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Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (43)

With a majority objecting to return to negotiations without an Israeli acceptance of Palestinian conditions, and while a majority reaches the conclusion that the two state solution is no longer viable, domestic conditions - such as the financial crisis, the electricity crisis, and the failure of reconciliation - contribute to internal frustration and weaken the standing of PA leadership and all Palestinian factions

15-17 March 2012 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 15-17 March 2012. This poll was conducted immediately after a ceasefire went into effect in the Gaza Strip after more than 20 people were killed in Israeli missile attacks that came in response to rocket attacks launched from Gaza by resistance forces in retaliation for an Israeli assassination of the top commander of the Popular Resistance Committees. The period preceding the poll also witnessed talks by the Fayyad government about increasing taxes. It also witnessed the signing of the Doha agreement between Khalid Mish'al and Mahmud Abbas for the formation of a reconciliation government to be headed by Abbas. Ismail Haniyeh declared from Cairo his support for the Syrian revolt in what seemed to be the first statement by a Hamas leader on the subject. Security conditions in the West Bank somewhat deteriorated as a result of settlers' attacks or due to Israeli measures, such as setting more checkpoints, that came in response to the escalation in the Gaza Strip.  This poll covers Palestinian attitudes regarding the PA financial crisis, the Doha Agreement, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The first quarter of 2012 brings bad news to the governments of Fayyad and Haniyeh, to Fateh and Hamas, and to president Abbas. Findings show a significant drop in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government, particularly in the West Bank. The drop is probably due to anticipated fallout from the PA's financial crisis and in response to government talk about a tax increase and/or a reduction in the size of the public sector, two measures clearly rejected, as findings show, by a majority of respondents. The financial crisis, the slowdown in the UN bid, and pessimism about the chances for reconciliation might also be some of the factors behind the decline in the popularity of Fateh and the dissatisfaction with Abbas, especially in the West Bank.

Findings also indicate a significant decline in the popularity of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and a decrease in the positive evaluation of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, probably due to Hamas' behavior, standing on the sideline, during Gaza's rocket war with Israel and due to the prevailing pessimism about the chances for reconciliation, particularly given the outspoken criticism of the Doha agreement by some of Hamas' Gaza leaders at a time when the agreement receives massive public support from all sectors of the public. Perhaps the only positive sign for Hamas is the significant increase in the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh in the West Bank, which might have come as a result of his visibility lately during his travels to Arab and Islamic countries and as a result of his public support for the popular revolt in Syria, a revolt that receives the overwhelming support of the Palestinian public. It is worth noting in this context that a majority of the public does not believe that Hamas supports the Syrian revolt or simply does not know Hamas' real position regarding that revolt.

Findings also show that a majority of the public is opposed to the resumption of exploratory talks with Israel and almost half of the Palestinians believe that Abbas made a mistake by taking part few months ago in such talks in Amman. When asked about the viability of the two-state solution, a clear majority expressed the belief that settlement expansion has made such a solution unworkable. But when asked about abandoning it in favor of a one state solution, a clear majority opposed such a shift.

(1) PA's Financial Crisis:

• To solve PA's financial crisis, 29% support forcing early retirement in the public sector, 9% support increasing income tax, 11% support both adopting both measures, and 48% oppose both solutions.
• In searching for alternative solutions to the financial crisis, 52% support returning to peace negotiations as the means to obtain international financial support while 27% support dissolving the PA. 
• A majority of 60% believe that the PA is capable of surviving for a period between 3 to 10 years or longer

We asked the public about its view on how to deal with the financial crisis facing the PA, a crisis that might constrain its ability to pay salaries: 48% opposed solving PA's financial deficit by increasing taxes or forcing some public sector employees to take early retirement. Only 9% came in favor of a tax increase and 29% came in favor of the early retirement solution. 11% favored adopting options, the tax increase and the early retirement. Support for early retirement  increases among holders of BA degree (35%) compared to illiterates (14%), among farmers and students (56% and 35% respectively) compared to retirees and housewives (12% and 25% respectively), and among Hamas supporters (34%) compared to Fateh supporters (28%).

When we asked the public for alternative solutions to the financial crisis, other than the tax increase and the early retirement, a majority of 52% selected the option of returning to negotiations with Israel in order to obtain greater international financial support while 27% selected the option of dissolving the PA altogether. 21% selected various other options or could not come up with any. It is worth noting that about half of those who favor return to negotiations oppose unconditional return that does not insure an Israeli settlement freeze and an acceptance of the 1967 borders. Support for dissolving the PA increases among the youth between the ages of 18-28 (31%) compared to those over the age of 50 (20%), among graduates of colleges (31%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (7% and 21% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (46%) compared to those who support the peace process (22%), among those who work in the private sector (30%) compared to those who work in the public sector (25%), among supporters of Hamas (38%) compared to supporters of Fateh (17%).

When we asked the public about its expectations regarding the ability of the PA to survive for long given the current financial crisis, the continuation of occupation and settlement construction, and the suspension of peace negotiations, about one third (34%) said it can survive for ten or more years, 26% said it can survive for three to ten years, 14% said it can survive for a year or two, and 16% said it can survive for a year or less.

(2) The Doha Agreement and Reconciliation: 

• 84% support and 12% oppose the Doha Agreement, but only 46% believe that reconciliation will succeed and 49% believe it will not succeed.
• 62% want the reconciliation government, when established, to follow the peace policies of Abbas and 20% want it to follow Hamas' policies regarding the peace process.
• A majority of 57% expects international sanctions and suspension of financial aid to follow the formation of the reconciliation government.
• 69% welcome the Qatari role in reconciliation and other internal Palestinian matters.

An overwhelming majority of 84% supports the Doha Agreement signed by Mahmud Abbas and Khalid Mish'al and calling for the formation of a reconciliation government to be headed by Abbas and to be tasked with conducting elections and starting Gaza reconstruction. 12% oppose the agreement.  Findings show that 93% of Fateh supporters and 81% of Hamas supporters are in favor of the Doha Agreement. But the public is split over the chances for reconciliation in the aftermath of the Doha Agreement with 46% expecting the two sides to succeed in implementing the agreement and 49% expecting them to fail. Worse yet, only 16% believe that a reconciliation government will be formed within weeks while 46% believe it will be formed after a long time and 31% believe that it will never be formed. Moreover, only 30% believe that Gaza and West Bank parliamentary and presidential elections will take place as scheduled in May or a little after that, 57% believe they will not take place, and 13% do not know. It is worth mentioning that three months ago 43% believed that elections will indeed take place on schedule or a little after that. Optimism about the chances for reconciliation increases among women (51%) compared to men (40%), among illiterates (55%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (43%), among the religious (51%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among supporters of the peace process (49%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (38%), among farmers and housewives (62% and 51% respectively) compared to business men, professionals and employees (33%, 33%, and 41% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh and Hamas (51% and 48%) compared to supporters of third parties and those who do not intend to participate in new elections (33% and 40% respectively).

If a reconciliation government, headed by Abbas, is established, 57% expect, and 35% do not expect, the return of international boycott, financial sanctions and aid cuts.  Perhaps this is why a majority of 62% believe that a new reconciliation government should abide by the peace policy of Abbas and the PLO while only 20% believe it should abide by the peace policy of Hamas. Belief that a new reconciliation agreement should follow the peace policies of Abbas and the PLO increases among men (67%) compared to women (57%), among graduates of colleges and holders of BA degree (66% and 64% respectively) compared to illiterates (42%), among those who define themselves as somewhat religious (67%) compared to the religious (54%), among supporters of the peace process (69%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (46%), among farmers and professionals (75% and 70% respectively) compared to housewives (55%), and among supporters of Fateh (91%) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%).

Half of the public (49%) believes that internal disagreements between Hamas leaders regarding the Doha agreement and the appointment of Abbas as prime minister for the reconciliation government are major and fundamental disagreements while 43% believe they are minor and marginal. In the context of the role played by Qatar in facilitating the Doha Agreement, a large majority of 69% welcomes, and 27% do not welcome, a Qatari role in Palestinian affairs.   Findings also show that if parliamentary and presidential elections were to take place now, 40% expect Fateh to win and 23% expect Hamas to win. The rest expects others to win or does not know.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• In the context of the rocket war in Gaza and southern Israel, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank drops from 47% to 31% and positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 26% to 13%.
• Belief that corruption exists in the West Bank's PA institutions stands at 73% while belief that corruption exists in the institutions of the Gazan dismissed government stands at 62%.
• Perception that press freedom exists in the West Bank stands at 66% and in the Gaza Strip at 50%. 
• Perception of safety and security drops in the Gaza Strip from 69% to 47% and in the West Bank from 59% to 51%.
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government drops from 41% to 36% and the Fayyad government from 44% to 34%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas drops in the West Bank from 67% three months ago to 60% today.

13% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 70% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, 26% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 47% described them as bad or very bad. It seems clear that the rocket war between Israel and resistance groups, which took place just before the conduct of the poll, has been responsible for the decrease in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip. By contrast, 31% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 36% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stood at 47%.

73% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 62% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. In the context of the recent step by the PA in the West Bank to submit corruption cases to courts, we asked the public if it thinks the PA is serious about fighting corruption: 53% said it was serious and 43% said it was not serious. Moreover, 66% of the public say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 31% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 50% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 40% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Findings also show that 30% of the public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 22% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security deteriorates in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank due to the war in the Gaza Strip and due to the deterioration of security conditions in the West Bank. It stands today at 51% in the West Bank (compared to 59% three months ago) and 47% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 69% three months ago).

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands today at 36% and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government stands at 34%. These findings indicate a decline in the positive evaluation of the performance of the two governments compared to the situation three months ago when it stood at 41% for the Haniyeh government and 44% for the Fayyad government. The decline, in the case of the Hamas government, might be due to the position taken by Hamas during the recent war in the Gaza Strip. In the case of the Fayyad government, the decline might be attributed to the talk about increasing taxes and reducing public expenditure as means of dealing with the PA's financial crisis. It is worth noting in this context that the positive evaluation of the Fayyad government has declined considerably in the West Bank from 48% three months ago to 33% in this poll while the positive evaluation of the Hamas government declined in the Gaza Strip from 37% to 31% during the same period. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Hamas government is higher among residents of the West Bank (40%) compared to residents of the Gaza Strip (31%), among women (40%) compared to men (33%), among those over the age of 50 (40%) compare to youth between the ages of 18-28 (35%), among illiterates (43%) compared to holders of BA degree (33%), among those who define themselves as religious (45%) compared to the somewhat religious (31%), among those opposed to the peace process (55%) compared to those who support the peace process (32%), among housewives (40%) compared to students (26%), among those who do not use the internet or use it once or several times every week (40% and 39% respectively) compared to those who use it every day (27%), and among those who say they will vote for Hamas or those who have not decided to whom they will vote (78% and 42% respectively) compared to those who will vote for Fateh, third parties, and those who will not participate in future elections (19%, 29%, and 26% respectively).

By contrast, positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government increases among men (38%) compared to women (31%), among residents of rural areas (39%) compared to residents of cities and refugee camps (33% and 34% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (42%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (18%), among farmers (71%) compared to laborers and housewives (30% and 31% respectively), among those employed in the public sector (39%) compared to those in the private sector (33%), and among supporters of Fateh (57%) compared to supporters of Hamas (21%).

Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 43% and 24% respectively.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 55% while 43% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. Three months ago, these figures stood at 60% and 38% respectively. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands in this poll at 48% in the Gaza Strip and 60% in the West Bank. Three months ago, 67% of West Bankers were satisfied with the performance of the president. The decline in the West Bank might be due to the slowdown of the UN bid, a bid that had been responsible, three months ago, for the increase in public satisfaction with Abbas in the first place. It is also possible that the public is unhappy with Abbas for accepting to take part in the exploratory negotiations in Amman early in the year despite continued Israeli refusal to suspend settlement construction or accept the 1967 borders as a basis for negotiations. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas is higher among men (58%) compared to women (52%), among those over the age of 50 (67%) compared to youth between the ages of 18-28 (51%), among residents of towns and villages (67%) compared to residents of cities (52%), among illiterates (71%) compared to college graduates (42%), among supporters of the peace process (64%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (29%), among farmers and retirees (84% and 70% respectively) compared to housewives and laborers (52% and 53%), and among supporters of Fateh (87%) compared to supporters of Hamas (26%).

