust, the ability of the Gaza Strip police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. 
• A majority of 64% say that it will not be possible, and 29% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Hamas’, to conduct their election campaigns in the West Bank without restrictions or interference from the Palestinian security services. Similarly, a majority of 56% says that it will not be possible, and 37% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Fatah’s, to conduct their election campaigns in the Gaza Strip without restrictions or interference from the Gaza security services.
• Only 42% believe, and 50% do not believe, that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair.
• The public is divided into two equal halves (43% each) in calling for taking away the jurisdiction of Palestinian courts, especially the Constitutional Court, in annulling the outcome of the legislative elections because of the fear that these courts might do so if the opposition to Abbas and Fatah were to win the elections.
• We asked the public about its expectations regarding the outcome of the upcoming elections: 40% (47% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip) expect Fatah to win the upcoming legislative elections while only 25% (19% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) expect Hamas to win.
• We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 40% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 29% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 41% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 31% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 24% (compared to 20% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 43% three months ago). It should be noted that among Fatah voters, as we see in another question, some are loyalists to Mohammad Dahlan, a former senior Fatah official.  If these Dahlan loyalists are removed from Fatah’s share, it would drop to 35%.
• We asked again about the voting intentions, but this time with the assumption that other newly created electoral lists, ones that have not participated in the previous elections in 2006, added to the list of candidates.  In this case, the participation rate would increase from 68% to 72% and the share of the undecided would drop from 20% to only 6%; Fatah share would rise from 40% to 44% (including Dahlan loyalists); Hamas share (32%) would remain unchanged; share of third parties (10%) would also remain unchanged; and 8% would vote for the newly created electoral lists. If Dahlan loyalists are removed from Fatah’s share, it would drop to 39%.
• More than two thirds (68%) believe that if Hamas wins the upcoming elections, Fatah will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 25% think Fatah will indeed allow Hamas to do so. Similarly, 59% believe that if Fatah wins the upcoming elections, Hamas will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 34% think Hamas will indeed allow Fatah to do so.
• A majority of 59% say that after the upcoming elections and the formation of a new government, such a government does not have the right to dissolve existing armed groups in the Gaza Strip and collect their arms because maintain the arms of these groups is more important than electoral legitimacy; 33% say that the newly elected government does indeed have the legitimacy to do so.  Regardless of the policy of a newly elected government on the armed groups, two-thirds (67%) say that it would be wrong, and 26% say it would correct, to dissolve Gaza’s armed groups and collect their arms.
• If new parties or movements were to be created to take part in the upcoming elections, 13% of the participants say that while they have not yet made up their mind, they will be willing to consider supporting a new party or movement. Also, 12% of committed voters are willing to shift support to a new party or movement. Nonetheless, the largest percentage of participating voters says they will not shift vote to a new party or movement.
• The overwhelming majority (79%) encourages, and 18% discourage, the participation of independent youth lists in the upcoming elections.
• The top priority that should be the aim of the upcoming elections is the unification the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the eyes of 36% of the public while 18% think it is the improvement of economic conditions, 17% say the ending of Gazan blockade and siege, 13% say fighting corruption, 7% say creating a democratic political system, and 6% say strengthening the resistance to occupation and settlements.
• The largest percentage (32%) believes that Fatah is the most able of all factions to succeed in realizing the top priority it has selected; 24% say Hamas is the most able, and 20% believe that none of the existing or newly created factions will be able to succeed in achieving the top priority they have selected. 

(2) Presidential elections:

• 61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 49% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 59%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).
• Only 31% think president Abbas is the best Fatah candidate for the presidency while 41% think that Fatah has better candidates; 29% say they do not know or have no opinion on the matter. 
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 49% and the latter 44% of the vote (compared to 48% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 37% of the vote (compared to 39% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 57% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 58% (compared to 56% three months ago) and Haniyeh 34% (compared to 36% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 62% and Haniyeh 34%.
• We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 21% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (2% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 5%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 4% each.  

(3) Blocking websites, the justice system, the electricity crisis, the American field hospital, the Shtayyeh government, and other domestic conditions:

• 60% of the public view the decision by the attorney general to ask the court to block access to more than 50 Palestinian media websites as imposing restrictions on free speech, a right guaranteed by the Basic Law; but 33% think the decision to do so is correct as it seeks to implement the law.
• In light of his decision to block more than 50 media websites, 53% think the attorney general should not stay in his position because he apparently does not believe in free speech. But 38% think that he should stay in his position because he simply implemented the law.
• A majority of 54% (59% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 39% (34% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.
• A majority of 55% (60% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary is rules according to whims and interests; 42% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law.
• In light of the current electricity crisis in central West Bank, 61% think that refugee camps should be exempted from paying their electricity bill and the PA should cover the cost; 35% disagree and think that refugee camps should pay their bills like everybody else.
• If refugee camps are indeed exempted from paying for their electricity, 89% want the PA to cover the cost while only 5% think that other paying customers should cover the cost.
• The largest percentage (36%) says that it supports, and 32% say they oppose, the construction of the American field hospital on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Israel; 28% say they have not heard about it.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 60%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 65% and in the West Bank at 52%.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 31% and declines in the West Bank to 20%.
• Only 35% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 62% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 51% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 46% say they cannot.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 67%.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 50% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 45% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• With more than eight months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (49%), the economy (39%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (53%), the preparation to hold general elections (47%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (51%). But a percentage ranging between 24% and 45% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 12% and 24% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a slight improvement in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings three months ago.
• Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 58% expects failure; only 33% expects success.
• In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a plurality of 48% expects failure and 44% expect success.
• In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 55% expects failure and 37% expects success.
• An overwhelming majority of 77% supports, and 22% oppose, the government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years. 
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Al Aqsa TV (15%), Palestine TV and Maan TV (13% each), Palestine Today TV (9%), al Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (4% each).   

(4) Reconciliation, Hamas and Islamic Jihad: 

• 36% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at only 30%.
• 44% are optimistic, and 51% are not optimistic, that the upcoming legislative elections will contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
• An overwhelming majority (78%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 20% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government.
• A majority of 52% (down to 44% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 10% believe the chances are high.
• Given Hamas’ position during the latest round of fire exchange in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Islamic Jihad, the largest percentage, standing at 39% (43% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), believes that Hamas should have participated in the exchange of rocket fire against Israel while 32% (22% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) think Hamas made the correct decision by not participating, and 16% think that Hamas did in fact participate. 

 (5) US declaration of settlements’ legality, the Trump peace plan, and Trump impeachment:

• 66% view the US declaration of the legality of Israeli settlements according to international law as destructive to the two-state solution while 18% think it will have no impact and 10% think that it will in fact strengthen the two-state solution.
• Similarly, 57% view the same decision as have a weakening impact on the one-state solution while 23% think it will have no impact and 9% think it will in fact strengthen the one-state solution.
• Almost three quarters (74%) think the US decision will lead to an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley, while 20% think it will have no such impact
• We asked the public if Palestinian acceptance of the Trump peace plan would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 85% say no; only 10% say yes it would.
• When asked if the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 75% of the public says it does and only 21% say it does not.
• We asked the public what should the Palestinian leadership do about the US peace plan: 74% indicate that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 16% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 6% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo. Three months ago, 69% said the PA should reject the plan out of hand. 
• A majority of 69% is opposed and 19% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
• A majority of 60% expects US president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 53% expect the US Congress to succeed in impeaching him. 

(6) The peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 42% and opposition at 55%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 42%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 54% believe that the majority opposes it.   
• A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 35% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 75% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 24% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 29% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 15% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 32% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 37% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the largest group (47%) chose armed struggle, 26% negotiations, and 20% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 60% support popular non-violent resistance; 52% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 28% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 40% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
• A majority of 58% expects the indictment of Netanyahu in corruption charges to his ouster from leadership in Israel soon while 34% expect him to succeed in staying in power despite the indictment. 

(7) Arab uprisings, Turkish incursion into Syria, and visit of Saudi football team:

• 57% of the public are in favor and 37% are not in favor of the current uprisings in the Arab world, in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
• But 65% do not expect, and only 31% expect, these uprisings to spread to Palestine.
• Similarly, 65% do not wish to see these uprisings spreading to the West Bank and a little more (70%) do not wish to see them spreading to the Gaza Strip.
• Nonetheless, 63% reject, and 26% accept, Hizbollah’s position which is opposed to the Lebanese uprising.
• A majority of 51% (60% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) views the Turkish incursion into the northern border area of Syria as unacceptable aggression while 40% (31% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) view it as a legitimate temporary incursion.
• A majority of 63% say that visits from Arab countries, such as that of the Saudi football team, should be encouraged while 34% say such visits should not be encouraged. 

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment and the spread of corruption in public institutions (26% each); 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.