(4) Presidency and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections are to be held today, Abbas would receive 54% and Haniyeh 42%.
• If the competition was between Marwan  Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the first receives 64% and the second 32%
• If new legislative elections are to be held today, Fateh would receive 42%, Hamas 27%, all other electoral lists 10%, and 20% remain undecided.
• The strongest alternative Fateh candidate to Abbas is Marwan Barghouti and if Abbas and Marwan Barghouti did not participate in the elections, the strongest Fateh alternative is Saeb Erikat.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 42% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 61%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 55% and Haniyeh 37%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 55% and Haniyeh 40% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 42%. These results indicate a considerable increase in Haniyeh's popularity in the West Bank compared to the situation three months ago when he received only 33%. The increase in Haniyeh's popularity in the West Bank might be due to his visibility during his recent visits to Arab and Islamic countries and due to his support for the Syrian popular revolt. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter would receive 32% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 72%.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 27% say they would vote for Hamas and 42% say they would vote for Fateh, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 27% indicating a significant decline of eight percentage points compared to the situation three months ago. This decline might reflect public dissatisfaction with Hamas' behavior during the recent war in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% compared to 25% three months ago. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 46% and in the West Bank at 40%. These results indicate a decline in Fateh's popularity in the West Bank by four percentage points, probably due to government talk about a tax increase and a reduction in expenditure.

In a question about the favored Fateh candidate to replace Abbas as a president, assuming Abbas would not run, a majority of 55% selectedMarwan Barghouti, followed by Saeb Erekat, Nasir al Qidwa, and  Mahmud al Aloul (3% each).  Abu Mahir Ghnaim and Ahmad Qurie’ received 2% each, Azzam al Ahmad and Jibril al Rojoub received 1% each. When we asked the public to select a candidate from a list that did not includeMarwan Barghouti, a large part of the vote went to Saeb Erikat (18%) followed by Nasir al Qidwa (9%), Mahmud al Aloul, Ahmad Qurie' and AbuMahir Ghnaim (7% each), Azzam al Ahmad (5%), Jibril al Rojoub (4%), and finally Salim al Za'noun (2%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation and build a state and 32% believe it should be to obtain the right of return
• 28% believe the first problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment while 25% think it is the continuation of Israeli occupation and 23% think it is the absence of national unity. 

45% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 8% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. These findings reflect continued stalemate in the UN bid, a bid that pushed the statehood goal to 59% six months ago at the peak of the UN drive. This percentage dropped to 48% three months ago and dropped an additional three percentage points in this poll.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% of the public while 25% believes the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 23% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 14% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 9% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

(6) The Syrian Popular Revolt and Hamas' and Hezbollah's attitudes:

• 83% support the Syrian popular revolution against the Assad regime and 9% support the Assad regime.
• 42% believe that Hamas supports the Syrian popular revolution and 27% believe Hezbollah supports the Syria revolution.
• The public is divided over the issue of foreign intervention to topple the Assad regime: 50% oppose it and 46% support it.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public (83%) supports the Syrian demonstrators seeking to bring down the Syrian regime led by president Assad. Only 9% support the Assad regime. But only 42% of the public believe that Hamas supports the Syrian demonstrators while 23% believe the movement supports the Assad regime, 5% believe it supports both sides, 7% believe it supports neither side, and 24% say they do not know Hamas' position.  With regard to Hezbollah's position on the Syrian revolt, only 27% of the public believe that it supports the Syrian demonstrators while 44% believe it supports the Assad regime, 4% believe it supports both sides, 3% believe it supports neither side, and 21% say they do not know Hezbollah's position. But Palestinian public support for the Syrian popular revolt does not necessarily mean it supports external military intervention to bring down the Assad regime: 50% oppose such intervention and 46% support it.

In the context of the Syrian revolt and the talk about the departure of Hamas leaders from Damascus, findings show that the largest percentage of the public (41%) wants Hamas to make the Gaza Strip the headquarter for its leadership while 19% selected other locations: 19% selected Doha, 17% selected Cairo, and 14% selected Amman.  

(7) Peace Process

• 58% support and 35% oppose a return to exploratory talks with Israel without an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement construction and accept the lines of 1967 as a basis for negotiations.
• 48% believe that Abbas' decision few months ago to take part in exploratory talks with Israel in Amman without a settlement freeze or acceptance of the 1967 lines as a basis for negotiations was a right decision and 43% believe it was a mistake.
• Now after the suspension of peace negotiations, 76% support returning to the UNSC for recognition of a Palestinian state and 61% support launching a popular peaceful resistance. By contrast, only 40% support dissolving the PA, 39% support an armed intifada, and 29% support giving up the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years to be slim or non-existent while 31% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• 58% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion while 37% believe that the solution remains feasible as settlements can be dismantled after reaching an agreement.
• 56% support and 42% oppose the Arab (Saudi) peace initiative and 55% oppose and 43% support mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people.
• 76% are worried and 24% are not worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished by Israel.
• 57% believe that the hunger strike by Palestinian prisoner Khader Adnan will help speed up the process of closing the file on administrative detention and 39% do not believe that.
• Arab revolts will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause in the eyes of 51% and a negative impact in the eyes of 22%. 24% believe they will have no impact, positive or negative.

Findings show that 58% oppose and 35% support return to Palestinian-Israeli exploratory talks in the absence of a settlement freeze and an Israeli acceptance of the line of the 1967 as a basis for negotiation. Support for returning to the talks is higher in the West Bank (38%) compared to the Gaza Strip (31%), among women (40%) compared to men (31%), among the youth between the ages of 18-28 (40%) compared to those over 50 years of age (31%), among the illiterates (39%) compared to those with a BA degree (30%), among the somewhat religious (39%) compared to the religious (32%), among supporters of the peace process (43%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (22%), and among supporters of Fateh (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%).

Findings also show that 43% believe that president Abbas made a mistake when he agreed few months ago to take part in exploratory talks with Israel in Amman without an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement construction and accept the line of the 1967 borders as a basis for negotiations. 48% believe Abbas' decision was the right one.  Belief that Abbas made the right decision increases in the West Bank (52%) compared to the Gaza Strip (42%), among non refugees (52%) compared to refugees (45%), among residents of villages and towns (56%) compared to refugee camps and cities (44% and 47% respectively), among illiterates (53%) compared to holders of BA degree (45%), among those who define themselves as somewhat religious (54%) compared to the religious (41%), among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (27%), among farmers (72%) compared to professionals, employees, and students (42%, 46%, and 46% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%).

Findings also show that a majority of the public supports two alternatives to negotiations and oppose three others. 76% support returning to the UN to gain recognition of a Palestinian state and 61% support launching a non violent campaign against Israeli occupation. On the other hand, only 40% support dissolving the PA, 39% support launching a new armed intifada, and 29% support abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

Findings also show that 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years to be slim to non-existent while 31% believe the chances to be medium or high. Worse yet, 58% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to expanded settlement construction while only 37% believe the two state solution remains viable because settlements can be dismantled or evacuated once an agreement is reached. Belief that the two-state solution is no longer practical increases among holders of BA degree (65%) compared to illiterates (46%), among those opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to supporters of the peace process (52%), and among supporters of Hamas (65%) compared to supporters of Fateh (45%).

Findings show that a majority of 56% supports and 42% oppose the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative which calls for Arab recognition of Israel and for normalization of relations with it in return for its withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. On the other hand, 55% oppose and 43% support recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people.

Findings also show that more than three quarters (76%) of the Palestinian public are worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished. They also show that 67% believe that the hunger strike by administrative detainee Khader Adnan and the agreement reached to end that strike will contribute to speeding up the process of closing the file of administrative detention while 39% do not share this view. Finally, more than half of the Palestinians (51%) believe that Arab revolts will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause while 22% believe that they will have a negative impact. 24% believe they will have no impact, positive or negative. 

 (8) An attack on Iran

• 46% expect and 48% do not expect an Israeli military offensive against Iran in the coming months.
• If Israel does carry out a military strike on Iran, 85% expect such an attack to lead to a major regional war.

Findings show that the Palestinians are divided regarding the assessment of an Israeli military strike against Iran: 46% believe Israel will indeed strike Iran in the coming months and 48% believe it will not. But findings show a semi consensus (85%) that such a strike, if it takes place, would trigger a major regional war and 11% do not expect that..... Full Report

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (49)

Palestinian public is spilt regarding the resumption of direct negotiations with Israel and pessimistic regarding the chances for success, but if the talks do lead to a peace agreement, the public believes that a majority of the Palestinians will approve it in a referendum

19-21 September 2013

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 19-21 September 2013. The period before the poll witnessed two major developments: the return to Palestinian-Israeli direct bilateral negotiations and the removal by the Egyptian army of president Morsi, replacing him with a new president and a new government. The army also partially closed the Rafah crossing into Egypt and began to close down tunnels along the Egyptian borders with the Gaza Strip. This press release covers public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Rami al Hamdallah, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, return to negotiations, developments in Egypt, and others. Total size of the sample is 1261 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the Palestinian public is divided almost equally over President’s Abbas’ decision to resume direct bilateral negotiations with Israel. Moreover, despite the vital importance attached by the public to the issue of prisoners’ release, a larger percentage gives greater priority to the two combined issues of the 1967 borders and settlement freeze. Furthermore, the lack of enthusiasm for return to negotiations seems to be driven by the belief of a large majority that the current round of talks will fail just like previous rounds. But if negotiations do succeed and an agreement is reached, the public believes that a majority of the Palestinians will approve it in a referendum.

A majority does not expect to see any positive development during the period of negotiations; only a quarter to a third expects improvement in economic conditions, reduction in settlement activities, or decrease in the number of checkpoints and other Israeli restrictions in the West Bank. Perhaps because of all of this, a majority supports waging popular non-violent resistance, side by side with negotiations. Indeed, two thirds want to go now to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in order to stop settlement construction even if such a step leads to suspension of Israeli transfer of revenues to the PA and a halt to prisoners’ release. It is worth mentioning in this regard that on the 20^thanniversary of the Oslo Agreement, less than a third of the public views it as having served vital national interests of the Palestinian people with a majority believing that the accord has in fact damaged those interests and that the PA should stop implementing it. 

Findings also show that the latest developments in Egypt, including the change of the president and government, increase doubts about the future of reconciliation and reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Stip. Optimism about unity has in fact reached the lowest level since the split in 2007. Findings also show that two thirds of the public believe that the change in Egypt will weaken Hamas’ authority in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, perhaps due to the partial closure of the Rafah crossing, the Egyptian army’s closure of the tunnels, and Hamas’s reaction to the change in Egypt, the percentage of positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip has decreased significantly. Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Ismail Haniyeh has also dropped. But findings do not show a decrease in the likely vote for Hamas in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip if elections are held today.

We asked the public about its views regarding developments in Egypt and Syria and regarding relations with Jordan. Findings show that about two thirds view change in Egypt negatively while less than a quarter sees it as good for Palestinians. Perhaps this reaction is driven by the fact that change in Egypt has led to the closure of the tunnels and the Rafah crossing leading to substantial hardships. On Syria, we found that despite the belief of the majority that the Assad regime was the one that used the chemical weapons against Syrian civilians, two-thirds oppose an American military strike against the Assad forces. The opposition to the strike might be due to the belief of many Palestinians that the strike would target Syria more than the Assad regime. Finally, with regard to relations with Jordan, findings show a reduction in support for a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation compared to the level of support obtained three months ago. It should be noted that support for the confederation increased last June in the aftermath of the signing of the holy places agreement, an agreement that was supported by a majority of the public at that time.

(1) Presidential and legislative elections:

• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 51% and Haniyeh 42%.
• If the presidential contest was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 58% and the latter 35%.
• If the contest was between Barghouti, Haniyeh, and Abbas, the first receives 35%, the second 33%, and the third 27%.
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 38%, Hamas 31%, all other electoral lists combined 10%, and 22% are undecided.

​

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 51% and Haniyeh 42% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 63%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 49% and Haniyeh 44%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 45% and Haniyeh 50% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 55% and Haniyeh 37%.  If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 58% and the latter would receive 35% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 71%. In our June poll Barghouti received 57% of the vote and Haniyeh 36%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (35%) followed by Haniyeh (33%), and Abbas (27%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 75%. In our previous poll last June, the results were identical to the current findings. 

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 38% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% and in the West Bank at 25%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 38% and in the West Bank at 39%. These results indicate a decrease in support for Fatah and stability in the vote for Hamas.    

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops to 21% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains at 29%
• 79% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank and 66% believe it exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip
• Only 31% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear and only 24% believe people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the dismissed Hamas government in the Gaza Strip without fear.
• Percentages of safety and security in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are equal, standing at 55%
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 36% and positive evaluation of the performance of Al Hamdallah government stands at 29% 
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 49%.

​

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops dramatically from 36% three months ago to 21% in this poll while 55% say conditions are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged compared to three months ago standing today at 29%. But the percentage of those who believe conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad increases from 37% to 44% during the same period.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 79% in this poll. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 66%.  Moreover, 20% say there is, and 41% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 16% say there is, and 33% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 24% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55% and in the Gaza Strip at 55%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 64% in the Gaza Strip and 56% in the West Bank.  But findings also show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 26%. Last June these percentages stood at 42% and 27% respectively. 

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 36%.Three months ago it stood at41%. Positive evaluation of the government of Rami al Hamdallah in the West Bank stands today at 29%.  Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas remains unchanged at 49%. Dissatisfaction with the president performance stands today at 48%.  

(3) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the chances for reconciliation and reunification stands today at its lowest point: 12%
• Majority believes that developments in Egypt weakens the chances for reconciliation and weakens Hamas’ authority in the Gaza Strip
• Large majorities believe that reconciliation will not succeed as long as restrictions are imposed on Hamas members in the West Bank and Fatah members in the Gaza Strip or without an agreement on the date for elections
• 77% support continued PA payment of salaries for Gaza public sector employees
• 47% support holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if separation continues for a long time

Given the developments in Egypt and the ups and downs in the Fateh-Hamas dialogue, percentage of optimism about the chances for reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip drops to the lowest level since the split in 2007, standing today at 12%. The belief that unity is impossible and that two separate entities will emerge increases from 36% three months ago to 41% in this poll. 42% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time. 57% believe that the latest development in Egypt reduces the chances for reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 14% believe it increases those chances and 25% believe it makes no difference. 67% believe that the Egyptian developments will weaken Hamas’ authority in the Gaza Strip while 10% believe they will strengthen it and 20% believe they will leave no impact on that authority.

We asked respondents about conditions under which they believe reconciliation cannot succeed. About three quarters believe that reconciliation will not succeed without first ending the restrictions on freedoms enjoyed by supporters of Hamas in the West Bank and a similar percentage (75%) believes that it will not succeed without ending restrictions on freedoms enjoyed by supporters of Fatah in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 67% say it will not succeed without first agreeing on an election date; 65% say it will not succeed if Hamas continues to reject agreements signed by the PLO with Israel; 63% say it will not succeed if security coordination with Israel in the West Bank continues; another 61% say it will not succeed if the PA continues to recognize Israel and the Oslo agreements; and 56% say it will not succeed as along as Hamas insists on keeping its al Qassam armed wing in the Gaza Strip.

The largest percentage (36%) believes that the PA, with its parts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 30% believe that it is an accomplishment for the Palestinian people. Furthermore, 15% believe that the PA in the West Bank is an accomplishment while the PA in the Gaza Strip is a burden. By contrast, a similar percentage (13%) believes that the PA in the Gaza Strip is an accomplishment while the PA in the West Bank is a burden.

56% regard the Gaza Strip as an Israeli-occupied territory, just like the West Bank. But 19% consider it a liberated area and 25% consider it semi-liberated and semi-occupied. Belief that the Strip is liberated or semi liberated increases in the Gaza Strip, reaching 58%, and decreases in the West Bank, standing at 35%.

More than three quarters of the public (77%) support the continued payment of salaries to Gaza Strip employees who used to work for the PA before the split in 2007. 20% believe that the PA should stop the payment. But the public is split over the necessity of holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if the current disunity continued for a long time: 47% believe it to be necessary to hold such separate elections and 50% believe it to be unnecessary.  

(4) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be the most vital Palestinian goal and 29% believe that obtaining of the right of return should be the most vital goal.
• 28% view the spread of poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 23% view the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split as the most serious problem. 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 2 and 4 June 2016. The period before the poll witnessed a significant decline in the number of incidents of confrontations and stabbings directed against Israelis. But a bombing attack on an Israeli bus took place in Jerusalem in mid-April. The period also witnessed meetings in Cairo between Hamas leaders and Egyptian officials and in Doha between Fatah and Hamas representatives. Data collection took place while the Paris Peace Conference was in session with the participation of representatives from more than 20 states. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reconciliation, Palestinian-Israeli confrontations, the French Initiative, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Results of the second quarter of 2016 point out to three main findings: (1) half of the public believes that the current Palestinian confrontations, or al habba al sha’biyya, has come to an end, support for stabbing attacks continues to decline, and the public continues to reduce its expectations from the current confrontations; (2)  by contrast, half of the public expresses support for the French Initiative that aims at providing an international backing for a revival of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, but public expectations of success for the initiative are much smaller than the support ; and, (3) there is a limited decline in support for Hamas and its presidential candidate, Ismail Haniyeh, despite continued demand for Abbas’ resignation from two thirds of the public.

Findings show a continued and significant drop, particularly in the West Bank, in support for stabbing attacks. The highest percentage of support for such attacks was registered six months ago before it considerably declined three months ago. Furthermore, findings show a continued decline in public expectations regarding a possible escalation of the current limited popular confrontations to an armed intifada; today, a 

quarter thinks such a development is likely. Similarly, findings show a decline, dropping from more than half to less than a third, in the percentage of those who think that if the current confrontations continue as they are now, they would contribute to achieving national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Decline, particularly in the West Bank, has also been found in the percentage of those who believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it would help Palestinians achieve national rights and in the percentage of those who support ending Palestinian implementation of PA obligations under the Oslo agreement. Nonetheless, a majority continues to believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it will help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Perhaps it is for this reason that a majority continues to support a return to an armed intifada. Indeed, more than two thirds supported the Jerusalem bus bombing attack which took place in mid-April and injured 20 Israelis.

If new presidential elections are held today in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh would do better than Abbas but findings show that the gap between the two narrows from eleven to five percentage points. Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular Palestinian figure. If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah is likely to do a little better than Hamas. It seems that the declining Palestinian-Israeli confrontations and the focus on international diplomacy in recent weeks have influenced the domestic balance of power in a manner that favors Abbas while somewhat weakening Hamas. Moreover, it is possible that the optimism regarding improved relations between Egypt and Hamas, which might have improved Hamas standing in the past, has now somewhat faded as the Rafah border crossing has remained essentially closed during most of the last three months.  Moreover, a majority is convinced that another Gaza war will erupt in the near future. On the other hand, Abbas, Fatah and the PA remain highly vulnerable as two thirds demand Abbas resignation, Fatah has not gained any additional support during the last three months, and a majority of Palestinians believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people.

(1) The French Initiative:

• 50% support and 41% oppose the French Initiative.
• 29% expect the French Initiative to succeed and 59% expect it to fail.

We asked the public about its support for the French Initiative. The initiative we presented to respondents as one that “calls for the formation of an international support group for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the holding of an international peace conference that would seek a settlement based on the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative in accordance with a specific time frame.” 50% of the respondents supported and 41% opposed the initiative. Support reached 46% in the West Bank compared to 56% in the Gaza Strip. Support for the French Initiative is higher also among those who intend to vote for Fatah, third parties, and those who have not yet decided to whom they will vote (68%, 56%, and 55% respectively) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas and those who do not intend to participate in the election (32% and 41% respectively), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (59% and 51% respectively) compared to the religious (47%), among supporters of the peace process (59%) compared those who are opposed to the peace process (30%), among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (46%), among farmers, the unemployed, and employees (62%, 57%, and 53% respectively) compared to students and housewives (46% and 48% respectively), among those working in the public sector (54%) compared to those who work in the private sector (49%).

We also asked respondents to indicate their expectations regarding the success or failure of the French Initiative in assisting the goal of reaching Palestinian-Israeli peace. 29% expected success and 59% expected failure. Here too there was a significant difference between residents of the West Bank compared to residents of the Gaza Strip: 39% of Gazans, compared to only 22% of West Bankers, expected success.

(2) Palestinian-Israeli confrontations:

• Half of the public believes that the current popular confrontation, or Habba Sha’biyya, is over and the other half believes it is still going on.
• Support for knifing attacks continue to decline, but two thirds support the Jerusalem bus bombing.
• Expectations that the current confrontation will develop into an armed intifada continue to diminish.
• 54% support return to armed intifada.

The public is divided into two equal halves regarding the end of the current popular confrontation, or al habba al sha’biyya: 48% believe it has stopped and 48% believe it has not stopped.  In the West Bank, 49% believe it has ended and 46% believe it has not. In the Gaza Strip, 46% say it has ended and 51% say it has not. The percentage of those who think it has ended increases among those between the ages of 40 and 49 years (53%) compared to those between the ages of 18 and 22 (42%), among those who intend to vote for Fatah, third party voters, and the undecided (56%, 53%, and 51% respectively) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas and those who do not intend to participate in the election (36% and 46% respectively), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (66% and 49% respectively) compared to the religious (44%), among supporters of the peace process (54%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (39%), and among merchants and the unemployed (56% and 53% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, laborers, and students (29%, 45%, 45%, and 46% respectively).

Findings also show that support for use of knives in the current confrontations with Israel continues to decline in this poll, dropping from 58% three months ago to 51%. Support for knifing attacks in the Gaza Strip stands at 75% and in the West Bank at 36%. Three months ago, support among West Bankers for knifing attacks stood at 44% and among Gazans at 82%. Nonetheless, support for the Jerusalem bus bombing attack which took place in mid-April and cause more than 20 Israeli injuries stands at 65%; only 31% say they oppose this bombing attack. Support for the bus bombing attack is higher in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (59%), among residents of refugee camps and residents of cities (72% and 67% respectively) compared to residents of villages and towns (54%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (76%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (55%), among voters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 62% respectively) compared to Fatah voters (53%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (80%) compared to supporters of the peace process (57%), among refugees (70%) compared to non-refugees (62%), among holders of BA degree (70%) compared to illiterates (49%), among merchants and students (73% and 72% respectively) compared to the retired, laborers, and farmers (34%, 57%, and 60% respectively), among the unmarried (70%) compared to the married (65%).

With regard to expectations, 25% believe that the current confrontations will develop into a new armed intifada, 17% believe they will develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, and 13% believe they will develop in both directions. By contrast, 29% believe the confrontation will stay as they are now and 13% believe they will gradually dissipate. Three months ago, 29% said that the current confrontations will develop into an armed intifada.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 54% support a return to an armed intifada; 75% support joining more international organizations; 56% support a popular non-violent resistance; 43% support the dissolution of the PA. Three months ago, 56% supported return to armed intifada. In the West Bank, current level of support for an armed intifada stands at 51% (compared to 52% three months ago). 58% of the public (68% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 65% (75% in the Gaza Strip and 59% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Moreover, 41% of the public (52% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 54% said that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Finally, findings indicate that 32% of the public (41% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, they would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 43% (54% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not.

When comparing the level of support of various parties for the current confrontations, Hamas comes on top with 66% of the public believing that it supports them, followed by Fatah (49%). By contrast, only 26% say president Abbas supports the confrontations. 

(3) The future of the Oslo agreement and the future of security coordination:

• 56% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement.
• Only 27% believe that president Abbas is serious about abandoning the Oslo agreement.
• Similarly, only 27% believe that president Abbas is serious about ending security coordination with Israel.
• 46% say that terminating the Oslo agreement would lead to PA collapse and the return of the Israeli “civil administration.”

56% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 63% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 30% opposed it. Support for the abandonment of the Oslo agreement stands at 57% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip. Support for abandoning the Oslo agreement is higher among men (63%) compared to women (50%), among Hamas voters, the undecided, and voters of third parties (63%, 60%, and 58% respectively) compared to Fatah voters (47%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (48%), among holder of BA degree (62%) compared to the illiterates (51%), among farmers, employees, merchants, and the retired (87%, 65%, 61%, and 60% respectively) compared to students and housewives (46% and 49% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (73%) compared to those who work in the private sector (61%).

When asked about the seriousness of the PA leadership regarding abandoning the Oslo agreement, 67% of the public indicated that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 27% think he is serious. Three months ago, 65% expressed the view that the president is not serious.  Similarly, we asked the public about its assessment of the seriousness of the Palestinian leadership regarding its intention to suspend security coordination with Israel in light of the Israeli announcement that the IDF will not stop its incursions into Palestinian cities. More than two-thirds (68%) indicated that the PA leadership is not serious while only 27% indicated it believes the PA leadership is serious.

We told the public that a Palestinian abandonment of the Oslo agreement might lead to one of two outcomes: the collapse of the Palestinian authority and the return of the Israeli “civil administration” or alternatively an Israeli suspension of its settlement activities and return to serious negotiations with the Palestinian side. We asked the public what it thought was the most likely outcome: 46% selected the collapse of the PA while 41% selected the Israeli suspension of its settlement activities.

(4) Palestinian Elections:

• 65% want president Abbas to resign and 31% want him to stay in office.
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 43% and the latter 48%.
• In presidential elections between Abbas, Haniyeh, and Marwan Barghouti, the first receives 20%, the second 35%, and the third 40%.
• If parliamentary elections took place today, Fatah receives 34% of the vote, Hamas 31%, and all other electoral lists combined 9%; 26% say they have not decided yet.

65% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. These results are almost identical to those obtained in our previous poll three months ago. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 64% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 30% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh;  Rami al Hamdallah receive 6%; Khalid Mishal, and Mustapha Barghouti and Mohammad Dahlan receive 5% each; and Saeb Erekat and Salam Fayyad receives 2% each. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% which is similar to the level of satisfaction we obtained three months ago.  Level of satisfaction with Abbas are identical in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 48% (compared to 52% three months ago) and the latter 43% (compared to 41% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 44% three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 49% (compared to 54% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 41% (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh 47% (compared to 50% three months ago).  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 20%, Barghouti 40% and Haniyeh 35%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 75% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 34% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 26% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 33% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 33% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 35% (compared to 34% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 34% three months ago).

(5) Domestic Conditions:

• Perception of security stands at 44% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank.
• In the Gaza Strip, percentage of those wishing to emigrate stands at 45% and in the West Bank at 22%.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands today at 80%.
• 52% believe that the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 41% believe it is an asset.
• More than three quarters of the public oppose the suspension of PLO financial payment to the PFLP and the DFLP.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 12% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 44%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands also at 44%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 47% and in the West Bank at 39%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago 48% of Gazans and 21% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate. The largest percentage (40%) of those who seek to emigrate indicates that the main motivation is search for jobs; 23% say difficult conditions imposed by Israeli occupation forces them to seek to emigrate; 12% say it is the lack of security and 9% say it is the lack of freedoms and democracy that push them out.

In an open-ended question, we asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al-Jazeera TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Hamas’ al Aqsa Palestine TV at 18%, Palestine TV and Maan-Mix at 17% each, Palestine Today (Filasteen al Youm) at 7%, Al Arabiya at 6%, al Quds TV at 4%, and al Mayadeen at 2%. 

We asked the public about its impressions regarding corruption, freedom of the press, the ability to criticize government and if the PA is a burden or an asset for the Palestinian people: Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%.  17% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 16% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. Finally, a majority of 52% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while only 41% view it as an asset. Percentage of those who think the PA is a burden is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip (53%) compared to the West Bank (51%). It is also higher among residents of refugee camps (60%) compared to residents of villages and residents of cities (45% and 52% respectively), among voters of Hamas, third parties, and those who do not intend to participate in the election (79%, 60%, and 60% respectively) compared to votes of Fatah (18%), among the religious (56%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (38% and 49% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to supporters of the peace process (39%), among holders of BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (41%), among farmers, merchants, laborers, and the retired (63%, 59%, 58%, and 57% respectively) compared to professionals and employees (46% and 48% respectively), and among those who work in the private sector (57%) compared to those who work in the public sector (43%).  

An overwhelming majority of 76% indicates that it does not agree with the decision apparently taken by the PA president to withhold financial support from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; only 16% agree with that decision.

(6) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government, and the possibility of another Gaza war:

• Optimism regarding reconciliation stands at 36% and pessimism at 60%.
• 28% are satisfied and 63% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• Only 19% blame Hamas for the bad performance of the reconciliation government
• 71% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the Gaza public sector under the former Hamas government.
• 65% want the reconciliation government to supervise security and police services in the Gaza Strip.
• 55% believe that there is a high probability of a new war against the Gaza Strip in the near future.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 36% and pessimism at 60%. Three months ago optimism stood at 38% and pessimism at 59%.  28% say they are satisfied and 63% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 66% and in the West Bank at 62%. We asked the public who is responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government. Findings show that belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 19% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) while 35% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 15% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

71% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salaries of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (69%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salaries of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government. In return, 65% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; only 26% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  Similarly, 75% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the pervious Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 21% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

We asked the public if it believes that there might be a real chance to open the Rafah Crossing on a normal regular schedule now after the meetings in Cairo between Hamas and the Egyptian officials and in light of the Doha meetings between Fatah and Hamas officials. 55% said there is a chance for that and 39% said there was no real chance for that. In light of recent talk about a possible Gaza war, we asked the public about its expectations: 55% said the prospects for such war in the near future are high or very high and 40% said the prospects are low or very low. A majority of 57% of Gazans believe the prospects for war are high or very high.

(7) The Arab World, war in Syria, ISIS, and US elections:

• 78% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own problems and that Palestine is no longer the Arabs’ principle cause.
• On Syrian, 40% are in favor of the Syrians Free Army, 18% favor Assad, and 5% favor radical Islamists such as ISIS.
• 88% see ISIS as an extreme group that does not represent Islam and 79% support the war against it.
• 70% believe that there is no difference between Clinton and Trump.

78% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 20% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.  In fact, 59% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 30% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

In light of the escalating conflict in Syria and the emergence of three main parties to the conflict, we asked the public for its view on the party it views as the more preferable or the one it views as the least harmful. The largest percentage (40%) chose the Free Syrian army, 18% chose Bashar Asad and his army, and 5% chose the extreme religious opposition, such as ISIS. 23% said they do not like any of the three parties.

An overwhelming majority of 88% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 8% believe it does represent true Islam. 4% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 16% (compared to 3% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 79% support and 18% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

We asked the public about the US elections and which presidential candidate, Hilary Clinton or Donald Trump, it viewed best for the Palestinians. A large majority (70%) said there is no difference between the two candidates, while 12% said Clinton is better and 7% said Trump is better.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% view Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state as the top most important Palestinian goal and 32% think the most vital goal is the right of return.
• 38% view poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 31% think it is occupation and settlement construction.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 38% of the pubic; 31% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and; 10% believe it is the spread of corruption in public institutions.

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll

In the Backdrop of the Gaza Takeover by Hamas, Israelis and Palestinians Share Grim Expectations of the other Side’s Leadership and the Chances for the Resumption of Negotiations

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between June 12 and 20, 2007. The data for these surveys were collected while the Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip took place. The evaluation of the reported figures must take into consideration this context. 

The joint poll examined the two publics’ support of a renewed cease fire agreement between Israel and the Palestinian factions and several ideas to promote it including the deployment of international forces on the borders of the Gaza strip, and the security plan proposed by US Secretary of State Rice. In addition we examined assessments of the Arab League (Saudi) plan, the Israeli leadership's degrees of freedom to negotiate with various configurations of a Palestinian government, and an Israeli-Syrian settlement.

• ·        89% of Israelis and 76% of Palestinians believed at the time of the survey that armed confrontations between the two sides will continue. 47% of Israelis and 51% of Palestinians believed that negotiations will resume. However only 31% of Palestinians believed it is possible to reach a compromise settlement with the current Israeli leadership.  Among Israelis, 42% believed that it is possible to reach such a settlement with Abu Mazin, and 25% - with a Palestinian national unity government.
• ·        63% of the Palestinians support the security plan proposed by the American Secretary of State last month, compared to 45% among Israelis who support it.  The plan requests from the Palestinians the enforcement of law and order, fighting terrorism, preventing rocket attacks on Israel, and preventing smuggling through tunnels. It requests the Israelis to open the crossings of Rafah, Kerem Shalom, and Karni on a regular and permanent basis, to allow passage of people and goods between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and remove checkpoints in the West Bank. Presumably Israelis’ lukewarm support of the plan has been driven by fears of renewed violent attacks by Hamas following its takeover of Gaza if checkpoints are removed and Gazacrossings are open, echoing Israeli security authorities’ concerns.
• ·        Regarding another closely related issue, the deployment of international forces along the borders of Gaza, Egypt and Israel, in order to prevent arm smuggling and rocket launching on Israel, a considerable majority among Israelis (65%) support this step, while 35% of the Palestinians support it. Three years ago in June 2004, 53% of the Israelis and 60% among Palestinians supported the deployment of such an armed force. 

Given the blowing of war winds in the region and speculations about a new war in the summer we attempted to asses the impact of these speculations on Israelis’ expectations and attitudes toward the use of force versus peaceful means to cope with threats that Israel faces.

• ·        46% of the Israelis believe that another war can be expected this summer while 42% do not expect such a war.
• ·        15% of the Israelis also believe that a ground operation in the Gaza strip can prevent a coming war in the summer while 49% believe that such an operation will rather promote war. 

And Given the difficulties the Palestinians confront in their domestic scene, we attempted to assess how the Palestinian public views its options regarding the future of the PA, possible confederation with Jordan, and the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years.

• ·        41% of the Palestinians want to dissolve the PA and replace it with an international trusteeship (26%) or return to full Israeli occupation (16%). 49% oppose the dissolution of the PA.
• ·        42% support the establishment of a confederation with Jordan and 52% oppose that.
• ·        70% believe the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are low or nonexistent and 26% believe the chances are medium or high.

The joint poll further examined Israeli and Palestinian assessments of the capability of both leaderships to reach a political settlement these days. 

Total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 14 and 20, 2007. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 598 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic, or Russian between June 12 and 19, 2007. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

Main Findings 

(A) Cease Fire Agreement and the renewal of the political process 

• ·        At the time of the joint poll, Israelis and Palestinians do not hold high hopes regarding the resumption of negotiations. Only 17% of Palestinians and 9% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop. 34% of the Palestinians and 38% of the Israelis think that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue. 41% of the Palestinians and 51% of the Israelis believe that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations
• ·        70% of the Israelis believe that neither side came out a winner in the current round of the conflict, 12% believe that the Palestinians won, 10% believe that Israel won and 5% believe that both won.
• ·        9% of the Israelis also believe that Israel will gain more from the recent cease fire while 33% believe Palestinians will gain more, 40% believe both will gain and 16% think neither side will gain.
• ·        As to steps which can help to sustain a cease fire, 35% of the Palestinians and 65% of the Israelis support a proposal to deploy international armed forces in the Gaza Strip, especially on the border with Israel andEgypt to prevent arm smuggling and rocket launching on Israel. 61% and 29% oppose this proposal respectively.
• ·        Similarly, 63% of the Palestinians and 45% of the Israelis support the American security plan, which was presented to the Palestinians and Israelis last month. The plan requests from the Palestinians the enforcement of law and order, fighting terrorism, preventing rocket attacks on Israel, and preventing smuggling through tunnels. It requests from the Israelis to open the Rafah, Kerem Shalom, and Karni crossings on a regular and permanent basis, allow passage of people and goods between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and remove checkpoints in the West Bank. 36% of the Palestinians and 52% of the Israelis oppose this plan.
• ·        40% of the Israelis support and 57% oppose the release of Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiations with him in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians.
• ·        60% of the Israelis support negotiations between Israel and Abu Mazin over a final status settlement.
• ·        Despite these levels of support only 42% of the Israelis believe that it is possible to reach nowadays a compromise settlement between Olmert and Abu Mazin. In December 2006, 46% believed so.
• ·        Similarly, 50% of the Israelis support and 46% oppose negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which includes Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement. However only 25% of Israelis believe that it is possible, and 70% think it is impossible to reach a compromise settlement with the Palestinian national unity government. In March 2007, 33% believed this is possible. This drop in Israelis’ optimism regarding the chances to reach an agreement between the two leaderships is likely a reaction of Israelis to the leadership crisis in the PA, following the recent events in Gaza.
• ·        As to Palestinians, 31% believe it is possible and 65% think it is impossible to reach a compromise settlement with the current Israeli leadership.
• ·        A majority of 60% among Palestinians and 64% of the Israelis agrees with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict, there would be mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. 38% and 30% respectively disagree. 51% of the Palestinians and 48% of the Israelis believe that a majority in their public supports such a proposal, and 37% and 36% respectively think the majority opposes it. However both publics are only partly aware of the majority support for such a step in the other side. Only 43% of the Palestinians and 35% of the Israelis think the other side public supports this step.
• ·        Despite the ongoing internal strife in the PA, these levels of support in a mutual recognition of identity did not change much. In December 2006, 63% of the Israelis and 58% of the Palestinians supported such a step.
• ·        Given the ongoing events, both publics are quite pessimistic regarding the chances for such a mutual recognition (marking support in a two state solution) to materialize. Only 26% of the Palestinians and 39% of the Israelis believe that there are medium or high chances that a Palestinian State will be established in the next 5 years. 70% of the Palestinians and 59% among Israelis believe that these chances are nil or low.
• ·        66% of the Palestinians and 43% among Israelis believe that a political settlement will never be reached or only in many generations to come, 13% and 33% respectively think it will come in the next generation or next decade, and only 13% Palestinians and 18% Israelis think it will come in the next few years.  

(B) The Arab league plan and negotiations with Syria 

• ·        In addition to the Palestinian arena, we examined in the poll both publics’ attitudes regarding the Arab League (Saudi) plan, and Israelis’ attitudes toward a settlement with Syria over the Golan Heights.
• ·        As to the Arab League (Saudi) plan, and after briefing our respondents on its essential elements, 36% of the Israelis and 66% of the Palestinians support the plan compared to 59% and 31% respectively who oppose it.
• ·        When we framed the reference to the refugees issue in terms of President Clinton’s approach to the issue, support for the Saudi plan decreased among Palestinians and slightly increased among Israelis. Under this framing 46% of the Palestinians and 39% of the Israelis support the Saudi plan while 49% and 52% respectively oppose it.
• ·        47% among Israelis believe that Israel should and 50% think that Israel should not enter negotiations with Syria's President Assad on full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement
• ·        25% of the Israelis support and 60% oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria.
• ·        Israelis’ support for the return of the Golan Heights increases noticeably when presented with the proposal to demilitarize the Golan Heights and to turn it into a recreational park under Syria's sovereignty, but administered jointly with Israel. Israeli citizens would be allowed to enter the park freely for vacation and recreational purposes. Under these terms, 31% support and 56% oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement. 

(C) Other Conflict Related and Conflict Resolution Issues 

• Given the current difficulties confronting the Palestinians, we examined Palestinian public perceptions of various threats and options:
• ·        A majority of Palestinians (56%) believe that the most serious threat confronting the Palestinians today is infighting and lawlessness, followed by poverty (21%), Israeli occupation and settlements (12%) and finally international boycott and sanctions (10%).
• ·        A large percentage (41%) of the Palestinians wants the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority but a larger percentage (49%) opposes that. The percentage of those in favor of dissolving the PA is divided among those who want it replaced with international trusteeship (26%) and those who want it replaced with a return to full Israeli occupation (16%).
• ·        Similarly, 42% of the Palestinians support the establishment of a confederation with Jordan while 52% oppose that. The percentage of those in favor the confederation solution is divided among those who want it now (25%) and those who want it only later after the establishment of a Palestinian state (17%).
• ·        Overwhelming majority of 82% of the Palestinians view acts such as the kidnapping of foreigners, the burning of internet cafe’s, and the bombing of foreign schools as criminal deserving condemnation while only 3% view them as nationalistic and deserving support. In the Gaza Strip, 85% view these acts as criminal and 2% as nationalistic.
• ·        Given the blowing of war winds in the region and speculations about a new war in the summer 46% of the Israelis believe that another war can be expected this summer while 42% do not expect such a war. We attempted to asses Israelis’ attitudes toward the use of force versus peaceful means to cope with threats that Israel faces. Israelis were presented with a list of possible steps Israel could take and were asked to assess the potential of each step to promote or rather prevent a war in the summer. The table below presents Israelis’ assessments of the possible outcomes of these steps.

• Of all the negotiation options facing Israel these days, the most preferred one is negotiations over the Saudi plan, with 31% of the Israelis chose preferring it most. Second stands negotiations with the Palestinians on a compromise agreement, with 25% preferring it most. Only 17% prefer most negotiations with Assad and Syria over the Golan Heights in return for full peace.17% do not prefer any of these options. 

(D) Palestinian Domestic Balance of Power 

• ·        If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fateh would receive 43% of the vote, the same percentage it received three months ago in our March survey. But support for Change and Reform (Hamas) drops from 37% three months ago to 33% in this survey. Support for all other third parties combined stands at 12% and 13% remain undecided.
• ·         If new presidential elections are held today and the only two candidates were Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, 40% would not participate in these elections. Among those who would participate, 49% would vote for Abbas and 42% for Haniyeh. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, non participation would drop to 31%. Among those who would participate, 59% would vote for Marwan Barghouti and 35% for Haniyeh. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti wins against Haniyeh by 55% to 41%. 

(E) General mood and attitudes toward democracy 

• ·        90% of the Palestinians describe current Palestinian conditions as very bad or bad while only 6% describe them as good or very good. 28% of the Palestinians say they want to immigrate to other countries and 23% say they are not proud of being Palestinians. As to Israelis, 44% think Israel’s general condition these days is bad or very bad, 38% believe it to be so-so and 17% describe Israel’s condition these days as good or very good.
• ·        In the backdrop of the internal strife in the Gaza strip 54% of the Palestinians and 85% of the Israelis see democracy in the Palestinian Authority as a failed system that cannot be implemented in Palestine. 41% of the Palestinians and 10% of the Israelis see democracy rather as a successful system that is suited for Palestine.
• ·        Nonetheless, 42% of the Palestinians who believe that democracy is a failed system believe that the Palestinian Authority should maintain that democratic system despite its problems, while 45% think that it should abandon it and adopt a non democratic system. 2% of the Israelis think that the current status of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority is very good or good, 12% believe it is so-so, and 84% think it is bad or very bad.   

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (45)

Mixed news for the PA: satisfaction with Abbas, Fateh, and Fayyad are down, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank is lower than positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip,  and three quarters believe protests in the West Bank will continue and escalate, but about 70% side with Abbas in opposing return to negotiations before Israel freezes settlement construction and accepts the 1967 lines with swaps as a base for negotiations and almost three quarters support a UN bid seeking international recognition of Palestinian Statehood

13-15 September 2012

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-15 September 2012. This poll was conducted during a period that witnessed significant price hikes, particularly fuel prices, and right after the eruption of widespread protests in the West Bank that started in early September but quieted down after the Fayyad government restored the older prices of diesel and gas. In the Gaza Strip, a young unemployed man burned himself but no mass protests took place. The same period witnessed incidents of lawlessness in northern West Bank, including the assassination of a colonel in the Preventive Security force in Jenin. Preparation for local elections continued in the West Bank while reconciliation efforts stalemated with Abbas announcing that no reconciliation government will be formed until Hamas allowed the Election Commission to resume its work in the Gaza Strip and agreed to hold general elections, two conditions that Hamas rejected. Under these conditions, Fayyad proposed holding parliamentary elections in the West Bank. During this period, the PLO announced that it intends to seek UN recognition of Palestine as a non member state but did not specify a date for the request. The period witnessed continued settlers' violence against Palestinians and threats by Israeli foreign minister against Abbas. But with the end of Ramadan, Israeli Civil Administration issued more than one hundred thousand permits allowing Palestinians from the West Bank to visit Jerusalem and Israel. It is worth noting that president Abbas went into a visit to India during the worst days of West Bank mass protests. This survey covers Palestinian attitudes regarding West Bank protests, general and local elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today, the peace process, and other topics. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The third quarter of 2012 brings bad news for the PA in the West Bank. Positive evaluation of West Bank conditions drops significantly. Similarly, positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government drops sharply. Moreover, Fateh's popularity drops and satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas decreases. By contrast, positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises. Indeed, for the first time since the split in 2007, a larger percentage of Palestinians give more positive evaluation to conditions in the Gaza Strip than to conditions in the West Bank. It is clear that the wave of price hikes and the decisions taken by the Fayyad government, in raising prices of fuel, are responsible for this sudden shift in public attitudes and evaluations. Indeed, findings show that two thirds of the public say that the current difficult economic situation forces them to demonstrate and protest while more than three quarters of the public expect the current wave of protests to continue and escalate. More than half of the public (55%) expect the protests to spread into the Gaza Strip.

In the midst of this environment, pessimism regarding reconciliation increases with the percentage of those expecting the split to become permanent doubling in 18 months, since March 2011. Findings also show that two-thirds reject the idea of holding legislative elections in the West Bank only, believing that such elections would further consolidate the split. But a majority of Palestinians accept president Abbas' position that conditions reconciliation on a Hamas consent to holding elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  

The good news for PA lies in public support for its UN bid and for its positions on negotiation with Israel. Findings show strong opposition (about 70%) to return to negotiations with Israel before it freezes settlement construction and accepts the 1967 lines with swap as a base for negotiations. Despite the realization of a large majority that going to the UN would bring about suspension of financial assistance and transfers from the US, Israel, and Europe, about 70% support such a step. But the public does not want a symbolic step; instead, it wants Palestinian assertion of sovereignty over the so-called "Area C" and over the border crossings with Jordan. Finally, findings show a huge gap between public assessment of the PLO's and the PA's long term goals and those of Israel. For the first time, we asked the public to assess the long term goals of the PLO and the PA. Specifically, we asked the public to tell us if it thinks the Palestinian long term goal is to recover the lands occupied in 1967 or alternatively to recover the land of 1948 and destroy the state of Israel. Two thirds said that the long term goal is to recover all or parts of the 1967 territories while less than one quarter indicated that the goal is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 land. When asked about Israel's long term goal, more than 80% said it was to annex all lands occupied in 1967 and expel its population or deny them their political rights.

(1) Price Hikes and Popular Protests:

• More than three quarters of the public expect the continuation and escalation of popular protests against price hikes and two thirds say that high prices forces them to demonstrate and protest.
• 44% believe that the PA's financial crisis is manufactured and 51% believe it is real.
• 37% believe that the cause of the PA's financial crisis is the international crisis  and the inability of donor to fulfill their commitments and 28% believe the cause is the cessation of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• 51% oppose tax increase or retiring some of the public sector employees as the means to resolve the financial crisis.
• A majority of 53% believe the PA will be able to pay salaries during next year and 37% believe it will not be able to do so.

More than three quarters (76%) expect the West Bank protests to continue and escalate while 22% expect them to stop. Moreover, a majority of 55% expects the protests to spread into the Gaza Strip and 39% do not expect that and 66% say the price hikes and the inability to provide for a better life force them to take part in the protests and 33% say they do not wish to take part in these protests. The percentage of those who believe that the protests will spread to the Gaza Strip is equal among residents of the Gaza Strip and residents of the West Bank. But it increases among women (59%) compared to men (52%), and among supporters of Fateh (57%) compared to supporters of Hamas (45%). Similarly, the percentage of those who say that high prices force them to take part in the protests is equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But it increases among men (75%) compared to women (57%), among supporters of third parties and Fateh (80% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (60%), among holders of BA degree (68%) compared to illiterates (46%), and among laborers (78%) compared to housewives (52%).

51% of the public is convinced that the current financial crisis of the PA is real while 44% think it is manufactured. The belief that the crisis is manufactured increases in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), among those who oppose the peace process (54%) compared to supporters to the peace process (41%), among supporters of Hamas (60%) compared to supporters of Fateh and third parties (30% and 42% respectively), among those who are over 50 years of age (49%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (38%), among illiterates (49%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (39%), among farmers, merchants, the unemployed, and the professionals (60%, 56%, 51%, and 50% respectively) compared to employees and students (38% and 40% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (48%) compared to those who work in the public sector (36%), and among those who earn the least income (49%) compared to those who earn the highest income (39%).

The largest percentage (37%) believe that the international financial crisis and the inability of the donor countries to fulfill their obligations to the PA is the reason behind the financial crisis of the PA while 28% say the reason is the cessation of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and 16% say the reason behind the crisis is the revolts in the Arab World and the Arab preoccupation with their own problems.

Despite the seriousness of the financial crisis, 51% oppose increasing taxes or forcing a number of public sector employees into early retirement as means of resolving the crisis, while 30% support early retirement, 8% support a tax increase, and 10% support both, the early retirement and the tax increase. By contrast, 44% believe that a return to negotiations would resolve the financial crisis, as donor assistance would increase, while 34% believe that dissolving the PA resolves its financial crisis. In any case, a majority of 53% believes that the PA will continue to be able to pay salaries during next year while 37% believe the PA will not be able to do so.

(2) Reconciliation: 

• A majority of 58% supports and 35% oppose Abbas' position linking reconciliation to a Hamas agreement on holding elections.
• But a majority of 66% oppose and only 28% support Fayyad's suggestion to hold elections in the West Bank only. A majority believes that holding elections in the West Bank only would consolidate separation.
• 42% believe that unity will not return, 14% think it will return soon, and 40% think it will return but only after a long time.

58% agree and 35% disagree with Abbas' position that the formation of a reconciliation government will come only after Hamas allows the Election Commission to resume work in the Gaza Strip and to set a date for elections. On the other hand, only 28% support and 66% oppose Fayyad's proposal to hold legislative elections in the West Bank only. Support for Abbas' position increases in the Gaza Strip (60%) compared to the West Bank (56%), among men (61%) compared to women (55%), among supporters of the peace process (64%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (42%), and among supporters of Fateh (81%) compared to supporters of Hamas and supporters of third parties (40% and 60% respectively). Opposition to Fayyad's suggestion increases in the Gaza Strip (70%) compared to the West Bank (64%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to supporters of the peace process (60%), among supporters of Hamas (85%) compared to supporters of Fateh and supporters of third parties (50% and 56% respectively), and among holders of BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (53%).

 Indeed, 63% believe that holding legislative elections in the West Bank only would lead to the consolidation of the West Bank-Gaza Strip split while only 10% believe it will increase the chances for reconciliation. In light of the stalemate in the Fateh-Hamas reconciliation efforts, the largest percentage (42%) believes that unity will never be restored and that two separate entities will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 14% believe that unity will be restored soon, and 40% believe unity will be restored but only after a long time. A year and a half ago, in March 2011, only 21% said unity will not be restored and two separate entities will be established.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip reaches 25% and conditions in the West Bank 19%.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank reaches 79% and in the public institutions in the Gaza Strip 63%.
• 42% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear and 26% believe that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in the Gaza Strip without fear.
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government reaches 35% and the Fayyad government 22%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas' continues to decrease reaching today 46%.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises from 22% to 25% while 52% say conditions are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank drops significantly from 30% last June to 19% in this poll. Today, 60% say conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad.  Indeed, only 15% of West Bankers describe conditions in the West Bank today as good or very good. It is worth noting that this is the first time since the split in 2007 that more Palestinians evaluate conditions in the Gaza Strip as better than conditions in the West Bank.

79% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 63% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, 24% say there is, and 42% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 17% say there is, and 35% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  Furthermore, 42% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, only 26% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These results indicate a significant increase in the perception of freedom to criticize authorities in the West Bank three months ago when it stood at 29%.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank reaches 56%  and in the Gaza Strip 64%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 58% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank. But findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 42%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 29%.

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands today at 35% and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government stands at 22%. Three months ago, positive evaluation stood at 36% for the performance of Fayyad and 38% for the performance of Haniyeh. Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 46% while 50% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 49% three months ago in June 2012 and 55% six months ago in March 2012. Satisfaction with Abbas increases in the West Bank (50%) compared to the Gaza Strip (40%), in rural areas (60%) compared to cities (43%), among men (51%) compared to women (42%), among those who define themselves as "somewhat religious" (52%) compared to the religious (41%), among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (26%), among supporters of Fateh and third parties (81% and 48% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (23%), among non-refugees (50%) compared to refugees (42%), among illiterates (47%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (41%), and among those who work in the public sector (53%) compared to those who work in the private sector (46%). 

 (4) Presidency, Legislative, and Local Elections:

• In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyeh, the former receives 51% of the vote and the latter 40%.
• In a  three way presidential elections, Abbas receives 20%, Haniyeh 29%, and Marwan Barghouti 45%).
• In parliamentary elections, Fateh receives 37% and Hamas 28% of the votes.
• 50%  say that local elections will take place on time, 47% say they will participate in the local elections, and 44% believe the elections will be fair.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 51% and Haniyeh 40% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 55%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 49% and Haniyeh 44%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 52% and Haniyeh 40% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 49% and Haniyeh 39%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter would receive 32% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 66%. If the presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives the highest percentage (45%) followed by Haniyeh (29%), and Abbas (20%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 69%. In our previous poll last June, Barghouti received 37%, Haniyeh 33%, and Abbas 25%. 

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 28% say they would vote for Hamas and 37% say they would vote for Fateh, 13% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 31% and in the West Bank at 25%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 40% and in the West Bank at 35%. These results indicate a decline in Fateh's popularity in the West Bank by six percentage points and in Hamas' popularity in the West Bank by two percentage points.

Only 38% of the public believe that local elections, scheduled to take place next month in the West Bank, will indeed take place as scheduled while 50% say it will not take place on the set date. 47% of West Bankers say they will participate in the upcoming local elections and 50% say they will not participate. When asked about the fairness of the upcoming local elections, 44% of the public believe that these elections, set to take place next month, will not be fair and an equal percentage (44%) believes they will be fair. Belief that local elections will be fair increases in the West Bank(46%) compared to the Gaza Strip (42%), in the cities (45%) compared to refugee camps (40%), among men (49%) compared to women (40%), among the somewhat religious (49%) compared to the religious (40%), among supporters of the peace process (50%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (31%), among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (35% and 41% respectively), among non-refugees (47%) compared to refugees (41%), among holders of BA degree (45%) compared to the illiterates (36%), and among those who work in the public sector (53%) compared to those who work in the private sector (46%).  

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% say that the first most vital Palestinian goal is to end Israeli occupation and establish a Palestinian state and 30% say it is the right of return for refugees.
• 32% say the most severe problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment and 23% say it is the continuation of the Israeli occupation.

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 32% of the public while 23% believe the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 19% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 9% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

(6) The Peace Process and Palestinian Options in the confrontation with Israeli occupation:

• 52% support and 46% oppose the two-state solution but 57% believe such a solution is no longer practical due to continued settlement expansion.
• 71% believe that that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent.
• But 68% oppose a one-state solution and only 30% support it.
• 69% oppose a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations before Israel freezes settlement construction and accept the 1967 lines with swaps as a base for negotiations.
• 73% support going to the UN, 61% support non-violent resistance, and 56% support a unilateral declaration of statehood.
• 59% oppose a return to an armed intifada and 52% oppose dissolving the PA.
• If Palestinians go to the UN, 80% believe Israel will stop the transfer of custom funds to the PA and 73% believe that the US will suspend its financial aid.
• In the aftermath of a UN recognition of Palestinian statehood, 66% support imposing Palestinian sovereignty over area C and 70% support taking control over the crossings with Jordan.
• 59% say they will participate in massive non-violent demonstrations that seek to break through check points and block roads used by the Israeli army and settlers.
• 72% are worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis.
• 81% believe that Israel's long term is to annex Palestinian territory occupied in 1967 and expel its population or deny them their rights.
• 66% believe that the PLO's and PA's long term goal is to recover all or parts of the land that was occupied in 1967 while 24% believe the goal is to defeat Israel and recover the land of 1948 or destroy its Jewish population.

Findings show that 52% of the public support and 46% oppose the two state solution. Support for this solution stood at 49% in our poll last June and 57% in March 2010. Findings also show that a majority of 57% (compared to 55% last June) believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to expanded settlement construction while only 37% believe the two state solution remains viable because settlements can be dismantled or evacuated once an agreement is reached. Findings also show that 71% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim to non-existent while 27% believe the chances are medium or high. Despite this, a majority of 68% oppose a one-state solution and only 30% support it.

Support for the two-state solution increases in the West Bank (55%) compared to the Gaza Strip (48%), in villages and towns (59%) compared to cities and refugee camps (51% each), among men (58%) compared to women (47%), among the somewhat religious (57%) compared to the religious (47%), among supporters of the peace process (58%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (40%), among supporters of Fateh and third parties (69% and 64% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (26%), among those over 50 years of age (63%) compared to those between 18 and 28 years of age (44%), and among those who finished elementary and preparatory schools (62% and 61% respectively) compared to the illiterates and the holders of BA degree (45% each).

Support for the one-state solution increases in the West Bank (34%) compared to the Gaza Strip (24%), among the somewhat religious (35%) compared to the religious (25%), among supporters of the peace process (34%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (26%), among supporters of Fateh and third parties (39% each) compared to supporters of Hamas (19%), among the illiterates (39%) compared to holders of BA degree (25%), and among those who work in the private sector (35%) compared to those who work in the public sector (30%).

Findings show that a large majority of 69% opposes and 29% support a return to negotiations with Israel before it freezes settlement construction and accepts the 1967 lines with swaps as a base for negotiations. Unconditional return to negotiations is opposed equally in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and by men and women. But opposition increases among the religious (73%) compared to the somewhat religious (66%), among those who oppose the peace process (80% compared to supporters of the peace process (64%) among supporters of Hamas and third parties (79% and 74% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (63%), and among holders of BA degree (71%) compared to illiterates (61%).

When asked about its views regarding six options that Palestinians have in their relations with Israel in the absence of negotiations, the public supported three and opposed three. Going to the UN for a recognition of a Palestinian state received the largest percentage of support (73%) while 26% opposed this option. 61% supported a non violent resistance while 38% opposed it. 56% supported a unilateral declaration of statehood while 43% opposed it. On the other hand a majority of 69% opposed the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution and 28% supported it; 59% opposed a resort to armed confrontations and 39% supported it; and 52% opposed a dissolution of the PA and 44% supported it.

Support for going to the UN remains very high despite recognition by the public that such an option will trigger financial sanctions. Findings show that 73% of the public believe that in the event of a Palestinian request for the UN to recognize Palestine as a state, the US will suspend financial assistance to the PA. 80% believe that Israel in this case will suspend transfer of custom funds to the PA. 56% believe Europe too will suspend financial assistance to the PA.

Findings also show that public support for and understanding of the UN bid is not restricted to the step's symbolic meaning. Instead, 66% of the public believe the PA should impose its sovereignty over all Palestinian territories in the West Bank including so-called "Area C" and begin the construction of an airport and the deployment of security services in that area. Only 28% of the public oppose such a step. Furthermore, 70% support extension of PA control over the crossings with Jordan even if such a step would lead to the closure of the Allenby Bridge ; 24% of the public is opposed to this step. Overall, the public is divided into three groups on its view of the best means to force Israel to end its occupation of the Palestinian state once that state is recognized by the international community: 33% support resort to peaceful means, 32% support armed means, and 28% support return to negotiations. If massive popular demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, with the aim of breaking through checkpoints and blocking roads used by the Israeli army and settlers, 59% of the public say they will participate in such demonstrations and 39% say they will not participate.  

Findings show that 72% of the Palestinian public are worried and 28% are not worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished. Moreover, the level of perceived threat regarding the aspirations of Israel in the long run is very high. 81% of Palestinians think that Israel’s long term goal is to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens or deny them political rights. When asked to assess the long term goal of the PLO and the PA, 66% believed it was to recover all or part of the land occupied in 1967 while 24% believed that it was to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 land or destroy its Jewish population. The percentage of those who believe that the PLO's and the PA's long term goal is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 land or destroy the Jewish population increases among women (28%) compared to men (20%), among the religious (25%) compared to the somewhat religious (22%), among those between 18 and 28 years old (28%) compared to those whose age is over 50 (15%), among the illiterates (29%) compared to holders of BA degree (18%), and among students, laborers, and housewives (28% each) compared to merchants, the retired, professionals, and employees (15%, 16%, 17%, and 18% respectively).

(7) Other Topics: Iran, Egypt, Syria, and American Elections:  

• 82% believe that a great regional war will follow an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Now after President Morsi has consolidated his power in Egypt, 42% believe that Egyptian-Israeli relations will remain unchanged, 21% believe it will improve, and 31% say the two sides will return to conflict.
• 90% condemn the armed attack against Egyptian soldiers on the Rafah border.
• 79% support Syrian demonstrators against the regime while 13% stand with the regime and Assad.
• If Obama wins the US presidential elections, 51% believe that such outcome will have no impact on Palestinian conditions while 32% believe it will have a negative impact and 9% believe it  will have a positive impact.
• In light of the statement made by US presidential candidate Mitt Romney regarding the cause of the gap between Palestinian and Israeli economies, 54% believe the cause of the gap is occupation, 33% believe the cause lies in the differences between the Palestinian and Israeli economic and political systems and only 7% attribute it to culture.

Iran: 43% believe that Israel will attack Iran's nuclear facilities in the coming months but 51% believe it will not. If Israel does attack Iran, 82% believe that such an attack will trigger a great regional war while 16% believe the attack will not lead to such a war.

Egypt: With Egyptian president Morsi consolidating his power, 42% believe Egyptian-Israeli relations will not change but 31% believe relations will go back to conflict and 21% believe relations will improve. Almost two thirds (64%) believe that Israel stood behind the armed attack carried out against Egyptian position along the borders with Rafah recently while 12% blame the attack on Egyptian terrorist groups or Bedouins from Sinai  and only 2% believe Hamas stood behind the attack. 90% of respondents condemn the attack 7% do not condemn it.

Arab Spring and Syria: Findings show that 48% believe that the Arab Spring will leave a positive impact on the Palestinian cause in the next year or two while 28% believe it will have no impact and 21% believe the impact will be negative. Findings also show that 79% of the public support the Syrian rebels while only 13% support the regime and Assad.

American Elections: A majority of 51% believe that an Obama victory in the upcoming American presidential elections will have no impact on the Palestinians while 32% believe it will have a negative impact and only 9% believe it will have a positive impact. Findings also show that the overwhelming majority of respondents reject the statement made by US presidential candidate Mitt Romney placing the cause of the wide gap between the Palestinian and Israeli economies on culture. Only 7% of the respondents agreed with Romney's statement while 54% saw occupation and 33% saw different political or economic systems as the causes for the wide gap between the two economies....Full Report

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (40) 

Palestinians want Abbas’ and PLO’s policy to be the platform of the reconciliation government and Fayyad to be its prime minister; an overwhelming majority wants a real state in September, one that exercises sovereignty in area C and at the international crossings with Jordan; and a majority wants to participate in big peaceful demonstrations that would breach checkpoints and block roads of Israeli settlers and army

16-18 June 2011    

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16-18 June 2011. The poll was conducted after the signing of the reconciliation agreement between Fateh and Hamas and during the continued turmoil and revolt in the Arab World including the popular uprisings in Syria, Yemen and Libya. This period witnessed increased PA official statements indicating insistence on going to the UN for recognition of a Palestinian state in September. This press release covers Palestinian domestic conditions, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the future of the reconciliation agreement, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the most serious problems confronting Palestinians today. It also covers issues related to the peace process and the expected September process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2011 show that the reconciliation agreement between Fateh and Hamas has triggered important changes in public attitudes and perceptions. Indeed, the agreement has removed, almost completely, the issue of the split between West Bank and the Gaza Strip from the list of critical problems in the minds of the public. But the fading of the problem of the split led to the emergence of a new problem: the concern that the agreement, once implemented, and a majority believes that it will indeed be implemented, it will bring back international political and financial sanctions and boycott. For this reason, and while findings show that Hamas has benefited considerably from signing the agreement, a clear majority of the public wants the new Palestinian government of specialists, once formed, to implement the president’s and the PLO’s peace program and policy rather than that of Hamas. Most importantly, the largest percentage wants Salam Fayyad, Fateh’s candidate, to be the next prime minister. Indeed, only a small minority wants Jamal Khodari, Hamas’ candidate, to be the next prime minister. Perhaps the public believes that if Fayyad stays as prime minister and if he continues to implement Abbas’ peace agenda and policies, the threat of boycott and sanctions would diminish or disappear.

Findings show a split in public attitude regarding the Obama proposal for terms of reference for the peace process on borders and the national identity of Israel and Palestine, both supported by half of the public. But three quarters of the public oppose Obama’s suggestion that the Palestinian state should be non-militarized and about two thirds reject the US position that going to the UN in September to seek recognition of a Palestinian state would be a mistake.  Findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians support an exercise of sovereignty over the so-called area (C) including the deployment of Palestinian security forces in those areas in the context of the UN recognition of Palestinian statehood. Similarly, three quarters support exercise of Palestinian sovereignty over the Allenby international crossing with Jordan even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing. Findings indicate that a majority wants to participate in big popular peaceful demonstrations that would seek to breach checkpoints and to block roads used by Israeli settlers and army.

(1) The future of the reconciliation agreement:

• A majority of 59% is optimistic about the chances that the reconciliation agreement will be implemented, but a similar majority (55%) expects the return of international financial sanctions after the establishment of a reconciliation government
• A plurality prefers Fayyad as prime minister and a majority wants the new government to follow the policies of the PA president and the PLO rather than the policy of Hamas
• The public is divided over the factors that led to the reconciliation agreement and half believes that both Fateh and Hamas emerged winners from the agreement

A majority of 59% believes that Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement and in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 37% believe they will fail. But a majority of 55% expects the return of international boycott and financial sanctions after the formation of a new reconciliation government and 37% do not expect that. Perhaps to reduce the probability of such a development, a plurality prefers Abbas’ candidate for the prime minister position over Hamas’ candidate: In a choice between Salam Fayyad and Jamal Khodari, 45% of the public favors the former and only 22% favor the latter. 12% favor other candidates and 21% remain undecided. Perhaps for the same reason, a majority of 61% wants the new government of reconciliation to follow the peace policies and agendas of President Abbas and the PLO rather than Hamas’. Only 18% want the new government to follow the peace policy and agenda of Hamas.

Belief that the new government should follow the policies of Abbas and the PLO increases among supporters of the peace process (69%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (38%), among those who are “somewhat religious” (65%) compared to those who are “religious” (54%), among supporters of Fateh (89%) compared to supporters of Hamas (27%). Preference for Fayyad as the prime minister of the reconciliation government increases among men (49%) compared to women (41%), among the “somewhat religious” (50%) compared the “religious” (39%), among supporters of the peace process (45%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (17%), among supporters of Fateh (80%) compared to supporters of Hamas (10%) and supporters of third parties and those who remain undecided (51% each), and among holders of preparatory certificate and illiterates (48%) compared to college and university graduates (42%).  Half of the public (50%) says that both Fateh and Hamas came out winners from the reconciliation agreement, 12% say Hamas came out the winner, 11% say Fateh came out the winner, and 20% say neither came out a winner. 29% believe that the reason a reconciliation agreement was signed has to do with the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt while 27% believe it was the youth demonstrations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that was responsible for forcing the two sides to sign the agreement. Moreover, 21% believe the reason was the failure of negotiations with Israel while 12% believe it was the eruption of youth demonstrations against the Syrian regime.

(2) Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, performance of the governments of Fayyad and Haniyeh, and presidential and legislative elections

• Increase in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but positive evaluation of West Bank condition remains higher than that of the Gaza Strip
• Positive evaluation of freedom of the press in the West Bank is higher than it is in the Gaza Strip and the same is true in regard to ability of citizens to criticize the government without fear
• But perception of personal safety and security is higher among residents of the Gaza Strip than among residents of the West Bank
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas increases from 46% to 52%
• If new presidential elections where to take place today, Abbas would receive 54% of the popular vote and Haniyeh 38%; but if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter 33%
• If new legislative elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 28% of the participants’ vote and Fateh 42%. All third parties combined would receive 10% and the undecided stands at 19%
• Three quarters support Abbas’ decision annulling articles in the penal code whereby those accused of “family honor” killings are given light sentences
• 70% support Fateh’s decision to expel Dahlan from its ranks

25% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 47% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, in March 2011, 21% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 56% said they were bad or very bad. It is worth noting that a year ago, in June 2010, only 9% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good. Today, 37% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 29% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 33% and 33% respectively. As can be seen in the following table, a year ago, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stood at 35%.

Table (1): Positive evaluation (good or very good) of conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

71% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 60% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. But 61% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 34% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 47% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 41% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 31% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 25% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These findings reflect an improvement in the situation in the Gaza Strip and a slight decline in the West Bank compared to where things stood three months ago. Since the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in June 2007, these percentages have witnessed gradual and significant decrease. As the table below shows, belief that people can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear stood at 56% while 52% believed that people can criticize the authorities without fear in the Gaza Strip. This is the first time since the split that we have seen an increase in the percentage of those who believe that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities there without fear. The change may be due to changing perceptions of Hamas’ behavior in the Gaza Strip after the signing of the reconciliation agreement.

Table (2): belief that people can criticize authorities in the West Bank or Gaza Strip without fear since the split between the two areas

Perception of safety and security stands at 56% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. This finding indicates a large increase in the perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip compared to March 2011 when it stood at 67%. The difference may reflect a perception change in light of the reconciliation agreement. Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 39% and Salam Fayyad’s at 43%. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 31% and 39% respectively. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries stands at 40%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 26%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 37% and 21% respectively, which means that the signing of the reconciliation agreement, despite the public support, has nonetheless brought back concerns about international sanctions and boycott.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 52% while 45% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. These percentages reflect an increase in the level of satisfaction with the performance of the president, which stood at 46% three months ago while the level of dissatisfaction stood at 51%. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank. The increase in the percentage of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas may be an outcome of the signing of the reconciliation agreement.  If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 38% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 60%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives in this poll 51% and Haniyeh 44% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 56% and Haniyeh 34%. These results are similar to those obtained in our pervious poll three months ago. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter would receive 33% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 67%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 56% and Haniyeh 40% and in the West Bank Barghouti receives 64% and Haniyeh 29%. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago.  Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 27% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (22%), Salam Fayyad (17%) Mustafa Barghouti (9%) and Saeb Erekat (4%).  

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 28% say they would vote for Hamas and 42% say they would vote for Fateh, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. These results indicate an increase of two percentage points to each of Fateh and Hamas compared to our results three months ago. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip in this poll stands at 36 % and in the West Bank 24%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip is 43% and in the West Bank 42%.

Findings show that an overwhelming majority of 75% supports and 19% oppose PA president decision annulling articles in the penal code whereby those accused of “family honor” killings are given light sentences. 70% support and 21% oppose the decision by Fateh’s Central Committee to expel Mohammad Dahlan from Fateh and transferring his file to the Attorney General’s office. Support for the decision is similar in the West Bank (71%) and the Gaza Strip (68%) but opposition to the decision increases to 28% in the Gaza Strip and drops to 17% in the West Bank. Moreover, support for the decision is higher among supporters of Hamas (90%) compared to supporters of Fateh (58%). 61% believe that differences of opinion within Fateh regarding Dahlan reflect big and serious disagreement within the movement while 33% believe they reflect a minor disagreement.  Differences of opinion that erupted within Hamas after the signing of the reconciliation agreement reflect big and serious disagreement within the movement in the views of 42% of the public while 48% believe that they reflect minor disagreements.  

(3) Palestinian attitudes and expectations towards September

• 65% support going to the UN to seek recognition of Palestinian statehood despite American warning not to do so
• If Palestinians go to the UN General Assembly, 57% believe they will obtain recognition of their state from two thirds of the members, but 76% believe the US will use its veto power in the Security Council
• 48% believe that Palestine will become a UN member in September and 44% do not believe so
• Two thirds expect Israeli occupation to become harsher in response to the UN vote
• The public is split over the best means of forcing Israel to end its occupation: about a third believes in armed attacks, another third believes in peaceful resistance, and 26% believe negotiation is the answer
• 76% want the PA to exercise sovereignty in September including the opening of highways, an airport, and the deployment of security forces in area (C) and 75% want Palestinian sovereignty over the Allenby crossing with Jordan even if such step leads to the closure of the crossing
• 52% say they will participate in peaceful demonstrations that would seek to breach checkpoints and block roads after the UN recognition of the state of Palestine
• A majority of 58% believes that most of the European countries will recognize the Palestinian state in September; despite this, a similar percentage believes that the position of the EU member states is closer to the Israeli position

President Obama stated that it would be a mistake for the Palestinians to go to the UN in September to obtain recognition for their state. Despite the Obama statement, 65% of the Palestinians believe the PA should go to the UN in September and 31% believe it should not. Support for going to the UN despite the American warning is higher among supporters of the peace process (71%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (51%), among supporters of Fateh (75%) compared to supporters of Hamas (61%), and among university and college graduates (70%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (58%).

A majority of 57% of the Palestinians believes that if the Palestinians turn to the UN General Assembly for recognition of a Palestinian state, they will succeed in obtaining a two thirds majority; 36% of the Palestinians believe they will not succeed. A majority of Palestinians also believes that the US will use its veto power in the UN Security Council in order to prevent the UN from admitting the state of Palestine as a UN member. 76% of the Palestinians think so, while 18% think that the US will not use its veto power. Palestinians are split with regard to the question whether a state of Palestine will become a UN member in September: 48% of the Palestinians think this will happen while 44% do not believe so.

Two thirds believe that if the UN recognizes the state of Palestine, Israel will respond by making the occupation worse and by increasing settlement building while 18% think Israel will do nothing and the status quo will prevail. 13% of the Palestinians think conditions in the occupied territories will become a little better.  We asked Palestinians how they think Palestinians can force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories if the UN recognizes the Palestinian state. Palestinians are split: 34% think armed attacks on army and settlers, 32% think peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw, and 26% of the Palestinians think negotiations with Israel can bring it to withdraw.

The preference for peaceful resistance increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (28%). But support for armed resistance is also higher in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (32%). In the West Bank, support for negotiations stands at 30% while in the Gaza Strip it stands at 17%. Support for peaceful resistance increases among men (36%) compared to women (29%), among supporters of third parties (42%) the undecided (38%) and supporters of Fateh (33%) compared to supporters of Hamas (24%). Among supporters of Hamas, preference for armed resistance is high, standing at 55%, while this percentage stands at 27% among supporters of Fateh, 23% among supporters of third parties, and 21% among the undecided. Support for peaceful resistance increases among students (40%) compared to housewives (25%), and among users of the internet (36%) compared to those who do not use the internet (29%).

We asked Palestinians what they think the PA should do after the UN recognizes the Palestinian state in September. 76% think the PA president and government should enforce Palestinian sovereignty over all the territories of the West Bank, for example by opening roads in area C, start building an airport in  the Jordan valley, and deploy Palestinian security forces in area C even if this leads to confrontations with the Israeli army and settlers. 20% think the PA should not do that. Similarly, 75% think the PA should insist on assuming control over the Allenby Bridge terminal from the Israeli side even if this leads to the closure of the terminal. 20% think the PA should not do that. Support for the exercise of sovereignty at the Allenby Bridge crossing even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing is almost identical in the West Bank (75%) and the Gaza Strip (76%). Similarly, support for the exercise of sovereignty in area (C), including the opening of roads and the deployment of security forces, is almost identical in the West Bank (75%) and the Gaza Strip (77%).

A majority of 58% of the Palestinians think that most European countries will recognize the Palestinian state in September, while 37% think that most European countries will not recognize it. A majority of Palestinians (56%) thinks the position of the EU countries regarding the peace process is closer to the Israeli position.

After the UN recognition of a Palestinian state, if large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in order to break through check points and close Israeli army and settlers' roads, 52% of the Palestinians say they think they will participate in them and 46% say they think they will not. Willingness to participate in peaceful demonstrations increases among residents of villages and towns in the West Bank (62%) and refugee camps (55%) compared to cities (48%), among men (59%) compared to women (45%), among supporters of third parties (71%) and supporters of Hamas (63%) compared to supporters of Fateh (58%) and the undecided (54%), among those who intend to participate in future elections (60%) compared to those who do not intend to participate in future elections (36%). It also increases among students (60%) compared to housewives (42%), among college and university graduates (59%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (48%), and among those who use the internet (57%) compared to those who do not use it (48%).

A majority of 51% of the Palestinians thinks that if such large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, they would contribute to speeding the process of ending Israeli occupation. But a majority of Palestinians (64%) does not think that if a peaceful popular revolt, like in Egypt or Tunisia, were to erupt against the Israeli occupation in the West Bank it would be capable of ending occupation; 34% of Palestinians think it would be capable of ending occupation. It is worth mentioning that an overwhelming majority of 89% of the Palestinians sympathizes with the demonstrators against the Assad regime in Syria and 90% sympathize with the demonstrators against the regime in Yemen.

(4) The Peace Process

• 50% support and 46% oppose the Obama proposal to consider the 1967 borders with mutually agreed swaps to be the basis for setting borders of Palestine, but two thirds oppose Obama’s proposal to the have the state non militarized
• 51% support and 47% oppose Obama’s proposal calling for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as a Palestinian state
• A majority of 61% opposes Obama’s call for the Palestinians to return to direct negotiations without a settlement freeze or an Israeli acceptance of the principle of the 1967 borders with swaps
• 88% believe the US position as outlined in the Obama speech is closer to the Israeli position while 8% see it closer to the Palestinian position
• 63% believe that it is Israel that determines US policy regarding the peace process and 32% believe it is the US that determines the Israeli position
• 58% support and 38% oppose the Saudi Initiative
• 62% believe the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years to be low or non existence and 37% believe it to be high or medium
• Perception of threat among Palestinians is very high: 81% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to annex the West Bank and expel its inhabitants or deny them their political rights. Moreover, 70% are worried that they or members of their family would be hurt by Israelis

A majority of 50% of Palestinians supports President Obama’s call for a Palestinian state within the 1967 lines with territorial swaps; 46% oppose it. With regard to the security issues, Palestinians oppose Obama’s proposal that the Palestinian state will be demilitarized, it will have no airplanes, tanks, missiles, or any other heavy armaments, and the Israeli army would carry out a full and phased withdrawal from the Palestinian state. 66% of the Palestinians disagree with this principle, and only 31% support it.  President Obama also said that a permanent peace should be based on the principle of two states for two peoples, the state of Israel as a Jewish state and a homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people, each would have the right to self determination, mutual recognition, and peace. 51% of the Palestinians support this principle, while 47% oppose it.

Support for Obama’s call for the 1967 borders with swaps to be the terms of reference for setting the borders of the Palestinian state increases in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (45%), among city residents (53%) compared to residents of villages and towns (40%), among men (52%) compared to women (48%), among the “somewhat religious” (52%) compared to the “religious” (47%), among supporters of the peace process (55%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (34%), among supporters of Fateh (63%) compared to supporters of Hamas (39%), and among those whose age is 40 or higher (53%) compared to those whose age is between 18-28 (49%).

President Obama also called upon the Palestinians to return to negotiations with the Netanyahu government, even though Prime Minister Netanyahu declared during his stay in Washington DC that Israel will not freeze settlement construction and refuses to accept the principle of returning to the lines of 1967 with swaps. 61% of the Palestinians think they should not accept the call to return to negotiations.  In light of President Obama’s speech, a majority of 88% of the Palestinians thinks the US position is closer to the Israeli position, while only 8% think it is closer to the Palestinian position.  Considering the two speeches by Obama and Netanyahu during Netanyahu's visit to the US, we asked Palestinians whom they think decide what the other should do regarding the peace process. 63% said Israel decides what the US should do and 32% said the US decides what Israel should do. 2% said neither decides what the other should do.

58% of the Palestinians support the Saudi initiative and 38% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. Inreturn, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our March 2011 poll there was a similar level of support for the plan.

A majority of 62% of Palestinians regards the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years as non-existent or low, 30% regard these chances as medium, and only 6% regard these chances as high. Moreover, 70% are worried and 30% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.  The level of perceived threat regarding the aspirations of Israel in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 21% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital is the most vital Palestinian goal in the eyes of 48% of the public while 26% believe that the most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return
• The primary problem confronting Palestinians today is unemployment and poverty followed by the continuation of the Israeli occupation and settlement construction, corruption, and the continued siege over the Gaza Strip

The largest percentage (48%) believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 26% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The largest percentage (40%) believes that the second most vital Palestinian goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages. 25% believe that the second goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, 19% believe that the second goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 16% believe the second most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 36% of the public while 30% believe that it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 18% believe it to be the corruption in some public institutions, and 11% believe it to be the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings. Only 2% mentioned the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split which was mentioned by 28% in our previous poll in March 2011. It is clear that the signing of the reconciliation agreement and the belief of the majority that the agreement will indeed be implemented has removed this issue from among the list of main problems as perceived by the public......Full Report